SETTLER GARRISON

Debt Imperialism, Militarism, and Transpacific Imaginaries

JODI KIM



SETTLER GARRISON

SETTLER GARRISON

Debt Imperialism, Militarism, and Transpacific Imaginaries

JODI KIM

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Durham and London 2022

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Typeset in Portrait Text and Quadraat Sans
by Westchester Publishing Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Kim, Jodi, [date] author.
Title: Settler garrison: debt imperialism, militarism, and transpacific imaginaries / Jodi Kim.
Description: Durham: Duke University Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021036596 (print)
LCCN 2021036597 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478015680 (hardcover)
ISBN 9781478018315 (paperback)
ISBN 9781478022923 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Military bases, American—Pacific Area. | Debts, Public—United States. | Imperialism. | Postcolonialism—Pacific Area. | United States—Territorial expansion. | United States—Foreign economic relations—Pacific Area. | Pacific Area—Foreign economic relations—United States. | BISAC: HISTORY / World | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Colonialism & Post-Colonialism
Classification: LCC DU30. K56 2022 (print) | LCC DU30 (ebook) | DDC 325/.32—dc23/eng/20211027
LC record available at https: //lccn.loc.gov/2021036596
LC ebook record available at https: //lccn.loc.gov/2021036597

Cover art: US Naval Base Guam on Apra Harbor. Courtesy the Department of Defense. The appearance of US Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: *US Exceptionalisms, Metapolitical Authority, and the Aesthetics of Settler Imperial Failure*

Bong Joon Ho's highly lauded *Parasite* (2019) made Oscar history in 2020 by becoming the first non-English language film to win the top prize of Best Picture. The South Korean film also won Oscars for Best Original Screenplay, Best Director, and Best International Feature Film. It seemed fitting that a film with such universal resonance and appeal would be the first to win in the newly renamed category of Best International Feature Film, changed from the provincial and outdated Best Foreign Language Film. The conferral of these top Academy Awards also seemed to position *Parasite* as a partial remedy for the US film industry's lack of diversity, encapsulated in the hashtag "#OscarsSoWhite."[1] By all accounts, it seemed that enduring problems of underrepresentation and English-language monolingualism (what Bong famously called the "one-inch tall barrier of subtitles") had indeed been at least partially overcome when the film achieved the trifecta of garnering prestigious awards globally, glowingly positive reviews, and high box-office receipts.[2]

Parasite's success can be attributed not only to Bong's technical prowess as an internationally recognized "genre-defying" auteur long preceding the release of

the film but also to the purported universality and resonance of its critique of capitalist class dynamics and wealth inequality through a South Korean setting and cast. Indeed, analyses of the film, both in terms of reviews and scholarly articles, applaud the ways in which the "local" context of South Korea effectively serves the "universal" theme of class hierarchy. In a *New York Times* review, for example, Manohla Dargis writes, "The story takes place in South Korea but could easily unfold in Los Angeles or London. The director Bong Joon Ho creates specific spaces and faces . . . that are in service to universal ideas about human dignity, class, life itself."[3] When asked the question, "What makes *Parasite* and many of your films specific to Korean culture, yet universal?" Bong responded, "Essentially, we all live in the same country . . . called Capitalism."[4] But are Seoul, Los Angeles, and London truly so facilely interchangeable, beyond general categorization as global megalopolises? Certainly, much of the critical focus on *Parasite* has rightly praised the film's trenchant way of grappling with capitalist class inequality. Yet what if we were to widen the aperture and see alongside or beyond *Parasite*'s putatively universal "upstairs/downstairs" motif in order to apprehend something less obvious and more complex as the narrative unfolds? What would come to light is that even as the film offers a universal story of class strife that could presumably take place in any global city, it simultaneously offers a story of US-led global racial capitalism's specific modalities in South Korea.

In doing so, *Parasite* dramatizes the four interlocking concerns of *Settler Garrison*. First, the film connects the South Korean modalities of racial capitalism to what I conceptualize in this book as US militarist settler imperialism, or the conjunction of US settler colonialism and military empire heavily concentrated in Asia and the Pacific in the post–World War II era. The "Cowboys and Indians" thematic refrain in the film, what I call "Indian cosplay," allegorizes the transpacific reach and transits of US militarist settler imperialism. Introduced as innocent child's play, the climactic and gruesomely bloody reenactment of a "Cowboys and Indians" encounter in the film underscores how class dynamics in South Korea are connected to the ongoing violence of US militarist settler imperialism. Second, *Parasite* also makes visible that the United States, in particular its military, can exercise certain jurisdictional and sovereign powers in specific locales or spatial exceptions across Asia and the Pacific that it has transformed into what I call the settler garrison. Thus, although Seoul, like Los Angeles and London, is a global megacity, a crucial difference is that it is the capital city of what is effectively a militarized US neocolony. If *Parasite* is in part a ghost story, the specter of US militarist settler imperialism is embedded in the very architectural design of the wealthy Park home, which becomes apparent as a kind of garrison.

Third, *Parasite* makes visible how this exceptional spatial dynamic of US militarist settler imperialism is linked to an exceptional temporal logic. The temporal logic emerges as debt, specifically the question of debt not simply as a straight economic relation but a broader manifold cultural relation and form undergirded by asymmetries of power at multiple scales. These asymmetries of power significantly determine not only the debtor/creditor relation itself but also which debtors must conform to a strict payback schedule (what I call the homogeneous time of repayment) while others get to evade it without the threat of discipline and carceral punishment. Differential vulnerability to economic debt conditions the relationship between the Parks and the Kims in the film, the haves and the have-nots. Yet the narrative twist of triangulating the class dynamics between these two families with that of a third, Moon-gwang and her husband Geun-se, reveals how the homogeneous time of debt repayment is crushing for some but not others. It is a kind of fatal double standard. *Parasite* reveals, moreover, how the homogeneous time of repayment applies not only to financial debt but also a figurative or affective one. The way in which debt as a cultural and temporal logic, conjoined with the economic one, is imposed on material spaces of the settler garrison such as South Korea is crucial to how US militarist settler imperialism asserts and continually renovates itself. Yet as *Parasite* also dramatizes through what we might call an aesthetics of settler imperial failure, the assertions and ends of US militarist settler imperialism are never fully guaranteed or completed.[5] This is the fourth interlocking concern of *Settler Garrison*—how the transpacific imaginaries of cultural forms such as *Parasite* at once critically magnify and gesture to world-makings and relations beyond the violence of US militarist settler imperialism through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

Let us begin with how *Parasite*'s class critique simultaneously amplifies the ongoing story of US militarist settler imperialism in Asia and the Pacific. In the film, all four members of the impoverished Kim family land staff positions in the wealthy Park household through a series of calculated and ingenious deceptions. The stark class differences between the Kims and the Parks become more layered through the narrative twist of triangulating these two families with a third, that of the previous housekeeper, Moon-gwang, whom the Kim matriarch, Chung-sook, has displaced. The narrative twist or surprise is that Moon-gwang's husband, Geun-se, has been secretly living in the underground bunker, the basement of the basement, of the elegantly sleek Park house for multiple years in order to evade debt collectors. The very existence of this bunker is itself also a secret to the Kims and even the Parks for much of the film. What is set up as an *inter*class dynamic between the Kims and the Parks also becomes a gruesome *intra*class war between the Kims and their doppelgängers Moon-gwang and Geun-se.

As the plot unfolds, this tale of how the precariat class is compelled to survive "by any means necessary" increasingly intersects with the tale of US militarist settler imperialism. We can think along these lines by apprehending the emergence of a Native American thematic, or "Indian cosplay," in the film. This allows us to link the frontier violence of US settler colonialism to what then gets projected overseas to Asia and the Pacific in the making of a military empire and settler garrison in the post–World War II era. Viewers are introduced to a seemingly insignificant detail when Ki-woo, the son of the Kim family, goes to the house of the wealthy Parks to be interviewed as a possible English-language tutor for their high school–age daughter, Da-hye. As soon as Ki-woo enters the house, Moon-gwang, the housekeeper, notices arrows on the wall, commenting as she quickly removes them that what was once a famous architect's creation is now a "playpen." We soon learn that the arrows have been shot by the Parks' ten-year-old son, Da-song, while playing with his "Indian" (Native American) bow and arrow set. This Native American trope becomes more significant as the film progresses. We learn that Da-song has become an "Indian fanatic" just like his Cub Scout leader. His mother, Yeon-kyo, has indulged this "fanaticism" for all things Native American by ordering a plethora of stereotypical "toys" from the United States, a bow and arrow set complete with headdresses (war bonnets) and a teepee. Da-song's obsession with "playing Indian" seems to convey nothing more than a fetishism for American toys, as part and parcel of the nouveau riche Parks' fetishism of all things American. Yet his "fanaticism" draws on the long-standing trope of imperialist nostalgia for a time before the closing of the US frontier. This trope functions to recycle the myth of colonial innocence.

Parasite at once displays and shatters the myth of colonial innocence in a climactic scene. Da-song's "Indian cosplay" is indulged yet further toward the end of the film at an impromptu birthday garden party at the house that is thrown for him to make up for having to return home early from a family camping trip because of heavy rain. Meanwhile, while the Parks were gone, the Kims had indulged themselves with a night of eating and drinking at the Park house, only to be interrupted by the return of Moon-gwang, who by this point had been fired as a result of the Kims' machinations. Moon-gwang returns to feed her husband and pleads with the Kims to keep the secret and to keep him alive by feeding him surreptitiously on a regular basis. In return, they would receive ongoing payments from her. The Kims refuse and threaten to call the police, but soon Moon-gwang realizes that these four new household staff members are not strangers to one another at all but a family unit that has essentially finagled itself into the unwitting Parks' employ. Thus ensues a violent chain of events as these two impoverished families who occupy the same

precarious class position within South Korea's strict capitalist hierarchy must compete to survive. By the time of Da-song's birthday party, Moon-gwang has already been injured gravely in this battle, and she and her husband Geun-se have been bound and tied up in the bunker while the Kims scramble to clean things up when Park matriarch Yeon-kyo calls to say they are returning home early from the camping trip.

The plot of the birthday party "Indian cosplay" has been worked out in advance, with the Kim and Park patriarchs each donning an Indian headdress and playing "bad Indians" against Da-song's "good Indian." The so-called bad Indians will attempt to capture Kim daughter Ki-jung ("Jessica"), Da-song's art therapist, as she presents him with his birthday cake. But the "cake princess" will ultimately be saved by Da-song as the "good Indian." This plot is thwarted, however, when Geun-se is able to free himself and emerges from the bunker to avenge Moon-gwang's death. He stabs Ki-jung ("Jessica") to death as she walks to Da-song with his cake, and Da-song has a seizure upon seeing Geun-se, the "ghost" he had encountered late at night exactly a year before when he snuck into the kitchen to devour the rest of his birthday cake. Kim patriarch Ki-taek immediately goes to his stabbed daughter, ignoring Park patriarch Dong-ik's repeated calls to him to get the car so Da-song can be taken to the hospital. Then Dong-ik asks to be thrown the car key, but Geun-se's body, mortally injured by Kim matriarch Chung-sook, falls on top of it. In turning Geun-se's body over to grab the car key, Dong-ik holds his nostrils closed. Throughout the film, he had been complaining to his wife, Yeon-kyo, that Ki-taek smells and that the odor is difficult to explain but definitely unpleasant, like a "boiled rag." Yeon-kyo then begins to notice the smell herself, and Da-song innocently notices that all four staff members basically smell the same.

This odor, which Ki-jung ("Jessica") attributes to their semibasement apartment, not only signifies class difference but also Dong-ik's class snobbery and sense of superiority. When Ki-taek sees Dong-ik hold his nose closed against what he considers to be the intolerable stench of working-class bodies, Ki-taek basically snaps. He deviates from his prescribed "Indian cosplay" role by taking off his headdress and going for Dong-ik, also taking off Dong-ik's headdress before killing him. As noted by Ju-Hyun Park in an incisive analysis of the film, given Director Bong's known reputation for storyboarding his films meticulously, this removal of the two headdresses is not insignificant. It might very well gesture to Ki-taek's, and by extension the film's, refusal to cosplay or replicate the genocidal violence of settler colonialism in an uncritical manner, and to refuse to be complicit with South Korea's aggressive allegiance to US-led global capitalism and its neocolonial status as part of the US military empire.[6]

The removal of the headdresses also signals that frontier violence is no longer metaphorical but is a real, contemporary relation. That is, the "bad Indians" transform back into the characters of Ki-taek and Dong-ik with the removal of the headdresses, suggesting at once a kind of break but also a certain continuity in the chain of violence from the settler colonial conquest of Indigenous land in what became the United States and on through the contemporary relation. That contemporary relation, as I have been suggesting, is constituted by the specific modalities of US-led global racial capitalism in South Korea and the dynamics of militarist settler imperialism.

This appearance of the Native American trope in *Parasite* doesn't simply remain at the level of innocent child's play learned in the Cub Scouts. Indeed, putatively innocent child's play as thwarted "Indian cosplay" resulting in multiple gruesome deaths reveals the distinct yet connected and imbricated dynamics of US militarism, settler colonialism, and imperialism as they make their violent transits across the Pacific. The Cub Scouts, itself a settler colonial institution through which young boys get interpellated to adopt a masculinist settler subjectivity via activities such as playing "Cowboys and Indians," gets exported overseas to South Korea as a form of US cultural imperialism, along with the necessary commodified accoutrements or "toys" and "costumes." Moreover, this form of US cultural imperialism is not only replicating as play but is also materially connected to the logics and tactics of settler colonialism on the soil of what has become the United States of America. These logics and tactics get projected overseas to pivotal parts of the US military empire such as South Korea. In turn, military empire is itself also a laboratory for configurations of rule and domination that get applied in modified form within the territory that has become the "domestic" United States through settler colonial conquest and successive seizures of Indigenous land. We thus see in *Parasite* the visible eruption of the structuring conditions of possibility of the dominant terms of order, the circuits through which US militarist settler imperialism continuously asserts and renovates itself. This is to speak of the visible eruption of the violence that is absented, invisibilized, and shunted both literally and figuratively to the bunker and the semibasement, as it were. Yet it is omnipresent. It is the ongoing violence of—and the gruesome structuring violence that undergirds—South Korea's "economic miracle" and subimperial status within Asia as part and parcel of the dominion of US militarist settler imperialism.

To speak of South Korea's "economic miracle" is to speak of its transformation into a US neocolony in the distended shadow of the division of the Korean Peninsula after World War II. To speak of this division, in turn, is to speak of the violence that is shunted, as I have observed, to the bunker. This brings us to

the second interlocking concern of *Settler Garrison* that *Parasite* dramatizes—the transformation of spaces in Asia and the Pacific into America's settler garrison where US military authority and sovereignty supersede local sovereignty. We can begin to think along these lines by asking why the Park house even has a secret underground bunker, not just a basement but also a secret basement beneath that basement. The very existence of the bunker in their own house is unbeknownst to the Parks for much of the film. We learn from Moon-gwang that the house was built by a noted architect. For the architect and others of his generation, building a house with an underground bunker was not uncommon given the very real and ongoing Cold War threat of possible nuclear war between North and South Korea. When selling the house to the Parks, a much younger generation for whom the threat of war is less real, the architect did not disclose the existence of the bunker out of "embarrassment." Yet his housekeeper, Moon-gwang, stayed on and continued to work in that capacity for the Parks, which would explain her knowledge of the bunker's existence and how it became a refuge or last resort for her husband to evade the aggressively persistent debt collectors.

Indeed, the "Cold War bunker" or fallout shelter is a globally ubiquitous architectural form that has been repurposed or long abandoned as one among an array of haunting Cold War ruins. The Cold War shame of this bunkered past, the shame of one's nation being divided by an external force that has then led to an existential standoff between the two divided halves, is here connected to the shame or moral economy of indebtedness. The bunker is thus a kind of return of the repressed of the Korean War, of the United States' imperial Cold War machinations in dividing the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel into a North and a South in the first place, and of the still formally unended Korean War (1950–53) that saw the cessation of hostilities not through a peace treaty but an armistice. The Korean War and the division of the peninsula also emerge through other details. Moon-gwang imitates famous North Korean news anchor Ri Chun-hee for fun, and Ki-taek the Kim patriarch responds that he knows quite well everything "south of the 38th parallel" when Dong-ik the Park patriarch compliments him on his good navigating skills after he shuts off the car's GPS system. The divided Korean Peninsula is a geography of militarism. It is a lacerated space. North of the laceration that is the 38th parallel are the lacerations of the US carpet-bombing campaign during the war, and south of it are the lacerations of US military bases and camptowns.

Moreover, *Parasite* exquisitely and excruciatingly contrasts the multilevel Park house set high in the hills of Seoul with that of the semibasement Kim apartment in the lowland areas of Seoul, which are vulnerable to flooding and

Figure I.1. Right: The exterior wall and gated front entrance of the Park house in *Parasite*. Neon

a literal "shitstorm" of sewage water. Yet this upstairs/downstairs class motif becomes complicated when we consider the specific contours of the Park house (more appropriately a compound) and how the film thematizes the issue of space and territory more broadly. It would be an understatement to say that the Park house/compound is gated, for it is surrounded and secured not simply by a gate but rather a high and thick concrete wall of dark gray. This wall completely separates the house itself from the street, affording total privacy and security. In this light, while the house includes a secret underground bunker, we could say that the house itself is a kind of bunker or garrison heavily protected and secured by not only the big wall but also multiple security cameras. The Kims thus infiltrate not only the Park family but also the Park garrison. To repeat a refrain said a few times throughout the film by Ki-woo, "It is metaphorical," or, per the English version of the screenplay, "symbolic." This house, as the metaphor or symbol of wealth, specifically nouveau riche tech wealth, is also a garrison as the metaphor or symbol of South Korea's heavily militarized status as a US neocolony. That is, South Korea is a site from which and onto which the United States projects its militarist settler imperial power.

In this sense, the garrison is more specifically a settler garrison, whose making and contours in Asia and the Pacific I will be elaborating throughout this book. In terms of South Korea, it is home to, after Germany and Japan, the third-largest number of US military bases on foreign soil. And central Seoul in particular was home to Yongsan Garrison (the headquarters of US military forces in South Korea) until its relocation to Pyeongtaek in 2017. About sixty-five kilometers south of Seoul, Pyeongtaek is home to Osan Air Base and Camp

Humphreys, a former helicopter base that, after an $11 billion expansion, is now the largest overseas US military installation in the world and reputedly the US Department of Defense's largest construction project on record.[7] The Park compound in *Parasite* thus symbolizes a pivotal node in America's settler garrison. It is a heterotopic space; what it means and symbolizes depends on one's positionality within the contours of US militarist settler imperialism. For Geun-se, it is at once a refuge but also a kind of prison, given his indebted fugitivity. It is the site of the US frontier narrative, but also one that goes awry, for the "good Indian" does not get to save the "cake princess" after all and the fatalities pile up in unexpected and complex ways that depart from the prescripted "Indian cosplay." The departure, or improvisation, as it were, is precipitated by the appearance of Geun-se, a return of the repressed ghostly figure. *Parasite*'s inter- and intraclass warfare produces macabre collateral damage, yet as I have been demonstrating, the ultimately thwarted "Indian cosplay" through which that warfare plays out bespeaks US militarist settler imperialism's imbrications and complicities with global racial capitalism. As such, *Parasite* as an allegory of class is simultaneously an allegory of US militarist settler imperialism.

If *Parasite*'s revelation of the existence of the bunker that Geun-se occupies is a return of the repressed of the unended Korean War, his emergence from that bunker as the indebted fugitive makes gruesomely visible the exceptional temporality of debt regimes that structure and haunt US militarist settler imperialism. The film grapples with this third interlocking concern of *Settler Garrison* by making plain that for those without resources and privilege, it is difficult if not impossible to evade the punitive consequences of defaulting on debt. Short of disappearing from society, Geun-se is compelled to repay his debts with full usurious interest. Yet this disciplinary regime is differentially applied depending on the debtor's positionality within already existing asymmetries of power. To put it simply and mildly, there is a double standard in determining who must conform to the homogeneous time of repayment, whether the debtor is an individual or a whole nation. Moreover, by seeking shelter in the Park house bunker, Geun-se's indebted subjectivity is in a way redoubled, for he feels total indebtedness to the Park patriarch, who is at once his unwitting captor, commander, and host. In attempting to evade the homogeneous time of repayment of economic debt, Geun-se takes on an affective debt. Such a figurative debt, as I shall demonstrate throughout this book, is one that can never be fully repaid. Yet it must be performatively repaid over and over again, as we see with Geun-se's faithful and precise synchronization in turning on each of the stairway lights every time the Park patriarch comes home and ascends from the garage level. Unable to detect this synchronization, the Parks see it as an electrical malfunction.

It is precisely their vulnerability and proximity to debt that compels the fateful decisions of Geun-se and Moon-gwang and their doppelgängers the Kims. Household or individual debt of their kind, in both its figurative and economic registers, is connected to and also mirrored at the scale of the nation itself. In terms of the figurative debt, the South Korean nation's structure of feeling vis-à-vis the United States is one of gratitude or indebtedness for two successive putative liberations, first from Japanese colonial rule at the end of World War II and then from the specter of "totalitarian" Communist domination as World War II bled into what would be an escalating Cold War. As I examine in Chapter 2, South Korea "pays back" this figurative debt and demonstrates its gratitude to the United States in significant part by "hosting" a large number of US military bases. In terms of the financial debt, the "miracle" of South Korea's ultrarapid modernization and economic growth has generated a host of contradictions, notably a precariat class. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis compelled the fateful decision of affected nations such as South Korea to borrow heavily from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in accepting "bailout" money that comes with a host of conditions. These conditions included further deregulation, privatization, and austerity—namely, the privatizing of previously public sectors; the lifting of trade restrictions; the opening of the nation's capital markets to more foreign investment; and, of course, the cutting of public expenditures and an already-fragile social safety net. This led to massive unemployment, particularly for women. South Koreans were thus correct in their assessment that the purported solution to the crisis was worse than the original crisis itself. Hence, the crisis is called the "IMF Crisis" in South Korea, giving rise to jokes that IMF stands for "I'm fired." It has also given witness to the coining of phrases such as "IMF suicide" to mark the alarming rise in suicides in the wake of the crisis, and "IMF *chonyo*" (IMF maiden) to refer to the predicament of single women who delayed marriage because married women were the first to be subjected to layoffs.

This South Korean naming of the IMF as an exacerbation of the crisis rather than the solution to it points to a broader problem of representation and politics of knowledge. As Laura Hyun Hi Kang trenchantly analyzes, the moniker "Asian Financial Crisis" is not a neutral geographic designation but rather a racialization that obfuscates what forces and players outside of South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia significantly contributed to the crisis. American schadenfreude when the crisis hit, and the identification of "crony capitalism" as the culprit, whose previous iterations include "Oriental despotism" and "Asiatic absolutism," belied the important role played by a US government increasingly beholden to Wall Street. Along with increased deregulation in the

early 1990s, which led to the innovation of new financial instruments such as risky derivatives, the Clinton administration took an active role in compelling the "Asia-Pacific" region to open itself up to what is euphemistically called global market forces or free trade. Yet in effect, the region has been compelled to make itself available to the speculative, risky, and short-term interests of American banks and corporations. As for the IMF, former US Trade Representative Mickey Kanter called it a "battering ram" for American interests because of the outsize power and influence that the United States has in dictating IMF policies and "bailout" terms.[8] The IMF is thus accountable and transparent only to the owners of capital rather than to the nations and citizens it purports to save, and the conditions attached to its loans usher in a repetition and exacerbation of the vicious cycle of the very processes that caused the crisis in the first instance. Simply put, openness to global markets, such as South Korea opening itself up to short-term loans and risky new derivatives dreamed up by American financial corporations, precipitated the crisis. Yet the cause of the crisis is narrated and racialized, which is to say Asianized, as "crony capitalism" putatively peculiar to autocratic-leaning Asian nations and distinct from "Western" liberal capitalism. The conditions of the IMF "bailout" called for South Korea to continue to make itself available to foreign capital investment, eliding how such speculative investments had precipitated the crisis in the first place.

This is not to suggest that South Korean actors bear no responsibility. Rather, it is to suggest that such moments of "crisis" erupt as the result of specific policies, US imperial interests, and capitalist global interconnections that render parts of the globe differentially vulnerable when creditors and investors collectively panic and take flight. In this way, since their creation as part of the Bretton Woods Agreement in the World War II era, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and especially the IMF have increasingly engaged in a US-dictated "mission creep" beyond their original charge of providing social support and alleviating poverty. The US government, in turn, has increasingly become beholden to Wall Street interests. Ultimately, this hypercapitalist convergence of interests and influence has congealed as a "Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex."[9] The power of this complex is crystallized in this example: J.P. Morgan was at the forefront of the effort to convert the short-term debt of South Korean banks into sovereign debt. Why? Because J.P. Morgan held $2 billion in derivatives contracts with South Korean banks. Moreover, as Kang argues, the spatial and racial bracketing as an "Asian Financial Crisis" also has a temporal bracketing, insofar as calling something a crisis obscures the long "prehistory" leading to the crisis (the underlying as opposed to immediate causes) as well as its stubbornly distended aftermath persisting into and after "recovery."[10]

I have unpacked this "IMF Crisis" story, which is also a story about the interests of US militarist settler imperialism, with some detail here precisely because what at first appears to be a matter of strict political economic concern turns out to be a *story* as well. In other words, each word in the very naming of the political economic problem, *Asian*, *Financial*, and *Crisis*, is shorthand for a larger narrative that obfuscates more than it reveals. It is precisely this narrative and broader cultural valence of the debtor/creditor relation, in particular its sleight of hand tendency, that I will be elaborating throughout this book. US militarist settler imperialism operates significantly through the imposition of debt's manifold relations and forms beyond the strictly economic at multiple scales. How does the US imposition of debt operate as a sleight of hand and production of subjectivity in disciplining some players (whether individuals or whole nations) to conform to the homogeneous time of repayment, even as the United States reserves for itself an exception, or the right to be exempt from the very disciplinary protocols it imposes on others?

In another layer to this story, films such as *Parasite* and the work of Bong's cohort of fellow South Korean auteurs owe their material conditions of possibility in large measure to the South Korean government's efforts to recover from the IMF Crisis.[11] Part of this effort was to strategically invest in and promote the South Korean culture industry not only for domestic consumption but also for international export. This has produced what has been called the "Korean Wave," or *Hallyu* in Korean. The increasing international visibility and commercial success of Korean popular culture—especially films, television dramas, and K-pop boy bands such as BTS—have thus been significantly overdetermined by the South Korean nation's need to manage a debt crisis.[12] Yet for the working class, the IMF Crisis continues to be experienced as a never-ending crisis, producing precariat conditions of prolonged unemployment, underemployment, semi-employment, and thus ultimately household debt reaching epidemic levels.[13] The characters Ki-taek, Chung-sook, Moon-gwang, and Geun-se in *Parasite* would all have been in their early thirties when the crisis hit.[14] Living within this more recent distended shadow layered over the distended shadow of the division of the peninsula, these two couples' employment prospects at what would have been their prime working years were irreparably disrupted. This would explain why Ki-taek does not see the point of making plans and why he has had a string of unsuccessful stints, whether as driver, valet, chicken house owner, or Taiwanese castella cake shop franchisee. This would also explain Geun-se's indebted fugitivity and why he also, like Ki-taek, lost a great sum of money on the Taiwanese castella cake shop franchise. In South Korea, this cake shop franchise has become a symbol of economic failure because it became a

common yet ultimately unsuccessful small business venture for employees laid off from large companies. It bears noting that in *Parasite*, Moon-gwang is the only gainfully employed one among the four at the beginning of the film. Even though the massive layoffs effected by IMF-mandated austerity restructurings differentially impacted women more than men, domestic work as particularly feminized labor is one circumscribed terrain "available" to women.[15] Thus, inasmuch as *Parasite* tells a universal tale of class hierarchy, these modalities of what we might call the "miracle's crises" are specific to the neocolony of South Korea and its place within US militarist settler imperialism's orbit.

In addition to displaying the contradictions of the "miracle's crises," *Parasite* also displays a refusal to submit to the homogeneous time of repayment on the part of vulnerable debtors such as Geun-se. This brings us to *Settler Garrison*'s fourth interlocking concern—how the transpacific imaginaries of cultural works such as *Parasite* display an aesthetics of settler imperial failure that gestures to world-makings and relations beyond the violence of US militarist settler imperialism. What I have called Geun-se's indebted fugitivity, his flight from whatever violent disciplinary punishment would be meted out by his creditors and their agents the debt collectors, and his unwillingness to use any significant portion of Moon-gwang's earnings to pay back his debts, constitutes a refusal to conform to the homogeneous time of repayment. Although Geun-se's flight is circumscribed by a kind of carcerality in the bunker and inaugurates a figurative indebtedness to his unwitting "host" Mr. Park, in the end it is still a refusal to submit to payback time and to the violence of his creditor. Through amplifying such refusals and rendering yet ultimately horrifically twisting the US frontier narrative, *Parasite* displays an aesthetics of settler imperial failure. US militarist settler imperialism continually needs to assert and renovate itself precisely because its ends and continued existence are never fully guaranteed. Indeed, the violence and fatalities it has produced and continues to produce are a mark or index of that very failure or incompleteness.

Parasite's aesthetics of settler imperial failure also emerges through seemingly insignificant details, such as the name of Dong-ik aka "Nathan" Park's tech company, Another Brick. In the audio commentary for The Criterion Collection's edition of *Parasite*, Bong reveals that Another Brick is indeed a nod to Pink Floyd; he was a "huge fan" of the band when he was in high school. "Another Brick in the Wall" (1979) has been interpreted by some as an enduring antiestablishment anthem, so it is a curious choice of name for a highly successful tech company. Yet on one level, it is fitting, given Silicon Valley's own enduring perception of itself as antiestablishment, though of course it has long become *the* establishment given the dominance and ubiquity of tech,

big and otherwise. Indeed, as Geun-se observes in the film, the "send" button on a smartphone is like a "missile launcher," a "North Korean rocket, a North Korean missile button" when the content is sufficiently damaging to one's opponent. Moreover, it would seem that Another Brick, a South Korean company, is outcompeting US companies and technologies in producing a "Hybrid Module Map" of New York City, a virtual and augmented reality platform that allows users from anywhere in the world to experience and get to know the city. Finally, Pink Floyd's song has also been interpreted as a motif of isolation or a barrier, referring in particular to the band's isolation from fans and one another. It is ambiguous within *Parasite*'s diegesis if "Another Brick" means another brick or barrier (physical and otherwise) of the dominance of US tech companies destroyed through technological innovation and specifically South Korean hypercompetitiveness, or if it means another brick laid in the edifice of global racial capitalism. And to extend the metaphor of the Park house/compound as at once the desired isolated bastion of the wealthy and of the US settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific, has another brick of this fortification been blasted away or has a new one been laid? These ambiguities and possible interpretations constitute an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

Parasite's aesthetics of settler imperial failure is also suggested by the ultimate ambiguity in the film's title, an ambiguity that turns on its head the initial presumption of who the parasite might be. This is related to the sleight of hand tendency of the cultural or narrative valence of debt that I examine throughout this book. Who owes what to whom? Are those who have been compelled to be debtors really, in fact, the creditors? For example, the "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries" or the HIPCs of sub-Saharan Africa have been compelled to be debtors and are stereotyped as "Third World debtors." Yet are they in fact creditors, when we consider that Europe owes them for colonial plunder? Yet this European debt to its African creditors is one that is not even acknowledged as such, along with the reality that the very reason why HIPCs need to borrow so heavily in the first place is because of colonial plunder and its distended shadow as manifested in the neocolonial practices of institutions such as the IMF. In a similar vein, *Parasite* asks who is actually the parasite (debtor), and who is the host (creditor)? In dramatizing exactly how easy it was for the Kims to infiltrate the Park house/garrison in order to leech off the Parks' wealth as paid members of the household staff, it would seem that the Kims are the parasite of the film's title. Yet by ingeniously invading the Park house(hold) through exploiting and exposing the weaknesses, insecurities, and failures of the Parks—and by extension US militarist settler imperial domination—the presumably parasitical Kims represent the ungovernability and unpredictability of

that domination. We are thus compelled to ask: Who is leeching off whom; who is the parasite and who is the host? Are the Kims leeching off the Parks, or is it that the Parks are leeching off the invisible labor that the Kims provide? This labor, though absolutely essential to the smooth running of the Park household, is at once invisible and disposable or interchangeable, for as we saw in the film, the laborers themselves can be quite easily replaced. One might argue that the parasite and the host can in certain instances be interchangeable. Yet on a macro level, the creation of value and accumulation of wealth are made possible in the first instance by exploitation and by the violent processes of what Karl Marx calls "primitive accumulation," such as colonial plunder and racial chattel slavery, which I discuss in the next chapter.

Parasite's concluding moments poignantly punctuate an aesthetics of settler imperial failure. The film ends with Ki-woo's class aspirations of one day owning the Park house himself getting articulated as a filial desire to liberate his father, who has replaced Geun-se as the fugitive in the bunker evading arrest and prosecution for the killing of Dong-ik Park. This earnestly filial epistolary moment, captured like a dream sequence, is preceded in the film with absurdist moments of Ki-woo laughing uncontrollably, and often at inappropriate moments, after he emerges from brain surgery. This medical aftereffect displays its most absurd moment when we see Ki-woo laughing at a photo of his sister when he and his mother visit the columbarium, where the funerary urns containing cremated remains are stored. As Bong relates in his audio commentary, it is "quite sad" that even after death, impoverished people such as the Kims are confined to the "basement," a "condensed space," whereas "rich people have a huge space for their grave." Bong laments that "it's cruel." Indeed, burial plots are sold as pieces of real estate priced in accordance with the market of the city in which they are located. Unsurprisingly, plots or "cemetery property" in global cities such as Seoul or Los Angeles are quite expensive.

In this light, what are we to make of the prefiguration of Ki-woo's filial earnestness in his letter to his father with the absurdity of his laughter in his visit to his sister's cremated remains? On the one hand, we could say that Ki-woo's class aspirations of one day buying the Park house are absurdly delusional, as suggested by the dreamlike quality of that sequence. Yet on the other hand, the ultimate absurdity of Ki-woo's laughter points less to an individual delusion and more to the collective or structural dynamic in which capitalist cruelty follows one even into death. This is the ultimate absurdity, and *Parasite*'s aesthetics of settler imperial failure suggests that perhaps one of the best ways to expose and mock that very absurdity is to laugh at it. In this sense, what at first appears to be the absurdity of wildly inappropriate laughter turns out to

be wildly *appropriate* laughter in the face of the absurdity of a capitalist cruelty whose postmortem temporality outlives or follows the dead to their graves. Yet in this instance, that idiom has lost its literal resonance because the cruelty is that the grave itself as expensive real estate or "cemetery property" is increasingly prohibitively out of reach while (premature) death is all too easily within reach for the Kims of the world.

Militarist Settler Imperialism and the Relational Analysis of the Distinct Yet Linked

I begin this introductory chapter with the film *Parasite* because it provides quite a productive point of entry into *Settler Garrison*'s analysis of how transpacific cultural productions articulate decolonial and antimilitarist imaginaries that at once diagnose and envision alternatives to what I conceptualize as militarist settler imperialism and the attendant making of America's settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific. I analyze cultural forms such as *Parasite* precisely because they do the important work of mediating and making critically visible the contours of US militarist settler imperialism and of America's settler garrison, yet also gesturing to world-making imaginaries beyond such contours through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure. In conceptualizing US militarist settler imperialism within and across Okinawa, the Philippines, South Korea, and Guam (Guåhan), *Settler Garrison* offers a *relational* analysis that departs from the geographic and cartographic privileging of continental landmasses and emphasizes as well the terraqueous and the oceanic alongside island, archipelagic, and peninsular spatialities.[16] With attentiveness to both Asia *and* the Pacific, my book bears in mind Teresia Teaiwa's analysis of the conjoined pitfalls of either marginalizing the Pacific altogether or of engaging in a "rhetoric of Pacific exceptionalism."[17] Moreover, in offering an interrogation of distinct yet linked forms of colonial domination, the conjunction of US settler colonialism and military empire in particular, *Settler Garrison* departs from a focus on one form that tends to elide completely or deemphasize the other. As Lisa Lowe observes, these "operations that pronounce colonial divisions of humanity . . . are imbricated processes, not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not temporally distinct nor as yet concluded."[18]

The aesthetics of settler imperial failure contained in the transpacific cultural works I analyze allows us to think through the relationship between settler colonialism and military empire in this way: settler colonialism is at once military empire's proving ground, obscured condition of possibility, and imbricated partner in violence. The United States as the literal testing ground

for biopolitical tactics and technologies that are geopolitically and militarily projected abroad has produced and continues to produce Native American displacement and dispossession, and that geopolitical and military projection abroad in Asia and the Pacific in turn produces Asian migration and Indigenous Pacific Islander displacement and dispossession. Indeed, as Jodi A. Byrd asks, "Given all these difficulties, how might we place the arrivals of peoples through choice and by force into historical relationship with Indigenous peoples and theorize those arrivals in ways that are legible but still attuned to the conditions of settler colonialism?"[19] As I elaborate later in this Introduction and throughout *Settler Garrison*, to think through distinct yet linked formations and experiences across and within Asia and the Pacific, and to analyze Asian, Asian diasporic, and Indigenous Asian cultural forms alongside Indigenous cultural forms from different parts of the Pacific is to think broadly and relationally about obscured connections without losing sight of local specificities, hierarchies, and incommensurabilities. What I call the "relational analysis of the distinct yet linked" is a method for apprehending circuits of US power specifically concentrated in Asia and the Pacific, the power of US militarist settler imperialism and its making of the settler garrison.

Focusing on the post–World War II era, I conceptualize militarist settler imperialism as the conjunction of US settler colonialism and military empire and argue that it is an ensemble of relations significantly structured and continually reproduced through a conjoined set of temporal and spatial exceptions. As I have analyzed, in the film *Parasite*, temporal and spatial exceptions come into play first through the representation of economic and affective indebtedness at multiple scales whose disciplinary regime of the homogeneous time of repayment the United States imposes but exempts itself from, and secondly, through the transpacific garrison, a juridically ambiguous zone of US military power. In thus focusing on temporal and spatial exceptions, the goal of *Settler Garrison* is not to magnify the dichotomies of the exceptional and normal, the extraordinary and the quotidian. Indeed, the exceptional and the unexceptional are coimplicated and coconstituted. Rather, at stake is an analysis of how the very creation and perpetuation of temporal and spatial exceptions enable the projection of US militarist settler imperial power and metapolitical authority. Metapolitical authority, as distinct from mere political authority, is the ability to define and prescribe the very content and scope of "law" and "politics" as such.[20]

In analyzing temporal and spatial exceptions, I conceive of the exception as the modality through which the United States attempts to impose a kind of metapolitical authority that in turn fortifies its militarist settler imperial power.

US metapolitical authority is such that the United States has the power to render itself exempt from, or as an exception to, the very rules that it imposes and enforces on others, whether it is abiding by the homogeneous time of debt repayment or fully respecting the sovereignty of nations and territories. Crucially, metapolitical authority is the power not simply to create these temporal and spatial exceptions but to discursively obfuscate and render these exceptions as precisely their opposite, as unexceptional. Metapolitical authority is thus a kind of sleight of hand: its very exercise or imposition is accompanied by a vanishing act that causes it to disappear. As such, temporal and spatial exceptions as I conceive them are distinct from Giorgio Agamben's highly influential work on the camp and the "state of exception" (which I discuss in Chapter 3) insofar as temporal and spatial exceptions are related not only to biopolitical space but also to the geopolitics of statehood and geopolitical territoriality.

Temporal and spatial exceptions as the technology of US metapolitical authority also give a new meaning to American exceptionalism. Against the dominant "shining city on a hill" thesis, American exceptionalism(s) can also signify the ways in which the United States has a tendency to render itself exempt from, or exceptional to, the very order of things that it imposes on others.[21] As I discuss in my analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment in Chapter 1, US exceptionalisms in this sense are no mere hypocrisy; indeed, they are the animating constitutive contradictions integral to the very founding of the United States as a settler state and continuing on through the post–World War II metastasizing growth of its military imperium in Asia and the Pacific. In this sense, metapolitical authority is a kind of exceptional power not simply exercised through the normalization of an exception but more substantively exercised without the need to declare a state of exception at all in the first instance.

A related alternative frame through which we can think about exceptionalism as it relates to settler state power and sovereignty is offered by Marie Lo in her brilliant analysis of plenary power. Lo argues that plenary power is "a particular technique of the racial regime of settler imperialism founded on a constant state of emergency." It is not simply that plenary power relies on a rhetorical construction of exceptionalism in order to rationalize "extraconstitutional" measures to counter threats. More crucially, "such exceptionalism is a structural and constitutive feature of the powers inherent in U.S. sovereignty."[22] Prior to the metastasizing growth of US military empire in the post–World War II conjuncture, the US exercise of settler imperial sovereignty was consolidated and codified as plenary power in a set of legal cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These cases pertained to Chinese immigration exclusion, the abrogation of treaties with Native Americans to enable further

theft of land, and congressional power over the unincorporated territories ceded to the United States after the defeat of the Spanish in 1898. In granting congressional power over these domains, the cases codified plenary or absolute power as specifically an extraconstitutional or exceptional power whose exercise is justified in regulating the borders of the nation and defending it against "external" threats. As I elaborate in my discussion of Guam in Chapter 4, whereas extraconstitutional plenary power as the alibi for ruling over acquired territories presumed that such territories would soon be incorporated as US states, Guam still remains an unincorporated territory. Thus, we might say that the permanence of plenary power over the spatial exception of the unincorporated territory is metapolitical authority.[23]

As I will elaborate further in the next chapter and throughout the book, the temporal exception is debt imperialism. That is, debt is a form of imperialism, or more specifically a temporal exception that the United States grants to itself of rolling over its significant national debt indefinitely even as it imposes the homogeneous time of repayment and an indebted subjectivity on others at multiple scales. Speaking of debt, or a condition of great indebtedness, as a form of imperial power might at first sound counterintuitive. The ability to leverage great indebtedness into a form of imperial power demonstrates how debt can function in such counterintuitive ways because it is not simply a financial economy. Indeed, debt is undergirded by historically persisting asymmetries of power and thus also manifests in crucial ways as a figurative economy or narrative structure. Far more than indexing the sum of money owed, debt thus constitutes manifold regimes, relations, and forms. It is a broader social relation, production of subjectivity, sleight of hand, and creation of a temporal exception through which US militarist settler imperialism functions and continually attempts to re-create itself.

As *Settler Garrison* demonstrates, it is then no wonder that in this varied relation, debt can oddly appear in two forms that seem to be antonymous: as a form of imperialism, on the one hand, *and* as a form of freedom, emancipation, or liberation, on the other. How, in other words, can debt be the foreclosure of freedom *as well as* its effect? That is, debt as imperialism is a twin operation. First, vulnerable populations and nations are compelled to go into debt and must pay it back at often-usurious interest rates under threat of discipline and punishment and the imperial protocols of international financial institutions such as the IMF or the gendered racial predatory lending practices of banks and payday lenders. This is debt as the foreclosure of freedom. Simultaneously, debt imperialism is also the temporal exception through which the United States does not have to conform to this homogeneous time of repayment that

it imposes on everyone else. Though this form of debt as imperialism is tethered to a straight economic valence, the form of debt as (the effect of) freedom or liberation refers to the production of an indebted subjectivity or gratitude for a figurative debt, the "liberation" from a range of unfreedoms, whether racial chattel slavery, military occupation, or colonial domination. Yet the production of this indebted subjectivity, and the attendant injunction to pay the figurative or affective debt back properly, is a sleight of hand. For the enslaved would not have required emancipation had they not been enslaved in the first place, and what is narrated as "liberation" from military occupation or colonialism elides how the liberator often becomes the new colonizer. As I analyze in Chapter 4, the United States' colonial domination of Guam has been narrated as Guam's "liberation" from centuries of Spanish colonialism and from Japanese military occupation during World War II.

This is to speak about promises, and the transpacific cultural forms I analyze in this book—literature, film, and performance—critically grapple with the promise made in bad faith, the promise that can be rolled over indefinitely, the promise that does not have to be made at all, the necropolitical promise that cannot be settled even with death. The *promise*, in other words, is another word for debt, and while debt imperialism certainly has an economic valence, it is also crucially a broader cultural operation and logic. As such, the cultural forms I analyze are a privileged site that renders visible and grapples complexly with the counterintuitive and manifold forms of the debtor/creditor relation and of the temporal exception that is debt imperialism.

The temporal exception of debt imperialism operates in tandem with the spatial exception. I analyze the ways in which the transpacific cultural texts in my study make visible how three types of spatial exceptions in Asia and the Pacific—the military base and attendant camptown, the POW camp, and the unincorporated territory of Guam—are remade into America's settler garrison. The spatial exceptions I focus on are the material sites on which the temporal exception of debt imperialism, the cultural operation, gets imposed in especially protracted ways. I conceive of these three types as spatial exceptions and have chosen to focus on them in particular, because they are juridically ambiguous spaces on which the operative logics of US aspirations to seize metapolitical authority get negotiated and revealed. Such spaces are laboratories, as it were, where we see the convergence of hypermilitarization, legal liminality, and negotiation of metapolitical authority. Neither domestic nor strictly foreign, these spatial exceptions are a part of the US settler garrison but not the United States of America insofar as they are not within the fifty states. To the extent that US dominion over spatial exceptions has not been

"naturalized" via formal incorporation as US states, sovereignties at once proliferate, compete, and cancel one another out as the United States attempts to supersede local sovereignty. Thus, although Hawai'i is also certainly a heavily militarized and colonized site in the Pacific, I do not include it in this book precisely because it has been incorporated as a US state and is therefore not a legally liminal spatial exception as I conceive it.

Though *naturalization* commonly refers to the incorporation of people, the legal process through which those who are not "natural-born" US citizens can become so-called naturalized citizens, we can also think of it in the context of the settler colonial and imperial incorporation of territories. Formal incorporation or admission of colonized Indigenous territories as US states "naturalizes" colonization, which is to say that the very granting of statehood renders natural or invisible the colonial conquest that makes territories available for statehood in the first place. In this sense, we might say that the granting of statehood is US metapolitical authority's ultimate disappearing act, for it converts *metapolitical* authority into *political* authority by incorporating territory into the "proper" federal jurisdiction of the US nation-state. Yet the granting of statehood as metapolitical authority's formal fait accompli is simultaneously its incompleteness or failure. For as I have observed, US militarist settler imperial power continuously needs to assert and renovate itself in the face of challenges to it.[24]

The cultural productions in this book defamiliarize and estrange this naturalization by linking the land seizures of US settler colonialism to those of military empire. How do transpacific cultural forms articulate a theory of distinct yet connected varieties of land seizure? They name and link the process through which Indigenous land has been successively incorporated into the white settler nation as the fifty states constituting the United States of America *and* the process through which a proliferating expanse of Asian and Pacific sites (the legally liminal spatial exceptions I have named) has been converted into the bases, camps, and territories constituting the US military imperium and settler garrison. In other words, to speak about the very making of the US nation-state is to speak about the growing contours of its militarist settler imperial power or its continued aspirations to exercise metapolitical authority as the kind of disappearing act that I have described.

Even as the United States attempts to impose metapolitical authority in this way, its ends are never fully guaranteed. Indeed, the ongoing violence generated by settler colonialism and military empire is a mark or index of their very incompletion or failure, as are the solidarities, oppositions, and continued survivals of communities and peoples against whom (and often ostensibly *on behalf* of whom) such violence is waged. While Patrick Wolfe's important conceptualization of

settler colonialism is that it is a "logic of elimination" whose dominant feature is the acquisition of land via the elimination of the Indigenous population and its replacement with the settler population, Maile Arvin theorizes settler colonialism as a logic of "possession through whiteness" precisely because possession rather than elimination more fully highlights the incomplete or continually deferred status of Indigenous elimination and replacement.[25] And although for Wolfe settler colonialism is a structure and not an event, insofar as settler colonialism is not an absolute fait accompli but rather a process that requires continual renewal and renovation, I comprehend it as *both* a structure *and* a processual series of ongoing events.[26] I link it, moreover, to military empire, observing how the United States is at once a settler state and imperial power whose militarist logics condense in a particularly heightened form specifically in Asia and the Pacific in the post–World War II era. Yet still, as Iyko Day and others have importantly argued, we need to go beyond a binary theory of settler colonialism structured around a settler-Indigenous dialectic. Day maps out "the triangulation of Native, alien, and settler positions" in North America with an attentiveness to how divergent conditions of both forced and voluntary migration are significant features of US settler colonialism.[27]

Alongside such important work, my concern is to apprehend the nexus of settler colonialism *and* the orders and outposts of military empire—a militarist settler imperialism—in Asia and the Pacific. The Obama administration's decision to "pivot" from the Middle East to the "Asia-Pacific," revealed in the then secretary of state Hillary Clinton's October 2011 policy plan, called "America's Pacific Century," gives renewed vigor to an already-protracted history of violence. Indeed, the transformation of the Pacific into an "American Lake" has been over a century in the making. In Clinton's recent articulation of this ongoing history, the "Asia-Pacific" is identified as the most crucial sphere of US influence in the twenty-first century and the region where US military resources will be concentrated. An "emerging" China is named as a new global reality to which the United States will need to pivot.[28] Yet crucially, a group of scholars from around the world practices a "decolonial political geography" in offering island perspectives on what it calls "China threat discourse." This discourse increasingly describes China's overseas activities as "neocolonialism," "imperialism," "creditor imperialism," "debt trap diplomacy," and "sharp power." The charge of neocolonialism and imperialism, however, becomes the alibi for retrenchment of the West's own neocolonial and imperial interests.[29] Indeed, the continuation and escalation of military buildup in the Pacific are rationalized by the concern that the "American Lake" is in threat of becoming a "Chinese Lake." In the case of island territories such as Okinawa and Guam,

which I analyze in Chapters 2 and 4, respectively, this has witnessed an escalation of already-hypermilitarized geographies. If the sheer pervasiveness of US militarism and military violence in Asia and the Pacific constitutes what Sasha Davis calls a "banal colonialism," then we need to make obvious the brutality of that banality.[30] The transpacific cultural texts in this book make obvious the brutality of that banality and imagine alternatives to it through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

In what follows, I offer a further elaboration of the book's central concepts and terms of settler garrison, regimes of militarism, and transpacific imaginaries, while I devote the next chapter to a sustained discussion and contextualization of debt imperialism. Each chapter thereafter is organized around a specific spatial exception: the military base and camptown, the POW camp, and the unincorporated territory of Guam.

The Settler Garrison and "Astounding Political Creativity"

The territoriality of US settler imperial projections of power include not only the fifty states (or incorporated territories) but also a variety of unincorporated and discontiguous territories.[31] It is crucial to note that the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau in the Pacific were effectively annexed, falling under US trusteeship at the end of World War II and governed by the US Navy until 1951, then by the Department of the Interior until 1978, as the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.[32] This granted the United States the right to establish military bases on the islands, and US military control did not end even after they were granted formal independence by signing "compacts of free association" with the United States because the compacts gave defense responsibilities to the United States. This, combined with the 1946 "Truman Proclamation," which extended the littoral state to two hundred miles out to sea, instantiated what Elizabeth DeLoughrey calls a new "ocean territorialism" that tripled the size of the United States and saw its emergence as a dominant Pacific power. President Truman's violation of the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine in turn triggered a "scramble for the oceans" and led to the protracted and contested United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[33] More recently, with the development of new mining technologies, the Pacific Ocean is being called a new "El Dorado" in the scramble for submarine mining rights.[34]

Indeed, the Pacific is an intense locus not only of "ocean territorialism" but more critically of an ever-expansive US "transoceanic militarism." In a significant recent development, the US military renamed its largest command, the Pacific Command (located in Hawai'i), to the "US Indo-Pacific Command"

(USINDOPACOM), expanding its maritime regime to 100 million square miles, or an incredible 52 percent of the earth's surface.[35] The presumption of *terra nullius* (nobody's land) that abets settler colonization of land becomes conjoined with the presumption of *aqua nullius* (nobody's water) that abets the military imperium's colonization of the seas, or land seizure coupled with oceanic seizure. Indeed, oceanography has been from its very inception a military-funded science, growing in step with US naval power and empire since the nineteenth century. We might speak, then, of *terra nullius* and *aqua nullius* as the legal grammar of US militarist settler imperialism's seizures of land and sea. America's settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific is thus constituted not only via the seizure of land but oceanic seizure as well, or the colonization of the Pacific Ocean itself.

This transformation of the Pacific into the "American Lake," though certainly heightened in the post–World War II era, has a long-standing history and prehistory. Indeed, US imperial practices long predated the acquisition of overseas territories such as the Philippines and Guam at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Before that war, the United States had already claimed numerous guano islands located throughout the Caribbean, Pacific, Atlantic, and even Indian Oceans.[36] Yet still, US imperial practices also predated the acquisition of guano islands. US imperialism, while often presumed to be in reference to "overseas" territories, needs to be reframed. In theorizing "continental imperialism," Manu Karuka writes, "To conceive of the United States in national terms is to naturalize colonialism. There is no 'national' territory of the United States. These are only colonized territories." Karuka goes on to elaborate that what we call the United States is composed of hundreds of colonized Indigenous nations, so invoking the United States as a "nation" in this context functions to provide an alibi for imperialism.[37] This process, as I have observed, is US metapolitical authority's ultimate assertion as well as its disappearance. The alibi obscures not only continental and extracontinental imperialism (or the process through which successive territories extending from the Atlantic and into the Pacific were incorporated as US states) but also the ongoing US domination of the territories that it has *not* incorporated as states, namely Guam, American Sāmoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Yet still, the alibi also obscures the existence of a US military empire, the tentacular reach of US power on military bases throughout the globe numbering about eight hundred, close to 40 percent of which are disproportionately concentrated in Asia and the Pacific.[38] Continental imperialism has been linked to the extracontinental seizure of land and sea in Asia and the Pacific for explicit and what is turning out to be enduring military (ab)uses. This makes possible the very

making, persistence, and exponential growth of America's settler garrison and at once manifests and enables militarist settler imperial projections of power.

This is to speak about the United States as what Walden Bello calls a "transnational garrison state."[39] This is also to speak about the spatialities and geographies of militarism, as distinct from military geography. Whereas military geography (as a subfield of the discipline of geography) is closely aligned with the state and is "aimed at the application of geographical tools and techniques to the solution of military problems," geographies of militarism, as I conceive them, constitute the transformation and malformation of space and social relations for militarist purposes.[40] As such, geographies of militarism index militarism itself as the problem. If geographies of militarism are thus a variety of what Katherine McKittrick calls geographies of domination and enclosure, they also give rise to antimilitarist and decolonial geographies and imaginaries.[41] We witness this interplay on the settler garrison, the spatial manifestation of militarist settler imperialism.

As a geography of militarism, America's settler garrison is constituted by the spatial exceptions of the military base/camptown, the POW camp, and the unincorporated territory, where multiple sovereignties at once compete and cancel one another out as the United States aspires to metapolitical authority. Observing the declension of European imperial power and the ascension of that of the United States in the interwar years, Carl Schmitt recognized what he considered to be America's "superiority and astounding political creativity." He observed that a historically meaningful imperialism is constituted not only by military and economic superiority but also crucially by the ability to define and determine the very content of political and legal concepts as such. A nation is thus conquered in the first instance when it surrenders to a foreign "vocabulary" or concept of law, particularly international law.[42] What we might euphemistically call sites of US "political creativity" are subjected, then, to its metapolitical authority. These sites or spatial exceptions are multiscalar "strategic hamlets" set off not only physically and legally but also conceptually and morally.[43]

The settler garrison, as both a term and concept, is meant to highlight precisely how these connected geographies and spatialities of militarism are produced. The settler garrison links US settler colonialism and military empire by amplifying how the latter also involves the theft of Indigenous land, especially when such land is transformed into US military bases and attendant camptowns, the first type of spatial exception in my study. Transpacific cultural productions generate and respond to a crucial set of linked questions: On whose land are US military bases in Asia and the Pacific built, and through what means was that land acquired? Within the context of the land constituting the United States

itself, Winona LaDuke reminds us that much of what is today US military land was seized from Native peoples through a variety of violent means—gunpoint, massacres, forced marches, starvation, broken treaties, acts of Congress or state legislatures, or presidential authority.[44] This terrain is the proving ground or laboratory for practices and tactics that get projected overseas, and these projections then also rebound in revised form back to the "domestic" United States in a recursive manner that bootstraps militarist settler imperialism. This is amplified, for example, in the US military's very naming practices, such as referring to enemy territory as "Indian Country" in the Vietnam War, or "Geronimo EKIA" (Enemy Killed in Action), the moniker given to Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and the United States' initial principal enemy in its so-called war on terror. The military also abounds with weapons and machinery called, for example, Kiowa, Apache Longbow, and Black Hawk helicopters or Tomahawk missiles.[45] And though the common presumption is that military bases are temporary "wartime" structures, they are durable and enduring. In short, they are proving to be permanent insofar as it is much easier to change functions at existing bases than to move or shut down the bases altogether.[46] Or as Chalmers Johnson asks, "Have these bases become ends in themselves?"[47]

As the cultural works I analyze reveal, while US military bases at once manifest and enable the projection of US militarist settler imperial power, they themselves also constitute settler projects or settlements. And as I elaborate further later in this Introduction, insofar as militarism's logic is the preservation of military institutions whether they are needed for war or not, these settlements of the settler garrison have become permanent outposts whose raison d'être and justification are no longer connected to questions of military preparedness or necessity, nor are they contingent on strong congressional oversight. Rather, they have taken on a life of their own, a tautology in which the raison d'être is d'être. In other words, the permanence of the base itself is a kind of temporal exception. Thus, although the US military, its personnel, and its contractors are not settlers in the classic sense, the enduring spatial logic and architecture of military bases and facilities—indeed the sheer amount of actual space they take up—constitute a settlement that violently displaces and dispossesses the Indigenous or local population.

Though the second type of spatial exception in my study, the POW camp, is a temporary wartime structure by definition, this temporariness is characteristic of specific POW camps. As a general form, however, the POW camp is a permanent feature of war, and the United States is a permanent warfare state. As my analysis reveals, the POW camp within the contours of America's settler garrison becomes a preeminent site or laboratory for the making of US

metapolitical authority. Whether a question of abiding by new international human rights protocols governing the treatment of prisoners of war or applying new forms of psychological warfare in which human subjectivity itself is treated as a new figurative settler frontier to be conquered, the effects of such post–World War II negotiations of US metapolitical authority are enduring.

Finally, the third type of spatial exception in my study, the unincorporated territory, specifically Guam, has been remade into an effective military colony, a site of intense hypermilitarization. Neither a sovereign nation nor incorporated as a US state, Guam's political status remains ambiguous. The indefinite deferral of the possibility of incorporation or statehood for Guam, now for over a hundred years and counting, constitutes another kind of temporal exception. Taken together, the spatial exceptions of the military base and attendant camptown, the POW camp, and the unincorporated territory of Guam function as America's settler garrison for the creation, perpetuation, and projection of a militarist setter imperial power.

On America's settler garrison, the unincorporated territory already lacks sovereignty, yet even formally sovereign nations can only assert merely nominal sovereignty in the face of US metapolitical authority. However, as the transpacific cultural texts in my study powerfully reveal, there are alternative decolonial and antimilitarist imaginaries, relationalities, and futures, another kind of "political creativity," if you will, that at once reveal the violence of US settler imperial metapolitical authority and transcend it through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure. These cultural texts ask and imagine what it would mean, as Mishuana Goeman suggests, to "unsettle settler space."[48]

"The Cunning of Capitalist Militarism" and Regimes of Militarism

To speak of the militarization that produced and continues to reproduce the United States as a white settler state and military empire is to speak of a way of life. President Eisenhower warned the nation in his 1961 farewell address about the dangers of a "military-industrial complex" acquiring unwarranted power.[49] This sober warning, from a man who had himself reached the highest ranks of the US military as a five-star general and supreme commander of the Allied Forces in Europe during World War II, turns out to have been prescient and necessary, but ultimately unheeded. Indeed, even as far back as over one hundred years ago, in the era of the First World War, significant critiques of militarism were being articulated. Notably, in the last chapter of *The Accumulation of Capital* (originally published in 1913), Rosa Luxemburg observed that "militarism has yet another

important function. From the purely economic point of view, it is a pre-eminent means for the realization of surplus value; it is *in itself* a province of accumulation."[50] Put simply, militarism is big business, from "the purely economic point of view." Karl Liebknecht, writing in 1917, punctuated this symbiosis between militarism and capitalism in dissecting a "capitalist militarism." Yet militarism is not purely economic, nor purely (geo)political, nor is it even purely military. As Liebknecht aptly put it, "The cunning of capitalist militarism is characterized by the diversity of its activity." This cunning allows a militarist logic and militarist institutions to pervade all of society, both our public and private lives.[51]

The pervasiveness of militarism as a broad ethos and the "diversity of its activity" have not abated since Luxemburg's and Liebknecht's critiques over a hundred years ago. My analysis and conceptualization of militarism build upon older works by figures such as Luxemburg, Liebknecht, and Alfred Vagts, as well as more recent critiques by feminist scholars.[52] Such work, while in some cases emerging from different political-intellectual traditions and historical as well as geographic contexts, ranging from European Marxism of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Indigenous, decolonial, and women of color feminisms of the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, can collectively cohere as an archive of antimilitarist critique. My juxtapositions of such thinkers and activists generate an analysis of the stubborn endurance of militarism and its imbrication with settler imperial state power, colonialism, and racial capitalism. This stubborn endurance and imbrication, while obvious or predictable on some levels, is also counterintuitive on other levels.

Just as debt has a counterintuitive valence, so too does militarism. Rather than presuming that the meaning of militarism is obvious, I defamiliarize it instead. Though we can use the terms *militarization* and *militarism* interchangeably, we might also think of militarization as the process that both contributes to and is the effect of militarism. Next, militarism, in turn, indexes something much more pervasive than the collusion between the military and the arms industry named by Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex." We might conceptualize instead "regimes of militarism" as the colonial and neocolonial nexus of state and capital that generates a proliferation of military logics beyond formal military institutions and sites, and beyond the war-making, peacekeeping, and security functions of the military itself. Put simply, militarism's logic is the preservation of military institutions whether or not they are needed for war, transcending, as Vagts observed in his classic study, "true military purposes."[53] Thus, regimes of militarism constitute US military empire but are not reducible to it, nor are they reducible to the collusion between the military and the arms industry. Regimes of militarism pervade the ideological and institutional,

the material and discursive, the global and local, and act as a structuring force and logic not only in international geopolitical relations but also in the daily and intimate lives of (neo)colonized and gendered racial subjects.

As the process that both contributes to and is the effect of militarism, militarization exceeds the temporal parameters of war, the spatial demarcations of military bases, the functional ends of military institutions, and the enlistment of military personnel. Militarization, in other words, is all of these things, yet more. Today, a constellation of phenomena, historical processes, and subjectivities can be properly characterized, and need to be urgently critiqued, as militarized. These include militarized humanitarianism, militarized diaspora, militarized adoption, militarized sex work, militarized kinship, militarized capitalism, militarized tourism (what Teaiwa calls "militourism"), militarized entertainment, militarized settler colonialism, militarized logistics for the transportation of the world's oil supply, and militarized carbon emissions.[54] Crucially, there is also militarized nuclearization, or a "radioactive" militarism producing an "irradiated transpacific."[55] What does it mean that the term *militarized* serves as a proper adjective, appearing in a host of modifier-noun couplings that at first seem oxymoronic or unlikely but upon closer critical examination are compatible, coconstitutive, and verging on the tautological? Alongside a "military-industrial complex" there is what Teaiwa calls a broader "military cultural complex" generated by militarism as a phenomenon that "bleeds" across formal boundaries or military institutions and seeps into the significantly more fundamental aspects of social and cultural life. Teaiwa thus draws a distinction between military studies and studies of militarism.[56] In a similar vein, Catherine Lutz observes that the "massive entangled system can go by the knotted moniker of the military-industrial-Congressional-media-entertainment-university complex." This draws attention to the broad array of institutions and groups benefiting and profiting significantly from a large military budget.[57] Within the context of the Pacific in particular, Victor Bascara, Keith L. Camacho, and Elizabeth DeLoughrey conceive of a "critical militarisation studies" that analyzes state regimes of violence in the Pacific in relation to issues of ethnicity, Indigeneity, gender, and sexuality. They ask, moreover, how such regimes produce "new cultural practices and modes of expression in literature, the arts, activism and politics."[58]

The proliferating contours of US military empire constitute a crucial manifestation of regimes of militarism. This empire, what has been called an "empire of bases," proliferated globally, especially in Asia and the Pacific, during and after World War II, the Cold War, the more recent war on terror, and now the new twenty-first-century "Asia-Pacific pivot."[59] Yet if we consider, again, the very "founding" of the United States, we would recall that the young nation's

ever-westward expansion during the nineteenth century depended on the stationing of soldiers in more than 250 military forts. The establishment of an overseas empire beginning significantly with the 1898 Spanish-American War also depended on the expansion of overseas bases. Then, during World War II, "island hopping" across the Pacific (through Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and Okinawa) for the bombing of Japan witnessed an expansion of US bases, as did the inheritance of the British basing structure. By 1945, more than 44 percent of all US military facilities overseas were located in the Pacific, with the extensive global network stretching from the Arctic Circle to Antarctica.[60] And although the more than 2,000 overseas installations during World War II had dwindled to 582 by 1949, as the Cold War escalated (especially in Korea), the number had risen to 815 by 1957 and yet higher to 1,104 by the peak of the Vietnam War. Two-thirds of these bases were in South Korea, Japan and Okinawa, and West Germany, and the majority continue to be located there as of the release of the 2018 *Base Structure Report* of the US Department of Defense (DoD).[61] Notably, before the closure of US bases there in 1992, the former US colony of the Philippines hosted one of the most significant and vast US military complexes in the world, employing seventy thousand Filipinos and thirteen thousand US military personnel. Clark Field became the second-largest US airbase on the planet, and Subic Bay became the largest American naval facility outside the United States.[62] Yet even after the historic base closures, US military presence has persisted not only in terms of ecological harm and environmental damage but also via a direct remilitarization in which the United States compels the Philippines to make itself available as a logistics hub. A series of military agreements, formally bilateral yet effectively an extension of US neocolonialism, facilitates the renewed and growing presence of US military forces on small bases or "lily pads" throughout the Philippines. In short, the DoD manages what it calls "a worldwide real property portfolio" that is extensive. The United States, in other words, is not only the biggest military power in the world but it is also the world's biggest landlord and leaseholder.[63] It is not surprising, then, that the United States accounts for nearly 40 percent of the *world's total* military expenditures each year.[64]

Transpacific Imaginaries, Decolonial Genealogies, and the Oceanic

In focusing on Asia and the Pacific as a crucial site of militarist settler imperialism in the post–World War II conjuncture, when the US settler state also becomes a military empire heavily concentrated in Asia and the Pacific, it is not my intent to reduce the complexities, heterogeneities, entanglements, and

hierarchies within the region to a homogenized whole.[65] Different encounters with colonial formations and subjectivities of race, ethnicity, Indigeneity, and power more broadly work against facile conflations and generalizations. For example, there are incommensurable differences between neocolonialism experienced by an Asian site, on the one hand, and Indigenous Pacific Islander dispossession, on the other. Yet still, within the domestic space of the United States, Asian American concerns such as immigration exclusion and civil rights can ultimately reinforce the power of the settler state and of what Byrd calls "liberal multicultural settler colonialism" because they presume or leave uninterrogated Indigenous deracination and dispossession.[66] This difference and incommensurability are heightened even further in the specific context of Hawai'i, where we see the formation of Asian settler colonialism.[67] Further still, both among and within Native American, Pacific Islander, and certain Asian communities (such as Okinawa), Indigeneity has local specificities and differences, so we might speak of Indigeneities in the plural.[68] But to the extent that Asia and the Pacific have been and continue to be strategic sites and staging grounds of US militarist settler imperialism, or the locus of a militarized interconnectedness, we can speak of linked futures, productive solidarities and relationalities, and oppositional imaginaries.[69] For while militarist settler imperialism deploys specific modalities across smaller scales of time and space, there is also a significant consistency in its continual engulfment of larger scales of time and space in attempting to renovate itself for the perpetuation of US hegemony and metapolitical authority. Alongside the local specificities and hierarchies within Asia, within the Pacific, and across Asia and the Pacific, the vast contours of US militarist settler imperialism in the region have produced and continue to produce militarized intersections. This necessitates intellectual, political, and cultural projects that can take those crossings and that interconnectedness into critical account while also being attentive to incommensurable local specificities, histories, and hierarchies.

Bearing this in mind, my intent, goal, and hope are to interrogate *the very production* of the "Asia-Pacific" as a site of US strategic and geopolitical interest as opposed to a geographic given. As such, unless I am referring specifically to and querying this dominant ascription of "Asia-Pacific," I use *Asia and the Pacific* as the preferred naming practice to reference the region in more straightforwardly descriptive rather than ascriptive terms. While the hyphen in *Asia-Pacific* can tend to homogenize the region, the *and* in *Asia and the Pacific* links the two without necessarily conflating them. Further, as I elaborate in what follows, my use of *transpacific* in conceptualizing "transpacific imaginaries" is less about a singular geographic designation and more about what I have called

an aesthetics of settler imperial failure articulated in cultural productions. As such, I do not use the terms *Asia-Pacific*, *Asia and the Pacific*, and *transpacific* interchangeably. Even as it would seem that all three name the same region, each comes freighted with its own particular context of deployment and purpose. To the extent that the "Asia-Pacific" is not only a geopolitical production but also a geo*historical* and geo*colonial* production, it calls for what I have called the "relational analysis of the distinct yet linked."

Yet further, *Settler Garrison* takes its inspiration from *alternative* theorizing of what scholars have more recently called the "transpacific."[70] I focus on what Lisa Yoneyama calls a "dissonant reading" and "decolonial genealogy" of the transpacific precisely because the term itself also has potential limitations and pitfalls.[71] Indeed, mindful that the term *transpacific* has increasingly been adopted as a shorthand for transnational Asian American or Asian diasporic critique, Erin Suzuki cautions that there is a risk of repeating "colonial evacuations" of the Indigenous Pacific performed by earlier "Pacific Rim" discourses unless scholars of the transpacific rigorously investigate "material and cultural entanglements within the Pacific itself . . ." That is, "scholarship that frames itself as '*transpacific*' *must* engage with Indigenous Pacific histories, frameworks, and methodologies, or else the term loses its unique critical purchase."[72] Given this, *Settler Garrison*'s engagement with *alternative* theorizing of the transpacific is not to create or reify a new object or method. Rather, my conceptualization of "transpacific imaginaries" gestures to the transpacific as a placeholder of sorts for naming at once a differentiated and vexed geocolonial site, method of decolonial critique, and multivalent keyword. This holds critical possibility for interrogating the dominant ascriptions of "Asia-Pacific" or "Pacific Rim" and substantively engaging with Indigenous analytical frames and subjectivities that have hitherto been ignored or insufficiently considered. As a geocolonial site, while the transpacific is tied together by ongoing histories of the conjunction I have named as US militarist settler imperialism, it is not reducible to it. As I have observed, hierarchies and local specificities within the transpacific, as well as decolonial epistemologies and movements, work against reductive ascriptions. We can thus think of the transpacific as constituted by "distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies," to cite what at times is the overlooked part of Ruth Wilson Gilmore's important formulation of racism.[73]

As such, the *trans* in *transpacific* is certainly not meant to invoke a "pan" Pacific harmony or homology. Moreover, the prefix *trans* calls to mind Chadwick Allen's conceptualization of "trans-Indigenous" in his call for a global Native literary studies. For Allen, given ongoing colonial histories, *trans* seems the best choice to convey the analytic and ethos of the "together (yet) *distinct*," for

it "may be able to bear the complex, contingent asymmetry and the potential risks of unequal encounters borne by the preposition *across*. It may be able to indicate the specific agency and situated momentum carried by the preposition *through*. It may be able to harbor the potential of *change* as both transitive and intransitive verb, as both noun and adjective."[74] Allen's methodology of focused and purposeful juxtapositions, with mindfulness of the etymological difference between *compare* (which unites *together* with *equal*) and *juxtapose* (which unites *close together* with *to place*), is productive in thinking through and juxtaposing the "complex, contingent asymmetry" and at times incommensurability of the Indigenous and non-Indigenous transpacific.[75] My book *places* these parts of the settler garrison alongside one another as together yet distinctly constituting America's settler garrison in a manner that is attentive to the particularities of Indigenous place-based relations. The methodology of focused and purposeful juxtapositions is connected to a *relational* analytic rather than a comparative one that tends to presume or effect equivalence or homology.

Moreover, my engagement with *transpacific* departs from the sole privileging of continental landmasses by emphasizing as well the geographies and spatialities of the island, the archipelago, and the peninsula, alongside the terraqueous and the oceanic. As I elaborate in Chapter 2 and especially Chapter 4 as well as the Epilogue, the emphasis on the terraqueous and the oceanic is particularly important for island sites such as the Philippines, Okinawa, and Guam, as well as low-lying Pacific islands facing existential threat due to climate change. In a linked yet different way, it is also pertinent to peninsular South Korea and its subjugation of Jeju Island. Epeli Hau'ofa theorizes this powerful shift to the oceanic in his influential essay "Our Sea of Islands." Hau'ofa argues that switching the frame of reference from the terrestrial or continental to the oceanic opens up the world of Oceania and allows us to see the worldliness of islands. He writes, "There is a world of difference between viewing the Pacific as 'islands in a far sea' and as a 'sea of islands.' The first emphasizes dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centers of power. Focusing in this way stresses the smallness and remoteness of the islands. The second is a more holistic perspective in which things are seen in the totality of their relationships."[76] In short, the concern is to be attentive to the Pacific Basin, not just the Pacific Rim.[77]

This is to speak about nissology, "the study of islands on their own terms," or a perspectival shift away from both continental and Pacific exceptionalisms.[78] *Settler Garrison* thus also takes inspiration from interdisciplinary island studies approaches, in particular island and decolonial feminisms, in adopting a critically oceanic lens that takes into account the interrelation between the

oceanic and the terrestrial, or "aquapelagic assemblages."[79] The militarized and colonial dynamics of islands are such that they undergo a simultaneous process that seems disjunctive but is violently conjunctive: "de-islanding," or the alienation of the island's inhabitants from its geography and ecosystem, and "islanding," or the imperial offshoring of militarism, tourism, and extraction along with their attendant infrastructures.[80] Yet we can also think of islanding, or *island* as a verb form, in a quite different or antipodal way. As Teaiwa argues, to make *island* a verb is to embrace and practice a way of living that centers an ethics, epistemology, and ontology of care for multispecies lifeforms and ecologies. In this sense, to island and to be islanded is to awaken "from the stupor of continental fantasies" and to crowd out such fantasies with a care-centered way of life. Teaiwa declares, "Let us 'island' the word!"[81] This alternative conceptualization of islanding as care is thus the challenge to and antithesis of islanding as militarist settler imperial processes of offshoring. Within the context of my analysis, to speak about this twinned process of de-islanding and islanding is to speak about the violent transformation of the spatialities, topographies, and ecosystems—of Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, and increasingly to a certain extent the South Korean island of Jeju—into the "offshore" sites or pivotal "aquapelagic assemblages" of America's settler garrison. Moreover, to speak of Teaiwa's alternative sense of islanding in opposition to imperial processes of islanding or offshoring is to speak about the aesthetics of settler imperial failure in the transpacific cultural forms I analyze.

Yet still, the "imaginaries" in my formulation of "transpacific imaginaries" foregrounds cultural texts—literature, film, and performance—as a potent figurative site for at once rendering visible and disarticulating the geocoloniality of the transpacific. Cultural works such as *Parasite* contain a powerful aesthetics of settler imperial failure, opening up to antimilitarist and decolonial worldmakings that aspire to shatter "another brick" in the wall of America's settler garrison. Grouping such texts together into a transpacific collective or archive also departs from the limitations of adhering to nation- or region-bound designations of literatures and cultural forms. By being attentive to and highlighting the decolonial and antimilitarist contours of transpacific cultural productions, my book takes seriously Albert Wendt's declaration in his 1976 foundational essay, "Towards a New Oceania," that works of art contribute significantly to a "genuine decolonisation" and the creation of a "new Oceania."[82]

Settler Garrison proceeds with a focus on debt imperialism in the next chapter, and each chapter thereafter is organized around a particular spatial exception: the military base and attendant camptown, the POW camp, and the unincorporated territory of Guam. Chapter 1, "Perverse Temporalities: Primitive Accu-

mulation and the Settler Colonial Foundations of Debt Imperialism," provides an elaboration of debt imperialism as the temporal exception. In situating debt imperialism within the multiple linked genealogies of the US nation-state's manipulation of debt since its very founding, of the longue durée of racial capitalism and primitive accumulation, and of the debt form and relation more broadly as a manifold regime of gendered racial and colonial asymmetries of power at multiple scales, the chapter conceptualizes debt anew. What is at stake in this conceptualization is twofold. First, it is an interrogation of the elision of the conditioning and ongoing violence of US militarist settler imperialism. Second, it is an analysis of the US attempt to possess metapolitical authority specifically through a split between militarist settler imperialism's imposition of the homogeneous time of repayment on others and its own inhabitation of an exceptional temporality.

Chapter 2, "The Military Base and Camptown: Seizing Land 'by Bulldozer and Bayonet' and the Transpacific Masculinist Compact," begins with a discussion of the linked yet differentiated ways in which sites across Asia and the Pacific are targeted to house US military bases and camptowns. Island spatialities such as Okinawa (Japan) and Jeju (South Korea) are especially targeted because they are doubly subjugated, by both the United States and the respective East Asian nations of which they are a part. These nations also enjoy a relatively privileged subimperial status within Asia vis-à-vis poorer and less powerful nations such as those of Southeast Asia. The chapter then examines how a range of transpacific cultural productions critically magnifies the land grabs that make possible the formation of the spatial exception of the perduring military base and camptown. How is this variety of land grab connected to the settler colonial seizures of land that make possible the very constitution of the United States of America? The base and camptown are the result of the wholesale spatial transformation of seized Indigenous or local land into a virtual "America Town" where US metapolitical authority reigns. How, moreover, do transpacific cultural works grapple with the ethics and politics of how to represent the necropolitical contours of the camptown, insofar as camptown sex workers perform a necropolitical labor that functions as a form of debt bondage and are also vulnerable to gendered racial and sexual violence that can be fatal? Focusing on the Philippines, Okinawa, and South Korea, I begin with an analysis of Rachel Rivera's documentary *Sin City Diary* (1992). I then turn to Okinawan literature: Kishaba Jun's short story "Dark Flowers" (1955), Higashi Mineo's novella *Child of Okinawa* (1971), and Medoruma Shun's short story "Hope" (1999). Next, I turn to South Korean and Asian diasporic literature and film, beginning with an analysis of *Bloodless* (2017), Gina Kim's

VR (virtual reality) documentary based on the 1992 murder of a South Korean camptown sex worker by an American soldier. My analysis meditates on how this transpacific cinematic form deploys the relatively new technology of VR to grapple in sophisticated ways with the politics and ethics of representing the gendered racial and sexual violence of US militarist settler imperialism perpetrated on the settler garrison. I then turn to Ahn Junghyo's *Silver Stallion: A Novel of Korea* (1990) and the documentaries *The Women Outside: Korean Women and the U.S. Military* (1995) and *Camp Arirang* (1995). Throughout, I ask how this constellation of transpacific cultural productions, collectively cohering as a critical archive of US militarist settler imperialism, articulates decolonial and antimilitarist imaginaries even as it leaves unresolved complex questions about the politics and ethics of representation.

Chapter 3, "The POW Camp: Waging Psychological Warfare and a New Settler Frontier," focuses on how Ha Jin's transpacific novel *War Trash* (2004) renders the POW camp of the Korean War (1950–53) as a particular kind of spatial exception. The POW camp as a laboratory and later general form for the aspirational goals of US metapolitical authority emerges out of the Korean War's introduction of the "voluntary repatriation" program, whose goal was to increase the number of anti-Communist defections, or POWs choosing not to repatriate back to China and North Korea. *War Trash* demonstrates how the "voluntary repatriation" program was a form of psychological warfare flouting both international law as well as the national sovereignties of China, North Korea, and South Korea. Coconstituted by biopolitical space and geopolitical territoriality, the POW camp as the site for the practice of psychological warfare and attendant fears of Chinese Communist "brainwashing" of American POWs reanimate the US settler imperial state's foundational tropes. Human subjectivity and loyalty become the new figurative "frontier" for American expansion that would in turn enable the widening of the literal frontier of US Cold War spheres of influence. The brainwashing scare breathes new life into the fear of captivity, drawing on a long-standing American trope dating back to the colonial era about the ever-present Indian threat faced by white settlers. The permanence of the US POW camp as a general form and the United States as a militarist settler imperial and permanent warfare state link as conjoined temporal exceptions operating in tandem with the temporal exception of debt imperialism. Moreover, the production of nonrepatriates or refugees would in turn generate an indebted subjectivity vis-à-vis the anti-Communist host nations, a figurative debt that can never fully be repaid even as refugee status was the result of psychological warfare.

Chapter 4, "The Unincorporated Territory: Constituting Indefinite Deferral and 'No Page Is Ever Terra Nullius,'" focuses on the unincorporated territory of Guam and offers an analysis of the poetics and what we might call a nondidactic archive and pedagogy of antimilitarist decolonization in Craig Santos Perez's multibook poetic project: *from unincorporated territory [hacha]* (2008), *from unincorporated territory [saina]* (2010), *from unincorporated territory [guma']* (2014), and *from unincorporated territory [lukao]* (2017). Perez's antimilitarist and decolonial poetics critically illuminates Guam's status as an unincorporated territory, a spatial exception made and remade into America's settler garrison or effective military colony. I argue that *from unincorporated territory* also provides a complex rendering of US militarist settler imperialism's temporal exception of debt imperialism. How does the temporal exception at once condition and obscure the imposition of the disciplinary temporality of an indebted subjectivity onto the Chamorro for their putative "liberation" by the United States from Spanish colonialism and Japanese occupation? For the unincorporated territory, there is another valence to the temporal exception that is connected to the spatial exception. The legally ambiguous status of the unincorporated territory, determined over a hundred years ago in the *Insular Cases* (1901–22), is characterized by the indefinite deferral of the possibility of statehood. This as-yet-perpetually deferred decision, the denial of even the promise of any definitive or final status, is also a kind of temporal exception. Against the logics of these spatial and temporal exceptions, *from unincorporated territory*'s aesthetics of settler imperial failure gestures to the urgency of how we might refuse and thwart US militarist settler imperialism's fatalities.

In the Epilogue, "Climate Change, Climate Debt, Climate Imperialism," I analyze *Moana: The Rising of the Sea* (2013/2015), a multimedia stage production that dramatizes climate change and sea-level rise in Oceania and significantly features the poetry of Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner, the Marshallese poet, performance artist, and educator. The forced migrations and displacements of the people of Oceania and other disproportionately impacted parts of the world are only one among the many devastating effects of climate change. Zoonotic diseases, and most certainly the COVID-19 pandemic, are also linked to climate change and industrial agriculture. I analyze how climate change brings to the fore another form of the manifold debt relation—that of the climate debt that nations with the largest carbon footprints, such as the United States, owe to the nations with significantly smaller footprints. As with the debt owed to Indigenous nations and groups, this, too, is a debt that is predominantly unacknowledged. It is also a debt that is generated by US militarist settler imperialism, specifically by

the disproportionate carbon emission rates of the US military in securing the flow of oil. *Moana* grapples complexly with the climate debt and the vexed politics of what it means to be labeled a "climate refugee" insofar as it functions as a trope of victimhood and object of imperial humanitarian rescue. I thus close *Settler Garrison* with yet another urgent and necropolitical debt produced by militarist settler imperialism, the climate debt implicated in the Anthropocene, or, more accurately and critically, the Racial Capitalocene. *Moana*'s aesthetics of settler imperial failure refuses the trope of victimhood in embracing and demanding a complex ethics of survival and critical reckoning.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 For an insightful analysis of how the claim that Asian *Americans* have nothing to gain by the success of *Parasite* actually misses the point, see Eng-Beng Lim, "Living in *Parasite* Country as Asian/American."

2 When *Parasite* won the 2020 Golden Globe Award for Best Foreign Language Picture, Bong notably began his acceptance speech, translated by Sharon Choi, in this way: "Once you overcome the one-inch tall barrier of subtitles, you will be introduced to so many more amazing films."

3 Dargis, "'Parasite' Review." In addition to reviews, academic essays that focus on the film's critique of capitalism include Gabilondo, "Bong Joon Ho's *Parasite* and Post-2008 Revolts"; and Noh, "Parasite as Parable."

4 "Bong Joon-ho Discusses PARASITE, Genre Filmmaking And The Greatness Of ZODIAC," YouTube Video, 5:08, posted by Birth.Movies.Death., October 16, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXuXfgquwkM&fbclid=IwAR09ptKpv-MLıkgHgCRRyWlvDZR2Ffj5-5LTcHYy_VogNxbg8b4PCOmPk9g.

5 As Alyosha Goldstein, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Manu Karuka suggest, it would be productive to analyze settler colonialism as a "structure of failure." See Goldstein, Pegues, and Vimalassery (now Karuka), "Introduction: On Colonial Unknowing." Similarly, in his critical history of Hawaiian statehood, Dean Saranillio argues that "U.S. imperialist ventures in Hawai'i were not the result of a strong nation swallowing a weak and feeble island nation, but rather a result of a weakening U.S. nation whose mode of production—capitalism—was increasingly unsustainable without enacting a more aggressive policy of imperialism." See Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire*, 9.

6 Park, J-H., "Reading Colonialism in 'Parasite.'"

7 For an incisive and revealing analysis of how consent for the Pyeongtaek base expansion was strategically fabricated, see Martin, "From Camp Town to International City."

8 Kanter, quoted in Kang, "Uses of Asianization," 423.

9 Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, quoted in Kang, "Uses of Asianization," 423.

10 Kang, "Uses of Asianization," 424, 412.

11 Joseph Jonghyun Jeon analyzes what he calls "Korea's IMF cinema" as a way to periodize compelled political and economic restructuring following the 1997–98 crisis. See *Vicious Circuits*.

12 The South Korean government's deep investment in its domestic film industry in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was formalized by the Kim Young-sam administration through the Basic Culture Industry Promotion Law in 1999. A national film culture has been transformed into an international culture export whose market ranks now among the top ten film markets in the world. See Worthy et al., "Appeal of Korea." Although the South Korean government has a unilateral policy of promoting the Korean Wave, it has increasingly relied on expanding private sector resources. This is the case with *Parasite*, a private sector initiative, whose executive producer is Miky Lee, a Samsung heiress and early investor in DreamWorks who established CJ E&M, an entertainment and media subsidiary within her family's CJ Group's conglomerate.

13 In 2019, South Korea's Financial Services Commission (FSC) chairman, Choi Jong-ku, warned of dangerous increases in the level of household debt, averaging $44,000 per family in 2018. According to the Bank of Korea, household debt hit a record of $1.34 trillion at the end of September 2014, accounting for over 97.5 percent of South Korea's GDP in 2017, markedly higher than the average of 67.3 percent of the OECD member countries. See Lee Suh-yoo, "Average Seoul Household Debt over $44,000," *Korea Times*, July 8, 2019, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/04/281_271912.html; Jhoo Dong-chan, "FSC Chief Warns of Ballooning Household Debts," *Korea Times*, January 27, 2019, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2019/12/367_262749.html.

14 The *Parasite* screenplay indicates that all four of these characters are in their mid- to late forties.

15 Kang, "Uses of Asianization," 430. See also Kim, H. M., "Work, Nation and Hypermasculinity."

16 Guåhan is Guam in the Chamorro language; it means "we have." I have chosen to use "Guam" and not "Guåhan" throughout my book because it is more apt for describing and naming the island's status as an unincorporated territory and a specific type of spatial exception constituting America's settler garrison within the terms of my analysis.

17 Teaiwa, "On Analogies," 83.

18 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*, 7.

19 Byrd, *Transit of Empire*, xxvi. In theorizing the nexus of US settler colonialism and military empire in Asia and the Pacific as militarist settler imperialism, I also amplify Alyosha Goldstein's contention that focusing exclusively on imperialism and empire can risk obscuring how territorial seizure, occupation, and expansion; differential modes of governance; and their attendant justifications remain the conditions of possibility for more indirect forms of rule, the vast network of military encampments, and global economies. See Goldstein, "Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present," 9.

20 My conceptualization of metapolitical authority has been informed by Mark Rifkin's deployment of the term and analysis of it in the context of US sovereignty over Native Americans. See Rifkin, "Indigenizing Agamben," 117.

21 American exceptionalism, the United States' mythical conception of itself that it alone has the right, either by "divine sanction or moral obligation, to bring civilization, or democracy, or liberty to the rest of the world, by violence if necessary—is not new. It started as early as 1630 in the Massachusetts Bay Colony when Governor John Winthrop uttered the words that centuries later would be quoted by Ronald Reagan. Winthrop called the Massachusetts Bay Colony a 'city upon a hill.' Reagan embellished a little, calling it a 'shining city on a hill.'" See Zinn, "Power and the Glory." Zinn provides a useful historical overview of how the myth has driven the conquest of Native Americans as well as military intervention abroad. Two additional related aspects of American exceptionalism are the notions that the United States is distinct from the "old world" of Europe in two ways: that it does not possess overseas colonies and that its lack of a landed aristocracy makes class mobility possible.

22 Lo, "Simultaneity and Solidarity in the Time of Permanent War," 43. See also Lo, "Plenary Power and the Exceptionality of Igorots." The plenary power cases Lo analyzes are *Chae Chan Ping v. United States* (1889, also known as the *Chinese Exclusion Case*) and *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock* (1903).

23 Moreover, insofar as US metapolitical authority is asserted in reaction to and as an attempted negation of Indigenous and other national sovereignties, it is what Manu Karuka calls countersovereignty. Karuka writes that as a mode of political authority, countersovereignty is closely linked to counterintelligence, counterinsurgency, and counterrevolution. These are all modes of "reactive anxiety" betraying a profound anxiety about the future possibility of anti-imperialist and anticapitalist transformations of collective life. See Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*, xii, 183.

24 A stark example of this is the most recently admitted state, Hawai'i. Its incorporation into the United States in 1959 as the fiftieth state, occurring in the distended shadow of invasion, occupation, and annexation dating back to the late-nineteenth century, converted metapolitical authority into political authority. Although colonization was thus "naturalized," the living memories and vital decolonial movements of Native Hawaiians, Kānaka Maoli, continually denaturalize, or render visible, that colonization.

25 See Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native." In *Possessing Polynesians*, Arvin explains that possession highlights how settler colonialism is also a highly gendered project, for the "supposed consanguinity between the settler and the Native is necessarily produced through heteropatriarchy" (17). Arvin's conceptualization of settler colonialism is also useful: "Settler colonialism, as a structure of dominance, is particularly set on the domination and exploitation of land. Settler colonialism is not a structure limited to any discrete historical period, nation, or colonizer. Though never monolithic or unchanging, settler colonialism is a historical and a contemporary phenomenon. Its power usually operates simultaneously through economy (the turning of land and natural resources into profit), law (the imposition of the legal-political apparatus of a settler nation-state, rather than an indigenous form of governance), and ideology (culturally and morally defined ways of being and knowing resulting from European post-Enlightenment thought)" (15).

26 Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," 388.

27 Day, *Alien Capital*, 19, 20. For a trenchant study along similar triangulated lines that goes beyond the Native-settler dialectic, see Le, *Unsettled Solidarities*. For an analysis of a "transpacific settler colonial condition" as "the interconnected nature of Indigenous struggles against settler colonialism across the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific Islands, given shared histories of American empire and military violence" (50), see Gandhi, "Historicizing the Transpacific Settler Colonial Condition."

28 Clinton's "America's Pacific Century" was published in the November 2011 issue of *Foreign Policy*. US imperial and militarist violence in Asia, previously rationalized under the sign of the Cold War, gets reanimated under the sign of "new global realities." The policy plan posits, "In the last decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities" (63). The "Asia-Pacific" is identified as the United States' "real 21st century opportunity" (63). The now-defunct economic arm of the Asia-Pacific pivot, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, has been called the NAFTA for the Pacific, or "NAFTA on steroids." See, for example, Lori Wallach, "NAFTA on Steroids," *Nation*, June 27, 2012, https://www.thenation.com/article/nafta-steroids/. The twelve participating nations were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The United States withdrew from the agreement on January 23, 2017.

29 Grydehøg et al., "Practicing Decolonial Political Geography."

30 Davis, "Repeating Islands of Resistance," 1.

31 In the Pacific, these territories are the unincorporated organized territory of Guam, the unincorporated unorganized territory of American Sāmoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the three Compact of Free Association nations (or the "Freely Associated States") of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.

32 British constitutional law expert Stanley de Smith called it "de facto annexation." Quoted in Vine, *Base Nation*, 84. The Northern Mariana Islands were also part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Yet unlike the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau (which signed Compacts of Free Association with the United States but are independent, sovereign states), the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands still remains an unincorporated territory and commonwealth of the United States.

33 DeLoughrey, "Heavy Waters," 705; DeLoughrey, *Routes and Roots*, 31. DeLoughrey explains that UNCLOS was formed out of complex dynamics between emergent postcolonial states and dominant Western powers because of contestations over ocean governance in the post–World War II context. The 1982 UNCLOS, "the most important remapping of the globe in recent history . . . expanded the sovereignty of coastal nations to 12 nautical miles, their contiguous zones to 24 nautical miles, and established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles" (*Routes and Roots*, 33).

34 DeLoughrey, *Allegories of the Anthropocene*, 140.

35 DeLoughrey, "Toward a Critical Ocean Studies for the Anthropocene," 24. As defined by geographers, the Pacific Ocean is sixty-three million square miles and covers one-

third of the earth's surface area. However, to the US military, it extends all the way to India's western coast. India, along with twenty-four other predominantly Pacific Rim nations except China and Russia, has the largest naval force in South Asia and participates in RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) military exercises. In summer 2018, the twenty-sixth biennial RIMPAC exercise was held. The largest maritime exercise in history, it involved the participation in "war games" of 25,000 military personnel of twenty-five predominantly Pacific Rim nations. See DeLoughrey, "Toward a Critical Ocean Studies for the Anthropocene," 21, 24; DeLoughrey, "Island Studies and the US Militarism of the Pacific," 29. DeLoughrey also compellingly analyzes how "transoceanic militarism" is connected to the smooth flow of global energy sources, diasporic masculinity, and state power. See "Toward a Critical Ocean Studies for the Anthropocene," 23. Simeon Man trenchantly analyzes the making of US military empire in the Pacific by deploying the "decolonizing Pacific" as a methodology for illuminating the coevality of US imperial and race wars and anticolonial movements in the United States, Asia, and the Pacific after 1945. See Man, *Soldiering through Empire*, 8.

36 Burnett, "Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty," 781.

37 Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*, xii, 174.

38 As David Vine observes, the US military has so many bases that it itself does not know the exact total. It is impossible to compile a fully accurate and comprehensive list of all US bases throughout the world because of Pentagon secrecy, poor reporting practices, and shifting definitions of what actually counts as a "base" in light of the increasing pattern of constructing "lily pads" (small bases under ten acres in size or valued at under $10 million). Based on the Pentagon's count of "base sites" in its 2018 *Base Structure Report*, Vine estimates that there are about eight hundred US military bases abroad. Given the obvious errors and omissions in the *Base Structure Report*, Vine has created, updated, and made public a list. See Vine, "Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 1776–2019." See also Vine, *United States of War*, 350n1. According to Vine's continuously updated list, as of late 2019, of the approximately eight hundred overseas bases and lily pads, 285 are located in Asia and the Pacific. This does not include Hawai'i since it is a US state.

39 Bello, "From American Lake to a People's Pacific," 14.

40 Woodward, "From Military Geography to Militarism's Geographies," 720.

41 Katherine McKittrick has a generative conceptualization of geography: "Geography, then, materially and discursively extends to cover three dimensional spaces and places, the physical landscape and infrastructures, geographic imaginations, the practice of mapping, exploring, and seeing, and social relations in and across space." McKittrick deploys the term *traditional geography* to describe cartographic, positivist, and imperialist formulations upheld by a legacy of exploitation, exploration, and conquest, and argues that "if we imagine that traditional geographies are upheld by their three-dimensionality, as well as a corresponding language of insides and outsides, borders and belongings, and inclusions and exclusions, we can expose domination as a visible spatial project that organizes, names, and sees social differences (such as black femininity) and determines *where* social order happens." Although McKittrick is writing within the context of black women's negotiations

with the "traditional geography" of the legacy of transatlantic slavery, her work is useful in thinking through how America's settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific, a geography of militarism, is also a kind of "traditional geography" of domination. How, moreover, do the transpacific cultural works in my study contest this geography? See McKittrick, *Demonic Grounds*, xiii–xiv, emphasis in original.

42 Schmitt, quoted by G. L. Ulmen in Translator's Introduction, *Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum*, 19.

43 Constituted at multiple scales and in a variety of ways, spatial exceptions make possible, as Paul A. Kramer writes, "extraordinary power exercised at and through the interstices of sovereignty, often underwritten by essentialisms of race, gender, and civilization." See Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1357.

44 LaDuke with Cruz, *Militarization of Indian Country*, 80.

45 LaDuke with Cruz, *Militarization of Indian Country*, 18.

46 Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 35.

47 Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 253.

48 Goeman, *Mark My Words*, 2.

49 In the original draft of the speech, President Dwight D. Eisenhower termed it the *military-industrial-congressional complex*. The full transcript of his farewell address to the nation, delivered on January 17, 1961, can be found in *Public Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, DC: US National Archives, 1961), 1035–40.

50 Luxemburg, *Accumulation of Capital*, 454, emphasis added. Giovanni Arrighi observes, "So-called 'military Keynesianism'—the practice through which military expenditures boost the incomes of the citizens of the state that has made the expenditures, thereby increasing tax revenues and capacity to finance new rounds of military expenditures—is no more a novelty of the twentieth century than finance capital and transnational business enterprise." See Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing*, 266.

51 Liebknecht, *Militarism and Anti-Militarism*, 56, 39. More recently, Manu Karuka has theorized the "war-finance nexus." See Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*, 168. For an analysis of militarization as a "complex politics of diffusion" that pervades everyday power relations as well as resistance to such relations, see Henry and Natanel, "Militarisation as Diffusion."

52 These feminist scholars include Kozue Akibayashi, Megumi Chibana, Elizabeth DeLoughrey, Cynthia Enloe, Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, Catherine Lutz, Seungsook Moon, Tiara R. Na'puti, Margo Okazawa-Rey, Teresia Teaiwa, and others. There is an important body of scholarship analyzing militarism and the long and ongoing history of military intervention in Asia and the Pacific. In addition to the scholars I have already cited, notable recent work includes Juliet Nebolon's generative conceptualization of "settler militarism" as "the dynamics through which, in Hawai'i, settler colonialism and militarization have simultaneously perpetuated, legitimated, and concealed one another." Although Nebolon is writing specifically within the context of martial law in Hawai'i during World War II, her formulation of the symbiotic nexus between settler colonialism and militarization is helpful for analyzing other related contexts. See Nebolon, "'Life Given Straight from the Heart,'" 25. In the context of Asia and the Pacific more broadly, Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho analyze militarization "as an *extension of colonialism* and its gendered and

racialized processes," interrogating how "colonial histories constitute the conditions of possibility for ongoing forms of militarization." See Shigematsu and Camacho, "Introduction: Militarized Currents, Decolonizing Futures," xv, emphasis in original. And Cynthia Enloe observes that Asia and the Pacific are strung together with a necklace of US military bases, violently producing a "militarized interconnectedness." See Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, 85.

53 Vagts, *History of Militarism*, 13.

54 On militourism, Teresia Teaiwa writes, "*Militourism* is a phenomenon by which military or paramilitary force ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry masks the military force behind it. The roots of militourism in the Pacific go back as far as Ferdinand Magellan's first (and last) encounter with the natives of Guam in 1521." Teaiwa continues, "Militourism is complex. It goes beyond the simple presence of military bases and tourist resorts on the same islands or in the same archipelagoes. Often, the tourist industry capitalizes on the military histories of islands." See Teaiwa, "Reading Paul Gauguin's *Noa Noa* with Epeli Hau'ofa's *Kisses in the Nederends*," 251, 252. For an important work on militourism in Hawai'i and the Philippines, see Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise*.

55 For a useful overview of these manifold ways in which the transpacific is militarized, see Chen, "Transpacific Turns." On "radioactive militarism," see DeLoughrey, "Myth of Isolates," 172. On the "irradiated transpacific," see Bahng, *Migrant Futures*, 147.

56 Teaiwa, "Bleeding Boundaries," 2.

57 On the "military-industrial-Congressional-media-entertainment-university complex" as constituting the "military normal," see Lutz, "Military Normal," 29. Similarly, in *Maneuvers*, Enloe argues, "Militarization does not always take on the guise of war." It is a "pervasive process, and thus so hard to uproot, precisely because in its everyday forms it scarcely looks life threatening" (2–3).

58 Bascara, Camacho, and DeLoughrey, "Gender and Sexual Politics of Pacific Island Militarisation."

59 On "empire of bases," see Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, especially Chapter 6.

60 Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 14.

61 Höhn and Moon, S., "Politics of Gender, Sexuality, Race, and Class in the U.S. Military Empire," 7–8. According to the 2018 *Base Structure Report*, the Department of Defense (DoD) "manages a worldwide real property portfolio that spans all 50 states, 8 U.S. territories and outlying areas, and 45 foreign countries. The majority of the foreign sites are located in Germany (194 sites), Japan (121), and South Korea (83 sites)" (7). There are 4,150 sites in the United States, 111 sites in US territories, and 514 overseas, totaling 4,775 overall. The "DoD occupies a reported 279,240 buildings throughout the world, valued at approximately $749 billion and comprising approximately 2.3 billion square feet" (9). Recent *Base Structure Reports* of the DoD can be found here: https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/BSI/BEI_Library.html (accessed June 10, 2019).

62 Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 12.

63 According to the 2018 *Base Structure Report*, the US military controls 26.9 million acres of territory, with approximately 538,000 acres of that located overseas and made available by host governments. In terms of cost, it would be close to $1.2 trillion to replace the Department of Defense's "existing inventory" of facility assets such

as buildings, structures, and linear structures using standards and codes updated through the 2018 *Base Structure Report*. Although the report is not fully accurate or comprehensive insofar as many bases are secret or officially "nonexistent" sites, it is useful in providing a picture of the sheer scale of US military presence throughout the globe. See 2018 *Base Structure Report*, 8, 9.

64 González, Gusterson, and Houtman, Introduction, 6, emphasis added.

65 To be clear, this is not a call for a more purportedly inclusive "Asian Pacific American" or "Asian Pacific Islander" designation by subsuming a Pacific or Indigenous Pacific Islander within a presumably broader Asian American or Asian category. For a useful overview of how a sustained engagement with Native and Indigenous theorizing challenges some of the prevailing concerns of Asian American studies (such as immigration, diaspora, and civil rights), see Tiongson Jr., "Asian American Studies, Comparative Racialization, and Settler Colonial Critique." For a critically trenchant examination of the problematics and pitfalls of the "Asian Pacific Islander" designation, an attempt to make "Asian American" more inclusive by subsuming Pacific Islander within it without taking into sufficient account substantive differences and hierarchies, see Kauanui, "Asian American Studies and the 'Pacific Question.'" See also Hall, "Which of These Things Is Not Like the Other." Alice Te Punga Somerville makes a similar point as well, noting that Pacific studies and Indigenous studies function as separate fields with distinct genealogies and methods, and any overlap is partial. Moreover, each category—Pacific and Indigenous—in and of itself is complex, which can lead to "rabbit holes of definitions and categorizations." See Somerville, "Searching for the Trans-Indigenous," 100. Teresia Teaiwa also sees the Asia-Pacific coupling as problematic, noting that the Pacific is relegated as a vague suffix of Asia, when in fact the Pacific itself is an umbrella term containing diverse elements within it. Similarly, Terence Wesley-Smith points to the sheer number of Pacific languages and epistemologies, which means that "the architects of Pacific studies programs will have to engage with a more diffuse and fragmented epistemological landscape than they might like." See Teaiwa, "For or *Before* an Asia Pacific Studies Agenda?"; Wesley-Smith, "Rethinking Pacific Studies Twenty Years On," 161. For a useful, concise overview of these debates, see Suzuki, "And the View from the Ship."

66 Byrd, *Transit of Empire*, xvii.

67 Given the political, economic, and demographic power of Asian Americans, particularly East Asian Americans, in Hawai'i, they are "settlers of color" or "arrivants" who are structurally complicit with settler colonialism. As Haunani-Kay Trask, Noelani Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, Candace Fujikane, Dean Saranillio, and others have written, this structural complicity does not and should not prevent Asian Americans from being "settler allies" in Hawaiian decolonization movements. Jodi A. Byrd borrows the term *arrivants* from African Caribbean poet Kamau Brathwaite. See Byrd, *Transit of Empire*, xix. See Trask, "Settlers of Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony"; Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, *Seeds We Planted*; Fujikane, "Mapping Abundance on Mauna a Wākea as a Practice of Ea"; and Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire*.

68 For a useful discussion of Asian Indigeneities in sites such as Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, see the 2015 special issue of *Amerasia Journal* on "Indigenous Asias," edited by Greg Dvorak and Miyume Tanji. For another special issue of a journal on

Asian Indigeneities, see the Fall 2018 issue of *Verge: Studies in Global Asias*, edited by Charlotte Eubanks and Pasang Yangjee Sherpa.

69 Indeed, Jinah Kim amplifies this militarized interconnectedness in calling the region the "Pacific Arena." See *Postcolonial Grief*, 17. Kim writes, "*Arena* references the tendency to refer to zones of combat as *theaters of war*. Unlike a theater, however, an arena more accurately describes the conditions of war and the ways that it is made into violent fantasy for consumption" (17–18, emphases in original).

70 For an important earlier articulation of the term *trans-Pacific* within critical Asian studies, see Sakai and Yoo, Introduction to *Trans-Pacific Imagination*. Writing specifically within the context of East Asia, they posit the "trans-Pacific imagination" as an analytic for grappling with the neo-imperial US-Japan alliance or complicity. For a "decolonial approach to fabulating transpacific futurity" that focuses on the transpacific as at once a geopolitical realm, material ecosystem, culturally produced imaginary called "the Pacific," and the temporal ascription called "the Asian Century," see Mok and Bahng, "Transpacific Overtures," 5, 4. For an analysis of transpacific critique that "knits together diverse memories of historical violence—settler colonialism, military expansion, and refugee displacement—into a layered story of US Empire in the Asia-Pacific region," see Espiritu, "Critical Refugee Studies and Native Pacific Studies," 483. For a study of "transpacific redress" in terms of the performance of "redressive acts" that challenge the erasure and denial of the history of Japanese military sexual slavery, see Son, *Embodied Reckonings*.

71 The term *transpacific* can be deployed, for example, in a purely descriptive, uncritical, or even celebratory sense to track the transnational movement of goods, people, ideas, and so on across the Pacific. It can re-center East Asia or the US mainland, whether unwittingly or wittingly. It can also be taken up in ways that elide Indigeneity and the Pacific Islands, even as the stated goal might be to do otherwise. Bearing this in mind, Lisa Yoneyama engages in what she calls a "conjunctive cultural critique of the transpacific" and "a dissonant reading of the transpacific as an alternative to the Cold War geography, which emerged out of transwar, interimperial, and transnational entanglements." See Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, x. In a more recent article, Yoneyama elaborates further on her conceptualization of the transpacific and of transpacific critique. Calling attention to the problems of a transpacific critique that absents Indigenous and Pacific Islander epistemologies and interventions, she continues by noting the "potentials for developing alternative theorizing of the transpacific even further, through exposing the conjunctions among settler states, imperialisms, and the overseas military deployment whether in aggression, in peacekeeping, or as occupying forces." See Yoneyama, "Toward a Decolonial Genealogy of the Transpacific," 478–79. In a similar vein, for an analysis of "transpacific entanglements" as constituted by "historical and ongoing settler logics of invasion, removal, and seizure" as they intersect with racialized capitalism and overseas empire, see Espiritu, Lowe, and Yoneyama, "Transpacific Entanglements," 175.

72 Suzuki, *Ocean Passages*, 4, emphasis in original. In an earlier piece, Suzuki and Bahng pointedly query the potential pitfalls of deploying the term. They ask, "At the institutional level, does transpacific actually just rebrand more familiar methods of comparative analysis between nation-based settler units that pass over and

even obfuscate Indigenous place-based relations?" Bearing this in mind, they take inspiration from the Oceanic framework and suggest that it might be useful to refer to the transpacific not as a "singular geopolitical space or descriptor" but rather as a keyword or category. See "Transpacific Subject in Asian American Culture," 6. For important early work that critiques the celebratory capitalist articulations of Pacific Rim discourse, see Dirlik, *What Is in a Rim?*; Connery, "Pacific Rim Discourse."

73 This is the latter part of Ruth Wilson Gilmore's highly cited and influential definition of racism: "Racism is the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death, in distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies." See "Race and Globalization," 261.

74 Allen, *Trans-Indigenous*, xiii, xiv–xv, emphases in original.

75 Allen, *Trans-Indigenous*, xvii–xviii, emphasis added.

76 Hau'ofa, "Our Sea of Islands," 152–53. This essay was originally published in *A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands* (1993), edited by Eric Waddell, Vijay Naidu, and Epeli Hau'ofa. Indeed, the very terms that are used for the region, *Pacific Islands* and *Oceania*, reflect the difference between the two perspectives. Whereas the prevailing first term, *Pacific Islands*, denotes small areas of land, the second term, *Oceania*, denotes a large sea of islands full of people and places to explore. Drawing on Hau'ofa, David Hanlon writes that "the Pacific" evokes outlander visions, while "Oceania" highlights a vastness, diversity, fluidity, and complexity that require a more Indigenous conceptualization of history. See "Losing Oceania to the Pacific and the World," 286. Normative Eurocentric cartographic practices also minimize the Pacific, splitting it literally down the middle and relegating it to the left and right margins. As J. Kēhaulani Kauanui notes, this consignment to the literal margins has a distorting effect, reducing the vastness of Oceania as well as the islands in relation to each other. See Kauanui, "Imperial Ocean," 626. See also RDK Herman's *Pacific Worlds* (http://www.pacificworlds.com/), a web-based Indigenous geography project, and the related article "Pacific Worlds."

77 Kauanui, "Asian American Studies and the 'Pacific Question,'" 126.

78 McCall, "Nissology," 1.

79 For a discussion of island studies as a decolonial project, see Nadarajah and Grydehøj, "Island Studies as a Decolonial Project (Guest Editorial Introduction)." For a study of the institutionalization of island studies and where it might be headed in the future, see Randall, "Island Studies Inside (and Outside) of the Academy." For a discussion of island feminism, see Akibayashi, "Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence." As I discuss in Chapter 2, Akibayashi contends that the writings and activist work of Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence (OWAAMV) constitute an "*island feminism*, which suggests a challenge to the interlocking of military violence and colonial violence in its fundamental critique and a challenge to patriarchy" (39, emphasis in original). See also Karides, "Why Island Feminism?" Karides writes, "Island feminism is a theoretical orientation that understands 'islands on their own terms' and draws from feminisms of intersectionality, geography, and coloniality and queer theory" (31). On "aquapelagic assemblages," see Hayward, "Aquapelagos and Aquapelagic Assemblages." Hayward proposes *aquapelagic assemblages* as a term "to emphasize the manner in which the aquatic spaces between land around groups of

islands are utilized and navigated in a manner that is fundamentally interconnected with and essential to social groups' habitation of land" (1).

80 On "de-islanding," see Gómez-Barris and Joseph, "Introduction: Coloniality and Islands." On "islanding," see Sheller, "Caribbean Futures in the Offshore Anthropocene," 972; Sheller, *Island Futures*. Gómez-Barris and Joseph as well as Sheller are cited in an insightful essay by Gonzalez, "Target/Paradise/Home/Kin," 25.

81 Teaiwa, "Island Futures and Sustainability," 514.

82 Wendt, "Towards a New Oceania," 60.

CHAPTER 1. PERVERSE TEMPORALITIES

1 Frain, "'Make America Secure,'" 224.

2 Na'puti and Bevacqua, "Militarization and Resistance from Guåhan," 846–47.

3 In a video uploaded to YouTube, we can see the protesters singing and holding up signs. See "Save Pagat," YouTube Video, 10:00, posted by sixsixdegrees, July 25, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_j3k8_qidW8.

4 Heim, "How (not) to Globalize Oceania," 137.

5 Na'puti and Bevacqua, "Militarization and Resistance from Guåhan," 848.

6 Graeber, *Debt*, 391.

7 Graeber, *Debt*, 391.

8 See Hogeland, *Founding Finance*; Wright, *One Nation under Debt*; and Konings, *Development of American Finance*.

9 For an analysis of the American Revolutionary War as a "settler revolt" and the evolution of the United States as a "settler empire," see Rana, *Two Faces of American Freedom*.

10 Park, K-S., "Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America," 1009. Michael J. Shapiro also describes the process through which Indigenous cultural systems of meaning and exchange were negated in the imposition of Euro-American lending practices. See *Violent Cartographies*, 12.

11 For an incisive analysis of how property law, conjoined with white supremacist racial logic in the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, and Israel-Palestine, effected the colonial appropriation of Indigenous lands, see Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*.

12 Marx, *Capital*, 915.

13 Robinson, *Black Marxism*. As Jodi Melamed writes, the capitalism that was Marx's purview "was always already racial capitalism" (80). See "Racial Capitalism."

14 Marx, *Capital*, 919.

15 Marx, *Capital*, 940.

16 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 30.

17 Nichols, "Disaggregating Primitive Accumulation," 19.

18 Luxemburg, "Accumulation of Capital," 194.

19 Nichols, "Disaggregating Primitive Accumulation," 19.

20 Harvey, *New Imperialism*, 143–44. Harvey usefully elaborates the wide range of processes included in Marx's description of primitive accumulation:

> These include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms