

The Los Angeles County

Sheriff's Department

21st Semiannual Report

by Special Counsel Merrick J. Bobb and Staff
and Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC)

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S p e c i a l C o u n s e l a n d S t a f f

Special Counsel

Merrick J. Bobb
Police Assessment
Resource Center
(PARC)

Staff

Brian Buchner
Allyson Collins
Scott Dash
Oren Root
Tim Shugrue
Norma Zamudio

Senior Advisors

Chief Thomas Frazier,
Baltimore Police
Department (retired)

Chief Bernard Melekian,
Pasadena Police
Department

Consulting Psychologist

Zoltan Gross, PhD

Consultant

Julie Ruhlin

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T w e n t y - F i r s t S e m i a n n u a l R e p o r t

Introduction

This is the **Twenty-First Semiannual Report** of Special Counsel reviewing the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) for the Board of Supervisors, the Sheriff, and the public. The County of Los Angeles retains Special Counsel to monitor the LASD's ongoing efforts to implement the wide range of reforms set forth in the 1992 **Kolts Report** and to provide recommendations for further improvement. These public reports are intended to assist the Board of Supervisors and the Sheriff in identifying ways to improve the LASD's ability to manage the risk of negligence and reckless or willful misconduct. This report looks solely at the LASD's efforts to train its sworn personnel.

In Chapter One, we look at the ways in which the Department provides training to deputies in the tactics and skills necessary to make sound judgments in the often stressful and fast-paced environment of a patrol assignment. No one can seriously question the link between a deputy's ability to perform in this environment and the extent to which that deputy has trained for the situation. When a deputy fails to perform to LASD standards, the Department's executives, the media, and oversight groups like ourselves may question the deputy's judgment, but we also look at the training he or she has received to judge the Department's effectiveness in preparing the deputy. Unfortunately, over the past five to six years, as the Department's budget tightened, training programs have frequently suffered.

When the LASD began experiencing serious budget shortfalls in 1999 and 2000, it was forced to make difficult decisions about where to spend its money. Training was not among the top priorities. Just as a cash-strapped homeowner may put off necessary maintenance to the home's roof or

foundation to buy groceries and pay utility bills, the LASD cut training programs in favor of more immediate needs. It is not our intent to criticize the Department for those past decisions, but rather to point out some of the current shortcomings in training programs and caution against continued neglect. Training is the foundation of the Department. Without adequate training programs, officer and citizen safety is jeopardized and the LASD's risk management strategies collapse. Money spent on training programs are returned with high interest in fewer settlements and judgments, fewer tragic incidents for both officer and the public, and greater safety and security both on the streets as well as in the jails. As the budget crisis passes, the LASD ought to perform some deferred maintenance and return training to a priority funding item.

The Department was forced to take a hard look at its record of training patrol deputies and supervisors on May 9, 2005, when 10 Compton Station deputies fired 120 rounds at a suspect and his vehicle following a protracted pursuit. We do not need to repeat the by now familiar facts of that incident, nor the findings and conclusions of the subsequent investigations. Twelve deputies and one sergeant faced discipline. While there is little doubt these individuals performed below the expected standard, it is also clear that the individuals involved were unprepared to deal with the stress of that incident.

The poor tactics employed that night served as a wake up call for the Department. In the aftermath of the Compton shooting, the chiefs of each of the three field operations regions visited the Training Bureau to assess the quality of tactical training being provided to deputies and field supervisors. The response was an increased effort to get personnel to existing training programs and to develop some new programs to meet changing needs. LASD executives are now placing greater emphasis on in-service training at patrol stations and on training for field sergeants and lieutenants.

We viewed the incident as a reminder of the importance of adequately and continuously training deputies. We have in the past several years done in-depth reviews of the LASD's tactical firearms training. *See* **Sixteenth** and **Eighteenth Semiannual Reports**. While we consistently have found this training to be excellent, we have concluded that the LASD does not provide deputies sufficient opportunity to attend regular refresher training. We examine in this report the Department's efforts to get more deputies to tactical training more frequently. This is an ongoing struggle, exacerbated by the LASD's current personnel shortages. In addition, we examine other types of training the LASD provides, including in-service training conducted at the station level. Finally, we report optimistically about proposed changes to the Field Training Officer program, including greater incentives for more senior deputies to continue training. Our principal recommendation is that the LASD allocate training budgets at each station at a level sufficient to guarantee every assigned deputy 24 hours of training each year.

The Compton incident provided members of the Department excellent talking points about the value of training, leadership, and teamwork. We frequently heard executives talk about things getting done "because of the 120 rounds." But even the best intentions are meaningless unless translated into additional equipment and training. Despite the laudable renewed emphasis on training following the May 2005 shooting in Compton, we remain concerned the LASD will eventually revert to its old habit of balancing its budget by shortchanging training.

In Chapter Two, we look at specific training provided on new LASD policies and the ways in which the Department can effectively communicate its commitment to those new policies. In particular, we look at the new Foot Pursuit Policy implemented in November 2004 and contrast the Department's effort to train on that policy with its effort to educate deputies on the amended policy for shooting at moving vehicles promulgated in the wake of the May 2005 Compton shooting.

In Chapter Three, we examine training in the Custody Division and the struggles the jails face in finding the time and resources to provide their deputies with meaningful, up-to-date training. In the jails, as on patrol, training efforts suffer from lack of resources and a shortage of personnel. The Custody Training Unit has worked hard to adapt to this reality, developing a number of short, Intensified Format Training courses that are taught at jail facilities to on-duty personnel. Some jail facilities are doing an excellent job of ensuring that deputies attend regular refresher training, a good percentage of which is force-related. Others are not. The Custody Division needs to do more to ensure uniformity among jail facilities to see that all custody deputies receive regular refresher training, particularly force training.

We also look at the Custody Division's 12-week training program and find the position of Custody Training Officer undervalued. Deputies currently spend the first four to six years of their careers working in the jails, and the custody training program provides the first opportunity to indoctrinate young deputies to the expected work ethic and the LASD's core values. We conclude the division should create a more robust training program by making training for Custody Training Officers mandatory and by giving incentives to deputies chosen to fill these important positions.

We are finalizing this report in mid-February, following two weeks of major inmate disturbances in the Los Angeles County jails. The events are too fresh for reflective analysis, and the facts are not yet settled. We nonetheless offer some preliminary observations. It is useful to distinguish between the LASD's performance in quelling the disturbances and its performance leading up to them. Although the facts are not all in and our research has only begun, our tentative view is that LASD deputies and command staff ably handled the disturbances. Although more than 100 inmates have been injured, some seriously, we have not seen evidence that

the injuries occurred as a result of the use of excessive force by deputies or from failures by deputies to intervene in a timely manner. We have some serious concerns about the LASD's tactic of depriving inmates of their clothing both as a punishment and as an incentive to stop fighting. We believe the practice is inhumane and likely to incite further frustration, anger, and violence, which may in the future be directed at deputies. Despite our condemnation of this tactic, given the extent and duration of the disturbances, our tentative view is that the Sheriff's Department seems to have handled these disturbances in a professional way. We certainly have no cause to say that the recent disturbances resulted from or were aggravated by LASD training failures.

The death of two African-American inmates at the hands of other inmates during the disturbances, while appalling, does not detract from our tentative view. Although we suspect classification and housing errors by the LASD made those deaths more likely, at this point, the deaths do not appear linked causally to the manner in which the Sheriff's Department handled the disturbances themselves. But the LASD will have much to answer for if our suspicions that those deaths can be traced to long-standing errors in classification and decisions about where to house inmates are correct.

The weaknesses in classification and housing in the jails are nothing new, and experts in the field have told the LASD that the mixing of high risk and moderate risk inmates is impermissible. Nonetheless, it continued to happen, seemingly unabated, thereby raising serious questions about the competence and willingness of the Department to manage known and obvious risks of high magnitude. Our next semiannual report will examine these issues.

Finally, as is our usual practice, we have included at the end of this report tables containing the most recent data on shootings and uses of force by members of the LASD, as well as the outcomes of litigation against the

Department. The numbers of shootings at suspects dropped slightly from 2004 to 2005, though they continue to trend upward, from 33 hit and non-hit shootings in 2000 to 49 in 2005. *See* Tables A and B. Force incidents remain stable. *See* Tables E and F.

The LASD's total incurred liability continues the downward trend we reported in our **Nineteenth Semiannual Report**. In 2002-2003, the LASD spent \$10.7 million to resolve claims and lawsuits. In 2004-2005, that number was cut in half, to \$5.3 million. *See* Tables G and H. The \$18 million jury verdict returned against the Department in February 2005 will end this statistical downward trend, though we are optimistic that case will prove to be an anomaly and the LASD will continue its recent success in managing litigation outcomes.

“No training, no expectation of success.” - Captain Daryl Evans

Introduction

The May 9, 2005 shooting in Compton—where ten deputies fired 120 rounds at a vehicle whose driver, it turns out, was unarmed—was a wake-up call on the inadequacy of tactical training throughout the patrol operations of the Sheriff’s Department. The LASD Training Bureau, region chiefs, and station captains and their training staffs acknowledged the Department’s efforts to prepare sworn personnel for the situations they will encounter on the street had diminished in recent years. They responded by creating some new training programs, renewing an emphasis on in-service training, and fast-tracking some plans whose implementation had stalled. While these efforts are praiseworthy, we fear they may turn out to be not so much permanent cures as short-term patches in response to a crisis, as is sometimes the case with the LASD.

Following all the talk and flurry of attention paid to training following the May shooting, we are concerned that the LASD’s other budgetary constraints ultimately will continue to win the tug-of-war with the need for frequent refresher training. It is not our aim to criticize the LASD for its past budgetary decisionmaking but rather to caution against continued neglect of the training programs that form the foundation of the Department’s mission of protecting its officers, protecting the public, and managing its risk. The fate of the mobile shooting simulator trailers could not provide a better example of the budgetary pull on training. We have consistently praised the tactical firearms training provided via the mobile trailers, particularly the on-site training informally known as the “Roadshow.” As early as August 2004,

we noted in our **Eighteenth Semiannual Report** that this critical equipment was experiencing frequent breakdowns due to age and overuse. Over the past two years, the Training Bureau repeatedly warned that the trailers were in an advanced state of disrepair and were destined to fail. The Department nonetheless neglected to find the funds necessary to repair and renovate the trailers, instead putting the Training Bureau in the awkward position of choosing between maintaining firearms qualification trailers or the mobile shooting simulators. At the end of last year, the computer and electronic systems in the Roadshow trailers failed completely and the Training Bureau was forced to temporarily suspend Roadshow training. The Department recently gave authorization to retrofit the trailers, but not before patrol stations lost four months of valuable training.

No one questions the causal link between a deputy's ability to perform in the often stressful environment of patrol duty and the quality and frequency of training received beforehand. When required to make split-second decisions under stress—for example, whether to shoot at a suspect—most individuals lack the time to ponder alternatives or think creatively. It is only through subconscious recall and developed instinct that people in such situations make sound decisions, and the only way to develop a sound instinctual response is through recurrent training.

I. The Training Bureau

Formal training for deputies working non-custody assignments is the responsibility of the Training Bureau, until very recently under the command of Captain Ted Siara.¹ The Training Bureau is broken down into various units with each unit responsible for training in different aspects of a patrol

¹ The Court Services Training and Custody Training Units operate under the command of the Professional Development Bureau and its Director, Richard Weintraub, and are responsible for providing training to deputies in court services and custody operations.

deputy's duty. The Recruit Training Unit is responsible for running the LASD Academy, taking newly-hired trainees and equipping them to be sworn deputy sheriffs. The responsibility for providing ongoing training to deputies and higher-ranking officers is spread among various units. The Weapons Training Unit ensures that deputies remain qualified on their duty weapons and provides training and qualification for other types of firearms and weaponry. The Weapons Training Unit is responsible for operating the Department's two ranges—the Biscaluiz Center range in Los Angeles and the Pitchess Detention Center range in Castaic—as well as the Tactics and Survival Training at Laser Village.

The Field Operations Training Unit is responsible for the Department's Continuing Professional Training (CPT), and its deputies are the Department's primary force and defensive tactics instructors. The Advanced Officer Training Unit runs all of the non-CPT courses in the Training Bureau, including, among many others, field operations courses for sergeants and lieutenants and the two-week Patrol School through which every deputy must pass after his or her custody tenure and before reporting to a patrol assignment. Finally, the Department's Emergency Vehicle Operations Center (EVOC) instructs deputies on the safe and effective operation of their patrol cars. Together, these units provide mandatory training and put on additional courses for LASD personnel and members of other local law enforcement agencies seeking to develop new skills and tactics.

There are two sources of training requirements for the LASD: State-mandated training and LASD-mandated training. The State issues training requirements and protocols through the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). POST mandates 24 hours of Continuing Professional Training for patrol deputies, sergeants, and lieutenants every two years. POST also requires CPR and first aid refresher courses every three years, and has certain non-recurring training require-

ments, including Sergeant Supervisory School for new sergeants and Middle Management training for lieutenants.

The LASD has its own training mandates, including quarterly handgun qualification and recurrent training to prepare for emergencies and critical incidents. The Department-mandated training also includes numerous non-recurring requirements, including Respect Based Leadership classes and the Department's Deputy Leadership Institute. Respect Based Leadership classes focus on sensitivity to diversity and sexual harassment concerns. The Deputy Leadership Institute is intended to help deputies recognize their leadership responsibilities and enhance leadership skills. We commend the Sheriff for his continued commitment to this training in the face of the frequent complaints we heard about these so-called "soft skills" mandates, based not necessarily on the content of the courses but on the perception that other, more important training suffers as a result of these requirements.

Formal instruction provided by the Training Bureau, however, is only part of the overall training deputies and other members of the Department receive. Many of the skills a deputy learns are acquired in less formal in-service training, in patrol station briefing rooms, and through planned and impromptu training scenarios organized by field sergeants and station training staffs.

II. CPT Training

Every two years, each deputy, sergeant, and lieutenant in the LASD is required by POST to complete 24 hours of Continuing Professional Training. For members of the LASD, the CPT requirement includes eight hours of training at Laser Village; an eight-hour Practical Police Course (PPC)/Shotgun training at the Pitchess Detention Center range; four hours of defensive tactics, taught at the STARS Center in Whittier; and four hours of vehicle operations training, taught as a lecture, also at STARS.

The Department's CPT curriculum differs slightly from the POST mandate. Prior to 2002, POST simply required law enforcement officers to complete 24 hours of training of any type in a two-year period. The POST requirement now includes training in perishable skills—14 of an officer's 24 training hours must be in use of force, use of firearms, driving, and tactical communications. The other ten remain elective. The LASD exceeds the State mandate for perishable skills training by making Tactics and Survival (Laser Village and the PPC) part of the CPT requirement, so that for LASD deputies, all 24 hours of CPT are perishable skills training. Nonetheless, we argued in the **Sixteenth Semiannual Report** that even this biannual training was not enough and recommended the Department provide all deputies refresher training on tactical firearms skills each year.

A. Tactics and Survival (Laser Village)²

The eight hours of tactics and survival training at Laser Village is broken down into four hours of classroom instruction and four hours of role-playing scenarios using Simunitions rounds. Over the past several years, we have done in-depth reviews of this training. See **Sixteenth** and **Eighteenth Semiannual Reports**. Our conclusions in those reports were the same—the training provided is excellent but needs to be more frequent:

The Sheriff's Department suffers from a lack of adequate and timely refresher training. Firearms and tactical skills are perishable, but they can quickly be revived. The Laser Village instructors are adept at conditioning deputies to avoid the most common and serious mistakes, so that under high-stress conditions, they will instinctively make tactically sound decisions. During the training exercises, officers who had some form of Laser Village training within the past six or eight months nearly always

² The Department's Tactics and Survival Training Unit historically has been referred to as "Laser Village," dating to the day when deputies used laser guns in their training. The Department no longer uses the laser weapons, and the unit is trying to phase out the use of the term "Laser Village." We will use Tactics and Survival training unit and Laser Village interchangeably here.

performed much better than their classmates. Frequent tactical training makes a noticeable difference. **Eighteenth Semiannual Report**, August 2004, p. 45.

We remain impressed with the quality of the instruction at the Tactics and Survival Training Unit and with the ability of the trainers to offer constructive criticism, yet we remain concerned that this instruction is being disseminated neither frequently nor widely enough.

B. Practical Police Course/Shotgun training

The second part of a deputy's 24-hour CPT compliance is eight hours of PPC/Shotgun training at the Pitchess Detention Center range. This training starts in the afternoon so that it ends after dark and the deputies can practice shooting in low-light conditions. Again, the training begins with a lecture. Instructors review basics such as the technique for loading shotguns and clearing jams from duty weapons. In a relatively new part of the curriculum, they also discuss the physiological effects of stress and how that impacts a deputy's ability to perform. Instructors then counsel deputies on techniques for dealing with stressful situations, calming their heart rates, and allowing for greater levels of proficiency with their weapons.

After the lecture, deputies go onto the range for three different weapons qualifications. In the first, deputies fire their duty weapons at traditional paper targets from various distances and positions. They then fire shotguns, again at targets at various distances.

The second qualification is the combat firearms course. The deputies are required to hit a series of targets while they move through the course. They start with a shotgun and, using a patrol car as cover, fire five rounds on two separate metal targets. They are required to hit four of these five rounds. Deputies then transition to their handguns and fire twice on a metal pop-up target, knocking it down. They then move to a window frame, through

which they see a metal target and three “Hollywood targets” (paper targets with life-like pictures) of various suspects, including a hostage-taker and a perpetrator pointing a gun toward the deputies.

Deputies fire two rounds at each target. As they continue through the course, they encounter more Hollywood targets and various opportunities for cover. Deputies are required to fire and hit the “hostile” targets and perform tactical reloads of their weapons while in positions of cover. In all, deputies are required to take 25 shots and hit 20 of them, within a two-minute time limit. Deputies who fail the course get a second chance to go through it; those who do not hit the required number of targets in two tries must return for a remedial one-day firearms course.

The third qualification is shooting in low-light conditions. At the end of the day, the deputies receive instruction on using their flashlights to illuminate a target area and are then required to go back to the range and demonstrate proficiency with hitting targets in low light.

The Weapons Training Unit has changed the combat firearms course for 2006, creating a scenario more akin to an actual engagement in the field. The deputy begins the course seated in a patrol car. As the deputy steps out of the car, the engagement begins as a paper target turns toward the deputy, pointing a weapon. The deputy uses the patrol car for cover and concealment while firing on various targets, then moves a short distance across the range to a second patrol car from which he or she obtains a shotgun and then continues firing on targets. On the new course, the deputy has to make more distinctions between friendly and hostile targets and has to react more quickly, firing as targets move.

Like the Laser Village scenario training, the PPC training provides more realistic firearms training than the State- and Department-mandated quarterly firearms qualification. Deputies are required to move, find cover, identify targets, and fire with control and accuracy. And they must do it under

pressure, as their peers look on. Failure requires attendance at a remedial class. While it is impossible to recreate the stress and adrenaline flow of an actual gunfight with a suspect, the PPC training comes closer than the handgun qualification, which currently requires deputies to fire with minimal accuracy at a stationary target 25 yards away.

Also like the scenarios at Laser Village, the combat firearms course is changed periodically, to keep it fresh for the deputies who must complete the course every two years and to keep up with current trends and problems encountered on the street. To that end, the sergeant in charge of the Tactics and Survival Unit at Laser Village, Sergeant Gary LeBeau, began in 2004 to participate in the Executive Force Review for all shootings, providing the committee a training perspective and enabling the sergeant to identify poor practices and problem areas that can be addressed through training.

C. Defensive Tactics and Emergency Vehicle Operations

The remaining eight hours of CPT are divided into two four-hour segments in defensive tactics and emergency vehicle operations. The defensive tactics portion is split between a lecture on the Department's use of force policy, including an update on changes in the law, and time in the mat room working on ground fighting and baton skills.

The four-hour segment taught by the Emergency Vehicle Operations Center is entirely lecture. Though this satisfies the POST mandate, the Training Bureau acknowledges that driving instruction that includes no time behind the wheel of a patrol car is less than ideal. Currently, however, the obligation to train Academy classes has EVOC operating at full capacity. The existing EVOC facility at the Pomona Fairplex is simply too small to accommodate CPT courses.

A recent and very positive change in Department policy requires all patrol trainees to complete an eight-hour EVOC update at the end of their field training program. Prior to this change, the only behind-the-wheel training a

deputy received was 24 hours during Academy training. Even with this modified policy, though, a deputy never receives realistic vehicle operations instruction once he or she is off training, unless ordered to take a remedial class following a traffic accident or a record of poor driving. Given the risks involved in operating a patrol car, the lecture-only training update is insufficient. For at least the past 15 years, the Training Bureau has been trying to remedy this by developing a new EVOC site. It currently is reviewing potential sites and working on cost analyses, with plans to present a proposal in 2006.

D. Range Qualification

Three times a year, every member of the Department through the rank of chief must qualify with his or her duty weapon. The Department has 10 mobile ranges at which officers shoot to qualify. Officers shoot 30 rounds at stationary paper targets from 25 feet and must score 210 out of a possible 300 to qualify. The Weapons Training Unit coordinates the movement of the trailers to various stations throughout the County, but station staff operates them. These deputies are trained to operate the ranges but are not certified weapons instructors. Range operators, therefore, may be able to give a struggling deputy some tips on why he or she is misfiring, but the operator cannot offer professional instruction.

At the beginning of 2006, the Weapons Training Unit added greater challenge and realism to the mobile range course. While deputies still shoot at non-moving targets to formally qualify, they also are required to shoot a new Combat Shooting Experience (CSE) course in the mobile trailers. At least for the first year, the course will be used to collect data only; deputies will not be assigned passing or failing scores.

The CSE course uses Hollywood targets on a turning mechanism, so that deputies must acquire their sights and fire when the targets turn to face them,

then must hold fire when the targets turn away. Though it is hardly a sophisticated system, it is far better than shooting only at stationary targets. The CSE course is particularly useful at training deputies to use controlled fire—to fire off two or three rounds when the target turns, then stop and reassess as the target turns away. Sergeant Dave Nell at the Weapons Training Unit first proposed the course two years ago. Despite the fact the project has a minimal price tag (literally the price of the targets and the bullets, as the turning mechanisms have been in the mobile ranges since they were built) and everyone involved seemed to agree it was a good idea, implementation stalled, simply as a matter of inertia or the unwillingness to accept change.

The May 2005 shooting in Compton, where deputies demonstrated a clear need for additional training to fire in a confident, controlled manner, gave the Weapons Training Unit renewed incentive to introduce the CSE course as a critical tool in deputies' firearms training. Though the CSE course likely would have been implemented eventually, the Training Bureau believes the Compton incident speeded the process by at least six months. While we applaud the change and look forward to seeing the data collected by the Weapons Training Unit, it is troubling that the LASD is unwilling to embrace and adopt good ideas like the CSE course *before* a tragic incident.

E. CPT Compliance

Every two years, POST audits the LASD's training records to measure compliance with the POST CPT requirement. The February 2005 audit showed 90 percent of LASD deputies compliant with the 24-hour biannual requirement. However, POST's auditing capabilities in the past have been limited to monitoring total training hours, not the specific perishable skills training required for CPT. That is, a deputy could do only eight of the 24 hours of CPT, but have also taken courses on CPR and report writing, all totaling 24 hours, and POST would count that deputy in compliance.

The LASD's internal auditing procedures are different than POST's. Field Operations Support Services (FOSS) audits training records during each station's annual command inspection, reviewing, among other things, compliance with CPT and other State- and Department-mandated training requirements. By the FOSS count, 84 percent of deputies were in compliance with the Department's specific CPT requirements. FOSS records of CPT compliance by patrol station over the past three years are shown in Table 1.1. Compliance rates generally have improved over the three-year period, with many stations reporting 90 to 100 percent compliance. At more than half of the stations we visited while preparing this report, however, training staff reported they expect their compliance numbers for 2005-06 to be substantially lower as a result of personnel shortages.

The Training Bureau does not track individual deputies' CPT compliance; it is each station's responsibility to ensure its deputies' compliance with the 24-hour biannual training requirement. The bureau, however, does keep attendance records and monitors which stations are represented in each training session. These records provide a different mark of the Department's level of compliance with its CPT mandate. The Training Bureau maintains a schedule that allows staff to provide 24 hours of CPT training for 60 officers during each week. Its equation allows for everyone on the Department required to do CPT to attend every 2 years, and includes space for 10 deputies assigned to the Custody Division to attend CPT each week.³ Currently, there is at least a 25 to 35 percent vacancy rate in CPT classes. Indeed, according to attendance records kept by the Training Bureau, only 50 percent of deputies satisfied the CPT requirement in 2004-2005.

This difference between the relatively high CPT compliance level reported by FOSS (84 percent) and the significantly lower rates recorded by the

³ Deputies assigned to Custody Division are not required to do CPT training, but in an effort to boost the morale of custody deputies, most of whom currently spend five to seven years in a custody assignment before being assigned to a patrol station, the Department recently began allowing some deputies near the end of their custody tenure to attend CPT training. Because of staffing shortages at the jails, however, all 10 slots typically are not filled.

Table 1.1 CPT Compliance

	Deputy			Sergeant			Lieutenant		
	2005	2004	2003	2005	2004	2003	2005	2004	2003
Field Ops Region I									
Altadena	41%	83%	100%	40%	56%	78%	0%	100%	100%
Crescenta Valley	95%	97%	85%	100%	100%	93%	100%	100%	60%
East LA	100%	88%	54%	100%	64%	36%	100%	25%	17%
Lancaster	97%	78%	19%	70%	36%	5%	100%	0%	20%
Lost Hills/Malibu	100%	37%	43%	33%	14%	5%	100%	80%	17%
Palmdale	97%	27%	44%	77%	59%	9%	33%	17%	17%
Santa Clarita	88%	98%	86%	90%	81%	54%	50%	67%	60%
Temple	90%	98%	75%	100%	65%	60%	71%	75%	38%
Field Ops Region II									
Carson	94%	83%	62%	90%	52%	40%	100%	100%	0%
Century	19%	20%	68%	19%	19%	43%	10%	0%	22%
Compton	78%	28%	24%	11%	100%	8%	0%	100%	57%
Lennox	69%	50%	57%	22%	11%	26%	0%	0%	33%
Lomita	72%	84%	95%	0%	8%	62%	0%	0%	50%
Marina del Rey	92%	54%	76%	62%	54%	48%	100%	0%	33%
West Hollywood	53%	78%	64%	100%	17%	30%	33%	14%	33%
Field Ops Region III									
Avalon	100%	100%	13%	100%	100%	33%	100%	100%	0%
Cerritos	90%	100%	84%	71%	67%	50%	100%	33%	75%
Industry	80%	91%	60%	72%	86%	58%	100%	100%	100%
Lakewood	96%	82%	92%	76%	89%	77%	63%	75%	25%
Norwalk	100%	100%	50%	91%	89%	38%	40%	33%	100%
Pico Rivera	93%	77%	74%	86%	81%	67%	50%	75%	33%
San Dimas	97%	91%	97%	100%	93%	57%	40%	33%	75%
Walnut /Diamond Bar	100%	100%	100%	87%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Average of all Patrol Stations	84.4%	75.8%	66.2%	69.4%	62.3%	46.8%	60.4%	53.3%	46.3%

Training Bureau is indicative of a disconnect between FOSS and the Training Bureau. One possible explanation for the statistical difference stems from FOSS's method of auditing and reporting data. While the Training Bureau monitors compliance based on a two-year CPT cycle, the FOSS data is a snapshot of a station's level of compliance on the day of the FOSS audit, a different day for each station. That is, it provides a record of what percentage of sworn personnel has completed their required training on the given day. For CPT, the compliance rate is the percentage of deputies (and sergeants and lieutenants) who have attended all 24 hours of CPT training within the previous two years. The inspection will not capture or measure how often deputies at the station fell out of compliance. For example, if FOSS completes an inspection in September 2005, a deputy who last attended training in October 2003 would be regarded as in compliance. If that deputy attends CPT in August 2006, just prior to the next FOSS inspection, his or her 10 months of non-compliance will never be noted.

Another possible explanation for the disparate figures is that some stations over-report compliance with CPT. FOSS does not verify or cross-check a station's records with the Training Bureau's attendance rosters. We find it unlikely that stations are engaging in this sort of deceptive reporting, however, because they have little incentive to do so. There is no penalty imposed for failure to achieve CPT compliance and, in fact, low numbers support a station's claim that it lacks essential resources. Indeed, one chief with whom we spoke expressed surprise that his Region's CPT numbers were so high. He expected them to be lower, given the personnel shortages with which stations are struggling.

Whatever the reason for the discrepancy between the FOSS and Training Bureau compliance numbers, the vacancy rate at Laser Village and other CPT courses means the Department is wasting some training capacity. There is no rule prohibiting deputies from attending training more often than every two

years. If the Training Bureau can accommodate additional students in its classes, the Department should make better use of these resources. If stations continue to have difficulty getting deputies to the Training Bureau for refresher training, the Training Bureau should continue to think creatively about alternative ways to deliver training. *See* Section IV.C., below.

III. Training Budgets

As we discussed training in more than forty interviews with members of the Department, from deputies to chiefs, we frequently heard complaints about the lack of resources dedicated to training. The costs associated with training are numerous. The Department must staff and run the Training Bureau. Stations have to pay their training staffs. To send officers to specialized training not put on by the LASD, stations must pay registration fees and travel expenses. By far the greatest expense, though, is the cost of “backfilling” behind a deputy at training; that is, paying the salary of the deputy who is working the shift of the absent deputy.

In the late 1990s, though the Department did not fund dedicated training budgets for patrol stations, each station had sufficient personnel and general funds to cover the cost of sending deputies to training and backfilling their shifts. As the Department’s budget tightened in 1999 and 2000, however, stations’ budgets were cut and the ability to train suffered. CPT and other training mandates did not change, but stations had greater difficulty complying. For several years, the Department’s CPT compliance declined as many stations could not afford to send all of their deputies to training.

In 2004, the Training Bureau acquired POST Plan II certification of the Tactics and Survival training to fulfill the CPT requirement, which enables stations to capture POST funding for this training. The State now reimburses the Department to backfill for deputies attending CPT courses. In 2003-04, the Professional Development Bureau recovered roughly \$40,000 from POST

for personnel costs associated with deputy training. As stations have grown more adept at complying with the formalities of capturing this money, the amount recovered has grown, to nearly \$520,000 in 2004-05. The Professional Development Bureau expects this number to grow even larger in the current year.

The POST backfill money has alleviated some patrol stations' difficulties in paying for CPT training. The Department's ability to recover backfill reimbursement from POST has given stations more freedom to use overtime funds to pay for training. Though we heard some complaints about an inability to pay for specialized training beyond the CPT requirement and to buy certain equipment to be used for in-service training, inadequate staffing is currently a far more pressing issue for stations than the lack of money. It is well known that the Department is down roughly 1,100 deputies from its targeted hiring number. One result is that stations are operating with less-than-ideal staffing levels, making it difficult to fill patrol cars when some deputies are off at training.

Every station we visited in the last six months reports that deputies are working as much overtime as they want to work and, at many stations, deputies are being drafted to work overtime shifts against their will so that stations have enough patrol cars on the street to comply with their contractual obligations. Nearly every station also does some "carping," (a term derived from "Cadre of Administrative Reserve Personnel") which means that administrative personnel work patrol shifts to help alleviate understaffing. When a station is stretched to the limit just to fill patrol cars, training takes the backseat. In any event, supervisors are understandably reluctant to force a deputy to work overtime so that his or her partner can go to training. In short, while patrol stations may now have the money to send people to CPT, they currently do not have the people to send.

In the past, before the most recent hiring freeze and its concomitant personnel shortages, patrol stations had dedicated training days. Each Field

Operations Region had a given day in which its stations scheduled nearly all of its deputies to be on duty. Each station could then fill its patrol assignments and have on-duty deputies to either attend in-service training at the station or go to CPT or other off-site training. These training day schedules are inefficient and costly, however, so as budgets and sworn personnel ranks shrunk, stations mostly eliminated training days. A few stations have managed to hang onto a modified training day, in which extra staff is scheduled to be on-duty for certain days each month. For the most part, though, dedicated training days are considered a luxury in today's LASD.

Because of the LASD's personnel shortages, few captains or unit-level training staffs express great concern over the lack of dedicated training budgets. They have to struggle just to send their deputies for minimum required training. When the Department overcomes its personnel shortages, though, it will again be confronted with the decision about how to prioritize funds for training programs.

The LASD should create a training budget for each station at a level sufficient to guarantee each assigned deputy 24 hours of training each year. We have in the past argued that the State's 24-hour biannual training mandate should be the floor, not the ceiling, and the Department should provide refresher tactical firearms training each year. **Sixteenth Semiannual Report**, p. 101. With 24 hours of training each year, deputies could easily comply with the POST biannual mandate and could use the extra training time to receive additional firearms training at Laser Village or the PDC range, attend Training Bureau classes aimed at furthering their career goals, or attend other State- and Department-mandated training.

The formula for funding such an initiative would be relatively simple. Each station requires a certain number of sworn deputy labor hours to run properly. It would not be difficult, then, to compute both the number of additional hours required to guarantee training, and how much those hours would cost in dollars. The Department should give stations this amount,

with an offset for whatever is recouped from POST for CPT, as a fixed budget item that could not be raided for any other purpose.

Included in a station's training budget should be a fixed amount to be used for tuition and travel to outside, specialized training and for miscellaneous equipment costs associated with in-service training. These latter items are minimal compared to the personnel costs associated with training, and the presence of such non-transferable funds may encourage some stations currently not focused on in-service training to do more creative unit-level training. For example, some stations currently are developing station-level training with Simunitions weapons, but do not have a ready source of funds to purchase the equipment. All patrol stations should be encouraged to seek out and promote this type of training opportunity, and the Department should support those efforts with designated funding that a station must use or lose each year.

IV. In-Service Training

With stations often struggling to get deputies to CPT and other training sessions offered by the Training Bureau, the field operations regions are increasing their emphasis on in-service training at individual patrol stations. Shortly after the May 9, 2005 Compton shooting, the chiefs of all three patrol regions—Chief Neal Tyler in Region I, Chief Ronnie Williams in Region II, and Chief Marvin Cavanaugh in Region III—decided to take a “surgical look” at what the Department has been training and with what frequency. The chiefs and other executives visited the Training Bureau, energetically assessed all of the field operations courses, and looked closely at the frequency with which Training Bureau resources are being deployed in their regions.

The executives have focused in particular on how and what the Department is teaching sergeants and lieutenants. While the Training Bureau puts on excellent courses in field operations for sergeants and lieutenants and

incident command training for watch commanders, and while Department policy mandates that supervisors attend these courses within the first year of their assignment, the reality was that stations simply were not sending their sergeants and lieutenants to this training. The excuses given were not surprising—stations lacked either the personnel or the money to backfill behind supervisors at training. But in the wake of the Compton incident, executives put increased pressure on officers in their commands to get to these courses, and stations found ways to work around their budget and personnel shortfalls. Since last May, the supervisor courses taught by the Training Bureau have been filled to capacity. In addition, the Tactics and Survival Training Unit has developed a tactical on-scene command school for supervisors that it will roll out this spring. The class will consist mainly of scenarios in which sergeants and lieutenants will lead, direct, and supervise role-playing deputies as they deal with emergent tactical operations. We look forward to reviewing and reporting on this newly-developed course.

A. Field Operations Region-Wide Training Efforts

The region chiefs also stepped up efforts to emphasize and encourage more standardized training at individual patrol stations. Since 1993, the Department has not had formal pre-shift briefings, although some briefing occurs regularly during the first 15 minutes of a shift. Often, however, deputies are on duty and frequently must leave briefings to handle calls. It used to be that the LASD had formal, mandatory 15-minute shift briefings. Deputies were required to report 15 minutes prior to the start of their shifts in order to attend briefings. Deputies eventually complained about this unpaid job requirement, and until 1993, received overtime pay for briefing time (provided they worked at least two hours of regular overtime each pay period). The formal briefing time met its end when the Department eliminated this source of overtime pay.

Stations still conduct briefings during the first 15 minutes of every shift, but when they receive calls for service, they frequently have to bust briefings in order to send deputies to the field. Stations combat this to some degree with staggered schedules, so that there are always patrol cars in the field, even during shift changes, but often that is not enough. At some fast stations, briefings are busted three or four out of five nights.

Formal briefings have distinct advantages and the Department should work with the deputies' unions to bring them back. Indeed, the LASD is out of step with other major law enforcement agencies in not having formal briefing times. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, has 45-minute shift briefings during which officers discuss policy and procedural changes, training lessons, crime trends, and other information critical to their upcoming shift. We surveyed 10 other large departments nationwide and found only one—the Boston Police Department—that does not have formal pre-shift briefing times during which deputies are not expected to handle calls for service. In all of the other cities we researched—Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Irvine, Las Vegas, Washington, D.C., and Phoenix—police departments conduct formal pre-shift briefings that last anywhere from 10 to 45 minutes.

Pre-shift briefings allow sergeants and deputies to debrief from prior shifts, sharing intelligence on the day's or night's activity in various neighborhoods. They give stations the opportunity to reach personnel on a given subject, including changes in policy or law. The briefing gives sergeants the chance to get to know the deputies who work with them, and vice versa. Sergeants often must be critical of the deputies they supervise, sometimes creating bad feelings. Interaction at briefings can dissipate this tension, and gives sergeants the opportunity to work as intermediaries between deputies and the Department's executives, dispelling misperceptions and quashing rumors.

Briefings also provide a good opportunity for the Training Bureau or station training staffs to deliver 10 to 15 minute training pieces. In the past,

the Department issued “instructional bulletins,” Department-wide briefings on core subjects followed by short quizzes to test deputies’ mastery of the subjects. These were eliminated along with the formal briefing times, and development of training topics for briefings fell largely to station training staffs. With briefings frequently being busted as deputies leave to handle calls for service, formal instructional efforts dropped off or were, at best, inconsistent.

The Training Bureau produces and disseminates videos on timely subjects or issues relating to Department policy changes. For some of these, viewing is mandatory, but many are distributed to the stations or directly to deputies via the Department’s intranet with no mandate and no way of ensuring that deputies watch them. Indeed, many deputies resent the expectation that they will view training videos or instructional memos sent via e-mail on their own time. Though we have done no formal polling on the subject, we question whether many deputies pay close attention to the policy and legal updates and training videos sent to their e-mail accounts without official reinforcement. Formal briefings would provide an excellent opportunity for stations to guarantee their deputies receive the messages conveyed by the Training Bureau’s videos and memos.

One executive acknowledged, with others in concurrence: “We need to get back to basics. We have gotten away from so many things we used to do.” In October 2005, Region III initiated a new Standard Daily Briefing program. Region staff established a briefing topic for every day of the month and disseminated it to patrol stations in the region along with a one- to two-page lecture outline. The briefings, framed in a question-and-answer format, are intended to facilitate discussion. Topics range from flashlight use and canine deployment to transporting mentally ill persons to solving landlord-tenant disputes. Watch commanders are required to log the briefings so Region staff can monitor compliance, and deputies are encouraged to participate in the program by submitting suggested topics for future briefings. The other regions

are considering whether to piggyback on Region III's efforts and at least one station, Century, is establishing its own daily briefing program.

Region I also developed a program reminiscent of the Department's former "instructional bulletins." Dubbed the "Core Knowledge Assessment Program," the program aims to create a body of core knowledge that everyone working patrol needs to know, and then to do systematic briefings on these subjects, with follow-up questions that deputies can use to test themselves. At some regular interval, perhaps quarterly, the region plans to test its deputies' knowledge in these core subject areas. Region III is working on a similar initiative to periodically quiz deputies. Both regions are aware of contractual limitations on their ability to evaluate deputies based on such test results and are attempting to work within those limits.

We are encouraged by these Region-wide efforts to get back to basics in instructing deputies. We are concerned, however, that these initiatives will lose momentum without formally protected pre-shift briefing times. Creating a system to regularly deliver consistent and uniform messages about good police work and sharing information from shift to shift is commendable; assuring that deputies are around to hear the messages is another matter. The Department should work with the deputies' unions and the County to bring back formal briefings.

B. Patrol Station Training

The Training Bureau staff has the opportunity to work with a given deputy about once every two years. Every station has a training sergeant and at least one training deputy who get to see patrol deputies on a much more regular basis. The opportunities for training at the station level are tremendous. Besides the 15-minute shift briefings, some stations find ways to occasionally pull deputies from patrol duties for one-hour training segments, or to do in-depth debriefings of incidents, or to take advantage of even a modified training day schedule to provide deputies with timely

perishable skills training. We visited patrol stations in all three Field Operations Regions and found some stations that do an excellent job of capitalizing on such training opportunities.

Unfortunately, not all stations do an adequate job. Certainly, a station's budget, the extent of its staffing vacancies, and the number of calls for service it receives impact its ability to train. Perhaps more important than these factors, however, the amount and quality of in-service training largely is dependent on the enthusiasm and talents of the station's scheduling and training staff and leadership.

A station's training/scheduling sergeant, along with a staff of at least one deputy (more at larger stations), typically is responsible for managing the schedules of sworn personnel and for monitoring CPT and other mandatory training compliance. The training staff controls deputies' shifts, days off, vacation time, and their ability to attend training. This is a vital, though often thankless, task. Schedulers find themselves caught in the battle zone between those in the Department who place a high value on getting people to training and those who watch the money and do not want to see overtime budgets spent on training. The scheduler has to make sure there are enough patrol cars on the street and get personnel to mandatory training.

A skilled scheduler can minimize inefficiency and positively impact the station's training by wringing out more time for deputies to attend classes. There is no Department-wide uniformity in this task; it is up to each station to determine how to best manage its personnel. Indeed, schedulers typically learn on the job after assuming their responsibilities with little more than a briefing by the person previously in charge of scheduling. The Leadership and Training Division has created a list of "Essential Scheduling Principles and Practices" that it hopes to distribute to units and eventually enforce via random audits to ensure that units are using resources most efficiently. The division also plans to develop a training curriculum for schedulers to create some uniformity in the quality of performance of this key task.

At many stations, the training staff does little more than schedule deputies to attend CPT courses and plan Department-mandated training.⁴ At others, the staff is actively engaged in substantive training at the station. The training sergeant and deputies may bring outside speakers to talk about a timely issue, such as identifying methamphetamine labs or dealing with elder abuse, and coordinate deputies' schedules so that those most interested are available to attend. Others coordinate briefings or scenario training on issues of particular concern to the station.

At Cerritos Station, for example, Captain Daryl Evans and his staff conduct “power briefings”—one-hour scenario training on each shift once a month on topics such as building entries, traffic stops, and close range gunfights. The station is fortunate to serve just one relatively wealthy city that is willing to provide its Sheriff's station with the resources it needs to operate at an optimal level. The City of Cerritos is responsive to the captain's requests for training equipment and facilities. The city allows the station to use an abandoned city building to do scenario training, practicing entries, searches, and basic firearms skills. The city purchased Simunitions weapons for the station to use in training and, according to Captain Evans, generally “gives us everything we need.” In addition, the city employs a number of special assignment deputies. These deputies have flexibility as to when they can train because they are not regularly answering radio calls. And the special assignment deputies can relieve regular patrol deputies, taking calls at the beginning and end of shifts so that the patrol deputies can attend the station's training sessions.

With all of these resources, Captain Evans has set out to make Cerritos a “model” Sheriff's station for training, to demonstrate what can be done with the right resources. Though Cerritos is lucky to be resource rich, it is not just the equipment and training sites that make the station stand out. Captain

⁴ Department policy mandates two station-wide training exercises annually: one Emergency Operations Center (EOC) exercise, such as planning for an earthquake or other natural disaster; and one school safety/rapid response exercise, in which station personnel coordinate responses required in the event of an active shooter scenario.

Evans is a former Special Enforcement Bureau lieutenant, and he and his training staff, also former SEB officers, are passionate about training and have the subject matter expertise to be effective trainers.

Lennox Station does not enjoy the wealth of resources that Cerritos has, but prides itself on a tradition of providing its deputies with excellent training. The Lennox staff also is passionate about training and as a group, they frequently conduct scenario training in the station's parking lot. The station has staggered shifts, so when enough deputies are on duty, they will have a few overlap cars at the beginning and end of shifts and can pull deputies out to run through the scenario training. The station just recently began using Simunitions rounds during these training sessions.⁵ We observed one in-service training session during an early morning shift at Lennox. The scenario presented was a suspicious person standing in the corner of a parking lot. The trainee had to approach in a patrol car, then get out and give appropriate commands. The suspect then drew a weapon and pointed it at the trainee, at which point the trainee was expected to seek cover and fire his or her Simunitions-equipped weapon at the suspect. When the suspect went down, the trainee was required to put out proper radio traffic and coordinate the approach to the still-armed suspect. The trainees were required to perform under the watchful eyes of their training officers, fellow deputies, at least three sergeants, and a lieutenant. At the end of the scenario, the trainees were critiqued, though in a positive way and not too harshly. In all, we found this to be excellent training, on par with the scenarios being run at Laser Village, with consistent instruction offered by the sergeants and training officers. Lennox conducts this type of scenario training on a semi-regular basis, mainly for its trainees, though station veterans participate and offer constructive criticism.

⁵ On the night we observed, a Laser Village deputy was present and brought Sims guns and protective gear. Normally, the trainees and scenario role players carry wooden guns and shout "bang" when they intend to fire. The station has received special funding and intends to purchase weapons equipped to fire Simunitions rounds.

Planned and impromptu training at the station level allows stations to flexibly respond to current events and issues of particular concern to the communities served. Delivering training in short, one-hour segments instead of eight-hour training days gives schedulers greater flexibility and allows trainers to deliver more frequent training on a broader range of subjects. In addition, with personnel shortages making it increasingly difficult for stations to get deputies to Department-wide training, station-level training is a good stopgap measure to ensure deputies receive refresher training on perishable skills. By reporting on Cerritos and Lennox Stations, we do not mean to imply these are the only stations providing good in-service training. Yet we were disturbed by the number of stations we found doing little or none of this training. Given the value of station-level briefing and scenario training, we encourage the Department to pay closer attention to the quantity and quality of training and briefings being done at individual stations.

C. Training Bureau Support

The resources the Training Bureau can deploy at the station level are becoming increasingly important because of personnel vacancies and stations' inability to backfill behind deputies attending day-long training sessions. Stations need more one- to two-hour training segments that deputies can attend at the beginning or end of their shifts, or at any time when there are enough deputies on duty to handle responsibilities in the field. More frequent training positively impacts deputies' ability to make tactically sound decisions in stressful circumstances. While we applaud those stations that have taken the initiative to provide additional training on their own, the Department should not rely on such station-level initiatives to meet its training needs.

Some in the Training Bureau express guarded enthusiasm for stations' use of scenario training with Simunitions out of concerns about safety and consistency of training. Simunitions weapons are standard Beretta 92 Fs,

modified to fire Simunitions rounds. When deputies go to Laser Village for training, they leave their duty weapons behind so that staff knows that all the weapons in use carry Sims rounds. As Cerritos and Lennox Stations began using Sims rounds in training, Laser Village staff traveled to the stations to observe the training and instruct on safety precautions. While officially the Training Bureau has certified and approved these station-level trainings with Simunitions, some training staff privately express concerns about what could go wrong in a training scenario, with deputies moving quickly from patrol duty to training and from live rounds to Sims rounds.

The Training Bureau also must be concerned with consistency in the content of the instruction offered. Training must be uniform Department-wide, for both officer safety and liability concerns. If different messages are delivered in CPT courses and station-level training, deputies may be confused and less confident in their actions. And if ever disciplined or forced into litigation on a shooting incident, the deputy and the Department need to be able to clearly answer questions about how the deputy was trained to perform in the given circumstance. Mixed messages are unacceptable. In addition, deputies' attendance and participation at station-level training is not regularly recorded,⁶ and there is no way to reliably track what training a deputy has received at the station level.

We do not mean to suggest that stations should discontinue their in-service training scenarios. At the stations we visited with the most active training programs, the deputies and sergeants running the scenarios paid close attention to safety precautions and were very conscious of the need to provide a consistent message. Indeed, the leading trainers at these stations often are former Training Bureau deputies or have other experience beyond the level of a patrol deputy. Though we have some concerns about the use of Simuni-

⁶ For in-service training at the station, the watch commander generally will log that the training occurred, but it will not appear on individual deputies' training logs.

tions outside the control of the Training Bureau, we appreciate the value of frequent tactical training that is not otherwise provided by the Department.

Again, though, the quality and quantity of a station's in-house training program is dependent on the enthusiasm and skill of the station's training staff. While the Department should encourage unit leaders to offer meaningful training at the station level, it also should do more to ensure that Training Bureau resources are more frequently deployed to stations throughout the County.

1. Mobile Tactical Live Fire Shooting Simulators

The Tactics and Survival Unit operates the Mobile Tactical Live Fire Shooting Simulators. The Department owns two trailers in which deputies fire live, frangible ammunition at a large video screen playing shoot/don't shoot scenarios. We described these scenarios in detail in the **Sixteenth Semiannual Report**, pages 89-100. We remain convinced that the training provided is excellent and are troubled by the trailers' state of disrepair. Confirming our assessment of the value of the training conducted in the mobile trailers, we heard one story about a young deputy from Century Station who attended the training several days before he became involved in a shooting. He performed well, firing just two rounds and striking the suspect once. He reported back to the training staff that the scenario training had been valuable, that he felt more confident and was able to slow down and better manage his stress during the incident.

What makes the trailers particularly valuable, when they are operational, is their mobility. Tactics and Survival staff take the trailers from patrol station to patrol station for several days at a time. This on-site training, known as the "Roadshow," generally lasts around 20 minutes. At a minimum, deputies run through the shoot/don't shoot scenarios in the trailer. Depending on the number of Laser Village trainers available on a given day, Roadshow instruction may also include training with less-lethal weapons conducted outside the

trailer. With sufficient resources, Laser Village staff also could do scenario training with Simunitions as part of its Roadshow curriculum, stretching 20 minutes of training to an hour and providing deputies with realistic training that most will otherwise only receive during biannual CPT training at Laser Village.

The patrol station captains with whom we met said they would like more training opportunities for their deputies that are short, frequent, highly relevant, and do not require deputies to leave their patrol stations— exactly the kind of training provided by the Roadshow, which allows deputies to attend training at the beginning or end of their shifts, or during a downtime when there are no incoming calls. As we have noted in the past, the problem with the Laser Village Roadshow is that it is not regularly deployed. In 2005, the Roadshow provided training to just six stations.⁷ The mobile trailers were deployed to six stations in 2003 and only three stations in 2004. The Department is doing better to target those stations with higher rates of deputy- involved shootings for Roadshow training. Last year, Century and Compton Stations each saw the Roadshow three times. While it is undoubtedly important for deputies at these “fast” stations to receive frequent tactical firearms training, the minimal resources available for Roadshow training means deputies at many slower stations never have the opportunity to train in the mobile shooting simulators.

The most immediate concern with the Roadshow is the physical condition of the trailers. The electronics and computer systems inside the trailers broke down in November 2005, rendering them non-operational. The Department had ample warning of this breakdown. According to the manufacturer, the trailers surpassed their life expectancy, in part because Laser Village staff has been cannibalizing one trailer to make repairs to the other. The complete

⁷ Training was scheduled at eight stations but had to be cancelled at Temple and East LA. Stations in November and December because the electronics system in the trailer broke down. Often, Tactics and Survival staff will set up at one station but invite deputies from nearby stations to attend training. For example, the Roadshow set up at Lancaster Station but conducted training for Palmdale and Lancaster deputies. Likewise, Compton and Century or Century and Lennox are often paired.

breakdown of the final trailer has been imminent for at least the past year, but the Training Bureau's request for funds to upgrade the systems stalled, with the Department forcing the Training Bureau into a difficult choice between maintaining the firearms qualification trailers or the Roadshow simulators. Given the recognized value of the mobile trailers, we are extremely troubled by the Department's inability to plan for their readily-anticipated mechanical failure. The Department recently authorized the funding to upgrade the electronics and computer systems for the two mobile trailers, but valuable training opportunities have been lost while the Roadshow has been grounded.⁸

Once the trailers are restored to functionality, with proper staffing and support, the Tactics and Survival Unit could operate the Roadshow nearly continuously. However, it requires three or four staff members to run the on-site training, and there are only seven deputies assigned to Laser Village (with one current vacancy), all of whom are required at Laser Village to run CPT courses. Unless the unit shortchanges both training courses, Tactics and Survival can only run the Roadshow when there is no CPT being conducted at Laser Village, 10 weeks out of the year. As a result, the trailers sit idle for much of the year. We have recommended in the past that the Department double the Laser Village staff to match patrol stations' outstanding needs for refresher tactical firearms training. **Eighteenth Semiannual Report.** We continue to press for this additional investment. The Training Bureau has repeatedly requested additional staffing for this purpose. One executive with whom we spoke noted: "We just continue to bang our heads over this proposal."

In addition, we recommend that any increase in resources for the Roadshow be accompanied by a change in Department policy mandating that deputies attend the mobile shooting simulator training annually. Currently, Tactics and Survival Training Unit staff coordinate with the station's captain

⁸ Training Bureau staff is working on some alternative training it could conduct during trailer-less Roadshow sessions, but so far, scheduled Roadshow engagements in November and December 2005 and January and February 2006 have been cancelled.

and training staff weeks in advance of a scheduled Roadshow and attend shift briefings to encourage deputies to attend the training. But the training is not mandatory and deputies often are too wrapped up with other priorities to take even 20 minutes from a shift to go through the trailer scenarios. For example, the Roadshow visited Lakewood Station in September 2005. Out of nearly 200 assigned deputies, only 48 attended the training. On average, 50 percent or less of a station's deputies attend the training when the mobile trailers are at their station. The only patrol stations that got more than 50 percent of their sworn personnel to the Roadshow training in 2005 were Century and Compton, each of which had the trailer at their station on two separate occasions.

The Field Operations Training Unit used to run its own Roadshow-style training. Until about a year ago, trainers traveled to patrol stations as often as four times per month to lecture or give demonstrations on force policies, defensive tactics, or whatever other subjects the stations needed or requested. Because the Field Ops Training Unit is also responsible for teaching force classes to recruits at the LASD Academy, however, its staff has been fully engaged and unable to get out to stations for this type of training since the Department began hiring in earnest and filling Academy classes in 2005. The unit plans to resume this training when it has sufficient personnel or its recruit training responsibilities are minimized.

2. Communication Between Stations and the Training Bureau

Apart from the occasional Roadshow appearances and some special circumstances,⁹ the Training Bureau currently does no regular station-level training. However, Training Bureau staff generally are eager to assist patrol stations when asked or when the need arises. For example, when Lennox and Cerritos stations began using Simunitions in their training scenarios, Laser Village deputies went to these stations to observe the training, ensure consistency, and comment on safety issues. Patrol station staff report that they use their

⁹ For example, the foot pursuit training described in Chapter 3.

connections with the Training Bureau (i.e., field or training sergeants who left the Training Bureau after promotion and patrol deputies who left for a Training Bureau assignment) to get things done, such as finding room in a class for a particular deputy.

Though the Training Bureau works cooperatively with unit-level training staffs to meet the needs of patrol stations, there is no regular, formal exchange of substantive ideas between patrol stations and the Training Bureau. And there is almost no interaction between training staffs from various patrol stations. More than one training sergeant with whom we met suggested that some regular exchange between and among the Training Bureau and patrol station training staffs would be useful. The Training Bureau may find ways to better support station-level training staffs and stations could exchange ideas for in-service training or discover mechanisms for sharing resources to get more of their deputies the kind of training they both need and want. We support the idea of having regular Department-wide meetings between the Training Bureau and patrol station staffs. One goal of the Department's new Master Field Training Officer program is to promote this type of information flow.

V. Field Training Officers

A. New Three-Tier FTO Program

For years we have heard members of the Department complain that the position of Field Training Officer (FTO) has lost its prestige. What was once a gateway to promotion or transfer to a specialized unit such as SEB or COPS is no longer seen as a requirement for upward mobility in the Department. Though being an FTO certainly helps a deputy's career, the position has been deemphasized in recent years, with deputies more likely to serve only one year as an FTO before either moving on to specialized assignments that pay higher salaries and carry greater prestige, or deciding the demands of the position are not worth its benefits and giving up their FTO status.

The result is detrimental to the Department. The first six months of a deputy's patrol duty can shape the rest of that deputy's career. Following a custody assignment and two weeks of Patrol School, deputies new to patrol are assigned an FTO with whom they will work for the 26 weeks of their six-phase field training program. While their Academy training and Patrol School gives deputies much of the knowledge they need, it is during this time that patrol trainees actually learn how to function as patrol officers. They adopt the habits and attitudes, both good and bad, of their FTOs, and frequently report that they intend to model themselves after their training officers. FTOs thus have a critical role in shaping the Department's future and their fall from prestige can only slow the Department's progress.

In early 2005, the Sheriff announced a plan to put FTOs back on their pedestal. The three-tier FTO program, still pending final approval by the Board of Supervisors, focuses on increased compensation as a way to demonstrate the importance of the position. Newly-selected FTOs receive 5.5 percent above their base salary, the same as all FTOs currently receive. On the second tier are Senior FTOs, who are paid at 11 percent above their base rate. To be a Senior FTO, a deputy is required to have served as an FTO for at least 12 months and demonstrated "exceptional proficiency" for training and mentoring patrol trainees. Senior FTO assignments are made at the captain's discretion, based on the same criteria as FTO selections. The pay increase for Senior FTOs is meant to serve as encouragement for the most qualified FTOs to remain in patrol assignments, training deputies as opposed to moving on to other assignments that pay more than 5.5 percent above base rate. A number of deputies in the Detective Bureau and other specialized assignments indicated to us that they missed working patrol, but needed to leave in order to make more money. The 11 percent pay bump may encourage some of these deputies to stay in FTO assignments for longer periods of time, a boon for the Department, as its best and most senior deputies will be available to train young deputies.

The third tier of the new FTO program is Master Field Training Officer. Each patrol station will be assigned one Master FTO with a long list of designated duties and responsibilities. A Master FTO will serve as his or her station's lead training officer, with responsibility for overseeing the progress of the stations' trainees. Master FTOs will not have assigned trainees, but will occasionally ride with trainees to assess their progress or to offer special assistance to struggling trainees. Master FTOs also will be expected to periodically ride with new deputies, recently off training, during that critical time when these deputies often need advice and are particularly open to learning more about their patrol assignments. A station's Master FTO will meet with custody deputies seeking assignment to his or her patrol station to mentor them and advise them on preparing for patrol.

Master FTOs also will assist the Training Bureau with FTO School and Patrol School and will create an annual FTO update course. Department-wide, Master FTOs will meet monthly to foster relationships and share ideas for improving the Department's field training program. Among the Master FTO's most important responsibilities will be to provide remedial training for trainees who are struggling to succeed on patrol. The Master FTO will work with these trainees to identify deficiencies and determine their causes, and will set up individual corrective action plans. In addition, Master FTOs will mentor FTOs, offering advice and resources to maximize their performance as trainers.

A Master FTO will receive enhanced compensation of 16.5 percent above base for the first 12 months, then additional compensation equivalent to 22 percent above his or her base salary. To be eligible for Master FTO, a deputy must have served as an FTO for 18 months. The Department-wide selection process requires an application and participation in an oral interview conducted by three lieutenants. Deputies who pass the oral interview will be placed on an eligibility list from which unit commanders will select and appoint a deputy to the position, with concurrence of the Region Chief. The Chief's

concurrence is considered a critical part of the selection process, as the Sheriff has stressed that he wants the chiefs to know who their Master FTOs are and to monitor their progress.

Beyond the official job description, the Training Bureau has high hopes for how the Master FTO position will improve training on the Department. As envisioned, the Master FTO will serve as his or her station's liaison with the Training Bureau. In regular meetings, Master FTOs and Training Bureau staff will discuss ways in which the Training Bureau can support station-level training, and Training Bureau staff will be able to monitor the quality and quantity of training being provided by station trainers. The Training Bureau intends for the Master FTO to become the station's trainer, not just coordinating the field training program but also running in-service training programs for the entire station. Master FTOs will have rigorous training requirements, ideally attaining the same credentials as deputies working the Training Bureau, including certification as force instructors and the ability to teach Tactics and Survival at Laser Village. We share the Department's hope that, through this rigorous training and strict selection criteria, Master FTOs will restore professionalism to the FTO program.

We applaud the Sheriff's efforts to revamp the FTO program. On the whole, we are optimistic about the proposed changes and urge their approval. We have a few concerns about the program, however, that make us cautious in our optimism. First, in order to successfully implement the Sheriff's vision for the Master FTO, the Department must provide each station an additional budgeted deputy item. The Master FTO position has a long list of job responsibilities. In order to do it right, the Master FTO cannot regularly work patrol shifts or ride with an assigned trainee. Master FTOs will be expected to design and coordinate in-service training, monitor and document the progress of all of the station's trainees and FTOs, attend meetings and training sessions at the Training Bureau, and mentor individual trainees. All of this

will require the Master FTO to work varying shifts, sometimes working late at night or early in the morning to keep tabs on trainees working different schedules. If done diligently, the Master FTO position is a full-time assignment. Our fear is that the Department, in time, may cheat the program, requiring stations to assign a Master FTO without providing them the resources to do so. This fear is particularly acute now as the Department struggles with personnel shortages.

Another concern is with the level of oversight under which Master FTOs will operate. Initially, captains, chiefs, and the Sheriff himself will focus great amounts of attention on Master FTOs to ensure the program develops as envisioned. As with some employees in all large organizations, however, as the initial attention fades, there is a tendency to become complacent. For example, every station has a training sergeant, many of whom are excellent and work hard to get sworn personnel at their stations to interesting and desirable training. Some, though, do little more than coordinate schedules, infrequently interacting with deputies on substantive matters. Master FTOs will have a good deal of autonomy, and there may be a temptation by some to become paper-pushers, less involved in the lives of trainees and FTOs than envisioned. Captains and chiefs must maintain accountability in order to make sure the Department is getting the most out of this position.

B. FTO Selection Criteria

We also have some concerns about the criteria governing selection of all three tiers of FTOs. Because FTOs have such a critical status as mentors and role models, we have since 1992 stressed the importance of the Department's criteria for selecting deputies to serve as FTOs. Modification of the selection criteria for FTOs has been bogged down for years in the validation processes required by the *Bouman* litigation. While we have mainly desired to stay removed from that litigation, we have over the years urged that the selection

of FTOs be centralized, with uniform standards, and that the Department use FTOs as a primary vehicle for the transmission of the Department's core values and the new police culture adopted following the **Kolts Report**. Specifically, we have argued that deputies who have founded complaints for misuse of force, discrimination, or other integrity-related charges should be disqualified from serving as FTOs.

The Department soon will finalize the selection criteria for FTOs but still has not committed to formally making ineligible those deputies with such founded complaints, choosing instead to rely on captains' sound exercise of discretion when making FTO selections. We remain adamant that deputies with proven records of misconduct should be barred from FTO positions for five or more years or until it is clear beyond doubt that the individual has informed his or her behavior to the LASD's core values.

Conclusion

In summary, the LASD has balanced its budget by shortchanging training. In this, the Department has been penny wise and dollar foolish. Any dollars spent in training are returned with high interest in fewer settlements and judgments, fewer tragic incidents for both officer and the public, greater safety and security on the streets, and fewer humiliating and dangerous incidents like the Compton shooting.

Our core recommendation is that the Department allocate generous training budgets that cannot be cut or invaded for other purposes. Additionally, we recommend the following:

- Provide all deputies refresher training on tactical firearms skills each year.
- Create a training budget for each station at a level sufficient to guarantee each assigned deputy 24 hours of training each year, and provide each station a fixed amount to be used for tuition and travel to outside, specialized training and for miscellaneous equipment costs associated with in-service training.
- Promptly upgrade the electronics and computer systems for the two Mobile Tactical Live Fire Shooting Simulators and resume Roadshow training.
- Double the Tactics and Survival unit staff so they can operate the Roadshow at patrol stations more frequently to match patrol stations' outstanding needs for refresher tactical firearms training.
- Accompany increases in resources for the Roadshow with a mandate that deputies attend the mobile shooting simulator training annually.
- Work with the deputies' unions and the County to bring back formal briefings.
- Press forward with planned changes to the Field Officer Training program, without buckling to budget and personnel shortages. Maintain accountability for the newly-created Master FTO positions.
- Adopt selection criteria for Field Training Officers formally disqualifying deputies who have founded complaints for misuse of force, discrimination, or other integrity-related charges within the previous five years.

When the LASD implements a new policy, it of course must inform deputies and other personnel of the change. For some new or amended policies, this can be as easy as sending an e-mail to every member of the Department and announcing the new rule at the beginning of every shift. For others, simply disseminating the new language in the policy manual is insufficient—the contours and limits of the new policy must be explained.

In the last 15 months, the Department has implemented two key policy initiatives to address officer safety and use of force. One—the LASD’s Foot Pursuit Policy—was sent out in November 2004 with little formal training. The other—the amendment to the Department’s firearms policy to address assaults by moving vehicles—was released in June 2005 in conjunction with mandatory training and an instructional video produced by the Training Bureau and the LASD Video Production Unit.

We wrote in detail about the new foot pursuit policy in our **Nineteenth Semiannual Report**. The new policy generally forbids partner-splitting and one-person foot pursuits but allows solo deputies to pursue a suspect for the purposes of establishing a containment. Lone deputies are not permitted to close distance and apprehend suspects. In all foot pursuits, deputies are required by the new policy to broadcast basic identifying information within the first few seconds of the pursuit.

In 2005, deputies still were grumbling about the restrictions imposed by the new foot pursuit policy. There was some confusion about what the policy said or how it applied to specific situations with which patrol deputies regularly deal. The predominant deputies’ union complained loudly that the policy prevented deputies from doing their jobs and catching “bad guys.”

At least partly in response to these complaints, the Training Bureau created a curriculum to teach foot pursuit tactics and the new policy in Patrol School. Because that training was well-received by executives who observed it, the Training Bureau and patrol regions decided to send the Advanced Officer Training Unit (AOT) staff member who taught it, Deputy Mike Row, out to every patrol station to conduct the one-hour training sessions. The training begins with a lecture/ discussion on the new policy. Deputy Row starts by asking deputies what they understand the new policy to mean, and what they think of it.

In the classes we observed, the deputies who spoke up seemed to have a good general understanding of the new policy, but opinions about its correctness were mixed. Some deputies understood the Department's primary objective in implementing the new policy and agreed that one-person pursuits are "too dangerous." Others resented the Department's attempts to restrain the way in which they perform their duties. One deputy remarked: "If I feel comfortable I can apprehend the guy, I should be able to chase him, put hands on him, and handcuff him." Deputy Row tried to diffuse this sentiment by talking about effective tactics for setting up containments: "We want to catch the bad guys, but we need to do it safely."

The Training Bureau has produced a video for use in conjunction with this class. Trainers pulled deputies out of the field to demonstrate the dangers of splitting partners while chasing a suspect. In a re-creation of a commonly used tactic, one deputy would drop his or her partner off on a corner and then drive around to the opposite corner, ostensibly to lock down all four corners of a block and catch a suspect running through backyards. In the demonstration, the deputy on foot receives a radio broadcast that his or her partner has been shot. The deputy takes off running to assist his or her partner. For even the most fit deputy portrayed on the video, the run takes a surprisingly long time—one minute and 22 seconds—and when he arrived at his partner's

location, he was spent, having burned all his energy in a dead sprint to assist his partner. All of the deputies portrayed in the video admitted that they would be of little use to their partners if engaged in a fight with a suspect at the end of the run. This sort of “reality TV” training video appeared to have an impact, and the class goes from there to talking about ways to effectively contain suspects without splitting partners and without chasing suspects through unknown territory.

The bottom line of the foot pursuit policy, as taught, is twofold. First, the policy is meant to keep deputies safe, but still allow them to do their jobs and catch people. Second, it is a matter of career survival—deputies should follow the policy even if they don’t like it.

Unfortunately, AOT has only provided this training to patrol stations in Region III and has not coordinated with the other two regions to teach the foot pursuit class at their stations.

Ongoing resistance to the new foot pursuit policy is in part the result of poor training and integration. When the new policy was introduced, the Training Bureau conducted several “train the trainers” sessions to which all station training staffs were invited. It was not mandatory, and while most attended, some did not. The training session consisted mainly of an outline of the language of the new policy with some questions and answers about how it might apply to specific situations. Each station’s training staff was required to introduce the new policy to deputies at its station. This took place during shift briefings. This might have been adequate if the new policy was a simple rule change. But the foot pursuit policy represented more than just a rule change—it was a cultural change for the Department. The subsequent resistance from deputies and their union evidences the degree to which some deputies value the freedom to chase suspects without restraint. The Department’s infringement on what they see as a core responsibility of police work needed to be sold to deputies with a clear, consistent, and redundant

training message. As Deputy Row, the AOT instructor currently teaching the foot pursuit class, said, a trainer “needs to be passionate about it” in order to effectively convey the message in training. Instead, training was left to station-level trainers, many of whom themselves likely were not sold on the new policy. Indeed, the brief instruction from the Training Bureau and the delay in developing a focused class for Patrol School raises the question whether the Training Bureau completely bought into the policy at the time it was introduced. The Training Bureau now acknowledges it could have done better in rolling out the new foot pursuit policy, and is working to remedy its mistakes.

By contrast, the amendment to the Department’s firearms policy to address shooting at moving vehicles has been met with relatively little opposition from deputies. The new policy states that a deputy may not fire a weapon at a motor vehicle “in response to a threat posed solely by the vehicle” unless he or she has an objectively reasonable belief that: “The vehicle or suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to the Department member or another person, AND the Department member has no reasonable alternative course of action to prevent the death or serious physical injury.” In essence, the policy requires deputies to get out of the way rather than shoot at a moving vehicle.

The Department promulgated the changes to the firearms policy in the immediate wake of the May 2005 Compton shooting. The Training Bureau introduced the policy along with a 10-minute training video that clearly recites the language of the policy and explains the rationale behind it. The video, produced by the Training Bureau and the Department’s Video Production Unit, emphasizes and demonstrates the tactical options available when faced with the threat of a moving vehicle. It stresses the dangers and futility of firing a handgun at a vehicle. It shows numerous examples of firearms rounds failing to stop vehicles and effectively makes the point that even if rounds injure or incapacitate the driver, a vehicle can continue to move on its path.

Finally, the training video uses footage of the Compton incident to demonstrate the dangers of crossfire and ricocheted bullets and to discuss the importance of tactical coordination among responding units.

The Training Bureau conducted “train the trainer” sessions, with mandatory attendance for all stations’ training staffs. They screened the video, discussed the new policy, and gave each station a copy of the video to show to patrol deputies during shift briefings. This clear and consistent training no doubt is a factor in the relatively few complaints about the new policy we have heard from the deputies and their union.

Other factors are at work as well. This policy change is less of a cultural change than the new restrictions on foot pursuits. Certainly the ability to fire at a moving vehicle is seen as less central to a deputy’s role than the freedom to decide when and how to chase fleeing suspects. The one-page shooting at vehicles policy is also more straightforward than the four-page and somewhat convoluted foot pursuit policy. Finally, the May 2005 shooting in Compton served as a wake-up call for deputies as well as executives. Everyone in the Department had the opportunity to repeatedly view that incident, which provided an excellent example of what can go wrong when a vehicle is perceived as a threat to which a deputy responds by firing his or her Beretta. Thankfully, the Department has had no ill-advised one-person foot pursuits with tragic consequences to serve as such a public wake-up call.

We recommend that the Department continue its excellent foot pursuit tactics training. The Advanced Officer Training Unit should promptly schedule training days with patrol stations in Regions I and II to ensure that deputies at those stations attend the foot pursuit training. Further, we recommend that when the LASD promulgates or amends a policy in the future affecting a core aspect of deputies’ responsibilities, the Training Bureau coordinate a plan to effectively convey to all personnel the meaning of the new policy and the Department’s commitment to it.

We are finalizing this report in the immediate aftermath of a series of major inmate disturbances in the County jails. The disturbances are too recent for us to have conducted a thorough review, but it is impossible to ignore these events in examining and writing about training for Custody Division personnel. In our very preliminary review of the disturbances, we have seen no evidence that any of the more than 100 inmates' injuries resulted from excessive force by deputies or deputies' failure to intervene in a timely manner. While we make a number of observations below about shortcomings in the Department's efforts to train custody deputies, we do not mean to imply that the recent inmate disturbances occurred or were either prolonged or more injurious because of training failures.

Custody training faces challenges similar to those confronted by training for patrol operations—budget cuts and personnel shortages that make getting deputies and custody assistants to even a minimal amount of training difficult. Staffing jail facilities takes priority over training, and the jails currently are struggling just to meet minimum staffing requirements. The Custody Training Unit (CTU) has done a good job adapting to this reality, developing a number of short, intensified training courses that can be taught by unit-level training staffs to deputies and custody assistants whose assigned facilities cannot afford to send them to full-day classes. Unfortunately, not all facilities have adapted well to this new training format and the amount of instruction a deputy receives varies greatly from unit to unit.

The value of a new deputy's custody training program likewise can be inconsistent. The position of training officer in custody is unpaid and largely

untrained and undervalued, resulting in a lackluster training program for custody deputies. Because deputies spend the first four to six years of their careers working in the jails, custody training provides the first and a substantial opportunity to indoctrinate young deputies to the expected work ethic and the LASD's core values. To some extent, the Department is squandering this opportunity. The Custody Division should invigorate its training program for new deputies and should also work to ensure greater uniformity among units in the amount and quality of ongoing training provided to deputies throughout their custody tenures.

I. State Standards and Training for Corrections

The Custody Training Unit provides training for deputies working the LASD's Custody Division. The CTU is run by Lieutenant Allan Smith who answers to civilian Director Richard Weintraub within the Leadership and Training Division. The CTU has north and south teams to serve the jail facilities in different parts of the County as well as a team of regular force instructors. Each team is staffed by six deputies and one sergeant, and each of the County's jail facilities has a Custody Training Unit staff member assigned as a liaison. Likewise, each facility has its own training staff that works with the Custody Training Unit.

Just as POST regulates training for patrol deputies, the State's Corrections Standards Authority monitors training for deputies working in the jails. That body developed Standards and Training for Corrections (STC) mandates that require deputies to attend 24 hours of certified training each year. Until 2003, the State funded around one-third to one-half of STC training by reimbursing the Department for the cost of backfilling for deputies at training. When the State eliminated that funding in June 2003, the LASD lost \$1.7 million previously allocated to custody training, and the Custody Division began struggling to train deputies. In 2002-2003, the Department had nearly 100 percent

compliance with the STC mandate. That dropped substantially in 2003-2004, to just 62 percent. In 2004-2005, still only two-thirds of deputies completed the 24-hour STC mandate.¹ Table 3.1 lists STC compliance for 2004-2005 broken down by jail facility.

Table 3.1 2004-05 STC Compliance

Unit	Eligible personnel	Completed STC	Percentage
CRDF	48	38	79.2%
PDC-East	94	47	50.0%
Inmate Reception Center	342	300	87.7%
Mens Central Jail	532	188	35.3%
NCCF	229	196	85.6%
PDC-North	183	19	10.4%
Twin Towers	575	549	95.5%

The Department's 62 percent compliance with the STC mandate in 2003-2004 resulted from the change in State funding. Current training difficulties, however, are in part attributable to the lack of money but can also be blamed on the Department's personnel shortages and inability of unit-level training staffs to adapt to new training formats.

It is a now well-publicized fact that the staffing levels at the County's jail facilities are dangerously low. A deputy at training obviously must be replaced at his or her security post by another deputy. With many deputies already working the maximum amount of overtime and jails regularly drafting deputies to work beyond their shifts, some facilities report there simply are not enough deputies working custody to ensure adequate staffing and provide regular training opportunities. Other facilities, though struggling with similar staffing

¹ In each of the past two years, the Department reported that roughly half of the non-compliant deputies had completed between 12 and 23 hours of training.

shortages, still find ways to get their personnel to regular training sessions.

Prior to the STC funding cuts, training for custody deputies was provided mainly by the Custody Training Unit during eight-hour classes. A deputy would miss his or her entire shift to attend training. After the funding cuts, units struggled to pay to backfill behind deputies at training, and as staffing shortages exacerbated the problem, the eight-hour training blocks became impracticable. The CTU still schedules and conducts some eight-hour classes, but attendance numbers are inconsistent as jails are reluctant to send deputies to these classes. As a sergeant at one jail facility told us, “We’re so understaffed, you pull one guy out and the system collapses.”

Funding for STC Training

The Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) was created by the legislature in 1980 to develop Standards and Training for Corrections that apply to local jails statewide. Institutions’ participation in the program is voluntary, but for the first 13 years of the program’s existence, participation carried substantial financial benefits. Funded by penalties assessed against defendants in criminal cases, the CSA reimbursed institutions and agencies for amounts spent on backfilling for deputies attending training. In return for this money, jails were expected to train to established minimum standards, and facilities that did not meet these standards risked losing their funding. In June 2003, the State defunded the CSA and returned criminal penalties to the State’s general fund. Since then, most local jails have continued voluntarily to attempt to meet the STC standards, but the CSA no longer has any real power to mandate compliance.

II. Intensified Format Training

In response to the declining feasibility of the eight-hour training block, the Custody Training Unit developed one- to two-hour long Intensified Format Trainings (IFTs). IFTs are run mainly by each jail facility’s training staff, with regular guidance and oversight from the CTU. IFTs are taught to

on-duty deputies during regular shifts at each jail facility. The Custody Training Unit has developed a wide variety of IFTs, including classes on basic jail security, cell extractions, drug recognition and identification, impact weapons, searching and handcuffing, suicide prevention, and tactical responses to jail disturbances. In all, the Custody Training Unit has sought and received STC certification for 57 IFT classes, which allows deputies who participate in these classes to claim credit toward the 24-hour STC requirement. The long list of available IFTs highlights a key benefit of this method of training: Classes broken down into one- to two-hour segments give trainers the opportunity to reach deputies more frequently than once or twice a year, covering a greater variety of subjects than in the traditional eight-hour courses. This allows the jails to effectively respond to current events and threats, and to customize training to address issues of greatest concern to each particular facility. Additionally, because IFTs are taught at the actual facility, drills and scenario training are more realistic, with tactical responses tailored to the building's specific physical layout.

For example, at Men's Central Jail, visiting room staff recently reported they had removed guns from three visitors during random searches. Concerned about deputies' preparedness to handle a situation with an active shooter in the jail's visiting room, the training staff planned a training scenario in which a role player with a handgun was holding hostages in one row of visiting booths. Using Simunitions-equipped weapons, teams of six deputies and one sergeant were required to coordinate tactical responses to this threat. This was excellent training, requiring the deputies and sergeants to recall skills not regularly used in custody assignments. The scenario also helped sergeants by requiring them to take charge of the situation and manage and supervise their teams' responses.

Similarly, at the North County Correctional Facility, where high security level inmates are housed in dormitory settings in which fights between

inmates frequently occur, trainers conduct more classes or drills for Emergency Response Teams' engagement in inmate disturbances than any other type of IFT. And at Twin Towers Correctional Facility, which holds the jail population's mentally ill inmates, the training staff runs frequent drills to train in tactical intervention in suicide attempts.

This type of training cannot be accomplished in Division-wide, full-day classes. IFTs typically are small, often with fewer than 10 deputies in attendance. The scenarios or drills can be run in a single one- to two-hour training segment; instructors are not expected to fill an entire day with training on a given subject. Finally, the IFT format allows for training in response to a current and particular threat, whereas traditional day-long classes are planned well in advance and need to apply more broadly.

The Custody Training Unit developed IFTs as a way to deal with diminishing resources. When the Department initially was hit with the STC budget cuts, the Custody Training Unit viewed IFTs as better than nothing, a good way to administer a minimal amount of training as traditional training sessions became unfeasible. Now, though, the flexibility of the short format training is preferred by all of the trainers we interviewed for this report. Indeed, we agree that IFTs are a good way to meet some of the training needs of custody staff.

Unfortunately, though, IFTs are plagued by the same problems as patrol station training—deputies often do not or cannot find the time to go. Deputies attending IFTs are on duty and trying to juggle the responsibilities of their jobs along with training. As a result, it is difficult even to schedule IFTs, and at some facilities classes frequently are cancelled or interrupted with deputies being called back to their posts. While trainers try to put together a schedule for IFTs each month, they generally do not know until the day before a scheduled class which deputies will be available to attend. For the IFT format to work optimally, deputies should be able to attend at a time when they have

no other job responsibilities. The inability or failure to build deputies' schedules around training sends a dangerous message to deputies that training is not a priority.

Because IFTs are run mainly by each jail facility's training staff, the number of IFTs taught and attendance at those classes, as with the level of STC compliance, varies throughout the Custody Division. Table 3.2 shows the number of IFTs taught at each facility in fiscal year 2004-2005, along with the number of students and hours taught. Not surprisingly, these numbers correspond well with statistics on STC compliance. *See* Table 3.1. For example, at Twin Towers, instructors taught 530 IFTs to over 9,000 students and the facility achieved 95 percent compliance with the 24-hour annual training requirement. By contrast, at Pitchess Detention Center-North trainers conducted 33 IFTs for 425 students, resulting in just 10 percent compliance with the STC standard.

The numbers of IFTs conducted and STC compliance roughly correlates to the numbers of trainers a facility has on staff. Those units investing substantial resources in training staffs generally are doing a better job complying with the State standards. Success is not just determined by the numbers, however. As we said in Chapter One with respect to patrol station training

Table 3.2 Intensified Format Training in Custody, 2004-2005

Unit	Total IFTs	Students	Total Training Hours
Inmate Reception Center	34	341	682
Mens Central Jail	92	2,479	4,811
NCCF	64	1,004	2,008
PDC-East	46	966	1,932
PDC-North	33	425	761
Twin Towers	530	9,394	18,593

staffs, the amount and quality of unit-level training largely is dependent on the enthusiasm and talents of the unit's training staff and leadership. At Twin Towers, for example, Lieutenant Mike Pippin is actively engaged in the training conducted by his staff. With five deputies and one sergeant on his training team, their goal was to conduct an IFT every day.² Deputies attend classes while on duty, but are scheduled to attend, and go with the expectation that their training time will be interrupted only for the most serious emergency. The training staff has little patience for deputies who claim to be too busy to attend training. As a result, classes are rarely interrupted or cancelled. In 2004-2005, 549 of the facility's 575 eligible deputies completed 24 hours of training, proving that training can be a priority even in the face of staffing shortages. We urge jail managers to pay closer attention to the quantity and quality of IFTs being offered by their training staffs.

We also recommend that the Custody Training Unit work to reestablish more regular eight-hour training sessions and that jail facilities make it a priority to have their personnel attend these classes. While we agree that IFTs are an important training tool because of their flexibility, the longer classes should not be abandoned entirely. The eight-hour classes provide more in-depth training on core issues. Because they generally are taught off-site, when a deputy is not on duty, the deputy can better focus on his or her only job for the day—to learn. The optimal way to deliver meaningful, dynamic training is with a balance of two-hour IFTs and traditional eight-hour training segments.

III. Force Training in Custody

We last discussed force training in custody in our **Seventeenth Semiannual Report**. There, we expressed concern that the LASD was not optimally protecting inmates from unnecessary injury, deputies from

² The Custody Division recently cut the Twin Towers training staff in half in advance of moving female inmates and some custody staff out of that facility and into the Century Regional Detention Facility.

assaultive inmates, or the County from liability resulting from mishandled or unnecessary force events. In preparing that report, we observed that unit-level force trainers were not held to the standards of force trainers Department-wide and urged the LASD to ensure that only qualified instructors provide force training to custody personnel. We are pleased to report that force training in custody is now provided only by certified force instructors. Likewise, the Custody Training Unit's efforts to obtain STC certification for IFTs taught at the unit level has promoted greater uniformity in the techniques and tactics being taught at the unit-level, remedying another problem we noted in our **Seventeenth Semiannual Report**.

We also recommended that all custody staff be required to attend periodic in-service training in the use of force. Once a deputy completes Jail Operations School at the beginning of his or her custody assignment, there are no mandatory force training updates. Like tactical firearms skills discussed in Chapter One, use of force skills are perishable. Deputies regularly called upon to interact with inmates in situations that may require the use of force should receive frequent refresher training. Though some jail facilities are doing a good job of providing force training on their own, the Department has not formalized a requirement of annual force training for all custody deputies.

The force instructors in the Custody Training Unit and unit-level training staffs do provide excellent force training, but at most facilities it is not presented frequently enough. Twin Towers, the Inmate Reception Center (IRC), and the North County Correctional Facility (NCCF) are the only facilities that provided substantial levels of force training in 2004-2005.³ At IRC, which was nearly 90 percent compliant with the STC standard, 92

³ There are 12 certified force IFTs: Carotid Restraint Refresher, Cell Extractions, Force Decision Making, Force Policy Refresher, Ground Defense, Hobble Restraint, Impact Weapon (Flashlight), Personal Weapons, Pressure Point Review, Searching and Handcuffing, Situational Use of Force Options Chart, and Takedown Techniques. There are also 10 STC-certified eight-hour force courses: Basic Force Training, Critical Decision Making, Defensive Tactics for Women, Edged Weapon Defense, Expandable Straight Baton Certification, Ground Defense Training, Personal Weapons Training, Special Weapons & Cell Extraction Practical Application, Supervisor's Force Update, and Team Cell Extractions.

Table 3.3 Force Training in Custody, 2004-2005

Unit	Force IFTs	8-hour Force Classes	Force Training Hours	Total Training Hours	Percentage of Training Force-Related
Inmate Reception Center	2	8	628	682	92.1%
Mens Central Jail	21	1	536	4,811	11.1%
NCCF	24	1	902	2,008	44.9%
PDC-East	2	0	52	1,932	2.7%
PDC-North	6	0	144	761	18.9%
Twin Towers	117	6	5,308	18,593	28.5%
Totals	172	16	7,570	28,787	26.3%

percent of training was force-related. NCCF, which likewise nearly met the STC standard, 44 percent of training hours were force-related. And at Twin Towers, the facility that provided by far the most training of all custody facilities last year, almost 30 percent of that training was force-related. Deputies at other jail facilities did not receive sufficient refresher training on force-related issues. *See* Table 3.3. Custody Division-wide, 26 percent of all training hours in 2004-2005 were force-related. This number is skewed, though, by the performance of IRC and NCCF, both of which far exceeded the percentage of force training provided by other facilities. Though the 24-hour STC standard does not require any specific amount of force training, the Custody Division should create its own internal standard to require a minimum of six hours of force-related training annually for each deputy. The success of IRC, NCCF, and Twin Towers demonstrates this is an easily-attainable goal.

One training scenario presented as an IFT at Men’s Central Jail demonstrates well the practical value of regular force training. This particular IFT tests a deputy’s ability to use appropriate force when confronting a combative inmate and to accurately report that force. In the scenario, a deputy fights with a trainer in a “redman” suit playing the role of an antagonistic inmate.

Another trainer videotapes the fight. After subduing the inmate, the deputy must write a force report. The deputy and trainers then view the video, noting all the things neglected in the report or reported inaccurately. The training provides a poignant reminder to carefully report uses of force without exaggerating an inmate's actions or downplaying the escalation of violence. This training is excellent on several levels. It provides deputies realistic training in defensive tactics to employ with combative inmates, and urges use of the minimum force necessary to subdue them, limiting injuries to both deputies and inmates. The training also encourages deputies to accurately report these encounters, with the reminder that, while encounters with inmates typically are not videotaped, they often are witnessed by other deputies, inmates, or civilian jail staff. Of course, accurate reporting of force incidents is important both to ensure accountability and to minimize County liability. Unfortunately, the training is time intensive and, given staffing and budget shortfalls, infrequently offered.

IV. Custody Training Officers

For the LASD, where deputies spend the first four to six years of their careers working in the jails, training in custody is in some ways as important as patrol training. Certainly the field training program in patrol teaches deputies many critical skills and decisionmaking processes not confronted in the custody setting—when to stop, search, and arrest a citizen; how to safely operate a patrol car; and whether to fire a weapon. While there are not as many critical skills to learn in the custody training program, there are separate and equally important skill sets to master. In addition, custody training provides the first opportunity to indoctrinate young deputies to the expected work ethic and the Department's core values. A deputy who emerges from the jails to a patrol assignment after five years in the Department has developed attitudes and behaviors that will remain for the duration of his or her career.

A new custody deputy is on training for the first three months of his or her assignment. Trainees must complete an approximately 250-page training notebook that includes various report writing scenarios, performance tests, and evaluations. Trainees also must demonstrate proficiency in radio codes, Emergency Response Team preparedness, interviewing inmates, and statutes governing the custody setting. A Custody Training Officer (CTO) guides and evaluates the trainee during the 12-week program and ultimately must vouch for the trainee's competence.

It is surprising, then, that the role of training officer in custody is an untrained, unpaid, and largely undervalued position. With no pay incentive, it is difficult to convince deputies to take on the extra burdens and responsibilities of a CTO. At most facilities, CTOs are assigned multiple trainees, so a trainee seldom gets the benefit of developing a one-on-one relationship with his or her training officer. While all of the custody leaders we interviewed are pleased with the quality of their CTOs and grateful for their dedication and commitment, we have to wonder how much better the custody training program would be if the Department provided greater incentives to do this important job.

Bonus pay certainly would help in attracting deputies to CTO positions. However, we are aware that a CTO does not have the same number of additional responsibilities as a Field Training Officer, and so equal pay incentives would likely encounter resistance. The training program in custody is 12 weeks as opposed to 26 weeks in the field, the volume of paperwork is substantially lower, and training officers do not spend their entire shifts with their trainees as they do in patrol assignments. If a pay incentive is not feasible, there are other ways in which the Custody Division could encourage deputies to serve as training officers. Training officers should have the opportunity to attend specialized training that not only will assist in their training officer roles but also serve to enhance their careers. At a minimum, however, the Department ought to create some form of recognition for CTOs.

A more robust training program with mandatory training for CTOs also could serve as an incentive to deputies selected to serve as training officers by boosting the sense of importance around the CTO position. While Field Training Officers on patrol must attend a 40-hour FTO school before they are assigned a trainee, there currently is no structured training for CTOs. While the Custody Training Unit offers a 24-hour course for CTOs, it is not mandatory and is sparsely attended. The LASD should make this training mandatory for all CTOs to ensure greater uniformity in the custody training program and to create a greater level of professionalism among training officers.

More than just effectively indoctrinating deputies into the Department's values, an invigorated training program could help build morale and stem attrition. Allocating resources to create a more dynamic and personalized custody training program would show deputies that the organization cares about their career development and is willing to invest in their future with the Department.

Conclusion

In the LASD, staffing jail facilities takes priority over training facility staff. So long as the Department struggles to hire and retain deputies, custody training will suffer. Though IFTs provide relevant, dynamic training opportunities, they have not been taught with enough regularity Division-wide to adequately compensate for the nearly complete elimination of the traditional eight-hour training session. The Department's inability or unwillingness to build training time into deputies' schedules, instead requiring deputies to attend training while on duty and beholden to other responsibilities, sends the wrong message that training is not a departmental priority. We recommend the following:

- Provide sufficient funding for substantial training staffs at each jail facility. Carefully monitor the selection and activities of those staff members, with the expectation that they will conduct or coordinate a sufficient number IFTs to guarantee each assigned deputy 24 hours of training each year.
- As resources permit, re-institute more regular eight-hour courses taught by the Custody Training Unit and encourage jail facilities to make attendance a priority so that personnel receive a balance of IFTs and longer, more in-depth training.
- Modify the 24-hour annual training requirement to include at least six hours of force training.
- Create a more robust training program for new custody deputies by making training for Custody Training Officers mandatory and giving pay or other incentives to deputies chosen to fill these positions.

Shooting, Use of Force, and Litigation Tables

Table A Total LASD Shootings


	2000			2001			2002		
	<i>On Duty</i>	<i>Off Duty</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>On Duty</i>	<i>Off Duty</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>On Duty</i>	<i>Off Duty</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hit ¹	18	0	18	19	0	19	22	0	22
Non-Hit ²	15	0	15	11	3	14	16	0	16
Accidental Discharge ³	11	1	12	9	4	13	12	1	13
Animal ⁴	35	2	37	33	1	34	35	5	40
Warning Shots ⁵	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tactical Shooting ⁶	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	81	3	84	72	8	80	86	6	92

	2003			2004			2005		
	<i>On Duty</i>	<i>Off Duty</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>On Duty</i>	<i>Off Duty</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>On Duty</i>	<i>Off Duty</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hit ¹	24	1	25	36	1	37	28	0	28
Non-Hit ²	20	1	21	19	1	20	18	3	21
Accidental Discharge ³	12	2	14	8	3	11	2	0	2
Animal ⁴	35	3	38	28	1	29	34	0	34
Warning Shots ⁵	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
Tactical Shooting ⁶	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	91	7	98	92	6	98	83	3	86

- 1 **Hit Shooting Incident:** An event consisting of one instance or related instances of shots (excluding stunbags) fired by a deputy(s) in which one or more deputies intentionally fire at and hit one or more people (including bystanders).
- 2 **Non-Hit Shooting Incident:** An event consisting of one instance or related instances of shots (excluding stunbags) fired by a deputy(s) in which one or more deputies intentionally fire at a person(s), but hit no one.
- 3 **Accidental Discharge Incident:** An event in which a single deputy discharges a round accidentally, including instances in which someone is hit by the round. Note: If two deputies accidentally discharge rounds, each is considered a separate accidental discharge incident.
- 4 **Animal Shooting Incident:** An event in which a deputy(s) intentionally fires at an animal to protect himself/herself or the public or for humanitarian reasons, including instances in which a person is hit by the round.
- 5 **Warning Shot Incident:** An event consisting of an instance of a deputy(s) intentionally firing a warning shot(s), including instances in which someone is hit by the round. Note: If a deputy fires a warning shot and then decides to fire at a person, the incident is classified as either a hit or non-hit shooting incident.
- 6 **Tactical Shooting:** An event consisting of an instance or related instances of a deputy(s) intentionally firing a firearm but not at a person, excluding warning shots (e.g., car tire, street light, etc.). Note: If a deputy fires at an object and then decides to fire at a person, the incident is classified as either a hit or non hit shooting incident.

Source: Internal Affairs Bureau

Table B **LASD Shootings 2000 to 2005**



Source: Internal Affairs Bureau

Table C LASD Hit Shootings by Unit

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Number Of Incidents	18	19	22	25	37	28
Altadena Station	1	0	0	0	0	0
Carson Station	1	1	2	0	1 [†]	1
Century Station	2	6 [*]	5	2 ^{**}	10 ^{††}	5 ^{†††}
Community Colleges Bureau	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1
Compton Station	NA	NA	0	6 ^{***}	6 ^{††}	2
Court Services Bureau	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Crescenta Valley Station	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0
East Los Angeles Station	2	0	0	0	0	2
Industry Station	0	1	1	1	1	1
Lakewood Station	0	2	1	1	4	1
Lancaster Station	1	0	1	0	1	1
Lennox Station	0	4	2	0	6	1
Lost Hills/Malibu	0	0	0	1	0	0
Major Crimes Bureau	0	0	0	2	0	0
Marina Del Rey Station	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	0
Men's Central Jail	NA	NA	NA	1 ^{****}	0	0
Mira Loma Facility	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous Units	NA	NA	0	0	0	0
Narcotics Bureau	1	0	0	1 ^{*****}	0	0
Norwalk Station	1	1 [*]	1	1	2	0
Operations Bureau	NA	NA	NA	NA	1 ^{††}	0
Palmdale Station	1	0	3	0	0	2
Pico Rivera	0	0	1	1	1	1
Safe Streets Bureau	NA	NA	1	4 ^{***}	3 ^{††}	3
San Dimas	0	0	1	0	0	0
Santa Clarita Valley Station	1	0	0	0	2	1
Special Enforcement Bureau	2	3 [*]	0	3	0	2 ^{†††}
Temple Station	3	1	1	1	0	2
Transit Services Bureau	0	0	0	1 ^{***}	1	1 ^{††††}
Walnut Station	0	1	0	0	0	0
West Hollywood Station	NA	NA	0	0	0	1
Number of Suspects Wounded	6	8 [*]	11	12	12	16
Number of Suspects Killed	12	12	11	16	27	12

* One shooting (2-18-01), involved three units (Century, Norwalk and SEB). Two suspects were wounded.

** In the Century Station shooting (5-1-03), one suspect was killed and one suspect was wounded.

*** One shooting (7/8/03) involved three units (Safe Streets Bureau, Compton Station, and Transit Services Bureau).

**** The Men's Central Jail shooting occurred off duty, away from the facility.

***** In the Narcotics Bureau shooting (11/11/03), two suspects were wounded.

† In the Carson Station shooting (3-31-04), one suspect was killed and one wounded.

†† One shooting (1-5-04) involved four units (Century, Compton, Safe Streets Bureau and Operations) and resulted in the deaths of two suspects.

††† In the Century Station shooting (5/29/05), one suspect was killed and one bystander was wounded.

†††† Both shootings occurred while assisting outside agencies (2/8/05 Downey Police Department; 6/7/05 California Highway Patrol).

††††† In the TSB shooting (3/24/05), one suspect was wounded and one deputy was wounded.

Source: Internal Affairs Bureau

Table D LASD Non-Hit Shootings by Unit

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Number Of Incidents	15	14	16	21	20	21
Carson Station	2	0	1	0	1**	1
Century Station	2	6	3	4	5**	3
		<i>(1 off duty)</i>				
Century/Compton Transit Services	2	1	0	0	0	0
Cerritos	NA	NA	1	0	0	0
Compton	NA	NA	2	4	3	3
Crescenta Valley Station	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	0
East Los Angeles Station	1	1	1	2	0	2
Gang Murder Task Force	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2
Homicide Bureau	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1
Industry Station	2	6	2	2	0	1
Lakewood Station	2	0	0	1	0	0
Lancaster Station	NA	NA	1	1	1	0
Lennox Station	0	1	1	2	1	2
Lost Hills Station	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	1
Marina del Rey	0	1	0	0	0	0
Men's Central Jail	0	1	0	1*	0	0
Narcotics Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norwalk Station	0	0	2	1	0	0
Palmdale Station	0	1	0	1	0	0
Pico Rivera	2	0	0	0	0	0
Safe Streets Bureau	0	1	0	1	3	4
Santa Clarita Valley Station	2	0	0	0	1	0
Special Enforcement Bureau	1	1	0	0	1	0
Temple Station	1	0	1	0	0	0
Transit Services Bureau	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	1
Twin Towers	NA	NA	0	0	1*	0
Walnut Station	NA	NA	0	1	0	0

* The Men's Central Jail and Twin Towers shootings occurred off duty, away from the facility.

** One shooting (2-6-04) involved two units (Carson and Century).

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Incidents Resulting in Force/Shooting Roll-Out	91	87	92	89	115	93

Source: Internal Affairs Bureau

Table E LASD Force

Department Wide*	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Force Incidents (Total)	2190	2399	2645	2643	2708
Total Force/100 Arrests	2.31	2.60	2.81	2.69	2.40
Significant Force:					
Hospitalization/Death/100 Arrests	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
Significant Force:					
Visible Injury/100 Arrests	0.52	0.63	0.68	0.78	0.70
Significant Force:					
Complaint of Pain/100 Arrests	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.42	0.40
Significant Force:					
No Complaint of Pain/Injury/100 Arrests	0.35	0.42	0.40	0.28	0.26
Less Significant Force Incidents/100 Arrests	0.43	0.75	0.88	0.48	1.02
OC Spray/100 Arrests	0.63	0.41	0.46	0.71	0.61
Field Operation Regions (FOR)	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Region I Force Incidents	349	401	406	496	527
Per 100 Arrests	1.19	1.40	1.40	1.44	1.37
Region II Force Incidents	584	568	589	634	629
Per 100 Arrests	1.85	1.96	2.1	2.35	2.04
Region III Force Incidents	353	271	356	354	349
Per 100 Arrests	0.21	0.96	1.17	1.16	1.14
FOR Total Force Incidents	1286	1240	1351	1484	1505
Per 100 Arrests	1.43	1.45	1.55	1.61	1.51
Field Operation Regions (FOR)	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Regions I, II & III Significant Force	739	700	699	782	832
Per 100 Arrests	0.82	0.82	0.80	0.85	0.83

* Includes all patrol stations and specialized units, including custody and court services.

Source: Management Information Services

Table F LASD Force/100 Arrests All Patrol Stations

Station	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Altadena	NA	1.87	1.68	1.31	1.88
Crescenta Valley	1.20	0.53	1.40	1.15	2.35
East LA	1.04	1.38	1.11	1.14	1.55
Lancaster	0.92	1.39	1.63	1.54	1.41
Lost Hills/Malibu	0.86	0.67	1.11	1.21	1.42
Palmdale	1.79	1.81	1.85	1.37	0.82
Santa Clarita	1.15	1.42	1.55	1.95	1.92
Temple	1.52	1.28	0.79	1.39	1.46
Region I Totals	1.21	1.40	1.40	1.44	1.37
Carson	1.33	1.44	1.56	1.77	1.86
Century	2.42	2.29	2.16	3.18	2.13
Community College	NA	NA	7.14	7.03	7.55
Compton	1.71	2.59	3.04	1.86	1.94
Lomita	1.50	2.32	0.87	1.17	0.66
Lennox	1.31	1.41	1.80	1.24	1.72
Marina del Rey	1.42	2.17	2.12	1.29	1.25
Transit Services Bureau	NA	1.71	2.06	4.53	3.11
West Hollywood	2.19	2.29	2.29	2.71	2.42
Region II Totals	1.87	1.96	2.10	2.35	2.04
Avalon	2.00	1.43	2.04	2.49	1.10
Cerritos	1.20	1.65	1.16	1.73	1.32
Industry	1.16	0.71	1.06	0.97	0.89
Lakewood	1.35	1.39	1.61	1.41	1.45
Norwalk	1.16	0.90	1.20	1.26	1.27
Pico Rivera	0.97	0.67	0.81	0.95	1.06
San Dimas	1.17	0.83	1.13	0.62	0.57
Walnut	0.78	1.03	0.80	0.87	0.82
Region III Totals	1.21	0.96	1.17	1.16	1.14

Source: Management Information Services

Table G Litigation, Department Financial Summaries


Lawsuits	FY 00-01	FY 01-02	FY 02-03	FY 03-04	FY 04-05
Police Liability	\$17,948,937.00	\$8,613,220.67	\$4,883,000.90	\$3,686,634.77	\$3,229,980.00
<i>Portion of Total for Alleged Excessive Force</i>	<i>(\$2,864,300.00)</i>	<i>(\$6,378,936.00)</i>	<i>(\$2,746,912.34)</i>	<i>(\$2,442,800.00)</i>	<i>(\$2,923,180.00)</i>
Personnel Issues	\$487,000.00	\$782,967.00	\$338,000.00	\$789,000.00	\$1,022.00
Auto Liability	\$458,843.00	\$508,505.03	\$3,765,373.65	\$229,991.59	\$1,514,405.89
Medical Liability	\$57,750.00	\$183,999.99	\$1,258,500.00	\$948,000.00	\$308,159.00
General Liability	\$500.00	\$105,000.00	\$131,519.80	\$10,000.00	\$6,250.00
Totals	\$18,953,030.00	\$10,193,692.69	\$10,376,394.35	\$5,663,626.36	\$5,059,816.89

Claims	FY 00-01	FY 01-02	FY 02-03	FY 03-04	FY 04-05
Police Liability	\$102,965.00	\$145,597.01	\$100,957.20	\$70,582.89	\$82,216.23
Auto Liability	\$162,718.00	\$229,450.54	\$225,683.02	\$296,686.14	\$189,480.12
Medical Liability	\$0.00	\$141.50	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
General Liability	\$2,722.00	\$1,284.13	\$259.85	\$0.00	\$3,133.86
Total	\$268,405.00	\$376,473.18	\$326,900.07	\$367,269.03	\$274,830.21

Incurred Claims/Lawsuits Liability Total **\$19,221,435.00 *** **\$10,570,165.87** **\$10,703,294.42** **\$6,030,895.39** **\$5,334,647.10**

* One settlement, in *Valentin v. County of Los Angeles*, accounts for \$13,913,695.00 of this total.
Source: Risk Management Bureau

Table H Incurred Liability 2000-2005



Source: Risk Management Bureau

Table I Litigation, Force Related Judgments and Settlements

FY 95-96	FY 96-97	FY 97-98	FY 98-99	FY 99-00
\$17 million*	\$3.72 million	\$1.62 million	\$27 million**	\$4.58 million***
FY 00-01	FY 01-02	FY 02-03	FY 03-04	FY 04-05
\$2.86 million	\$6.39 million	\$2.75 million	\$2.44 million	\$2.92 million

* Includes \$7.5 million for Darren Thompson paid over three years.

** Includes approximately \$20 million for 1989 Talamavaio case.

*** Includes \$4 million for Donald Scott and \$275,000 for Anthony Golden.

Source: Risk Management Bureau

Table J Litigation, Department Financial Summary, 2004-2005

	Dept. Funded	Contract City Funded	MTA Liability Funded	Totals
Lawsuits				
Police Liability	\$3,053,980.00	\$176,000.00	\$0.00	\$3,229,980.00
<i>(Portion of Total for Alleged Excessive Force)</i>	<i>\$2,754,180.00</i>	<i>\$169,000.00</i>	<i>\$0.00</i>	<i>\$2,923,180.00</i>
Personnel Issues	\$1,022.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,022.00
Auto Liability	\$1,063,905.89	\$294,000.00	\$156,500.00	\$1,514,405.89
Medical Liability	\$308,159.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$308,159.00
General Liability	\$6,250.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$6,250.00
Writs	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Lawsuit Total	\$4,433,316.89	\$470,000.00	\$156,500.00	\$5,059,816.89
Claims				
Police Liability	\$66,517.23	\$13,879.00	\$1,820.00	\$82,216.23
<i>(Portion of Total for Overdetentions)</i>	<i>\$6,825.00</i>	<i>\$0.00</i>	<i>\$0.00</i>	<i>\$6,825.00</i>
Auto Liability	\$158,038.63	\$19,169.33	\$12,272.16	\$189,480.12
Medical Liability	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
General Liability	\$133.86	\$3,000.00	\$0.00	\$3,133.86
Claim Total	\$224,689.72	\$36,048.33	\$14,092.16	\$274,830.21
Incurred Claims/ Lawsuits				
Liability Total	\$4,658,006.61	\$506,048.33	\$170,592.16	\$5,334,647.10

Source: Risk Management Bureau

Table K LASD Litigation Activity

Force Related Lawsuits, 1995-2005

	95-96	96-97	97-98	98-99	99-00	00-01	01-02	02-03	03-04	04-05
New Force Related Suits Served	83	61	54	41	54	67	78	68	57	59
Total Docket of Excessive Force Suits	132	108	84	70	93	102	71	118	94	124
Lawsuits Terminated										
Lawsuits Dismissed	42	39	27	20	24	34	21	37	47	31
Verdicts Won	6	3	6	1	1	4	3	5	8	10
Verdicts Against LASD	5	2	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	0
Settlements	82	41	45	32	12	21	23	41	26	18

Lawsuits Terminated, 2004-2005

	Dismissed	Settled Won	Verdicts Against	Verdicts	Totals
Police Liability	95	37	15	2	149
Medical Malpractice	21	7	1	0	29
Traffic	23	33	1	2	59
General Negligence	6	1	0	0	7
Personnel	5	0	0	2	6
Writ	5	0	0	0	5
Total	155	78	17	5	255

Active Lawsuits by Category 2000-2005

	7/1/00	7/1/01	7/1/02	7/1/03	7/1/04	7/1/05
Police Liability	341	299	322	313	224	257
Medical Malpractice	25	30	31	33	33	20
Traffic	37	50	57	59	78	60
General Negligence	3	12	9	10	10	12
Personnel	16	16	13	23	14	22
Writ	13	15	8	10	9	7
Total	435	422	440	448	368	378

Source: Risk Management Bureau

Table L Lawsuits and Claims Filed, 2000-2004

	FY 00-01	FY 01-02	FY 02-03	FY 03-04	FY 04-05
Lawsuits*	287	270	326	198	258
Claims**	1151	1052	1016	1064	885

* Includes Police Liability, Auto Liability, Medical Liability, General Negligence and Personnel Issues.
 ** Includes Police Liability, Auto Liability, Medical Liability, General Negligence and Inmate Over Detention claims.
 Source: Risk Management Bureau