


# HOME RULE

National  
Sovereignty  
and the  
Separation of  
Natives and  
Migrants

NANDITA  
SHARMA



# HOME RULE

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National Sovereignty  
and the  
Separation of  
Natives and Migrants

NANDITA SHARMA

DUKE

Duke University Press — Durham and London — 2020

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*For Santosh Rani Sharma and Gaye Chan*

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My mother, Santosh Sharma, died while I was working on this book. In many ways I've written it because of—and for—her. Like so many of us, she was continuously refashioned according to the historical changes taking place in state forms, and through an ever-encompassing capitalism. My mother was born a “British subject.” As the clock ticked past midnight on the day India achieved home rule, she was made an “Indian national.” That same day, she set out for the Delhi railway station to bring food to those forced to flee Pakistan, the other side of partitioned British India. There she encountered people desperate to flee massacres in India and she offered them food as well. Santosh lived the second half of her life in Vancouver, first as an “immigrant” and then as a “Canadian citizen.”

Denigrated as a “native” in British India, Santosh and her parents strongly supported M. K. Gandhi's nationalist version of decolonization. My father, Kesho Ram Sharma, was a communist and held a different view of decolonization than my mother, but he was enthralled with modernity. Kesho took Santosh to see her first film: *Mother India*, a classic tale of development. He also forced her to have three abortions in order to comply with India's modernization campaign of two children per (nuclear) family. When my parents immigrated to Canada with my brother and me, we were among the first cohort admitted after Canada's “preferred races and nations” clause was removed. In Canada, Santosh experienced racism day in and day out. Beaten by strangers on the street, harassed on buses for wearing saris and a nose ring, she was only able to find employment at a number of very low-paying jobs, from seasonal farm worker to nanny to dishwasher to short-order cook in fast food hamburger chains. Santosh nonetheless made a life for herself and for those she loved: my brother, Paul Sharma; her mother, Maya Devi Sharma; her sister, Kaushalya Devi Sharma, who was denied entry to Canada; her nephew, Yash Pal Sharma; and me. She even supported my abusive father. She learned Punjabi and made good friends across racialized, nationalized, and sexualized divides. She was never seen as a Canadian in Canada. And she never gave up her fierce anticolonial spirit. In one memorable moment, upon watching the Canadian state send in armed soldiers to put down a revolt by Mohawks in Kanehsatà:ke and Kahnawà:ke in 1992, she commented, “Us and

them: same, same.” She recognized the violence against Mohawks from her own experiences of colonialism in both India and Canada. “Same, same” was a vow of solidarity to defeat racists, nationalists, capitalists, and anyone who lords their power over us. My mother supported me in all of my own transformations and taught me much. Thank you Mama.

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## HOME RULE

The National Politics  
of Separation

Let nothing be called natural.  
 In an age of bloody confusion,  
 Ordered disorder, planned caprice,  
 And dehumanized humanity, lest all things  
 Be held unalterable!

—Bertolt Brecht, 1937

## “CREATION, FALL, FLOOD, NATIONS”

The story of the Deluge comes to us from a time of great antiquity.<sup>1</sup> A divine retribution in the form of a great outpouring of waters flooded the face of the earth. In the aftermath of this catastrophe, the waters gradually subsided to reveal a new world to the remnants of a decimated humanity. In the years that followed, the legend tells us that humanity regenerated itself and set its feet once again on the path of a great collective endeavor: “And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech. . . . And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly. . . . Let us build us a city and a tower, whose top *may reach* unto heaven” (Genesis 11:3–4, King James Version). Thus did they aspire together and so engaged in a great work. The people had a common purpose and a shared vision. They spoke the same language, so to speak.

God was greatly displeased: jealous but also afraid. From his omniscient vantage point, he realized the dire threat the builders of the city and tower of Babel posed to his kingdom. Their city with its “tower whose top assaults the

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sky” marked humanity’s rejection of the border between heaven and earth, the very line he had drawn between his own divine realm and the mundane clay from which he had shaped humanity (Genesis 11:9). He saw that they built not to exalt *his* greatness but their own. Their mutual cooperation demonstrated the builders’ “view of heaven as life; not heaven as post-life” (Morrison 1993). Thus, he thundered, “Indeed the people are one and they all have one language, and this is what they begin to do; now nothing that they propose to do will be withheld from them” (11:6).

Thus, God worried, and he fumed. Setting out to undermine the builders’ plans, he knew they would not be deterred were he merely to destroy the tower. Had he not just flooded the world in his wrath only to see them striking out boldly without him once again? Therefore, instead of smashing the city and its tower that daily encroached upon his exclusive domain, God set out to confound their collective project. He shouted, “Come let us go down and there confuse their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech” (Genesis 11:7). He succeeded. The builders of the great city and the tower of Babel abruptly faltered and ceased working together. Their sense of common purpose, the solidarity that had expressed itself in a grand communal imagining and shared labor, was instantly transmuted into mutual incomprehensibility. In this way did God “scatter them abroad from there over the face of all the earth.” By separating people one from the other, God had won. Usurping the creative capacity of the builders, he took the title of *Creator* for himself. Expropriating their productive power for his own aggrandizement, he lorded his sovereign power over them.

The biblical story about the great city and tower of Babel is a very old one. It has been preserved in both written word and oral tradition in many places across the world, well beyond the Judeo-Christian version that is most familiar (Lambert 1969; Dundes 1988). In Genesis 11:9, *Babel* stems from the Hebrew verb *balal*, meaning to confuse or confound and also to mix up. Much as God did when destroying *Babel*, earthbound overlords have separated and disempowered people joined in a collective effort at liberty by placing them in defined and differentiated groups. Done in the name of God, the monarch, the father, the empire, the “race,” or the “nation,” these separations have had very real and long-lasting effects. The group with which one is identified shapes every aspect, great and small, of our world. Our ability to engage in a common endeavor across—and especially *against*—these differences has become difficult to imagine and even harder to carry out. Separation has indeed been glorified.

God has long since been replaced by the new religion of nationalism. The authority once granted to God (and his earthly representatives) has devolved

to the representatives of the “nation,” even as religion continues to play a significant part in some ideas of “nationhood.” In this book, I examine the emergence of what I call a *Postcolonial New World Order* in which people are defined as part of separated “nations” and ruled through the apparatus of nation-state sovereignty, international bodies, and global capital. Established after the end of World War II (WWII), postcolonialism marks the end of the political legitimacy of imperial-state sovereignty and the beginning of the hegemony of national forms of state sovereignty. After WWII, with astonishing speed, the near-global space of imperialism was mostly nationalized. Between 1945 and 1960 alone, three dozen new nation-states in Asia and Africa were granted either a restricted autonomy or outright independence from empires. In the 1960s, the two most powerful imperial states entering WWII—the British and the French—lost much of their empires and nationalized the sovereignty of their metropolises. For those colonized people who did not get their national sovereignty, the demand for it defines their struggles. For many people identifying as Armenians and Kurds, Mohawks and Hawaiians, Palestinians and Kashmiris, their struggles are seen as one of national liberation. In the Postcolonial New World Order, being a member of a nation in possession of territorial sovereignty is *the* thing to be(come). It is an aspiration, moreover, that cannot be named as such, for, to be convincing, it must not be seen as an invention but an *inheritance*.

By definition, nations are not an inheritance shared by all. As Benedict Anderson pointed out, societies organized as nations always imagine themselves as *limited communities* (Anderson 1991). Because no nation encompasses all the world’s people, nor wants to, immigration and citizenship controls become crucial technologies for nation-making (and nation-maintaining) strategies. By limiting entry to national territory and limiting rights within it, these controls “produce the effect of unity by virtue of which the people will appear, in everyone’s eyes, ‘as a people,’ that is, as the basis and origin of political power” (Balibar 1991b, 93–94). The Postcolonial New World Order of nationally sovereign states thus ushers in a new governmentality, one which produces people as Nationals and produces land as territories in control (in the past and sometime in the future if not always the present) of sovereign nation-states (see Foucault 1991).<sup>2</sup> *Territorialization* is a key technology of postcolonial governmentality.

Territoriality, as Robert Sack (1983, 55) usefully defines it, is a “strategy for influence or controls.” Territories are never simply the physical lands the state controls; territories are those lands that states successfully abstract as *state space*. National forms of territorialization transform land, water, and air into the territory of a nationally sovereign state and, in the process, forge a naturalized

link between a limited group of people and a certain place. As each nation imagines that it has its own place on earth, Nationals come to see themselves as the “*people of a place*.” *Postcolonial racism* is the ground upon which national homelands are built. The historical articulation between ideas of race and nation wherein ideas of national soil are racialized and racist ideas of blood are territorialized results in the formation of “neo-racist” practices wherein each nation, seen as comprised of different “types” of people, exists within a supposedly horizontal system of separate and sovereign nation-states (Balibar 1991a, 20). Those excluded from the heaven of national belonging in the actual places they live come to be represented as foreign bodies contaminating the national body politic. They are made into the “*people out of place*.”

Hostility to those who move—or who are imagined to have moved—is thus bred in the bone of the Postcolonial New World Order. In a world of nation-states, national sovereigns have the “right” to determine who their members are. By law, only Nationals have the right to enter the territory of a nation-state. Rights within national territory are formally guaranteed only for Citizens. This works to make the Migrant the quintessential Other in postcolonial practices of ruling. Migrants are made to be outside of the nation even as they live on national territory. Migrants are those people whose mobility into nation-states is regulated and restricted. Migrants are those people who are legally denied the rights of national citizenship where they live.

Through the seemingly banal operation of citizenship and immigration controls, the Postcolonial New World Order not only produces but also normalizes a racism in which political separations and segregations are seen as the natural *spatial* order of nationally sovereign states. In the dogma of nationalism, the believers’ new sacred duty is to enforce the national borders separating them from Migrants. Much like God’s efforts to reinforce his border between heaven and earth, the jealous guarding of the National People of their National Places is seen as a *virtue*, one codified in international law.<sup>3</sup> Nation-states thus mark territorial and affective borders. In so doing, they demand that we choose sides. Thus does nationalism become the *governmentality* of the Postcolonial New World Order, the separation of “national subjects” from Migrants its *biopolitics*, and “national self-determination” its *leitmotif*.

#### POSTCOLONIAL BIOPOLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS

The enactment of immigration controls historically distinguishes nation-states from other forms of state power. Imperial states were largely intent on bringing as many people *into* imperial territory as possible. This is captured in the

Roman Empire's maxim of *imperium sine fine*, an empire without end or limit. Limitlessness through the expansion of imperial territory and numbers of imperial subjects was a key part of imperial projects. "Barbarians," people at the edges of imperial-state power, were declared "uncivilized"—and threatening. Empires thus strived to bring these people (and the places they lived) *in*. The more people whose lives imperial states controlled—to labor, pay taxes, soldier—the more power imperial rulers had. For this reason, James Scott (2017) refers to the earliest states in the Near East, formed about five thousand years ago, as "population machines."

Like all states, imperial states also controlled people's mobility. It is not for nothing that an origin of "state" is "stasis," or immobility (Bridget Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2009). However, imperial states were primarily concerned with preventing people's escape *from* imperial territory. Simultaneously, imperial states also moved people *into* imperial-state spaces across numerous continents and archipelagos, largely to labor or fight for its glory. Indeed, empires developed entire systems of movement, including Atlantic slavery, convict transportation, and the "coolie" system of indentured labor.<sup>4</sup> Imperial-state practices concerning the entry of people into its territories thus operated under what Radhika Mongia (2018) calls a "logic of facilitation."

Nation-states reversed this imperial order by operating under what Mongia (2018) calls a "logic of constraint." Borne from the exigencies of the British imperial state seeking to secure a disciplined labor force in the wake of the successes—and ongoing pressure—of slavery abolitionist movements in the early nineteenth century, by that century's end, immigration controls defined the sovereignty of emergent nation-states, first in the Americas. Indeed, the nationalization of state sovereignty was announced—and institutionalized—by controls limiting both the entry and rights of those who came to be classified as Migrants. Thus, far from a *general* characteristic of state sovereignty, supposedly in place since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, immigration controls became a hallmark of state sovereignty only with the advent of the nation form of state power.

The nationalization of state sovereignty profoundly reshaped the imperial imagination of the political community, the space and makeup of society, and, importantly, the relationship between the state and those subjected to its rule. Nationalist discourses, promising a horizontal (and cross-class) *sameness* among Nationals, institutionalized stark *differences* between Nationals and Migrants. This communitarian basis of nationalized sovereignties produced a shift from imperial to postcolonial racist strategies (R. Miles 1993, 117).



The nationalist process of sorting which people were—and were not—the “people of a place” dramatically bifurcated people’s freedom of mobility. Nation-states largely eliminated imperial exit controls but increasingly regulated and restricted the entry of people. Nationals not only had the exclusive right to enter the nation-state, but they were the only ones with the right to stay. Migrants, in contrast, came to be defined by their deportability (De Genova 2002). Consequently, Migrants were defined as outsiders to national society and its culture—that is, they were made “people out of place.” Importantly, not all people moving across national borders were regarded as Migrants. Nationals of imperial metropolises, and later Rich World states,<sup>5</sup> were not only the most likely to be granted permission to enter other nation-states, but they were often not even seen to be Migrants. They were, instead, “ex-pats,” “backpackers,” “adventurers,” and so on, thus adding to the classed character of the figure of the Migrant.

National borders were not only limits or barriers but also *conduits* for the realization of postcolonial power. Immigration controls created an “environment of life,” one that normalized the fragmentation of a global capitalist labor market into national markets (Bigo 2008, 97). Within each nation-state Citizen workers were seen as having a right to jobs, at least the “good” ones. But within every nation-state were also Migrant Workers who came to constitute a distinct labor-market category by virtue of being defined as “people out of place” (Ng 1988; Sharma 2006). One’s wages, type of jobs, membership in labor unions, formal workplace protections and rights, as well as access to state benefits and services depended on the citizenship and immigration status one held. Thus, citizenship and immigration controls not only produced National-Natives and Migrants, but they also produced highly competitive labor markets. In so doing, they fundamentally strengthened employers’ and states’ ability to exploit and control workers.

A world capitalist system in which nation-states ruled gave capital greater leverage. By the late 1960s, the universalization of the nation-state system occurred alongside the start of neoliberalism. With the addition of new nation-states, the number of competing sites for capital investment grew. Each new nation-state came with the enactment of national immigration controls. Citizenship and immigration controls intensified competition between workers within and across nation-states. The result has been greater disparities of all sorts, perhaps the greatest of which is the infinitely greater mobility rights granted by nation-states to capital investments than to Migrants. Far from being a contradiction, this is, instead, an integral feature of the governmentality of the Postcolonial New World Order.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, national citizenship and immigration controls are, together, the key technologies for the material and cultural realization of postcolonial bio-power. Disputes over their scope and application are central to the continuous (re)making of the national body politic. As new nations and new nation-states form and older ones dissolve; the unity needed to keep a nation intact is continually challenged. New national liberation movements arise to remake the borders of nationalized territory and set different limits to national belonging. Centripetal as well as centrifugal forces of nationalist thought take place at various state levels: municipal, regional, state, or federal. People may demand that they be reunited with their fellow Nationals (but not fellow citizens) resident in another nation-state's territory. People may demand more rights for locals over nonlocals in gaining access to property, services, or votes, even when the nonlocals are citizens of the same nation-state. Or they may demand that the nation-state tighten up its immigration controls to better "serve and protect" the nation. Redefining which people are a part of which nation—and which nation should control which territory—secures the body politic as *national*.

Arguably, with every reimagining of the community as national, a hardening of nationalism takes place, one that further restricts membership in the national political community. Increasingly, the discourse of *autochthony* is deployed to do this work. Autochthonous discourses restrict national belonging to those who can show they are Native to the nation. In a way, such discourses define national forms of state membership with its ideas of sovereignty over national territory. Thus, even though the state category of Native—which marked the status of colonial subjects—was thought to have disappeared along with empires as colonized Natives become "independent" Nationals, I argue throughout this book that embedded in each idea of national sovereignty—or home rule—is the notion that "true" Nationals are those who are Natives of its territory. By restricting the making of claims to sovereignty, territory, and rights to those who are *National-Natives*, discourses of autochthony produce borders even more fortified and difficult to cross than those between National and Migrant. I examine one particularly powerful assertion made by those employing a national discourse of autochthony: the assertion that Migrants *colonize* National-Natives.

#### NATIONAL AUTOCHTHONIES

National autochthonous discourses are a legacy of imperialism. Having constructed a Manichean binary of European/Native, fearful imperial states, beginning with the British Empire's containment of the Indian Rebellion of

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1857, regained control by separating colonized Natives into two, supposedly distinct, groups: “Indigenous-Natives” and “Migrant-Natives,” with the former regarded as more native than the latter (Mamdani 2012). The basis of this imperial distinction was the idea that a primordial relationship existed between a certain group of people and a designated place. Indigenous-Natives, not unlike certain flora and fauna, were portrayed as being “of the place,” further *naturing* them in the process. Migrant-Natives, on the other hand, were portrayed as being subsequent settlers from outside the colony and therefore not *of* it.

Both categories were codified in imperial law so that the two categories of colonized Natives were governed by different laws. These laws, which included differential allocations of land, political rights, and power for people in the two groups, materialized the differences between Indigenous-Natives and Migrant-Natives. Indigenous-Natives were granted formal access to territories and political rights on it through “Native authorities.” Migrant-Natives were not. Such imperial distinctions profoundly reshaped politics in the colonies and informed how national liberation movements imagined which people were *the* People of the nation. Nationalists took the imperial idea of indigeneity as a stable and static group and retooled it to fit the nations they were in the process of creating. With “independence,” the imperialist meanings attached to both Natives and Migrants were relocated to nationalized territory. When the colonies and, later, imperial metropolises nationalized their sovereignties from the late nineteenth century, claims to *national* status were underpinned by claims to autochthonous belonging. Being Native, once the denigrated Other to the colonizer, has, in the Postcolonial New World Order, become the quintessential criterion for being a member of the nation. Migrants, unable to cross the racialized boundary of Nativeness (at least in the places they actually live) and unable to organize themselves into a nation, remain “out of place.”

Placing people into separated categories of National-Natives and Migrants is no trifling matter. People’s relationship to nation-states, to national political bodies, and to one another are organized by the rights associated with the category people find themselves in. Across the world system of nation-states, a further *contraction* of the already limited criteria of national belonging has taken place around the figure of the National-Native. At the same time, an *expansion* of the term “colonizer” has occurred, one that encompasses all those seen to be Migrants. Borrowing the imperial meaning of Natives as colonized people, National-Natives see themselves as “colonized” by Migrants. In turn, Migrants’ own experience of colonization is seen as unimportant—and unpolitical. Instead Migrants are demonized as destroyers of nations.

Today, national autochthony is increasingly important to nationalist projects, both from above and from below. Most troubling, the legal and/or social separation of National-Natives and Migrants animates deadly conflicts around the world. A particularly stark example of this is taking place in Myanmar (formerly Burma), where the separation of National-Natives and Migrants is the basis for what has been termed the world's most recent genocide, this time against Rohingya people (International State Crime Initiative, Queen Mary University of London, 2015). Nation-state officials and popular Buddhist monks categorize (mostly) Muslim Rohingya people as “illegal Bengali migrants” and argue that expelling them from both the nation and its sovereign territory is necessary for the defense of national society (see Foucault 1978, 137; Foucault 2003). Over the past four decades, Rohingya people have had their homes and property destroyed; they have been tortured, killed, and placed in camps; their citizenship has been removed; and a growing number have been forced to flee. Having already been socially *constituted* as Migrants, many have been *made* Migrants both in national law and in everyday life.

Treating Rohingya people as deportable people without rights, Myanmar has constructed approximately sixty-seven camps and moved about 140,000 Rohingya people into them since 2012. Many observers regard these camps as nothing less than concentration camps (Motlagh 2014; Fortify Rights 2015; Kristof 2016). Since 2015, violence against Rohingya people has intensified further. From late August 2017 to January 2018, *two-thirds of all Rohingya people in Myanmar*—an estimated 688,000 people—fled to Bangladesh to escape attacks from Myanmar's military (see Ibrahim 2018; UNHCR 2018). Bangladesh, meanwhile, is trying to force them “home.” Rohingya people are thus simultaneously victims of both the hardening criteria for national citizenship in Myanmar and the intensification of national immigration controls in Bangladesh and other nation-states, which try to deny them a new life elsewhere. Made stateless, Rohingya people have thus been made subject to the coercive power of *all* nation-states.

Another stark example of the political work done by separating National-Natives from Migrants is the popular “Save Darfur” movement, which has successfully reframed the economic, political, and ecological legacies of European imperialism in the Darfur region of Sudan as a racialized conflict between “Black African” National-Natives and “light-skinned Arab” Migrants. Playing directly into the hands of oil companies, this division has further fueled the Islamophobic U.S.-led war on terror in the region. Probably the best-studied example of the violence ensuing from the separation of National-Natives and Migrants is the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, when those

acting in the name of Hutus killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and those Hutus who opposed this mass murder. Such state-organized killings were evident at least as far back as the first murderous attacks against Tutsis by Hutus in the lead-up to Rwanda's 1961 declaration of national independence. From that time on, the self-identification of Hutus as the National-Natives of Rwanda and the categorization of Tutsis as colonizing Migrants was consistently used to violently expunge Tutsis from the national political body.

A not dissimilar process took place in the 1991–2002 Yugoslav Wars. Ideas of National-Native belonging fueled the claims to Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Bosnian homelands. In each national territory, people targeted for “ethnic cleansing” were said to be Migrants and thus foreign elements in the national homelands of others. A total of 140,000 people were killed, with another two million people displaced. In Myanmar, Sudan, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, women's bodies were abstracted as national symbols. Consequently, rape was a major weapon of war used to define national populations (Chinkin 1994; Agamben 1998; Kesic 2002). No one was spared. Combatants on all sides targeted women for either being Native to the enemy or being the Migrant enemy.

These are only some of the better reported—and most murderous—events where the politics of separating National-Natives from Migrants has been central. Organized through a politics of autochthony, each has employed the politics of home rule to exclude, expel, and even to systematically exterminate those constituted as Migrants. However, autochthonous politics have also been the prime basis for the indigenization of numerous African states, such as Idi Amin's forced expulsion of “Asians” from Uganda in 1972; they are also fundamental to military coup d'états unseating democratically elected “Asian” parliamentary leaders in Fiji; and they are at the core of moral panics over “Migrant invasions” across Europe.

The politics of separating Natives from Migrants is also evident in the former “White Settler” colonies. Here there are two very differently situated claimants to National-Native status. *Indigenous National-Natives*, colonized by various European empires, maintain that they are the first inhabitants and “first nations,” while *White National-Natives* claim to be the “first improvers” and “first sovereigns” of these territories. Indigenous-Natives maintain that because they are highly subordinated and lack a separate national sovereignty over these territories, they remain colonized. White National-Natives, on the other hand, rely on Hobbesian and Lockean discourses to claim their own standing as National-Natives. The antagonism between White National-Natives and Indigenous-Natives is evident in deadly struggles over who has the sovereign right over na-

tionally contested territories, a struggle dominated by White Native-Nationals whose claims are often backed by the coercive power of nation-states. Some legal victories have been won by Indigenous-Natives based on national courts' rulings that they hold special constitutionally granted rights. However, for the most part, the long, violent history of their subjugation, first as colonized Natives and now as juridical citizens in these nation-states, but ones who regard themselves as the true sovereigns, continues (see Wiessner 2008).

Much has been written about colonial relations in the former White Settler colonies. My focus is to look at how both White National-Natives and Indigenous-Natives represent Migrants as colonizers. White National-Natives have long seen non-White Migrants as a significant threat. Indeed, the former White Settler colonies, particularly the United States, were among the first to nationalize state sovereignty through their enactment of racist immigration restrictions. What is more novel is how many Indigenous National-Natives, since at least the late 1980s, have come to view all Migrants (White and non-White) as barriers to their own claims to national sovereignty. Indeed, a growing chorus of Indigenous National-Native opinion asserts that *all* Migrants are "settler colonists." Some Indigenous National-Natives have even said that "the label settler is too historically and politically sterile" and that all Migrants are nothing less than "occupiers" (Ward 2016). As the "White" in White Settler colonialism is omitted and replaced by a generic discussion of "settler colonialism," negatively racialized people (i.e., Black, Latinx, or, perhaps especially, Asian people)—each of whom was expressly excluded from the White Settler colonial project—are increasingly depicted as colonizers of Indigenous National-Natives.

Significantly, in each instance of the aforementioned national politics of autochthony, colonization is conflated with migration. In them, real or imagined human migration—today, hundreds, or even thousands of years ago—is seen as nothing less than colonization. Being a "settler/colonist" is synonymous with being defined as a Migrant to national territory. And "colonialism" becomes nothing more than the existence of Migrants in the "nation." This is what makes autochthonous politics uncanny. This is perhaps nowhere more so than when people once categorized as the Natives of various European colonies are now described as colonizers. Sometimes they are said to "colonize" Native-Europeans, at other times, they "colonize" National-Natives in the national liberation states or Indigenous National-Natives seeking a separate national sovereignty.

The conflation of migration with colonialism results from what is a structural aspect of the Postcolonial New World Order. In it, being a Migrant is seen as having no lawful claim to territory, livelihoods, or political membership. Yet



being a Migrant is not only a state (juridical) category but also a social one. Consequently, *anyone* placed outside the limits of the nation can be made a Migrant. Indeed, across the world, there is a strong tendency to move people from the political category of Citizen to Migrant. In this sense, the national politics of autochthony is marked by *nativism*. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that nativism, the idea that “some influence originating from abroad threatened the life of the nation from within,” arose alongside the influence of nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century (Higham [1955] 2002, 4). Nativism became an important political force when states (starting in the Americas) began the process of nationalizing their sovereignty from the late nineteenth century. Today, turning Migrants into “colonizers” is part of the politics of nativism informed by calls to “make the nation great again.” It is not only U.S. President Donald Trump who makes this his central political agenda. Instead, it defines the anti-immigrant politics of both right and left across Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The Migrant is the figure who, National-Natives believe, prevents the nation from realizing its full glory, a glory that many nationalists worry has become a thing of the past.

At the same time, of course, each instance of autochthonous politics is specific to its own historical and social context and is voiced by people very differently affected by imperialism, racism, and nationalism. White National-Natives within the nation-states in Europe or the former White Settler colonies; Indigenous National-Natives (e.g., “Indians” or “Aborigines”) within these latter nation-states; and National-Natives in national liberation states in Asia, Africa, and the Americas each mobilize a discourse of autochthony to make claims to national sovereignty. Yet however much they share in common—and they share much—they are not equivalent.

White people demanding the expulsion of Migrants in the name of being the “indigenous people of Europe,” for example, are not the equivalent of various Indian or Aboriginal claims to national sovereignty in the United States, Canada, or Australia. Nor is it my argument that all contemporary discourses of autochthony advocate or mobilize genocidal violence against Migrants. Indeed, discourses of autochthony deployed by some Indigenous National-Natives, for instance, argue that their national sovereignty is essential to taking good care of the planet, each other, and the generations of life to come.

At the same time, however, there are important similarities in the different uses of autochthonous discourses—and these are not merely semantic. All autochthonous discourses portray Nativeness as an essential, unpolitical characteristic of some people. Autochthony is further understood as a concept helping us better understand social relations. However, Nativeness

is neither an essence nor an analytic tool. It is, instead, a racialized idea and political category allowing some to make claims against others. All autochthonous discourses are also relational. They *produce* Migrants as the negative others of National-Natives. By articulating Nativeness with “nationness” and claiming that only National-Natives have rightful political claims to power, autochthonous discourses count on the subordination of Migrants. This is the case in far-right autochthonous politics, and it is the case of metaphysical indigeneity in sovereign futures of “decolonial love” (L. Simpson 2013). Each type of autochthonous discourse establishes National-Nativeness as the necessary basis for political action, sets racialized limits to belonging and rights, and valorizes nationally sovereign territory. In doing so, each mobilizes particular philosophical, material, and relational ways of knowing and being that normalize the Postcolonial New World Order with its national forms of political, social, economic, and affective power. By so doing, the enormous disparities and violence of postcolonialism is further entrenched.

Hence, I argue that the deployment of autochthonous discourses reveals a crucial feature of postcolonial power: all nationalisms are fundamentally autochthonous and productive of a hierarchical separation between National-Natives (autochthons) and Migrants (allochthons). Across the political spectrum from far right to hard left, the right of National-Natives is the right to home rule. In the process, Migrants are left without a home in this world. The separation of Natives and Migrants is, I argue, both a legacy of imperialism and constitutive of the hegemony of nation-state power in the Postcolonial New World Order.

Having said this, it is also important to recognize that there are *two* postcolonialisms. The first and more widely known refers to the scholarship that maps the connections forged by imperialism(s) across space and time, exposes its contemporary legacies, and politicizes the postcolonial condition extant in supposedly independent nation-states. The second is the Postcolonial New World Order, which I argue is the *contemporary mode and governmentality of ruling relations*. In this view, postcolonial domination, by normalizing nation-states as self-determinative, produces subjectivities that turn us into National-Natives *of* some place, sometimes places we have never been or places we have left to build new homes elsewhere and with other people. Postcolonial theory is enormously useful to better understand the Postcolonial New World Order.

My use of postcolonial theoretical approaches to understand postcolonialism as also a ruling regime is offered as a corrective to the widely used concept of *neocolonialism*. Examining the Postcolonial New World Order allows us

to see not only the legacies of colonialism and the failure of national liberation states to deliver on their promises of decolonization, but also how postcolonialism rearticulates people's dreams of liberation as national dreams *so that they never materialize*. It allows us to see, in other words, that postcolonialism is a *containment* of demands for decolonization. Such a conceptualization is a refusal of the historical amnesia produced by nationalisms. What nationalists willfully forget is that the formation and maintenance of the national form of state power is always already a violent process. People are neither easily excluded nor easily included. The actions used to describe the late-twentieth-century breakup of the former Yugoslavia into several new nation-states—"murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property"—are not unique (UN Security Council 1992; also see Shrager and Zacklin 1994). From the start and the world over, elements of these processes are part and parcel of making "nations" and achieving "national self-determination." Partitions, expulsions from nationalized territory through "population transfers," and social and legal exclusion from the nation are par for the course. They are parts of the biopolitical process of creating and separating those constituted as a "people of a place" and those relegated to being a "people out of place."

#### POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE CONTAINMENT OF DECOLONIZATION

The idea that National-Natives are *colonized* by Migrants is one aspect of the confusion about what exactly postcolonialism is. One of the most commonly expressed complaints—and confusions—about postcolonialism is that the "post" in postcolonialism fails to acknowledge that some people are still colonized, be it politically, economically, and/or socially (Brennan 1997, 2; Dirlik 1999; San Juan 2002; Lazarus 2002; B. Parry 2004, 9). What this usually means is that some people, having organized themselves into a nation, lack sovereignty over claimed territories (e.g., Byrd and Rothberg 2011). This confusion, however, only confirms postcolonialism's hegemony. Embedded in the idea that the "post" in postcolonialism is meaningless is the idea that the end of colonialism occurs when all nations have obtained their national sovereignty. This is a confusion of *decolonization* for postcolonialism.

Postcolonialism, far from ending the violent practices and relationships of colonialism, marks the ascendancy of the national form of state power

and its reliance on nationalist subjectivities, national forms of exclusion, and kinds of violence that nation-states carry out. Postcolonialism is thus, I argue, a form of ruling that substitutes demands for decolonization with demands for national sovereignty. Postcolonialism has indeed ended the legitimacy of imperial states, but not the practices associated with them. Instead, practices of expropriation and exploitation have expanded and intensified in the Postcolonial New World Order. Far from freeing people, then, postcolonialism has freed up *capital* instead. This is not a coincidence, nor is it a by-product of “neocolonialism” with its web of financial dependencies and military occupations across nationally sovereign states (Sartre [1964] 2001; Nkrumah 1965; Amin 1974; Rodney 1974). Instead, like imperialism, the rule of nation-states is part of a global regime of power. However much each nation-state insists on its separation from others, each operates within an *international* and *interstate* regime of ruling.

From the start, the United States has dominated the making of the Postcolonial New World Order. Having nationalized its own state sovereignty in the late nineteenth century with the passing of its first immigration controls (the 1875 Page Act), the United States played a pivotal role in ending empires and establishing the global rule of nation-states. Shortly before the end of WWII, the United States insisted on the doctrine of national self-determination as the basis of a restructured global capitalist economy, which it hoped to dominate. After World War I (WWI), the United States was able to enshrine the Wilsonian doctrine of self-rule in the League of Nations. At that time though, this doctrine did not apply to imperial colonies. Empires were willing to reimagine their metropolises as national societies, but they well knew that extending such a status to their colonies would result in the collapse of empire.

By 1941, however, with metropolitan France under Nazi occupation and the British metropole under siege, Britain was desperate for U.S. help in fighting the Axis powers. The United States seized the opportunity to demand a reorganization of the still largely imperial world to its advantage. That year, President Roosevelt succeeded in getting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to accept the extension of the Wilsonian doctrine of self-rule to the Natives in the colonies. Their agreement was sealed in the 1941 Atlantic Charter. However, the Atlantic Charter was far from an expression of solidarity with the colonized on the part of the United States.

Indeed, the United States could not have been *less* interested in giving up expropriated land (including the lands comprising U.S. national territory). It neither had any intention of ending the exploitation of people’s labor power nor in creating a world without hierarchies of worth and disparities in wealth,

power, and peace. Instead, the United States understood that imperial-state monopolies over their colonies prevented capitalists based in the United States from exploiting these same territories and the people in them. Empires simply stood in the way of the United States becoming a world hegemon. The basis of U.S. support for expanding the principle of national self-determination to the colonies was the understanding that it would gain from the opening of closed imperial markets for land, labor, and commodities. Such an opening would be achieved by the transformation of both imperial metropolises and colonies into “independent,” sovereign nation-states, each enmeshed in an international regime of financial, political, and military ties.

The United States was wildly successful in achieving these goals. The universal principle of self-rule agreed to in the 1941 Atlantic Charter formed the basis for the first major international political institution of postcolonialism—the United Nations (UN). In its 1945 founding charter, the UN enshrined the recognition of the right of national self-determination—or the right to national sovereignty for those people who could successfully claim to being the “people of a place”—as the bedrock of international law.<sup>7</sup> Hostility to Migrants was firmly established in this charter. With its declaration of the rights of nations to self-determination, it would not—nor could it—account for the rights of all those people who were not *the People* of the nation, i.e. those who were “people out of place.” The UN Charter thus stood in stark contrast to how many people actually lived, and certainly in stark contrast to the reality of the immediate post-WWII experience of mass migration. As John Torpey (2000, 123) puts it, “With millions of people on the move in response to the transformations that were taking place, and often seeking to escape violent conflict, the limitations of a system that presupposed mutually exclusive citizenries all of whom were distributed uniquely to one state or another became apparent almost immediately.”

Hannah Arendt had already understood this in her analysis of the post-WWI efforts of the League of Nations. It was the League’s Minority Treaties, she argued, which legitimized the nationalist idea that political rights flowed from membership in a “nation.” With the formation of several new nation-states from the dissolution of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires in the interwar period, it was the League and not new nation-states that was charged with protecting the rights of national minorities—that is, those people residing within national territory who could not meet the criteria of national membership. The signing of various Minority Treaties thus institutionalized the communitarian basis of nation-states and led Arendt ([1951] 1973, 275) to declare that the “nation had conquered the state.”

Just as the UN Charter of national self-determination organized the *political* order of postcolonialism, the Bretton Woods institutions established its *economic* order. Emerging from the UN's 1944 Monetary and Financial Conference, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the (somewhat later) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) together controlled a large part of the international flow of finances. As a result, each sovereign nation-state, while formally holding the financial levers over its economy, also existed within a global field of capitalist power that was far from even. The inequalities of the imperial order were thus far from resolved by the transformation of colonies into nation-states. The sheer weight of past concentrations of wealth meant that nation-states of the former imperial metropolises and the former White Settler colonies reaped most of the benefits. The United States was best positioned to benefit, particularly as it became a global source for finance capital. Its use of \$17 billion in Marshall Plan funds allowed it to dominate the devastated economies of Western Europe. Indeed, from 1948 to 1952, the United States was able to extract agreements from various European states to liberalize trade between them, *including their extant colonies*, thus ensuring capital based in the United States entrance into previously closed markets (Scott Jackson 1979).

The political and economic aspects of postcolonialism were enforced by post-WWII military expenditures. Most nation-states, including those containing the most impoverished people, devoted large portions of their budgets to building up the coercive apparatuses of state power, not a small portion of which would be used against people resident in their territories. Again, the United States dominated. Its military-industrial complex grew alongside its power to influence the Bretton Woods institutions. The bifurcated politics of the Cold War, including the nuclear arms race dominated by the United States and the USSR, cast a menacing shadow over life in the Postcolonial New World Order. The United States insisted that it was defending democracy and freedom even as it toppled popularly elected governments and replaced them with dictators who would implement free market policies and follow the U.S. position in global politics. Conversely, the USSR "fought imperialism," all the while extoling the nationalist "socialism in one country" line, expropriating the land and labor of the people in its "socialist republics," and eliminating (politically as well as corporeally) untold numbers of people fighting for socialism (Carlo 1974).

The "alternative" to the Cold War—the "Third World political project," which came into its own with the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955 (see Prashad 2007)—also failed to support any real transformation of the



social relations of imperialism. While the discourse of “national liberation” mobilized some (but not all) anticolonial movements and oversaw the formation of Third World nation-states, it was also central in turning “classes into masses” (see Arendt [1951] 1973, 460). Speaking for the nation, which was said to unify all classes in a shared project, Third World nation-states tended to support the rural, landed gentry, merchants, and nascent bourgeoisie in their now-nationalized territories. Thus, just as the First, Second, and Third World projects together produced the Postcolonial New World Order, together they also contained the revolutionary forces offering alternatives to it.

Yet in the years after the end of WWII and the dawn of the Postcolonial New World Order, it did not always feel as if one was being contained or conquered by the nation-state. The excitement and sheer joy of living to see the demise of imperial rule was palpable. Postcolonialism, after all, had come about not only through the machinations of the United States but also through the many, many years of anticolonial struggles by millions upon millions of people around the world. For them, the existence of new, seemingly independent nation-states represented the fruition of their dreams of decolonization. The rural peasants and the urban proletariat, without whom the national liberation movements would not have succeeded, imagined that with the end of imperial-state rule and the start of national self-determination, they would finally enjoy the land and liberty long denied them. Their move from the denigrated category of colonized Natives to the exalted category of independent Nationals, they were told, would change everything. Indeed, those who sacrificed much for the national liberation states extended enormous goodwill toward them—and did so for far longer than could have been reasonably expected.

Soon enough, however, the reality of living under nation-state rule failed to live up to the rhetoric of national liberation. Instead, the post-WWII extension of national self-determination to colonized people extended the reach of both capital and states into people’s lands and lives. Because of pressure to “develop,” land and labor became crucial elements in the glorification of national liberation states. The rubric of “modernization” drove—and depoliticized—these states’ emphases on capitalist markets by derogatorily portraying national societies without fully developed markets in land, goods, services, and labor—and without people who had a fully developed sense of either nationalism or possessive individualism—as “traditional.” Moreover, national liberation states “grafted” the discourse of national development “onto local class, ethnic, racial, and religious hierarchies” (Shohat 1997, 4). Mega-development projects and the destruction of the rural economy and resultant urbanization, along with import-substitution policies valorizing industrializa-

tion, expanded the ranks—and the immiseration—of the proletariat. As more and more land was expropriated, by both states and capital, as more and more of the remaining commons was titled as either public or private property, as more and more aspects of people's lives came under the surveying eye of nation-states, more and more people found that participation in capitalist markets for land, food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, and more had become even more of an imperative than it had been under imperial rule (Wood 2002; Wallerstein 2005). This left most people in the national liberation states with little option but to sell their labor power in exchange for the stuff of life. Thus did the global capitalist system expand under postcolonialism.

Unsurprisingly, a pall of “postcolonial melancholia” soon fell over people's dreams of decolonization (Gilroy 2005). It fell first and hardest over those who had only recently been transformed from the Native subjects of imperial colonies into the National Citizens of “independent” nation-states, those who had actively placed their hopes in the same national liberation states now organizing and exacerbating their impoverishment. But a postcolonial melancholia also enveloped people in the former metropolises that had by the mid-1960s also nationalized their sovereignties. Here the nation was no less an alibi for the expansion of the power of capital and states. The melancholic character of the response to the failures of national liberation meant that in both the former colonies and the former metropolises, it was all things “foreign”—foreign states, foreign corporations, and most especially foreign people—that were held responsible for people's misery (and immiseration). This too was fully in keeping with postcolonial rule.

Many people who became a *People* grossly misidentified their feelings of loss. Rather than question the rhetoric of nationhood or national sovereignty, people in both the former colonies and the former metropolises assumed that their nations did not have *enough* sovereignty. In the national liberation states, postcolonialism was renamed “neocolonialism” in a bid to explain why “national self-determination” felt like imperialism, or worse. In the nation-states of the former metropolises, the recurring (and ever shorter) crises of capital were misread as resulting from the movement of people from the former colonies into now-national territory. Migrants were proffered as an explanation to Nationals for why their nation-states failed to deliver jobs and prosperity for them (and them alone). Both of these deflectionary discourses only deepened and prolonged the melancholic response. With the nation-state—and nationalism—monopolizing the political, it could not generally be acknowledged that national sovereignty was *bound* to fail people—both National-Natives and Migrants.

The Postcolonial New World Order was not designed to produce an even distribution of wealth, power, peace, or even prestige. Far from it. Indeed, disparities within this system are only worsening. To put the global character of such disparities in clearer perspective, especially between the United States and the rest of the world, it was recently shown that “an American having the average income of the *bottom U.S. decile* [was] better-off than  $2/3$  of [the] world population” (Milanovic 2002, 89; emphasis added). Another way of putting it is that the material basis for the Postcolonial New World Order of nation-states has not diverged fundamentally from the previous imperial world order. Unsurprisingly, it is those people who are not recognized as a People—the “subalterns,” or those who have had no beneficial part of the nation or its state—who are to be found at the losing end of national hierarchies. National minorities, Tribals, and Migrants are the losers of the UN Charter’s declaration on national self-determination. Their struggles are, at best, seen as a thorn in the side of nation-states, and at worst, as targets for military campaigns for national security. This is true in the Rich and Poor World nation-states.

The Postcolonial New World Order is thus not only a particular historical period (the post-WWII era) or the body of scholarship trying to understand it. Postcolonialism is the governmentality of the international system of nation-states and the equally international system of capitalist social relations. While postcolonialism clearly does not work for most of the world’s people, the largely melancholic response to postcolonialism sustains it. Support for nationalism and for nation-states remains hegemonic across the political spectrum, as national sovereignty continues to be seen as the last bastion of resistance to “foreign” incursions. This is the hegemony of postcolonialism, and its power is far from spent. Neoliberal restructuring has altered the operation of postcolonial institutions such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO, which replaced the GATT in 1995), but it has not altered the fundamental biopolitical foundations of postcolonial power. In fact, the postcolonial politics of separation between National-Natives and Migrants are hardening and expanding in evermore uncanny ways.

A single book cannot say everything about the Postcolonial New World Order with its separation of National-Natives and Migrants, and this one certainly does not aim to be comprehensive. I do not aim to trace the history of postcolonialism and the transformation of imperial states into nation-states—as well as the shift from an imperial world order to a Postcolonial New World Order—through two centuries and through all its various forms and structures in this study. My aim, instead, is to plot the formation of postcolo-

nialism as a new world order and to show its biopolitics and governmentality. Thus, I offer an overview of some of the key historical developments in the formation of the Postcolonial New World Order and analyze postcoloniality in its historical and theoretical context. Crucial aspects of this project are a critique of capital that has long been globally operative, a critique of nation-states that usurp people's freedom to move, and a critique of nationalist subjectivities increasingly insistent on a partition between National-Natives as a "people of a place" and Migrants as "people out of place."

Before I proceed, however, I find it necessary to state clearly that this book is not against Indigenous people, even if indigeneity is historicized and deconstructed (i.e., repoliticized). There has been a long and infamous list of scholars trying to deny and to depoliticize the violence enacted upon those categorized as Natives and to reject their demands for liberty. This book emphatically refuses such a project. This book is not "pro-Migrant" either, even as I also historicize and deconstruct the emergence of the category of Migrant to better understand how Migrants became "people out of place." Instead, this book is my effort to contribute to a deepening and strengthening of a collaborative project of decolonization by making it truly collaborative. By challenging people's placement in the state categories of National-Native or Migrant, what I challenge is the Postcolonial New World Order that contains people's demands for decolonization. In so doing, I challenge the strategy of laying claim to national sovereignty, a claim increasingly limited to those successfully mobilizing a discourse of autochthony. Historically—and today—there is a much broader collectivity opposed to capitalism than the one that nations can ever hope to represent. Indeed, the existence of this broad, global collective is what must be denied so that nationalist and racist imaginations can exist.

#### KEY QUESTIONS

In embarking on a critical discourse of how people have come to be Natives or Migrants, I heed Rogers Brubaker's (1996, 15) warning to remain vigilant against utilizing "categories of practice" as "categories of analysis." Native and Migrant are not natural, timeless categories, even if states and people act as if they are. They are *political* categories. I thus begin with the understanding that Natives and Migrants have come into being—and continue to exist—within a shared and globally operative field of power. They are therefore best examined by situating them in the same field of analysis. To avoid further reification of Natives and Migrants, I thus de-essentialize these political, state categories by historicizing and repoliticizing their construction.

With this as my basis, a number of questions motivate the following chapters. Why is the separation between Natives (or autochthons) and Migrants (or allochthons) important, and to whom? Historically, how were people separately constituted as Natives or Migrants? How much is the contemporary nationalist discourse of autochthony a legacy of imperialism? Is the privileging of autochthony merely a *defensive* position wherein arguments for essential and incommensurable differences are used (strategically or otherwise) to organize against power (see Spivak 1994)? Or are autochthonous discourses *formative* of power and, if so, what political work do they accomplish? And, perhaps most importantly, what would decolonization look like if we rejected the separation—and the political categories—of Natives and Migrants?

In trying to answer these questions, I examine the construction and separation of Natives and Migrants through a critical analysis of both imperial and national forms of state sovereignty, their specific projects of territorialization, and how each differently constrain people's freedom to move. In particular, I historicize the separation of our world into sovereign nation-states and the immigration controls that establish them as nationally self-determinative structures of power. As all nationalisms attempt to turn classes into masses by promoting ideas of cross-class national solidarity, I also examine how global capitalism has been reorganized—and significantly expanded—by the nation form of state power.

In so doing, I join the many others who have taken “lines of flight” away from essentialist, ahistorical, and reified views of social relations and recognized that difference making is always political (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). Along with the mythical builders of the tower of Babel creating their own heaven on earth, I follow the many, many people who have forged solidarity across—and against—gods, empires, and nations and who have worked for a worldly place that is a home for all. While we have not yet been able to turn right-side up again a world where ideas of race, sex/gender, and nation fundamentally deform our ideas of society and self and allow capitalists to “prowl the globe” (Enloe 1990), this book insists that we can. By “we” I mean all of us who are committed to struggles for decolonization. Claiming this “we-ness” is also a political decision, of course, one that, unlike nationalist autochthonies, is borne out of a shared political project, not a shared genealogy or a shared territory. This book urges us to join the many people over time and place struggling to liberate our land and our labor from expropriators and exploiters. Now, as then, a heaven on earth will only be of our making.

## CHAPTER OUTLINE

In chapter 2, “The Imperial Government of Mobility and Stasis,” I examine how today’s growing separation of Natives and Migrants is part of the lasting legacy of imperialism. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, European Empires bifurcated colonized Natives and defined one group—Indigenous-Natives—as both temporally and spatially *static*. Another group of colonized Natives—Migrant-Natives—was defined by their *mobility*. In the aftermath of the British Empire’s difficulties in quelling the massive 1857 Indian Rebellion (or “British Mutiny”), a greater emphasis was placed on maintaining imperial rule through biopolitical technologies. Unlike the direct-rule form of colonialism preceding it, indirect-rule colonialism depended on imperial-state practices of surveillance, definition, segregation, protection, and immobilization. Efforts were undertaken to make each and every colonized Native legible as a member of a distinct and discrete group. Employing racialized ideas of “blood,” Natives placed in one or another group were said to naturally belong together.

The discursive practice of autochthony was key to the separation of colonized Natives. The imperial distinction between Indigenous-Natives (or autochthons) and Migrant-Natives (or allochthons) rested on—and was productive of—an opposition between the “people of the place” and the “people out of place.” Those categorized as Indigenous-Natives were subject to a new imperial regime of “protection,” one that worked to enclose them within “custom.” Colonialism was now portrayed as necessary, not to *change* Indigenous-Natives (e.g., to “civilize” them), but to *preserve* their (often invented) traditions and customs as they encountered the “modern” world (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The governance of Indigenous-Natives through appointed “Native authorities” became the new governmentality of imperial states. In contrast, Migrant-Natives, whom imperialists imagined to be more like them than Indigenous-Natives, were seen as better prepared to be modern and, thus, less in need of protection. I discuss these processes, both their similarities and their distinctiveness, across the imperial colonies of Asia and Africa as well as in the White Settler colonies of the British Empire (what is now the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

In chapter 2, I show that though the White Settler colonies are often assumed to be distinct from colonies in Africa and Asia, practices of both direct- and indirect-rule colonialism were also implemented there—and within a similar timeframe. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, as processes of nationalizing state sovereignty accelerated in the White Settler colonies, new efforts were made to count, control, and contain Natives. Foremost



among them was the creation of “reserved” parcels of land to which Natives were tied. Each existed within broader projects of racist segregation. As with indirect colonialism in Asia and Africa, the system of “reservations” in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were created in the name of protecting Natives. Spatially delineated, each “tribe,” “band,” or “nation” of Indigenous-Natives was nominally ruled by its own Native leaders appointed by the imperial state and, later, nation-state. Recognition as a member of a Native group was controlled by the state through various racialized systems, including that of “blood quantum” to limit their numbers and thus weaken claims to protections upon which the new governmentality of indirect-rule colonialism rested.

This also worked to weaken Indigenous-Natives’ competing claims to territories claimed by White people, who came to see themselves as Natives of these colonies (and later nation-states). The autochthonization of Whiteness was an aspect of colonial rule in the White Settler colonies not seen in Asia and Africa. In the White Settler colonies, an amalgamation of the techniques of direct- and indirect-rule colonialism occurred. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the discourse of “protecting” colonized Natives worked *alongside* discourses of civilization and assimilation. Their coexistence stemmed from the fact that in the rapidly nationalizing White Settler colonies, there were two competing groups of Natives—*White National-Natives* basing their autochthonous claims on being the first “improvers” and sovereigns, and *Indigenous National-Natives* who came to base their own autochthonous claims on having been the first inhabitants and later, as nationalism was widely taken up, the first sovereigns. By the mid to late nineteenth century onward, even as regimes of “protection” were put in place, efforts to forcibly assimilate Indigenous-Natives into the normative practices of White National-Natives intensified. The establishment of Native schools from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries was an especially violent part of this practice, as they operated under the guise of both protecting and “civilizing” seized children.

It is important to recognize the significance of Whiteness as a “possessive identity” in the making of these colonies *as* White Settler colonies (see Lipsitz 1995). Inculcating an identity of Whiteness was enormously effective in ending resistance across—and against—ideas of race, resistance evident in numerous instances of joined struggle by those identified as Native, White, Black, and Asian people (see Linebaugh and Rediker, 2000). Institutionalized in the law, racialized separations of Whites, Natives, Blacks, and Asians, along with the relative mercy shown to Whites by states, consolidated the view that

all Whites, irrespective of class, formed a community. White people thus came to imagine imperial, and later national, territories as their own. As imperial sovereignties were nationalized in the late nineteenth century, Whites were autochthonized as White National-Natives. Ideas of Whiteness thus allowed the contradiction between practices of colonization and discourses of autochthony to be bridged.

In the rapidly nationalizing White-Settler colonies, however, not only were there White National-Natives and Indigenous National-Natives; there were also people classified as Migrants, a category that by the mid-twentieth century came to include Black people moved there by imperial states as slaves. By the late nineteenth century, a nationalization of the White Settler colonies took place. The process began with the enactment of the first of many immigration controls regulating and restricting people's entrance to state territories. Such controls were racist from the start. Together, the imperial government of stasis and mobility succeeded in planting the seeds of national belonging. Former imperial metropolises along with former colonies would by the mid-twentieth century model themselves on the practices wrought by indirect-rule colonialism, namely, the drawing of a highly consequential separation between Natives and Migrants in the nation-state.

In chapter 3, "The National Government of Mobility and Stasis," I show the centrality of the state category of Migrant to the world-historic shift from imperial states to nation-states. This major shift in ruling relations came on the heels of another consequential shift: the end of the slave trade and the start of the coolie labor system. The first immigration controls implemented against coolies by the British Empire on their colony of Mauritius in 1835 was the imperial state's response to planters' demands for a new system of labor discipline to replace slavery. At the same time, slavery abolitionists demanded that workers moving from British India to Mauritius be protected from new forms of slavery. The contract of indenture along with the enactment of new mobility controls for coolies met both demands.

Significantly, the first mobility controls imposed upon British subjects within the shared space of empire were predicated on the discourse of protection. In this way, the later discourse of indirect-rule colonialism, with its emphasis on "protecting" the "traditional cultures" of those categorized as Indigenous-Natives, was *prefigured* by imperial needs to discipline and contain a labor force freed from the "evil institution" of slavery—but not from the imperative of seeking one's livelihood in capitalist markets. Indeed, the Mauritius Ordinances set the stage for subsequent regimes of immigration controls. Coolieism thus operated as the crucial bridge from what Radhika

Mongia (2018) usefully terms the imperial “logic of facilitation” to the national “logic of constraint.”

To demonstrate the significance of the *form* that state power takes—imperial or national—in how states imagine and exercise their sovereignty over stasis and mobility, I compare the first, racist immigration acts of the United States in the late nineteenth century with those of Canada decades later in the early twentieth century. Unlike the United States, Canada, still a formal colony of the British Empire at the time, was beholden to demands by the imperial London Office to not formally restrict entry to negatively racialized but still *British* subjects, in the name of the formal equality among its imperial subjects. I further show how the making of Nationals and Migrants by immigration acts borrowed heavily from imperial discourses of indirect-rule colonialism. From the beginning, Nationals were *National-Natives*. Within ever strengthened nationalisms, claims to nationhood were grounded in claims to autochthonous belonging. Members of nations imagined themselves as the “people of the place.” Immigration controls, first implemented under imperial-state rule to discipline and “protect” coolie indentured laborers, were seen, under nation-state rule, as protecting the National Citizen from Migrants.

In chapter 4, “The Jealousy of Nations: Globalizing National Constraints on Human Mobility,” I show that while most states in the Americas had nationalized their sovereignties by 1915, a fully developed system of immigration controls only came into being after WWI when a wider international system capable of administering the rapidly nationalizing politics of mobility came into existence. In this regard, actions taken by certain states during WWI (28 July 1914 to 11 November 1918) were crucial. The dissolution of the Russian (1917), Austro-Hungarian (1918), German (1918), and Ottoman Empires (1922) resulted in their former territories either being incorporated into other imperial states or claimed as new national homelands. The making of new nation-states depended on the formation of new nations, of course, the making of which was always a violent process.

As it was in the Americas, nation-state formation across Europe and Asia Minor relied on imperial discourses of autochthony. New National-Natives claimed to have an eternal and essential relationship with a particular, imagined national community and timeless sovereignty over a particular territory. The realization of national political communities required that various biopolitical groupings of people be forcibly moved. People who were not part of the People were moved *out* of national homelands, while other people claimed by the nation were moved *in*. Both processes were imagined as “homecomings,” as people in both groups were imagined to be moving to

where their nations existed. Both groups were used to embody the nation on whose behalf nation-states claimed to rule. The normalization of such enormous violence rested on the idea that those outside of the nation were also from outside nation-state territories and were, therefore, “people out of place.” It was in these interwar years that new state categories, including National Minorities, Refugees, and Stateless were institutionalized, categories announcing the ascendancy of the national form of state power. I discuss actions taken by the 1923 emergence of the nation-state of Turkey as being emblematic of this world historic shift in how the relationship between political communities and human mobility was understood.

The very structure of nation-states meant that they portrayed themselves as ever precarious. From their formation, threats to the nation were said to be everywhere. The best-known example of this was Germany after the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nazis) took control of the state in February 1933. The Nazi Party, formed in the years following the dissolution of the German Empire, adhered to racist, sexist, able-ist, anticommunist, and populist politics. They promoted the most limited view of German nationhood on offer and became central to normalizing fascism. In the Nazis’ 1935 Reich Citizenship Law, German citizenship was further limited to people racialized as “German,” loyal to the Nazi regime, and meeting fascist standards for physical and mental normativity. As a result, Jewish people, and later, people categorized as “Gypsies, Negroes, and their bastards,” as well as people said to have “mental and/or genetic deformities” (Friedländer 2009) were made stateless and thus deportable. The Nazis’ planned expulsion of stateless people failed, however, largely due to Allied states’ refusal to dismantle the vast “paper walls” they had erected against Migrants. Refused admittance by other states, large numbers of the Nazis’ victims were forced to remain in (expanding) German state territory. The first death camps were established after it became clear that Nazi plans for their expulsion were not feasible.

In the interwar years, states intensified their immigration controls. Even imperial states imposed new controls on entry into their metropolises (and sometimes into their colonies). However, except for the White Dominions, *imperial subjects* were not generally subject to such controls and retained their relatively unrestricted right to move across imperial territory.<sup>8</sup> Once WWII started, immigration controls were expanded greatly. As the Nazis’ victims (and others) discovered, nation-states across the New World had walled themselves off, while imperial territories in Asia and Africa were officially closed to the entry of nonsubjects.<sup>9</sup> At war’s end and with the start of the Postcolonial New World Order, controls that had largely been portrayed as temporary and exceptional

were accepted as necessary and permanent features of now-national state sovereignty. As it was at the end of WWI, the expansion of immigration controls after WWII was enacted precisely when tens of millions of people across the world had been left dispossessed, displaced, and in search of new homes.

As had also occurred after WWI, in the first years following WWII, “population transfers” were used to establish the limits of national membership. In addition to the movement of people claimed by various nations throughout Europe, the partition of British India into Pakistan (East and West) and India led to the permanent movement of almost fifteen million people: the single, largest migration event known. The formation of Israel as a Jewish nation-state resulted in the forced movement of over 700,000 Palestinian people out of the new state. Roughly that same number of Jewish people moved into the new state of Israel, many fearful of continued persecution in Europe or by their recent demonization in Northern African and Middle Eastern states. With the formation of each new nation-state, new immigration controls were enacted.

In the emergent Postcolonial New World Order, immigration regulations and restrictions became a key mechanism through which inequality on a *global* scale was reorganized. Immigration policies constructed a “global apartheid” of highly differentiated rights, entitlements, and life outcomes, so that one’s nationality came to comprise an international barrier to mobility and to accessing life’s resources (Richmond 1994). With the hegemony of the national form of state power, the practice of human mobility from place to place—occurring since time immemorial—was pushed out of the political imagination. It was replaced with the glorification of stasis. Yet in each and every national homeland were people who were not *the People*. Nationalism thus ushered in the dual—and intimately connected—crises of emplacement and displacement. All sorts of violence, symbolic and life ending, was unleashed as a result.

In chapter 5, “The Postcolonial New World Order and the Containment of Decolonization,” I discuss the creation of the post-WWII world of nation-state rule. This postcolonial world was created jointly by the victors of numerous national liberation movements in the former colonies and the nationalization of the sovereignty of the former metropolises of empires (which I discuss further in chapter 7). The transformation of a world ruled by imperial states to one in which nationness became (and remains) “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Benedict Anderson 1991, 3) was actively championed by the United States and its insistence that imperial monopolies on trade and capital investment be dismantled in favor of national home rule.

This Postcolonial New World Order did not represent a *challenge* to the social relations of imperialism but, instead, organized new modes of managing

now-national populations and situating each one within globally operative—and competitive—capitalist social relations. Postcolonialism thus worked to *contain* the revolutionary and liberatory demands to abolish the practices of expropriation and exploitation most closely associated with imperialism. Indeed, the new international system provided the institutional structures (and force of coercive action) for capitalist social relations to expand. They did so through—not against—the nationalization of states, sovereignty, territory, and subjectivities. Claiming to have liberated people, postcolonialism liberated capital instead.

These outcomes were organized by the key institutions of postcolonialism—the United Nations; the Bretton Woods institutions; the national military-industrial complexes of the First, Second, and Third Worlds; and the international “development” goals for national liberation states. *Politically* important was the United Nations and its founding charter (1945), which declared that people who could make themselves into the People of a state’s territory had the right to national “self-determination.” *Economically*, the institutional arrangements organized by the Bretton Woods agreements positioned national sovereignty as a disciplinary mechanism for the workers of the world. *Militarily*, the Cold War normalized the enormous buildup of a military-industrial complex across the world and shored up national mechanisms of violence.

Yet even as the Postcolonial New World Order was touted as the establishment of a horizontal system of equal and sovereign nation-states, it was both global and hierarchical. Indeed, its organizational structure ensured the intensification of racialized and gendered class disparities within and across nation-states. Disparities within nation-states and across the international system were enforced by national citizenship and immigration controls that, together, produced a global apartheid even more intense than that of the imperial system it replaced. Despite this, the Postcolonial New World Order enjoyed enormous legitimacy. Discourses of national autochthony were key to ensuring this. Postcolonial forms of ruling separated people based on nationalist notions of liberty, whereby nation-state sovereignty was glorified as a form of empowerment.

In chapter 6, “Developing the Postcolonial New World Order,” I discuss how the strong, international agreement on the need for “developing” the former colonies was a crucial aspect of the expansion and consolidation of the national mode of capital accumulation and state power. The paradigm of development rested on a pseudopsychological discourse of “modernization” in which the imperial impoverishment of the now-former colonies was reframed as a result of a failure to develop. The pursuit of a minimum per

capita GNP (gross national product) and a high rate of annual growth by nation-states was normalized. Heavily promoted by new international institutions, developmentalism thus normalized new, national ways of doing capitalism and entrenched the Cold War machinations of the First and Second Worlds on the Third World while doing so. Third World national liberation states, however, were far from passive victims in this process, even as most people they ruled were certainly victimized. Instead, these nation-states posited development as necessary for the *reversal* of the conditions of colonialism. The linking of developmentalism to national liberation became crucial for their construction of an overarching national identity.

Developmentalism, always speaking in autochthonous terms, argued that home rule was dependent on nation-states reducing their foreign dependency and becoming reliant on the national production of industrial and consumer goods and services. This greatly strengthened the fundamental postcolonial binary of National and Foreigner, making developmentalism a significant part of the biopolitical rule of postcolonialism in the Third World. Developmentalism—including state support for the national bourgeoisie—also became a crucial part of how decolonization itself was reframed as a process of economic modernization and not the end of practices of expropriation and exploitation. Discourses of development, therefore, helped to depoliticize newly independent nation-states' emphasis on capitalist markets as well as obfuscate the process by which how nation-states delivered more and more people to capitalism. Significantly, developmentalism, as an always future-oriented aspiration, allowed national liberation states to forever delay making good on their promises of decolonization.

The postcolonial political, economic, and military structures resulted in a world where the cyclical crises of capitalism would affect the lives of more and more people. In response to the crisis begun in the mid-1960s, shortly after the metropolises of the British and French empires were also nationalized, a set of policy reforms called the Washington Consensus were undertaken to reorganize both the Bretton Woods institutions and the policies of nation-states. Named after the agreement of Washington, DC-based institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT—these institutions became more politicized than they already were. Using their much-needed financial capacities to demand policy changes from borrowing states, condition-laden loans (particularly from the IMF) soon became a standard source of national revenue, especially for the national liberation states.

The neoliberal reforms wrought by the Washington Consensus affected nation-state policies ranging from finances to incarceration to stepped-up



immigration controls. Together these secured a shift in the balance of class relations throughout the international system. Everywhere, neoliberal restructuring strengthened the power of capital and nation-states. In the First World, there was a steady erosion of post-WWII gains made in wages, including the national social wage, and levels of labor unionization. In the Second World, workers faced greater control by state bureaucrats. And in the Third World, the pace of land grabs intensified, as did the destruction of the rural economy, both leading to greater urbanization, unemployment, and poverty. Consequently, across the world, there was, simultaneously, an enormous growth in the mobility of capital and a greater effort by nation-states to simultaneously expropriate, displace, *and* immobilize workers.

Yet neoliberal reforms were most often viewed through a nationalist lens. Despite their global character—and despite the fact that class disparities intensified between people within nation-states as well as across this system—“foreigners” were defined as being the “problem.” Nationals in the former colonies and the former metropolises imagined themselves as having been “colonized” by all things—and all people—deemed “foreign.” Demands for nation-states to take action against foreign corporations and foreign workers were (and remain) common. It simply could not be acknowledged that each national economy existed within a *global* capitalist system, one fundamentally based on the exploitation of workers pitted against one another within as well as across the system of nation-states, and one that persistently required fixes for its crises of profitability and control.

Instead, the deep disappointments, disillusionments, and disenchantments that accompanied the growing crises facing workers across the world resulted in what Paul Gilroy (2005) calls a “postcolonial melancholia,” one that led people across the world to believe that their nation-state had simply been hijacked by “foreign capital” and/or by “foreign workers” either in other nation-states or Migrants within nation-states. Refusal to acknowledge that nationalism never could live up to its promises ironically led to further nationalism. Postcolonial melancholy shifted from sadness to rage against all things not-National. The emergence of theories of neocolonialism emanated from such a belief. Part of the “structure of feeling” of postcolonialism, ideas that people had been colonized anew kept the possibility of a future national liberation alive (see Williams 1961).

In chapter 7, “Global Lockdown: Postcolonial Expansion of National Citizenship and Immigration Controls,” I discuss how by the late 1960s the entire inhabitable surface of our earth was demarcated as the (often contested) territory of one or another sovereign nation. The formation of new

national liberation states across Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean, along with the nationalization of the sovereignty of the two largest remaining imperial states—the British and the French—resulted in a world where there was no freedom of movement. Exercising its newfound national right of self-determination—each nation-state erected barriers to the entry of people into its territories. In two tables, I show the strong relationship between the obtainment of independence and the enactment of laws governing nationality and immigration in Asia (including the Middle East) and Africa. In more narrative form, I discuss the same for the Pacific and the Caribbean.

In this consolidated Postcolonial New World Order, the separation of National-Natives and Migrants was sealed. Even as social, economic, and/or political rights of noncitizens varied greatly among nation-states, in none did Migrants have rights commensurate with Nationals. Today, one's national citizenship is the single most consequential factor in predicting how well and for how long one lives. This "citizenship premium" depends upon citizenship and immigration controls (Milanovic 2015). In the Postcolonial New World Order, the global gap in prosperity and peace has shifted from being primarily a difference between imperial metropolises and colonies to an even greater one between citizens of nation-states.

Even so, nation-states cannot ensure that only National-Natives reside within their territories. Not only is this a logistical impossibility—people will attempt to move to where they believe they can live and live better—but regardless of rhetoric to the contrary, nation-states do not see the end of immigration as a desirable outcome. Across the postcolonial world, especially in the Rich World, there is a structural reliance on the *recruitment* of Migrant Workers. The categorization of workers *as* Migrants allows nation-states to use their citizenship and immigration policies to create ever greater competition between workers. Such a strategy works because of the *nationalization of the wage*. Nationals are generally granted more workplace rights and paid more than Migrants. Thus, aside from producing nationalism as a strong territorial attachment, citizenship and immigration policies also produce Migrants as the sort of flexible and precarious worker sought by employers and states. Migrants thus show us that national states do not form a closed system but are part of a *global* one. Indeed, the expansion of capitalist social relations under conditions of postcolonialism—and the consequent growth in capitalists' need for commodified labor power—is one of the main ties that bind not only individual nation-states but also workers together into a global system.

In chapter 8, "National Autochthonies and the Making of Postcolonial National-Natives," after having analyzed one of the two main technologies of

postcolonial power—the globalization of national citizenship and immigration controls—I examine the second: the national discourse of autochthony. I show how postcolonial discourses of national autochthony differ in tenor, are mobilized “from above” and “from below,” and, as the examples I chose show, are exercised by people across the left-right political spectrum. By looking at events in the national liberation states of India, Sudan, South Sudan, and Myanmar; the growing power of “White Natives” in both Europe and in the former White Settler colonies; the Cherokee and Mohawk Indigenous-National Natives in the United States and Canada, respectively; and Bolivia under Evo Morales, its first self-identified Indigenous president, I show that autochthonous claims clearly differ, both in scale and effect, and take on different forms within, between, across, and at times against today’s existing nation-states. The people who deploy such discourses also have wildly varying abilities to institutionalize their nationalist politics of autochthony.

What each of these examples shows, however, is that the category of National-Native carries enormous legal and moral authority precisely because it is a legacy of the autochthonization of political membership first practiced by imperial states. At the same time, postcolonialism has turned the category of Native on its head. Being Native once marked someone as a *subjugated* subject of empires. Now, being Native is to make oneself the subject of “national self-determination.” Today, the exemplary National subject is someone laying claim to being a Native *of* national territory. The imperial binary of European/Native has thus been flipped into the national binary of National-Native/Migrant. Surreally—and dangerously—migration is increasingly portrayed as colonialism. A growing number of National-Natives imagine themselves as being colonized by Migrants. Such claims are perhaps most often made in the former White Settler colonies where there are two claimants for the category of autochthon: White National-Natives and Indigenous National-Natives. However different their relations to the extant nation-state is, both conflate migration with colonization. Arguing in zero-sum terms, Migrant emplacement is seen to cause National-Native dispossession.

This, once again, demonstrates that in the Postcolonial New World Order, the struggle for national liberation is a never-ending one. Many of today’s conflicts, and some of the most violent ones, are represented as National-Natives struggling to oust Migrant “colonizers.” Such discursive practices have only hardened under neoliberalism as the material substance of national citizenship has been “hollowed out” (Jessop 1993). Thus, claims of being Native to the nation trump formal National citizenship.

In the rest of this chapter, I try to understand how it is that autochthonous discourses are plausible—and how they work—in a remarkably wide set of circumstances, ranging from far-right political parties to the movements of some of the most exploited and oppressed people on the planet. Studying how national autochthonous discourses are deployed across the world and the political spectrum allows us to see that their similarities are neither superficial nor semantic—that is, evident only in their shared use of the terms “Native” or “Indigenous.” Instead, both are technologies of postcolonial governmentality. Discourses of national autochthony allow those laying claim to Nativeness to make exclusive political claims to national identity, belonging, sovereignty, and territory. As each mobilization of national autochthony is reliant on—and productive of—the figure of the Migrant, the violence of national exclusions and even national inclusions is laid bare.

I conclude this book with chapter 9, “Postseparation: Struggles for a Decolonized Commons,” in which I argue that the failure to achieve decolonization is a failure of the national form in which liberation has been imagined. National self-determination, the leitmotif of the Postcolonial New World Order, is a form of power that contains and ultimately extinguishes the goals of—and the desire for—a decolonization worthy of its name. I argue that the very real problems we face in realizing decolonization are greater than the existence of asymmetry within the global system of sovereign nation-states. The inability of nation-states to counteract the limits to equality set by global capitalism lies not in the mechanism of uneven development, as the neocolonialism thesis argues, but in the banal, everyday work done by nation-states to ensure that the lands they territorialize and the people made into National-Natives are readily available to capital. A key delivery vehicle is nation-state restrictions against free mobility. Citizenship and immigration controls serve up Migrants to capital looking for ever cheaper and more vulnerable workers, and to National-Natives debilitated by postcolonial melancholia. Looking to national sovereignty as the means to decolonization—and to the National-Native as the only subject needing or capable of realizing decolonization—only guarantees that people will be consigned to postcolonial power.

We need to take into account what was lost by the victory of national self-determination, so that we can do better in our next round of struggles. I believe that a collective and a cooperative project for decolonization is possible, one that can unite Natives and Migrants through a shared refusal to identify with these state-categories. I say this not in some flight of utopian fancy or because of some deep-seated denial of the very real harm done to

people categorized as Natives or as Migrants, but with the knowledge that only by coming together can we defeat those who lord their power over us.

Such knowledge has long been put into action by many people. People who had been colonized, enslaved, and/or indentured together built maroon societies; people fighting against slavery asked, “Am I not a man and a brother?”; pirates freeing themselves from the sovereign power of ships’ captains sang, “All for one and one for all”; Diggers addressed each other as “fellow creatures”; women accused of speaking out of turn declared that “God was no respecter of faces”; and many direct producers organized against capitalism under the banner of “Workers of the world, unite!” Each of these struggles to break the chains of servitude to states and capital was built on the mobile politics of solidarity. People’s shared experience of the terror of expropriation, exploitation, and oppression led to people’s shared resistance—and to shared subjectivities.

Tragically, their struggles were lost. The victors cemented their power by institutionalizing private property, expanding the capitalist mode of production, enhancing states’ power, and weaving an interlocking web of ranked hierarchies normalized by ideas of race, gender/sex, and nationhood. Their greatest victory was the fact that many people experiencing expropriation, exploitation, and oppression saw themselves through these ruling identifications instead of with other direct producers. The acceptance and intensification of the contemporary separation between National-Natives and Migrants is the latest manifestation of such relations of “define and rule” (Mamdani 2012).

In rejecting the Postcolonial New World Order with its separated political categories of Natives and Migrants, I embrace a collective struggle for our common, borderless world. The contemporary struggle for our commons, one that I believe must be both worldly and global, is the latest effort to decolonize our world and our imaginations, another effort to make our heaven on earth, despite the jealousies and violence of those who want to be sovereign lords.

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HOME RULE

## NOTES

### *Chapter One*

- 1 “Creation, fall, flood, nations” is a popular refrain regularly recited by staff and students at St. Julian’s Church School in Wellow, United Kingdom. Many thanks to Alfreda Barosso Taylor, a former student there, for this information.
- 2 Throughout this book, I capitalize the political categories of National, Native, Citizen, and Migrant (and their various permutations) to acknowledge that each is a social and political *figure* as well as a category of states. I use the term “Migrant” over “Immigrant” to recognize that the legal meaning of immigrant is associated with having the right of permanent residency in a nation-state. The term “Migrant” thus allows us to talk about the full range of statuses a non-citizen might be given within a nation-state. I use the term “immigrant” when directly quoting its use.
- 3 The first multilateral treaty on nationality was concluded in 1930 at the Hague Codification Conference. Its basic principle was that each state had the right to establish its own law determining who its nationals are. A number of treaties confirming this were signed after the end of WWII (Hailbronner 2006).
- 4 As the term “coolie” is a racist term, I place it within quotation marks to signify its being problematized. However, for the sake of easier reading, I will omit these quotation marks from hereon in. Likewise, in subsequent chapters, I will place scare quotes around it the first time it is used only.
- 5 I use the term “Rich World states” instead of either First World, with its Cold War connotations, or Global North, with its inaccurate geographical designation. Like these other designations, however, it too is a relational term that refers to those nation-states which collectively experience average quality of life indicators and average standards of living well above those of Poor World nation-states.
- 6 This is true even in free-passage zones, such as the European Union (EU). The EU lifted restrictions against the intra-EU movement of “EU Nationals” with its 1995 Schengen Treaty. However, Schengen simply reorganized the category of “members” and “non-members” of a nascent European “society” by expanding the group of people able to move (relatively) freely and reside lawfully in an EU nation-state other than their own, while constraining the mobility of people at its frontiers. Even so, Schengen is unraveling, as some EU member states reintroduce border controls, while others who are not in the Schengen zone, such as the United Kingdom, increasingly detain EU Nationals in immigration detention centers (see U.K. Home Office 2017). In 2017, France, Malta, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden “temporarily” reinstated border controls (see European Commission, Migration, and Home Affairs 2017).

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- 7 Organized as a body of nationally sovereign states, the UN had as one of its paramount objectives the establishment of an international regime of laws. As stated in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, the objective “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained” is central to the work of the UN (UN n.d.).
- 8 Dominion status entailed a form of semi-independence in government, civil service, armed forces, and treasury. Canada gained Dominion status in 1867, Australia in 1900, New Zealand in 1907, Newfoundland in 1907. South Africa also became a Dominion in 1910. Together, they came to be known as the “White Dominions.” Nevertheless, under the British Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, the British Empire had the power to nullify any laws that contradicted laws passed by the British Parliament. Moreover, the White Dominions lacked the power to pass laws which had extra-territorial effect.
- 9 I use the term “New World” to designate colonies claimed by various European empires across what is now the Caribbean and the American continents and in the Pacific. My usage follows that of Sylvia Wynter, who in addition to rejecting the colonizers’ doctrine of discovery, also argued that, “a New World view of 1492 should seek to reconceptualize the past in terms of the existential reality specific to our [American] continent. It must recognize, as Cuban novelist Alejo Carpentier (1976) indicates, that all the major and hitherto-separated races [sic] of the world have been brought together in the new world to work out a common destiny.” She adds that, “this destiny would entail the transformation of our original dominant/subordinant social structure and its attendant perceptual and cognitive matrices into new ones founded on reciprocal relations” (in Sharma 2015, 164).

## *Chapter Two*

- 1 Although many believed the partition to be a cynical act of divide-and-rule politics, and even though the division was rescinded and the borderline between the two erased in 1911, the initial partition spurred some Muslims to form an India-wide movement separate from that of Hindus (who dominated the Indian National Congress). Indeed, the 1947 partition of British India was carried out along the lines Curzon first laid out in 1905. Indeed, what came to be East Pakistan was almost indistinguishable from Curzon’s “East Bengal.”
- 2 “Zomia” generally refers to the uplands of southern Asia—“from the Vietnamese highlands up into the Tibetan plateau and as far west as Afghanistan”—where “hill peoples” have purposely lived with as little contact with state power as possible, at least until the era of postcolonialism (see Bennett 2009). It was first named “Zomia” by Willem Van Schendel (2002) to challenge official geographical boundaries and proffered an alternative way of understanding the terrain of power in the region.
- 3 In addition to the two categories of French “citizens” and “subjects,” there was a third category of persons within imperial French territory: “French-