· GRATEFUL NATION ·

STUDENT VETERANS AND THE RISE

OF THE MILITARY-FRIENDLY CAMPUS

ELLEN MOORE

· **GRATEFUL NATION** ·

· GRATEFUL NATION ·

STUDENT VETERANS AND THE RISE
OF THE MILITARY-FRIENDLY CAMPUS

Ellen Moore

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO
VETERANS RETURNING FROM WARS AND
TO ALL THOSE COMMITTED TO
ENDING WAR

Contents

Preface

My interest in veteran support and higher education is rooted in my family history. I was born on a U.S. military base to an Army captain father and a pacifist mother, and have lived in communities where I was exposed to the diverse worldviews of both military members and civilians. My father grew up during the Depression in a working-class family in Fresno, California, then a small agricultural town. For my father, military service and GI Bill education benefits provided a pathway to academic opportunities that eventually enabled him to join the professional class and later provided me with a straightforward pathway into college. Within my family narratives of social mobility are inextricably tied to narratives of military service. Thus, my research on military veterans in college involves multiple layers of my identity as a student, a daughter, a university instructor, a civically engaged citizen, a writer, and an analyst.

As this book goes to press in the spring of 2017, the rhetoric of war has returned to America with renewed force. Daily life in the United States is marked by a heightened sense of vulnerability and anxiety about national security. We are warned that enemies at home and abroad threaten U.S. jobs, families, homes, and a presumed singular U.S. cultural identity. This national insecurity problem has come with an built-in solution: militarized interventions in the form of expanded and instrumental use of deadly force by police, walled-off militarized border zones, and local sheriffs deputized as deportation "force multipliers" in multiple, simultaneous wars against perceived enemies.

At this fearful and precarious time in history, this book argues that it is crucial to engage in difficult conversations about war and peace, consent and dissent, social conformity and social difference, and about what it takes for a nation to be demonstrably secure. Yet finding common ground across diverse worldviews can be difficult, especially when the country is involved in highly

contested military and political conflicts. We are living in a highly polarized ideological environment that suppresses nuance, heterogeneity of thought, and comfort with ambivalence. This polarization is apparent in national discussions about the economy, national security, health care, immigration policies, education, and policing. A similar polarization is apparent in discussions about military veterans, military service, and the current wars.

News and social media stories about military veterans routinely characterize participants, institutions, or actions dichotomously as pro- or antiwar, pro- or antiveteran, and pro- or antimilitary. But what do these dichotomous terms really mean? This question surfaced time and time again as I became immersed in veteran support services. The three years I spent in and around veteran communities showed that these dichotomies cannot adequately describe diverse beliefs held by military members, veterans, and civilians about relationships with the military and the contemporary wars. These labels take a broad brush to ideological dispositions, inhibiting critical exchange.

I began this research by asking veterans about their experiences in the military and in college. With time, my findings led to new questions as I observed tensions in the making and unmaking of soldier and student identities. I was troubled by the deployment of an antiveteran label against those who voiced dissent from military policies or actions. This labeling precluded critiques of wars that caused soldiers to die on the battlefield and to take their own lives at war or at home. My experience showed that this formulation was no accident but instead emerged from a militarized common sense that conflates support for veterans with support for the institutional military and silent acquiescence to the wars, which in turn serves to rationalize and enable a permanent state of war.

My hope is that this book will provide analysis to help people differentiate between support for veterans and support for the wars in which they fought. It challenges dualistic understandings of pro- or anti-military, veteran, and war to broaden our discussion about what it means to be a soldier, veteran, or civilian in a country at war. The book looks closely at military recruits' experiences, at the transitions from civilian to combatant and back again into civilian society. By analyzing the influence of popular narratives about veterans and veterans' needs on college campuses, I find, among other things, that the simple gesture of thanking soldiers for their service can be transformed into tacit support for war. In offering this gesture, I ask that we carefully consider not only what we honor with our gratitude but also what we suppress.

Acknowledgments

The act of writing a can be a solitary effort, but many people contributed to
this book and I am grateful for their inspiration, critique, advice, and technical
assistance during the many stages of research and writing. First and foremost, I
want to thank the veterans who spent many hours in conversation with me,
and without whom this book would not exist. For reasons of confidentiality,
I can't name them, but I am grateful for their generosity of spirit in trusting me
with their stories and sharing their experiences, their accomplishments, and
their conflicts. From these veterans I learned that service and sacrifice can and
do take many forms. Many chose to speak with me because they wanted their
experience to be shared for the benefit of other veterans; that is my hope as
well. I have done my best to be faithful to their stories, even as my conclusions
and analysis may not be universally shared by participants.

My sincere gratitude also goes to the college instructors and staff who al-
lowed me to observe their work on behalf of student veterans. Those who per-
form the difficult work of designing and providing support services typically
do not receive the credit they deserve, and these instructors and staff worked
long hours providing behind-the-scenes support to the veterans profiled in
this book. While my analysis offers a critical perspective of social forces that
produce militarism on campuses, this book is in no way intended to diminish
the importance of the work of these service providers. Among them I found
extraordinary teachers and advisors, and their commitment to veterans' educa-
tional success was a continuing source of inspiration.

This book comes out of my dissertation research, for which I was fortunate to
receive advice and mentorship from exceptional critical scholars. Their intel-
lectual influence on this work is indelible. I am deeply indebted to Jean Lave
for her ongoing and steadfast guidance, for her willingness to help me clarify

It is a pleasure and an honor that this book found a home in the Duke University Press Global Insecurities Series, and I am grateful to editors Catherine Besteman and Daniel Goldstein for opening that door. Thanks to the Duke University Press editorial staff, particularly to Gisela Fosado and Lydia

Introduction

On the sunny suburban campus of Los Olmos Community College, a palpable buzz of anticipation—made up of equal parts excitement and tension—circulated around Parking Lot B. The college had been preparing for Veterans Day for weeks. Members of the campus veterans club put finishing touches on the tables in the courtyard, setting up signs and ferrying food for invited guests, as support service providers arranged brochures and pens, keychains and water bottles advertising social services for veterans. In the parking lot, a fifty-foot Tiller hook-and-ladder fire engine was parked with its ladder extending high above campus. Attached to its rungs flew flags of the five branches of military services. Students from the school's police and firefighter public safety programs stood in parade rest position (feet shoulder-width apart, hands touching behind backs) and practiced crowd-control techniques as they formed a human perimeter around the parking lot, which on this day also served as a helicopter landing pad. The daylong event began with an aerial military salute—a flyover and landing on campus grounds of a Vietnam War–era Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division Huey helicopter. Hundreds of observers on the ground watched as the helicopter descended slowly, ceremoniously circling above campus before touching down. Upon landing, a team of officers in Army combat fatigues jumped from the aircraft to pose for pictures, as the crowd of observers applauded and whooped in appreciation.

The opening ceremony was followed by formal presentations from a local Air Force base color guard.[1] After the formal flag salute, two Los Olmos students sang the U.S. national anthem and "God Bless America," while the crowd of students, faculty, administrators, and community supporters stood solemnly facing the flags, hands placed over hearts or saluting hand-to-forehead. The atmosphere at Los Olmos that day was at once festive and solemn, both reverential

and celebratory. It was clear that this occasion was meant to commemorate both veterans and the wars in which they fought, as well as the institutional military to which they had belonged.

A few days later in another part of the state, a group of student veterans sat in a classroom on the campus of Southwest University (su) listening to a talk given by a local Veterans Affairs (va) representative. This was a veterans' orientation class, where student veterans were welcomed and introduced to the campus. Meeting weekly, student veterans received instruction in academic norms, expectations, and customs of the university. On that day in November, there was an unmistakable feeling of affection in the room, extended to every one of the thirty (twenty-eight men, two women) student veterans. It appeared that all student veterans were welcomed and cared for in this space. Whatever tips students had picked up in the first weeks of school, they shared with the group: the importance of keeping aware of deadlines, how to avoid late fees, and how to get into classes if they missed the enrollment deadline. They shared information about special adaptive equipment available for veterans with disabilities, and advised one another on the intricacies of GI Bill benefits, with tips on how to plan the semester to ensure that they wouldn't run out of money before graduating. The student veterans offered advice about which classes to take and suggested taking harder classes during summer session, when there would be less pressure; they exchanged information about which professors were particularly friendly toward veterans, and which professors were supportive of military polices.

On this day the class listened attentively to the va representative talk about what it was like to come to the large urban university campus in the late 1960s to recruit students to enlist in the military. The speaker, who was also a veteran of the Vietnam War, opened his presentation by saying that the university "has its own legacy, not always friendly to the military," and recounted a story about his friend, a former marine and Vietnam War veteran, who was sent to recruit students on the su campus: "[My friend] said that as a Marine recruiter, he was more afraid coming to this campus than he was at Khe Sanh." While the reference to one of the deadliest land battles of the Vietnam War was assumed to be hyperbolic and students chuckled appreciatively at the characterization, it nonetheless positioned su as a frighteningly hostile place—enemy territory in which marines could expect to be physically attacked or even killed. This speaker invoked a past imaginary—rather than present reality—of the contemporary university as hostile to the U.S. military. In doing so, he positioned his recruiter friend, himself, and his audience of current student veterans as

beleaguered victims of a collegiate environment unsympathetic to the mission of the U.S. military and to veterans.

These two examples illustrate seemingly opposite phenomena faced by contemporary veterans on college campuses. Symbols of military valorization and patriotism are the new normal on many campuses, as college administrators, faculty, staff, and students are encouraged to express gratitude for service and sacrifice by veterans, yet there is a concurrent and abiding mythology that contemporary college campuses are unwelcoming to war veterans and hostile to their viewpoints. This book is about the tensions arising from these simultaneous and contradictory discourses, and about how these distinct narratives—of increasing military valorization and ostensible hostility toward veterans—are taking place on college campuses amid an absence of discussion about the actual wars in which the U.S. military is engaged. It is also about how this absence of discussion serves to obviate dissent and distance the U.S. civilian population from the human consequences of war. In combination, these social processes help to erase and thus naturalize a state of permanent war.

College campuses are often spaces of critique and dissent, yet over a decade into the widely unpopular contemporary wars (collectively known as the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT), college campuses are largely silent about the wars. At the same time, these wars have militarized daily life in the United States. Some signs of the militarization of social space are new, like police-deployed surveillance drones and decommissioned armored personnel carriers patrolling city streets.[2] Other signs of militarization have become commonplace to the point of being unremarkable: civilians driving Hummer-branded vehicles, children carrying camouflage-patterned backpacks to school, and the Homeland Security apparatus marking everyday life in U.S. airports, government buildings, hospitals, electronic communications, mass media, and entertainment.

Our social world is also militarized, although in less noticeable ways. Everyday consciousness is informed by a militarized common sense, which I define as the embedded worldview that war is a natural and necessary aspect of maintaining and protecting nationhood; military priorities are more important than nonmilitary ones; and war veterans should serve as positive public symbols of U.S. military actions. Militarized common sense naturalizes the valorization of the military on college campuses. Militarized common sense is a salient social force that portrays the interests of the individual soldier as inseparable from the interests of the institutional military and military projects.

The U.S. military has been in and around the academy for a long time. Indeed, two of the oldest colleges in the nation, West Point (est. 1802) and Annapolis

Naval Academy (est. 1845), were founded by and are administered by the armed services. But today the ties between the military and higher education are both more ubiquitous and less obvious: U.S. departments of Defense and Homeland Security pour billions of research dollars into the development of weapons and cybersecurity systems, robotics and biometric identification systems used by official and unofficial military organizations around the globe.[3]

The militarization of the academy has been the subject of extensive scholarship as have military efforts to organize support from civilian academics.[4] Much of the existing scholarship documents ways that the military has guided, gathered, shaped, and suppressed knowledge to further military goals through research grants and academic partnerships; and chronicles ways in which academics are recruited for military purposes through research funding, endowed chairs, and preferential access to information.[5]

The direct financial relationship between the U.S. military and American universities dates back at least to World War II, when universities were presented with a willing and wealthy patron in the U.S. armed forces. As a result, many universities expanded the scope of their research and academic departments, especially in disciplines of physics, chemistry, biology, and technology.[6] Military funding of academic institutions continued after World War II and has increased dramatically since that time, most notably after September 11, 2001. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awarded 12,753 prime contracts to colleges and universities in 2000, worth a total of $4,449,065,114; by 2006, the DoD had awarded 62,488 such contracts worth $46,748,542,346.[7]

The post-9/11 increases in DoD funding of academic research have been accompanied by a comparable rise in military tuition payments to American colleges and universities. From 2002 to 2011, over 4 million education benefits claims were filed by U.S. military veterans, representing more than 30 billion dollars.[8] In an era in which higher education is defined and shaped by permanent budget crises, student veterans bring billions of dollars in guaranteed tuition to college campuses, creating strong financial incentives for colleges to project themselves as friendly toward the U.S. military in pursuit of GI Bill–funded veterans.

This book examines the effects of military training and the contemporary wars on student veterans, and it traces effects of military-valorizing discourse on the institutions of higher education in which veterans enroll. Just as civilians must learn to become soldiers and adapt to military life, veterans must learn to become college students by adapting to civilian academic norms and practices. In turn, the presence of student veterans on college campuses trans-

forms institutional practices and discourse. Institutional initiatives designed to welcome veterans to college ultimately welcome military viewpoints and suppress debate about the current wars. Thus, the militarization of common sense on college campuses narrows and suppresses democratic debate.

Some scholars and veterans' affairs specialists assume that civilian campus cultures are hostile toward veterans and argue that this ostensible hostility causes difficulty for student veterans.[9] My analysis shows that veterans' academic challenges are caused not by collegiate hostility toward the military but by multiple factors, including disjunctions between veterans' military training and academic demands, and psychological trauma engendered by their experiences in war. My analysis also shows that student veterans are challenged by pervasive cultural expectations that they should serve as venerated representatives of the current wars, and that these cultural expectations form part of a growing militarized common sense on campuses. The assertion that college campuses are hostile to veterans is not only unwarranted but also harmful, inhibiting critical analysis of military projects and generating silent consent to war. This silencing erases veterans' lived experiences, including those that may give rise to their own critiques of war.

Veterans and Higher Education

This book is a meditation on the interplay between civilian academic and military worlds, but it didn't start out that way. It began as a research project about veterans in higher education and ended up as an exploration of social processes of militarization and education. I began the research as an attempt to understand a jarring statistic I heard quoted in 2008: 96 percent of all recruits had signed up for GI Bill educational benefits upon enlistment, but only a small fraction (8 percent according to one study) of those who signed up actually made use of their benefits.[10] Though this number changed significantly after 2008, I decided to explore the reasons for this disparity as well as the obstacles faced by war veterans in college.[11]

Narratives of the returning soldier have fueled popular and political imaginations since Homer's *Odyssey*. After every U.S. war, veterans have returned from combat to reenter noncombatant communities, where their presence is utilized for different purposes: to reaffirm national identity, to become symbols of national strength and protection, or conversely—particularly in the case of veterans returning from World War I and the war in Vietnam—as symbols of government neglect. The body and welfare of the returning soldier-cum-veteran becomes a "contested site where memory, biography and personal histories call

attention to, challenge and resist unified and traditional versions of American identity and government."[12]

The esteem in which veterans historically have been held by society has been reflected in a system of pensions and bonuses, developed in response to shifting political will and military necessity.[13] From widows' pensions to ceremonial burials to college tuition, veterans' bonuses have been used in various capacities: as inducements to enlist, wages for soldiers' labor, and remediation for wounds suffered in battle. Prior to the Civil War, soldiers received military bonuses of land and money. After the Civil War, veterans received cash bonuses for fighting. World War I veterans came home to a contracted economy, no jobs, and no land grants, and they rebelled.[14]

The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944—commonly known as the GI Bill of Rights, or simply the GI Bill—provided returning veterans with social supports for civic and economic engagement, including housing, education, and health care.[15] World War II veterans were not only welcomed home as heroes and hailed as the Greatest Generation, they were also the beneficiaries of one of the largest federal wealth redistribution initiatives in U.S. history.[16] Popular and scholarly accounts of the history of the GI Bill reflect a discourse of reverence for World War II soldiers who returned victorious from what was embraced by civilians as the "Good War." The original GI Bill was rooted in the idea of veteran exceptionalism, the belief that military veterans deserve benefits other citizens do not because they had sacrificed by going to war. The legislation reflected a New Deal approach to social welfare, providing special benefits to members of the armed forces who, as stated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, make "greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us, and are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems."[17]

The dominant narrative of the World War II era described military service as a democratizing force that prepared young recruits for educational and economic success. Military service, it was said, provided both the means and method of preparing young (male) Americans to return to participation in civilian life.[18] Military training was positioned as a transformative process. By instilling values of discipline, patriotism, heroism in combat, duty, and citizenship, military service was supposed to turn unformed young boys into college-bound men. In this narrative, war was a catalyst and crucible for men's character, regardless of background.[19]

This narrative shifted significantly alongside changes in the U.S. political economy. The end of military conscription in 1973 made the decision to join the military a vocational option rather than a civic duty, and the erosion of New

Deal policies shifted the political tide against government entitlements.[20] The clear popular support for military conflicts enjoyed by the U.S. government during World War II did not persist for other conflicts.

Many Americans believe that U.S. military service is a route to upward social mobility, an equalizer of economic opportunity, and guarantor of higher education. Historical narratives of social mobility and economic opportunity are interwoven with narratives of wartime military service, but with the end of mandatory conscription in 1973, military service became even more closely linked to the promises of educational opportunity and social mobility.[21] Today, many high school students and young adults enlist in the armed forces to access college funding. Recruiters promise that military service will pay for college and prepare young men and women to attend.[22] However, many veterans never realize this promise. The low rates of utilization of educational benefits reported in 2008 indicated that returning war veterans were not enrolling in college, or they were dropping out before graduating. To try to understand this troubling trend, I began to study the experience of veterans on contemporary college campuses.

Much of the literature on war veterans in college identifies three major obstacles to veterans' success in higher education: First, there is a claim that military enlistees tend to be academically unprepared for college because many come from working-class backgrounds and choose military enlistment as an alternative to lower-wage jobs or unemployment.[23] Second, there is a claim that combat veterans face enduring symptoms of trauma that interfere with reintegration in civilian classrooms.[24] Third, some campus student affairs literature claims that civilian college campuses are unfriendly to the U.S. military, driving military veterans away from college.[25]

By limiting its focus to these three obstacles, the current literature ignores the structural causes of veterans' difficulties in college and assumes that military recruits are marked by intellectual and psychological deficits. The first claim that veterans may not be prepared for academic rigors of college is belied by the fact that many contemporary first-generation college student veterans successfully complete and excel in higher education. Moreover, military recruiters' promise of college education as a benefit of the military contract implies that regardless of background, service members should be able to take advantage of that benefit after discharge. As to the second claim, it is true that some veterans face enduring symptoms of combat trauma that interfere with reintegration in civilian classrooms.[26] Indeed, some student veteran participants in this research suffered from posttraumatic stress reactions that negatively affected their classroom performance. However, it is unlikely that war trauma is the major factor

in inhibiting postsecondary achievement, given the successes of GI Bill recipients from World War II and the Korean War.[27]

The final obstacle—unfriendly college campuses—was identified based on two unsupported assumptions: that civilian college campuses are antimilitary and that all veterans have uniformly positive associations with the institutional military. Regarding the first assumption, campuses such as Stanford, Harvard, and Columbia, having banned the ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) during the heated Vietnam War protests of the 1960s and '70s have since welcomed back the ROTC and implemented robust veteran support programs, similar to many public colleges and universities across the country. As to the second assumption, many war veterans are highly ambivalent about the institutional U.S. military as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the stereotype that many college campuses are antimilitary persists, forming part of a veteran support discourse on college campuses that venerates military policies and projects and silences debate about the wars.[28]

The chapters that follow show how, through everyday practices, militarism becomes part of the hidden curriculum of college life—in the ways teachers are instructed to treat veterans deferentially in their classrooms, and in their avoidance of talking about the wars for fear of offending veterans. Through analyzing the words of individual veterans, I trace larger narratives of war, military support, and public dissent to understand how military ideology is lived and practiced in daily life.

But what do we mean when we talk about militarism? The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought about renewed discussions among social scientists regarding empire, militarism, and militarization. In the United States, "militarization" is most commonly used to refer to contexts of war, but this book argues that our everyday, domestic social world is also deeply militarized.[29]

Scholarly notions of militarism and militarization are contested and multifaceted. Lesley Merryfinch observed, "Like electricity, 'militarism' can best be described by its effects. When military goals, values and apparatus increasingly dominate a state's culture, politics and economy, militarism is on the rise."[30] Michael Mann broadens the concept of militarism beyond a narrow focus on military institutions to refer to "a set of attitudes and social practices which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity."[31] Thus, militarization involves embedding military priorities into the civilian sphere; this entails shifts in both public consciousness and in social practices.[32] Similarly, Edward P. Thompson warned against an overly narrow focus on concepts such as "the military-industrial complex" because this "suggests that [militarism] is confined in a known and limited place: it may threaten

to push forward, but it can be restrained, contamination does not extend through the whole societal body."[33] Writing during the Cold War, Thompson observed, "the USA and the USSR do not have military-industrial complexes: they are such complexes."[34]

Cynthia Enloe describes militarization as "a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing (such as an institution) gradually becomes controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but normal."[35] Peter Kraska offers straightforward, if somewhat circular, working definitions for both militarism and militarization: "Militarism is a cultural pattern of beliefs and values supporting war and militarization that comes to dominate a society. Militarization is the preparation for that activity."[36]

"War created the United States," writes Michael Sherry, and although many Americans profess antipathy toward wars and war making, U.S. history has been shaped by militarism.[37] The U.S. government has deployed troops to fight in military conflicts—as leading proponents or in background roles—for most of its relatively brief history as a nation. From 1775 to 2015, troops of the U.S. armed forces were openly deployed in 315 foreign and domestic armed conflicts.[38] These include not only U.S. wars considered by historians and the general public to be major conflicts but also wars of expansion and annexation, military occupations, and conflicts to protect U.S. business interests abroad.[39]

While U.S. military engagement domestically and worldwide has been a near-constant feature of the nation's history, the contemporary period is marked by a heightened sense of vulnerability and anxiety about U.S. national security. This has given rise to what Andrew Bacevich calls the "New American Militarism": an era of permanent, preemptive war. Bacevich writes that prior to September 11, 2001, U.S. presidents had consistently claimed that the United States declared war solely as a last resort. However, after the 2001 attacks, George W. Bush called for a new military strategy in which the United States would no longer passively allow enemies to strike. Speaking at West Point Military Academy in 2002, G. W. Bush vowed to "take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge."[40] Bacevich argues that this represents a fundamental shift in U.S. military policy in which going to war becomes a first, rather than a last, resort: "Bush's remarks indicated that he was actually referring not to preemption, but to preventive war. This became the essence of the Bush Doctrine."[41]

Wars are always destructive in terms of infrastructure and human life, to opposing combatants and to civilians caught in the crossfire. Since September 11,

2001, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to over 108,000 U.S. casualties, including 6,800 deaths (with 298 suicides), 45,889 wounded in action, and 56,874 other medical evacuations due to injury or disease.[42] U.S. soldiers died by rocket-propelled grenade fire and improvised explosive devices (IEDS)— weapons responsible for approximately half of all deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. wartime casualties also include soldiers who died in vehicle crashes, from electrocutions, heatstroke, friendly fire, and battlefield suicides.[43]

Of course, casualties are not limited to, nor even most pronounced among, officially designated fighting troops. It is estimated that over 210,000 civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan have been killed or wounded as a result of U.S.-led military actions in these countries since 2001.[44]

According to Martin Shaw, militarism develops not only when war-making ideology is strong, but also more generally as military valorization affects social relations and practices.[45] In the past, military glorification was designed to rally public support for specific geopolitical conflicts, but the contemporary period is marked by perpetual and regionally diffuse wars, like those of the Global War on Terrorism. In this context, military valorization is infused into everyday civilian life. The institutional military is taken for granted as protective, necessary, and unquestionable.

Adopting Matthew Sparke's characterization of the Global South, my research found that militarism is "everywhere but always somewhere."[46] That is, even as militarism is omnipresent, its effects are felt in multiple specific sites. In particular, this book analyzes within the field of education the mechanisms that produce militarized common sense in individual soldiers, in supporters of military veterans, and in the academic institutions in which veterans enroll as students. It explores everyday militarism as social practice in which we all consent and participate.[47] This book raises the question: what social processes enable military-valorizing cultural patterns, beliefs, and values to take hold and become dominant, particularly at a time when the country is engaged in a series of unpopular wars?

The ideas of Italian cultural theorist Antonio Gramsci are helpful to understand the question of how ideas are adopted through cultural diffusion of common sense, by which Gramsci means the "incoherent set of generally held assumptions and beliefs" of conventional thought that becomes naturalized and taken for granted in society.[48] Through daily practices and habits, military valorization becomes embedded in daily practices and social relations. Yet while processes of militarization coincide with and are amplified by a generalized conservative entrenchment on college campuses, military-valorizing

assumptions and attitudes are not some kind of false consciousness imposed from above.[49] Rather, campus discourses of military valorization come from students, teachers, administrators, staff, and surrounding communities; they arise from and gratify a societal need to support and care for those sent to fight wars.

Gramsci wrote about periods of conservative entrenchment as periods when dominant logics, assumptions, and attitudes become "permanently consolidated, organized ideologically, and exalted lyrically" and that they become embedded in daily practices and relations.[50] This book traces ways in which militarist logics, assumptions, and attitudes become consolidated through college programs, organized ideologically through "best-practice" literature, and exalted lyrically in valorizing discourse that conflates those who fight wars with a unifying military mission. In doing so, this book explores the construction of unstated but operative alliances between military projects and the academy.

The production of militarized common sense creates social meaning and consent for military projects, and involves the creation of national and military identification within society. This process is facilitated by the promotion of what I call—borrowing from Michael Billig—"banal militarism," or everyday symbols and practices that conflate the interests of the nation and its people with the interests of the military.[51] Billig's notion of banal nationalism refers to manifestations of nationalist ideology in daily life. Symbols such as national flags, which are metaphors of both warfare and freedom, are used in everyday contexts, including classrooms, sporting events, children's clothing, television advertising, and department store sales. The mobilization of these symbols in everyday life creates an imagined solidarity with the national project by conflating the interests of the nation-state with those of its citizenry. This occurs in commonplace practices and rituals; for example, the phrase "Our soldiers are fighting for our freedoms" produces affiliations and unities of interest among and between the civilian subject, the military subject, and the goals of the nation-state. Ritualized expressions of gratitude such as "Thank you for your service" express gratitude for service on military projects and implicitly assume a unity with military missions. These phrases articulate military interests with the everyday ideological habits, symbols, discourse, and practice surrounding veteran support. In doing so, these phrases both produce and are produced by militarized common sense on college campuses and in the broader civil society.

Many public stories are told about contemporary war veterans, yet these stories are portrayed through a narrow range of narratives. Designated the "New Greatest Generation" by Joe Klein in *Time* magazine, veterans are depicted

at times as heroes returning to a society that does not sufficiently appreciate military sacrifice; at other times they are portrayed as psychologically wounded and suicidal; at other times as violent and unstable.[52] In the midst of these public tropes about veterans, there are overlooked and untold stories about veterans' experience of war and of reincorporation into civilian society. Many veterans do experience psychological sequelae of combat trauma, but their personal stories are not reducible to that. While I did not start out to explore the effects of combat trauma in veterans, the topic surfaced in conversations because posttraumatic reactions formed part of participants' daily experience and affected their classroom performance. Veterans in this study did experience real and persistent psychological aftereffects of combat trauma, and for many of them, understanding the meaning of their suffering was intimately tied to understanding their own actions as combatants.

The cognitive, social, and emotional lives of many former soldiers are profoundly affected by combat stress. Since the American Psychiatric Association first included post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in its *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* in 1980, most research on the disorder has focused on trauma associated with threats to soldiers' lives and safety. Yet a growing body of literature acknowledges that veterans also experience psychological trauma from being perpetrators of wartime violence.[53] This research indicates that soldiers experience moral injury from "perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations."[54] Research carried out by the VA with Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans indicates that trauma arising from being both victim and perpetrator of violence has contributed to unprecedented high rates of suicide among former and current military members.[55]

Cultural anthropologists who examine connections between trauma, violence, and political community show that traumas produced by wars and repression are inscribed and reinscribed in everyday narratives.[56] Brison writes that the undoing of the self in trauma involves a radical disruption of memory, a severing of past from present, and typically an inability to envision the future. Many veterans in this study found that reentering civilian society and college required them to find ways to reconstruct themselves and carry on with a reconfigured life.[57]

For some veteran participants of this study, race and gender were a source of alienation from the military as well as a disjunction between military and civilian collegiate institutions. Culturally, the practice of soldiering in the U.S. military is racialized (white) and gendered (male).[58] Even as the current all-volunteer armed forces rely increasingly on racial and ethnic minority male

and female recruits and consciously and explicitly portray themselves as race and gender neutral, scholarship confirms that military practice is infused with the social construction of whiteness and hegemonic masculinity.[59] With the understanding that gendered and racialized perspectives shape institutional and informal military practices, I found that some gendered and racialized practices carried over into collegiate settings.[60]

There is a broad consensus among scholars that military institutional practice and wars are masculine social endeavors.[61] Enloe writes that nationalism and militarism typically spring from "masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope."[62] Because it is not possible to study military practices without also understanding the male perspectives that historically shaped both institutional and informal conventions, this book explores experiences of both men and women soldiers and veterans through processes of basic training, deployments, and veterans' organizations.

The Study

Developing commonsense understandings of the world entails processes of learning and teaching in which individuals, groups, and institutions learn to adopt agreed-upon understandings as fact. This study focuses on multiple sites of learning to answer some key questions: How do civilians learn to become soldiers? What happens when soldiers leave the military, return to civilian life, and enroll in colleges as students? How does the presence of student veterans on campuses affect our understanding of veterans and the wars in which they fought? In what ways do veteran support efforts and relationships between campus actors (veteran advocates, college staff and administrators, academic instructors) and noncampus actors (community veteran support groups) shape discourse about the military? Answering these questions requires that we consider the broader implications of academic-military relationships.

This book uses ethnographic methods to explore the experiences and identities produced at the dynamic intersections of civilian, military, and student practices by focusing on processes and practices that socially make and unmake soldiers. In the context of military training, I examine sociocultural processes used to make soldiers, including participation, inculcation, sensemaking, and the legitimation and delegitimation of cross-border violence and racialized and masculinized nationalism. I examine what happens when soldiers return home and enter college—a site where their militarized identity is unmade and remade as civilian-veteran—and the ways that combat-related physical and emotional trauma affect student veterans' lives.

Laura Nader writes that tracing the less-visible ways in which complex systems of power operate within societies is a daunting task.[63] She calls for scholarly investigation into environments where individuals conduct their daily lives within systems that are designed, operated, and maintained by the institutionally powerful. The ethnographic method is appropriate for this type of inquiry. Ethnographies of power require that the researcher represent complex personal experiences without losing sight of the broader connections between the social and the individual. Ethnographic observation can be used to identify processes through which institutional power is exercised and normalized in the interplay between social structure and individual agency.[64] Ethnographies of power require the examination of unequal relations to identify what Nader calls "controlling processes"—the mechanisms through which ideas are taken up by individuals and institutions and become accepted relations of power.

Similarly, Catherine Lutz suggests that in ethnographies of empire, scholars may draw on the anthropological ethnographic tradition of person-centered contextual analysis to examine the processes through which imperial power is configured, reconfigured, maintained, and reinforced. Lutz argues that "empire is in the details," as power takes root through lived, daily interactions.[65] Drawing on this tradition, I look at the production of militarized common sense in quotidian disciplinary practices, such as training to comply with commands from superiors or the application of the "Military Friendly" designation to particular campuses.[66] To understand how militarism operates culturally in daily life, I studied the relations between veterans, instructors, and veteran supporters in multiple sites. My analysis focused on the practices of unofficial knowledge production—knowledge that is assumed and naturalized, rather than officially quantified.

All individuals, institutions, and locations noted in this book are identified pseudonymously. While some participants said they would be happy to have their real names and affiliations used, others felt they could speak more freely knowing that their identities would not be made public.[67]

Over the course of three years, I attended public and private veteran support events and spoke to veterans on and off college campuses. To examine institutional military teaching practices, I spoke with recent veterans about their experiences in basic training, supplementing veterans' recollections with a close study of Army training manuals. Next, to understand how college campuses receive recent war veterans, I spent three years in classrooms, veterans' club meetings, and meetings with school administrators and community service providers. To learn about veterans' perspectives on these support initiatives, I

conducted over two hundred hours of open-ended, semistructured interviews on college campuses, in cafés, and in veterans' homes and by socializing with veterans in bars, at formal campus events, and at conferences. Participant observation in these contexts allowed me to examine the social and cultural processes of veteran reentry in civilian colleges.

Veterans had highly varied experiences with the enduring effects of military service on their college academic and social lives. Attempting to present a bounded portrait of veteran participants' experiences risks losing the full diversity of thought, personality, motivations, needs, opinions, and political orientations. Just as the population of civilian college students represents a wide diversity of backgrounds, aptitudes, opinions, and beliefs, so does that of military veterans.

This book focuses on higher education because college is the institution most closely associated with the promise of educational opportunity made by military recruiters. Colleges are institutions that conform to a specific set of civilian social norms. The content and structure of college courses are intended to educate students about how to conduct themselves in the adult world; at best, higher education can serve to teach students to think critically and function as autonomous members of civilian society.

The majority of the ethnographic data presented in this book were collected at two sites in California: a community college in a semirural agricultural valley town and an elite university in a cosmopolitan urban area. These two sites, which I call Central Community College and Southwest University, offer a study in contrasts. They represent the metaphorical bookends of the tiered U.S. public system for higher education, offering distinct pedagogical, cultural, structural, and social opportunities and constraints for military veterans. While Central College and SU were my primary research sites, I also conducted ethnographic observation on a third college campus referred to as Los Olmos Community College, and interviewed students from six additional colleges.[68]

Historically, community colleges have served as open-access portals into postsecondary education. These colleges serve many nontraditional college populations, including first-generation college students, low-income students, immigrant students, and older students returning to college. Large research universities, as institutions conferring advanced degrees and producing scholarship for academic publication, historically serve a student population that is trained in college preparatory courses during secondary school.[69]

At the time of this study, both Central College and SU offered benefits to veterans that included priority registration, priority hours for financial aid appointments, authorization for reduced course loads, and increased time to take

exams.[70] Yet despite these basic commonalities, the two campuses offered very different veterans' services.[71]

Because the majority of student veterans begin their post-service college careers at a community college, I chose to study community college as the initial contact zone between the military and postsecondary education.[72] As institutions of learning, community colleges differ markedly from the military; they are open-access institutions that inculcate civilian social and academic norms. In these social spaces, returning veterans learn about conduct in the adult civilian world and have the opportunity to think critically about their place in society. These lessons about civilian adulthood contrast with the lessons inculcated by basic training, which teaches soldiers to follow explicit orders without question, subsume individual identities to group affiliation, and maintain a constant state of alertness.

In contrast to the broad-based educational approach of Central College, su was an elite civilian institution, representing a best-case academic scenario for many aspiring students in the United States. Nevertheless, for many veterans who transferred to su, military academic and cultural norms clashed with civilian ones, making their college experience difficult.

Central Community College is located in a majority Latino—primarily Mexican immigrants and their descendants—agricultural town that was hit hard by the 2008 economic recession. In this respect, it is typical of many towns from which the majority of military recruits are drawn during times of war.[73] Central College is on the outskirts of Orchard Valley (approximate population 50,000), a rural valley town and former agricultural hub in California.[74] Like many rural communities, Orchard Valley is currently in transition away from agriculture and toward housing subdivisions and retail stores. Large swaths of stone fruit orchards and root vegetable farms were paved over for housing tracts in the 1960s, a development pattern that accelerated during the real estate boom of the 1990s and early 2000s. Yet by 2010, abandoned half-built housing developments littered the adjacent country roads, skeletal reminders of failed economies of expansion. Manufacturing and business services in the area declined beginning in the early 2000s, as did electrical assembly jobs. Low-wage sales jobs were common, and big-box retail stores were the town's major employer. Yet agricultural labor remained a major source of employment in Orchard Valley, with at least six migrant worker camps run by private parties for profit.

Southwest University has a reputation as a prestigious research university, and admission is highly competitive. Promotional materials for su describe the campus as home to top scholars, accomplished writers, star athletes, and prize-winning scientists.[75] It is located in Los Santos, a cosmopolitan and densely

populated city with a reputation for liberal leanings and antipathy toward military projects and militarism in general. The su campus has become nearly synonymous with progressive and antiwar activism. Yet various military support organizations have designated the university one of the nation's top "military-friendly" schools, and su boasts of having maintained its rotc program even as other campuses were discontinuing them during the Vietnam War. It is expensive to live near su: the university is located within a metropolitan area with high concentrations of wealth, which has become a factor in the high cost of living for students.

I interviewed fifty military veterans (thirty-three male and seventeen female) who participated in the campaigns Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), or who had been stationed internationally as part of the U.S. military initiative titled the Global War on Terrorism. Because I was interested in the effects of war trauma on veterans' subsequent college experience, I invited participants who had participated in combat; however, I did not exclusively seek participants with combat-identified military occupational specialties, such as infantry, explosives specialists, or combat engineers. Instead, I chose a broader range of participants under the assumption that in conditions of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, anyone in zones of conflict (including U.S. military personnel and civilian nationals) can be subject to combat-related violence. Because I was also interested in everyday military practice unrelated to combat, I did not exclude participants who had never served in overseas zones of conflict.

I did not prescreen participants for family educational level and socioeconomic class, but many came from family backgrounds that did not consider college an expected educational goal; all but 10 were in the first generation of their families to attend college. All veteran student participants were between ages twenty-three and thirty-three. The racial and gender demographics roughly approximated the demographics of the current U.S. military (see table I.1).[76]

Participants enlisted in the military for a variety of reasons: to fund post-secondary education, to serve their country, to access job training and employment, to experience life outside of their hometowns, or to get out of difficult or dangerous social situations (some were offered enlistment as an alternative to jail; some wanted to distance themselves from criminal involvement in their hometowns; and some did not see any other available opportunities). Most participants noted a lack of economic or social opportunities in their preservice lives as influencing their decision to enlist.[77] Several participants (both women and men) came from military families and wanted the same experiences as their

TABLE I.1 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS:
Iraq and Afghanistan War Veteran-Students by Race, Gender, and Site (*N*=50)

	Southwest University		Central Community College*	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Total	21	6	12	11
White	14	5	6	3
Hispanic/Latino/a	3	0	4	3
Asian/ Pacific Islander	2	1	1	2
African American	2	0	1	1
Native American	0	0	0	2

*Participants drawn principally from Central Community College, but also from six additional
  college campuses.

fathers, grandfathers, or brothers. With the exception of two officers (one who was commissioned after completing ROTC and the other who had attended the naval officer training school), all participants enlisted in the lowest ranks (E-1 or E-2 equivalents).[78]

Methodological Challenges: Researcher Positionality

Scholars in the areas of feminist studies, cultural studies, and critical theory assert that the researcher's subjectivity shapes and is shaped by the subject of study.[79] There are clear epistemological challenges to doing research in communities in which one is not a member.[80] As a researcher in anthropology and education and an outsider to military cultures, my goal is to understand and analyze how participants live and experience particular cultural dispositions in their military and postmilitary academic lives. I use ethnographic description and extensive quotations from interviews to reflect veterans' experiences and perspectives as accurately as possible.

My interview method was based on an open-ended, semi-structured interview protocol. I told participants at the beginning of each interview that I would ask questions about their experiences in military training and in college. I decided not to ask participants directly or explicitly about their combat experience because this was not the focus of my study and because I did not want to open topics that might leave them psychologically vulnerable when they left the interview, sometimes returning directly to their college classes. However, I decided that if participants brought up the topic of their combat

experience, I would not avoid taking about it, and that I would ask follow-up questions.

The methodological tools at my disposal—observation, in-depth interviews, and participation (as an outsider)—seemed inadequate to fully capture their experiences, so to supplement my in-person research, I also relied on scholarly and popular literature (particularly war memoirs) and popular films, and I asked veteran participants to provide corrective critiques of these materials.

I came into this research prepared for the possibility that my position as a white, middle-aged, university-trained civilian woman might influence military participants' decision to talk to me—positively or negatively, though I assumed negatively. I wondered whether my civilian status might lead some veterans to be less forthcoming in their responses in formal interviews and informal social gatherings. As a situated other I attempted to mitigate this situation by demonstrating that I was dedicated, persistent, and genuinely curious about veterans' experiences in college.[81] As is common with longer-term ethnographic projects, I came to feel a great respect and affection for many of the participants. In the hope that participants might accept my presence as a researcher, I attended veterans' group meetings, answered questions about my research whenever asked, accepted social invitations, and joined, by invitation, a veterans' online community.[82] As a researcher, my outsider position undoubtedly influenced interactions with participants, yet I believe that my outsider status also provided a lens that rendered visible dispositions and practices not often considered by civilians. My social distance may have enabled a type of critical examination different from that of institutional insiders.

Terminology

A Marine is not a soldier. . . . A soldier is a soldier. A Marine is a Marine.
Anonymous poster on Military.com

This study's participants came from four U.S. military branches: Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Each branch of service promotes its own identifying nomenclature: soldier (Army), sailor (Navy), marine (Marine Corps), airman, and guardsman (used for both male and female Air Force and Coast Guard members, respectively).[83] In the chapters that follow, I introduce individual veterans by noting the military branch in which they served. However, when referring to military members in general, I use the generic term "soldier," which commonly denotes "one engaged in military service" or one "who fights as part of an organized land-based armed force."[84] I chose this term for its inclusivity and because

it stresses a gender-neutral, practice-based, and institutional relationship with the U.S. armed forces. I also wished to avoid military naming practices, which ascribe essentialized identities to members based on their branch of service.[85] I chose not to use the branch- and gender-neutral term "warrior" that is currently favored by the U.S. armed forces as a contemporary general term for military members because that term implies that service members are engaged primarily or exclusively in warfare. This implication conveys an ideological valence, framing and thus naturalizing the identity of military service members solely in terms of their function in war.

Plan of the Book

Militarized common sense is produced through everyday efforts to support veterans on college campuses, but how does this happen? The chapters that follow trace the production of militarized common sense on multiple levels and focus on multiple sites of learning.[86] In basic training, individual recruits are socialized into military life and trained for combat through explicit pedagogies that teach them how to think, talk, and act like soldiers. Veterans leaving the military and enrolling in college experience the social, cultural, and pedagogical norms of civilian campuses. In civilian life, we are also trained to support military projects in more subtle ways, informed by collective memory and the desire to respectfully care for veterans.

While it is important to understand how military valorization is produced on a societal level, it is equally important to understand how individual recruits are trained and socialized in the military milieu. Chapter 1 looks at individual processes of militarization, through veterans' reflections about their experience in basic training, where civilians learn to become soldiers. Through specific rituals of preparing uniforms, gestures of hierarchical relations, and complying with reward and punishment systems, civilian recruits learn to identify with the military institution, military mission, and fellow soldiers. The pedagogical techniques of basic training, which include isolation and separation, regimentation, enforced group participation, gendered group identification, enforcement of hierarchy, and the naturalization of violence, endured for the veterans and informed their subsequent college experiences. Embodied disciplinary practices teach recruits to shed their previous self-definition as civilians to identify as members of a military corpus. Through veterans' descriptions of basic training as a gateway into military life, we can see how military pedagogy informs and is informed by broader discourses of war, social mobility, and service.

The experience of basic training was profound and enduring for veterans, yet the processes of militarization did not end when soldiers left the military and became veterans. When veterans enrolled in college, the highly situated lessons of military training were transposed onto civilian academic settings. These distinct educative spaces—civilian college and the institutional military—are spaces of difference and contestation wherein disparate cultures meet, engage, and struggle with each other. Student veterans returning from war often encountered difficulties in the transition to college, finding that military training and combat experience complicated their ability to function in civilian schools. Chapter 2 explores how student veterans' military training intersects with civilian academic practices on college campuses, creating disjunctions between conflicting teaching, learning, and cultural norms of military and civilian institutions. Drawing on experiences of recently returned war veterans in college classrooms, I show that conflicting pedagogical and cultural expectations and practices create a disjointed experience for student veterans, and that these disjunctions may interfere with veterans' ability to succeed in college.

On college campuses, militarized common sense is organized ideologically through the best-practice literature for veterans' services that promotes a valorizing discourse that conflates support for veterans with acceptance of military actions and objectives. Chapter 3 examines how military support is introduced on two college campuses by offering an analysis of campus veteran support initiatives. Campus initiatives were marked by military-inflected relations, as trainings, meetings, support programs, classroom practices, and campus-wide events were designed to achieve the designation of being military friendly. Some educational initiatives promoted an exceptionalist view of the veteran student as more disciplined, dedicated, and serious (and by implication, more deserving) than his or her civilian counterparts, creating barriers to interaction with civilian students. These forms of military exceptionalism also had the unintended effect of alienating some of the very veterans they were designed to support.

Chapter 4 turns away from institutionally sponsored programs to explore the diverse strategies veterans used to adapt to postmilitary life as college students. These strategies included efforts to sustain and re-create military bonds, as well as efforts to distance themselves from military relationships and ideologies. Social bonds forged in military training and combat both re-created and contested militarized socialization on college campuses. Personal histories of men and women veterans offer a window into the affective nature of military bonds, how these bonds differed for men and women soldiers, and

how gender relations were reproduced, codified, and enforced through cultural practices based on an ideology of male supremacy.

Chapter 5 provides some theoretical and historical context about ways that the legacy of the Vietnam War shapes contemporary understandings of veterans' needs and societal obligations by exploring campus discourse about military veterans and the current wars. This chapter argues, based on historical narratives of campus antiwar protests of the 1960s, that college campuses are portrayed as inimical to military interests and to veterans. The shared public imaginary of campus hostility toward veterans gives rise to what I call protective and valorizing discourses of care that conflate support for the veteran with uncritical support for military projects and have the effect of silencing debate on campus about contemporary military conflicts.

This discourse of care positions veterans as underrepresented minorities, beleaguered victims, and heroic figures, laying the foundation to increase military displays and military-valorizing discourse that ultimately represent and serve the interest of the militarized state. Stuart Hall argues that commonsense understandings of the world can be constructed through articulation, or the manner in which social relations, attitudes, and beliefs are related to broader societal forces that produce collective practices.[87] The process of articulation creates new relations among relatively autonomous social, cultural, and economic elements. These elements—such as discourses of militarism, social inclusion, civil rights, and veteran support—are structured as an ideological unity that defines and produces social meanings and practices. These newly formed social meanings include positioning veterans as underrepresented minorities and using ideological discourses (such as language and political strategies adapted from lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] and immigrant rights movements) that allow for the creation of programs that valorize and celebrate military projects on campuses. By positioning veterans as both victimized by and superior to the civilian population, these discourses conflate support for student veterans with support for military projects.

Chapter 6 returns to the voices of the student veterans and shows us that lessons learned through military service have important implications for veterans' identities and reincorporation into their postmilitary lives. Using extended excerpts from interviews with veterans, we can see some of the unintended consequences of support initiatives that rely on uncritical esteem for the military and societal silence about the current wars, as veterans struggle to make meaning of their combat experience and educate a society that has been shielded from the consequences of a national policy of war. Engaging deeply with the voices of veterans allows us to hear that ritualized public gratitude and suppres-

sion of public debate about the wars can leave some veterans feeling silenced, rather than supported.

Military valorization on campus ebbs and flows, tacking with shifting social trends and political currents. It is important to understand veterans' experiences in civilian colleges because it is important to improve their access to higher education, but also because this information can teach us about our country at war. The conclusion reexamines distinctions between what it means to strive to be veteran friendly as opposed to military friendly, and attempts to separate the conflation of the two. This begins with the recognition that what might be helpful for student veterans is not necessarily the promotion of a national military project. The chapter calls for meaningful dialogue around the wars generally, but also in particular about veterans' military experiences, and makes clear that the veterans interviewed for this study wanted to be welcomed home from war. These veterans wanted their voices to be heard and their experiences to be understood by society. It is also clear that many, and likely the majority of, U.S. civilians want to support veterans returning from the current wars. But it is the mobilization of that inclination to acknowledge and support returning veterans that deserves more focused attention.

Taken together, these chapters focus on the educative aspects of military activities—pedagogies of warfare and practices of schooling—to explore the links between military training and civilian education. Tracing the effects of wartime military experience on veterans' academic lives provides a more complex understanding of the gap between recruitment promises and their contestable fulfillment. When veterans return home and enroll in college, they bring the war, which is inscribed in their bodies and consciousness, into civilian college, a space that is generally assumed to be non-militarized. This book argues that civilian institutional spaces, and particularly civilian colleges, are not, in fact, non-militarized. They are simply militarized in a different way.

Notes

Introduction

1 Color guard is the ceremonial display of flags representing different military branches, regiments, campaigns, and military support organizations (for example, vfw and American Legion). Color guard flag bearers are flanked by armed soldiers.

2 Becker and Schulz, "Cops Ready for War."

3 Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology*. Moreover, Mariana Mazzucato (2011) writes that technologies originally developed for military use such as drones, robotics, and biometrics are increasingly being used on campuses and commercially in the private sector: "The role of government in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (darpa) model goes far beyond simply funding basic science. It is about targeting resourcing in specific areas and directions; opening new windows of opportunities; brokering the interactions between public and private agents involved in technological development, including private and public venture capital; and facilitating commercialization" (76). Mazzucato adds that the U.S. Department of Defense has funded the formation of entire disciplines on university campuses: "Going way beyond simply funding research, darpa funded the formation of computer science departments, provided start-up firms with early research support, contributed to semiconductor research and support to human computer interface research, and oversaw the early stages of the internet" (77–78).

4 Jorgenson and Wolf, "A Special Supplement"; Foster, "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Understanding Perpetrators"; Price, *Anthropological Intelligence*; González, *Militarizing Culture*; Noble, *America by Design*; Noble, *Forces of Production*; Cahill, "Fighting the Vietnam Syndrome"; Enloe, *Maneuvers*; Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*; Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology*; Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System*; Stavrianakis and Selby, *Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security, Theory*.

5 Mazzucato, writing about the Cold War period in the United States, notes that "darpa officers engaged in business and technological brokering—linking university

researchers to entrepreneurs interested in starting a new firm; connecting start-up firms with venture capitalists; finding a larger company to commercialise the technology; or assisting in procuring a government contract to support the commercialisation process. Pursuing this brokering function, DARPA officers not only developed links among those involved in the network system but also engaged in efforts to expand the pool of scientists and engineers working in specific areas. An example of this is the role DARPA played in the 1960s by funding the establishment of new computer science departments at various universities in the USA" (Mazzucato, *The Entrepreneurial State*, 79). See also Noble, *Forces of Production*; Price, *Anthropological Intelligence*; Price, "Cloak and Trowel"; Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology*.

6   See Jungk, *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns*.

7   Bogart, *Unwarranted Influence*.

8   Department of Veterans Affairs, "Department of Veterans Affairs Education Program Beneficiaries: FY 2000 to FY 2012," 2013, http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs /Utilization/EducNation_2012.xls; Fain, "Follow the Money"; Cate, *Million Records Project*.

9   Shepherd and Shepherd, "War and Dissent"; Shepherd and Shepherd, "War Attitudes and Ideological Orientations of Honors Directors"; Herrmann et al., *Educating Veterans in the 21st Century*; Herrmann, Raybeck, and Wilson, "College Is for Veterans, Too."

10   See Williamson's Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America report, "A New GI Bill." That report found that 30 percent of veterans made no use of their educational benefits.

11   Accurate data on the postsecondary academic enrollment and outcomes of contemporary student veterans are difficult to find. Critics of this statistic, including the advocacy group Student Veterans of America, note that inconsistent methods of data collection create confusion about the higher education enrollment and completion rates of student veterans. More recent data are both more comprehensive and more encouraging. A 2014 joint study by Student Veterans of America and U.S. Veterans Affairs indicates that in 2009–2013, 51.7 percent of veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars completed college; a more comprehensive post-9/11 iteration of the GI Bill was in effect at that time (Cate, *Million Records Project*). Despite the problems with the methodologies of earlier studies, more student veterans took advantage of GI Bill benefits and graduated higher education institutions after 2008. This is because the post-9/11 GI Bill offers more money for housing, books, and tuition than the previous post-Vietnam Montgomery GI Bill, making college a more attractive option for veterans. In addition, during the prerecession period of 2001–2007, civilian jobs for returning veterans were relatively plentiful, making paid employment a more attractive option for veterans. Finally, concern about low rates of veteran success encouraged colleges to provide support services that increased student veteran retention and graduation rates (Cate, *Million Records Project*). Improved education benefits and depressed civilian employment opportunities increased enrollment while campus veteran support services improved retention and completion. The VA is expected to publish graduation rate metrics for four-year

institutions of higher learning after six-year and eight-year outcome studies. See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, "Education and Training," http://www.benefits .va.gov/gibill.

12 Berdahl, "Voices at the Wall," 113. While returning war veterans may individually challenge and resist unified versions of American identity and government, public representation of soldiers' sacrifice has served historically to bind national interests with military interests. For example, after the Civil War, the zeal for honoring dead soldiers was leveraged to consolidate federal authority, as private lands were annexed for war memorials. These memorials were intended as object lessons to promote patriotism and to venerate not only war casualties but also a unifying and newly remilitarized national project. Battlefield monuments were created to manifest the power of the federal government and to link inextricably the good of the nation with its military: "Can [the federal government] not erect the monuments provided for by these acts of Congress, or even take possession of the field of battle in the name and for the benefit of all the citizens of the country for the present and for the future? Such a use seems necessarily not only a public use, but one so closely connected with the welfare of the republic itself as to be within the powers granted Congress by the Constitution for the purpose of protecting and preserving the whole country. It would be a great object lesson to all who looked upon the land thus cared for, and it would show a proper recognition of the great things that were done there on those momentous days. By this use, the government manifests for the benefit of all its citizens the value put upon the services and exertions of the citizen soldiers of that period. . . . Such action on the part of Congress touches the heart and comes home to the imagination of every citizen, and greatly tends to enhance his love and respect for those institutions for which these heroic sacrifices were made. The greater the love of the citizen for the institutions of his country, the greater is the dependence properly to be placed upon him for their defense in time of necessity, and it is to such men that the country must look for its safety. The institutions of our country, which were saved at this enormous expenditure of life and property, ought to and will be regarded with proportionate affection. Here upon this battlefield is one of the proofs of that expenditure, and the sacrifices are rendered more obvious and more easily appreciated when such a battlefield is preserved by the government." *United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co.*, 160 U.S. 668 (1896): 682.

13 For example, George Washington instituted the first U.S. system of military bonuses for soldiers after mass desertions at the Battle of Valley Forge.

14 In the summer of 1932, 43,000 World War I veterans and their families and supporters (called the "Bonus Army" in press accounts) marched in Washington, DC, demanding immediate cash redemption of service bonuses that had been issued to them as bonds that could not be redeemed until 1945.

15 This belief in veteran exceptionalism continues even in the current era of public rejection of redistributive programs. Current recipients of the GI Bill are still spared the stigma of accepting government welfare. Frydl, *The GI Bill*, 24, 37.

16 Frydl calls the original GI Bill "social welfare in the superpower state, a program of redistribution designed under and made possible by the most powerful federal

government the U.S. had yet known" (*The GI Bill*, 10). Benefits included low-cost home mortgages, low-interest business loans, one year of unemployment compensation, and tuition and living expenses to attend universities, vocational schools, or high schools. Frydl notes that this wealth redistribution initiative, though massive, was uneven because nonwhite and female veterans were excluded from many benefits. For example, the federal government guaranteed low-cost home and business loans to all veterans, but banks could and did selectively refuse to provide loans to African American and single female veterans.

17 Statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on enacting the original GI Bill, June 22, 1944. Available at U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, "Education and Training" section, "History and Timeline": http://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/history .asp.

18 Altschuler and Blumin write that the original GI Bill was seen by some as a Marshall Plan for returning soldiers. Some critics of the Marshall Plan claimed that it was wrong to allocate money to rebuild Japan and Germany unless the United States also invested in its own soldiers (*The GI Bill*, 4).

19 Many scholars, including Bennett (*When Dreams Came True*), Mettler (*Soldiers to Citizens*), and Humes (*Over Here*), give uncritical accounts of the legislation, arguing that the GI Bill had a lasting positive effect on the social and economic landscape of the United States. For a critical discussion of the GI Bill's affordances, see Frydl, *The GI Bill*. A good example of scholarship that actively constructs this hegemonic narrative is the U.S. Department of Defense publication *When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America*, Michael J. Bennett. For a more critical assertion of this argument, see Bouffard, "The Military as a Bridging Environment in Criminal Careers."

20 Military entitlements—which for political ends are often exempted from being framed as government entitlements—were among the few government benefit programs to survive the proscriptions against government welfare spending resulting from neoliberal economic reforms of the 1970s to the present day.

21 Frydl, *The GI Bill*; Bennett, *When Dreams Came True*; Pérez, *Citizen, Student, Soldier*; Guttman and Lutz, *Breaking Ranks*; Mariscal, "The Poverty Draft."

22 Frydl, *The GI Bill*; Altschuler and Blumin, *The GI Bill*. After the Iraq War, 45,000 troops returned to recession and high unemployment in the U.S. economy. With the anticipated end of the war in Afghanistan, many more are expected to leave the military and enter college. Because military recruiters aggressively target poor and working-class high school students, promising that military training and experience will pay for and prepare them to go to college, many recruits enlist for education funding.

23 Bouffard, "The Military as a Bridging Environment in Criminal Careers"; and Grubb, Badway, and Bell, "Community Colleges and the Equity Agenda" discuss problems of lack of academic preparation as an impediment to working-class students' success in higher education. Bouffard's work engages military members more directly, arguing that military service creates a "bridging environment" that allows low-income participants in criminal activities to learn skills that

improve their social and economic circumstances. Amy Lutz published a study in the *Journal of Military and Political Sociology* showing that lower family income was an important predictor of military service. She writes, "the military may indeed be a career option for those for whom there are few better opportunities" (2008:184).

24 Cantrell and Dean, *Once a Warrior*; Armstrong, Best, and Domenici, *Courage after Fire*; Tick, *War and the Soul*; Hoge et al., "Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan."

25 Herrmann, Raybeck, and Wilson, "College Is for Veterans, Too"; Herrmann, Hopkins, Wilson, and Allen, *Educating Veterans in the 21st Century*; Thomas, "Safe Zone for Veterans"; Briggs, "Stray Anti-military Vibes Reverberate"; Holloway, "Understanding Reentry of the Modern-Day Student-Veteran"; Lederman, "Preparing for an Influx"; Lewis, "Serving Returning Vets"; DiRamio, Ackerman, and Mitchell, "From Combat to Campus"; Boulton, "A Price on Freedom"; Byman, "Veterans and Colleges Have a Lot to Offer"; Bunting, "Class Warfare"; Roth-Douquet and Shaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from Military Service—and How It Hurts Our Country*.

26 Cantrell and Dean, *Once a Warrior*; Armstrong, Best, and Domenici, *Courage after Fire*; Tick, *War and the Soul*; Hoge et al., "Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan."

27 Humes, *Over Here: How The GI Bill Transformed the American Dream*; Bennett, *When Dreams Came True*.

28 For example, see the news stories: Briggs, "Stray Anti-military Vibes Reverberate"; Shane, "Student Vets Say Anti-military Attitudes Persist on Campus"; and Petrovic, "Anti-military Sentiments on an Elite American College Campus."

29 There are many contemporary examples of domestic militarization; one of the most notable occurred in Ferguson, Missouri, in the summer of 2014.

30 Merryfinch, "Militarization/Civilization," 9, cited in Cock, "Rethinking Militarism in Post-Apartheid South Africa," 2.

31 Mann, Incoherent Empire, 16–17, cited in Shaw *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarism and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, 7.

32 Mann, "The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism," 35–36.

33 Thompson argues against the position of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who decried the spiritual and moral effects of the military-industrial complex ("Exterminism," 21–22).

34 Thompson, "Exterminism," cited in Cock, "Rethinking Militarism in Post-apartheid South Africa," 2.

35 Enloe, *Maneuvers*, 3.

36 Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System*, 15.

37 Sherry, *In the Shadow of War*.

38 Excluding instances when the U.S. government gave only aid with no military personnel involvement, and excluding Central Intelligence Agency operations.

39 The following categories of conflict are outlined in Grimmett, "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forced Abroad, 1798–2009" and Axelrod, *America's Wars*. Conflicts considered major U.S. wars include the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War (1846–1848), the American Civil War (1861–1865), the Spanish-American War (1898), the

Philippine-American War (1899–1913), World War I (1917–1918), World War II (1941–1945), the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1959–1975), the Gulf War (1990–1991), the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), and the war in Iraq (2003–present). Examples of military-enforced territorial expansion include the so-called Indian Wars (1776–1777, 1785–1795, 1816–1880, 1890) and the annexation of Hawaii (1893), Samoa (1898–1899), and South Pacific territories. Examples of U.S. military occupation include the following countries: Nicaragua (1867, 1910), Haiti (1915–1934), Dominican Republic (1916–1924), China (1932), Philippines (1944–1946), South Korea (1945–1949), Germany (1945–1948), Austria (1945–1955), and Japan (1945–52). Instances of military troops being sent in to protect U.S. business interests are too numerous to list here, but examples include China (1854, 1856, 1859), Uruguay (1855–1858), Egypt (1882), Panama (1856, 1865, 1885, 1925, 1990), Korea (1888,1894–1896), Hawaii (1889), Haiti (1891), Nicaragua (1857, 1896, 1898, 1899, 1926, 1933), Honduras (1903, 1911, 1912, 1925), Cuba (1912), Turkey (1912), and Dominican Republic (1965).

40 Quoted in Tom Lasseter, "Officers: Military Can't End Insurgency," *Philadelphia Enquirer*, June 13, 2005, cited in Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*, 227.

41 Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*, 227.

42 Veterans for Common Sense, "Iraq and Afghanistan War Impact Report," December 2, 2011. Updated figures from Crawford, "War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement."

43 Crawford, "War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement." Moreover, official Pentagon statistics do not include the many troops who return home and kill themselves as a result of psychological wounds such as PTSD, nor does DoD report suicides among non–active duty reservists.

44 Crawford, "War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement."

45 Shaw, *Post-Military Society* .

46 Sparke, "Critical Geographies of the Global South."

47 Social practice theory helps us understand how individuals and institutions shape and are shaped by the cultural environment in which they operate by examining the interactions between individual agency, social practices, and cultural norms.

48 Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 323n1.

49 Binder and Wood, *Becoming Right.*

50 Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 118.

51 Billig, *Banal Nationalism.*

52 See Klein, "The New Greatest Generation."

53 See Lifton, *Home from the War*; Grossman, *On Killing*; Sherman, *The Untold War*; Gutmann and Lutz, *Breaking Ranks*.

54 Litz et al., "Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans"; see also Shay, *Odysseus in America*; Maguen and Litz, "Moral Injury in Veterans of War." Treatment programs in the VA are increasingly adopting Shay's (*Odysseus in America*) framing of moral injury. These programs tend to limit the scope of moral injury to psychological conflicts soldiers feel when the demands of combat require that they violate their personal ethical or religious moral codes—they do not relate moral injury to

broader issues such as the rationale for specific wars or the overall military mission. I argue that this individually focused definition of moral injury does not allow veterans to heal from war trauma from a position of active opposition to war.

55 Hautzinger and Scandlyn, *Beyond Post-Traumatic Stress*; Maguen & Litz, "Moral Injury in Veterans of War." U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs data show that veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are two and a half times as likely to commit suicide as people the same age with no military experience. Cited in Aaron Glantz, "After Service, Veteran Deaths Surge," *New York Times*, October 17, 2010, 29A.

56 Feldman, "Difficult Distinctions"; Artexaga, "Engendering Violence"; Feldman, "The Actuarial Gaze"; Feldman, *Formations of Violence*.

57 Brison, "Trauma Narratives and the Re-making of the Self." Brison explores the role of trauma narratives, which she labels "speech acts of memory," in remaking the self. She argues that remastering traumatic memory involves a shift from viewing one's self as the object of another's speech to being the subject of one's own. The act of bearing witness to the trauma facilitates this shift, not only by transforming traumatic memory into a coherent narrative that can be integrated into the survivor's sense of self and worldview but also by reintegrating the survivor into a community. Brison writes that trauma research supports a view of the self as fundamentally relational and notes the multiform and fluctuating nature of memory. Memories of trauma are experienced by the survivor as inflicted, not chosen. In contrast, narrative memory, or narrating memories to others, is a chosen act that enables survivors to gain more control over the subjective experience of the trauma. "Narrative memory is not passively endured," she writes. "Rather it is an act on the part of the narrator, a speech act that diffuses traumatic memory, giving shape and a temporal order to the events recalled, establishing more control over their recalling, and helping the survivor to remake the self."

58 Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*; Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*; Sue, "Whiteness and Ethnocentric Monoculturalism"; Madriaga, "The Star-Spangled Banner"; Belkin, *Bring Me Men*.

59 The U.S. military claims to offer the template for a colorblind deracialized America (for a prime example of this claim, see Moskos and Butler, *All That We Can Be*). However, Sue, "Whiteness and Ethnocentric Monoculturalism"; and Madriaga, "The Star-Spangled Banner" point out that the U.S. military as an institution is in fact thoroughly constituted in discourses of whiteness (Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*; Blatt and Roediger, *The Meaning of Slavery in the North*; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*) and ethnocentric monoculturalism (Sue, "Whiteness and Ethnocentric Monoculturalism").

60 Contemporary scholarship in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and human geography clarify that gender is multivariate and not fully encompassed in a male-female binary. For this study, I consciously adopt the static and reified typologies of the U.S. military by using the dichotomous categories of male and female for gender.

61 For more on this, see Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, *Women's Lives*; Nagel, "Masculinity and Nationalism"; Acker, "Hierarchies, Jobs, and Bodies"; Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*; Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*; Enloe, *Globalization and Militarism*;

Oliver, *Women as Weapons of War*; Belkin, *Bring Me Men*; and Gardiner, "The Warrior Ethos."

62 Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, 45. See also Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, *Women's Lives*; and Lutz, "Living Room Terrorists." Writing about the U.S. military, Lutz notes that "there is no workplace more supportive of a masculine identity centered on power, control, and violence" ("Living Room Terrorists," 17–18).

63 Nader, "Controlling Processes."

64 Generally, I find dichotomizing structure/agency frameworks reductive and unhelpful, as they tend to reify idealized poles while eliding the complex, mutually constitutive, and shifting subjective relations within social and ideological structures.

65 Lutz, "Empire Is in the Details."

66 The website gijobs.com maintains and promotes a list of schools designated as military friendly. The criteria by which campuses qualify for this designation varies, but it generally means that there are staff, funding, and supportive services dedicated to military veterans on campus, and that there is a difficult-to-quantify atmosphere of respect for former service members. Every year since 2009, GI Jobs.com has named SU one of the "Top 50 Military Friendly Schools."

67 All formal interviews were conducted using research protocol from the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects.

68 The additional campus research sites are identified in the text as Los Santos Community College, Mountain Community College, Inland Community College, Fulton Community College, Coastal University, and Urban State College.

69 As a public university, SU has a mandate to accept qualified students transferring from community colleges. In 2014, 17 percent of the SU incoming class was transfer students.

70 Programs benefitting veterans have been a source of some conflict. For example, many of these benefits (such as reduced course loads, priority course registration, and increased time for exams) began as an accommodation to disabled students, and veterans previously accessed them through the campus Disabled Students Services (DSS). But many veterans and veteran advocates objected to the fact that these benefits were routed through DSS. They particularly objected to the "disabled" designation, a qualifier that was anathema to veterans who were not, or did not consider themselves, disabled. They advocated for the decoupling of veteran services from DSS (interviews JD, FL, October 9, 2011). Today, many campuses have programs that explicitly offer this service to student veterans without being associated with DSS.

71 I discuss differences in support services at the respective campuses in chapter 3.

72 A 2014 report by the Student Veterans of America states that 89.7 percent of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans begin their postsecondary, postservice education at community colleges. Cate, *Million Records Project*.

73 National Priorities Project (2001–2010); Kleycamp, "College, Jobs, or the Military?"; Kleycamp, "Military Service and Minority Opportunity"; Asch, Heaton, and Savych, *Recruiting Minorities*.

74   According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Latinos constituted 58 percent of Orchard Valley's population.

75   Southwest University promotional materials, retrieved September 30, 2011.

76   I used a modified chain sampling method to identify participants at each site. I began by presenting my research proposal in classes, campus veterans' clubs, and veterans' community meetings, after which I distributed my contact information with a request for participants. I followed up with the veterans who contacted me. While I did not ask veterans to refer me to other potential participants, I did ask some to vouch for me with potential interviewees who expressed skepticism about talking to a civilian researcher. In some cases, instructors gave my name to veterans who might be interested in participating.

77   For example, one participant, having grown up in conditions of community violence, said that he enlisted (in December 2003, well after the Iraq War was underway) to help provide for his family. He explained his decision to go to war through a cost-benefit lens, saying that if he died as a result of street violence in California his family would be left with nothing, whereas if he died in combat, his mother would be entitled to death benefits.

78   E-1 is the first and lowest rank and pay grade for the U.S. Army. E signifies enlisted, and E-1 is the most entry-level private rank; E-2 signifies private second class (E-3 is private first class, etc.). Many of the SU veteran participants left the military with the rank of E-5 (sergeant) or E-6 (staff sergeant). The Navy and Air Force rank designations have different names, but participants in this research enlisted in similar entry-level ranks.

79   Studying cultural practices from the outside presents particular challenges, but as anthropologist and army captain Alexandra Jaffee ("The Limits of Detachment") notes, there are also challenges involved in attempting to produce ethnography while positioned within a "total system" (Goffman, *Asylums*) like the military. Jaffee was unable to write an ethnography of her military experience because she was unable to separate her civilian and military identities inside the totalizing discourse of her military environment.

80   See, for example, DuBois, "Passionate Scholarship"; Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?"; Abu-Lughod, *Writing Women's Worlds*; Jaffee, "The Limits of Detachment."

81   Lykes, "Activist Participatory Research."

82   I fully answered all questions from participants about the process of this research, but I was unable to provide a full account of my findings because my analysis was still being developed.

83   No student veteran who served in the Coast Guard was interviewed.

84   *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, *Fourth Edition*.

85   For example, the Marines ("The Few, the Proud, the Marines") are promoted as the most elite fighting force—tougher, more committed, and braver than other military members. Members of the Army have a reputation as workhorses (perceived by members of the Air Force and Navy to "work harder, not smarter"). Members of the Navy and Air Force have a reputation as more intellectually rigorous and technologically skilled than members of other branches.

86 One convention of academic ethnographies is to place theoretical chapters in the front of the book, followed by chapters informed by ethnographic observation. This book follows a different roadmap. I have chosen to invite the reader to follow a process of discovery similar to mine as I researched this book. I began my research exploring the hypothesis that veterans might encounter difficulties in college due to differences in military and academic training methods, and so the study began by looking at veterans' experience during their military training and in college. However, through observation on college campuses I came to identify contradictions between public discourse about antimilitary campuses and the fact that even campuses said to be hostile toward military veterans were actually quite welcoming to them. This finding raised questions about this divergence between public image and lived reality, which I examine in later chapters. For these reasons, the placement of the chapters is intended to represent my method as well as my findings.

87 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity."

Chapter 1. Basic Training

1 This study began with focus on the lived effects of lessons learned through structured institutional practice. I did not set out to study the educative aspects of living through wartime combat, which takes place in highly diverse and situationally specific sites. This important topic is aptly explored in academic literature such as Hautzinger and Scandlyn's *Beyond Post-Traumatic Stress*, and in fiction and nonfiction memoirs by war veterans, for example: Boudreau, *Packing Inferno*; O'Brien, *The Things They Carried*; and Williams and Staub, *Love My Rifle More Than You*.

2 I think of basic training as forming part of what Mary Louise Pratt calls a "contact zone" or "social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often as highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination" (1991:34).

3 Goffman, *Asylums*.

4 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*; Lande, "Breathing Like a Soldier."

5 Bourdieu, *Distinction*; Bourdieu, *In Other Words*; Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*. Bourdieu describes "a socialized body, a structured body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world, or a particular sector of that world—a field—and which structures the perception of that world, as well as action in that world" (*Practical Reason*, 81).

6 All active-duty Army soldiers and officers must go through this process, with the exception of certain specialty branch officers (MDs in the Army Medical Dept., legal, judge advocates, and religious): "Chaplain Corps officers do not participate in BT due to the extensive rifle marksmanship, weapons familiarization, and combatives training conducted in the course. The mission of the Chaplain Corps as noncombatants is considerably different than the mission of other officers thus requiring a different training philosophy." United States (TRADOC) Army Regulations AR 350–1 Section 3–24, 65.