STATE OF FEAR

POLICING A POSTCOLONIAL CITY

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STATE OF FEAR

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For Jess, Sebastian, and Roger

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia; Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
AKABRI	Akademi Angkatan Senjata Republik Indonesia (i.e., military academy)
ARD	Algemeene Recherche Dienst; General Investigation Bureau
BAP	*Berita Acara Pemeriksaan*; police investigation report
BIMMAS	Bimbingan Masyarakat; Guidance of Society Unit of the police
GDN	Gerakan Disiplin Nasional; National Discipline Movement
GOLKAR	Golongan Karya; Functional Groups (political party)
HANSIP	Pertahanan Sipil; Civil Defense
KAMRA	Keamanan Rakyat; People's Security
KODAM	Komando Daerah Militer; Regional Military Command
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia; Indonesian Democratic Party
PETRUS	Pembunuhan Misterius; Mysterious Killings

PID	Politieke Inlichtingendienst; Political Intelligence Service
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party
POLDA	Polisi Daerah; provincial police
POLRES	Polisi Resor; subdistrict police
POLSEK	Polisi Sektor; police precinct
POLWILTABES	Polisi Wilayah Kota Besar; metropolitan region police
POM	Polisi Militer; Military Police
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development Party
SABHARA	Satuan Huru Hara; Security and Crowd Control Unit (police)
SATPAM	Satuan Pengamanan; Security Unit
SATPAMSUS	Satuan Pengamanan Khusus; special security guard
SISKAMLING	*Sistem keamanan lingkungan*; environment security system
TNI-AL	Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Angkatan Laut; Indonesian Navy
VOC	Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie; Dutch East India Company
WNI	*Warga negara Indonesia*; Indonesian citizen (euphemism for ethnic Chinese Indonesians)

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Introduction

Fear, Policing, and State Power

I never saw the inside of a cell in the city of Bandung's main prison.
I never even made it into the cellblock. It was in the prison yard
that my courage failed me. I was with a friend of mine, Tedi, an In-
donesian student of history, and we were walking from the prison's
cafeteria, just inside the perimeter wall, across the wide and barren
yard toward the cellblocks in the middle of the prison compound.

We were both scared to be there. It was the mid-1990s and Presi-
dent Suharto, Indonesia's authoritarian leader, was still in power. We
had been allowed into Bandung's Sukamiskin Prison to interview
inmates so we could learn more about what I described as "the cul-
ture of crime and security" that reigns in the city and the country
more broadly. Most of the other students who came to the prison

were studying criminology or psychology, so it was unusual for an anthropologist and a historian to be there. Perhaps because I was a foreigner, or perhaps because of Tedi's connections, we were allowed to meet with the inmates in the cafeteria rather than the official visitors' room. This meant we could mix quite freely with inmates in an informal manner, rather than having to make an appointment to interview a specific person under the formal circumstances that govern most prison visits. It was during one of these informal gatherings that a few of the young men we were talking to suggested that we go over to the cellblocks. I was certainly interested; I had been looking out on the cellblocks for the past few weeks and wondering what was going on in there. According to the inmates we talked to, prison guards rarely entered this area of the prison, which was considered under the de facto authority of the inmates, who were themselves organized into a hierarchy of gangs. But while the guards had not expressly forbidden us to go out there, I was still hesitant, in part because I knew the guards were already a bit suspicious of us for spending so much time with the inmates. After a moment's hesitation, we decided to proceed.

The cellblocks were constructed in the shape of an X and were enclosed by a square perimeter structure that served as both prison wall and the site of various administrative offices, workshops, and places of worship. In its architecture, the prison was typical of the high modern period of Dutch colonialism in Bandung, which is characterized by massive structures that mix various local design accents with striking straight lines that can only be fully appreciated from an aerial view. It wasn't exactly the panopticon envisaged by Jeremy Bentham, and which for Michel Foucault served as the visual expression of the disciplinary society, but it was not too far off. Except here—in this postcolonial moment—the disciplinary logic of surveillance had been at least partly disrupted, with many inmates covering their windows with sheets and bits of laundry so as to shield their cells from the hot sun and make it impossible for guards located in the perimeter structure to see inside.

As we left the shelter of the perimeter buildings and started walking across the yard, I could sense that the guards were taking an interest in what we were doing. It was one of many moments during my research in those years when I felt I was moving out onto unknown and possibly dangerous ground. I'm not sure what it was that made me fearful, whether it was the looming cellblocks and their inmates ahead of us or the prison guards behind us. Whatever it was, I felt extremely exposed out there in the middle of the dirt yard in the glare of the midday sun. A whistle from

a guard stopped us in our tracks. Tedi went back to see what the guard wanted. When he came back, he explained to me that the guards would not prevent us from going into the cellblocks, but neither could they guarantee our safety if we went there. That gave us pause. Was it a warning or a threat? Should we trust in the protection of our inmate guides and follow them into the cellblocks or remain under the watchful gaze of the prison guards?

It was only later that I came to understand that out there in the prison yard, I had unwittingly become caught up in a strangely structured "culture of fear" (Barker 2009, 270): on the one side, an opaque world of criminality, territoriality, and fighting prowess, represented by the gangs in the cellblocks; on the other, a world of bureaucratic surveillance and policing, represented by the guards in the perimeter structure. Both are menacing in their own ways, and both lay claim to a domain of authority and the capacity to provide us with "security."

When the whistle sounded and I was forced to decide between venturing further into the shadowy world of the cellblock or turning back toward the prison's administrative offices, I chose the latter, availing myself of the more familiar "security" provided by the prison guards.

This book is about fear, policing, and state power. It is about everyday struggles over the authority to define threats and police society. Based on ethnographic research among police officers, vigilantes, and street-level toughs in the Indonesian city of Bandung, it examines how fear and violence are produced and reproduced through everyday practices of rule.

Vigilantism is when citizens take the law into their own hands, either to prevent illegal activity, investigate suspected offenses, or mete out punishments to those deemed to have committed a crime (Bateson 2021, 925). In Indonesia, vigilantism has been evident in high-profile cases involving members of radical Islamist groups who portray their acts as the prevention of, or punishment for, the sins of unbelievers. But it has also long been implicated in a range of more locally directed acts of violence that receive far less media attention: market vendors dousing suspected pickpockets in gasoline and setting them alight, neighborhood watch groups beating thieves, villagers killing those among them suspected of using black magic, and gangs seeking revenge for perceived offenses against their honor. On occasions like these, vigilantes act not in the name of the state but in the name of their neighborhood community, village, gang, political party, community of believers, or ethnic group. On other occasions, those committing vigilante acts are themselves state actors—police officers or members

of the military, say—and the line between vigilantism and state-sponsored extrajudicial violence can often become blurred.

Such acts of vigilantism highlight an aspect of postcolonial state power that has been the subject of growing scholarly attention in recent years: the presence of a range of institutions outside the formal state apparatus that nonetheless claim some form of sovereign authority over their respective domains. In Indonesia, these institutions include neighborhood watch groups, gangs of toughs, youth organizations, militias, and private security guards. They are very important, particularly in the domain of policing, as they far outnumber the uniformed police, and their influence extends into nearly all areas of society. Historically, such groups have often been actively cultivated and supported by elements within the state who wish to appropriate their influence and further monopolize the means of violence and social control. However, even when pressured to operate from under the umbrella of some part of the formal state apparatus, such as the police or the army, these groups have often acted relatively independently of their state handlers, occasionally even standing in outright defiance of official authority. When one steps back and looks at the relationship between such groups and the state over time, the picture is of a complex dance of interdependencies, overlapping claims to authority, and shifting jurisdictional boundaries punctuated by periods of rupture and sometimes even violent confrontation.

This study focuses on this complex dance as it has played out in the city of Bandung, a major commercial and industrial center on the densely populated island of Java, in the sprawling archipelago of Indonesia. It is in part an analysis of the array of formal and informal institutions involved in policing—broadly understood—and their changing forms and relationships as Bandung developed from a tiny colonial outpost into a bustling postcolonial metropolis over the course of a little more than a century. During this time, the city went from being a small beacon of colonial modernity to being one among several Indonesian cities to experience intense urbanization and change as the country passed through convulsions of war, anticolonial revolution, ambitious nationalism, counterrevolutionary mass violence, a lengthy period of authoritarianism, and, eventually, democratization. How did the assemblage of institutions involved in vigilantism and policing adapt to these changes and to the city's changing political economy? Answering this question is important because, as I will show, these institutions have played a key role not only in the everyday violence associated with local vigilantism and routine policing but also in more

diffuse episodes of violence in which local security concerns became enmeshed with national fears related to state or regime security. In such cases, it becomes difficult to distinguish between state violence and popular violence, with horrific results both in terms of number of lives lost and in terms of the development of an aura of impunity for the perpetrators of such violence.

A core contention of this book is that by looking closely at the assemblage of institutions involved in vigilantism and policing in Bandung, one can discern an underlying dualism and ongoing struggle between two opposing ways of imagining, constituting, and enforcing social order in an urban setting. On one side of this struggle is a modernist vision of urban order, defined and enforced through bureaucratic techniques of policing, surveillance, and social control. This is a form of governmentality[1] that involves the collection of data about the city and its inhabitants in the world "out there," the abstraction and arrangement of such data into fixed representations (maps, identity cards, blueprints, legal codes, etc.), and the effort to make the realities of urban society conform to these abstractions.[2] On the other side is what I call a *territorial* vision of urban order, in which the city is divided into semiautonomous fiefdoms, each overseen and protected by a figure of charismatic authority. This is a form of social order in which new fiefdoms are continually being constituted, existing ones are always open to challenge, and unstable hierarchies are established through demonstrations of superior prowess in the areas of fighting, spiritual cultivation, and mystical knowledge. Most often the modernist vision of urban order is enforced by those institutions seeking to rule over places and populations at a distance—in other words, by centralized states, colonial governments, occupying forces, and transnational institutions. Those seeking to establish and maintain a territorial system of fiefdoms, in contrast, tend to be people deeply enmeshed in the micropolitics of street life, such as gang members, local toughs, members of neighborhood organizations, and local leaders of ethnic groups and religious congregations.[3]

In most cities, the two modalities of understanding and enforcing social order coexist through an ad hoc recognition of the limits of their respective domains of influence. Precisely where that line gets drawn, however, varies. In many European and North American cities, for instance, technologies of modern policing are so ubiquitous and so powerful that the territorial order has been criminalized and pushed almost completely underground. Mafias and gangs are certainly active in some neighborhoods and economic arenas, but most people—especially in the middle and upper classes—can go about

their daily lives more or less oblivious to gossip about the latest street-level rivalries. This can, however, change during times of crisis if the administrative and bureaucratic order of the city has been so weakened that the police lose their capacity to control the streets, as sometimes happens following natural disasters or during bouts of civil unrest. In such moments, territorial authority quickly emerges as one of the most powerful means of enforcing social order and community security. In such circumstances, the realpolitik of the street becomes something that even the wealthy can ignore only at their peril.

In cities like Bandung, by contrast, a social order of fiefdoms and vigilantism is not something that appears only in times of crisis. While such an order undoubtedly becomes more pronounced and visible during crises, it nevertheless endures in the fabric of city life, even during times characterized as normal. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to examine the articulation and disarticulation of bureaucratic regimes of surveillance and control with local, territorially based regimes of community protection and self-defense. In this book, I study these dynamics by examining the genealogies of institutions, technologies, and practices used to enforce order and maintain security. These institutions include the notoriously corrupt Indonesian police, with their modern techniques for social control, as well as an array of "street sovereigns" (Kivland 2020b) who use magic, violence, and fear to establish their own domains of authority within the city and enforce their own visions of urban order.

While this book looks at various historical moments in Indonesia, its core aim is to develop an understanding of the dynamics of authoritarianism during the time of President Suharto's rule, known by the somewhat Orwellian moniker the New Order (*Orde Baru*). President Suharto was an officer in the Indonesian Army who came to power in 1966 on the pretext of restoring order after an alleged attempted coup by members of the Indonesian Communist Party, followed by army-instigated mass killings of up to a million ordinary Indonesians labeled "communists" (Roosa 2006). The New Order regime was in power for thirty-two years, and over this time, it assembled an elaborate security state undergirded by violent repression, ideological indoctrination, the co-optation of civil society, the construction of an enemy other, and the cultivation of fear. Institutions, technologies, and practices of urban ordering such as the neighborhood watch, the police precinct, the identity card, and the community punishment of thieves were key components of this authoritarian state assemblage. Yet if one looks

individually at these components, both in terms of their historical geneal-ogy and in terms of their constitutive social effects, it is evident that they have their own life and logic, which is not reducible to the larger assemblage in which they are embedded. In this sense, the authoritarian state should be seen not just as something constructed by the regime's leadership but also as an aggregated effect of the operations and momentum of its constitu-ent components. As such, it both predates the New Order and has proven itself capable of outliving it.

My analysis of the building blocks of New Order authoritarianism has implications for our current global juncture. As this book will show, many of the institutions, discourses, technologies, and practices that were criti-cal to the formation of an authoritarian state—fingerprinting, household registration, social cordons, cleansing operations, to name just a few—were first introduced during colonial times to protect against a pandemic; later, these policing technologies were adapted for use in domains beyond public health and played key roles in the New Order regime's repressive apparatus. Similarly, everyday territorial institutions like the neighborhood watch, which has long served as an embodiment of local solidarity and is by defi-nition "of the people," came to be instrumentalized by the regime, both for coercive purposes and to endow state violence with an aura of legitimacy. At key moments, these different modalities of policing and social control combined with devastating results. While the circumstances today may be quite different, countries around the world have had to grapple with the effects of a pandemic that has led to the proliferation of an array of new surveillance technologies—only now, these are capable of reaching far deeper into the inner recesses of people's lives. And at the same time, many countries are witnessing the spread of militias and populist movements, which often define themselves in explicitly territorial terms. While these dynamics now play out with the amplifying effects of digital technologies, it is illuminating to take a fine-grained ethnographic look at an earlier mo-ment, when technologies were mostly analog yet the same core forces were operative and sometimes came together with frightening consequences.

Vigilantism, Informal Sovereigns, and the State

The fact is that the state has to be understood as an institution, of the same species as the church, the university, and the modern corporation. . . . And, like its sister institutions, the state not only has its own memory but

harbors self-preserving and self-aggrandizing impulses, which at any given moment are "expressed" through its living members but which cannot be reduced to their passing personal ambitions.

Benedict Anderson

As an institution, the Indonesian state carries with it many legacies of the Dutch East Indies colonial state. In the essay from which the above quote is taken, Benedict Anderson emphasizes how the New Order state was largely an attempt to resurrect the bureaucratic edifice that had been constructed by the Dutch colonial regime during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, after a period in which it had been severely weakened by war, revolution, and the political turbulence of postwar state consolidation. This is certainly the case, as I will discuss, but it is only part of the story. Another part of the story relates to a characteristic of colonial states that has not always been fully appreciated, but which has received greater attention in recent years as scholars seek to understand the dynamics of postcolonial state power in countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America: the fact that the territorial authority of colonial states was patchy and depended to a large extent on franchising out sovereign authority to other entities (Stepputat and Hansen 2005). This had several consequences, but for my purposes, I would like to highlight three important ones. First, postcolonial state authority does not adhere to the idealized Weberian image of a unitary, sovereign state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; rather, its authority can be characterized as "bifurcated" (Mamdani 2018), plural, fragmented, or multipolar. Second, the authority of the postcolonial state is often encumbered with a sense of being provisional and perpetually incomplete; as a consequence, further state building and projection of authority seems always to be required. Third, and relatedly, since sovereignty is something that comes into being only through performative acts, another characteristic of postcolonial states—and, indeed, of their colonial predecessors—is their frequent recourse to spectacular performances, as they seek to suture over their incompleteness and obtain public recognition of their authority.

The idea that the state is unitary and powerful is very widespread. Most of us are accustomed to thinking of the state as an entity that stands above and rules over society through an appeal to a transcendent law. In order to enforce this law, the state exercises, as Max Weber (1968) famously described, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A person who breaks

the law is punished for their crime. But such punishment is not a form of vengeance perpetrated by the victim of this crime; it is an act performed by an ostensibly impartial state for the purposes of upholding the law. Both law enforcement and punishment are the sole prerogatives of the state, and they take place through its instruments: the police, the courts, and the prison system.

According to this long-standing conception of state power, when people commit acts in which they "take the law into their own hands"—or "play judge themselves" (*main hakim sendiri*), as the Indonesian saying goes—these are understood to be criminal acts. Such acts challenge the authority of the state since they represent the appropriation of violence by private actors. While this idealized view of state power continues to have a good deal of currency, the reality in many postcolonial settings is that the state does not enjoy a monopoly on legitimate coercive force and other groups are routinely involved in everyday policing and the administration of justice. To understand the dynamics of policing and urban ordering in such settings, we cannot focus exclusively on state power; we need to expand the frame to analyze who exercises authority, in whose name, and how (Buur and Jensen 2004, 7). In the case of Indonesian policing, this expanded frame brings into view an assemblage of institutions dispersed throughout all levels of society, including neighborhood watch groups, militias, and the like. Scholars have proposed various overarching terms for these entities, but the two that best apply to the Indonesian context are "informal sovereigns" (Hansen and Stepputat 2006) and "street sovereigns" (Kivland 2020b).[4] Like the state described by Anderson at the beginning of this section, these institutions also have memories and "impulses" of their own.

The fact that postcolonial sovereignty is dualistic or multipolar is due in large part to the fact that colonial state authority was so often delegated to village chiefs and other community leaders through various forms of indirect rule. In some colonies, including in the Dutch East Indies, the dualistic or pluralistic authority of the state was further accentuated by differentiation in the legal system, with "customary law" being applied to certain groups or regions, and certain domains of law, while a version of European law was applied in others (Mamdani 2018). How this differentiation worked, and how "native" or "indigenous" authority was characterized and structured, was itself shaped by the colonial encounter and the ways knowledge about colonized societies—including ethnological knowledge— was collected, interpreted, imagined, reinvented, and represented (Pemberton

1994). Lines were drawn based on some combination of territory, race, culture, ethnicity, or religion and enclaves of authority established accordingly. Sometimes these alternate centers of authority were respected and given an official seal of approval, and at other times, they were criminalized and repressed. Sometimes steps were taken to incorporate them within the postcolonial state, and at other times, they were excluded. In Indonesia, remnants of such dualism remain within the institutional structures of the state, in policing and in law, for instance, but the deepest effect has arguably been an underlying conviction on the part of state actors that effective governance is only possible through partnerships with extrastate institutions that are seen to be more deeply embedded within the fabric of society. While this conviction can create openings for new centers of authority to appear, and even to be accorded a degree of social legitimacy, it can also create a sense that the state has never fully arrived, that its authority is somehow provisional, and that more needs to be done to complete the state-building project, however defined.

Within this context, the performance of sovereign claims takes on added salience. Sovereignty can only come into being through performative claims, and colonial states were continually engaged in such performances, particularly in territories where their sovereignty was provisional and contested. As Danilyn Rutherford (2012, 4–5) argues, such performances are both unavoidable and fraught with risk, for they depend on recognition by others for their legitimacy. Like other forms of public address, such performances therefore invoke and attempt to call into being an audience, but in doing so, they may also find other, unexpected audiences or have their performances interpreted in unanticipated ways. For instance, a sovereign claim meant to induce in its audience a feeling of fear may go awry and cause the performer embarrassment. In postcolonial states, such performances of claims and counterclaims abound, constituting one of the key arenas for deciphering the relationship between states, informal sovereigns, and the wider public. States may use performances not only to assert their sovereignty but also to try to ground their sovereign claims ideologically in particular sources of legitimacy, such as by connecting these to an imagined precolonial tradition or to "the people." Sometimes this might mean identifying themselves with the kind of authority associated with informal sovereigns, while at other times, it can involve characterizing the latter as threats, criminals, or enemies of the state (Siegel 1998). For their part, informal sovereigns often engage in reciprocal performances that characterize their relationship, or desired relationship, to state power (Barker

2013, 260). To express an affinity with state power, they may replicate within their own institutions some outward attributes of the state—for example, its uniforms, organizational structures, idioms, or acronyms. Conversely, they may tell stories that represent the state as a terrifying outside imposition that is fundamentally alien to local mores, thereby seeking to ward off its encroachments. Sometimes what appears as an assertion of informal sovereignty may in fact be a performance designed to draw the state closer. Daniel M. Goldstein (2004, 3), for example, highlights how attempted lynchings of thieves in Bolivia serve as spectacles in which politically and economically marginalized urban residents, normally invisible, assert their forceful presence as a means to garner the attention of the state by publicly showcasing its absence in certain local settings.

When looking at dynamics between states and informal sovereigns, it is evident that postcolonial developments have introduced additional layers to these relationships, sometimes shifting their contours and their meanings. In some countries, the anticolonial struggle itself depended on the organizational capacities and coercive force of informal sovereigns, providing them with a new identity and adding new dimensions to their mythologies of power. For instance, people who in colonial times had been labeled bandits or gangsters became nationalist revolutionaries (Cribb 1991). In other conflicts, as in Liberia, grassroots civil defense groups have been mobilized by the postcolonial state to serve as a mercenary army and deployed across national borders (Hoffman 2011, 16). In Indonesia, similar groups have played key roles on both sides of various secessionist movements, either serving as a base from which to mobilize against the Indonesian state or being instrumentalized by the state as part of its counterinsurgency operations. Other studies have focused on democratization and neoliberalization, showing how these processes can transform the relationship between the state and informal sovereigns. Competitive electoral politics often fragment informal sovereignties as party leaders compete for alliances with brokers of street-level authority capable of mobilizing votes, while street-level sovereigns become more entrepreneurial as they seek out party patrons capable of providing them with something in return (Kivland 2020a; Wilson 2006, 2015). Under conditions of neoliberalization, as state power is thinned out, marginalized communities may assert and perform their sovereign authority in part to attract the attention of the absentee state and to find new ways of connecting with it (Goldstein 2004; Jaffe 2013; Kivland 2020a, 2020b). Another possible outcome is that gangs fill the void created by the retreat of the neoliberal state. According to Dennis Rodgers

(2006, 321), this is what happened in Nicaragua, where gangs were initially seen to provide neighborhood communities with predictability, order, and a sense of local belonging, but then evolved to prey on residents, instituting local "regimes of terror," a shift precipitated by their involvement in the drug trade. This more extreme outcome looks a lot like a neoliberal version of what Mahmood Mamdani (2018, 8) described as the colonial legacy of "decentralized despotism."

These examples show how malleable the institutional formations of informal sovereignties are and how their complex dance with the state is always being redefined as circumstances change. To fully understand this dance, however, it is not enough to trace the changing contours of the overall assemblage; we must also look more deeply at what Anderson called the "impulses" that motivate these institutions, at their internal dynamics and logics. Benedict Anderson (1990c) identified one of these impulses when he described Indonesia's New Order state as an effort to resurrect the late-colonial Dutch administrative state, an effort in which he sensed the impulse to rationalize, bureaucratize, and deploy modern technologies of rule. James C. Scott (1998) memorably analyzed a key part of this impulse in terms of the modern state's project of simplifying and making legible the territories and populations it governed, a logic of social control he described as "seeing like a state." Strangely, this fundamental aspect of state power is now often overlooked, perhaps because it has become so normalized and ubiquitous.[5] As regards the impulses that motivate the institutions of informal sovereignty, it is often through fine-grained ethnographic work that these are best understood. Philippe I. Bourgois's (2003) study of street-level drug dealers in New York City is exemplary in how it delves into cultural ideas of respect, histories of marginality, and street livelihoods and how these in turn shape gang life. Similarly rich ethnographies from other countries show the sheer variety such institutions take—in the scope of authority they assert, in their degree of formalization, in the cultural values that motivate them. But they also show many underlying commonalities—for example, the importance of territory, security, ideas of masculinity, and linkages to street economies.[6]

In this book, I approach the overall assemblage of the state and informal sovereignties as consisting of microregimes, each with its own particular logic, affective investments, ethics, performances, technologies, and repertoire of policing practices. In Bandung, these microregimes include, among others, the *ronda*, or neighborhood watch patrol, with its guardhouse

and its slit gong; street gangs, youth groups, and *jegger* (street toughs), with their tattoos and magical powers; police archives, with their maps, identity cards, and blacklists of undesirables; and the police precinct, with its data room, its periodic "cleansing operations," and its holding cells. Some of these microregimes, such as the police data room and the identity card, derive from various modern governmental technologies that proliferated under colonialism, while others, such as the night watch and the tattooed body, lean more toward local and national genealogies.

The myth of authoritarian state power during the New Order held that each of these microregimes was part of a giant whole that was pyramidal in shape and unified in structure.[7] In the realm of policing, this myth was enshrined in official and unofficial government policies and practices that sought to co-opt informal sovereigns and put them to work for the ruling party, the police, or the army. There is no denying that these policies had real effects. The New Order established an "environmental security system" (*sistem keamanan lingkungan*) in which neighborhood watches, local toughs, and private security guards worked in close collaboration with the state. In most cases, these groups offered themselves up to be overseen and supported by elements within the ruling regime. However, even during the New Order, they sometimes acted relatively independently of the regime, or even against it, belying the pyramidal image. For example, it was not uncommon in Bandung for the police to decide against arresting a suspect whose neighbors threatened to avenge such action with a mob attack on a police station. In the wake of President Suharto's resignation, such assertions of local authority reached something of a fever pitch, and while they have moderated somewhat in recent years, they remain an important factor in everyday policing (Herriman 2006; Jaffrey 2019; Welsh 2008).[8] It is thus important to analyze the microregime of neighborhood territorial authority in its own terms, to see how this impulse for autonomy functions internally, as well as to understand how it sometimes comes to be incorporated within the broader state apparatus. The same is true for the other microregimes mentioned above; one must look closely at each, exploring its internal logic and its various structural transformations. By doing so, I will show how the two logics of rule I have identified—territoriality and surveillance—extend across the broader state assemblage, strongly defining some of its constituent elements while only weakly defining others. For both informal sovereigns and the uniformed police, much of what they do therefore involves navigating the tensions that arise between these different modalities of rule.

Policing, Surveillance, and Territoriality

The term *police* is commonly used refer to a public force involved in maintaining order and enforcing laws or regulations, but historically, the word also had a more expansive meaning, referring generally to the power to govern and to those acts aimed at creating an ordered society (Garriot 2013, 4–7). This broader understanding of policing was famously taken up by Foucault, who used it to describe a wide range of regulatory practices, including, among others, establishing spatial order, intervening in health and hygiene, defining criminality and illegality, and controlling populations (Foucault 1995). For this study, I follow Foucault's lead as I am interested in tracing the genealogies of Indonesian policing practices, many of which first emerged outside the institutional context of the police, either in local security practices or in biopolitical and surveillance projects of the colonial state. That said, I also focus part of my study specifically on the police as an institution, and on the practices of police officers during the New Order. As other ethnographers have noted, studying the routine practices of the police can be revealing of the logics of governance more broadly, as they are key mediators in a range of events, institutions, processes, and performances, providing a window into social and cultural orders (Haanstad 2013; Martin 2013). This is also true of informal sovereigns, who frequently position themselves in similar ways: both as enforcers of local order and as brokers between local communities and powerful outsiders.

When I first started this research, in the mid-1990s, Bandung was a city permeated by fear and obsessed with security. The most obvious manifestation of this obsession was the saturation of urban space with security guards. The entranceway to virtually every bank, supermarket, restaurant, factory, or government, university, or office building had a security post staffed twenty-four hours a day by uniformed security guards. In many of these places, the guards noted down information from the identity cards of all who visited; in factories, they body-searched workers at the end of every shift. In places without uniformed guards, one could still be sure that someone was earning money watching over security. Outdoor markets, bus terminals, sections of roads, parking areas, city squares, discotheques, brothels, and cinemas—all had someone whose job was to provide protection. Even spaces with nothing much to protect were usually guarded. For example, plots of land that had been taken out of cultivation but had yet to be developed into factories or commercial centers were often walled off and provided with security posts and full-time guards. Sometimes these

secure spaces stood unused for years, empty except for the guards in their posts. The same was true of residential neighborhoods. To varying degrees, every residential area in Bandung was something of a gated community. Some neighborhoods had a surrounding wall and a guarded gate, like those found in the suburbs of many American cities; others merely had a guard post at the main entrance. In poorer areas, these posts were manned not by salaried guards but by residents of the neighborhood working in rotation. These guards spent the night patrolling their neighborhoods looking for intruders. Even with these night watches, however, families were very conscious of the need for household security. Those I lived with not only locked their outer gates and main doors but also their bedrooms, cupboards, and even telephones and refrigerators, if they had them. Nor was it uncommon for people to perform rituals to ward off thieves and other threats, for example, by reciting mantras and fasting so that one's house would be made invisible to anyone with malevolent intentions.

The tremendous local emphasis placed on security, moreover, was doubled by the presence of state institutions such as the police and the army. As a big city and a provincial capital, Bandung is home not only to several police precincts and district army commands, but also to city- and provincial-level police and army headquarters, as well as military training and education facilities. All these institutions are located within the city limits, and many occupy prominent real estate in the city center. Their buildings, many of which were inherited from the Dutch colonial period, stand as constant reminders of the central role the state's security forces play in virtually every facet of national life.

Despite this pronounced interest in security—or perhaps because of it—it was difficult to find someone who had not been the victim of a crime in the recent past. Everyone seemed to have a story to tell. Many of these circulated by word of mouth and focused on crimes that had taken place locally. Indeed, within hours of such an incident, everyone in the vicinity would know about it and many would claim to have the inside story on what exactly had happened and who was involved. Newspapers and magazines both capitalized on and cultivated this interest, giving crime stories a sphere of circulation that transcended their locality. Regional papers carried daily reports on robberies, rapes, murders, thefts, and arrests that had taken place in the city and province; national papers picked out the most shocking of these and distributed them throughout the archipelago. As James T. Siegel (1998) has described, almost all newspapers and magazines had a section entitled "Criminality" ("Kriminalitas"), and those seeking a wider readership

often did so by dedicating more space to such coverage. In addition, private television stations often carried special crime bulletins alongside official government news broadcasts.[9] For North American or European viewers perhaps accustomed to a somewhat more sanitized form of crime reporting, these bulletins could be a bit shocking. Not only did they provide direct interviews with those in police custody accused of committing offenses (sometimes even showing police interrogations); they also did not hesitate to show corpses and to interview victims in the immediate aftermath of horrific crimes. These reports served to heighten people's awareness of the threats to their security, making them that much more conscious of the need for protection.

Both the police and informal sovereigns during the New Order justified their existence less in terms of law enforcement than as a matter of maintaining "security." The root word for security in the Indonesian language is *aman*, which can be translated as peaceful, calm, safe, secure (Echols and Shadily 1989, 14). Variations on the word can be used as a verb: *mengamankan*, meaning to secure, place in safekeeping, pacify; or it can be used as a noun: *pengamanan* or *keamanan*, which describe security guards of various kinds. As employed by the New Order state, the notion of "security" was inflected by related terms used by the Dutch colonial state. An overarching ambition of the colonial state was to establish what in Dutch was called *rust en orde*, tranquility and order (in Indonesian, *tata tenteram* or *tata tertib*), which was to be achieved in part through policing and in part by reinforcing certain elements of traditional Javanese statecraft and culture, which similarly emphasized the importance of calm and orderliness (Shiraishi 1990, 5–6, 186). Yet both during and after colonial times, much could be lost in translation. What Nils Bubandt (2005) refers to as "vernacular" concepts of security might mean one thing in the context of local communities and something quite different in the eyes of the government, and this gap often served to undermine rather than reinforce the state's overarching security discourse.

But the instability of this discourse arguably goes even deeper, for it is a discourse that so often seems to self-proliferate in the way it interpellates and affects people. This is illustrated by my opening story about the prison guards, where drawing attention to the question of security triggered in me and Tedi a sense of fear about possible sources of danger (*bahaya*) and thus a feeling of insecurity. (The Indonesian term for insecurity is *rawan*: restless, unsettled, sensitive, or disturbed—placing it in a slightly different semantic field than the English term, but similar in that it, too, may apply equally to

a territory and to one's own emotional state, thus highlighting the reciprocal relationship between external condition and internal affect.[10]) The fear that comes with a feeling of insecurity engenders heightened vigilance and alertness (*waspada*) on the part of those affected and often leads to suspicion. As Patricia Spyer (2006, 206) has argued in her analysis of the dynamics of communal violence in Ambon, a city in eastern Indonesia, this sense that something bad could happen at any time can also lead to "a hyperhermeneutic—or a compulsive need to interpret and mine just about everything for hidden meaning, to see any trivial occurrence as a sign or omen of what might come." Under such conditions, people deploy "anticipatory practices" aimed at "short-circuiting" the feeling of unpredictability, and in so doing, ironically, sometimes feed the violence they fear (189). In sum, to understand the security state, it is therefore necessary to untangle this mutually reinforcing circuitry of policing practices and fear, security and insecurity. In doing so, we must also be attentive to domains where "vernacular" concerns about security are paramount and can have a logic of their own.

In the chapters that follow, I use the term "surveillance" to refer to a self-consciously modern logic that seeks to make the world "out there" legible and to make it correspond to an image, representation, or blueprint of order.[11] The city constituted through surveillance is therefore a panoptic city in which spaces and persons are subjected to the perpetual disciplinary gaze described by Michel Foucault (1995) and Michel de Certeau (1984). "Territoriality," in contrast, refers to a logic that seeks to establish an order grounded in a shared, habitual relation to a territory, and to instill in residents a social imperative to defend that territory against outsiders.[12] The city constituted through territoriality, then, is a city of distinctive locales, each watched over by a self-appointed and often charismatic guardian or protector.

By framing my analysis in terms of surveillance and territoriality, I aim to both renew and reframe two strands of late twentieth-century thinking about power and the state in Indonesia that have for a time been overshadowed by a focus on understanding post-Suharto democratization, decentralization, and oligarchic politics.[13] These strands analyzed both "traditional" ideas of power and the state dating from precolonial times (Anderson 1972, 1990a, 1990b; Errington 1989; Geertz 1980; Milner 1982; Moertono 1981; Wolters 1999) as well as modern forms of power associated with the late-colonial bureaucratic state (Anderson 1990c; Sutherland 1979). I view territoriality as an aspect of the type of power and unstable hierarchy associated with Oliver Wolters's (1999) "men of prowess" and Anderson's

(1990b) charismatic Javanese ascetics. This is a notion of inner power (*tenaga dalam*) as something substantial and as something that can reside in people (such as fearless fighters or ascetics), places (the abodes of spirits, say), and things (like amulets). Anderson (1990b) and Pemberton (1994) have described how in Java, such charismatic power was monopolized and endowed with a degree of stability over time by virtue of being overcoded with kinship structures and subjected to reproducible disciplines. They showed, in other words, how charismatic power was appropriated and re-tooled to provide the patrimonial state with added legitimacy. Leaders were charismatic because of who their father was or because they had access to mystical knowledge only available to members of the traditional Javanese court (*kraton*). My analysis, in contrast, looks at what has happened—and continues to happen—to the kinds of charismatic power that were not fully appropriated and remained at large in society. Specifically, I focus on charismatic power that gets invested in bodies and places, or what I call *territories*. To use Errington's (1989) and Keeler's (1987) terminology, I focus on the "potency" of territorial places and persons. Whether in the form of gang members' tattooed bodies or sacred spots within the cityscape, such potency allows for the constitution of social hierarchies that do not depend on recognition by the state for their legitimacy. Such hierarchies can be maintained even as practices of surveillance seek to deterritorialize bodies and places and install them in an abstract, state-controlled order of identities and addresses.[14]

While the abstract logics of territoriality and surveillance are evident in policing practices everywhere, precisely how they manifest varies greatly from place to place. In Bandung, there has been and continues to be a no-table dualism in urban policing. The modern, centralized, and bureaucratic police force exists alongside an array of shadowy institutions, most of which are more informal, local, and charismatic in orientation. As indicated above, this dualism has its origins in the colonial period. Up until the early twenti-eth century, policing was organized locally according to general principles established by the government. Much of the day-to-day work of policing was done by local people who had no position in the civil service and were both unsalaried and untrained. They were local figures in the sense that their sphere of action, their responsibilities, and their authority were ter-ritorially limited and also in the sense that, insofar as they had connections to the government, their connections were usually to indigenous officials rather than European representatives of the Dutch colonial regime.[15] In effect, policing was part of a system of indirect colonial rule.

The move to create a professional police force was part of a broader effort on the part of the Dutch to establish more direct control over the colony and its peoples. Techniques of surveillance were integral to this effort and made their way into policing in two ways. First, they were used to reconstitute the police apparatus itself, scrutinizing existing policing practices, comparing them to an implicit ideal of direct, centralized control, and eventually effecting a transformation whereby the police were bureaucratized, rationalized, and subjected to new forms of discipline. This process began in earnest around the start of the twentieth century with the research and publication of several monumental studies about policing in Java and the reforms that subsequently followed. Second, surveillance in the form of mapping, fingerprinting, and the use of identity cards became the principal means of policing populations and territories. Such technologies emerged in a variety of domains—including that of health and hygiene—and only gradually came together to form a loosely integrated police surveillance system. What is now identifiable in Indonesia as the modern institution of the police is best viewed as the result of the combined efforts of subjecting the police apparatus to surveillance and employing surveillance techniques to police the wider population.

While the modernization of policing had profound effects, it never resulted in the elimination of older institutions and practices of policing. Like their colonial predecessors, postcolonial administrations continued to rely upon local figures for much of their policing needs. The Indonesian government has often claimed that this is because Indonesians have a culture of *gotong royong*: cooperation, self-help, and mutual support. Indeed, many of these self-help practices are very old. However, the history of community self-policing demonstrates that since colonial times the state has not merely celebrated such practices but actively enfolded and incorporated them.[16] This was especially true of the New Order regime, which made neighborhood guards an obligatory part of community organization and encouraged a vast expansion of privatized security services.[17] It also increased police oversight of these institutions by making the police responsible for training and integrating these services into the broader state apparatus of surveillance and social control (Barker 1999, 2001; Bertrand 2004).

The result was the "environmental security system" mentioned above, in which neighborhood watches, local toughs, and private security guards worked in close collaboration with the ruling party, the army, and the police. This arrangement had two notable advantages for the regime: it cost the government very little, and it created a citizenry that thought and

acted like police. As one officer indicated to me during my fieldwork in a police precinct toward the end of Suharto's rule, under this arrangement, every head of household would learn to fulfill the function of a police officer.[18] With the demise of the New Order, the Indonesian government underwent significant decentralization and democratization, a process that resulted in multiple centers of authority in both governance and electoral politics. In this context, the fragmentation of coercive authority, often submerged during the New Order, became far more pronounced. Existing groups grew more assertive and new ones emerged on the scene, often defining themselves in explicitly populist, ethnic, or religious terms (Herriman 2006; Telle 2013; Welsh 2008; Wilson 2006, 2015). In this context, efforts by the state to mobilize neighborhood groups against perceived national threats, such as terrorism, have not always been effective, and local support has sometimes been made contingent on the implicit conferral of impunity for community-based vigilante acts (Jaffrey 2019).

In the chapters that follow, I try to elucidate the underlying logics of territoriality and surveillance, and how they relate to one another, across this dispersed field of policing institutions. By exploring the genealogy and logic of each modality of rule, I aim to shed light on how a street-level anticipatory politics of fear both interfaces with and diverges from a bureaucratic politics of fear, and how territorial practices of policing variously interact with or disrupt practices of state surveillance. In doing so, I draw attention to the very different kinds of fears and the very different senses of "security" that can underpin vigilantism and policing in the postcolonial city. I also show how, under certain circumstances, a coincidence of fear and violence makes it impossible to distinguish the police from vigilantes.[19]

Bandung: The Development of a Postcolonial City

Bandung is a large metropolis located on a plateau in the highlands of western Java, just a few hours by train or automobile from Indonesia's capital city, Jakarta. With an estimated population of more than 2.5 million people (more than 8 million in the broader metropolitan area), Bandung is the third-largest city in Indonesia.[20] It is the capital of the province of West Java and an important center of Sundanese culture (the Sundanese are the second-largest ethnic group in Indonesia). It is also a highly cosmopolitan city, with a dynamic youth culture and a large population of newcomers from across the archipelago, many of whom came to Bandung to study or work and subsequently took up long-term residence there. The mix of Indo-

nesian cosmopolitanism and local Sundanese heritage is evident in everyday discourse in Bandung, which consists mainly of code-switching between the Sundanese language and the national lingua franca, Bahasa Indonesia.

The pattern of urbanization in Bandung and its environs over the last two centuries directly reflects the major political and economic shifts that have marked modern Indonesian history. For much of the nineteenth century, Bandung was a small town that served mainly as a remote outpost of a dualistic colonial government—Dutch and indigenous—in the middle of a large and highly fertile agricultural region. It was only in the latter part of the century that the Dutch East Indies government opened the region to private investment and wider settlement, leading to an influx of Europeans and ethnic Chinese, an expansion that was further enabled by the development of a railway connection to the coast. The timing of this new stage of urbanization coincided with the high modern period of colonialism, and the European plantation class around Bandung took advantage of the city's designation as a municipality, granted in 1906, to pursue a range of modernizing projects focused on making the city a beacon of colonial tropical modernity. Schools, churches, hospitals, and roads were built, the Bandung Institute of Technology (then called the Technische Hoogeschool) was established, and tourism was encouraged. These efforts culminated in the 1920s with a plan to relocate the center of colonial government from Batavia (Jakarta) to Bandung, which, although only partially realized, resulted in an influx of civil servants as several large government departments moved to the city. These developments, together with the city's growing manufacturing and service sectors, helped support a burgeoning middle class and establish Bandung as thriving cultural and economic center in its own right. Many residents of postcolonial Bandung look back nostalgically on the decades prior to the Second World War as the city's golden age, the "before times" (*tempoe doeloe*) when the city was still orderly and clean. But the legacy of the colonial period was very much that of a "divided city" (Low 2002)—racially and ethnically as well as administratively and spatially—even though the actual people living there, and their manner of living, often did not fit neatly into the boxes of colonial racial categories (Taylor 1983; Stoler 2010).

Part of the nostalgia for the "before times" is undoubtedly a reflection of the turbulence that followed. In Bandung, the period from the 1940s through the early 1960s saw a brutal occupation by Japanese forces, a series of revolutionary battles fought against returning Allied forces, and an influx of migrants from nearby rural areas escaping a thirteen-year conflict

Bandung

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
I.1 Map of Bandung. (1) Villa Isola, (2) Bandung Institute of Technology, (3) Gasibu Plaza, (4) Gedung Sate, (5) Metropolitan Police Headquarters, (6) Bandung Central Square, (7) Sukamiskin Prison, (8) Provincial Police Headquarters. Map by Geoffrey Wallace.

between the army and the Darul Islam rebellion. In each of these conflicts new lines were drawn and people were forced to take sides. Yet even in these years the city retained some of its reputation as a beacon of pluralistic modernity. This was perhaps most in evidence in 1955, when Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, chose it as the site for the famous Asia-Africa Conference, a gathering of leaders from newly independent countries in Asia and Africa at which the Non-Aligned Movement was first proclaimed. Sukarno himself was among the first non-Europeans to graduate from the Bandung Institute of Technology, and during colonial times, he had been imprisoned in Bandung for his nationalist activism. The building where the conference was held had been, prior to independence, a social club off-limits to non-European guests. The event thus served to signify the successful Indonesianization of formerly colonized Bandung while reinforcing and renewing the city's status as a beacon of pluralist modernity (Barker 2008).

While Bandung was spared the worst of the anticommunist violence of 1965–66, the city was fully incorporated into the broader push by the New Order regime to consolidate its power, erect a bureaucratic security state, and pursue its top-down economic agenda of "national development." For a time, campus-based politics at the Bandung Institute of Technology provided a platform for critical voices, but eventually even this modest level of dissent was stifled through changes to the institute's leadership and the deployment of a nationwide, antipolitical "campus normalization" policy (Akhmadi 2009; Lowe 2007, 117). More importantly, as a municipal center of government, as well as a provincial capital, the city became a key hub in the expanding military and administrative state. This was reflected in the city's built environment, with significant real estate dedicated to government offices, the military, and the police, as well as to a growing number of schools and universities. All these institutions required personnel, who in turn required housing, so there was extensive construction of new residential complexes, pushing the edges of the city further and further outward. This expansion was also bolstered by the structure of the New Order's state-driven developmentalist capitalism, which depended upon, and enriched, the country's military-bureaucratic elite (Robison 1986). The contractors, suppliers, technical experts, and others necessary to realize the government's developmental goals benefited from their proximity to this elite, and a state-dependent private sector subsequently grew up alongside the administrative state.

The administrative state was not the only colonial artifact resurrected in the postcolonial period. Industrialization also resumed in force, most notably in the textile sector, with large numbers of factories shaping the landscape at the southern edge of the city. These industries depended on a large pool of low-wage workers, mostly women from villages across Java, who migrated to the city and lived in densely packed dormitories and rooming houses in new "urban villages" adjacent to the factories. Migrants also made up the large workforce of construction workers, domestic servants, and drivers, who were needed first to expand the city and then to take care of its middle-class and elite households. A further legacy of colonialism was the ethnic divide that characterized this industrial development. Factory owners—like shop owners—were overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese and their workers almost all Sundanese and Javanese; class divides were thus overlaid by ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. This led to an underlying social tension—sometimes erupting in anti-Chinese violence—that was productive for the security apparatus, both formal and informal, since owners of capital continually felt under threat and in need of protection.

This overall pattern of urban transformation in Bandung has never disappeared, but since the 1990s, it has seen layered onto it two new dynamics that have significantly altered the city's trajectory: Indonesia's democratization and the city's tighter integration into the megacity centered on Jakarta. Indonesia's move to democratize, which followed the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and resulted in President Suharto's resignation the following year, was spearheaded by a reform (*reformasi*) movement carried out on campuses and streets and helmed largely by students. In Bandung, the financial crisis precipitated a massive increase in the size of the informal sector, and with it the takeover of much public space in the city center by vendors of all kinds. The reform movement and the ouster of Suharto helped reinforce this takeover, at least initially, by pushing the army and the police off the streets and allowing the people to reclaim a range of urban spaces. Democratization also affected government, with competitive electoral politics yielding a more multipolar political constellation in the city just as a nationwide decentralization policy was devolving some powers to lower levels of government.

While over the years these changes had the effect of vitalizing city politics and making them more consequential, they arguably brought about only a modest change in the way state power actually functioned in the city. Furthermore, although in the realm of government the city was becoming more empowered vis-à-vis Jakarta than had previously been the case, this was taking place against the backdrop of a longer trend toward increased socioeconomic integration within the emerging Jakarta megacity region. This closer integration with Jakarta had a long history, but after the New Order it reached unprecedented levels as a flood of large-scale real estate investment transformed large sections of Bandung into shopping malls, outlet stores, cafés, restaurants, hotels, and apartment buildings for visitors, many from nearby Jakarta. The overall effect of this integration has been the economic and infrastructural deterritorialization of more and more areas of the city, even as the older dynamics of Bandung's urbanization continue to play out, albeit in areas previously thought to comprise its periphery.

Organization of the Book

In the chapters that follow I trace a path through a series of institutions and sites that are central to the policing of Indonesian cities, from neighborhood guardhouses to the tattooed bodies of street toughs, from colonial-era brothels and rat-infested homes to late twentieth-century malls and

marketplaces, and from the captain's office in a police precinct to the city streets where a paramilitary campaign resulted in the killing of thousands of people labeled "criminals." In tracing this path, I introduce a cast of characters and describe their everyday practices: neighborhood watch guards out on patrol, neighbors relating crime stories, pickpockets policing their turf, toughs running protection rackets, colonial bureaucrats reconstructing the cityscape, vaccinators collecting fingerprints, and police officers taking bribes. I show how these characters use everyday policing technologies—which in the Indonesian context includes slit gongs, investigation handbooks, invulnerability spells, divination manuals, data rooms, and slang—as tools to both maintain urban security and reflect upon what security means.

The core of this book is divided into three sections, organized thematically and chronologically. In part 1, I draw upon a combination of historical and ethnographic evidence to describe how security is defined and operationalized in the territorial mode. Chapter 1 explores the range and flexibility of neighborhood territorial formations, from rather diffuse, egalitarian "societies against the state" (Clastres 1987) to rigid, hierarchical units that function as components of a broader state assemblage. Chapter 2 describes how territorial groups imagine threats to their security—thieves, strangers, challengers, and the state—and shows how they organize themselves to protect against such threats. While my engagement with the territorial mode focuses mainly on its more contemporary manifestations, I understand this mode as having its genesis in precolonial times.

In part 2, I use historical sources to construct a genealogy of police practices of urban surveillance as they arose within the context of colonial rule. Chapter 3 examines the emergence of surveillance in the context of Bandung's founding and subsequent development. It focuses on the way surveillance became a central part of the late-colonial vision of what a modern colonial city should be and traces the peculiar route by which the new conception of urban discipline and order reconfigured and reconstructed the cityscape. In doing so, it shows how Dutch colonists fantasized about the use of surveillance as a way to ferret out contagions and other threats to security, and how colonial subjects were implicated in this vision. Chapter 4 examines how surveillance was used to control populations, tracing the process whereby the police were subjected to surveillance, and techniques such as employing anthropometry, fingerprinting, spying, and using identity cards were integrated into police practices. Together these chapters show how the state used surveillance to control its territory and the general population in a manner that did not depend on local institutions and power

structures. They also show how colonial fears often became centered on uncontrollable contagions and on those points where scientific languages and their blueprints of order failed to correspond to the order of things in the world "out there."

In part 3, I examine the development of postcolonial policing practices with a particular emphasis on the various ways that urban territoriality and surveillance articulated alongside each other during the New Order. Territoriality and surveillance involve very different ways of seeing and interpreting the world. To take one example (discussed in chapter 5), tattoos and fingerprints mean one thing within a system of bureaucratic policing aimed at the identification of criminals, and something quite different when seen from the perspective of a gang member interested in assessing the spiritual potency of a rival. Yet the reality of policing is that it involves a constant interplay between these two viewpoints. Indeed, the effectiveness of contemporary Indonesian policing—both in terms of its capacity to enforce order and in terms of its legitimacy—is dependent on a careful management of this interplay. In part 3 I discuss the symbolic and sociological dimensions of such management. Chapter 5 employs historical material to examine a decisive moment in the history of postcolonial Indonesian policing—namely, the paramilitary operation carried out in the early 1980s in which the New Order state sought to kill certain "figures of criminality" (Rafael 1999) on its watch lists. In this way, the state criminalized territorial figures while trying to appropriate their power to help buttress the authoritarian state. In combination with a program aimed at privatizing and regulating local security practices, this campaign subjected territorial fiefdoms to unprecedented state control. Chapter 6 then presents an ethnographic account of life in a police precinct in the mid-1990s. It shows how masculinist networks of corruption—what I call *fraternities*—allow the police to link formal representatives of the centralized, bureaucratic state to figures of territorial authority by a means other than surveillance,[21] and how the police, while continuing to practice surveillance and pay lip service to an "official" notion of security, use these networks to take over territorial power and exploit it for economic gain. Taken together, these two chapters present a picture of a postcolonial police apparatus with tremendous surveillance capabilities, albeit one whose predatory aspects increasingly trace fraternal and territorial lines. In the book's conclusion, I summarize my analysis of these different dynamics and show how postcolonial policing has unfolded in Bandung in the period since the end of the New Order.

Thoughts on Research Process and Positionality

> The ethnographer experiences fear at the same time as he learns how social control works.
>
> **Didier Fassin**

I conducted most of my field research for this book over a period of twenty-six months between January 1995 and July 1997, while the Suharto dictatorship was still very much in place. I then taught at the Bandung Institute of Technology from 1998 to 2001, where I saw first-hand the reform movement unfolding in the city. In the two decades since, I have conducted numerous shorter stints of fieldwork in Bandung, including a collaborative project on one of Bandung's main plazas that forms the empirical basis for the conclusion.

My experiences obtaining research permission for my initial period of intensive fieldwork helped shape my understanding of Indonesian policing. I received permission for my research only after months of screening procedures and after being interviewed by members of police intelligence at least twice. To the best of my knowledge, I was the first foreign researcher to conduct first-hand ethnographic research among the police. The dozens of hours I spent in various offices of the provincial and national police, waiting for signatures, getting photographed and fingerprinted, and chatting with officers at their desks provided me with my first exposure to the complex procedures involved in bureaucratic surveillance, especially as they were applied to what were then seen to be suspect populations like "foreigners" and "researchers." Being on the receiving end of these procedures gave me an appreciation for how deeply mechanical and routinized they were, and for the extent to which police work was dedicated to building and maintaining the police archive.

Once I received permission to conduct field research, I collected ethnographic data on the police using a variety of formal and informal techniques. At both the provincial- and city-level police headquarters, my interviews were mostly formal, although at the latter site I did have the chance to take part in a good deal of more or less informal conversation with officers from the Criminal Intelligence section. In most cases, I found the officers to be rather careful in their dealings with me. Partly because of this reticence, I did the bulk of my ethnographic work at the Cilengka Precinct.[22] It was there that I spent many long days and nights accompanying the police on their patrols; observing them interacting with complainants, witnesses, and

suspects; listening to their stories; and hanging out. This did not mean my access was unfettered. I was aware of several occasions when I was deliberately kept out of conversations or conveniently left behind while officers went about some secret business. Furthermore, certain characteristics of Cilengka skewed the kind of data to which I was exposed. Although at that time approximately 3 percent of Indonesian police officers were women (International Crisis Group 2001, 7), there were no women posted to Cilengka. As a result, my discussion of the banter among men in chapter 6 reflects the deeply masculine and often chauvinist culture present in the precinct at the time. While I believe that this culture is prevalent throughout the police, I would expect that it manifested somewhat differently in offices where women were present on a daily basis.[23]

I faced similar challenges and constraints when conducting research at the Sukamiskin Prison, an experience that informs this study but is not a focus of any of the chapters. I was fortunate in being allowed to simply hang out in the cafeteria and the yard, mixing with the inmates and engaging them in conversation. Here, too, however, I was aware of many instances in which inmates were hesitant to talk and it would not have been appropriate or possible to press them. And again, because there were no women at this prison, I never heard first-hand stories about the violence female prisoners might be exposed to at the hands of the police.

My research outside the formal institutions of rule was subject to fewer constraints. During the time of my main research in Bandung, I lived in three different neighborhoods, all in the southern part of the city. One was an upper-middle-class housing complex that had been built in the 1980s and was home to people from a variety of ethnic groups, religions, and professions. Ethnic Chinese, Sundanese, and Javanese were all represented, and many had intermarried. Most breadwinners were active or retired business-people, high-level civil servants, and military types. It was not an exclusive environment like those found in the richer parts of Jakarta, though it was an environment where people left each other more or less alone. The other two neighborhoods, consisting largely of Sundanese or Javanese Muslims, were more typical of how a majority of Bandung's residents live. These were much more tightly knit communities, each centered on an extended family that had originally owned all the surrounding land. The higher-status figures in these neighborhoods were people who had succeeded in the civil service, though most of the inhabitants were factory workers, administrative assistants, mechanics, pushcart traders, or other small-scale merchants.

In addition to my work in Bandung, I conducted a shorter stint of research in Jakarta during the New Order, where I stayed in a boarding house on a back alley in the heart of Kota, which is historically an enclave for ethnic Chinese. The street-side homes in this neighborhood were all owned by well-to-do merchant families, though many of the families who lived in the back alleys were very poor. Dispersed throughout the neighborhood were dozens of boarding houses in which an odd assortment of people—office clerks, hairdressers, single mothers, second wives, night-club hostesses, gamblers, drug addicts, fences, and drug dealers—lived together cheek by jowl. Much of my local ethnographic data comes from observations of life in these four communities and discussions with the people I came to know in them.[24] While these communities are certainly not representative of all of Indonesian society, they are fairly representative of the kinds of communities one finds in many of Java's big cities.

Primary textual sources on postcolonial crime and policing were not easy to come by. Fragmented and incomplete reports produced by the army and the police from all over West Java were available at the provincial archive. This helped me understand how the police fit into the broader governmental and military security apparatus, as it was possible to see how the reports moved up and down through the bureaucracy. With local data I was more fortunate in that the Cilengka Precinct had a nearly complete set of case files for the past six years as well as copies of administrative reports. This archive proved very useful for understanding the anatomy of recent crime in the precinct and for seeing how the police make a case. Secondary published sources based on first-hand research of crime and policing in Indonesia are also relatively rare, though the police college in Jakarta had thousands of theses written on such topics in its library. Some of these are based on personal experience or on first-hand research, and thus were quite informative. Moreover, since they date back to the late 1960s, they provide an unusual glimpse into how police interest in particular problems changed over the course of the New Order period. In a similar but more critical vein, some excellent theses were also available in the University of Indonesia's Department of Criminology. Historical materials about crime and policing, and about Bandung's history, were collected at several local and personal libraries around Bandung, at the National Archive in Jakarta, the National Library in Jakarta, the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, and Cornell University's Kroch Library.

When publishing ethnographic accounts, anthropologists often face ethical dilemmas about how to report on what they have learned. Other

ethnographers of policing have noted how this field of inquiry in particular places the ethnographer in a difficult position ethically, as the researcher so often needs to conceal from interlocutors what they are thinking and how they are feeling (Fassin 2017; Herbert 2017). In my research, many of the things I heard about and observed involved acts of violence. In one particularly disturbing case, which I discuss in chapter 6, I was present in the next room during a violent police interrogation of a teenaged boy. At the time, I was frightened and unsure about what to do, and I did not directly intervene. In other cases—discussed in chapter 5—interlocutors told me about past killings they claimed to have perpetrated or taken part in. I have sometimes been told that anthropologists have an ethical or a political obligation to act as advocates or representatives of the people they study. While this may be appropriate for those anthropologists who focus on marginalized and oppressed populations, this does not make sense for a study like this. If anything, my ethical responsibility is to advocate for the victims of violence, including those who are dead, rather than to advocate for the police and others with whom I worked. In this study, I advocate for victims in the way I know how, which is not by uncovering and exposing individual culpability but by analyzing and describing the mechanics and mechanisms of rule that help produce and reproduce cultures of fear and violence.

In order to derive this systemic aspect, I relied on the willingness of countless people to participate in the research by sharing their daily lives with me. To provide them with some degree of anonymity, I have changed the names of interviewees, interlocutors, and research sites. In addition to my use of pseudonyms, this book has a few other stylistic features that should be mentioned. In the chapters that follow, extended textual citations are distinguished by the standard indentation, while field note citations are italicized. Field note citations may include my own descriptions, observations, paraphrases of oral statements, and quotations. Direct quotations within the field note citations are always placed in quotation marks. In paraphrasing people's statements, I did my best to provide a rendition of what people said, in the order they said it. In some cases, field note citations have been modified slightly from the originals to make them grammatically correct and intelligible to English-language readers, or I have included bracketed interjections. In both field notes and textual citations, translations from Dutch and Indonesian into English are my own.

NOTES

Introduction

Epigraph: Benedict Anderson (1990c) "Old State," 95.

Epigraph: Didier Fassin (2017). "Introduction," 12.

Earlier versions of some portions of this introduction were published in Joshua Barker, 2006, "Vigilantes and the State," *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Cultural and Social Practice* 50 (1): 203–7.

1 Foucault developed the concept of governmentality in his later work. It may be defined as "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons" (Gordon 1991, 2), or as "all those more or less calculated and systematic ways of thinking and acting that aim to shape, regulate, or manage the comportment of others, whether these be works in a factory, inmates in a prison, wards in a mental hospital, the inhabitants of a territory, or the members of a population" (Inda 2005, 2). It generally operates less through force and more through the cultivation of people's desire to govern themselves and others. See also Dean (1999).

2 The idea that there is a gap between the world "out there" and the world of representations, and that there ought to be isomorphism between the two, is integral to a correspondence theory of truth.

3 The territorial vision is certainly not exclusive to these groups. The modern nation-state is a thoroughly territorial entity, and even at the level

of cities, there are many examples of state actors seeking to define their authority in territorial terms.

4 "Informal sovereigns" resonates because very often such groups take shape within the so-called informal sector, such as among street vendors and others working at the margins of the legal economy, and it is there where their base of authority is strongest. It also reflects a discourse within the institution of the police, which highlights the need to engage with "informal leaders" as a means of enhancing law enforcement and security. However, the shortcoming of this term is that it does not fully capture an important aspect of such parastate power: that it is periodically subjected to, and sometimes seeks out, formalization. The lines between formal and informal are thus shifting, which does not mean they do not matter, but it does mean one needs to keep a critical eye on processes of formalization and informalization and not take these categories for granted. The term "street sovereigns" does not carry this connotation and nicely reflects an aspect of parastate power that is a key focus of this book: its territoriality and the fact that it emerges from the street and spaces associated with the street, such as the neighborhood and the marketplace. Furthermore, the term's ties to street economies and street politics are very often what endows it with its force, even if it comes to take on broader identities based on religion, ethnicity, or political stripe. In what follows, I use the terms "informal sovereigns" or "informal sovereignties" when I am describing the general phenomenon and "street sovereigns" when I wish to make explicit the connection to the street.

5 On the history of this gaze in Thailand, see Winichakul (1994) and Vandergeest and Peluso (1995). On its history in Indonesia, see Mrázek (2002).

6 To take just a few further examples: in urban Haiti, *baz*, a kind of social club of neighbors that can serve as a locus of local political power and help manage everyday infrastructures such as garbage collection and informal access to the electrical grid, while also brokering relationships with politicians and NGOs (Kivland 2020a, 503); in Jamaica, "dons" take on a variety of governmental functions: taxing businesses, policing, assisting in relocating informal vendors, mediating conflicts, getting out the vote at election times, and providing welfare (Jaffe 2013, 2015); and in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, the Amadlozi are based on a form of charismatic leadership; they investigate a wide range of crimes and petty disputes, and hold regular public sessions that function much like a court (Buur 2005).

7 Much scholarship on state power outside the Indonesian context has drawn a distinction between the myth, image, or imagination of state power and actual technologies or practices of rule (Migdal 2001; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). Whereas the state presents an image of itself as an

entity that is unified and all-powerful, standing above and ruling over society, practices of rule would seem to belie this myth. On the undermining of this myth in the postcolonial Indonesian state, see Geertz (2004) and Klinken and Barker (2009).

8 Rutherford (2012) has shown how the authority of the state relies on performances of sovereignty that always run the risk of serving to undermine its sovereign claims.

9 Following the end of the New Order, the media interest in crime has grown, fed in part by a growth in the numbers of newspapers and private television stations. Virtually all television stations now have programs dedicated to crime reporting, many of which are modeled after the American reality television show *Cops*.

10 On the use of *rawan* to describe whole regions of the country during Suharto's rule, see G. Robinson (1998).

11 The modern forms of legibility and visual order I am referring to here correspond to those described by Mitchell (1988, 2002) and Scott (1998).

12 My understanding of the logic of territoriality is heavily influenced by the discussion of territory and milieu found in Deleuze and Guattari (1991, chap. 11).

13 For a more comprehensive discussion of theories of the Indonesian state, see Barker and Klinken (2009).

14 For definitions of deterritorialization, see Deleuze and Guattari (1991, 61, 141–44, 453–56). My use of the term is analogous to Weber's use of the term "transpose," as in the following: "Bureaucratic and patriarchal structures are antagonistic in many ways, yet they have in common a most important peculiarity: permanence. In this respect they are both institutions of daily routine.... The patriarch is the 'natural leader' of daily routine. And in this respect, the bureaucratic structure is only the counter-image of patriarchalism *transposed* into rationality. As a permanent structure with a system of rational rules, bureaucracy is fashioned to meet calculable and recurrent needs by means of a normal routine" (Weber 1968, 18; emphasis added).

15 On the use of figures as both signs and personifications of broader social transformations, see Barker, Harms, and Lindquist (2013a, 2013b).

16 Indonesian law (UU No. 2 tahun 2002) enshrines the notion that policing is the responsibility of all citizens, stating that "the police function, which encompasses the maintenance of security and social order ... be carried out by the Indonesian National Police as the instrument of the state, assisted by society." See also Rajab (2003, 2).

17   Indeed, the government has encouraged the emergence of a private-sector security industry in part because it is easier to regulate and surveil the activities of formal businesses as compared with the activities of gangs and toughs.

18   Since heads of households were generally assumed to be men, this also served to reinforce the tight connection between the New Order's militarism and its patriarchy (Suryakusuma 2004a).

19   In an analogous way, Tom Boellstorff (2007, 37) discusses the "coincidence" between systems of meaning deployed by Indonesian gay publications and those found in broader discourses of national belonging.

20   Population figures are based on 2020 data. See "Jumlah Penduduk (Jiwa), 2018–2020," Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Bandung, accessed August 9, 2022, https://bandungkota.bps.go.id/indicator/12/32/1/jumlah-penduduk .html; "Bandung, Republic of Indonesia," Global Future Cities Programme, accessed August 9, 2022, https://www.globalfuturecities.org /republic-indonesia/cities/bandung.

21   Territoriality and bureaucratic state power share a reliance on masculinist ideology, and this ideology is integral to the culture of fraternities.

22   "Cilengka" is a pseudonym.

23   However, it may not differ that much. Sexist ideologies about women and their sexuality were core features of the New Order state and extended into the social fabric. See Suryakusuma (1996); K. Robinson (1998); and Sen (1998).

24   This is a study of policing in a broad sense, not an ethnography of policing within a particular neighborhood. For a study that presents an account of transformations to policing and informal sovereignties within the context of a specific Bandung neighborhood, see Barker (2009c).

Chapter 1: *Ronda*: The Neighborhood Watch

Epigraph: Robert E. Park (1968). "The City: Suggestions," 26–27.

Epigraph: Marc Augé (1995). "From Places to Non-Places," 61.

Earlier versions of some portions of this chapter appeared in Barker, 1999, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung," 95–127.

1   I've seen other substitutes used, including the rim of a car wheel and an empty rocket shell dating from the Second World War.

2   Following Deleuze and Guattari, consistency here is understood "not in the sense of homogeneity, but as a holding together of disparate elements" (Massumi 1992, 7).