



**Reform and Oversight Efforts:  
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department**

**October to December 2022**

**Issued February 15, 2023**

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## INTRODUCTION

This report provides an overview of the Office of Inspector General's regular monitoring, auditing, and review of activities related to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department occurring between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022.<sup>1</sup>

## MONITORING SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT'S OPERATIONS

### Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Office of Inspector General reports on all deputy-involved shootings in which a deputy intentionally fired a firearm at a human, or intentionally or unintentionally fired a firearm and a human was injured or killed as a result. This quarter there were eight incidents in which people were shot or shot at by Sheriff's Department personnel. The Office of Inspector General staff responded to each of these deputy-involved shootings. Five people were struck by deputies' gunfire, four fatally.

The information in the following shooting summaries is based on the information provided by the Sheriff's Department and is preliminary in nature. While the Office of Inspector General receives information at the walk-through at the scene of the shooting, receiving preliminary memoranda with summaries, and by attending the Sheriff's Department Critical Incident Reviews, the statements of the deputies and witnesses are not provided until the investigation is complete. Under the previous administration the Sheriff's Department did not permit the Office of Inspector General's staff to monitor the on-going investigations of deputy-involved shootings, did not provide access to the full body-worn camera videos of deputies involved in the incident, and did not comply with lawful requests for documentation of these investigations. The current Sheriff has signaled a willingness to cooperate with the Inspector General and has already provided the Office of Inspector General with access to Sheriff's Department data systems.

**Compton:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 3, 2022, at approximately 12:13 p.m., Compton patrol station received a call of a Hispanic man who was swinging an axe at patrons at a convenience store in Compton. Deputies responded to the area and found a man matching the description walking near the location. When deputies attempted to contact the man, he ran down a river embankment and entered a parking lot.

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<sup>1</sup> The report will note if the data reflects something other than what was gathered between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022.

As he entered the parking lot, two deputies followed him with their vehicle. The man stopped at the entrance of a large retail store while still holding an axe in his hand. One of the deputies exited his vehicle and ordered the man to stop. The man turned toward the deputy at which time the deputy shot the man three times. The man was transported to the hospital and was later pronounced deceased. No deputies were injured.

Deputies moved the axe away from the scene and placed it in one of their vehicles. A short time later, a deputy unintentionally discharged his firearm while reaching for his keys. The negligent discharge was not related to the initial deputy-involved shooting.

The shooting was captured on body-worn cameras. Portions of the video were shown at the Sheriff's Department's Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department at that time had not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether all cameras were activated and whether the cameras that were activated were done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Did the deputies consider using less lethal options prior to the use of deadly force? Were any attempts made to de-escalate the situation? Did the shooting deputy consider the backdrop? Did the deputies request back-up? Why did the deputies remove the axe and place it in their patrol vehicle, thereby, possibly tampering with the scene?

**Hacienda Heights:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 9, 2022, at approximately 5:20 p.m., Fullerton Police Department officers saw a black Honda sedan with expired registration tags and tinted windows. The officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop of the driver and became involved in a vehicle pursuit.

The suspect led the officers on a high-speed chase during which the suspect vehicle collided with multiple cars, sustaining considerable damage. Following the collisions, the suspect stopped the car in the city of Whittier. The suspect exited the passenger side window and fled on foot. By this time, Sheriff's Department deputies had joined the pursuit as it had crossed into Sheriff's Department jurisdiction.

The suspect entered a nearby home and stole a vehicle that was parked in the driveway, engaging the deputies and officers in another high-speed chase that now included Norwalk and Pico Rivera station Sheriff's deputies. As the suspect slowed, a

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<sup>2</sup> The Sheriff's Department is in the process of providing Office of Inspector General staff access to body-worn camera video.

deputy from the Pico Rivera station intentionally rammed his patrol vehicle into the rear of the suspect's car, thereby forcing him to drive forward into a gas station.

The suspect reversed his car and collided with the patrol vehicle. Simultaneously, a deputy fired several rounds at the suspect's vehicle. The shots hit the driver side door and window, but the suspect was not hit. Other deputies shot non-lethal 40 mm baton rounds at the windows of the vehicle.

Special Enforcement Bureau deputies arrived and formed an arrest and rescue team. The deputies approached the vehicle and broke the window at which time the suspect surrendered to deputies. The suspect was taken to the hospital to be treated for a wound to his left wrist.

The shooting was captured on body-worn cameras. Portions of the video were shown at the Sheriff's Department's Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department at that time had not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether all cameras were activated and whether the cameras that were activated were done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Was the Sheriff's Department pursuit policy followed? Did the deputy who used the patrol vehicle to ram the suspect's vehicle have the proper training and approval to use that technique and was it done within Sheriff's Department policy? Did the deputy who shot consider the backdrop? Numerous deputies surrounded the vehicle, with weapons drawn, was consideration given to a potential crossfire situation?

**Valencia:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 16, 2022, at approximately 10:35 p.m., Santa Clarita patrol deputies responded to an attempted burglary call at a fast-food restaurant. The reporting party stated a man wearing a black hoodie and blue jeans was trying to break the glass of the business. Arriving deputies located an Asian man matching the description. When deputies approached the Asian man, he pulled out a knife and fled from them. At that time, the deputies formed a search team. They were able to locate the man with the assistance of the Aero Bureau. The man was in a wash that was filled with heavy brush with very limited lighting.

Deputies contacted the man who was now armed with two knives. One of the deputies employed his Taser, but it had no effect. Another deputy employed his Taser, also too no effect. The man charged towards the deputies with the knives in hand. At that time, one deputy fired nine rounds at him, and another deputy fired one round at him.

The subject was hit several times and was pronounced deceased at the scene. During the investigation, the Sheriff's Department discovered that the deceased man was not the person who attempted to break into the fast-food restaurant.

The shooting was captured on body-worn cameras. Portions of the video were shown at the Sheriff's Department's Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department at that time had not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether all cameras were activated and whether the cameras that were activated were done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Did the deputies attempt to contact any of the reporting parties to find out more about the attempted burglary at the restaurant to confirm the suspect's description? Why didn't the search team wait for other less lethal options prior to engaging with the armed subject? Was there a plan in place for contacting the man? When the deputies initially engaged with the subject, it appears he may have had some mental health issues, did the deputies attempt to de-escalate the situation? Was a Mental Evaluation Team requested? On the video of this incident, it appears that one of the deputies had a Taser in one hand and his gun in the other, is that consistent with Sheriff's Department training and law enforcement best practices?

**South Los Angeles:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 25, 2022, at approximately 5:00 p.m., South Los Angeles patrol deputies responded to a call for service regarding a man with a gun. The caller stated they had just seen a Black man with a firearm in his waistband.

As the deputies were driving to the location, they saw two Black men walking on the sidewalk near the location of the call for service. One of the men matched the description of the person who reportedly was in possession of a firearm. This man had his hand on the grip of a weapon in his waistband. As the driver deputy exited the patrol vehicle, he ordered the man to stop, and the man pulled the weapon from his waistband. At this time, the deputy fired one round at the man but he was not hit. The man then dropped the firearm, which was later identified as a Nerf toy gun. The man was taken into custody without any further incident.

The shooting was partially captured on body-worn cameras. It appears that the shooting deputy may not have turned on his body-worn camera in time to capture the full incident. Portions of the video, which were captured, were shown at the Sheriff's Department's Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department at that time had not

provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether all cameras were activated and whether the cameras that were activated were done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Was there a delay in activation of the body-worn camera? Knowing that the deputies were responding to a possibly armed suspect, was their approach tactically sound and consistent with Sheriff's Department training in terms of distance and cover? Was it determined if the man was the same one as described by the reporting party? Did investigators search the neighborhood in an attempt to see if any firearms similar to the ones the callers had identified could be found?

**San Dimas:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 26, 2022, at approximately 10:00 a.m., San Dimas patrol deputies responded to the city of Covina, in regard to a woman who had vandalized an occupied vehicle with a pipe wrench. Deputies responded to the call, with a single deputy in a marked patrol vehicle being the first to arrive.

The deputy saw a woman walk into the street and break the passenger side window of another vehicle, that was passing by, with the pipe wrench. The deputy exited his vehicle and saw the woman approach his vehicle and break the rear window of the patrol car.

The woman advanced toward the deputy, screaming at him. The deputy attempted to retreat in order to create distance between himself and the woman. As he moved backward, he approached passing traffic. The woman raised the pipe wrench over her head and charged toward the deputy at which time the deputy fired three rounds at the woman striking her.

The woman was taken to the hospital and treated for gunshot wounds. The deputy was uninjured.

The initial contact and the shooting were captured on body-worn camera. Portions of the video was shown at the Sheriff's Department Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department at that time had not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether all cameras were activated and whether the cameras that were activated were done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Was there a delay in activation of the body-worn camera? Were there any less lethal options available?

**Lancaster:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 2, 2022, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Lancaster patrol deputies responded to a robbery call in the city of Lancaster. The caller described a Black man armed with a shotgun who had stolen money from a cash register. During the investigation into the robbery, deputies were able to identify the suspect and an associated address to a home in the city of Lancaster.

Deputies responded to the residence and established a containment. While deputies made announcements on the Public Announcement System for the suspect to surrender, the suspect lit a large "M-80" type explosive device and threw it toward the deputies from a second story window. The device detonated next to several parked vehicles and in front of the deputies. The suspect, then pointed a shotgun toward the deputies. Simultaneously, one of the deputies fired two rounds from his handgun and another deputy fired one round from a shotgun at the suspect.

The suspect was not hit. The suspect set a mattress on fire inside the residence. He then fled with the shotgun and climbed onto a neighbor's roof. The suspect was able to jump down and flee on foot. The Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) team responded to assist in locating the suspect. Over several hours, SEB deputies searched the surrounding area for the suspect. At approximately midnight, the suspect emerged with the shotgun pointed to his own throat. A K-9 was deployed and the suspect was bitten on his left forearm. The suspect was taken into custody without further incident and was subsequently transported to the hospital where he was treated for a dog bite.

The shooting was captured on body-worn camera. Portions of the video was shown at the Sheriff's Department Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department at that time had not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether all cameras were activated and whether the cameras that were activated were done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Did the deputies formulate a tactical plan? If so, what was the plan? Was a supervisor at the location? Were there adequate personnel deployed? Was the call made to the SEB before or after the shooting? Did the original deputies deploy in a tactically sound



manner consistent with their training and law enforcement best practices when attempting to contact an armed robbery suspect?

**Lancaster:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 20, 2022, at approximately 11:44 p.m., California Highway Patrol (CHP) attempted to make a traffic stop of a car driving at a high rate of speed. The driver refused to stop, and CHP engaged in a vehicle pursuit. As he was fleeing from the CHP, the driver called the Lancaster Sheriff's station and stated he was armed and made several threatening statements towards the CHP officers and the driver's one-year-old son, who was in the car. During the chase, the driver, a 24-year-old Hispanic man, fired several times at the CHP officers who were pursuing him.

The driver finally stopped the car outside of a residence in the city of Lancaster. He got out of his car and held a gun to his child's head, as he barricaded himself and the child in the residence. At this time, Lancaster Sheriff's deputies and SEB deputies responded to assist CHP. An 18-hour hostage situation ensued with SEB and crisis negotiators trying different tactics to extricate the child and get the suspect to surrender. At one point, a SEB deputy saw the suspect at the window of the residence holding a gun to the child's head. When the suspect lowered the child, a SEB deputy fired one time striking the suspect. SEB deputies then made entry and rescued the child. The suspect was later pronounced dead at the scene. Fortunately, the child was not injured in the incident. The suspect's firearm was recovered from the scene.

None of the SEB deputies had body-worn cameras. Other Lancaster deputies did not activate their body-worn cameras, and it is unclear as to the reason why. Portions of the incident were captured by CHP. Portions of those videos were shown at the Sheriff's Department Critical Incident Review.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Why did the deputies who were so equipped not activate their body-worn cameras?

**Gardena:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 22, 2022, at approximately 10:30 a.m., the Gardena Police Department requested the assistance of SEB in apprehending an armed barricaded suspect in the city of Gardena. The suspect was a Black man wanted for an assault that had taken place the day before. Gardena and Hawthorne Police department Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams had surrounded the building and had attempted several different tactics to get the suspect to come out and surrender.

When SEB deputies arrived, they surrounded the location and began to try different tactics to get the suspect to surrender. In addition to the methods attempted by the Gardena and Hawthorne Police Departments, the SEB tried to get the suspect to surrender by utilizing the Sheriff's Department's Crisis Negotiation and Mental Evaluation Teams. None of those methods were successful. Finally, about 24 hours after the suspect had first barricaded himself in the building, SEB deputies and a K-9 dog made entry.


The suspect, who was on the second floor, retreated to a bedroom. A K-9 dog was employed. The SEB deputies proceeded to the second floor and saw the K-9 dog biting the suspect's arm. The suspect shot and killed the K-9 dog. He then turned the gun towards the deputies. At that time, two deputies fired a total of 13 rounds at the suspect. The suspect was hit and pronounced deceased at the scene. The K-9 dog died as a result of the wounds suffered when shot by the suspect. The suspect's firearm was recovered at the location.

None of the SEB deputies had body-worn cameras.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

SEB deputies were aware the suspect was armed with a firearm and that he had used it. In addition, they were notified by their partners at the Gardena and Hawthorne Police Department that the suspect had made suicidal statements indicating he would not be taken into custody.

## Comparison to Prior Years



## District Attorney Review of Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Sheriff's Department's Homicide Bureau investigates all deputy-involved shootings in which a person is hit by a bullet. The Homicide Bureau submits the completed criminal investigation of each deputy-involved shooting which results in a person being struck by a bullet and which occurred in the County of Los Angeles to the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (LADA) for review and possible filing of criminal charges.

Between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022, the LADA issued seven findings on deputy-involved shooting cases involving the Sheriff's Department's employees.

- In the October 16, 2020, fatal shooting of Fred Allen Williams, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated October 3, 2022](#), that there was

insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that deputy Adrian Ines did not act in lawful self-defense.

- In the August 11, 2021, fatal shooting of Adrian Sanchez, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated October 18, 2022](#), that deputy Kenneth Borbon acted lawfully in self-defense.
- In the December 29, 2021, non-fatal shooting of Katlan Marshall, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated October 24, 2022](#), that deputies Jose Ramirez and Tyler Wilson acted lawfully.
- In the August 31, 2020, fatal shooting of Dijon Kizzee, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 10, 2022](#), that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that deputies Christian Morales and Michael Garcia did not act in lawful self-defense and in the defense of others when they fired their weapons.
- In the March 14, 2021, fatal shooting of David Ordaz, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 22, 2022](#), that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that deputies Nathaniel Trujillo, and Jaime Romero did not act in lawful self-defense and in the defense of others. The District Attorney opined in the same memorandum that deputy Edwin Navarrete acted in lawful defense of others.
- In the September 23, 2020, non-fatal shooting of Samuel Nelson, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 22, 2022](#), that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that deputy Raymond Chavez did not act in lawful self-defense.
- In the March 31, 2021, non-fatal shooting of Isaias Cervantes, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 30, 2022](#), that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that deputy David Vega did not act in lawful self-defense and in the defense of his partner when he fired his weapon.

### **Homicide Bureau's Investigation of Deputy-Involved Shootings**

For the present quarter, the Homicide Bureau reports that 19 shooting cases involving Sheriff's Department personnel are open and under investigation. The oldest case the Homicide Bureau is still actively investigating is an October 16, 2021, shooting which occurred in the jurisdiction of Temple Station. For further information as to that shooting, please refer to the Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, October to December 2021](#). The oldest case that the Bureau has open is a 2017 shooting in the jurisdiction of Century Station, which is with the LADA's office awaiting a filing decision.

This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported it sent 5 cases involving deputy-involved shootings to the LADA for filing consideration.

### **Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau**

The Sheriff's Department's Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) reports directly to the Division Chief and the Commander of the Professional Standards Division. ICIB investigates allegations of criminal misconduct committed by Sheriff's Department personnel in Los Angeles County (misconduct alleged to have occurred in other counties is investigated by the law enforcement agencies in the jurisdictions where the crimes are alleged to have occurred).

The Sheriff's Department reports ICIB has 81 active cases. This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reports sending 5 cases to the LADA for filing consideration. The LADA is still reviewing 30 cases for filing. The oldest open case that ICIB has submitted to the LADA for filing consideration is a 2018 case, which was presented to the LADA in 2018 and is still being reviewed.

### **Internal Affairs Bureau**

The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) conducts administrative investigations of Department policy violations by Sheriff's Department employees. It is also responsible for responding to and investigating deputy-involved shootings and significant use-of-force cases. If the LADA declines to file a criminal action against the deputies involved in a shooting, IAB completes a force review to determine whether Sheriff's Department personnel violated any policies during the incident.

Administrative investigations are also conducted at the unit level. The subject's unit and IAB determine whether an incident is investigated by IAB or remains a unit-level investigation based on the severity of the alleged policy violation(s).

This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported opening 107 new administrative investigations. Of these 107 cases, 37 were assigned to IAB, 45 were designated as unit-level investigations, and 25 were entered as criminal monitors. In the same period, IAB reports that 105 cases were closed by IAB or at the unit level. There are 431 pending administrative investigations. Of those 431 investigations, 297 are assigned to IAB and the remaining 134 are pending unit-level investigations.

## Civil Service Commission Dispositions

There were five final decisions issued by the Civil Service Commission this quarter. Of those five, three sustained the Sheriff's Department's discipline and the other two reduced the Sheriff's Department's discipline.

## The Sheriff's Department's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

The Sheriff's Department reports it deployed its Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 6 times between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022.

The UAS was deployed on November 10, 2022, to assist Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) with locating a suspect inside a location where a shooting had occurred. The UAS was utilized to clear the interior of the location and locate the suspect. The suspect was taken into custody.

The UAS was deployed on November 18, 2022, to assist SEB in serving a high-risk warrant. The UAS was utilized to clear the interior of the location. The suspect was taken into custody.

The UAS was deployed on December 2, 2022, to assist Lancaster Patrol Station with a deputy involved shooting. The suspect had shot at the deputies and hid in the neighborhood. The UAS was utilized to search the area. The suspect was later taken into custody. He was found in a yard and taken into custody with the help of the K-9 unit.

The UAS was deployed on December 9, 2022, to assist SEB to search a location for an armed suspect. The suspect's parents reported the suspect was under the influence of drugs and had fired several shots into the ceiling. The suspect was armed with two handguns, wearing ballistic armor, and was refusing to surrender. The UAS was utilized to search the location and find the location of the suspect within the residence. The suspect eventually surrendered after gas was introduced into the location.

The UAS was deployed on December 21, 2022, to assist SEB in a possible hostage situation. A suspect had barricaded himself and a possible hostage. The UAS was used to fly outside the location to locate the suspect through the exterior windows. The hostage was eventually rescued, and the suspect was taken into custody.

The UAS was deployed on December 22, 2022, to assist SEB in locating a barricaded suspect. The UAS was used to fly outside the location to locate the suspect through the exterior windows. The suspect was eventually located and taken into custody.

## CUSTODY DIVISION

### Jail Employment Opportunities at Century Regional Detention Facility

The Office of Inspector General continues to monitor Century Regional Detention Facility's (CRDF) efforts to provide meaningful opportunities for people in custody to participate in educational and rehabilitative programming.

For the fifth consecutive quarter, there is inequitable racial/ethnic representation of people in custody at CRDF participating in jail employment through the Prisoner Personnel Office (PPO).

The Office of Inspector General's previous report on reform and oversight efforts, recommended that "the Sheriff's Department implement a system that documents reasons for denial of PPO participation, documents reasons for elective non-participation, explore ways to promote PPO participation for eligible persons, and explore alternative ways of evaluating persons for PPO to provide equitable opportunity for participation."<sup>3</sup>

The Sheriff's Department reported that it has made efforts to undertake the first two recommendations. Specifically, the Sheriff's Department is working with software companies to create efficiencies in the PPO screening of potential inmate workers, including improving documenting of both jail employment participation denial and elective non-participation. At the January 10, 2023, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Meeting, the Assistant Sheriff for the Custody Division indicated that he was aware of the racial/ethnic inequity in PPO participation at CRDF and planned to ensure that a system would be implemented to track non-participation.

The Office of Inspector General will continue to work with CRDF and Sheriff's Department leadership to monitor racial/ethnic equity in jail employment opportunities at CRDF.

### In-Custody Deaths

In 2022, 42 individuals died while in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department. In the past, the Office of Inspector General has reported on the preliminary cause of death as determined by Sheriff's Department and Correctional Health Services personnel. Because the information provided is preliminary, the Office of Inspector General has

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<sup>3</sup> See the Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Efforts – Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department – July to September 2022](#).

determined that the better practice is to report on the manner of death. There are five manner of death classifications: (1) natural, (2) accident, (3) suicide, (4) homicide, and (5) undetermined.<sup>4</sup> Natural causes include illnesses and disease and thus deaths due to COVID-19 are classified as natural. Overdoses may be accidental or the result of a purposeful ingestion, the Sheriff's Department and Correctional Health Services (CHS) use evidence gathered during the investigation to make a preliminary determination as to whether an overdose is accidental or purposeful. Where the suspected cause of death is reported by the Sheriff's Department and CHS, the Office of Inspector General will include this in parentheses.

With the passage of AB 2671, the Penal Code was amended to include [section 10008](#) requiring the reporting of information on in-custody deaths within 10 days of a death<sup>5</sup>, including the manner and means of death, with updates required within 30 days of a change in the information, including the manner and means of death. The information must be posted on the agency's website. This law went into effect on January 1, 2023. The Sheriff's Department has begun posting information on its website and can be accessed with this link: <https://lasd.org/transparency/icd/>.

Between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022, 11 individuals died while in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department. Of these 11 decedents, two died at Men's Central Jail (MCJ), one died at Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF), three died at Twin Towers Correctional Facility Correctional Treatment Center (TTCF-CTC), and five died in hospitals to which they had been transported.

Office of Inspector General staff attended the CSD Administrative Death Reviews for each of the eleven in-custody deaths.

The following summaries, arranged in chronological order, provide brief descriptions of each in-custody death and a notation as to the preliminary manner of death:

On October 21, 2022, an individual was found unresponsive at MCJ while staff were conducting wristband count. Emergency aid was rendered by Sheriff's Department staff, CHS staff, and paramedics, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene. There are reports that there was a three-minute delay in Sheriff's Department discovering the decedent unresponsive and rendering resuscitative efforts. Preliminary manner of death: Accidental (suspected overdose).

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<sup>4</sup> Randy Hanzlick, John C. Hunsaker III, and Gregory Davis, "[For Manner of Death Classification](#)," National Association of Medical Examiners, First Edition, February 2002 and [Los Angeles County Medical Examiner-Coroner: FAQs: Glossary of Terms](#).

<sup>5</sup> There is a 10-day delay permitted if the agency is not able to timely locate the next-of-kin to make the death notification.



On November 9, 2022, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from East Los Angeles Station Jail on October 26, 2022, after being found unresponsive in a single-person detox cell with fresh blood on his forehead. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown – pending a determination by Department of Medical Examiner-Coroner (Coroner).

On November 14, 2022, an individual died at East Los Angeles Doctors Hospital after being transported from MCJ on October 14, 2022, for a higher level of care. Preliminary manner of death: Natural.

On November 15, 2022, an individual died at Good Samaritan Hospital after being transported from TTCF on November 14, 2022, for a higher level of care. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown – pending a determination by the Coroner.

On November 27, 2022, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from TTCF-CTC on November 8, 2022, for a higher level of care. Preliminary manner of death: Natural

On December 7, 2022, an individual was found hanging in the shower adjoined to his cell at TTCF-CTC during a Title 15 Safety Check. Emergency aid was rendered by Sheriff's Department staff, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene. Preliminary manner of death: Suicide.

On December 10, 2022, an individual was found hanging in the shower adjoined to his cell at TTCF-CTC during a Title 15 Safety Check. Emergency aid was rendered by Sheriff's Department staff and paramedics, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene. Preliminary manner of death: Suicide.

On December 12, 2022, an individual was found unresponsive at TTCF-CTC during medical checks. Emergency aid was rendered by Sheriff's Department staff and paramedics, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown – pending a determination by the Coroner.

On December 17, 2022, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from NCCF on November 27, 2022, for a higher level of care. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown – pending a determination by the Coroner.

On December 17, 2022, an individual was found unresponsive at CRDF during a Title 15 Safety Check. Emergency aid was rendered by Sheriff's Department staff and paramedics, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene. There are reports that there was a three-minute delay in Sheriff's Department discovering the decedent unresponsive and rendering resuscitative efforts, and the decedent and the decedent's

cell appeared to be covered in fecal matter. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown – pending a determination by the Coroner.

On December 27, 2022, an individual was found hanging in his cell at MCJ during a Title 15 Safety Check. Emergency aid was rendered by Sheriff's Department staff and paramedics, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene. The decedent had informed custody and healthcare staff of his suicidal ideations multiple times throughout his incarceration. CHS reports that the individual verbalized suicidal ideation in response to his housing assignment and possible housing relocation and that he was evaluated by healthcare staff each time he communicated suicidal thoughts to CHS staff. Preliminary manner of death: Suicide.

## Other Deaths

Between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022, one individual died under circumstances which do not fit within the current categorical definition of an in-custody death but was under the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department when the condition which resulted in the person's death occurred.

On December 9, 2022, an individual was detained by CSB personnel in the Harbor-UCLA Medical Center parking lot when he began experiencing a medical emergency. The individual was transported inside of Harbor-UCLA Medical Center and was pronounced dead approximately seven hours later. Preliminary manner of death: Natural.

## Office of Inspector General Site Visits

The Office of Inspector General regularly conducts site visits and inspections at Sheriff's Department custodial facilities to identify matters requiring attention. In the fourth quarter of 2022, Office of Inspector General personnel completed 164 site visits, totaling approximately 505 monitoring hours, to IRC, CRDF, MCJ, TTCF, TTCF-CTC, NCCF, Pitchess Detention Center (PDC), Pitchess Detention Center North Facility (PDC North), Pitchess Detention Center East (PDC East), Lomita Station Jail, East Los Angeles Station Jail, and Marina Del Ray Station Jail.<sup>6</sup>

As part of the Office of Inspector General's jail monitoring, Office of Inspector General staff attended 167 Custody Services Division (CSD) executive and administrative meetings and met with division executives for approximately 203 monitoring hours

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<sup>6</sup> Any site visit or meeting related to Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) audits are included.

related to uses of force, in-custody deaths, COVID-19 policies and protocols, Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) audits, and general conditions of confinement.

### Taser Use in Custody

The Office of Inspector General continues to compile the number of times the Sheriff's Department has employed a Taser in custodial settings. Below are the numbers from January 2021 through December 2022. The numbers below were gathered from the Sheriff's Department's *Monthly Force Synopsis*, which the Sheriff's Department produces and provides to the Office of Inspector General each month.<sup>7</sup>

<b>Month</b>	<b>Number of Times a Taser was Employed</b>
January 2021	4
February 2021	8
March 2021	3
April 2021	5
May 2021	3
June 2021	11
July 2021	5
August 2021	4
September 2021	3
October 2021	6
November 2021	3
December 2021	4
January 2022	2
February 2022	3
March 2022	6
April 2022	4
May 2022	6
June 2022	10
July 2022	4
August 2022	6
September 2022	5
October 2022	3
November 2022	4
December 2022	2

### Use-of-Force Incidents in Custody

The Office of Inspector General monitors the Sheriff's Department's use of force incidents, institutional violence<sup>8</sup>, and assaults on Sheriff's Department or CHS personnel by people in custody. The Sheriff's Department reports the following numbers

<sup>7</sup> The Office of Inspector General is not opining on whether the use of the Taser in each of these incidents was permissible under the Sheriff's Department's policies and/or if the Taser was employed lawfully.

<sup>8</sup> Institutional violence is defined as assaultive conduct by a person in custody upon another person in custody.

for the uses of force and assaultive conduct within its CSD (the Sheriff's Department is still verifying the accuracy of the reporting of incidents that occurred subsequent to June 30, 2022)<sup>9</sup>:

Use of Force Incidents:

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2018	546
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2018	592
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2018	530
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018	452
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2019	501
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2019	478
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2019	525
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2019	431
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2020	386
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2020	274
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2020	333
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2020	390
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2021	373
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2021	430
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2021	450
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2021	428
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2022	384
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2022	428

Assaults on Personnel:

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2018	144
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2018	173
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2018	131
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018	115
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2019	122
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2019	132
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2019	164
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2019	136
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2020	131
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2020	91
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2020	111

<sup>9</sup> The Sheriff's Department recently provided information to the Office of Inspector General regarding some discrepancies in the reported data based upon its internal reporting systems. The Office of Inspector General will work with the Sheriff's Department to understand the reasons for the discrepancies and to ensure accurate reporting.

4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2020	140
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2021	143
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2021	145
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2021	153
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2021	136
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2022	137
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2022	118

Incidents of Institutional Violence:

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2018	871
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2018	905
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2018	988
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018	881
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2019	769
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2019	794
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2019	858
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2019	709
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2020	717
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2020	496
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2020	560
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2020	753
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2021	745
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2021	698
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2021	746
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2021	693
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2022	659
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2022	811

## HANDLING OF GRIEVANCES AND COMMENTS

### Office of Inspector General Handling of Comments Regarding Department Operations and Jails

The OIG received one hundred new complaints in the fourth quarter of 2022 from members of the public, prisoners, prisoners' family members and friends, community organizations and County agencies. Each complaint was reviewed by OIG staff. Sixty-five of these grievances were related to conditions of confinement within the Department's custody facilities, as shown in the charts below:

Grievances/ Incident Classification	Totals
Personnel Issues	6
Medical	34
Living Condition	6
Classification	3
Telephones	3
Food	2
Showers	2
Property	1
Mail	1
Mental	1
Other	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>

Thirty-three complaints were related to civilian contacts with Department personnel by persons who were not in custody.

Complaint/ Incident Classification	Totals
<b>Personnel</b>	
Neglect of Duty	6
Discrimination	4
Improper Tactics	4
Force	4
Discourtesy	2
Improper Search, Detention, Arrest	2
Harassment	1
<b>Other</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Service</b>	
Response Time	2
Policy Procedures	1
Other	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>

Two complaints were not about the Department or Department personnel and were referred to the appropriate agency or the complainant was directed to seek legal advice.

## Handling of Grievances Filed by People in Custody

The Sheriff's Department has not fully implemented the use of tablet computers (tablets) in its jail facilities to capture information related to requests, and eventually grievances, filed by people in custody. There are 165 iPads installed in jail facilities.<sup>10</sup> However, the Sheriff's Department reports that only 23 iPads<sup>11</sup> are presently functional. The Office of Inspector General recommends that inoperable tablets be repaired or replaced and continues to recommend that the Sheriff's Department pursue full implementation of tablets throughout the CSD.

As reported in the Office of Inspector General's January 2018 *Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department* report, the Sheriff's Department implemented a policy restricting the filing of duplicate and excessive grievances filed by people in custody.<sup>12</sup> The Sheriff's Department reports that between October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022, one person in custody was restricted from filing eight grievances under this policy. The Office of Inspector General continues to raise concerns about the quality of grievance investigations and responses, which likely increases duplication and may prevent individuals from receiving adequate care while in Sheriff's Department custody.

## Sheriff's Department's Service Comment Reports

Under Sheriff's Department policies, the Sheriff's Department accepts and reviews comments from members of the public about departmental service or employee performance.<sup>13</sup> The Sheriff's Department categorizes these comments into three categories:

- External Commendation: an external communication of appreciation for and/or approval of service provided by the Sheriff's Department members;
- Service Complaint: an external communication of dissatisfaction with the Sheriff's Department service, procedure or practice, not involving employee misconduct; and

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<sup>10</sup> There are 31 iPads at CRDF, 49 iPads at MCJ, and 85 iPads at TTCF.

<sup>11</sup> According to the Sheriff's Department, these functional iPads are currently installed at CRDF and TTCF.

<sup>12</sup> [See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Manual, 8-04/050.00, Duplicate or Excessive Filings of Grievances and Appeals, and Restrictions of Filing Privileges.](#)

<sup>13</sup> [See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Manual of Policy and Procedures, 3-04/010.00, "Department Service Reviews."](#)

- Personnel Complaint: an external allegation of misconduct, either a violation of law or Sheriff's Department policy, against any member of the Sheriff's Department.<sup>14</sup>

The following chart lists the number and types of comments reported for each station or unit.<sup>15</sup>

INVESTIGATING BUREAU/STATION/FACILITY	COMMENDATIONS	PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS	SERVICE COMPLAINTS
ADM : NORTH PATROL ADM HQ	0	1	0
AER : AERO BUREAU	0	1	0
ALD : ALTADENA STN	3	2	0
AVA: AVALON STN	2	1	0
CCS : COMMUNITY COLLEGE BUREAU	4	1	0
CEN : CENTURY STN	2	2	1
CER : CERRITOS STN	3	4	2
CMB : CIVIL MANAGEMENT BUREAU	3	6	5
COM : COMPTON STN	0	8	4
CPB : COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP BUREAU	1	2	0
CRD: CENTURY REG DETEN FAC	0	1	0
CRV : CRESCENTA VALLEY STN	6	1	0
CSB : COUNTY SERVICES BUREAU	4	0	0
CSN : CARSON STN	6	3	1
CST: COUT SERVICES TRANSPORTATION	0	1	1
ELA : EAST LA STN	2	5	0
EST : COURT SERVICES EAST	0	5	0
FCC : FRAUD & CYBER CRIMES BUREAU	4	0	0
FDS: CUSTODY FOOD SERV	0	1	0
HOM : HOMICIDE BUREAU	2	1	0
IAB : INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU	0	1	0
IND : INDUSTRY STN	6	6	0

<sup>14</sup> It is possible for an employee to get a Service Complaint and Personnel Complaint based on the same incident in question.

<sup>15</sup> This data was provided by the Sheriff's Department from its Performance Recording and Monitoring System on January 4, 2023, and reflects the data provided as of that date.



INVESTIGATING BUREAU/STATION/FACILITY	COMMENDATIONS	PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS	SERVICE COMPLAINTS
IRC : INMATE RECEPTION CENTER	0	1	1
LCS : LANCASTER STN	13	21	6
LKD : LAKEWOOD STN	6	4	0
LMT : LOMITA STN	8	4	1
MAR : MARINA DEL REY STN	5	1	2
MCJ : MEN'S CENTRAL JAIL	1	1	1
MLH : MALIBU/LOST HILLS STN	17	7	8
NAR : NARCOTICS BUREAU	2	1	0
NCF : NORTH CO. CORRECTL FAC	2	3	0
NWK : NORWALK REGIONAL STN	9	5	2
OSS: OPERATION SAFE STREETS BUREAU	0	1	0
PKB : PARKS BUREAU	0	0	1
PLM : PALMDALE STN	9	26	7
PRV : PICO RIVERA STN	2	3	0
SCV : SANTA CLARITA VALLEY STN	14	8	1
SDM : SAN DIMAS STN	12	3	0
SLA : SOUTH LOS ANGELES STATION	2	4	0
SSB : SCIENTIFIC SERV BUREAU	3	0	0
SVB : SPECIAL VICTIMS BUREAU	1	1	1
TEM : TEMPLE CITY STN	11	1	2
TSB : TRANSIT SERVICES BUREAU	0	1	2
TT : TWIN TOWERS	1	0	0
USR: OFFICE OF THE UNDERSHF	0	3	1
WAL : WALNUT/SAN DIMAS STN	7	4	3
WHD : WEST HOLLYWOOD STN	3	12	1
WST : COURT SERVICES WEST	2	4	0
<b>Total :</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>54</b>