



# matterphorics

ON THE LAWS OF THEORY

DANIELA GANDORFER

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*On the Laws of Theory* DANIELA GANDORFER

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# Introduction: How to Begin?

A GUIDE

The library contains not books  
but glaciers.  
The glaciers are upright.

Silent.  
As perfectly ordered books would be.  
But they are melted.

What would it be like  
to live in a library  
of melted books?

With sentences streaming all over the floor  
and all the punctuation  
settled to the bottom as a residue.

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It would be confusing.  
Unforgivable.  
An adventure.  
—ANNE CARSON, “Wildly Constant”

What men are poets who can speak of Jupiter if he were like a man, but if he is an immense spinning sphere of methane and ammonia must be silent? —RICHARD FEYNMAN, *The Feynman Lectures on Physics*

And I, I am feeling a little peculiar.  
—4 NON BLONDES, “What’s Up”

In the beginning of *Cannibal Metaphysics*, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro reveals that he had originally planned to write a book as an homage to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. He would have written it from the point of view of his discipline, anthropology, and he would have called it *Anti-Narcissus: Anthropology as Minor Science*. Somehow, however, he sensed that this endeavor might be too unsettling, too contradictory, perhaps even too daring to be undertaken by him, especially alone. Instead of writing the book himself, he decided to write about it “as if others had written it.” He decided to write a beginner’s guide to the “endlessly imagined” book, which “ended up not existing—unless in the pages to follow.”<sup>1</sup> I found myself intrigued by this “invisible” book: written by not only one but more than one, an homage to Deleuze and Guattari’s work and existing only *in* and *as* relations. Viveiros de Castro’s beginning, his introduction, continues with an outlining of what is at stake—not yet with *Cannibal Metaphysics*, but with *Anti-Narcissus*, of which a draft, despite being fictional and invisible, “has begun to be completed by certain anthropologists who are responsible for a profound renewal of the discipline.”<sup>2</sup> The coming into existence of that book, whatever its form(s), is not only a collaborative endeavor addressing the stakes of a discipline; like the beginner’s guide, it is also a political project that aims to make anthropology the theory and practice of the “permanent decolonization of thought.”<sup>3</sup> Viveiros de Castro’s beginning comes from the middle, an active political project within and beyond institutional frameworks, carrying an ethics of relationality and collaborative thought that harkens back not only to Deleuze and Guattari’s work but also to the thoughts that made their thoughts possible and the works with which their works were and will be written.

Despite *Cannibal Metaphysics* bearing Viveiros de Castro’s name, declaring him the author is, to adopt the phrase Deleuze and Guattari use to describe their cowriting of *Anti-Oedipus*, “already quite a crowd.”<sup>4</sup> Deleuze, both present and absent in the three parts to come, insists that there is a major difference between

an author and a writer. The writer does not assume a world that awaits us to be created but rather “invents assemblages starting from assemblages which have invented him.”<sup>5</sup> One must, he continues, write *with* the world, *with* a part of the world, *with* people, not in place *of* but *with*.<sup>6</sup> Put differently, writing is not the skillful practice of an isolated genius expressing truth in language but rather an encounter that unfolds as a becoming. In writing, “one always gives writing to those who do not have it” (without writing *for* them or in their name), while those who don’t have it “give writing a becoming without which it would not exist” or would simply “be pure redundancy in the service of the powers that be.”<sup>7</sup> Because writing, for Deleuze, cannot be in the service of power, there is also no other reason for writing than “to be a traitor to one’s own reign,” to one’s majority, and to writing itself.<sup>8</sup> It is not easy to be, let alone to write as, a traitor—a fact that some writers know better than others. When Baruch Spinoza, the philosopher whose mode of thought and ethics Deleuze held in the highest esteem, began to write the *Ethics* in the seventeenth century, he already thought from a precarious place: “while it sometimes happens that a philosopher ends up on trial,” Deleuze writes, “rarely does a philosopher *begin* with an excommunication and an attempt on his life.”<sup>9</sup> And when the Italian philosopher Antonio Negri, more than three hundred years after the publication of the *Ethics*, takes on Spinoza’s work in his *Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics*, he does so while coming to terms with the fact that he too must begin writing from an arresting place. In his introduction, Negri discloses that “this work was written in prison” and that, once in prison, he “started from the beginning: reading and making notes” and asking his colleagues to send him books.<sup>10</sup> Neither Deleuze nor Viveiros de Castro have written from prison, and, to my knowledge, neither’s life has been in immediate danger as a result of having written an academic and philosophical book. Yet both have written with a particular mode of thought that, as I will show, challenges dominant political and onto-epistemological assumptions,<sup>11</sup> making it inevitable to think closely about what it means not only to write but also to cowrite and write-*with*. This is as much a question of ethics as it is of politics. In thinking back on cowriting with Guattari, Deleuze states that what was important was less working together than “this strange fact of working between the two of us,” creating a multiplicity; not only does one cease to be an author but “there is politics, micro-politics.”<sup>12</sup> Assuming that this is true not only for *Anti-Oedipus*, *A Thousand Plateaus*, and *Anti-Narcissus* and its beginner’s guide *Cannibal Metaphysics* but also for a mode of writing, thinking, and doing theory that is impersonal yet accountable, inherently collaborative yet singular, I have felt compelled to attend to the crowd I am and to the imagined book to which I want to contribute.

If I had written a book, it would have been one on law and its states of matter, arguing that law—every single law, in fact—is an expression or *configuration* of entangled physical, material, biological, chemical, political, cultural, and representational matters and forces. It would have drawn from, among other fields, legal theory, literature and media studies, and the sciences, and its title would have referenced *A Thousand Plateaus* rather than *Anti-Oedipus*. The political project carrying this imagined book would have been to facilitate a literacy and attentiveness for perceiving, sensing, and understanding the existence of law—not simply its effects and consequences but its entanglement with each and every particle and in each and every moment, especially in those of precarity and where questions of life and death, or death and non-life, are at stake. It would, for example, have exposed in a convincing manner how the drowning of an asylum seeker in the Mediterranean Sea is as much an outcome of political and ethical negligence, in large part deliberately orchestrated, as it is the result of the very constitution of particular laws, which cannot be disentangled from the materiality of the ocean, from Boyle’s law, from molecular and atomic interactions, from forces of all kinds, or even from the physical limits to what a human body can do: how far it can swim, what temperatures it can endure and for how long, how lungs fill with water, and how breathing becomes impossible. Attending to incidents of injustice and to how both the matter and materiality of law are rendered nonexistent precisely because they allow for violence and injustice to continue taking (a) place would have, over the course of this book, brought about a mode of sensing law that requires a different ethics and a different sense of response-ability—a *synaesthesia*.<sup>13</sup> This, of course, would have been too extensive and too delicate of a project for a single academic text to take on. It is a political project of this particular time-space, evolving amidst the rise of various forms of fascism and authoritarian regimes; ecological and environmental shifts resulting from global warming; global pandemics; the ensuing proliferation of military and social conflicts across the globe; neocolonial undertakings on earth and in outer space; scientific developments in, among other fields, quantum physics, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology; and new digital technologies, including blockchain, generative AI, virtual and mixed reality, and the Internet of Things (IoT). At this time—and in these times—the book on law and its states of matter is, I would argue, overdue. Fortunately, like *Anti-Narcissus*, this book has already begun to be written by those aiming to decolonize and materialize law and legal theory. As such, it aims to unthink modernist legal thought: its mind and matter dualism, its ubiquitous representationalism, its bounded idea of the subject, its

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predilection for transcendence, and the modes of power and governance it has created and rigorously defends. Many of the thinkers cited and referred to in this book have already been traitors to their disciplines, to their institutional frameworks, and to dominant modes of thought. They have thereby paved the way for those willing to think along with them to articulate arguments and theories that contribute to precisely this project. Despite knowing that this book will be, if successful, a beginner's guide to the project, making a case for its importance and timeliness, the question of *how* and *where* to begin remains to be addressed.

### Beginnings: Synaesthetics of Thought

The complexity of this question is what attracted me to Viveiros de Castro's beginning, to the concept of a beginner's guide, and to the imagined *Anti-Narcissus*, which exists only by means of relations and in the pages to follow. While my research, teaching, and social entrepreneurship focus on emerging, tech-informed normativities in frontier spaces, I am also trained as a scholar in literary and media theory. My own curiosity about the power of Viveiros de Castro's gesture and its potential to unsettle the disciplines close to me leads me to start with the question of the medium. Indeed, I would argue that the beginner's guide and *Anti-Narcissus*—a virtual yet real book aiming to decolonize thought without taking the form of a book itself—urge us to question what a book in general, and an academic text in particular, *is* and *can be*: the kind of relations it consists of and that make it possible. What's more, they prompt us to rethink the practices of academic writing, thinking, and reading and the common notions we attribute to them. Thinking about *Anti-Narcissus*, how are we to understand the multiplicity of forms, relations, and entanglements that make up what we consider a book and yet that exceed it by far—especially if what is expressed by a book (or text) is not simply content, ready to be extracted, critiqued, affirmed, negated, cited, and redacted, and cannot be contained within a fixed form (that of a letter, word, sentence, page, or book)? And, regarding the beginner's guide, how are we supposed to read an academic text that is based on, refers to, quotes, and invokes a book that does not exist in any recognizable form but nonetheless “radicalize[s] the reconstitution of the discipline?”<sup>14</sup> Asking where and when something becomes a *book*, and when it ceases to be one, means confronting and navigating different forms of power: the power to determine beginnings, dominate, colonize, rule, judge, and speak truth on the one hand; the power to resist and destroy oppressive modes of

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thought, think-with more-than-friends, and withdraw from rather than take (a) place on the other. Given the long history of the book and its assumed relation to both (written) truth and law, this is not an idle question. It touches on the delicate matters of authority, representation, authenticity, originality, foundation, and law, all of which are crucial pillars of a dominant (and dominating) mode of thought. Consider, for example, that the academic discipline of German language and literature studies, fundamentally rooted in philology—the study of the history of language and its sources—emerged from legal science at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the establishment of said academic field is attributed to Jacob Ludwig Karl Grimm, who, although commonly known as having co-edited *Grimms' Fairy Tales* with his brother Wilhelm Carl Grimm, was actually a legal historian, philologist, and student of the influential German legal scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny. (The latter will reappear, for a fleeting moment, in the first part.) Besides literary and legal works, Jacob Grimm wrote and co-edited *foundational* books, such as the *Deutsche Grammatik* (German Grammar), the *Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache* (History of the German language), and the *Deutsche Wörterbuch* (German Dictionary), deliberately seeking in philology a beginning and origin narrative, not only of German studies but of a cultural and national German identity in formation. Needless to say, this too was a vast political and legal project. It is imperative to acknowledge that the power of linguistic formation and the existential role language plays in determining not only identity but existence have been pivotal tools of colonialism, a notion famously articulated by postcolonial thinker Frantz Fanon: “to speak is to exist absolutely for the other.”<sup>15</sup> To speak, to use the language of power, and to obey its law is to begin to exist, to think, and to be thinkable.

Viveiros de Castro's *Cannibal Metaphysics* exposes, although differently, the predicament—but also the potential—of beginnings. By announcing to have written a “beginner's guide” to a book that exists in/as relation(s), Viveiros de Castro demonstrates that each beginning—of writing, of thinking, of a text and a book—unfolds from the middle, from a vast field of actual and virtual (im)possibilities and relations across space-time. *Anti-Narcissus* exists, and yet it might not have a beginning. It is powerful because it multiplies possibilities of what a book can be and do, yet it is not foundational. For Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of the middle is a crucial concept to think-with and think-from. It denotes neither an average nor a line that connects two points but rather a milieu, a space thick with relations “where things pick up speed” and becomings evolve.<sup>16</sup> As such, the middle is a *between* that does not denote a localizable relation but rather “a transversal movement that sweeps one and

the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks,” that does away with foundations and nullifies endings.<sup>17</sup> Although this book is not directly concerned with questioning, addressing, or deconstructing beginnings, foundational moments, and spaces, it remains critical of any mode of thought that derives its force and power, and often violence, from a claimed origin mostly understood as immaterial and representational. As such, I am thinking-with Deleuze—in particular, with the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, which opens precisely with the question of beginnings, stating that there is, in fact, no “true beginning” of philosophy, for “beginning means eliminating all presuppositions”: a noble aspiration, yet one that has not been achieved by Western philosophy, despite its constant reflections on that “very delicate problem.”<sup>18</sup> Even Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am,” Deleuze points out, does not denote a true beginning, as it already assumes everything that there is to assume: that “everyone knows, independently of concepts, what is meant by self, thinking, and being.”<sup>19</sup>

Part I takes its cue from this delicate problem and argues for a mode of theory that starts from the middle and refuses to claim territory or even (a) place: *matterphorics*. Highlighting both the pitfalls of representational modes of thinking and the ethical imperative to redefine what it means to think, the section challenges established notions of knowledge production and institutional power. Using the neologism *synaesthetics*, it advocates for a mode of thought guided by an ethics of collaborative sensing and sensemaking, attentive to the inseparability of mind and matter and the response-ability that there arises. Indicating the collaborative nature of thinking (*syn-*) and the nonrepresentational practices of sensemaking, the term also refers to *synesthesia*—a phenomenon that challenges traditional neurology by highlighting the complexity, interconnectedness, and plasticity of sensory processing in the brain while also questioning humanist ideas of the separation between mind and matter, consciousness, and representationalism. *Synaesthetics*, committed to the matter(s) of thought and a mode of theory that matters (*matterphorics*), bears the potential for different modes of existence to become thinkable and livable. The section demonstrates that both thought and theory must lose their minds, become unreasonable, commit the capital crime of treason, break the image of thought, question metaphor, and engender thinking in thought in order to become response-able and sensitive to what is not yet thinkable, to what at first might seem unthinkable and nonsensical: an electron crashing into language, a Red Bull logo breaking through the sonic barrier, oxygen molecules pushing legal theory, life and law becoming cutting edge.

## From the Middle: Matterphorics

Precisely because this book questions assumptions about beginnings, foundations, and origins—to test what theory can do if it rejects the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind, the inherently hierarchical separability of being and thinking—it tends, as a matter of method and resistance, to unfold from the middle: Donna Haraway calling out Bruno Latour for thinking-with the Nazi legal scholar Carl Schmitt, who embraced colonial land appropriation as paradigmatic beginnings; the Austrian parachutist Felix Baumgartner, standing at the edge of a balloon gondola about to free fall from the stratosphere while openly calling for Europe to close its borders to refugees and asylum seekers; a scalpel cutting through the body of conjoined twins, attributing a right to (a) life to one of the resulting bodies while cutting the other out of life; strong nuclear force overpowering electromagnetic force, leading not only to the fission of an atomic nucleus but to a chain reaction that bears the potential to erase and create space-time; a decentralized right to breathe emerging from a thousand plateaus calling for “another justice, another movement, another space-time,” a tune yet to be picked up by a mode of theory that can attend to what comes from the middle.<sup>20</sup> All these cases—matterphorical case studies—traverse disciplinary boundaries, expose complicities, and trace entanglements, revealing that what underlies concepts, including legal ones, is not (epistemological) uncertainty—conveniently resolved by the rational subject and detached from the world’s matter(s)—but an indeterminacy that disregards the separability of mind and matter. This shifts the issue from one of knowability to one of “what can be said to simultaneously exist” and in turn necessitates a different mode of doing theory and creating concepts: *matterphorics*.<sup>21</sup>

Part II reveals the import of a matterphorics of law by presenting a matterphorical case study of a man falling from the sky. Here, we uncover the inherent indeterminacy within legal concepts and underscore the ways they matterforth. In doing so, the section examines the entanglement of law with matter and force(s), challenging the hegemonic understanding of law—and legal concepts—as ideational, representational, and detached from the physical, embodied world. The matterphorical case study exposes the scope of concepts, taking the reader not only on a journey but also for a fall, ride, and dive—from space to the deepest point in earth’s oceans, from energy drinks to drownings, from sovereign to meme dog, from liquid oxygen to held breaths, from canons to cannons, from ballads to ballistics, from literature to law (and vice versa), from vertigos to vortices, from kings and territories to waves and forcefields, from naked ideas in a tub to Felix Baumgartner’s pressure helmet. Each movement

eventually reveals the indeterminacy of even the most powerful concepts: border, legal regime, territory, legal subject, rights. It is no coincidence that the space that reveals this indeterminacy most unapologetically is that of the frontier. Indeed, as the section shows, the frontier—a “shifting terrain between legality and illegality . . . violence and law, restoration and extermination”<sup>22</sup>—is where both indeterminacy and the desire to determine, regulate, appropriate, and territorialize are most pronounced and palpable. What’s more, frontiers—be they outer space, the Arctic, the Antarctic, the deep sea, metaverses, or the crypto-space—highlight the fluidity and malleability of legal concepts, which are subject to forces of all kinds. *Matterphorics* emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the materiality and complexity of these spaces and advocates for an ethical and participatory approach to legal sensemaking that is responsible to the shifting realities of frontier spaces. This also reveals a crucial underlying claim of the book—namely, that doing theory matterphorically, and engaging in an ethics of sensing and sensemaking (synaesthetics), does not imply avoiding power. Rather, as Brian Massumi states, it demands creatively getting “down and dirty in the field of play,” mobilizing complicity toward new kinds of emergences, staying with the trouble, and adamantly refusing to believe that “the game is over” or that there is “no sense having any trust in each other in working and playing for a resurgent world.”<sup>23</sup>

Part III returns to the beginning, Haraway’s critique of Latour and the Anthropocene as earth’s life story, to take a closer look both at the construction of the concept of *life*, an inherently ambiguous and indeterminate concept, across disciplines and what it means to have, take, and narrate (a) life. Given the progression of global warming and its differentially palpable effects, whose scale and complexity exceed borders, cultures, and modes of being, the question of who or what has the privilege to form a life story ought to be raised: What is the role of law in creating and sustaining this story, what does it have to do with genre, what concept of life underlies it, why does it matter (and for whom or what), and what can theory do? The section approaches these questions by tracing the complicity between not only life and legal theory—looking closer at what it means to have a right to (a) life—but also life and literary theory. Showing what it means for legal theory to become cutting edge—responsible to the cuts it performs and for questions of mattering—the section offers a matterphorical case study of the legal subject/person as bearer of rights, cautioning that, despite its importance, the concept operates through representational thought and the performance of onto-epistemological cuts. By demonstrating how the concept of autobiography, as the writing of the self’s binary *life story*, finds its expression in the narration of earth stories, this section

advocates for a more-than-real approach to literary and legal theory in alignment with a *jurisliterary* perspective on law, literature, and life.<sup>24</sup>

### The End? A Beginner's Guide to Emerging Normativities

I started writing this book many years ago as a beginner's guide to the book on law and states of matter: an endlessly imagined book, written by more than one, existing only in the pages that follow—only *in* and *as* relations. It became evident rather soon that this book not only subverts the authoritative power of beginnings but, to stay committed to a synaesthetics of thought, must also resist conclusions, determinations, and consensus. It is not only the power of the first word but also the finality of the last—whether conclusion or verdict—that reiterates the illusion of thought reaching a self-satisfied consensus. A book (or guide) on how to do theory matterphorically, how to create (legal) concepts that matter-*forth* differently, a book that argues for going beyond the limits of critique and experimenting creatively with complicity to make different modes of existence possible, cannot speak a final word, whether confidently or by following academic convention. If trained as an academic, how does one do theory from the middle, on the ground? How does one, as Massumi calls for, mobilize complicity toward new kinds of emergence?

Engaging with these inquiries prompts us to consider what it means to start doing theory where language and representational systems more broadly reach their limits. What does it take (quite literally) to create concepts that can withstand the pressure of new digital technologies, resist colonial and proprietary desires, and adapt to the shifting material conditions on earth? These concepts must emerge not as universal forms but as matterphorical expressions of a particular space-time: situated, understood in their specificity and historicity, and with awareness of the power they carry to matter-*forth*. What is the role of the critical scholar and the university? And importantly, what if concepts were to be created collaboratively, where the thinker thinks but does not hold knowledge exclusively, contributes but does not author, engenders but does not direct, establishes relations but does not determine the relata? What is the cost of democratized, participatory concepts; where do the funds come from; how do we navigate complicity with states and markets; and where do these concepts draw their power from if not centralized institutions, international contracts, supply-and-demand dynamics, or private wealth?

Grateful for the education I have received and the spaces the university provides for me yet acutely aware of its exclusivity and power—as well as its affinity for modes of thought that protect both—I resolved to seek alternative

vehicles for thought. Recognizing that theory is always already in the world and witnessing the profound impact it can have on questions of law and justice through academia-borne entities such as Forensic Architecture, I, together with colleagues Zulaikha Ayub and Jonathan C. Aguirre, cofounded LoPh<sup>+</sup> with seed money from Princeton University. Now a multi-award-winning nonprofit organization registered in Vienna, Austria, LoPh+ works on decentralized justice and tech-enhanced, community-based governance models, seeking different kinds of legal concepts for a more inclusive and diverse future to emerge. The lab's most prominent initiative—De.RtB (Decentralized Right to Breathe)—is an experiment in creating a radically different, participatory, and decentralized concept of rights. The final section of the book thus indicates what *Matterphorics* functions *with*—not only within academic confines but also beyond its walls, structures, logic, and immediate reach—including a continuously materializing decentralized right to breathe: a matterphorical legal concept in the making, created by a crowd of more-than-friends, decentralized in its power, distributive in its nature, participatory in its constitution, and affirmative in its operation. The commitment to infuse multiplicity into emerging technological frontier spaces, engaging with and diversifying these domains, is rooted in my extensive experience in these fields. Years of working and researching within these spaces illuminated the necessity for alternative, nonrepresentational, and radically relational approaches. In frontier spaces in particular, including the new governance frontier where emerging normativities are negotiated, claimed, and created, these approaches must be conceived in concert with new digital technologies. This includes distributed ledger technologies, like blockchain, decentralized AI, and the IoT, in order to ensure that they can endure shifting power dynamics and mounting pressures. Concepts, too, need to be powered, and what a technology can *do* depends on who has access to its creation and use. We need crowds, not geniuses. Besides, crowds are smarter anyway. Let us start, again yet not all over, together-apart by matterphorically going all the way down, becoming impersonal, creatively gaming complicity, acting response-ably, betraying matterphorically, desiring unreasonably, falling synaesthetically, and failing successfully.

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## Notes

### INTRODUCTION

1. Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, 39.
2. Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, 45.
3. Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, 40.
4. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 3.
5. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 51–52.
6. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 52.
7. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 44.
8. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 44.
9. Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 13 (emphasis added).

10. Negri, *Savage Anomaly*, xxiii. To be clear, this book was not written from a position in which my life was threatened or my body imprisoned, a fact that I wish to emphasize also because this is not the case for all of my colleagues at Princeton University. In 2016, Xiyue Wang, a graduate student at the history department, was, amidst his approved archival research, imprisoned in Iran and, after Trump's election as US president, sentenced to ten years in prison for espionage in 2017. Wang was released as part of a prisoner swap in December 2019. See Laura Secor, "Her Husband Was a Princeton Graduate Student. Then He Was Taken Prisoner in Iran," *New York Times*, July 10, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/magazine/american-civilian-hostages-in-iran.html>; and Michael Crowley, "In Prisoner Swap, Iran Frees American Held Since 2016," *New York Times*, December 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/us/politics/iran-prisoner-swap-xiyue-wang.html>.

11. *Onto-epistemological* is a term I am borrowing from Karen Barad. It refers to "onto-epistem-ology," which denotes "knowing as a material practice of engagement as part of the world in its differential becoming." Barad posits this concept as an alternative to the ontology/epistemology binary. See Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 89–90.

12. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 17.

13. The term *response-ability* (denoting the ability to respond) is borrowed from Donna Haraway and Karen Barad.

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14. Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, 40.
15. Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 1.
16. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 25.
17. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 25.
18. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 129.
19. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 130.
20. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 353.
21. Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 118. My account here is informed by Barad and their quantum-physical notion of ontological indeterminacy, which builds on Niels Bohr and argues against Werner Heisenberg's epistemological uncertainty principle, in favor of ontological indeterminacy.
22. Tsing, "Natural Resources," 5100.
23. Massumi, *99 Theses on the Revaluation of Value*, 69.
24. See Goodrich et al., *Law and Literature*.

### I. THINKING-WITH MATTER(S)

1. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 42–43.
2. Haraway and Creager, "Compost-Ography."
3. Haraway and Creager, "Compost-Ography."
4. Massumi, *Postcapitalist Manifesto*, 68.
5. Massumi, *Principle of Unrest*, 91–92; Massumi, *Postcapitalist Manifesto*, 69.
6. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 41.
7. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 45.
8. Deleuze, "Sunflower Seed."
9. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 43, 58.
10. Arendt, *Eichmann*, 49.
11. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36 (emphasis added).
12. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 47. For a more detailed analysis of the meaning of thoughtlessness regarding future imaginations of law, see Gandorfer, "Embodied Critique."
13. Butler, "Death Sentences," 49.
14. Schmitt, *Antworten in Nürnberg*, 60. In his written statement, Schmitt adds that the danger of theories, theses, and formulations being misconstrued is particularly pertinent in international law, constitutional law, and political theories, especially in times of latent or open civil war. The question of "ideological responsibility," and more generally the question of whether ideologies and doctrines should be justiciable at all, remains a difficult one, even more so, Schmitt states, in view of technology and propaganda. As is known, Schmitt was acquitted and released from prison.
15. Frisch and Kuhn, *Biedermann*, 38 (emphasis added). See also Povinelli et al., "Mattering-Forth," 318.
16. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.
17. See also Haraway, "Situated Knowledges." Haraway speaks of "a deeper surrender" to "immateriality, inconsequentiality, or, in Arendt's and also my idiom, thoughtlessness" in regard to what characterizes Eichmann's logic. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.