



***Revised* Report of the Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission
Regarding the Unmanned Aircraft System Program of the
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department**

Dated: September 28, 2017

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PREAMBLE

The initial report of the ad hoc committee of the Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission (COC) was presented to the COC at its July 27, 2017 meeting.

Based upon discussion at the meeting, the staff has made the following limited revisions to the initial report by adding a reference to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certificate that provides that the Los Angeles Sheriff Department (LASD) is not permitted to arm or weaponize any Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) or drone operated by it. Further, if the full Commission adopts the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, the report now makes clear that this would not be signifying approval by the COC of the use of UASs or drones.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By motion of January 24, 2017, the Board of Supervisors (Board) requested the COC to evaluate the LASD UAS program announced by Sheriff Jim McDonnell at a press conference on January 12, 2017.

After forming an ad hoc committee, the COC studied the LASD's policies regarding proposed uses of the UAS, witnessed operational use of the LASD's UAS, considered the April 2017 report of the Office of Inspector General (OIG), took extensive public comment, and examined available literature regarding law enforcement use of UASs within the United States.

The authorized uses for a UAS under the Sheriff's policy are limited to emergency, life-threatening situations, such as hostage rescue, bomb detection, active shooter and HazMat spills. UASs are capable of giving the LASD situational awareness that would not otherwise be possible in certain situations, and there is little doubt that they will save lives in the future. Although a relatively new technology, UASs are a potentially important public safety and officer safety tool. However, in light of the understandable public concerns surrounding the use of UASs, or drones, the COC is troubled that the LASD did not itself take public comment *before* implementing its UAS program last January. Its recent efforts to do so are commendable.¹

After evaluating the UAS program and the protocols surrounding its limited authorized uses, and considering the significant public concerns regarding, among other things, privacy and mission creep, including potential arming of UASs, the COC makes the following recommendations designed to tighten the limited uses for which a UAS in their

¹ Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dept Information Bureau (2017). 89% of the General Public Favor Use of LASD's Unmanned Aircraft System. Retrieved from: https://local.nixle.com/alert/6077405/?sub_id=100000307.

UAS program may be authorized, provide for oversight of the UAS program by the COC, and increase transparency of the UAS program to the public. The adoption of these recommendations by the COC should not be construed as approval of the use of UASs:

Recommendations:

1. The Sheriff should explicitly and unequivocally state that he has no intention of arming or allowing the arming of any UAS operated by the LASD. This is in accordance with the FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA), which specifically prohibits the arming or weaponizing of the UAS.²
2. Before seeking to expand the types of missions for which a UAS can be used, the Sheriff should commit to notifying the COC and allowing time for the COC to receive public comment prior to doing so.
3. The LASD Policy Manual should make explicit that use of a UAS is limited to gaining situational awareness in emergency, life-threatening situations.
4. SEB should maintain a log of Notices To Airmen (NOTAMs), the type of operational use authorized, who authorized it and the results of each such use.
5. The Sheriff should notify the COC, within 48 hours, through its Executive Director, of any authorized operational uses of UASs and any unauthorized uses.
6. On a quarterly basis, the Sheriff should provide the COC with a report regarding all operational uses of the UAS, the type of mission for which such use was approved, the results of such uses, and whether or not they were within policy uses. Further, in the interest of transparency, we recommend that this data be published on the LASD website or a readily identifiable link.
7. The UAS Program should be audited on at least an annual basis by the LASD. Its audits should be provided to the COC and the OIG.
8. Modify the Unit Order and Policy Manual to limit preservation of video footage, except for training, from ten to two years, unless there is a pending case requiring that it be preserved beyond two years.

² See Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, page 8 "Flight Standards Special Provisions" Section Item Number 2, attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

9. Include a separate section in the Policy Manual that specifically addresses the LASD's commitment to maintaining individuals' privacy and other constitutional rights and operating according to the Constitution and the law regarding searches.
10. Assure prompt investigation and appropriate accountability, including discipline when warranted, for out-of-policy use of the UAS.

INTRODUCTION

On January 12, 2017, Sheriff Jim McDonnell held a press conference announcing that LASD had received approval from the FAA to use a small unmanned aircraft vehicle, also known as a drone or UAS. During his press conference, the Sheriff emphasized that the LASD's UAS would be used only in limited, specifically described emergency situations involving significant threats to life or serious property damage. The limited uses are set forth in a LASD Unit Order dated January 10, 2017, and are discussed in more detail below. The Sheriff also stated that the FAA has also given approval to thirty other law enforcement agencies throughout California for use of UASs. The Sheriff described the LASD's use of the UAS as a pilot program which would be monitored by the LASD on a continuing basis.

By motion on January 24, 2017, the Board requested the OIG to gather information and prepare a report regarding the planned uses of the LASD's UAS and present its report to the COC. The OIG report was presented to the COC on April 5, 2017.

In its motion, the Board requested the COC to review and supplement the OIG's report with input from the LASD, public comment and any other source it deemed pertinent. Further, the COC was requested to evaluate the UAS program, make such recommendations as appropriate, and provide feedback on public comments regarding the program.

ACTIONS OF THE COC

After receiving the Board's request, the COC and its staff took the following actions:

1. Established an ad hoc committee consisting of three commissioners to work with the COC staff to study the LASD UAS program and report back to the full commission. The members of the ad hoc committee are Commissioners Lael Rubin, Priscilla Ocen and James P. Harris.
2. Carefully studied the OIG's report of April 2017 titled "Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Unmanned Aircraft System Evaluation."
3. Observed a demonstration of operational capabilities and an actual operational use by the LASD's Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) personnel of the LASD's UAS program.

4. Interviewed members of the SEB regarding the rationale for and limited uses of the UAS and Unit Order 2017-01 and met with the Sheriff and Undersheriff to discuss the program.
5. Took extensive public comment at several meetings of the COC and a special meeting of the ad hoc committee regarding the Sheriff's plan for limited use of the UAS.
6. Reviewed relevant literature and legislation, including United States Justice Department policy guidance for use of UASs by law enforcement organizations.³

SHERIFF POLICY AND THE USES OF THE UAS

At Sheriff McDonnell's press conference on January 12, 2017, and as stated in LASD Unit Order 2017-01 dated January 10, 2017,⁴ Sheriff McDonnell made clear that the use of the UAS is limited to "high-risk tactical/rescue/HazMat emergencies". In other words, use of a UAS is limited to "situations of extreme threat." The only missions for which the UAS can be authorized are the following emergency situations:

1. Search and rescue;
2. Explosive ordnance detection;
3. Disaster response;
4. Barricaded suspects;
5. Hostage and other high-risk tactical operations;⁵
6. Hazardous materials incidents; and
7. Fire-related incidents.

It recognizes that use of a UAS will be limited to "circumstances which would save life and property, as well as in situations to detect possible dangers that could not otherwise be seen."

³ Department of Justice (2015). DOJ Policy Guidance-Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Retrieved from: <https://www.justice.gov/file/441266/download>; Valdovinos, Maria, Specht, James, and Zeunik, Jennifer (2016). Law Enforcement & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust. Retrieved from: <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UAS-Report.pdf>; International Association of Chiefs of Police Aviation Committee (2012). Recommended Guidelines for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft. Retrieved from: http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/iacp_uaguidelines.pdf.

⁴ See LASD Unit Order 2017-01, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

⁵ Now includes active shooter situations. See LASD Proposed Manual Revision, 2017-003-02, attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

The Unit Order is explicit that:

“The UAS SHALL NOT be used for random surveillance missions or missions that would violate the privacy rights of the public.” (Emphasis in the original).

In addition to limiting the use of the UAS to defined emergency missions involving threats to life, the Unit Order also establishes the procedures that must be followed before use of a UAS. In this regard, it limits the operation of a UAS to SEB and within SEB, to FAA certified deputies. Authority, and therefore accountability have been limited. Only an SEB Team Commander can authorize the deployment of a UAS, and then only when there is an emergency mission within the limited ones described in the Unit Order. The authorization must be made “prior to deployment” (Ex. 1, para. 4.) Further, the Unit Order requires two-person teams and makes clear that “[e]ach SEB UAS operator shall be cognizant of, and sensitive to, the privacy rights of individuals” when operating a UAS and that all uses of a UAS must be documented with a public NOTAM prior to its operation.

In response to an OIG recommendation, the Sheriff has revised the LASD Policy Manual to incorporate the policies and procedures of the Unit Order into Department-wide policy and made clear that “no other member of the Department shall deploy their own personal UAS during the course of their duties.”⁶

Within the SEB, the LASD has three lieutenants and eight deputies trained and authorized to fly a UAS. The department has only one UAS, a DJI company model HV-44B, which is about 20 inches in diameter and weighs approximately six pounds. It is *not* armed, nor is it “equipped in any way to accommodate weapons.”⁷ There are no plans to arm the UAS. The UAS is equipped with a camera set to a default mode of not recording. The SEB operator is required to get approval from an SEB Team Commander before activating the record function of the camera. Recorded video footage can be preserved up to ten years.

As of July 27, 2017, the LASD has operationally used the UAS on six occasions, one of which was witnessed by the COC’s staff. Of the six uses, one involved a dangerous, armed gunman and the others were search and rescue missions for a missing woman and for a missing young boy.⁸ All missions were within the limited use policy of the LASD.

⁶ See Exhibit 3.

⁷ Office of Inspector General (2017). Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Unmanned Aircraft System Evaluation, p. 4. Retrieved from:

<https://oig.lacounty.gov/Portals/OIG/Reports/Los%20Angeles%20County%20Sheriff's%20Department%20Unmanned%20Aircraft%20System%20Evaluation.pdf?ver=2017-04-20-172758-373>

⁸ Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dept Information Bureau (2017). 89% of the General Public Favor Use of LASD’s Unmanned Aircraft System. Retrieved from: https://local.nixle.com/alert/6077405/?sub_id=100000307.

OIG REPORT

On April 5, 2017, the OIG delivered a report to the COC evaluating the LASD's UAS program.⁹ Although we will not summarize the report, the OIG's key findings and recommendations are set as follows.

Key findings of the OIG include:

1. UAS operators are deputies assigned to the LASD SEB who "have received a great deal of training and have passed a FAA certification test" and "are among the most highly-trained deputies in the department."¹⁰
2. The SEB handles high-risk situations such as barricaded suspects, hostage situations, search and rescue, arson fire investigations and bomb squad. The UAS deputies are "very well informed and extremely dedicated to the safe and ethical operation" of the UAS.¹¹
3. "There appear to be proper safeguards within the Unit Order to operate the UAS in a responsible and safe manner keeping privacy rights in mind".¹²
4. "The LASD's Unit Order appears to be narrowly tailored to the public safety missions to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property and does not allow for the improper surveillance of the public."¹³
5. The LASD's Unit Order is clear regarding its limitation to specific, emergency, potential life-threatening missions and it is also clear that a UAS is not to be used to conduct non-exigent surveillance.

The OIG report also has a legal analysis of privacy issues and the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, as they apply to the limited missions for which use of an UAS is authorized. In substance, the OIG report notes that searches without warrants are usually considered to be reasonable only if "exigent circumstances" exist, such as an emergency situation posing imminent danger to life or property, or to prevent the imminent escape of a suspect or loss of evidence. Regarding the limited emergency-type missions for which a UAS is authorized, the OIG opines that such missions would likely fall within the judicially recognized definition of "exigent circumstances." Furthermore, the OIG report notes

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹² Ibid., p. 7.

¹³ Ibid., p. 9.

that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” that citizens are accorded under the Fourth Amendment does not apply to barricaded suspects or hostage situations, and that law enforcement observations of public spaces do not “constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.”

The OIG report makes five recommendations:

1. The LASD should continue its commitment to transparency in their operation of the UAS by providing information to the public on the uses of its UAS.
2. The LASD should develop a department-wide policy on the use of its UAS which would ban the use of ANY UAS by any other units or deputies during the course of their official duties.
3. The current SEB Unit Order makes clear that a UAS should not be used for “random surveillance missions,” but as the primary mission/focus of utilizing a UAS appears to be gaining situational awareness in life-threatening situations, this limited goal warrants more emphasis in the LASD policy. The term “non-emergency surveillance” would better describe the intent of the LASD not to use an UAS for the mere gathering of criminal evidence outside of emergency situations. In addition, one of the listed uses in the Unit Order should specifically include an “active shooter” type situation since these incidents do not always include barricades or hostages.
4. The LASD should provide a record of usage, flight time, training and maintenance issues along with copies of all NOTAMs issued as a result of the UAS deployment. These documents/logs should be addressed within an operational type manual.
5. The LASD should continually research and implement “Best Practices” regarding the use of these systems.

The COC agrees with the OIG’s recommendations listed above. Moreover, we note that by letter dated March 30, 2017, Sheriff McDonnell concurred with all five OIG recommendations, and directed the LASD Audit and Accountability Bureau to monitor implementation of the recommendations.¹⁴

¹⁴ See Sheriff McDonnell's Letter to Inspector General Huntsman dated March 30, 2017, attached hereto as Exhibit 4

PUBLIC COMMENT AND FEEDBACK

Members of the public expressed their concerns regarding the LASD's announced use of the UAS at four of the COC's regular monthly meetings, its January 26, March 23, April 27, and May 25, 2017 meetings, and also at a community meeting held by the COC ad hoc committee on April 21, 2017. The UAS issue was explicitly agendized for the January 26, 2017 and the April 27, 2017 meetings of the COC, in part, to receive public comment. In addition, the COC and its staff received input from individual members of the community.

In total, several dozen members of the public addressed the COC at its public hearings on the subject of UASs. Without exception, the comments of every member of the public who addressed the COC were resoundingly negative. Much of the public comment included opposition from the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, including Mr. Hamid Khan and other members. Other organizations expressing opposition to the use of UASs, or drones, included the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Dignity and Power Now and the Youth Justice Coalition.

Mr. Khan and other members of the public who spoke were and are adamantly and passionately opposed to the use of UASs by the Sheriff's Department. Among other things, they indicated that their opposition was based upon concerns that:

1. Use of UASs will lead to an increase in the militarization of the LASD. In a letter to the OIG dated March 7, 2017, Mr. Khan stated that "[t]he addition of Drones would further signify the structural and operational formation of the LASD as an occupying institution that operates as a counter-insurgency force."¹⁵
2. There will be "mission creep." Even if initially UASs are authorized for limited emergency, life-threatening types of missions, it will lead to additional, more invasive uses.
3. In 2012, without notice the LASD used a *manned* aircraft in Compton to conduct mass surveillance in violation of privacy rights of residents. The LASD cannot be trusted to operate UASs.
4. Drones are associated with military uses and with "death and destruction."

¹⁵ See Mr. Khan's letter to the Office of Inspector General dated March 7, 2017, attached hereto as Exhibit 5.

A report was distributed by the ACLU during one of the meetings, “Making Smart Decisions About Surveillance,” which detailed community guidelines for accountability, transparency and oversight of such programs.¹⁶

The Sheriff was also criticized for implementing a policy allowing for use of the UAS without first getting public comment and input.

There is no question that the opposition that the COC heard from the public was sincerely motivated. There is considerable public angst surrounding the potential use of UASs and much of it stems from a lack of trust. They also pointed with alarm to legislation in at least one state (North Dakota) which permits law enforcement to attach weapons to UASs.

ANALYSIS

LASD’s limited use of the UAS can be an important component for providing situational awareness in high-risk emergency, life-threatening situations faced by the LASD, such as rescuing a hostage being held at gun point, responding to an active shooter situation, performing search and rescue missions in dangerous terrain, defusing a bomb planted in a public space, and investigating HazMat spills to determine the best strategies for containment without exposing the public and first responders to serious injuries. Indeed, it is likely that UASs will save lives. Used properly and within the limitations set by the Sheriff, UASs are an important public safety and officer safety tool.

It is unfortunate that the Sheriff did not obtain public comment before implementing the use of its UAS program in January of this year. As was clear from public comment received by the COC, there is a genuine and serious concern about the potential abuse of UASs by law enforcement. While the UAS technology is not particularly new, its use by law enforcement organizations is. Moreover, use by the United States military of much larger armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, is well known to the public and understandably unnerving to anyone who distrusts law enforcement. Unfortunately, a significant number of individuals in our community and nationally simply do not trust law enforcement. In our recommendations below, we address concerns about arming of UASs and mission creep that are not adequately addressed by the SEB Unit Order and Policy Manual changes.

We note that at the suggestion of the COC ad hoc committee, the Sheriff recently set up mechanisms to directly receive comments from the public. His willingness, even now, to reach out, receive and evaluate public comment is laudable.

¹⁶ ACLU (2016). Making Smart Decisions About Surveillance, Retrieved from: https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20160325-making_smart_decisions_about_surveillance.pdf.

The role of the COC is to promote meaningful reform within the LASD and to help restore public trust between the LASD and the communities it serves. This will not be easy, but it does involve encouraging increased transparency and accountability on the part of the LASD. Regarding its use of the UAS, the recommendations below are intended to further those goals. Implementing these recommendations, in our view, will help build public trust.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The COC recommends the following:

1. The Sheriff should explicitly and unequivocally state that the UAS operated by the LASD is not armed and that he has no intention of arming a UAS. Such a statement would be a confirmation of and consistent with the FAA COA which specifically prohibits the use of munitions or otherwise weaponizing UASs.¹⁷
2. Before seeking to expand the types of missions for which a UAS can be used, the Sheriff should commit to notifying the COC and allowing time for the COC to receive public comment prior to doing so.
3. The LASD Policy Manual should make explicit that use of a UAS is limited to gaining situational awareness in emergency, life-threatening situations.
4. SEB should maintain a log of NOTAMs, the type of operational use authorized, who authorized it and the results of each such use.
5. The Sheriff should notify the COC, within 48 hours, through its Executive Director, of any authorized operational uses of UASs and any unauthorized uses.
6. On a quarterly basis, the Sheriff should provide the COC with a report regarding all operational uses of the UAS, the type of mission for which such use was approved, the results of such uses, and whether or not they were within policy uses. Further, in the interest of transparency, we recommend that this data be published on the LASD website or a readily identifiable link.
7. The UAS Program should be audited on at least an annual basis by the LASD. Its audits should be provided to the COC and the OIG.


¹⁷ See attached Exhibit 1.

8. Modify the Unit Order and Policy Manual to limit preservation of video footage, except for training, from ten to two years, unless there is a pending case requiring that it be preserved beyond two years.
9. Include a separate section in the Policy Manual that specifically addresses the LASD's commitment to maintaining individuals' privacy and other constitutional rights and operating according to the Constitution and the law regarding searches.
10. Assure prompt investigation and appropriate accountability, including discipline when warranted, for out-of-policy use of the UAS.

EXHIBIT 1 – DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION CERTIFICATE OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION

FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment
Blanket Area Public Safety Agency COA
2016-WSA-178-COA

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<small>DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION</small> CERTIFICATE OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION	
<small>ISSUED TO</small> Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department 1060 N. Eastern Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90063	
This certificate is issued for the operations specifically described hereinafter. No person shall conduct any operation pursuant to the authority of this certificate except in accordance with the standard and special provisions contained in this certificate, and such other requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations not specifically waived by this certificate.	
<small>OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED</small> Operation of small Unmanned Aircraft System(s) weighing less than 55 Lbs. only in Class G airspace at or below 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) under the provisions of this authorization. See Special Provisions.	
<small>LIST OF WAIVED REGULATIONS BY SECTION AND TITLE</small> N/A	
STANDARD PROVISIONS	
1. A copy of the application made for this certificate shall be attached and become a part hereof. 2. This certificate shall be presented for inspection upon the request of any authorized representative of the Federal Aviation Administration, or of any State or municipal official charged with the duty of enforcing local laws or regulations. 3. The holder of this certificate shall be responsible for the strict observance of the terms and provisions contained herein. 4. This certificate is nontransferable.	
Note-This certificate constitutes a waiver of those Federal rules or regulations specifically referred to above. It does not constitute a waiver of any State law or local ordinance.	
SPECIAL PROVISIONS	
Special Provisions are set forth and attached.	
This certificate, 2016-WSA-178, is effective from September 10, 2016 through September 9, 2018 and is subject to cancellation at any time upon notice by the Administrator or his/her authorized representative. Should a renewal become necessary, the proponent shall advise the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in writing, no later than 45 business days prior to the requested effective date.	
BY DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR	
FAA Headquarters, AJV-115 <small>(Region)</small>	 Scott J. Gardner <small>(Signature)</small>
September 8, 2016 <small>(Date)</small>	Acting Manager, UAS Tactical Operations Section <small>(Title)</small>

FAA Form 7711-1 (7-74)

Version 1.2: May 18, 2016

COA Number: 2016-WSA-178

Issued To: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, referred herein as the "proponent"

Address: 1060 N. Eastern Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90063

STANDARD PROVISIONS

A. General.

The review of this activity is based upon current understanding of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations and their impact on the National Airspace System (NAS). This Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) will not be considered a precedent for future operations. As changes in, or understanding of, UAS operations occur, the associated limitations and conditions may be adjusted.

All personnel engaged in the operation of the UAS in accordance with this authorization must read and comply with the conditions, limitations, and provisions of this COA.

A copy of the COA including the special limitations must be immediately available to all operational personnel at each operating location whenever UAS operations are being conducted.

This COA may be canceled at any time by the Administrator, a person authorized to grant the authorization, or a representative designated to monitor a specific operation. As a general rule, this authorization may be canceled when it is no longer required, when there is an abuse of its provisions, or when unforeseen safety factors develop. Failure to comply with the authorization is cause for cancellation. All cancellations will be provided in writing to the proponent.

During the time this COA is approved and active, a site safety evaluation/visit may be accomplished to ensure COA compliance, assess any adverse impact on ATC or airspace, and ensure this COA is not burdensome or ineffective. Deviations, accidents/incidents/mishaps, complaints, etc. will prompt a COA review or site visit to address the issue. Refusal to allow a site safety evaluation/visit may result in cancellation of the COA. Note: This section does not pertain to agencies that have other existing agreements in place with the FAA.

Public Aircraft Operations are defined by statutes 49 USC §40102(a)(41) and §40125. All public aircraft operations conducted under a COA must comply with the terms of the statutes.

B. Airworthiness Certification.

The unmanned aircraft must be shown to be airworthy to conduct flight operations in the NAS. The proponent has made its own determination that the unmanned aircraft is airworthy. The unmanned aircraft must be operated in strict compliance with all provisions and conditions contained in the Airworthiness Safety Release (AWR), including all documents and provisions referenced in the COA application.

1. A configuration control program must be in place for hardware and/or software changes made to the UAS to ensure continued airworthiness. If a new or revised Airworthiness Release is generated as a result of changes in the hardware or software affecting the operating characteristics of the UAS, notify the UAS Integration Office via email at 2-AJV-115-UASOrganization@faa.gov of the changes as soon as practical.
 - a. Software and hardware changes should be documented as part of the normal maintenance procedures. Software changes to the aircraft and control station as well as hardware system changes are classified as major changes unless the agency has a formal process accepted by the FAA. These changes should be provided to the UAS Integration Office in summary form at the time of incorporation.
 - b. Major modifications or changes, performed under the COA, or other authorizations that could potentially affect the safe operation of the system, must be documented and provided to the FAA in the form of a new AWR, unless the agency has a formal process, accepted by the FAA.
 - c. All previously flight proven systems, to include payloads, may be installed or removed as required and that activity must be recorded in the unmanned aircraft and ground control stations logbooks by persons authorized to conduct UAS maintenance. Describe any payload equipment configurations in the UAS logbook that will result in a weight and balance change, electrical loads, and or flight dynamics, unless the agency has a formal process, accepted by the FAA.
 - d. For unmanned aircraft system discrepancies, a record entry should be made by an appropriately rated person to document the finding in the logbook. No flights may be conducted following major changes, modifications or new installations unless the party responsible for certifying airworthiness has determined the system is safe to operate in the NAS and a new AWR is generated, unless the agency has a formal process, accepted by the FAA. The successful completion of these major changes, modifications or new installations must be recorded in the appropriate logbook, unless the agency has a formal process, accepted by the FAA.
2. The unmanned aircraft must be operated in strict compliance with all provisions and conditions contained within the spectrum analysis assigned and authorized for use within the defined operations area.
3. All items contained in the application for equipment frequency allocation must be adhered to, including the assigned frequencies and antenna equipment characteristics. A

ground operational check to verify that the control station can communicate with the aircraft (frequency integration check) must be conducted prior to the launch of the unmanned aircraft to ensure any electromagnetic interference does not adversely affect control of the aircraft

C. Safety of Flight.

1. The proponent or delegated representative is responsible for halting or canceling activity conducted under the provisions of this COA if, at any time, the safety of persons or property on the ground or in the air is in jeopardy, or if there is a failure to comply with the terms or conditions of this authorization.
2. Sterile Cockpit Procedures.
 - a. No crewmember may perform any duties during a critical phase of flight not required for the safe operation of the aircraft.
 - b. Critical phases of flight include all ground operations involving:
 - 1) Taxi (movement of an aircraft under its own power on the surface of an airport),
 - 2) Take-off and landing (launch or recovery), and
 - 3) All other flight operations in which safety or mission accomplishment might be compromised by distractions.
 - c. No crewmember may engage in, nor may any pilot in command (PIC) permit, any activity during a critical phase of flight which could:
 - 1) Distract any crewmember from the performance of his/her duties, or
 - 2) Interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties.
 - d. The pilot and/or the PIC must not engage in any activity not directly related to the operation of the aircraft. Activities include, but are not limited to: operating UAS sensors or other payload systems.
 - e. The use of cell phones or other electronic devices is restricted to communications pertinent to the operational control of the unmanned aircraft and any required communications with Air Traffic Control.
3. See-and-Avoid.
 - a. Unmanned aircraft have no on-board pilot to perform see-and-avoid responsibilities; therefore, when operating outside of active restricted and warning areas approved for aviation activities, provisions must be made to ensure that an equivalent level of safety exists for unmanned operations. Adherence to 14 CFR Part 91 §91.111, §91.113 and §91.115, is required.
 - 1) The PIC is responsible:
 - (a) To remain clear and give way to all manned aviation operations and activities at all times,

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- (b) For the safety of persons or property on the surface with respect to the UAS operation,
 - (c) For ensuring that there is a safe operating distance between aviation activities and unmanned aircraft (UA) at all times, and
 - (d) For operating in compliance with CFR Parts 91.111, 91.113 and 91.115
- 2) The PIC is responsible to ensure that any visual observer (VO):
- (a) Can perform their required duties,
 - (b) Are able to see the UA and the surrounding airspace throughout the entire flight, and
 - (b) Are able to provide the PIC with the UA's flight path and proximity to all aviation activities and other hazards (e.g., terrain, weather, structures) sufficiently for the PIC to exercise effective control of the UA to prevent the UA from creating a collision hazard.
- 3) VO(s) must be used at all times and must maintain instantaneous communication with the PIC. Electronic messaging or texting is not permitted during flight operations.
- 4) The use of multiple successive VO(s) (daisy chaining) is prohibited.
- 5) VO(s) must be able to communicate clearly to the PIC any instructions required to remain clear of conflicting traffic.
- 6) All VO(s) must complete sufficient training to communicate to the PIC any information required to remain clear of conflicting traffic, terrain, and obstructions, maintain proper cloud clearances, and provide navigational awareness. This training, at a minimum, must include knowledge of:
- (a) Their responsibility to assist PICs in complying with the requirements of:
 - Section [91.111](#), Operating Near Other Aircraft,
 - Section [91.113](#), Right-of-Way Rules: Except Water Operations,
 - Section [91.115](#), Right-of-Way Rules: Water Operations,
 - Section [91.119](#), Minimum Safe Altitudes: General, and
 - Section [91.155](#), Basic VFR Weather Minimums
 - (b) Air traffic and radio communications, including the use of approved air traffic control (ATC)/pilot phraseology
 - (c) Appropriate sections of the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM)
- b. The proponent must not operate in Restricted Areas, Prohibited Areas, Special Flight Rule Areas or the Washington DC Flight Restricted Zone. Such areas are depicted on charts available at http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/. Additionally, aircraft operators should beware of and avoid other areas identified in

Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS) that restrict operations in proximity to Power Plants, Electric Substations, Dams, Wind Farms, Oil Refineries, Industrial Complexes, National Parks, The Disney Resorts, Stadiums, Emergency Services, Military or other Federal Facilities unless approval is received from the appropriate authority prior to the UAS Mission.

- c. The unmanned aircraft will be registered prior to operations in accordance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

D. Reporting Requirements

1. Documentation of all operations associated with UAS activities is required regardless of the airspace in which the UAS operates. NOTE: Negative (zero flights) reports are required.
2. The proponent must submit the following information on a monthly basis to UAS COA On-Line:
 - a. Name of proponent, and aircraft registration number,
 - b. UAS type and model,
 - c. All operating locations, to include city name and latitude/longitude,
 - d. Number of flights (per location, per aircraft),
 - e. Total aircraft operation hours,
 - f. Takeoff or landing damage, and
 - g. Equipment malfunction. Required reports include, but are not limited to, failures or malfunctions to the:
 - 1) Control station
 - 2) Electrical system
 - 3) Fuel system
 - 4) Navigation system
 - 5) On-board flight control system
 - 6) Powerplant
3. The number and duration of lost link events (control, performance and health monitoring, or communications) per UAS, per flight.
4. Incident/Accident/Mishap Reporting

After an incident or accident that meets the criteria below, and within 24 hours of that incident, accident or event described below, the proponent must provide initial notification of the following to the FAA via email at mailto: 9-AJV-115-UASOrganization@faa.gov and via the UAS COA On-Line forms (Incident/Accident).

 - a. All accidents/mishaps involving UAS operations where any of the following occurs:
 - 1) Fatal injury, where the operation of a UAS results in a death occurring within 30 days of the accident/mishap

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- 2) Serious injury, where the operation of a UAS results in:
 - (a) Hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date of the injury was received;
 - (b) A fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose);
 - (c) Severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage;
 - (d) Involving any internal organ; or
 - (e) Involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.
 - 3) Total unmanned aircraft loss
 - 4) Substantial damage to the unmanned aircraft system where there is damage to the airframe, power plant, or onboard systems that must be repaired prior to further flight
 - 5) Damage to property, other than the unmanned aircraft.
- b. Any incident/mishap that results in an unsafe/abnormal operation including but not limited to
- 1) A malfunction or failure of the unmanned aircraft's on-board flight control system (including navigation)
 - 2) A malfunction or failure of ground control station flight control hardware or software (other than loss of control link)
 - 3) A power plant failure or malfunction
 - 4) An in-flight fire
 - 5) An aircraft collision involving another aircraft.
 - 6) Any in-flight failure of the unmanned aircraft's electrical system requiring use of alternate or emergency power to complete the flight
 - 7) A deviation from any provision contained in the COA
 - 8) A deviation from an ATC clearance and/or Letter(s) of Agreement/Procedures
 - 9) A lost control link event resulting in
 - (a) Fly-away, or
 - (b) Execution of a pre-planned/unplanned lost link procedure.
- c. Initial reports must contain the information identified in the COA On-Line Accident/Incident Report.
- d. Follow-on reports describing the accident/incident/mishap(s) must be submitted by providing copies of proponent aviation accident/incident reports upon completion of safety investigations.
- e. Civil operators and Public-use agencies (other than those which are part of the Department of Defense) are advised that the above procedures are not a substitute for separate accident/incident reporting required by the National Transportation Safety Board under 49 CFR Part 830 §830.5.
- f. For other than Department of Defense operations, this COA is issued with the provision that the FAA be permitted involvement in the proponent's

incident/accident/mishap investigation as prescribed by FAA Order 8020.11,
Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting.

E. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM).

A distant (D) NOTAM must be issued when unmanned aircraft operations are being conducted unless notification of UAS operations will compromise the safety of the public agency. This requirement may be accomplished:

1. Through the proponent's local base operations or NOTAM issuing authority, or
2. By contacting the NOTAM Flight Service Station at 1-877-4-US-NTMS (1-877-487-6867) not more than 72 hours in advance, but not less than 24 hours for UAS operations prior to the operation. The issuing agency will require the:
 - a. Name and address of the pilot filing the NOTAM request
 - b. Location, altitude and operating area
 - c. Time and nature of the activity.

Note: The NOTAM must identify actual coordinates and a Radial/DME fix of a prominent navigational aid, with a radius no larger than that where visual line of sight with the UA can be maintained. The NOTAM must be filed to indicate the defined operations area and periods of UA activity. NOTAMs for generalized, wide-area, or continuous periods are not acceptable.

3. Due to the immediacy of some tactical operations, it is understood by the Federal Aviation Administration that this NOTAM notification may be reduced to no less than 30 minutes prior to these operations.

FLIGHT STANDARDS SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Failure to comply with any of the conditions and limitations of this COA will be grounds for the immediate suspension or cancellation of this COA.

1. Operations authorized by this COA are limited to UAS weighing less than 55 pounds, including payload. Proposed operations of any UAS weighing more than 55 pounds will require the proponent to provide the FAA with a new airworthiness Certificate (if necessary), Registration, Aircraft Description, Control Station, Communication System Description, Picture of UAS and any Certified TSO components. Approval to operate the new UAS is contingent on acknowledgement from FAA of receipt of acceptable documentation.
2. External Load Operations, dropping or spraying aircraft stores, or carrying hazardous materials (including munitions) is prohibited.
3. The UA may not be operated at a speed exceeding 87 knots (100 miles per hour). The COA holder may use either groundspeed or calibrated airspeed to determine compliance with the

87 knot speed restriction. In no case will the UA be operated at airspeeds greater than the maximum operating airspeed recommended by the aircraft manufacturer.

4. The proponent shall conduct and document initial training at a specific training site that will allow for the conduct of scenario-based training exercises. This training should foster a high level of flight proficiency and promote efficient, standardized coordination among pilots, visual observers, and ground crew members. To ensure safety and compliance, the training site should be well clear of housing areas, roads, non-participating persons, and watercraft. When the proponent has determined that sufficient training scenarios have been completed to achieve an acceptable level of competency, the proponent is authorized to conduct UAS public aircraft operations in accordance with Title 49 USC §§ Part 40125 at any location within the National Airspace System under the provisions of this COA.
5. The UA must be operated within visual line of sight (VLOS) of the Pilot in Command (PIC) and or the visual observer (VO) at all times. This requires the PIC and VO to be able to use human vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses, as specified on their FAA-issued airman medical certificate or equivalent medical certification as determined by the government entity conducting the PAO. The VO may be used to satisfy the VLOS requirement as long as the PIC always maintains VLOS capability.
6. This COA and all documents needed to operate the UAS and conduct operations in accordance with the conditions and limitations stated in this COA are hereinafter referred to as the operating documents. The Proponent must follow the procedures as outlined in the operating documents. If a discrepancy exists within the operating documents, the procedures outlined in the approved COA take precedence and must be followed. The proponent may update or revise the operating documents, excluding the approved COA, as needed. It is the proponent's responsibility to track such revisions and present updated and revised operating documents to the Administrator or any law enforcement official upon request. The proponent must also present updated and revised documents if they petition for extension or amendment to this COA. If the proponent determines that any update or revision would affect the basis upon which the FAA granted this COA, then the proponent must petition for an amendment to this COA. The FAA's UAS Integration Office (AFS-80) may be contacted if questions arise regarding updates or revisions to the operating documents.
7. The operating documents must be accessible during UAS operations and made available to the Administrator and/or law enforcement upon request.
8. Any UAS that has undergone maintenance or alterations that affect the UAS operation or flight characteristics, (e.g., replacement of a flight critical component), must undergo a functional test flight prior to conducting further operations under this COA. Functional test flights may only be conducted by a PIC with a VO and must remain at least 500 feet from other people. The functional test flight must be conducted in such a manner so as to not pose an undue hazard to persons and property.
9. The proponent is responsible for maintaining and inspecting the UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation.
10. Prior to each flight, the PIC must conduct a pre-flight inspection and determine the UAS is in a condition for safe flight. The pre-flight inspection must account for all potential

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discrepancies (e.g. inoperable components, items, or equipment). If the inspection reveals a condition that affects the safe operation of the UAS, the aircraft is prohibited from operating until the necessary maintenance has been performed and the UAS is found to be in a condition for safe flight.

11. The proponent must follow the UAS manufacturer's maintenance; overhaul, replacement, inspection, and life limit requirements for the aircraft and aircraft components.
12. Each UAS operated under this COA must comply with all manufacturer safety bulletins.
13. Government entities conducting public aircraft operations (PAO) involve operations for the purpose of fulfilling a government function that meet certain conditions specified under Title 49 United States Code, Section 40102(a)(41) & 40125(a)(2). PAO is limited by the statute to certain government operations within U.S. airspace. These operations must comply with general operating rules including those applicable to all aircraft in the National Airspace System. Government entities may exercise their own internal processes regarding aircraft certification, airworthiness, pilot, aircrew, and maintenance personnel certification and training.
14. The Proponent may not permit any PIC to operate unless the PIC demonstrates the ability to safely operate the UAS in a manner consistent with how the UAS will be operated under this COA, including evasive and emergency maneuvers and maintaining appropriate distances from persons, vessels, vehicles and structures. PIC qualification flight hours and currency must be logged in a manner consistent with 14 CFR § Part 61.51(b). Flights for the purposes of training the proponent's PICs and VOs (training, proficiency, and experience-building) and determining the PIC's ability to safely operate the UAS in a manner consistent with how the UAS will be operated under this COA are permitted under the terms of this COA. However, training operations may only be conducted during dedicated training sessions. During training, proficiency, and experience-building flights, all persons not essential for flight operations are considered nonparticipants, and the PIC must operate the UA with appropriate distance from nonparticipants in accordance with 14 CFR § Part 91.119.
15. Pilots are reminded to follow all federal regulations (e.g. remain clear of all Temporary Flight Restrictions). Additionally, operations over areas administered by the National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or U.S. Forest Service must be conducted in accordance with Department of Interior/US Fish & Wildlife Service requirements. (See 50 CFR §§ Part 27.34 and FAA Aeronautical Information Manual Section 4, paragraph 7-4-6.)
16. The presence of observers (i.e. spectators) during flight operations, other than initial or recurrent pilot-in-command and visual observer training is authorized given compliance with the following provisions:
 - a. Observers will receive a safety briefing that addresses the mission intent, safety barriers, non-interference with UAS mission personnel, and emergency procedures in the event of an incident or accident.
 - b. Observers will be directed to, and contained within, a specific observation point that minimized the risk of injury and ensures that they do not interfere with the UAS mission.

- c. Proponent will ensure that observers do not engage in conversations, discussions, or interviews that distract any crewmember or mission personnel from the performance of his/her duties or interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties.
 - d. Proponent will limit the number of observers to that which can be adequately monitored and protected by personnel and resources onsite.
 - e. Operation will be conducted in compliance with ALL of the existing provisions, conditions and mitigations of this COA.
17. UAS operations may only be conducted during the daytime and may not be conducted during night, as defined in 14 CFR § Part 1.1. All operations must be conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Flights under special visual flight rules (SVFR) are not authorized.
18. The UA may not be operated less than 500 feet below or less than 2,000 feet horizontally from a cloud or when visibility is less than 3 statute miles from the PIC.
19. If the UAS loses communications or loses its GPS signal, the UA must return to a pre-determined location within the defined operating area.
20. The PIC must abort the flight in the event of emergencies or flight conditions that could be a risk to persons and property within the operating area.
21. The PIC is prohibited from beginning a flight unless (considering wind and forecast weather conditions) there is enough available power for the UA to conduct the intended operation and to operate after that for at least five minutes or with the reserve power recommended by the manufacturer if greater than five minutes.
22. Documents used by the proponent to ensure the safe operation of the UAS and any documents required under 14 CFR § Part 91.9 and Part 91.203 must be available to the PIC at the UAS Ground Control Station any time the aircraft is operating. These documents must be made available to the Administrator or any law enforcement official upon request.
23. The UA must remain clear and give way to all manned aviation operations and activities at all times.
24. The UAS may not be operated by the PIC from any moving vehicle unless the government entity conducting PAO has determined that such operations can be conducted without causing undue hazard to persons or property and has presented such safety procedures to the FAA. Safety procedures include, but not limited to, emergency procedures, lost link procedures, and consideration of terrain and obstructions that may restrict the ability to maintain visual line of sight. Operations must also comply with all applicable federal, state and local laws pertaining to operations from a moving vehicle.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SPECIAL PROVISIONS

A. Coordination Requirements.

1. Compliance with Standard Provisions, E. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) satisfies the coordination requirement. Operator must cancel NOTAMs when UAS operations are completed or will not be conducted.
2. Coordination and de-confliction between Military Training Routes (MTR) and Special Use Airspace (SUA) is the operator's responsibility. When identifying an operational area the operator must evaluate whether an MTR or SUA will be affected. In the event the UAS operational area overlaps an MTR or SUA, the operator will contact the scheduling agency in advance to coordinate and de-conflict. Approval from the scheduling agency for MTR and non-regulatory SUA is not required. Scheduling agencies for MTRs are listed in the Area Planning AP/1B Military Planning Routes North and South America. Scheduling agencies for SUAs are listed in the FAA JO 7400.8.

B. Communication Requirements.

When operating in the vicinity of an airport without an operating control tower the PIC will announce operations on appropriate Unicom/CTAF frequencies alerting manned pilots of UAS operations.

C. Flight Planning Requirements.

This COA will allow small UAS (weighing less than 55 pounds) operations during daytime VMC conditions only within Class G airspace under the following limitations:

- a. At or below 400 feet AGL, and
- b. Beyond the following distances from the airport reference point (ARP) of a public use airport, heliport, gliderport, or water landing port listed in the Airport/Facility Directory, Alaska Supplement, or Pacific Chart Supplement of the U.S. Government Flight Information Publications:
 - 1) 5 nautical miles (NM) from an airport having an operational control tower, or
 - 2) 3 NM from an airport having a published instrument flight procedure, but not having an operational control tower, or
 - 3) 2 NM from an airport not having a published instrument flight procedure or an operational control tower, or
 - 4) 2 NM from a heliport.
- c. The PIC is responsible for identifying the appropriate ATC jurisdiction nearest to the area of operations defined by the NOTAM.

D. Procedural Requirements.

1. This COA authorizes the proponent to conduct UAS flight operations strictly within a “defined incident perimeter” as identified under the required provision of Section IE. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) of this COA.
2. All Flights operations must be conducted at least 500 feet from all nonparticipating persons, vessels, vehicles, and structures unless:
 - a. A “defined operating area” is described as a location identified by a Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) Radial/Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) fix. This location must have a defined perimeter that is no larger than that where visual line of sight with the UA can be maintained and a defined operational ceiling at or below 400’ Above the Ground (AGL).
 - b. The “defined incident perimeter” is established by means of barriers, structures or public safety officials authorized to sufficiently protect nonparticipating persons from entering the perimeter of the operating area.
 - c. UAS operations must remain within this “defined incident perimeter” controlled by law enforcement at or below 400 feet AGL. The proponent and supporting law enforcement/first responder/safety agencies will discover and manage all risks and associated liabilities that exist within the defined operating perimeter and all risks must be legitimately mitigated to assure the safety of people and property.
 - d. The PIC has made a safety assessment of the risk of operating closer to those objects and determined that it does not present an undue hazard and flight operations will not be conducted directly over nonparticipating persons. The PIC, VO, operator trainees or essential persons are not considered nonparticipating persons under this provision.

E. Emergency/Contingency Procedures.

1. Lost Link Procedures:
 - a. In the event of lost link, the UA must initiate a flight maneuver that ensures timely landing of the aircraft. Lost link airborne operations shall be predictable and the UA shall remain within the defined operating area filed in the NOTAM for that specific operation. In the event that the UA leaves the defined operating area, and the flight track of the UA could potentially enter controlled airspace, the PIC will immediately contact the appropriate ATC facility having jurisdiction over the controlled airspace to advise them of the UASs last known altitude, speed, direction of flight and estimated flight time remaining and the Proponent’s action to recover the UA.
 - b. Lost link orbit points will not coincide with the centerline of published Victor airways.
 - c. The UA lost link flight track will not transit or orbit over populated areas.
 - d. Lost link programmed procedures must de-conflict from all other unmanned operations within the operating area.

2. Lost Visual Line of Sight:

A VO loses sight of the UA, they must notify the PIC immediately. If the UA is visually reacquired promptly, the mission may continue. If not, the PIC will immediately execute the lost link procedures.

3. Lost Communications:

If communication is lost between the PIC and the VO(s), the PIC must immediately execute the lost link procedures.

AUTHORIZATION

This Certificate of Waiver or Authorization does not, in itself, waive any Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations, nor any state law or local ordinance. Should the proposed operation conflict with any state law or local ordinance, or require permission of local authorities or property owners, it is the responsibility of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to resolve the matter. This COA does not authorize flight within in Restricted Areas, Prohibited Areas, Special Flight Rule Areas or the Washington DC Federal Restricted Zone (FRZ) without pre-approval, except operations in the Washington DC Special Flight Rule Area may be conducted in accordance with FDC NOTAM 6/0126. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is hereby authorized to operate the Unmanned Aircraft System in the National Airspace System.

EXHIBIT 2 – LASD UNIT ORDER 2017-01

761551N25A - SH-AD (11/50)

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
A Tradition of Service Since 1850

DATE: January 10, 2017

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE FILE:

FROM: **JACK W. EWELL, CAPTAIN** TO: **ALL SEB PERSONNEL**
SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT BUREAU

SUBJECT: **UNIT ORDER 2017 - 01**
UTILIZATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) PLATFORM

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this Bureau Order is to establish procedures governing the utilization and deployment of a Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) platform.

SCOPE:

This order applies to all personnel requesting or operating an SEB UAS platform.

OVERVIEW:

SEB is tasked with responding to high risk tactical/rescue/HazMat emergencies throughout the County's 4,061 square miles, on a 24 hour / 7 day a week basis. It is the preeminent responsibility of SEB to respond to those incidents that exceed the scope, skills, and resources of patrol/detective personnel. In these situations of extreme threat the deployment of an SEB Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) may be authorized. Authorized missions are search and rescue missions, explosive ordnance detection missions, disaster response, barricaded suspects, hostage situations and other high-risk tactical operations, hazardous materials incidents, and fire related incidents. A UAS can support personnel in these all-hazards incidents which would benefit from an aerial perspective. The use of an SEB UAS platform will allow for the enhanced protection of the public in high risk environments. The UAS SHALL NOT be used for random surveillance missions or missions that would violate the privacy rights of the public.

MISSION:

The mission of the SEB unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is to protect the lives and property of residents and visitors of Los Angeles County in a constitutionally

UNIT ORDER 2017 - 01

and legally sound manner in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. A UAS may be utilized in circumstances which would save life and property, as well as in situations to detect possible dangers that could not otherwise be seen.

PROCEDURES:

The following are the procedures for the deployment and use of an SEB UAS:

1. SEB will maintain a cadre of individuals certified by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations to operate a UAS.
2. Only those personnel authorized by the SEB unit commander to operate a UAS will be charged with doing so.
3. The minimum personnel required on ALL UAS missions will be a two person team consisting of a qualified operator and observer.
4. All requests for the use of the UAS will be evaluated and authorized or denied by a SEB Team Commander prior to deployment.
5. The SEB UAS operator is directly responsible for, and is the final authority over, the actual operation of the UAS. SEB UAS operators have absolute authority to reject a flight based on personnel safety, public safety or violation of FAA regulations. SEB UAS operators are responsible for compliance with this order, department policy and procedure and FAA regulations.
6. Each SEB UAS operator shall be cognizant of, and sensitive to, the privacy rights of individuals when operating the UAS. The default mode of the UAS camera shall be non-recording. If circumstances require use of the recording function of the camera, the operator shall obtain authorization of the SEB Team Commander to turn on the record function of the camera. The use of the record function shall be noted on the incident report, and the footage shall be retained for a period of two years. An exception to this is training video. Video can be retained for training purposes if no one outside of LASD personnel are identifiable in the video.
7. The SEB UAS operator is responsible for making a public notice to airman and all required FAA notifications prior to operating an SEB UAS.
8. An SEB Team Commander is responsible for notifying and coordinating with the Aero Bureau watch commander, rank of sergeant or above, prior to any SEB UAS operations.

EXHIBIT 3 – LASD PROPOSED MANUAL REVISION, 2017-003-02

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
PROPOSED MANUAL REVISION

2017-003-02
PAGE 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This amendment to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP) will add section 5-09/550.00, Unmanned Aircraft System. This addition will implement a policy for the use of unmanned aircraft systems by Department personnel.

This proposed amendment to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's Manual of Policy and Procedures supersedes all previous versions of this policy.

This proposed amendment was submitted by Captain Jack W. Ewell, Special Enforcement Bureau, at 323-881-7823.

Staff Assignment: Sergeant John Rossi or Deputy Suzie Ferrell, Field Operations Support Services, at (323) 890-5411.

This proposed amendment is presented in legislative format. Proposed additions, amendments, and/or revisions are highlighted. Deletions to existing policy/text are indicated by ~~strikeout~~.

5-09/550.00 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM

For purposes of this section, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is defined as a small unmanned aircraft that weighs less than 55 pounds, including any attachments.

Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) responds to high-risk tactical/rescue/hazmat emergencies. In these situations of extreme threat, the deployment of an UAS may be authorized. SEB is the only unit authorized to operate an UAS and is the lead point of contact between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and LASD for UAS operations. No other member of the Department shall deploy their own personal UAS during the course of their duties.

Authorized UAS operations are search and rescue missions, explosive ordnance detection missions, disaster response, barricaded suspects, hostage situations, active shooters, hazardous materials incidents, fire-related incidents, and other high-risk tactical operations. The UAS **shall not** be used for non-emergent surveillance missions or missions that would violate the privacy rights of the public.

SEB shall maintain a cadre of individuals certified by the FAA to operate an UAS. Only those personnel authorized by the SEB unit commander to operate an UAS shall operate an UAS. An UAS operation shall require a two-person team of SEB personnel consisting of a qualified operator and observer.

An UAS is not a substitute for Aero Bureau. It may compliment Aero Bureau but has different missions and capabilities.

5-09/550.10 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROCEDURES

All requests for the use of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) shall be evaluated and authorized or denied by the Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) team commander.

The UAS operator shall be responsible for, and is the final authority over, the actual operation of the UAS. UAS operators have an absolute authority to reject or ground flights based on personal safety, public safety, or violation of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. UAS operators shall be responsible for compliance with SEB unit orders, Department policy, and FAA regulations.

UAS operators shall be cognizant of, and sensitive to, the privacy rights of individuals when operating the UAS. The default mode of the UAS camera shall be non-recording. If circumstances require use of the recording functions of the camera, the operator shall obtain authorization from the SEB team commander to turn on the record function of the camera. The use of the record function shall be noted on the initial incident report by the handling deputy. The video footage shall be retained for a period of ten years when a case is not filed. If a case is filed, the video footage shall be retained until the case is adjudicated, but no less than two years from date of incident. Video footage may be retained for training purposes if no one outside of LASD personnel are identifiable in the video.

UAS operators are responsible for making a Public Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) and all required FAA notifications prior to operating an UAS.

An SEB team commander shall be responsible for notifying and coordinating with the Aero Bureau watch commander, rank of sergeant or above, prior to any UAS operations.

JIM McDONNELL, SHERIFF

Drafted February 1, 2017

EXHIBIT 4 – SHERIFF McDONNELL'S LETTER TO
INSPECTOR GENERAL HUNTSMAN DATED MARCH 30, 2017



OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

HALL OF JUSTICE

JIM McDONNELL, SHERIFF



March 30, 2017

Max Huntsman, Inspector General
Los Angeles County Office of Inspector General
513 South Hill Street, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90015

Dear Mr. Huntsman:

RESPONSE TO THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
EVALUATION OF THE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

The Los Angeles County Office of Inspector General (OIG) recently conducted an evaluation of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Department) use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The OIG produced a report consisting of recommendations in five areas: (1) commitment to operational transparency, (2) developing a Department-wide policy limiting deployment to qualified Special Enforcement Bureau personnel, (3) clarification of conditions for deployment, (4) record keeping of training, maintenance, and deployment, and (5) continuous research and implementation of best practices regarding the use of UAS.

The effort and dedication made by members of the OIG to execute this evaluation are greatly appreciated by the Department. The Department values the comments relating to the development of policies and procedures for UAS measures. The Department concurs with the recommendations and will continuously strive to meet and/or exceed the expectations of this report.

The Audit and Accountability Bureau has the responsibility to monitor and document Department responses related to this evaluation and analysis. Should you have any questions, please contact Captain Steven R. Gross at (323) 307-8302.

Sincerely,


JIM McDONNELL
SHERIFF

211 WEST TEMPLE STREET, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

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EXHIBIT 5 – MR. KHAN’S LETTER TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL DATED MARCH 7, 2017



Stop LAPD Spying Coalition

March 7, 2017

Office of Inspector General
Los Angeles Sheriff's Department

Re: Stop LAPD Spying Coalition Opposition to the use of Drones by LA Sheriff's Department

The Stop LAPD Spying Coalition rejects the use of Drones aka Un-manned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) and demand that the LASD be prohibited from using them. The Coalition is comprised of a cross section of concerned individuals, including human and civil rights, and privacy rights organizations, faith based and community based organization. The Coalition's rejection of the deployment of Drones by LASD arises from deep concerns and history of violence, brutality, disregard for privacy rights, and several other factors including:

Militarization:

- The LASD is already one the most militarized police departments in the world using massive amount of tactical weapons, and human and electronic surveillance technology.¹ The addition of Drones would further signify the structural and operational formation of LASD as an occupying institution that operates as a counter-insurgency force.
- The LASD is in the process of creating a massive facial recognition and biometric database with the capacity to hold information on 15 million individuals.² This will be the largest database platform of any law enforcement agency outside of the FBI.

Mission Creep:

- LASD will broaden its usage of drones within the context of "mission creep." Mission creep alludes to the application of a specific tactic expanded beyond the original stated scope towards new and enlarged purposes. For example, the LASD Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) - Tips and Lead and the See Something, Say Something programs originally intended for counter-terrorism, are now LASD's insidious tool for everyday policing. The SAR program has resulted in rampant racial profiling and the opening of thousands of secret files on people engaging in innocent behavior such as photography.³
- A June 2014 report from American Civil Liberties Union, "The War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing," gives a stark example of mission creep revealing the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams very often deployed—unnecessarily and aggressively—to execute search warrants in low-level drug investigations.⁴
- Another glaring example of mission creep arises from the August 2015 passage of legislation in North Dakota legalizing armed police drones with weapons such as tasers and rubber bullets.⁵

Distrust:

- In 2014 it was revealed that in 2012 LASD secretly used a small aircraft equipped with mass surveillance technology over a period of two weeks over the City of Compton, CA. This was a flagrant violation of privacy of Compton residents.⁶

¹ <http://shq.lasdnews.net/pages/patrolstation.aspx?id=SEB>

² <https://www.revealnews.org/article/los-angeles-sheriff-invests-in-new-tech-to-expand-biometric-database/>

³ <https://www.aclusocal.org/en/cases/nee-v-lasd>

⁴ <https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf>

⁵ <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/26/first-state-legalizes-armed-drones-for-cops-thanks-to-a-lobbyist.html>

⁶ <https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/sheriffs-deputy-compares-drone-surveillance-of-compton-to-big-brother/360954/>

Email: stoplapdspying@gmail.com

www.stoplapdspying.org

Ph: (424) 209-7450

- Since 2012, the LA Sheriff's Department has ranked amongst the top five police departments in the country for killing the most people, while leading the country with most killings in 2013 and 2014. In 2015 LASD ranked second in the country for killing the most people, falling behind the Los Angeles Police Department.⁷
- There have been countless examples of community members calling LASD in moments of crisis that have resulted in lethal use of force against the very people requesting help for themselves and/or their loved ones.
- For more than four decades LASD has been a target of court decisions, lawsuits and federal investigations. Most recently there have been several indictments, convictions, and resignations of several Sheriff's Deputies, the former Assistant Sheriff Paul Tanaka and the former Sheriff Lee Baca.⁸

Safety and Trauma:

- Drones are globally associated with death and destruction. In the people's consciousness, drones represent the murder of thousands of people including children.
- According to a Washington Post study, 400 U.S. military drones crashed in major accidents worldwide between Sept. 11, 2001 and December 2013.⁹
- Recent reports by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have highlighted the increasing menace in our skies by private user of Drones resulting in dangerously close call with airliners, 700 just between January and August of 2015. The FAA "has acknowledged growing concern about the problem and its inability to do much to tame it."¹⁰

The Coalition has also engaged in extensive community outreach seeking feedback from members of diverse communities on the use of Drones by law enforcement. To date we have collected over 3200 signatures, conducted extensive surveys, organized community townhalls and outreach events, held numerous press conferences and in December 2015 released "The Drone Report."¹¹ The results have been unanimous - *Angelenos overwhelmingly reject the use of drones by law enforcement under all circumstances.*

Please feel free to contact us by email at stoplapdspying@gmail.com or by phone at (562) 230-4578.

On behalf of the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition.

Sincerely,



Hamid Khan

⁷ <http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/UOF%20Executive%20Summary.pdf>

⁸ <https://www.aclusocal.org/en/node/2578>

⁹ http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/06/20/when-drones-fall-from-the-sky/?utm_term=.70b5e84e62fb

¹⁰ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-records-detail-hundreds-of-close-calls-between-airplanes-and-drones/2015/08/20/5ef812ae-4737-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html?utm_term=.cd9f5c06a297

¹¹ <https://stoplapdspying.org/?s=Drone+Report>

Email: stoplapdspying@gmail.com

www.stoplapdspying.org

Ph: (424) 209-7450

Priscilla A. Ocen, Commissioner
Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission
350 South Figueroa Street, Suite 288
Los Angeles, CA 90071

July 25, 2017

Mr. Robert Bonner, Chairman
Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission
350 South Figueroa Street, Suite 288
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Re: Drone Use by the Los Angeles County Sherriff's Department

Dear Chairman Bonner,

On January 12, 2017, Los Angeles County Sheriff Jim McDonnell announced that his department had acquired an unmanned aerial device, also known as a drone, to assist deputies in resolving hostage negotiations, monitoring, containing and apprehending active shooters and conducting search and rescue missions. The Sherriff did not, however, consult the public prior to obtaining the drones.¹ During the announcement, McDonnell made assurances that the drone would not be used to surveil the public, instead asserting that the drone would be used exclusively for emergencies.

Shortly after Sherriff McDonnell's announcement, a number of concerns were raised by members of the public as well as policy advocates. As a result, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors referred the matter of drone use by the Los Angeles County Sherriff's Department to the Civilian Oversight Commission ("COC") for further review.

As you know, I, along with Commissioners JP Harris and Lael Rubin, served as a member of the COC's subcommittee on drones. Our subcommittee, which was valiantly led by Commissioner Rubin, thoroughly reviewed the matter. Indeed, our subcommittee met frequently, engaged in independent research with the assistance of Commission staff, convened community feedback sessions and fielded calls and e-mails from over 100 members of the community.

The diligent work of the subcommittee resulted in a set of recommendations drafted by Commission staff. Despite our subcommittee's best efforts, we were unable to come to a consensus regarding drone usage. For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent from the recommendations regarding drone usage by the Commission staff.

¹ The Sheriff has since announced his intention to solicit public feedback regarding the use of drones but has not committed to suspending the drones during the feedback process.

I. Inadequate Process for Public Engagement

The public was notified of the Sheriff's Department's intended use of the drone only after the drone had been obtained, three lieutenants and eight deputies were trained to operate the drone, and applications filed with the Federal Aviation Administration for its use.² This process is wholly inadequate and inconsistent with the best practices recommended by the International Police Chiefs Association.

Indeed, over the last few years, the public has expressed significant concern regarding drone use, specifically by the LAPD. The Sheriff's decision to bypass the Civilian Oversight Commission and the Board of Supervisors effectively ensured that the public would have no meaningful input regarding the drone and the policies for its use in Los Angeles County prior to their acquisition and deployment.

The Sheriff's failure to obtain public comment before acquiring the drone created unnecessary conflict and reinforced the longstanding mistrust that exists between the Department and the communities it serves. While the Sheriff need not solicit public input for every administrative or tactical decision he makes, drones fall into a different category given the significant potential for abuse and therefore is inconsistent with the best practices recommended by the International Police Chiefs Association.

II. Inadequate Concern for Privacy Interests of the Public:

Much of the conversation about the Sheriff's use of the drone has emphasized the administrative efficiency of drones and their potential to reduce the risks faced by deputies in dangerous situations. These are important potential outcomes and valid arguments in favor of drone use.

However, the countervailing interests of the public have not been sufficiently appreciated in the conversation about drones nor have they been adequately addressed by the Sheriff's drone policy. For example, the Sheriff's department has asserted that it will operate the drone in a constitutional manner. However, this may not be sufficiently protective of the public's privacy interests as individuals and groups may be surveilled in public places without a warrant as they have no expectation of privacy in such settings. Moreover, the warrant requirement may be waived upon a showing of exigent circumstances, which is precisely the kind of situation that is contemplated by the existing drone policy.

Moreover, the public may not be protected from aerial surveillance of their homes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that an individual may not have an expectation that one's backyard, for example, would be protected from aerial view. Importantly, the Court observed that "[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400

² James Queally, L.A. Sheriff's Department to Use Drones to Respond to Bomb Threats, Hostage Crises, L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 2017, available at <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriffs-drones-20170112-story.html>

feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse. The police officer did no more.” As a result, the Court held that the use of a helicopter to observe marijuana cultivation in a person’s backyard without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

California appears to be unwilling to address this gap in the law, as Governor Jerry Brown vetoed legislation (AB 1327) that would have required law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant before using drones, except when there is an imminent environmental emergency. The vetoed legislation would have required law enforcement agencies to collect data on drone usage and to destroy any materials collected by a drone within one year. Critically, it would have prevented drones from carrying weapons.

Additionally, images obtained by drones may be cross-referenced with other databases and technologies, including facial recognition software.

These concerns are not overblown. Indeed, the Sheriff’s Department used aerial surveillance without notice to political leadership or the public for approximately nine days in the City of Compton. Moreover, drone technology is only becoming cheaper, smaller and easier to use and for longer periods of time, which only increases the privacy concerns of the public.³

III. Militarization Concerns:

Community groups have raised valid concerns regarding the use of drones and the militarization of law enforcement. In particular, community groups have raised the potential for the weaponization of drones. Indeed, in states such as Connecticut, law enforcement has been authorized to develop policies for the weaponization of drones. This is a development that raises grave concerns regarding the power of law enforcement and the safety of marginalized communities that are already overpoliced.

IV. Mission Creep and Inadequate Checks on the Broad Use of Drones:

Community advocates and civil rights groups have raised compelling arguments regarding the use of drones and “mission creep.” By that, the community is referring to the ways in which tactics and technologies are deployed in a manner that extends beyond their initially intended use. SWAT teams and military tanks are prominent examples of this phenomenon. The community is concerned that while the current Sheriff may act in good faith to limit the “non-emergency” use of drones for surveillance, general crime investigation or weapon deployment, his successors and subordinates may not. As it stands, existing policy regarding the Sheriff’s Department’s use of drones has done little to alleviate these concerns.

The Department has adopted Special Enforcement Bureau (“SEB”) Unit Order #2017-1, which governs the use of drones by Sheriff’s Department personnel. The Unit Order is insufficient to address the privacy and mission creep concerns raised by community members for the following reasons:

³ Matt McFarland, Will tiny drones become a must have for soldiers?, CNN tech, May 9, 2017, available at http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/09/technology/drones_aerovironment/index.html?sr=twCNN050917drones_aerovironment0321PMVODtopLink&linkId=37383022

- The current policy states that the “UAS SHALL NOT be used for random surveillance missions or missions that would violate the privacy rights of the public.” There is currently no way to determine if the drone is used for “random surveillance” given that the Unit Order does not contain a public reporting requirement.
- Although the Unit Order mandates that the default setting of the drone shall be non-recording, this default can be overruled by the SEB Unit Commander. While this authorization must be documented on an incident report, there is no requirement that such recorded incidents will be reported to the public.
- Currently, only ten deputies are authorized to operate the drone, which may function to limit its use. However, more deputies could easily be trained to use the drone, thus expanding the scope of its operation.
- The FAA does not impose limits on the purpose for which drones can be used, only their manner of usage.
- The FAA guidelines do not mandate public reporting of drone usage. Although the current policy mandates that the *FAA* must be notified of the Sheriff’s intent to deploy a drone 30 minutes prior to its use, this information is not necessarily available to the public on a regular basis. Moreover, the FAA notification requirement can be waived in emergency circumstances.

V. Conclusion

Because the Sheriff has not participated in public conversations about the Department’s use of drones, he has not made the case that drones are necessary for the uses he has proposed. Community activists have highlighted the huge arsenal that is currently at the disposal of both the Sheriff’s Department and Fire Department for purposes of search and rescue and barricaded suspects.

Moreover, other agencies have demonstrated that the use of drones may not deliver on the purported law enforcement benefits. For example, use of drones by agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection has come under fire for the significant cost of operating the program with little to show for it in the way of drug interdiction and apprehension of individuals attempting to cross the border without authorization. While the law enforcement benefits are questionable, the intrusion on the privacy interests of the public are very real. Indeed, civil libertarians have argued that Customs and Border Patrol may be intruding on the privacy of individuals engaging in lawful behavior.⁴

Given this, and the very clear evidence of harm that the use of such drones can produce in the most vulnerable communities in Los Angeles, I am in favor of grounding the drones permanently.

⁴ Ron Nixon, Drones, so useful in war, may be too costly for border duty, NY Times, Nov. 2, 2016, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/us/drones-canadian-border.html>

Sincerely,
/s/

Priscilla A. Ocen
Commissioner

VIA EXPRESS MAIL AND EMAIL

September 25, 2017

Commissioner Priscilla Ocen
Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission
World Trade Center
350 South Figueroa, Suite 288
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Re: Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Use by Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Dear Commissioner Ocen,

In preparation for the upcoming meeting of the Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission (COC) on September 28, I re-read your letter addressed to me dated July 25, 2017. Your letter is thoughtful and well-written, yet I feel compelled to respond to several of the points you raise.

In your letter, you appropriately recognize that reducing "risks faced by deputies in dangerous situations" is a valid argument favoring drone use. Indeed, the safety of Deputy Sheriffs is unquestionably an important goal and nowhere is that more threatened than in hostage rescue, barricaded suspect, and active shooter situations and dealing with and disarming improvised explosive devices. If the greater situational awareness provided by a drone is likely to result in the saving of a deputy's life, which I believe it will, this alone would support their use in the limited circumstances for which they can be authorized.

Yet in your letter, you do not acknowledge that the potential of drone use (for the limited authorized purposes) to save lives of members of the public is also a valid argument favoring their use. (As you may know, these small drones have been credited with saving lives in other jurisdictions where law enforcement has used them.) Thus, while there may be public interests that "countervail" their use - - you principally cite privacy concerns - - they are not all countervailing. There are some strong public safety interests, going beyond deputy safety, in potentially saving lives of members of the public in, *e.g.*, hostage rescue and active shooter situations. If in fact a small drone has the potential for saving the life of a child taken hostage or lost in the narrow ravines of Eaton Canyon (inaccessible by helicopter), which it does, and mission creep can be avoided by strong COC oversight, in my view, this outweighs your stated privacy concerns.

Regarding the privacy issue, as you acknowledge, your concerns go beyond the privacy protections of the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which appear to be protected by the policy and procedures put into place by the LASD. While you are free to argue these beyond-what-is-required by the Constitution concerns, it is appropriate to remember that the constitutional reach of the 4th Amendment extends to all areas in which there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy". See *U.S. v. Katz*. Your argument necessarily is positing that drones should be prohibited even in areas where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. I

respectfully disagree, and particularly disagree with the proposition that the COC should impose on the Sheriff a higher standard of privacy than that required by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Regarding your concerns that drones would unduly “militarize” the LASD, I would make these points:

- As the Sheriff himself has said, he has no plans and no intent to arm the UAS. Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificate prohibits weaponizing the UAS.
- These small drones are not the type that the public typically associates with the military. They do not remotely resemble in size Predator Bs or Global Hawks.
- I am not sure what the state of Connecticut does is particularly relevant, but in any event to my knowledge Connecticut has not enacted a law permitting the arming of drones used by law enforcement there.

Perhaps most concerning to me is that your proposed solution of “grounding the drones permanently” does not provide for oversight of the limited use of a drone by the LASD; the very thing that the COC was established to do. In my view, it is important that the COC have oversight and this can best be achieved by the full Commission adopting the ten (10) Recommendations proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee re the UAS program. As you know, among other things, these Recommendations would commit the Sheriff to notifying the COC and seeking our comments and public comment before any expansion of the uses for which the UAS is authorized. They require that the Sheriff inform the COC within 48 hours of any and all uses of a drone. They require that the Sheriff provide the COC with periodic reports of all use of a drone, whether within policy or not. In the interest of transparency, pursuant to the proposed Recommendations, such reports would be available to the public via the LASD’s website. The Recommendations also make clear that any unauthorized use is subject to serious disciplinary action.

In my view, we should adopt these Recommendations. Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,



ROBERT C. BONNER
Chair

c: Brian K. Williams, Executive Director