

Franck Billé

SOMATIC STATES

On Cartography, Geobodies, Bodily Integrity

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For Valerio and the kids

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Contents

Acknowledgments

The idea of phantom territories that haunts the book grew out of a casual remark dropped by a Russian colleague in 2012 at a workshop about the Russia-China-Mongolia border. Speaking of the territories Russia had lost in its recent history, Viktor Dyatlov used the term *phantom pains*. The vividness of the metaphor immediately struck me. I wrote it down. Over the next few days, then weeks, the analogy kept circling in my head. These early reflections eventually percolated into an article, published in *Environment and Planning D* in 2014, which mobilized the metaphor in the context of the Sino-Russian relationship. For planting the initial seed, I am ever grateful to Viktor.

Northeast Asia, specifically the Russia-China border, was the original ethnographic locus of the book as well as the site of a postdoctoral project at the University of Cambridge (2012–15)—a project that led to a joint monograph with my colleague Carrie Humphrey (*On the Edge*, 2021). While this region still looms large in *Somatic States*, feedback and comments received at conferences in Cambridge, Berkeley, Seoul, and Tokyo, and at panels at the AAA and AAG meetings, quickly convinced me that the argument warranted a more global and sustained treatment. I am thankful to audiences at these events for drawing my attention to similar deployments of corporealized narratives elsewhere in the world.

From what was initially envisioned as a side project, destined to be sandwiched between worthier writing endeavors, *Somatic States* eventually grew into the main event—a ten-year-long book project that accompanied me in a transatlantic move and saw me become the dad to two amazing kids and

one wonderful dog. This book was also a companion in a bit of an academic identity crisis, from anthropology to geography back to anthropology by way of cultural studies, and the final acceptance that the book (and me) would have to sit somewhere between the three. Although several other writing projects ended up intercalating themselves in the last decade, *Somatic States* was the closest to my heart. The "phantom book," as friends and colleagues referred to it, was my baby, a labor of love, one I never tired of. Occasionally I would get sidetracked, but a text or email from a friend (Thank you Adam Levy and Evangeline McGlynn!)—sending me a geobody they had spotted in a book, on a car sticker, or as a tattoo—would fan my creative flames again. At other times, a kind, unexpected email would land in my inbox, assuaging self-doubts (Thank you Alexei Yurchak and Caren Kaplan!) and get me, unknowingly, back into writing mode.

I am delighted *Somatic States* found a home at Duke, a press I have long admired for its vision, politics, and beautifully designed books. Elizabeth Ault was a dream editor through the entire process, always responding immediately to any question I might have, and displaying endless patience as I navigated the pandemic-inflected challenges of parenthood and as weeks turned into months and months into years. I am grateful to the entire Duke production team, as well as my editor Andrew Ascherl.

During my time at Cambridge, where this book first began germinating, I was fortunate to receive encouragements and suggestions from many friends and colleagues. I am grateful to Henryk Alff, Doreen Bernáth, Ted Boyle, Sharyn Graham Davies, J. J. Fong, Sarah Green, Paula Haas, Shozo Hakozaki, Martin Hofmann, Carrie Humphrey, Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi, Laurent Legrain, Christos Lynteris, Nayanika Mathur, Libby Peachey, Ivan Peshkov, Steve Pile, Ed Pulford, Natalia Ryzhova, Tatiana Safonova, István Sántha, Jasnea Sarma, Jonas Tinius, Milan Vrućinić, and Umut Yıldırım for sharing their thoughts and knowledge about other regions of the world. In the later part of the writing process, while at UC Berkeley, I received further intellectual fuel and emotional support from friends and colleagues Alexander Akin, David Ambaras, Arjun Appadurai, Laurence Broers, Rebecca Bryant, Shane Carter, Chris Cristóbal Chan, Jason Cons, Alexandra Dalferro, Maria José de Abreu, Klaus Dodds, Elizabeth Dunn, Ryan Gourley, Bruce Grant, Stéphane Gros, Reece Jones, Sanjyot Mehendale, Lisa Min, Aihwa Ong, Sumathi Ramaswamy, Angel Ryono, Steven Seegel, James Sidaway, Gerard Toal, Jason Weidemann, and Kären Wigen.

Somatic States is dedicated to my family—to my parents and sister, and to the three little ones, Milo, Luna, and Max, who replay, in human/nonhuman

variation, age-old dynamics of sibling affection, competition, and rivalry. It is also, and primarily, dedicated to my husband, Valerio, without whom this book would never have seen the light of day. Book writing is a long and arduous task, as most authors note in their acknowledgments. Book writing is also a task accomplished through privilege, one that requires financial and temporal resources. *Somatic States* was completed only because I was lucky to have an understanding spouse who frequently took on more than his fair share, providing me with ample time to think and write.

Introduction

We don't have a country if we don't have borders.

—Donald J. Trump, 2016 political campaign ad

For most of human history, the border was a peripheral thing, a dusty land of criminality and relegation, a haven for tax evasion and nonconformity. A forgotten, far-flung place. Today, it is the center of the political world.

—Matthew Longo, *The Politics of Borders*

CARTOGRAPHIC ANXIETIES

On April 22, 2015, Indian viewers of Al Jazeera's English TV channel were suddenly confronted with a blank screen showing the message: "As instructed by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, this channel will not be available from 00.01 hours on 22nd April till 00.01 hours on 27th April 2015." The five-day suspension had been imposed on the channel as a penalty for displaying a wrong map of India in some of its broadcasts in 2013 and 2014. The Surveyor General of India, to whom the matter was referred, concluded that a portion of the Indian territory of Jammu and Kashmir had not been shown as a part of Indian territory and that the channel had also failed to include Lakshadweep and the Andaman Islands on some of its maps.[1]

This robust reaction from India concerning the mapping of its territory was in fact not the first.[2] In 2014 the Indian government had already filed

a complaint against Google Maps for an alleged wrong depiction of India's international boundaries. A couple of years later, in what was claimed to amount to a criminal offense, Twitter was accused of disrespecting New Delhi's sovereignty after showing Indian-ruled Ladakh as part of China. Against a backdrop of social media sites showing Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh as part of Pakistan and China, respectively, a measure was envisaged by the Indian government to punish violators with a hefty fine as well as with imprisonment for a period of up to seven years.[3]

Nor is India the only state enforcing strict policing over the production of maps. In 2007, China passed a law forbidding unauthorized foreigners from mapping any part of the country.[4] In addition, all maps produced in China must receive approval from the national Administration of Surveying, Mapping, and Geoinformation before publication, and must include the so-called U-shaped line that encompasses all of its territorial claims in the South China Sea.[5] Many other states—such as Russia, discussed extensively in this book—have a similar relationship to maps and routinely place limits on access and reproduction. At most borders, photography is strictly prohibited.

These forms of cartographic insistence are at the core of *Somatic States*. They speak, on the one hand, to a modern vision of maps as true reflection of, and occasionally precedence over, political geography and, on the other, to an undue focus on edges and corners of the state. Cartographic anxieties are of course not the exclusive domain of India, China, or Russia. But that these massive entities, ranking among the largest in the world, would feel threatened by the loss of a mountain peak, a river island, or another seemingly minute fragment of territory speaks volumes about the place of territory with respect to political sovereignty. As George Perec described evocatively, "People have fought for tiny fragments of space, portions of hills, a few meters of seaside, rocky peaks, the corner of a street. For millions of men, death came from a slight difference of level between two points located sometimes less than a hundred meters apart."[6]

This state of affairs feels familiar, yet such concerns about edges and borders would have been meaningless until a couple of centuries ago. As I develop in more detail in chapter 1, before the modern understanding of territorial sovereignty became hegemonic worldwide, the medieval world was hierarchical and localized. Sovereign power was radial—organized around alliances, networks of patronage, and fealty ties—and frequently coexisted and overlapped with a number of religious and imperial entities. By contrast, the modern state is theorized as bounded and homogeneously operative, thus placing inordinate emphasis on borders and outlines. Its primary analogy is that of the container:

a fixed, ahistorical unit of sovereign space, containing a given society in dichotomous contrast to the outside.[7] As a result, the equation between territory and state power has become emotionally loaded and the logic of the inherent value of territorial control deeply internalized, thus making the control of a forbidding and minuscule piece of land seem worth the bloodshed, economic costs, and political repercussions to both domestic publics and elites.[8]

If the territorial equation of political sovereignty only emerged, piecemeal and partially, after the treaties of Westphalia were signed in 1648, the preoccupation with distant corners and outlying territorial fragments is even more recent. The Siachen Glacier, for instance, embroiling India and Pakistan in a bitter conflict during which over two thousand soldiers have died, had been left unmapped during the 1949 Karachi and 1972 Simla border agreements, on the assumption that there would be no dispute over such a cold and barren region. The Liancourt Rocks (better known by their Korean name of Dokdo or their Japanese name of Takeshima), a group of ninety islets and reefs lying between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago, are an important point of contention between the two countries. In South Korea, the salience of these islets is unprecedented, and there are dozens, if not hundreds, of South Korean organizations engaged in Dokdo-related activism.[9] Featured on countless types of material, the islets are one of the first historic sites a foreign visitor to South Korea will notice.[10] As Alexander Bukh writes, education about their history and environment has become an integral part of the mandatory school curriculum, and numerous public and private institutions have Dokdo-dedicated corners, maps, and pamphlets that explain Korea's rightful ownership over the islets.[11] In a recent survey in Japan, 93 percent of respondents said they knew about the territorial issue, 59 percent stated that they were interested in it, and 78 percent "knew" that Takeshima was "Japan's inherent territory."[12] By contrast, a 1966 poll indicated that only 9 percent were interested in the Northern Territories, and 55 percent had no knowledge regarding the historical justifications for Japan's claims.[13] So low, in fact, ranked the disputed islets in Japanese and Korean consciousness a few decades ago that in a 1960s bilateral normalization treaty, negotiators even considered blowing them up as a solution to the dispute.[14]

GEOGRAPHIC IMAGINARIES

Somatic States asks why borders and outlines have come to take on such symbolic significance, in ways that are often economically and politically detrimental, especially given the current context of an increasingly staggered

and delocalized border management. A number of scholars have drawn attention to this disconnect between a proliferation of border walls, on the one hand, and a concurrent intensification of transnational processes and neoliberal forms of globalization, on the other. In *Walled States*, Wendy Brown suggests border walls have come to matter as symbols of control precisely in the face of an erosion of nation-state sovereignty.[15]

That border walls function essentially as symbols has been amply demonstrated. The strident calls for "big and beautiful" border walls have been central to populist narratives of taking back control in the United States and elsewhere, even if these are largely empty promises. In the United States the border wall is largely ineffective, given that the majority of illegal migrants enter the country legally and overstay their visas. If the construction of a border wall, costing millions of dollars, suggests a strong political will to stem the flow of immigration, the fact that there are no controls in place to monitor lapsed visas and virtually no financial deterrents for employers of illegal immigrants directly undermines political narratives outwardly tough on immigration. Further, most immigrants to the United States, including refugees, do not enter at the US-Mexico border and come from countries other than Central America, yet the southern border looms large as a political, economic, and cultural fault line. Donald Trump's "beautiful wall" resonates with voters because it is easy to visualize and very much in line with a geopolitical imagination that codes Mexico as a source of danger.[16]

Where Brown's argument is less convincing is in her claim that we are witnessing an erosion of nation-state sovereignty. Of course, the publication of her book precedes many events that have upended assumptions held about the state and the evolution of the international order, such as the Brexit vote, the further proliferation of border walls, or the election of a new crop of populist leaders preaching protectionism and national enclosure. These political developments speak to the enduring, overwhelming place of the state (and more precisely of the nation-state, unpacked below) in the political imaginary. The state, Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat already asserted at the turn of the century, "institutionalized in the international state system after 1945," remains "the globally most powerful idea of political order in the twentieth century" and is "pivotal in our very imagination of what a society is."[17] Contrary to suggestions that global linkages have weakened its position, the state remains the dominant vector of political power in the world.[18] Indeed, as John Agnew has argued, the two logics of state territoriality and global finances are not necessarily in opposition.[19] Russia's war on Ukraine, waged through both traditional forms of warfare and new technologies such

as fake news, cyberattacks, and electronic terraforming, demonstrates that the logics of spatial expansionism and territorial domination have not been displaced.[20] Assertions that we are moving toward an erosion of the state bespeak "an almost unbelievable naivety."[21] Far from being an "etiolated entity," the state retains control over "much of what exists, politically, economically, juridically, and territorially as well as biologically, environmentally, and . . . conceptually."[22]

Deeply embedded in institutions, the state is "universally taken for granted as the natural unit of analysis in geopolitics and political life."[23] It has co-opted our spatial imaginations, in ways that we accept uncritically.[24] As Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen have argued, our thinking about space is framed by what they term a *metageography* that organizes "studies of history, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, or even natural history." Categories such as continents and states guide our "basic conceptions of the natural world" to the extent that we talk of African wildlife, for instance, "as if it constituted a distinct assemblage of animals" and of states, no matter how internally divided they might be, as distinct and comparable units of analysis.[25] This framing of political and cultural space dominates the thinking of diplomats, journalists, politicians, and military strategists, but also informs "the highest levels of academic discourse."[26] It structures research questions, observations, and results in academic disciplines, thereby reinforcing further the reification of the state as a clearly delineated entity.[27] This "methodological statism," embedded in cultural studies and transnational migration studies, renders largely invisible those phenomena that take place outside of the statist imaginary, such as conflicts between states and insurgent groups.[28]

The vast and growing field of border studies has sought to shed a light on local conceptions of space in state interstices and emphasize the realities of cross-border exchange in social, familial, and commercial exchanges. Anthropology in particular has been attentive to giving voice to migrants, to the excluded, and to the displaced. While recognizing the crucial ethical significance of this endeavor, it is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of the world population lives within the borders of the state in which they were born and that this shapes their worldviews and attachments.[29] On one of my field sites, in the Russian border town of Blagoveshchensk, though only a stone's throw from China's economic powerhouse, locals routinely describe themselves as living in a remote location, on the edge of the polity. Moscow, thousands of miles away, remains for them the ultimate reference point.[30] Even in the case of the comparatively porous US-Canada border, the presence of the border has a structural effect, and two distant Canadian provinces will

trade more with each other than with US states bordering them.[31] Borders may be human-made and comparatively recent, but the spatial imaginary they project shapes nonetheless a sense of distance and proximity as well as a sense of self.

Intersecting with the work of scholars such as Timothy Mitchell, Rebecca Bryant, Yael Navaro, Sumathi Ramaswamy, and others, *Somatic States* is concerned with these state imaginaries. As I discuss in the book, the strident calls for taller and more secure border walls are symptomatic of a broader insistence on demarcations and territorial integrity. In the Russian Far East, for residents of closed towns and border exclusion zones, it can feel like being utterly cut off from the world insofar as visits from outsiders are restricted and regulated, making it impossible to open a business, for example. But being a resident in a restricted zone nonetheless confers special status from which to derive pride: membership in a special entity in an otherwise homogeneous national space and a proactive role to play in the protection of the sacredness of boundaries.[32] Similarly, on the US-Mexico border in South Texas, polls carried out prior to the construction of the border wall showed a majority of US residents were in favor of it, in spite of the infrastructural issues this would cause.[33] For these two communities as well as for many others discussed in the book, striving toward an isomorphic relation between the physical and the cartographic feels crucial.

State imaginaries are in this sense anything but abstract. As Timothy Mitchell has persuasively argued, the state may be a common ideological and cultural construct, but the institutions and practices that cohere around it will have nonetheless strong structural effects. In particular, the political and social practices of border management (such as barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspections, currency control, etc.) help manufacture the nation-state—the idea that a distinct human community, or nation, shares the same territory as the state—as "an almost transcendental entity," as a structure that contains and gives order and meaning to people's lives.[34] State practices also have an incremental effect. In spite of their initially arbitrary location—the outcome of historical circumstances—borders eventually come to acquire a material quality. Political borders are as a result some of the few human-made processes visible from space, with agricultural activity and animal herding practices accruing incrementally into stark distinctions on the landscape. China's deforested and densely populated regions thus contrast with Russia's and Kazakhstan's uninhabited and underused lands, and Guatemala's intense deforestation practices compared to Belize's show the two countries in completely different colors, while part of the Egyptian-Israeli

desert appears as two different shades of yellow as a result of trampling by people and their cattle on the Egyptian side.[35]

I argue in part I of the book that the imaginary of the state as a discrete, bounded entity with a unique outline has emerged out of two dramatic developments. The first one, detailed in chapter 1, is the evolution of cartographic practices that led to the central positioning of the map as support of the European national project and as core spatial metaphor denoting organization of knowledge. The second sea change, analyzed in chapter 2 and retraced briefly in the next section below, occurred through the corporeal deployment of sovereignty, with a shift from the body of the sovereign to that of the citizen.

The activity of mapping has frequently been described as an enduring human instinct, but as Matthew Edney reminds us, maps as we understand them today only developed after around 1800. In fact, the words *cartography* and *cartographer* did not exist until then, demonstrating that cartography is not a universal and transcultural endeavor.[36] It is also important, he argues, to dissociate the terms *mapping* and *cartography*—the former denoting what people do, and the latter what people think they do—lest we confuse "personal, cognitive acts with social, semiotic acts."[37] As I retrace in chapter 1, the history of cartography emerged out of a particular context of nationalism, namely the need of European governments to know and control their territory, but it was also an indirect product of the Scientific Revolution with its emphasis on quantification and measurement. Thus it was out of a specific convergence and coproduction of social, historical, intellectual, and political developments that maps gained such prominence and became hegemonic. This convergence helps account for the fact that while the "mapping impulse" was primarily European and helped disseminate a "model of territorial statehood and state-centered political economy from Western Europe into the rest of the world," modern maps also arose independently elsewhere, notably in East Asia.[38]

Further, that modern cartographic practices emerged in Europe and propagated throughout the rest of the world largely through empire and colonization should not lead to the assumption that cartography and the West are two coextensive fields. While Westerners certainly saw their own cartographic practices as superior to the seemingly "non-geometrical maps of colonized peoples," marking the latter as "innately irrational and therefore properly subject to Western rule," I highlight in the course of the book the multiple ways in which Western practices continue to be informed by premodern views.[39] If medieval European maps included religious symbolism such as the presence of heaven and hell, or were organized as a representation of

the body of Christ, the scientific maps produced in the Renaissance retained much nonscientific symbolism. As I explore in chapter 2, they also remained heavily suffused with body imagery, replacing the body of Christ with that of the sovereign, before gradually morphing again toward an equation of national territory and the body of the citizen.

Modern cartographic practices, both in Europe and elsewhere, led to new visuals of political geography. No longer polycentric and comparatively fluid, the state gradually solidified into its contemporary bounded form, its frontiers hardening into borders. These clearer demarcations were prompted by the need of rulers to gain a fuller knowledge of their territory and were greatly aided by surveying endeavors that facilitated the emergence of homogenization of territorial authority. The most comprehensive of these efforts, by far, was Great Britain's Ordnance Survey County Series, begun in the 1840s, which mapped the counties of Great Britain at both six-inch and twenty-five-inch scales with accompanying acreage and land use information.

Compounded by the eighteenth-century fascination with atlases, these surveys helped citizens visualize the country to which they belonged and familiarize them with a particular state outline. While it took comparatively longer for people living in borderlands to identify with a notional state, the visual force of the state's contour eventually took hold.[40] This logomap, in Benedict Anderson's felicitous phrasing, ultimately became a pure sign. Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, and infinitely reproducible, the logomap penetrated deep into the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem—including "for the anticolonial nationalisms being born."[41] Testament to the prominence of these visuals, the world's first jigsaw puzzle, designed by cartographer John Spilsbury in 1766, was a puzzle called Europe Divided into Its Kingdoms.

I argue in this book that the logomap has become the primary visual support for the idea of the nation-state, well ahead of the census and the museum, which Anderson saw as the other two primary components of a grammar of nationhood.[42] Given the increasing complexity of political and economic entanglements on a global scale, the logomap might strike us as indexical of a moribund worldview. Yet, if certainly anachronistic in its imaginary, I argue in this book that it is timely in its impact precisely because of its simplicity. In fact, the logomap remains ubiquitous, both for emerging states that need reiteration of the outline for international recognition and domestic instruction, and for old states whose contours have grown icon-like.[43] It functions in this sense, Madeleine Reeves writes, as a symbol analogous to the flag, the

coat of arms, or the effigy of the president: "to be viewed and committed to memory rather than carried or used."[44]

Reeves contrasts the logomap with maps used for navigation, which, especially in the post-Soviet context in which she works, are "rare and may be regarded with suspicion."[45] This suspicion extends well beyond the former Soviet Union and other authoritarian contexts. US law stipulates, for instance, that Google show certain parts of Israel/Palestine at low resolution, while many other areas of the world are deliberately censored.[46] While these restrictions are largely motivated by security reasons, the symbolism of the map is such that it is perceived to exist at a higher level of reality. The map does not simply denote a state's sovereignty, *it is that sovereignty*.[47] It is similar in this sense to the national flag whose desecration might be subject to criminal charges, fines, and/or imprisonment.[48] A map, and particularly a logomap, also holds the power to summon alternative sovereignties. Just as brandishing the flag of an unrecognized entity, a breakaway province, or a colonized country can be perceived as an offense against the integrity of a state, the use of an alternative logomap might be viewed as political and territorial separatism.[49] As the national map stands in for the sacred nation, Timothy Brook writes, "more real in some ways than the nation itself, a regime anxious about its legitimacy cannot afford to let it out of its sight."[50]

The symbolism previously contained in the body of the sovereign has now been displaced and sublimated into the body of the nation through its graphic representation. If earlier the body of the monarch was treated as a fetish, with a physical attack constituting the highest possible treason, the loss of territory, through marriage of descendants for instance, was not perceived as a threat to sovereign power. Today, by contrast, the shift of a boundary or the loss of an inch of territory places a state's entire legitimacy at risk.[51] The logomap thus represents nothing less than a state's physical integrity, reverberating the earlier symbolism contained in the body of the sovereign. More than just a logo, then, it operates as a fetish. The statement of the US clothing company Gap, responding to the outcry that followed the design of a map of China on one of their T-shirts that left out Taiwan, makes this manifest. In its apology, the company stated that the product had been "recalled from the Chinese market and *completely destroyed*."[52] Its removal was not sufficient—its mere physical existence was deemed a threat that required its obliteration. Upending philosopher Alfred Korzybski's famous statement that "the map is not the territory," I argue in chapter 1 that the map has in fact become the territory itself.[53]

CORPOREAL GEOGRAPHIES

If the contemporary focus on edges and remote corners has become hegemonic (I return to the question of hegemony and to its limitations in the next section), another ubiquitous component of cartographic anxieties is its strong corporealization. From military attacks conceptualized as rape, to territorial loss described as mutilation and dismemberment, and to narratives mobilizing corporeal terms such as strangulation, illness, death, and various others, chapter 2 analyzes the metaphoric constellations that tie the state and the body together.[54] Building on the foregoing discussion about the transformation of political space from a centrifugal, hierarchical, and labile spatial formation to one that is territorially bounded and homogeneously distributed, chapter 2 traces the shift of an imaginary of the nation-state initially equated with the body of the sovereign to a state outline and body of the citizen having become metaphorically coextensive. If anthropomorphic and zoomorphic maps, popular in the nineteenth century, emerged at a time when it was crucial to stage the nation-state as a natural and organic entity, I argue that modern representations have become more sophisticated, yet organic metaphors continue to undergird the concept of nation-state. In parallel with sedimented corporeal analogies such as "head of state" or "organs of the state," new somatic metaphors continually emerge in lexical coinages, in line with new understandings and conceptualizations of the body, such as "national DNA," for instance, which has gained much currency in the last two decades—with significant repercussions for understandings of nativeness and belonging.[55] Mark Neocleous also provides a slew of examples of headlines published in the space of a few months in 2018 and 2019 where the concept of "nervous breakdown" was applied to Brexit Britain, Spain, China, Russia, Australia, and Ireland, among others.[56] This suggests that, while organic narratives might strike us as quaint if not dangerous in their association with racism, the body continues to act as a potent source of analogies to think of the state, notably to discuss territorial loss and unshapely or fragmented territory. In the second part of *Somatic States*, I explore in particular the concepts of phantom pains, territorial prosthetics, and the idea of the monstrous body as points at which imaginaries of the state and imaginaries of the body fruitfully intersect. Exploring these conceptual overlaps helps lay bare the myriad assumptions we continue to hold about both the state and the body, and opens up potential spaces for reconceptualization.

Leveraging ethnographic cases from both within and beyond the Euro-American region, I show that the mobilization of somatic analogies, in places

as diverse as Thailand, India, or Mongolia, has turned the potent melding of corporeality and nationhood into a truly global narrative. Many of these similarities in the corporealization of political space find their origins in the history of European colonization, which provided a political grammar of sovereignty. To be recognized as a sovereign state, it was essential for postcolonial and non-Western states to be perceived as commensurably modern. This required adopting and projecting an organic view of the state bounded by unambiguous borders and administered up to its territorial limits—a trajectory traced very nicely by Thongchai Winichakul in the context of Thailand.[57] Unavoidably, hegemonic nationalist discourse expressed in corporeal metaphors has overridden, and alloyed with, a rich tapestry of indigenous conceptualizations of place and sovereignty. Corporeal deployments thus all have different lexical lineages and cultural reverberations. Accounts from Tibet, India, and China show, for instance, a frequent overlay of deities and other celestial bodies onto the land through a host of bodily metaphors, allegories, and similes that are unique to each place. The example of the nation shaped as a mother goddess that Sumathi Ramaswamy discusses in her work is thus specific to India yet taps into a body/territory analogy that makes it immediately recognizable to individuals from other cultural contexts.[58]

I contend in chapter 2 that the ease and rapidity with which this global shift occurred suggests that an interpretation narrowly focused on colonialism or formal education is inadequate and that there is something else at play. George Lakoff and other cognitive linguists have argued that metaphors are largely preconceptual and precultural, and that they are not found in random assemblages but come prepackaged in larger metaphoric constellations founded on experiential gestalts. Metaphors thus rely on family resemblances, and on a semantic grid that is both systematic and coherent.[59] It is of course critical to bear in mind that metaphors are contextual pieces of discourse and therefore not always decoded in the same way. Metaphors come embedded in particular historical and cultural narratives, are uttered by individuals with specific positions of power and authority, and their evocative power thus ultimately depends on geopolitical, social, and economic contexts.

Nonetheless, without losing sight of the danger of overextending the value of metaphors, which can certainly flatten and obfuscate differences, I make the case that these globalized metaphoric narratives share sufficient overlaps to be analyzed as a single phenomenon. An important reason for doing so is because metaphors are much more than ornamental rhetorical devices and serve an indispensable communicative function.[60] Individuals make sense of the world in figurative terms such as metaphors and metonymies because

these underlie the way we think, reason, and imagine, and are also the "main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning."[61]

Importantly, metaphors are not simply descriptive or interpretive but also generative devices in that they shape societal understandings and have political effects. The choice of one metaphor over another can have dramatic impacts and repercussions. Metaphors can also obscure and sanitize, as in the context of battle and occupation analogized as urgent medical interventions.[62] Once established and sedimented, metaphors become invisible and thereby gain additional potency. These metaphors become "sticky," and it then becomes extremely difficult to think of those concepts otherwise.[63] *Somatic States* argues that the metaphor of the state as an organic and bounded entity constitutes such a case.

Laura Kurgan writes that maps are like "extensions" of ourselves, as omnipresent as utilities such as electricity, water, gas, telephone, or television. What she has in mind is that maps have become infrastructural, like other forms of media.[64] But her statement also gestures toward a corporeal entanglement of people and maps. As I unpack in chapter 2 and then flesh out through the rest of the book, the numerous metaphors and discursive parallels used to speak of the state are likely to have emerged out of a corporeal experience. Cognitive linguists and anthropologists have persuasively argued that the concepts of top, bottom, left, right, inside, and outside are first learned in terms of the body and then extended to the wider environment.[65] Measurement terms in the English language take the body as primary model—again, an ostensibly universal trait—using hands and feet, or the yard (the length from the nose to the fingers at the end of an outstretched arm) to apprehend the environment. The world of tools, Susan Stewart remarked, is similarly "a world of handles, arms, blades, and legs."[66]

The synecdochic relationship between the margins of the human body and the boundaries of the social that Mary Douglas famously theorized has led to a situation whereby body and state are imagined to be commensurable if not wholly isomorphic.[67] At the core of this isomorphism is the organic coding of the logomap as geobody—a concept Winichakul coined in his analysis of Thailand's transformation into a modern nation-state and which rapidly established itself as a valuable paradigm to trace the affective presence of the state in a host of contexts outside of its original deployment.[68] Conceptualized as an organic entity, the state-as-geobody taps into the cognitive undercarriage that embeds individuals in their environment, thereby facilitating a view of the logomap as a natural extension of the individual's body.

As various scholars have noted, there is of course nothing intrinsically organic or corporeal about the logomap, whose existence is recent and the notion of which would have been meaningless before the emergence of the modern cartographic imagination.[69] In fact, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political imagery employed human and animal images to emphasize the naturalness of the cartographic state, suggesting that the linkage needed to be made explicitly.[70] As I detail in chapter 2, such visual practices were commonly used for a host of nascent states in Europe as well as in India, Turkey, the United States, and elsewhere, and they continue to be employed in postsocialist states like Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the former Yugoslavia.[71]

These visuals have proven crucial to foster and nurture state-bound attachments. Intertwined in organic metaphors and symbols such as national fauna and flora, the arbitrary and historically contingent boundaries of the state have become naturalized, hinting at a teleological destiny. In fusing together the territorial state and the people—indeed confusing one for the other, with *nation* and *state* often used interchangeably—organic metaphors have also helped birth the myth of the nation-state.[72] The notion that the two are coextensive, although this is rarely if ever the case, has proven very potent in bolstering the spatialization of the modern state as container. In addition, the figure of the logomap made possible an "affective identification with a bounded, defined political community."[73] As Benedict Anderson and others have emphasized, nationalism may be operationalized around an imagined community, but this does not make it an abstract concept. On the contrary, it is experienced as vividly present, a viscerally felt reality.[74]

While nationalism's very potency has been useful to elites and purposely promoted by them, there are dangers inherent to viewing it simply as a narrative foisted upon a hapless populace as a tool of control and domination. Alexander Bukh points out that appeals to certain ideals and norms by those he terms "national identity entrepreneurs" may simply be rhetorical resources concealing other mundane interests, and this rings true for many in the new crop of populist leaders who have emerged globally in the last decade or so.[75] Nevertheless, the top-down approach this suggests is partial and thus not particularly helpful. Scholars of nationalism have shown that the national state in which we are born leaves a strong imprint on all its citizens, the majority of whom "will retain a quiet loyalty" to their respective nation.[76] This includes, as noted above, individuals framing political and academic discourse, such as military strategists, diplomats, and academics.[77] Placing them outside of, and largely immune to, nationalist discourse is thus quite misleading.

Somatic States argues that a potentially manipulative behavior in fact takes nothing away from the very visceral way in which the message is received. Examples abound of popular sentiments, once roused, exceeding government policies in terms of territorial ambition and revanchism.[78] The case of Russia's current war on Ukraine is in this sense quite telling. Vladimir Putin's goals may have been geopolitical in nature, prompted by access to the Black Sea, natural resources, territorial expansion, and a longing to emerge from the humiliation of post-Soviet collapse, but the affect-laden official narrative—reconstituting the Russian nation, correcting border errors, and rescuing fellow Russians—has clearly reverberated very powerfully for his constituents. The war on Ukraine was "emotionally comprehensible" in ways that an attack on another lost Soviet territory, like the much larger Kazakhstan, would not have been. Ukraine's history is deeply enmeshed with Russia's, the two nations, along with Belarus, claiming the Kyivan Rus' Kingdom (882–1240) as their cultural ancestor. In consequence, despite gaining its independence thirty years ago, Ukraine has never felt quite foreign to most Russians. More crucially, Ukraine is also part of many Russians' personal geographies—the birthplace of family members and, in the case of Crimea in particular, a "beloved vacation spot that held happy memories" for generations of Russians.[79]

Ukraine evokes what I call territorial phantom pains—an enduring affective resonance for a loss that remains incompletely mourned. Lost territories are no longer included within the national body, and this new spatial configuration is made unequivocal through visual reiterations of a new logomap. However, as part of a previous national incarnation, they remain subject to sudden reactivation, as was indeed seen with Ukraine, taking much of the world by surprise. The ease with which Vladimir Putin was able to awaken this dormant affect is here again testament to the potency of a corporealized view of national territory. The reintegration of Ukraine into Russia's mutilated geobody, without which Russia was merely a stump (*obrubok*) of its former Soviet self, was clearly perceived to be worth the risks of international criticisms, economic sanctions, and potential military retaliation. These events may also presage flare-ups elsewhere in the region as phantoms reactivate, including in contexts where governments are attempting to rein in popular imaginaries around territorial loss.[80] In the specific case of Ukraine, it seems likely that the military decisions of Putin himself were to a large extent the outcome of affective calculations, notably his strong belief that Russia had been wronged and that the collapse of the Soviet Union had been nothing less than a historical catastrophe. This demonstrates once again the capacity of

imaginaries to shape the political world in ways that span the entire political spectrum, encompassing both political actors and their putative audiences.

Anthropologists Mateusz Laszczkowski and Madeleine Reeves have argued that studies of the state need to remain attentive to visceral, prelinguistic, unsettled moments of intensity. *Unsettled* does not mean unmoored or free-floating. Indeed, they clarify that this attention to affect "does not necessarily entail a displacement of considerations of history or of power and inequality."[81] Affect ultimately filters through a historical, social, and cultural context. Thus, Emma Hutchison notes, if it constitutes a "visceral force that influences political thinking in a diffuse yet analytically inaccessible way," affect traces intensities that defy or escape deliberate reflection.[82] As such, its contours are often difficult to anticipate or predict. The loss of one region may lead to a huge public outcry, while the loss of another may have little to no impact.[83]

HEGEMONY AND MYTHS

Somatic States is a global study of corporealized affective attachment to the state, particularly to its logomap. In presenting a ubiquitous and immediately recognizable narrative, the book might appear to tread familiar ground unnecessarily. However, in giving voice to a feeling that is "often articulated but rarely diagnosed," *Somatic States* seeks to defamiliarize a "commonsense understanding" of the state as well as to probe the origins and aptness of this "geopolitical analogy and its applications."[84] In the course of its narrative arc, the book questions the sticky metaphors that inform the body-state isomorphic relation, teases out the gender and racial assumptions smuggled in representations common to political geography, deconstructs the cultural notion of the body as a discrete unit, and finally offers suggestions for alternative forms of belonging.

Telling a story on a global scale also poses issues of cultural translatability. In particular, arguing that a given conceptualization of the state transcends cultural boundaries to become hegemonic can contribute to muting heterogeneity and can flatten multivocality. Cross-cultural comparisons are always a perilous exercise, warns anthropologist Léopold Lambert in the preface of his own study of a globalized French colonial system. Cross-cultural analyses silence specificities linked to contexts, peoples, histories, and struggles, and can percolate into simplistic conclusions.[85] Maps, and especially logomaps, also obfuscate forms of social organization that do not align with nonnational categories such as religious affiliations and racial, ethnic, and linguistic categories.

In fact, alternative forms of social, cultural, racial, and political organization continue to coexist with the boundedness of the modern state. Religious communities such as Islam, Buddhism, or Judaism exist in ways that are both tied to particular geographies and exist across diasporic space.[86] Buryat Buddhism, Anya Bernstein writes, complicates understandings of sovereignty, for instance, in sitting astride religious and political realms, with links to Mongolian and Tibetan Buddhism beyond the borders of the modern Russian state yet also able to proclaim the Russian president an emanation of a Buddhist goddess.[87]

Analyses of sovereignty by North American indigenous scholars similarly add an important layer to the story woven in this book. In *Mohawk Interruptus*, Audra Simpson draws attention to many forms of resistance deployed against the settler states of Canada and the United States, ranging from refusals of social assistance and medical coverage to rejections of national passports.[88] While her analysis does not necessarily contradict the core argument of *Somatic States* in that the Kahnawà:ke Mohawk modes of resistance she describes aim to carve spaces of sovereignty within the existing international state system (Haudenosaunee passports indeed requiring the discretionary recognition of formally established states), various attempts are certainly made by indigenous groups to reconceptualize sovereign space in radically different ways.[89] Rather than map space "as homogenous, bounded, and temporally linear," some Native women thus view space "not as bounded by geopolitics, but storied, continuous, and developing."[90] The collective contribution made by this literature is that, clearly, not everyone is equally seduced by the map.[91]

Perhaps even more problematic than these forceful inclusions are the violent exclusions exacted upon certain groups. Arguing for a radical reconceptualization of Black geography, eschewing the "dangerous fictions like citizenships, states, and maps, and all the restrictions they entail," William Anderson reminds us that Black people have always been "*residents in* but not *citizens of* the United States," ultimately stateless within the borders of empires, states, and nations.[92] This exclusion, unresolvable via "assimilation, inclusion, or civil or human rights," makes it ultimately impossible to establish alternative forms of territorial organization outside the established order, leading to the "destruction of Black communities that make even the slightest move toward becoming autonomous, semi-autonomous, or even self-sufficient."[93] African Americans (and other minority groups elsewhere) are thus largely confined to what Hortense Spillers aptly termed a vestibular position in reference to the slave "who is of the plantation household but

not fully in it"—a situation Imani Perry encapsulates as "monstrous," in ways in fact analogous to my own deployment of the term in chapter 5.[94]

As I retrace in chapters 1 and 2, the contemporary model of territorial sovereignty was never a teleological given. Numerous other forms of spatial organization existed prior to the emergence and consolidation of the post-Westphalian model, such as empires, city-state systems, and clan societies. In an analysis of nomadic and imperial formations that have historically existed seemingly outside national boundaries, sociologist William Brenner argues that the international system tends to reinforce similarities among the system's constituents in both structure and behavior.[95] In order to survive and preserve their autonomy, former nomadic and imperial states have imitated successful practices and as a result have ended up becoming very similar to modern nation-states. For "entities that arrive late to the contest for power, in part due to previous conditions of domination," innovation can prove key to survival.[96] However, here again, innovation does not necessarily equate with a lack of engagement. In the case of Al Qaeda, what we see is a synthesis of religious zealotry and modern ideology and technology. While the pan-Islamist organization may be opposed to the international system, it is nonetheless very much part of it, having emerged from the defeat of the Arab world by Israel in 1967 and the trauma of "being initiated into an international system in which they were not full participants."[97]

Similarly, borderlands populations, with cultural and familial ties woven across the border, complicate the idealized view of the state as a discrete container. I argue however that such examples supplement rather than displace the imaginary of the bounded state, and that these communities exist across, rather than outside, the boundaries of modern states. Hybrid rather than radically Other, these hyphenated identities in fact reinforce the notion of boundedness insofar as hybridity presupposes the stable identities of discrete subjects.[98]

Here the argument made by Anna Tsing can be helpful in reconciling the seemingly divergent forces toward hegemony and local variation. As she convincingly argued, "universal" does not necessarily designate homogeneity. The typical focus anthropology places on local notions and exceptionality, while contributing to weaving a rich tapestry of human experience, also "disengages/uncouples them from the cultural flows of which they are part."[99] The challenge of cultural analysis, instead, is to work against "the assumption of the autonomous self-generation of culture" and to attend to cultural friction by addressing "both the spreading interconnections and the locatedness of culture."[100]

It seems incontestable in any event that radically different forms of spatial organization, such as nomadic empires, or James Scott's deployment of the concept of Zomia, are proving increasingly difficult to accommodate within a modern political imaginary narrowly articulated around a state system of bounded containers.[101] The vanishingly small number of exceptions to this global modern view speaks to the power exerted by European models—a model predicated on an evolution toward commensurability, or at least mutual intelligibility, "in their structures and in the rationalities governing their actions."[102]

Inherently, this commensurability is tied to a presumptive audience. As political theorist Jens Bartelson insightfully remarked, the benchmark of a state's success in projecting its claims of legitimate sovereignty ultimately depends on its claims of "being recognized as such by other similar entities."[103] By way of example, as a member of the European Union, Spain was proactive in adopting restrictive EU policing guidelines and in setting up border controls in order to help prove "not only to the rest of the EU but to itself" that it truly "belonged."[104]

The hegemonic force toward commensurability, and the need to adhere to particular forms of sovereignty, are felt especially keenly by de facto states. The work of Rebecca Bryant on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus illustrates how de facto states, "subject to international condemnation and hemmed in by embargoes and isolations," are states "in practice." The TRNC, like other de facto states, possesses the necessary institutions of governance to hold elections, control their borders, issue identification documents, and provide health care and social security. In effect, a de facto state looks and acts like a state, requiring only recognition from other states to become de jure.[105] These "states" (the quotation marks indexing the gap between real and fake) resemble a drag performance—"a parodic displacement that calls attention to the made-up nature of *any* state."[106] Bryant's discussion of the state as drag recalls here Elizabeth Dunn's conceptualization of the refugee camp "always just on the cusp of becoming a real village like all the others," a place that is "almost nearly something, an asymptote, something that never really comes together or never really reaches the point it curves towards."[107]

The de facto state, the camp, the postcolonial, the enclave, the microstate, and a host of other entities approaching the Westphalian model show us something fundamental about the fictive nature of the state. Indeed, the closer one looks at the deployment of territorial sovereignty on the ground, the more exceptions appear to be the norm.[108] There does not seem to be, as

Bryant and Reeves have pointed out, any state that is "not touched by some form of sovereign exceptionality."[109] The gap between the idea of the state—confidently enmapped as a discrete, bounded, and homogenous entity—and the realities of the state—uneven, leaky, topological—has given rise to numerous coinages in the attempt to better theorize the contemporary nature of the state. Sovereignty has been described, in turn, as partial, overlapping, graduated, flexible, unbundled, aleatory, paternal, attenuated, spectral, variegated—to use some of the conceptual tools proposed by political anthropologists and international relations scholars.

In her analysis of social phenomena multiplying beyond the territory of the state (yet remaining spatially anchored to that state), Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary has suggested that these forms of extraterritoriality be interpreted not as aterritorial but as more-than-territorial.[110] While this approach is helpful in its incorporation of spaces beyond the terrestrial, this persistent framing through exceptionality implicitly reinscribes the Westphalian model as the norm.[111] And yet the trouble with sovereignty is not simply post-Westphalian, but pre-Westphalian, and Westphalian as well.[112] It is thus not simply that tumultuous times and distant realms create unmanageable complexity. As Laura Benton writes, political space everywhere generates irregularities.[113]

If Westphalian territorial sovereignty is a myth, an illusion, an organized hypocrisy, as a number of historians and theorists have convincingly argued, continued attempts to find fault with this system seem misdirected.[114] One of the points I make in this book is that the emerging forms of extraterritoriality we are witnessing are less a symptom of weakening or exceptionality than integral spaces of articulation enabling the very functioning of a system. Rather than exceptions, then, special economic zones, corridors, export processing zones, and offshore spaces function instead as instruments designed to work within the agreed system without having to challenge its core tenets.[115] As Jens Bartelson suggests, the principal ideological function of the concept of sovereignty may therefore not be "to legitimize particular claims to political authority, but rather to legitimize the international system within which those claims can be understood as meaningful."[116]

A longing for sovereign power—an "object of desire and collective aspiration"—thus "continues to haunt contemporary politics."[117] This particular point on the aspirational nature of territorial sovereignty is crucial. In dispelling the myth that political maps represent a reality that exists in the West, it challenges the entrenched assumption that the de facto state, the postcolonial, and the microstate imitate, but can only approximate, those

political standards. My argument about the hegemonic imaginary of the state as discrete and bounded does not place therefore the postcolonial world as mere consumer of modernity, as Parha Chatterjee protested, but as cocreator—as indeed demonstrated by examples I provide in the book from outside the Global North.[118]

It also challenges, as mentioned earlier, the resistant notion that this imaginary of the nation-state primarily constitutes a tool of subjection wielded by elites and governments. I fully agree with Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay and others who insist that, contrary to a "strand of anthropological and sociological literature focused on resistance to the state," more attention should be given to the seductiveness of the state as an idea, and to the ways in which average individuals expect certain standards and structures from the state and voice criticisms when they are absent.[119] After all, if the state is first and foremost a performance—the very fact of "acting like a state [bringing] the state into existence"—this performance is one coconstituted by both states and their citizens.[120]

Finally, the emphasis on territorial sovereignty as aspiration draws attention to the state's lack of internal cohesiveness. As a collection of institutions, organizations, stakeholders, agencies, and other state, parastate, and nonstate actors—many of whom are in competition with one another—the state is inherently multiple and as such pulls in different directions.[121] It is in part on account of these gaps and misalignments that the logomap, further reinforced by a host of somatic metaphors and analogies, derives its force. A powerful reiterative visual representation, it projects an imaginary of totality and integrity, a pictorial confirmation of a state that is bound, discrete, and exists in a dichotomous relation of inside/outside to other states.

As such, the logomap is indexical of that state imaginary. Through its cartographic solidity and its simplicity, it gives coherence to the state's amorphous nature and labile anatomy, particularly at a moment of increasing complexity. It neatly conceals the messy realities and blurry edges as well as the true footprint of (post?)imperial states such as Great Britain and France, and of territorial hegemons like the United States, as I discuss in chapter 5. Importantly, it also obfuscates the misalignment between state and nation, reinforcing the "convergence of analogies between nature and nationalism" whereby society is imagined to be coterminous with the boundaries of the state.[122] This convergence, placing undue emphasis on the role of state borders, finds itself reinforced in a feedback loop through the very visuality of a logomap portraying nothing but borders. This intimate entanglement, retraced in chapters 1 and 2, is what the second part of *Somatic States* proposes to unravel.

SOMATIC STATES

The title of this book, *Somatic States*, plays on the two significations of *state*. Its primary meaning gestures toward an imaginary of the state as an organic entity—not in a Ratzelian, biological sense, but in one that coheres through a constellation of metaphors shaping current understandings of borders and territoriality. It speaks to the visceral attachment to the state, how territorial loss for instance is analogized as mutilation through hegemonic linguistic coding. But the title also plays with the other meaning of the term *state*—as an impermanent mode of being, a condition of inherent spatial lability, and lack of temporal fixity. *Somatic States* denotes the tension, in other words, between the apparent weightiness and solidity of the political state and its actual impermanence.[123]

Somatic States also points to a political imaginary that is eminently corporeal. The second part of the book takes as its jumping-off point the metaphor of phantom pains, routinely used by my interlocutors in Russia (and which resonates more broadly on some intuitive level, as the work of various border scholars suggests).[124] Of course, in its focus on the body/state enmeshment, *Somatic States* unavoidably offers a partial account of the contemporary political imaginary and as such does not make claims of exhaustiveness. There are many other ways of thinking of the state in ways that are not primarily corporeal.[125] I do argue nonetheless that the ubiquity and range of corporeal deployments in political narratives on a global scale make it an important and worthwhile tool of analysis. Taking somatic metaphors in earnest—not as casual offhand remarks but as the somatized by-product of political narratives framed through organic analogies—chapters 3 through 5 further excavate their historical, sociocultural, linguistic, and cognitive entanglements. In doing so, I commandeer a wide range of cultural texts, including literature on neurobiology, in order not only to explore the full range of metaphoric resonances between the body and the political state, but also to shed light on the cobuilding of both representational models.[126]

Indeed, the notion of the somatic state relies on the assumption of the body as unitary, integral, and autonomous. But as Celia Lury reminds us in the opening paragraph of *Prosthetic Culture*, building upon Marilyn Strathern's work in Melanesia, this ideal construct of the person is both locally and culturally specific.[127] Thus the paradox I unpack in this book is that the body metaphor gives weight (or body) to the abstract concept of the state, yet is itself a construct that gains weight through its various deployments. The notion of immunity, for instance, is originally based in a sociopolitical

discourse, not a biological one. It is riddled, W. J. T. Mitchell argues, "with images drawn from the sociopolitical sphere—of invaders and defenders, hosts and parasites, natives and aliens, and of borders and identities that must be maintained." The body and the political, he writes, thus exist as a "bipolar image" whose effect is to "produce a situation in which there is *no literal meaning*, nothing but the resonances between two images, one biomedical, the other political."[128]

My exploration of the political ideals of integrity, contiguity, and homogeneity in chapters 3, 4, and 5 pulls at various threads in the fabric that weaves state and body together. By the time we reach the coda, this connective tissue has become frayed: state and body have lost the apparent solidity that helped sustain one another and are revealed for the myths that they are.

The conceptual trajectory of part II focuses specifically on misalignments of various kinds. These chapters speak to what lies beyond the bounds of the somatopolitical framework neatly laid out in part I—the lost, the unrepresentable, the unsaid, the repressed, the monstrous—in other words, the underside of a logomap projecting ideals of simplicity and visual clarity. In chapter 3, I focus on the question of territorial loss. I explore what happens when a breach opens between the geographical extent of the nation and the mental map held by its inhabitants. I argue that lost territories, no longer included within the national body, remain nonetheless part of a previous national incarnation and elicit an affective force resembling phantom pains. Through this lens I also unpack the geopolitical notions of buffer and backyard and introduce the idea of prosthetic territory—a phantasmatic extension of the national self where dreams and aspirations are mobilized, deployed, and reanimated. Intangible and unpredictable in their affective potential (unlike the spatially static imaginary of the palimpsest), these supplementary spectral layers hover invisibly and threateningly over the map.[129] The war waged by Russia on Ukraine provides here a vivid example of how a settled border hitherto free of disputes remains nonetheless suffused with affect and can see its territorial phantoms become reactivated through political expediency and erupt into violent territorial deflagration.

The fantasy of singularity, contiguousness, and organic integrity projected by the geobody has placed undue emphasis on the borders of the state, turning them into fetishized sites. As I develop in chapter 4, the denial of the nation-state's deeply fragmentary nature has led to cartographic anxieties nestled in boundaries, edges, and remote corners. The fetishization of the border thus indexes a political will seeking to guarantee sovereignty and

legitimacy, but it also sustains the continued fantasy of the state as singular. Mobilizing the metaphor of skin, I argue that skin and border both occupy a key position with respect to the individual and the nation insofar as they project, as containers, an image of coherence and cohesiveness. Tightly enmeshed in political and popular somatic metaphors, skin/border indexes the unresolvable gap between, on the one hand, the topographic inscription of unambiguous boundary lines and, on the other, the concealed topological realities of networks and flows that maintain the illusion of political boundaries. What this hints at is that the nation's visual emphasis on containment and hermeticity is actually sustained by a phantasmatic, abjected double.

I turn in the final chapter to this uncanny doppelgänger. Chapter 5 opens with an examination of territorial entities that depart from idealized geographical norms such as colonial dominions, enclaves, archipelagoes, and other atomized and fractured national spaces where the skin of the nation has been stretched beyond breaking point. These monstrous geographies, sprawling, uncontainable, and irreconcilably extraneous to the logomap, speak to the central argument of the chapter, namely that the visual clarity of the logomap emerges through the suppression of similarities and entanglements. The visually unambiguous logomap is thus accompanied by the shadowy figure of the monster, threatening to disrupt the idealized portrayal of the nation-state as autonomous and independent. I specifically marshal in this chapter the figure of conjoined twins, who powerfully dispel the fantasy of bodily unicity and open up paths to bring back and integrate monstrous bodies hitherto relegated to the hinterland of political national discourse: queer, Black, female, and disabled bodies. The chapter builds here on corporeal aspects drawn earlier in chapter 2, specifically on the symbolic use of able-bodied, heterosexual, fertile female bodies as tropes for the wholesomeness of the nation, and its protection by patriotic males.[130]

If it is addressed explicitly in chapter 5, the figure of the monster lurks in fact throughout the book. A crucial point made in *Somatic States* is that the sea monsters and monstrous races who previously roamed around the edges of medieval maps have not disappeared. They tend today to be mapped onto real-world ethnic groups—suggesting a survival of pernicious stereotypes—as well as onto bodies that deviate from the usual vector of somatic analogies: bodies that are cisgender, heteronormative, and, in a first-world context, white.

My aim in giving the monster center stage is twofold. First, importantly, it is to ensure that a multiplicity of voices continues to shape cultural and geopolitical narratives, particularly those voices that have long been silenced.

Alexander Weheliye points out that European thinkers have generally been given carte blanche to transpose theories and concepts to a variety of spatiotemporal contexts because they do not speak from an explicitly racialized viewpoint. By contrast, "nonwhite scholars who have written about racial slavery, colonialism, indigenous genocide" frequently find themselves "relegated to ethnographic locality within mainstream discourses." One often finds the presumption that the Western theoretical apparatus precedes, and is "uncontaminated by and prior to reductive or essentialist political identities."[131] Thinking through monsters here helps us develop a recognition of Otherness, thereby enabling an ethical understanding of difference.[132] But it is also to suggest alternative ways of envisaging political geography. *Somatic States* suggests that the use of corporeal analogies to apprehend the state is unlikely to melt away. Indeed, the use of new bodily metaphors that continually emerge with the increase of biological knowledge and subsequent scientific conceptual shifts shows that the body-state cognitive interface is extremely resilient and adaptable.

I suggest that the work on new materialisms by philosophers such as Karen Barad or Jane Bennett can be instructive for political geography. The recognition of widespread cross-species entanglements means that symbiogenesis is gradually replacing the earlier cruder model of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. To be entangled, Barad writes, "is not simply to be intertwined with another . . . but to lack an independent, self-contained existence."[133] Jane Bennett's notion of vibrant matter has also been helpful in highlighting the complex enmeshments of nonhuman material with the human, showing how "human agency is always an assemblage of microbes, animals, plants, metals, chemicals, word-sounds."[134]

In addition to rendering the container model obsolete, I argue that a body existing and thriving across species, scales, and life-forms constitutes a better model for the neoliberal landscape as well as for military geographies. As I discuss in the book's brief coda, the changing scale and speed of warfare is motivating military strategists to reconceptualize spatial models beyond the limiting imaginaries that have so far prevailed in political geography. Ushering a complete rupture in the body/state isomorphic relation discussed in *Somatic States*, new organizational models based on other biological architectures are privileging alternative kinds of bodies, eliciting new corporeal metaphors—this time avian and entomological rather than human. The model of the swarm in particular, giving precedence to autonomy, emergence, and distributed functioning, defies the fiction of the body as organic, natural, and unitary insofar as it continually finds itself on the verge of

materialization and dissolution.[135] Yet, through its fractured and dispersive nature, the swarm reflects a psychoanalytical view of the body as "always and already fragmented" (chapter 3), thereby dispelling the fiction of the body as discrete and singular.[136] Embracing such fragmented and dispersive models—of a corporeality otherwise—may thus help reconfigure metaphors of the neoliberal state in line with its actual spatiality and modes of operation, no longer resorting to qualifiers or exceptions, and jettisoning once and for all the Westphalian myth.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

Epigraphs: Donald J. Trump, political campaign ad, January 2016, archived January 27, 2016, at Archive.org, https://archive.org/details/PolAd_DonaldTrump_5iqfp; Longo, *The Politics of Borders*, xii.

1. Iyengar, "India Bans al-Jazeera."
2. In this book I occasionally use shortcuts for nation-states: *India*, *Russia*, *China*, and so on. This stylistic shorthand should not distract the reader from the multivocal and inherently messy nature of the state.
3. According to the draft bill, "No person shall depict, disseminate, publish or distribute any wrong or false topographic information of India including international boundaries through internet platforms or online services or in any electronic or physical form. Whoever acquired any geospatial information of India in contravention of the law shall be punished with a fine ranging from RS 1 crore to RS 100 crore and/or imprisonment for a period up to seven years" (*Indian Express*, "Up to RS 100 cr Fine, 7 YRS in Jail").
4. Callahan, *China*, 122.
5. Hayton, *The South China Sea*, 250. The U-shaped line is in fact ambiguous in that the PRC has neither clearly defined the exact location coordinates of the line nor what it means legally and politically. It has its origin, not in the graticular network of latitudes and longitudes on which modern maps are based, but in the more normative and aesthetic map-making practice of early modern China (Callahan, *Sensible Politics*, 151).
6. Perec, *Espèces d'espaces*, 147, my translation.
7. Agnew, "The Territorial Trap."
8. Similarly, the exchange of territory between states is "almost always portrayed as a net loss to state power even when the objective benefits of resolving territorial disputes include a mutual improvement in bilateral relations and greater regional peace and stability" (Abraham, *How India Became Territorial*, 143–45).

9. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 96.
10. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 1.
11. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 158.
12. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 157–58.
13. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 157.
14. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 3.
15. Brown, *Walled States*.
16. Agnew, *Hidden Geopolitics*, 84.
17. Hansen and Stepputat, introduction to *States of Imagination*, 10, 2.
18. Jones, *Violent Borders*, 67.
19. Agnew, *Hidden Geopolitics*.
20. On electronic terraforming, see Engelhardt, "On Space and Territory in Cyberwar."
21. Neocleous, *Imagining the State*, 126.
22. Brown, *Statelessness*, 3.
23. Koch, "Introduction: Spatializing Authoritarianism," 5.
24. Murphy, "The Sovereign State System," 107.
25. Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, ix, 2.
26. Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, xiii, 9.
27. Moisio et al., "Changing Geographies of the State," 3–4.
28. Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire*, 5. Mark Neocleous reports that the tiny proportion of conflicts between two sovereign territorial states receives the majority of media and academic attention (*Imagining the State*, 106).
29. Writing in 2007, Liam O'Dowd noted that only 3 percent of the world's population were currently living outside the state where they were born (cited in Paasi, "A Border Theory," 21). These numbers will almost certainly continue to swell under the pressure of climate change and economic inequalities, placing undue stress on asylum seekers and refugees in particular.
30. Billé and Humphrey, *On the Edge*.
31. Alesina and Spolaore, *The Size of Nations*, 199–200.
32. Billé, "Doughnut"; Ryzhova, "Freedoms, the State and Security."
33. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, cited in Díaz-Barriga and Dorsey, *Fencing in Democracy*, 17.
34. Mitchell, "The Limits of the State," 94. Rebecca Bryant has discussed how this transcendental entity is then materialized and reproduced synecdochally. In her discussion of national airlines, she argued that the abstract notion of the stateless becomes embodied: airplanes turn into "containers that become small pieces of the homeland outside the homeland itself" (Bryant, "Sovereignty in the Skies," 23).
35. For some dramatic contrasts, see Egoshin, "The Countries' Borders." The starkest difference is perhaps at night, between North and South Korea, while another fascinating contrast is between the former East and West halves of Berlin, whose electrical systems have not changed—the latter using mercury vapor or metal halide lights, and the former yellow sodium lights.
36. Edney, *Cartography*, 103.
37. Edney, *Cartography*, 1, 66.

38. Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations," 398. On Japanese and Chinese maps, see, respectively, Wigen, *A Malleable Map*; and Akin, *East Asian Cartographic Print Culture*.
39. Edney, *Cartography*, 5.
40. See for instance Sahlins (*Boundaries*) on the formation of French and Spanish national identities in the Pyrenees, and Dunlop (*Cartophilia*) on the search for identity in Alsace. Dunlop (*Cartophilia*, 129) notes that "maps trained people to see their national identity in their local surroundings: their village streets, bell towers, fields, and classrooms" and that it became crucial for nationalists to develop techniques of visual training and pedagogy that would tie these images of local and regional space to a universal image of the nation.
41. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 175.
42. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 185.
43. France, discussed at several junctures in the book, is a good example of the latter.
44. Reeves, "Signs of Sovereignty," 225.
45. Reeves, "Signs of Sovereignty," 225. In 1988 Soviet geographers admitted publicly that most of the maps that had been sold to the public since the 1930s had been willfully falsified and deformed (Vadrot, cited in Jacob, *The Sovereign Map*, 274).
46. Graham, *Vertical*, 45.
47. See Brook, *Mr. Selden's Map of China*, 5.
48. 18 U.S. Code § 700 stipulates that a person who knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. As per the code, the term "flag of the United States" means any flag of the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size, in a form that is commonly displayed.
49. Léopold Lambert (*États d'urgence*, 82–83) recalls the case of Yasmina Benson, who was sentenced to ten months in jail for holding up the Algerian flag in Paris during the Algerian War. On alternative logomaps, see Yıldırım ("Space, Loss and Resistance"), discussed in chapter 3, with the example of the Kurdish logomap, whose use is illegal in Turkey.
50. Brook, *Mr. Selden's Map of China*, 5.
51. Brook, *Mr. Selden's Map of China*, 5.
52. Shanghaiist, "Gap Apologizes for T-Shirt Design," emphasis added.
53. Korzybski, "A Non-Aristotelian System."
54. A compendium of somatic metaphors of the state and their cultural underpinnings and relevance can be found in the survey by Andreas Musolff, *National Conceptualisations of the Body Politic*. Many of these metaphors, in particular the rape metaphor, are expressed in heavily gendered language, as I discuss in the course of the book.
55. TallBear, *Native American DNA*.
56. Neocleous, *The Politics of Immunity*, 299.
57. Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*. This is discussed in detail in chapter 2.
58. Ramaswamy, "Maps and Mother Goddesses in Modern India."
59. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*.

60. Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind*, 126.
61. Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind*, 5, 17.
62. Jennifer Terry writes that an invading and occupying force, "staged metaphorically as an expert medical team whose main task is to rid the occupied society of a diseased insurgency," can transform the alleged patient "into a compliant subject of the new occupying regime" (*Attachments to War*, 28).
63. Psychologist Robert Epstein argues that the metaphor of the brain as computer, for instance, is a deeply flawed one. But it is "sticky" and as such "encumbers our thinking with language and ideas" we have trouble thinking beyond. He recounts challenging researchers at one of the world's most prestigious research institutes to account for intelligent human behavior without reference to any aspect of the concept of information processing. Although they saw the problem with the metaphor, they were unable to come up with a working alternative (Epstein, "The Empty Brain"). But even sticky metaphors are not static. Over the past two thousand years, writes George Zarkadakis, people have used six core metaphors to try to explain human intelligence (*In Our Own Image*).
64. Kurgan, *Close Up at a Distance*, 14.
65. Porteous, *Landscapes of the Mind*, 70.
66. Stewart, *On Longing*, 101–2.
67. Douglas, *Purity and Danger*.
68. Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*.
69. See, in particular, the argument made by Sumathi Ramaswamy discussed in chapter 1.
70. In the context of India, Sumathi Ramaswamy writes that the logomap was too abstract and unhomely and that it was accompanied at first with what she calls "barefoot cartography" ("Maps and Mother Goddesses in Modern India"). Similarly, maps produced in France and Germany lacked the "local perspective necessary to connect with the emotions or life experiences of ordinary Alsatians and Lorrainers" and gave rise to "vernacular" maps (Dunlop, *Cartophilia*, 14).
71. See Broers, *Armenia and Azerbaijan*.
72. I have been careful in this book to use *state* and *nation* appropriately, but for stylistic purposes I have sometimes taken liberties. This may be seen as a metacommentary on the ways in which the two are frequently confused and amalgamated in common speech.
73. Brown, *Walled States*, 118–19, paraphrased in Olson, *Imagined Sovereignties*, 12.
74. Olson, *Imagined Sovereignties*, 26–27.
75. Bukh, *These Islands Are Ours*, 5–14.
76. Anthony Smith, cited in Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness*, 48.
77. Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, 1997.
78. See for instance Callahan, *China*, 116; and Chung, *Domestic Politics*, 6–9.
79. Toal, *Near Abroad*, 251.
80. Both Poland and Hungary are regional examples where popular engagement with lost territories is particularly strong. Hungary's political discourse has been molded as a result of the Treaty of Trianon (June 1920) that saw the loss of two-thirds of its territory. In Poland, governments since World War II have continually emphasized the importance of good neighborly relations and future

peace, and have sought to silence dissenting voices. Occasional rumblings (see chapter 2) suggest that these borders may not be as stable as geopolitical maps indicate.

81. Laszczkowski and Reeves, "Introduction: Affect and the Anthropology of the State," 8.
82. Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, 13–16.
83. Itty Abraham writes that the loss of the province of Bengal led to such an outcry that the decision was reversed a few years later. By contrast, the separation of Burma from British India did not produce the same reaction, even though it led to much human strife. "Bengal was deemed a 'heartland' of the nation in 1905, while Burma in 1931 was little more than periphery whose partition was not construed in terms of national loss, even if many nationals lost everything they owned" (Abraham, *How India Became Territorial*, 36–37).
84. Reeves, "Signs of Sovereignty," 222; and Agnew, *Hidden Geopolitics*, 61.
85. Lambert, *États d'urgence*, 41.
86. In a large-scale study, Musolff reports several instances, from Saudi and Pakistani citizens, to analogize the Muslim community (*ummah*) as a body, suggesting that the corporeal metaphor may apply to groups beyond the constraints of the nation-state (*National Conceptualisations of the Body Politic*, 147).
87. Bernstein, *Religious Bodies Politic*, 35–36, 8.
88. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*.
89. The Haudenosaunee (or Iroquois) passport, in use since 1977, evolved from negotiations with the US State Department and other countries. While it has been successfully used for international travel in some cases, it is generally not accepted as a valid documentation, most notably by Canada.
90. Goeman, *Mark My Words*, 117, 206, and 117.
91. Or at least, not the national (logo)map. Simpson (*Mohawk Interruptus*, 33) speaks of a "cartography of refusal," which suggests the map remains at the core of spatial understandings of belonging.
92. Anderson, *The Nation on No Map*, 2, 5, and 23, emphasis in the original.
93. Sharpe, *In the Wake*, 14; Anderson, *The Nation on No Map*, 142. For an example of a violent suppression of collective attempts at Black economic autonomy, see Lewis, *Violent Utopia*.
94. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe"; Perry, *Vexy Thing*, 154.
95. Brenner, *Confounding Powers*, 26.
96. Brenner, *Confounding Powers*, 28.
97. Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," cited in Brenner, *Confounding Powers*, 205.
98. Gilmore (*Abolition Geography*, 420) prefers the term *syncretic*, which "downplays any presumption of prior purity" and "avoids suggesting technical intervention." I discuss these points further in chapter 5.
99. Tsing, *Friction*, 7.
100. Tsing, *Friction*, 122. Mindful not to "exoticize alterity for its own sake," Ramaswamy teases out the different trajectories of cartography outside Europe, thereby highlighting both overlaps and innovations ("Conceit of the Globe in Mughal Visual Practice," 754).

101. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed*. The term *Zomia* and the original development of its concept are attributable to Willem van Schendel ("Geographies of Knowing").
102. Hansen and Stepputat, introduction to *States of Imagination*, 10. One must also recall that full sovereignty was previously seen as the privilege of European nations alone (with partial exceptions made for some countries, like Turkey, Siam, Persia, and Japan). "This immediately excluded from consideration political formations that were nomadic or itinerant, or whose control over territory followed modes other than the prevailing organicist metaphor of territory as the state's body" (Abraham, *How India Became Territorial*, 65).
103. Bartelson, "Three Concepts of Recognition," 116, cited in Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 14–15.
104. Andreas, *Border Games*, 129.
105. Bryant, "Sovereignty in Drag," 60. See also chapter 5.
106. Bryant, "Sovereignty in Drag," 75, emphasis added.
107. Dunn, *No Path Home*, 195; and Dunn and Frederiksen, "Uncanny Valleys," 24.
108. As of 2009, the CIA assessed at around fifty the number of countries containing stateless zones, where the "local government has lost all effectiveness or simply given up" (Singer, *Wired for War*, 286).
109. Bryant and Reeves, "Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Sovereign Agency," 5.
110. Amilhat Szary, *Géopolitique des frontières*, 88. Writing about special zones and enclaves, Mezzadra and Neilson argue that these territorial excisions are not spaces of legal voidness but are instead saturated by competing norms and calculations (*Border as Method*, 208–9).
111. On three-dimensional approaches to the state, see Billé, *Voluminous States*.
112. Callahan, *Sensible Politics*, 222.
113. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 279.
114. See, respectively, Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*; Cocks, *On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions*; Krasner, *Sovereignty*.
115. This reverberates a point James Scott has made in his work. A planned institution, he writes, "generates an unofficial reality—a 'dark twin'—that arises to perform many of the various needs that the planned institution fails to fulfill" (*Seeing Like a State*, 261). I make a germane argument in my discussion of the territorial monster (see chapter 5).
116. Bartelson, *Sovereignty as Symbolic Form*, 63.
117. Bartelson, "Epilogue: The Ironies of Misrecognition," 241; and Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 26.
118. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, 5.
119. Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 111.
120. Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 4–5. Bryant and Hatay compare this performance to a "kind of metaphysical trick that makes something that is really only an idea seem like a real thing in the world." Ferguson and Gupta ("Spatializating States," 983–84) have drawn attention to how states invest much effort in developing practices to ensure that they are imagined in specific ways, employing rituals and procedures to "animate and naturalize metaphors." See also Billig (*Banal Nationalism*) on ordinary practices that reproduce the nation on a daily basis.

121. Dunn, *No Path Home*, 174.
122. Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness*, 51.
123. Arjun Chowdhury (*The Myth of International Order*) points out that the majority of states in the international system—about two-thirds of them—are weak states, resembling Libya more than Denmark or the United States. The language of weakness and failure, he writes, suggests an aberration from a norm, yet strong states are the exception.
124. See Bodin, "Russian Geopolitical Discourse"; Greenberg, "Divided Lands, Phantom Limbs"; von Hirschhausen et al., *Phantom Grenzen*; von Löwis, "Phantom Borders."
125. Anthropologist Liisa Malkki has argued, for instance, that the primary metaphor of nationhood is botanical ("National Geographic," 27). While a wider range of ethnographic contexts would be necessary to make the argument fully persuasive, its organic nature intuitively feels right. Malkki's notion of the refugee as someone extraneous, displaced, out of place, certainly reverberates with my argument about phantom territories and spectral presences.
126. In her exploration of the relation between the body and the city, Elizabeth Grosz has argued that the isomorphism in representational models is not a "mirroring of nature in artifice," but rather "a two-way linkage which could be defined as an *interface*, perhaps even a cobuilding" ("Bodies-Cities," 33–34, emphasis in the original).
127. Lury, *Prosthetic Culture*, 1.
128. Mitchell, "Picturing Terror," 917.
129. Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*, 1.
130. See Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*; Dixon, *Feminist Geopolitics*; Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*.
131. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*, 6–7. In fact, the Western model of the state and its territory was perfected "in a purer form" in the colonies, before being exported to the rest of the world (Elden, *The Birth of Territory*, 326). Weheliye (*Habeas Viscus*, 35–36) also notes that the German concentration camp has "its point of origin in German Southwest Africa at the turn of the twentieth century" before being subsequently reconstituted as an industrialized killing machine in Europe during the Third Reich.
132. Tomaini and Mittman, *Sea Monsters*.
133. Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, ix.
134. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, 120.
135. Parikka, *Insect Media*, 59.
136. Smith, "The Uncertainty of Placing," 2.

CHAPTER 1. CARTOGRAPHIC REVOLUTIONS

Epigraph: Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, 88.

1. Baltimore et al., "Mapping the Genome," 70.
2. Baltimore et al., "Mapping the Genome."
3. For more on medieval sea monsters, see Hill, *Cartographical Curiosities*, 34; and especially Nigg, *Sea Monsters*; and Van Duzer, *Sea Monsters on Medieval and Renaissance Maps*.