


China in the World



Culture, Politics,
and World Vision

Ban
Wang

China in the World

BUY

DUKE

SINOTHEORY A series edited by Carlos Rojas and Eileen Cheng-yin Chow

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

China in the World

Culture, Politics,
and World Vision

Ban
Wang

DUKE

Duke University Press Durham and London 2022

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

© 2022 DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License available at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞

Designed by Aimee C. Harrison / Project editor: Annie Lubinsky

Typeset in Portrait Text Regular and Helvetica Neue by Westchester Publishing Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Wang, Ban, [date] author.

Title: China in the world : culture, politics, and world vision / Ban Wang.

Other titles: Sinotheory.

Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2022. | Series: Sinotheory | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021021969 (print) | LCCN 2021021970 (ebook)

ISBN 9781478009801 (hardcover)

ISBN 9781478010845 (paperback)

ISBN 9781478012368 (ebook)

ISBN 9781478092452 (ebook other)

Subjects: LCSH: China—Foreign relations. | China—Civilization—20th century. | China—History—20th century. | China—Politics and government—20th century. | China—Civilization—21st century. | China—History—21st century. | China—Politics and government—21st century. | BISAC: HISTORY / Asia / China

Classification: LCC DS775.8 .w364 2022 (print) | LCC DS775.8 (ebook) |

DDC 327.51—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021021969>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021021970>

Cover art: Arnold Chang and Michael Cherney, *After Huang Gongwang* #6, 2014. Courtesy the artists.

This title is freely available in an open access edition made possible by a generous contribution from Stanford University.

DUKE

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Contents

Series Editor's Foreword | vii

Acknowledgments | xi

Introduction: Empire, Nation, and World Vision | i

1 Morality and Global Vision in Kang Youwei's World Community | 19

2 Nationalism, Moral Reform, and Tianxia in Liang Qichao | 40

3 World Literature in the Mountains | 59

4 Art, Politics, and Internationalism in Korean War Films | 80

5 National Unity, Ethnicity, and Socialist Utopia in *Five Golden Flowers* | 101

6 The Third World, Alternative Development, and Global Maoism | 123

7 The Cold War, Depoliticization, and China in the American Classroom | 148

8 Using the Past to Understand the Present | 170

Notes | 187

Bibliography | 201

Index | 211

DUKE

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Series Editor's Foreword | CARLOS ROJAS

Matteo Ricci's introduction to his 1603 Chinese-language catechism *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* opens with the binome *pingzhi* 平治—in which the first character, *ping* 平, is short for the phrase *ping tianxia* 平天下, meaning “to make peaceful all under heaven,” while the second character, *zhi* 治, is short for *zhiguo* 治國, meaning “to govern the nation.”¹ The phrases *ping tianxia* and *zhiguo* are paired in many classical Confucian texts—including, mostly famously, in the opening section of *The Great Learning*, one of the canonical “Four Books” within the Confucian tradition—and in alluding to these phrases here, Ricci was attempting to draw on the intellectual authority of Confucianism in order to promote Christian thought in China.

Ricci was one of the most important early Jesuit missionaries to visit China. He first arrived in the Portuguese settlement of Macau in 1582, and the following year he traveled to China, where he remained until his death in 1610. Ricci completed the first draft of *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven* in 1596, based on conversations he had had with several Chinese thinkers, and in the text, he draws heavily on Confucian vocabulary and concepts to introduce Christian ideas, specifically to make the case for the existence of

God. In 1603 Ricci added the introduction and published the catechism as an independent volume.

The term *tianxia* (all under heaven), embedded within the very first character of Ricci's introduction, also resonates with the first term in the text's Chinese title, *Tianzhu shiyi*—which uses *tian* to refer to the “Lord of Heaven” (*tianzhu*), the term that the Jesuits had adopted to refer to God in Chinese. In both *tianxia* and *tianzhu*, the initial character, *tian*, has a hybrid significance, alluding to the culturally specific concept of “heaven” within both the Confucian and Christian traditions, while simultaneously gesturing to the possibility of establishing an umbrella concept that might bridge these two worldviews. Indeed, the explicit objective of Ricci's text was to present a series of dialogues between himself and Chinese interlocutors, in order to find common ground between the Confucian and Christian traditions.

Often translated as “heaven,” the term *tian*, in early Chinese thought, referred both to the sky and to a divine power associated with the sky, while the binome *tianxia* began to be used as early as the Warring States period (roughly, the fourth century BCE) to refer either to the territory controlled by the Zhou kings or, more generally, to the (proto-)Chinese society that operated under Zhou values.² To the extent that *tianxia* came to refer to a culturally specific realm associated with what is now known as China, however, it is intriguing to consider that the term *tian* itself may be etymologically derived from “non-Chinese” origins like Mongolian (*tengi*) or Tibetan-Burman languages like Adi (*talen*) or Lepcha (*td̥-lyan*), and that as early as 1613 (just three years after Ricci's death), the first of several versions of the Chinese term (spelled “tayn”) had entered the English language as a loanword.³

This hybrid significance of *tian* as a figure of both universality and cultural specificity, of continuity and transformation, is also the focal point of Ban Wang's 2017 edited volume *Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics*, which traces the evolution of the Chinese cosmopolitical concept of *tianxia* from the early Zhou up to the present. While this edited volume is sensitive to the ways in which the term's meaning has changed over time, the book as a whole also highlights the important continuities in the ways that the concept has been understood and deployed from early China to the present. With respect to the modern and contemporary periods, meanwhile, the volume also underscores the apparent paradox that *tianxia* designates universality (“everything under heaven”) as well as sociocultural specificity (“everything under [a specifically Chinese-conceived] heaven”).

In the current volume, *China in the World*, Wang focuses more narrowly on the period from the late Qing dynasty (i.e., the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries) to the present day. He argues that during this tumultuous period of political transformation, China not only emerged as a modern nation-state but also continued to draw on a notion of polity derived from its premodern dynastic and imperial roots. As Lucian Pye puts it in a line that Wang cites in his opening paragraph, “China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a civilization pretending to be a state,” and Wang argues that this is true at the level not only of political sovereignty but also of ideology and political philosophy.

At its heart, accordingly, *China in the World* is concerned with the relationship between the two interlinked Confucian concepts to which Ricci elliptically alludes in the first two characters of his seminal 1603 text: “to make peaceful all under heaven” (ping tianxia) and “to govern the nation” (zhiguo)—including attendant questions of the relationship between universalism and particularity, continuity and transformation, inner and outer, self and other, and nation and world.

DUKE

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Acknowledgments

This book was underway when I began teaching the seminar “China in the World” at Stanford University in 2008. The students who participated in this seminar, repeated a few times with variations, are too numerous to list here. I express my gratitude to all the participants for their input, discussion, and writings. I hope the students will recognize something of their own when they have a chance to read this book.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Kenneth Wissoker of Duke University Press for his patience, advice, and wise steering of this manuscript through two rounds of review and revision. My thanks also go to three anonymous readers for their suggestions and comments, which made me improve the arguments and analyses.

DUKE

**UNIVERSITY
PRESS**

Empire, Nation, and World Vision

Introduction

THE RISE OF CHINA has generated intense debate on the country's power and worldview. Some fret that China's economic power is turning into military might and territorial ambition, threatening to repeat old-fashioned interstate conflict. Whether perceived as a threat or benefit, an empire or nation-state, modern China has been an unsolved mystery. Regarding China as a civilizational state in national disguise, Lucian Pye writes, "China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a civilization pretending to be a state."¹ China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative traces back to the ancient Silk Roads across Eurasia and sea routes in maritime trade in Asia and Africa. The proposal by the Chinese leadership for a "Community of Common Destiny with Mankind" rests on a belief that a global order of interdependence and cooperation will temper interstate rivalry. In taking the lead on climate change, China calls for a new power relation alternative to the interstate system. These engagements with the world invoke the ancient visions of *datong* 大同 (great unity) and *tianxia* 天下 (all under heaven), bringing old worldviews into the twenty-first century.

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

While the debate on China's place in the Western nation-state system dates back at least to the Qing dynasty, it came to a head during the Cold War. In 1968, when the Cultural Revolution and the Third World movement were making waves, John Fairbank warned that the Chinese vision, indebted to tianxia and empire, posed a challenge to the system of nation-states and national discourse rooted in "concepts such as nation, sovereignty, and equality of states." The nation-state paradigm is "ill-equipped to deal with the body of thought and practice" associated with the Chinese outlook.² Recently, Martin Jacques retraced this worldview to its imperial roots and ancient political culture, which served to "cohere an enormous population otherwise fragmented by dialect, custom, ethnic difference, geography, climate, level of economic development and disparate living standards."³ Nowhere is the world vision more vividly orchestrated than in the 2008 Olympics opening ceremonies under the rubric "One World, One Dream." Directed by Zhang Yimou, the spectacle goes backward to China's past and deploys ancient resources to forge spectacular patterns.⁴ But perplexing questions remain: Does the spectacle project China as a hegemon or promote a cosmopolitan unity of all nations? Does it flaunt leadership or imperialist power?

The question "What is modern China?" has been a vexed issue for more than a century. As the Qing empire was thrust into the world of nation-states in the late nineteenth century, Chinese thinkers recognized the necessity of engaging and adopting the nation-state as an effective model for competition and survival in the forest of nations. Yet confronted with the colonialist nations as aggressors and a source of global conflict, they often looked to cosmopolitan prospects beyond the national border. Observing the League of Nations in 1919, Liang Qichao wrote that the league, for all its unfair, backroom manipulation detrimental to China, heralded a dream of reconciling cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Referencing Immanuel Kant's idea of eternal peace, Liang applauded the league's initiatives as a vista of "a grand human community" (*quan renlei da tuanti* 全人類大團體)—an echo of China's classical vision of tianxia and datong. The Chinese tradition, wrote Liang a few years later, had never conceived the self-contained state, be it an ancient kingdom or modern nation, to be the ultimate unit of human society, and had always held tianxia to be a higher order over separate polities.⁵

In *Ou you xinying lu* 歐遊心影錄 (Travel impressions of Europe), Liang gave a favorable appraisal of the league's promotion of diplomatic reciprocity among nation-states and curtailing of their claims of absolute sovereignty. In a section titled "The Cosmopolitan State" (*shijiezhuyi de guojia* 世界主義的國家), Liang asserts that a nation is not the paramount polity but a threshold

to datong cosmopolitanism. The nation-state's *raison d'état* is not self-interested and chauvinistic but projects a planetary ethic. Progressing in a spiral from the individual and family through nation-state, a nation should cooperate with other nations so that all people would unite and culminate in a unitary world. Drawing on the Confucian doctrine "Cultivate the self, order the family, govern the country, and bring peace to all under heaven" (*xiuqizhiping* 修齊治平), Liang pictures a self that is not self-serving but sociable, and a nation-state that is not aggressive but a team player. This moral trajectory ascends in a spiral from the individual to family to nation-state, culminating in a peaceful and unified world.⁶

The ultimate aim of an individual's life is to make contribution to humanity as a whole. Why? The reason is that humanity as a whole is the upper limit of the self. If you want to develop yourself, you need to move in that direction. Why must the state exist? The reason is that with a state, it is easier to rally the cultural power of a national group; to perpetuate and grow it so that a country will be able to contribute to humanity as a whole and help the world grow as well. Building a state is thus a means of advancing humanity, just as the coordination of a municipal government with self-governing local regions is a means of building a state. In this light, individuals should not rest content with making their own state wealthy and powerful but should instead make their nation an addition to humanity. Otherwise, the state is built to no purpose.⁷

Liang is projecting an image of the cosmopolitan state with the full force of the *tianxia* tradition behind him. Rather than a "civilizational state," which traces a direct line from tribalism, ethnicity, and culture to nation-state, the cosmopolitan state transcends the clash of civilization thesis and is open-minded toward other civilizations.⁸ While attracted by transnational elements of "cosmopolitanism," the thinkers tapped into classical traditions to inject new meanings into the concept of nation-state. The ancient notion of *tianxia* has elicited a spectrum of interpretations lately. Literally "all under heaven," the term is essentially a conjunction of political system and moral authority, its meanings ranging from an imperial apparatus to a unified state equipped with an elaborate bureaucracy, a regime of value, an overarching quasi-religious authority, and a world vision distinct from the Western interstate system.⁹ Though often invoked together with "empire" and *datong*, *tianxia* leans toward *datong* but is distinct from empire in its stress on morality, culture, and authority. Empire marks an administrative and military mode of governance capable of holding vast regions and diverse populations

together, and is often mentioned in the same breath with *tianxia*. Yuri Pines has written that the Chinese empire remained intact throughout periodic disorders for two thousand years, until 1912, and some of its elements remain active in modern times. Defined “not only as an administrative and military entity,” *tianxia* is “also an ideological construct” and was accepted as the means for the “political unification of the entirely known civilized world.” The idea of *tianxia*, indeed, is eminently moral, cultural, and ideological: it has served as “building blocks of Chinese political culture”—a cluster of “ideals, values, and perceptions that laid the intellectual foundation for imperial unification.”¹⁰

Conventional wisdom has it that the Chinese nation-state came about by breaking away from the empire and its political culture. Yet the leading thinkers, such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Zhongshan, and Mao Zedong, often invoked the terms *tianxia* or *datong* in their thinking about national projects, seeking a broader passage to global outlooks. This hybrid of *tianxia* and nation-state becomes crystallized in the term *tianxia state*.

Echoing Liang’s cosmopolitan state, Luo Mengce 羅夢冊, a high-ranking official and political theorist in the Guomindang, coined the term *tianxia state* (*tianxia guo* 天下國). In his 1944 book *Zhonggou lun* 中國論 (On China), Luo conceived a multiethnic, cosmopolitan Chinese republic. At that moment, China’s impending victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and abolition of foreign extraterritoriality began to worry the observers. Was China rising as a national power or was it restoring the oriental empire? Refuting this national lens, Luo argued that China was not a mere nation-state. Neither would it be an imperialist power, much less an ancient empire. China’s new identity owed much to the tradition of *tianxia* and should be defined as a “*tianxia state*.” But a *tianxia state* would grow and rise not by clinging to the past but by moving forward. While memories of *tianxia* come alive in modern times, the Chinese should transform their country into a modern state through “national consciousness and state thinking.” By achieving sovereignty, industrialization, and modernization, China must strive to find its place in the world and make its contribution.¹¹

The refrain of *tianxia state* recognizes the nation-state not only as a vehicle for survival and struggle but more important as a road to a higher end. To many Chinese thinkers, the nation was but a way station toward a unified world of *datong*. Over and above the nation hovered a vision of human flourishing and planetary harmony. As Benjamin Schwartz noted, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Yan Fu, and others envisaged “a vast cosmic-social process leading mankind eventually to the realization of unimagined possibilities

of human achievement or even to a utopian resolution of all human problems.”¹² In his *Datong shu* 大同書 (Book of great community), Kang painted a trajectory of the world forging ahead—with China as one major mover and shaker. Instead of clashing nation-states, world history presented a “moral drama leading to a spiritual moral solution.”¹³ Promising to deliver men and women from the bondages of family, gender, class, and above all the nation-state, Kang’s vision projected a cosmopolitan harmony among individuals, people, and nations by “sinking into the ocean of humanity.”¹⁴

China’s position in the world has been a fiercely debated issue in recent decades. Theodor Hutters has shown the dilemmas over absorbing Western culture at the expense of the ancient heritage.¹⁵ Lydia Liu addresses the agency of Chinese writers in the translation of Western learning and interstate antagonism as imperial claims on sovereignty.¹⁶ Rebecca Karl analyzes popular nationalism in Asian colonies by showing that the “Chinese, in concert with Asian nations, could act against global unevenness.”¹⁷ Kun Qian’s *Imperial-Time-Order* brings to the fore a persistent imperial pattern under tianxia in Chinese Marxism, nationalism, and literature, and Nicolai Volland has explored literary circulation and cultural diplomacy in socialist cosmopolitanism during the Cold War era.¹⁸ Viewing China’s rise as a second coming, a regaining of “its former preeminence after one and a half century’s decline,” James Hsiung suggests that “we cannot grasp China’s present without taking due account of its long past” and outside its civilizational context. Distinct from the Westphalian interstate system, China has long cherished aspirations for “citizenship in the international society,” which derives from the millennial and modern visions for social unity, distributive fairness, and political culture.¹⁹

Gaps remain, however, in the study of China’s engagement with the world. To deepen this inquiry, it is imperative to explore the dialectic interplay between nationalism and cosmopolitanism and the persistence of the classical traditions. Indebted to the idea of tianxia, Chinese writers saw in cosmopolitanism or internationalism reincarnations of the classical notion. They yearned for a supranational community, shared interests, and solidarity beyond national borders. But cosmopolitanism would be wishful thinking and empty talk without the backing of national strength, independence, and influence. The architects of the nation grappled with the stark reality of a weak and colonized China and realized that the way to the cosmopolitan dream must go through the buildup of a strong nation-state. “If we are to promote cosmopolitanism,” declared Sun Zhongshan, “we must first strengthen nationalism.”²⁰ This national-international nexus was taken up by Mao, who asserted that “only China’s independence and liberation will make it possible

to participate in the world communist movement.”²¹ Thus, this study probes the dual track of nation building and cosmopolitan aspirations.

This book examines the way Chinese thinkers and writers draw on the classical vision of *tianxia* in imagining and projecting China’s place in the world. Examining a series of empirical cases, this study addresses the paradox of nationalism and cosmopolitanism by delving into their entwinement and interplay. I deal with these questions: How did nationalism and cosmopolitanism interact and clash during the transition from empire to nation-state? How did China’s national project align with its world visions? How did each term interact with the other in reciprocity and tension? How did the Chinese Revolution resonate and connect with world revolution? How did national literature find a place within world literature? How did socialist ethnicity policy hark back to the millennia of multiethnic coexistence? How did the Third World relate to China’s economic development and Maoism? How did China’s assistance to the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad trace back to the arrival of the Ming admiral Zheng He’s fleet in Africa? As China becomes integrated into the capitalist world, how does globalization shape the perception of China and Chinese studies in the United States?

Scholars in the Confucian tradition tended, writes Wang Gungwu, “to admire a remote Golden Age in the distant past and to use that image to guide and correct actions in the present.”²² A utopian image of peace and harmony, *tianxia* holds out an inclusive vision of cultural and political unity over fragmentation and conflict. Touted as China’s soft power, the idea is being salvaged from oblivion as a metaphysical and nostalgic image. Such approaches, however, shed little light on the rugged terrains of China’s journey into the modern world. Instead of a gaze back at the hoary traditions, this book traces modern reinventions of the past and explores how the old ideas experienced new leases of life as a source of inspiration for modern intellectual trends and cultural practices. Rather than a “Chinese essence,” I treat expressions of classical visions as a historically fluid and volatile activity, not reincarnations of some timeless wisdom. Driven by political contingencies and social practice, Chinese writers articulated world visions through frequent returns to the past. But each return to the ancestor home was a leave-taking—a round trip of refurbishment in order to travel further into the outside world. Invocations of the classical heritage are not meant to boost national pride but to place Chinese history in the broad narrative of world history.

Wang Hui’s work has brought to light the ancient motifs in weaving a broad narrative of China in the world. Challenging the European dichotomy of nation-state and empire, Wang looks at residual elements of empire that

inform China's national project and have delineated an evolving China as a nation-state with a broad spectrum of international outlooks.²³ Building on Wang's leads, in the next section I take a closer look at the relationships between nation and empire.

Empire and the Nation-State

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the West has enshrined the nation-state as the basic political unit and accepted the interstate world as the universal norm. To Immanuel Wallerstein, this universalism has spread as a civilization on the scale of humanity at the expense of non-Western world-views. Rooted in rationalism, individual autonomy, science, and sovereignty, the international norm has prevailed over prior civilizations.²⁴ Key to this universalism, the nation-state has preoccupied thinkers and statesmen as a fundamental category for understanding issues of law, politics, economy, ethnicity, language, history, and international relations. On the cusp of transition from empire to a nation-state, Qing China was struggling to fit into this norm. But its millennial imperial tradition remained so intransigent as to make the country unfit for the modern system. In the eye of Han nationalist thinkers like Zou Rong, overnight the empire became an alien regime ruled by the Manchus. But as William Rowe explains, the Qing had already attained the umbrella of tianxia as a “multinational, universal empire” and successfully “expanded the geographical scope of ‘China’ and incorporated non-Han peoples such as Mongols, Jurchens, Tibetans, Inner Asian Muslims, and others into a new kind of transcendent political entity.”²⁵ Consciously and unconsciously, ideas and institutions of empire had a staying power and drove reformers to push beyond the envelope of the nation. The challenge, writes Wang Gungwu, was to “deal with issues like building a nation after having been an empire for 2,000 years.” Beset by the difficulty of “reconciling their republic with the political culture they inherited,” reformers thought that China was “neither empire nor nation-state” and attempted to “renew the Chinese state through a civilization of industry and science fused with the best of their heritage.”²⁶ To understand the dilemma, we have to look at the empire-nation nexus.

Based on “ethnicity, territory, religion, and language,” the European nation-state model has proved inadequate for understanding modern China. Setting empire against the nation-state, Wang Hui addresses the productive tension and linkages at a deeper level. The imperial legacy persisted and allowed reformers and revolutionaries to articulate and weave tianxia, empire, and nation-state into a new synthesis. The concept of empire (*diguo* 帝國)

represents both a political structure and an ethical orientation. The political aspect describes an “overarching, absolute imperial sovereignty and a form of power based on the unified state.” A unified state needs shoring up against centrifugal forces of usurpers, hegemons, and kings in their endless struggle for power. The ethical side refers to the virtuous rule of a regime by means of culture, beliefs, and custom—an ability to “employ virtue to do battle” as opposed to the deployment of armed forces.²⁷ In other words, “empire” denotes a unified “political form” of an overarching centralized administrative system constantly in tension with local feudal estates. The system’s other pillar features an “ethical orientation,” a structure of virtue and morality essential to tianxia—“a formation of moral authority with religious significance, and a cultural strategy for political legitimacy.”²⁸

An order at once political and moral, the tianxia regime governs not merely by coercion but more through assimilation, culture, ritual, gift exchange, tributes, and mutual recognition. Theoretically, diverse cultures, traditions, and ethnicities could coexist in the realm of all under heaven. Through “kingly transformation” and spreading moral values, the regime draws people from afar to the shared values, yet different ethnic groups keep their historically distinct ways of life.

The Qing empire’s collapse made Chinese thinkers realize that the only way to preserve the country was to transform the empire into a nation-state. By building national institutions and acquiring modern knowledge, China would join the ranks of major nations. But stepping into the world does not mean abandoning the indigenous tradition. Unlike European nations that had splintered from the old empires, Chinese nation builders, writes Wang Hui, “took certain contents and characteristics of a syncretic universal imperial system and brought them into the inner structure of the nation-state.”²⁹ What emerged was an entity that was neither an empire nor a Western-style nation-state—an anomaly that has confounded the national perspective rooted in the empire-nation binary. Through a tortuous process of reform and revolution in the first half of the twentieth century, China has entered the world as the only society in the world that “has retained, within the structure of a sovereign nation-state, the territorial area, population, and political culture inherited from an empire that existed before the nineteenth century.”³⁰

Sun Zhongshan’s notion of a transnational Asia is instructive. In a 1924 speech in Kobe, Japan, Sun posited the idea of “Greater Asia” to distinguish from Japan’s program of Greater East Asianism. Recognizing the urgency for China to become a modern nation, Sun lauded Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 as a triumph of national sovereignty and power. But Sun

strove to go beyond the Japanese model. The architect of the new nation urged that China should be able to rally Asian nations to forge an intra-Asian network of self-rule and resistance. Following the Confucian Kingly Way (*wangdao* 王道) and ideas of virtue and morality, Asian nations would assist each other, join hands, and make common cause against imperialist domination and colonial subjugation. Motivated by the principle of self-determination, Asians would rise up against the hegemonic way (*badao* 霸道) of colonizer nations. The emotional structure of virtue and morality encouraged one person to empathize with pains of another, be compassionate with others, and come to one another's assistance. The Asian network is "a culture that rebels against the hegemonic way" and strives for "the equality and liberation of all peoples."³¹

Based on transethnic and cosmopolitan premises, Sun's Asianism sought to bring the multiregional, multiethnic groups and relations into a unified intra-Asian linkage. The plan envisaged a new Asia where multiple national and ethnic identities could coexist, merge, and coordinate in a common project. The far-reaching pluralism included "Japan in the East, Turkey in the West, and nation-states with traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism and other cultural heritages."³² Rather than a source of division, cultural specificity and national difference were the foundation for shoring up unity. Taking over multiethnic landscapes and demography from the prior imperial dynasties, the Manchus of the Qing had managed to cement their legitimacy as a "Chinese" dynasty by incorporating diverse ethnic communities, populations, localities, and religions "into a flexible and pluralistic political structure."³³ Although Sun wielded Han nationalism strategically in the anti-Manchu campaign, the newborn Chinese republic quickly implemented the policy of "five races under one union," comprising the Han, Manchus, Mongols, the Hui, and the Tibetans to preserve the empire's multiethnic, multicultural framework in a modern nation-state.

Updating *tianxia* to Asian cosmopolitanism, Sun was proposing an alliance and solidarity among colonized nations in their struggle for national independence against the colonizers. This vision evolved and transformed in the twentieth century. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao evinced a similar logic in their articulation of the empire-nation nexus. Kang's *datong* vision stemmed from a rethinking Confucian universalism in the context of moral authority and empathy that transcend national, religious, and ethnic divides.³⁴ Liang's nationalism called for the cultivation of a public morality (*gongde* 公德), updating the broadmindedness of *tianxia* advocated in *Li ji* 禮記 (*Records of Rites*).³⁵ Public morality signals a commitment beyond parochial and kinship ties, heralding a cosmopolitanism premised on mutual

assistance of nations in pursuit of independence. Later in the twentieth century, the tianxia vision continued to be updated and revised to inform socialist internationalism and Third World movements.

Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Socialist Internationalism

Sun's trinity of *sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義—nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood—goes beyond ethnonationalism and includes colonized Asian nations, gesturing toward socialist internationalism. Socialist internationalism, the major subject of this study, is often confused with liberal cosmopolitanism. A distinction needs to be made.

In the early twentieth century, liberal cosmopolitanism flourished on the presumption of nation-states' equal access to and participation in global trade and culture. Liang Qichao's novel *Xin Zhongguo weilai ji* 新中國未來記 (The future of New China, 1902) offers a glimpse of it. In its opening passages, world leaders come to attend a peace conference in Nanjing and an exposition of trade and commerce is in full swing in Shanghai.³⁶ Scholars from all over the world participate in seminars and talks, and diverse schools of thought engage in dialogue. Marveling at this massive interchange, Liang exclaims “datong” to capture a freewheeling sense of cosmopolitan cultural flows and exchange. World trade and commerce, as Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant hoped, would be an effective conduit for international hospitality and connectivity.³⁷

Chinese liberal cosmopolitanism had its halcyon days from the 1930s to the 1940s. Based in Shanghai's foreign settlement, the intellectual trend was dubbed by Joseph Levenson a “cosmopolitan fringe.”³⁸ Drawing on ancient motifs of tianxia, the cosmopolitan writers believed in the cross-fertilization and fusion of diverse traditions from East and West and upheld a humanism that transcended national cultural particularities. Zhou Zuoren, the best-known figure, was steeped in classical traditions yet commanded a wide range of modern knowledge such as anthropology, psychoanalysis, and aesthetics. A leading May Fourth thinker and activist along with Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, Zhou took a transcendent liberal-humanist stance and called for a humane literature (*rende wenxue* 人的文學).³⁹ Humane literature valorizes the individual as the fundamental unit of humanity. Like a tree in a forest, the human person sinks biological roots to the animal kingdom, yet culture uplifts the person and allows him or her to evolve morally from lowly strata to ascend to the ideal life. Literature is meant to depict the ideal pattern of human life as well as expose inhuman behavior and corruption.⁴⁰

As speedy communication and flows of knowledge offered the possibilities of understanding among nations, Zhou noted, literature would foster a catholic taste for all varieties of experience and transcend local preferences, allowing individuals to “move gradually together.” Although there are “the Peters and Johns in the West, and the Zhangs and Lis” in China, they are all “units of mankind, all endowed with emotions and natural dispositions.”⁴¹ Their pain will be my pain. Humane literature entails a form of cosmopolitan intersubjectivity, premised on moral sensibility and far-reaching empathy. A leader of the Peking School (*jingpai* 京派), Zhou espoused a cosmopolitan humanism free from nationalistic affiliation even in its appeal to “Chinese” motifs. As Shumei Shih has noted, instead of retreating to the past, *jingpai* insisted that the universal qualities of naturally endowed emotions are the foundation for a cosmopolitan world.⁴²

Lin Yutang, another leading cosmopolitan, struck a “middling path.”⁴³ Born of a Christian family in Fujian province, Lin attended St. John’s University in Shanghai and Harvard University, receiving his PhD at Leipzig University in Germany. Inspired by Harvard professor Irving Babbitt, he co-founded the *xueheng* 學恆 (review of classical learning) society with the mission to reassess and revive classical culture for the modern world. Self-styled as a scholar with “two feet crossed on both Eastern and Western cultures” and writing mostly in English, Lin eschewed the notion of “Chinese essence” by Babbitt and developed a “cross-cultural aesthetics.” Like Zhou, he managed to steer a path between nationalism and communism, championing individual autonomy in quest of commonalities between West and China and blending the two into a higher cosmopolitan synthesis. “To Lin,” writes Qian Suoqiao, “both Chinese and Western knowledge has to be selectively absorbed and contested in the process of its incorporation into modern China” through piecemeal reconciliation and contestation.⁴⁴ The highest caliber of a writer is the ability to “take modern culture as shared culture of the whole world, a cosmopolitan culture belonging to all,” while preserving his own national culture.⁴⁵

Liberal cosmopolitanism was exemplified by Lin Yutang’s career as editor, critic, and board member of two English-language magazines, *The China Critic* (1928–45) and *T’ien Hsia* (1935–41). In Shuang Shen’s insightful study, these magazines were the flash point of Shanghai’s cosmopolitan public spheres. Nestled in the foreign settlement, they offered a public forum for the cosmopolitan synthesis of East and West. Western educated and well versed in Chinese classics, the writers fused Western knowledge and Chinese tradition, promoted cultural exchange, and advocated world peace. Instead of

imitating Western cosmopolitanism, they valued national heritages and saw the nation as a step toward cosmopolitanism. As a columnist for *T'ien Hsia*, Lin adhered to the belief that liberal humanist education, cultural exchange, translation, and the study of foreign languages were key to achieving cosmopolitanism. Mutual learning and understanding would “alleviate cultural misunderstanding and abolish extraterritorial privilege.”⁴⁶

Although *T'ien Hsia* and *The China Critic* used English as the principal medium, the writers viewed the English language as an opportunity rather than a repressive tool of colonialism. The colonialists might wield English in their domination, but the English language might be employed as a weapon of critique and resistance in the hands of the colonized. More important, English enabled Chinese writers to have their voice heard in a global vernacular and lay claim to cosmopolitanism.⁴⁷

The liberal cosmopolitanism of Shanghai, however, has large blind spots and is implicated in the myth of culture as a form of capital and commodity. The expansion of global capitalism, wrote Karl Marx, not only has “given a cosmopolitan character” to local economies but also facilitates the circulation of culture: “In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nationals. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property . . . and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.”⁴⁸ Wary of the inevitable loss of deep-seated national culture and tradition in commodity circulation, Levenson called this cosmopolitanism the “silk fan” approach. Equipped with transcendent aesthetic patterns, this style attempts to “construct a culture out of selected values from particular histories, so that a cultural Esperanto will accord with the new technological universe.”⁴⁹ The term *technological* here points to the formal and abstract patterns expurgated of particularities and complexities of a lifeworld, pointing to Levenson’s insight of museumization of culture as relics for a detached taste.

The process of museumization, aided by commodification and canonization, consecrates formal properties of literature and arts and elevates them to an exalted space of “the world republic of letters.”⁵⁰ Literary values accrue to a reserve of cultural capital and become reified into a currency. Composed of discrete tropes, styles, schools, and aesthetics, such cosmopolitanism is illusory and becomes vulnerable, as Pheng Cheah puts it, to “the manipulative constitution of taste, desire, and opinion by the global commodity circuits of image production.”⁵¹ Disengaged from the struggle and lived experience of a semicolonized nation, aesthetic works are celebrated as something pure,

free, and universal. Writers turn away from the reality and became aficionados trading on commodities and currencies in a literary marketplace. At the risk of simplification, one may say that liberal cosmopolitanism in Shanghai was contemplative and obsessed with a syncretic spectacle of colorful diversity. Humanist and individualistic, it valorized a transcendent subject capable of cherry picking timeless cultural essences from national traditions and adding them to a world repertoire.

The ivory tower of cosmopolitanism ignores this question: Who is the ruler, and what kind of power structure dominates the garden variety of world culture? It averts the eye from the stark reality of the unequal relations governed by colonial control over peripheral territories, markets, and culture. As a semicolonized country, China was far from being an equal party and had no access to this freewheeling conversation. For all their rich heritage and long tradition, Chinese writers were unable to gain a hearing. The truism that diplomacy is not an option for a weak country applies just as well to writers of a colony intent on promoting the visions of cosmopolitanism.

A movement to overcome the unequal conditions of colonialism and imperialism, the Chinese Revolution pursued a different cosmopolitanism: socialist internationalism. To be sure, liberal cosmopolitanism shared with socialist internationalism certain aspirations and a common origin in the European Enlightenment. In Henri de Saint-Simon's utopian vision, socialist internationalism called for a European Parliament in which people's activities could "extend beyond their own country" and achieve the universal outlook.⁵² China's May Fourth or New Culture movement cherished cosmopolitan dreams. Li Dazhao, a leading socialist, for instance, lumped liberal cosmopolitanism together with communism and socialism in extolling the October Revolution. His cosmopolitanism gathered into one package humanism, universal principles (*gongli* 公理), pacifism, democracy, freedom, the red flag, working classes, enlightened citizens, and world leaders such as Woodrow Wilson.⁵³

But the growing aggression of colonialism and imperialism forced revolutionaries to approach China's future along the lines of internationalism. Tackling the dual task of national independence and social emancipation, revolutionaries became both nationalist and internationalist. They mobilized a wide swath of the population for national liberation from colonial rule and against Japanese invasion while forging alliances and solidarity among workers of the world.

Given the close links between national liberation and internationalism, the idea of nation takes on prominence in theories of socialist internationalism. Long a lacuna in orthodox Marxist internationalism, nationality is

disengaged from social and class emancipation. Marx famously remarked, “The nationality of the worker is neither French, nor English, nor German, it is labor, free slavery, self-huckstering. His government is neither French, nor English, nor German, it is capital.”⁵⁴ When the capitalist system exploited workers everywhere and divided the world into a bourgeois upper class and a proletarian underclass, workers’ national identity seemed a matter of no importance. Workers of one nation shared a common fate with those of other nations, becoming a universal, world-historical class regardless of national identities.

This is why internationalism and nationalism have been viewed as antithetical. The former refers to a supranational world order, whereas the latter is rooted in a particular national community. Throughout this book, however, I examine how this binary is crossed and how two terms interact and transform each other over time. In the context of revolutionary China, what seals the bonds of nation with socialist internationalism was the rise of a national liberation movement: the Chinese Revolution. On the one hand, colonized China must combat colonialism and build a sovereign nation-state. On the other hand, the nation’s laboring classes were to be mobilized as participants in nation building and social emancipation, laying the foundation of a people’s republic that is a socialist state. Thus, the Chinese Revolution embarked on the dual track of national liberation and class emancipation, taking on the double features of nationalism and internationalism.

What made this dual task visible and urgent was the watershed event of the October Revolution of Soviet Russia. Identifying domestic class oppression with colonial subjugation by foreign powers, Chinese socialists redefined the nation: the nation was to be constituted by a coalition of working classes seeking both social emancipation and national liberation. As John Fitzgerald puts it, the Chinese Revolution “seems to have delivered the awakening message to class and nation at the same time.”⁵⁵

Premised on a cosmopolitan future made possible by national liberation and class emancipation, socialist internationalism, in Wang Hui’s words, “stems from linking the liberation of one’s nationality with that of others rather than from an amnesia about national identity.”⁵⁶ The term *class nation* expressed this duality and gained prominence, opening the door to a sense of the common fate of working classes across national, racial, and ethnic lines. Revolutionary thinkers extended the concept of class nation to align with oppressed classes of other nations and ethnic groups. Affinity and solidarity linked them in a common fight against global capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism, warranting a passage through national to international struggles.

In “On New Democracy,” a speech delivered in Yan’an in 1940, Mao Zedong stated, “The Chinese Revolution is part of the World Revolution.”⁵⁷ China’s nation building, from the Opium Wars to the late Qing reform and the Republican Revolution of 1911, had centered on the bourgeois nation-state, with the express goal of fitting China into the capitalist world system and turning her into “an independent, democratic society.”⁵⁸ World War I pushed China in a different direction. The deepening crisis of capitalism, the plundering of the colonies, and the birth of the first socialist state in Russia redrew the battle line between global capitalism and the international proletariat. The bourgeois project was “to clear the path for the development of capitalism,” but Chinese revolutionaries looked forward to a working-class nation aligned with its counterparts in both the Western metropolises and far-flung colonies.⁵⁹

The 1931 Constitution of the First All China Soviet Congress declared this world-class subjectivity and projected the united front of working classes beyond China. American journalist Edgar Snow captured this internationalist sentiment at the grassroots level. In Yan’an, the birthplace of the socialist nation, national and cultural prejudices are “sublimated in class antagonism that knew no national boundaries.” The Chinese peasants hated the invaders from imperialist Japan but knew that “the Japanese masses were their potential allies.”⁶⁰ They treated oppressive foreign capitalists with as much hostility as they did Chinese landlords and compradors. Seeing themselves as part of a broad-based movement, they realized that their revolution was not isolated and that “hundreds of millions of workers, not only in Russia, but also throughout the world, are anxiously watching them, and when the time comes will emulate them.”⁶¹

The vision of the world splits in this shift from liberal cosmopolitanism to revolutionary internationalism. To be sure, capitalist modernity is nothing if not a world-making process. Capitalism by nature must extend capital and production around the world in search of markets, raw materials, colonies, and domination, remaking the world after its image. Yet such a world deepens rivalry, exploitation, inequality, and poverty. Spreading Western culture in the name of cosmopolitanism, the capitalist world order justifies the legitimacy and structure of colonial domination. In contrast, socialist internationalism cherished a dream of a subaltern coalition of national people composed of working classes—an alliance that heralded the Third World and the Global South. The twin theme of class emancipation and national liberation undergirded Mao’s claim that the Chinese Revolution is part of world revolution.

Levenson was probably right in suggesting that Mao’s melding of nationalism and internationalism was to redeem the ancient dream of China’s

world leadership. Although “communist cosmopolitanism” derived from a Marxist worldview, it “compensates for Confucianism lost,” serving “national enhancement and defense.”⁶² As I show in this book, the ancient motifs have persisted and inspired Chinese thinkers to engage the nation-state while articulating world visions.

Chapter Overviews

Focused on Kang Youwei’s *Datong shu*, chapter 1 discusses an updated Confucian universalism—a hybrid of ancient and modern ideas. Faced with interstate conflict and realpolitik logic, Kang drew on the classical ideas of *gong* 公 (public), benevolence, empathy, and aesthetic pleasure to construct a *datong* order. Resonating with the Kantian notion of *sensus communis*, Kang proposed that moral empathy and aesthetic communication could bring people and nations together. The Confucian classic *Chunqiu* prioritizes moral assessment as the guiding spirit of the *tianxia* order. Rooted in benevolence, equality, and popular sovereignty, this order treats democratic values as universal rather than of Western provenance. Kang’s Confucianism called for the curbing of monarchical power and religious authority by promoting social mobility, land redistribution, popular sovereignty, and meritocracy.

Chapter 2 examines how Liang Qichao grappled with tensions between nation-state and *tianxia* while attempting to reconcile them. Analyzing the novel *Xin Zhongguo weilai ji* and the treatise *Xinmin shuo* 新民說 (Discourse on a new people), the chapter reveals the contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Liang advocated the idea of public morality as opposed to private morality. Through moral reform and commitment to the common good, a national people would emerge imbued with a public ethos. The new people not only constitute a nation but are ready to embrace the *tianxia* outlook. Public morality fosters far-reaching compassion and empathy, manifest in the internationalism of mutual assistance among independence-seeking and decolonizing nations. This blended into Liang’s discovery of socialist precursors of harmony, equality, and redistribution in the Confucian classics.

Looking at the world literature seminar taught by novelist Zhou Libo, chapter 3 articulates a new configuration of humanism, nationalism, and internationalism. Teaching European fiction in the Lu Xun Academy of Arts in Yan’an, Zhou evinced a shift from romantic humanism to class-based, socialist humanism. In his lectures, Leo Tolstoy’s penetration into socioeconomic inequality in Russian land ownership transcended the

sentimentalism of European novels. The wartime urgency of national survival intensified the debate on the national form and worldwide socialist movements. The national form came to be conceived as the creation of a modern people, not passively received heritages. The idea of class nation viewed the toiling peasant class, not the national elite, as the mainstay of a nation. As the national independence movement paralleled working-class emancipation, nationalism paired with socialist internationalism.

Chapter 4 addresses the interplay of national defense and internationalism in the Korean War. The film *Heroic Sons and Daughters* weaponizes the spirit of self-sacrifice based on patriotism and internationalism. A continuation of the Chinese Revolution, China's involvement in the war extends class liberation beyond its borders. The politics of spirit bolsters the fighting spirit and inspires moral power over weaponry. Embodied by what Schwartz called the "reign of virtue," the empowered spirit illustrates Mao's strategy of the people's war and extols mass power as a spiritual atom bomb against imperialist superpower.⁶³

Chapter 5 addresses the multiethnic conditions of the imperial legacy that informed China's minority policy. Refuting the ethnonationalist lens, the film *Five Golden Flowers* (1959) portrays ethnic diversity and warm interaction between the "Han" cultural professionals and Bai minority workers. Propagating laughter, enthusiasm, and hard work through eulogistic comedy and across ethnic lines, the film highlights the inclusion of ethnic minorities into economic production and socialist communities. "Han" artists associate with minority people as humble pupils eagerly absorbing local ethnic culture, and national unity is anchored in multiethnic diversity.

Chapter 6 addresses the linkages among Third World internationalism, socialist development, and global Maoism. In opposition to the uneven, neo-colonial regime, the hegemonic powers, and the modernization paradigm, China pursued a different path of social economic development. Driven by the Maoist mass line, self-reliance, and the faith in the masses, the socialist development sought to combine social and economic progress to bridge the divides between city and countryside, industry and agriculture, and mental and manual labor. The valorization of the peasantry's revolutionary potentials and mass-line mobilization appealed strongly to the Third World and, during the heady days of May 1968, inspired Alain Badiou's critique of dogmatic Marxism and the rereading of Maoism.

The rise of the neoliberal empire in the wake of the Cold War erased the memory of Third World collective politics and reshaped Chinese studies in the United States. Addressing the interplay of capital and geopolitics,

chapter 7 shows the rise of capitalist cosmopolitanism and its depoliticizing tendencies. The trashing of memories of socialism and the Third World to the dustbin of history hollows out the subjective agency and transformative energy of collective movements. A new cosmopolitanism premised on possessive individualism and neoliberalism has reshaped the study of Chinese culture in the American classroom.

Chapter 8 concludes with a reexamination of key ideas and frameworks underpinning the historical case studies throughout the book. Many terms—empire and nation-state, ethnicity, universalism and cosmopolitanism, value and history, culture and politics, nationalism and internationalism, depoliticization and globalization—are fundamental to understanding China's past and ongoing engagement with the world. They have undergone controversy and distortion but maintain certain lines of consistency. Sharing Wang Hui's definition of Chinese modernity as a "modernity against modernity," the chapter delves into the discursive frameworks, historical practices, and polemics of these conceptual frameworks and clarifies their meanings, uses, and variations in history. The book ends by asserting China's deep yearning to be recognized as an equal part of the world. Involved in a national-international nexus, Chinese thinkers and modernizers have striven, in Perry Anderson's words, to "transcend the nation-state toward a wider community."⁶⁴

DUKE

Notes

Series Editor's Foreword

- 1 Ricci, *True Meaning of the Lord under Heaven*, 31–32. The full opening line is “平治庸理, 惟竟於一,” which Ricci’s English translators render as “All doctrines about making the whole world peaceful and governing correctly are focused on the principle of uniqueness.”
- 2 Lewi and Hseih, “*Tianxia* and the Invention of Empire in East Asia.”
- 3 Schuessler, *ABC Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese*, 495; Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimage*, cited in the *Oxford English Dictionary* entry for “tian.”

Introduction

- 1 Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, 235.
- 2 Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 5.
- 3 Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, 201.
- 4 Larson, *Zhang Yimou*, 333–45.
- 5 Liang, *Liang Qichao quanji*, 3031–32.
- 6 Liang, *Liang Qichao quanji*, 2978.
- 7 Liang, *Liang Qichao quanji*, 2986. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

- 8 Christopher Coker conceives civilization in terms of culture history and inherited values, antithetical to cosmopolitanism. Coker, *The Rise of the Civilizational State*.
- 9 Zhao, *Tianxia tixi*.
- 10 Pines, *The Everlasting Empire*, 2–11.
- 11 Luo Mengce, *Zhongguo lun*, 11–12.
- 12 Schwartz, “Themes in Intellectual History,” 100.
- 13 Schwartz, “Themes in Intellectual History,” 104.
- 14 Schwartz, “Themes in Intellectual History,” 104.
- 15 Hutters, *Bringing the World Home*.
- 16 Liu, *Translingual Practice*; Liu, *The Clash of Empires*.
- 17 Karl, *Staging the World*, 16.
- 18 K. Qian, *Imperial-Time-Order*; Volland, *Socialist Cosmopolitanism*.
- 19 Hsiung, *China into its Second Rise*, xviii–xix, 245.
- 20 Sun, *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, 9:226.
- 21 Quoted in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, 201.
- 22 Wang Gungwu, *Renewal*, 1.
- 23 Wang Hui, *Xiandai Zhongguo*.
- 24 Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture*, 217.
- 25 Rowe, *China’s Last Empire*, 284.
- 26 Wang Gungwu, *Renewal*, ix, x.
- 27 Wang Hui, *China from Empire to Nation-State*, 33.
- 28 Wang Hui, “From Empire to State,” 49.
- 29 Wang Hui, *Xiandai Zhongguo*, 21.
- 30 Wang Hui, *Xiandai Zhongguo*, 21.
- 31 Wang Hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, 32.
- 32 Wang Hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, 32.
- 33 Wang Hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, 86.
- 34 See chapter 1 for Kang’s Confucian universalism.
- 35 Liang, *Liang Qichao quanji*, 661.
- 36 Liang, *Liang Qichao quanji*, 5610.
- 37 Smith, *An Inquiry*, 2:141. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 301.
- 38 Levenson, *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, 19.
- 39 Daruvala, *Zhou Zuoren*, 40–46.
- 40 Zhou Zuoren, “Humane Literature,” 154.
- 41 Zhou Zuoren, “Humane Literature,” 161.
- 42 Shih, *Lure of the Modern*, 153.
- 43 Qian Suoqiao, *Liberal Cosmopolitanism*, 6.
- 44 Qian Suoqiao, *Liberal Cosmopolitanism*, 60.
- 45 Qian Suoqiao, *Liberal Cosmopolitanism*, 61.
- 46 Shen, *Cosmopolitan Publics*, 42.
- 47 Shen, *Cosmopolitan Publics*, 4.
- 48 Marx and Engels, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 338–39.
- 49 Levenson, *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, xx.
- 50 Casanova, *The World Republic of Letters*, 12.

- 51 Cheah, "What Is a World?," 33.
- 52 Schwarzmantel, "Nationalism and Socialist Internationalism," 637.
- 53 Li Dazhao, *Li Dazhao quanji*, 259.
- 54 Marx, "Draft of an Article," 280.
- 55 Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, 31.
- 56 Wang Hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, 35.
- 57 Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, 2:343.
- 58 Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, 2:342.
- 59 Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, 2:344.
- 60 Snow, *Red Star over China*, 406–7.
- 61 Snow, *Red Star over China*, 406.
- 62 Levenson, *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, 28, 30.
- 63 Schwartz, *China and Other Matters*, 169.
- 64 Anderson, "Internationalism," 6.

Chapter One. Morality and Global Vision in Kang Youwei's World Community

Portions of chapter 1 were published in *Chinese Vision of World Order*, ed. Ban Wang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 87–105.

- 1 Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 4.
- 2 Quoted in Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 4.
- 3 Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2.
- 4 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 21.
- 5 Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 26.
- 6 Levenson, *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, 24.
- 7 De Bary and Bloom, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 343, translation modified.
- 8 Kang Youwei, *Kang Youwei jingdian wenchun*, 10.
- 9 Kang Youwei, *Datong shu*, 69; Kang Youwei, *Ta T'ung Shu*, 80. I modified the English translation by Laurence Thompson. Further references to Kang's book appear parenthetically in the text with two sets of page numbers, for the original and its translation by Thompson.
- 10 Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, 260–61.
- 11 De Bary and Bloom, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 343, translation modified.
- 12 Kant, *Political Writings*, 44.
- 13 Kant, *Political Writings*, 44.
- 14 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 301.
- 15 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 73–75.
- 16 Cheah, *Inhuman Conditions*, 96.
- 17 Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, 96.
- 18 Quoted in Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire*, 148.
- 19 Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire*, 144.
- 20 Levenson, *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, 20.
- 21 Kang Youwei, *Datong shu*, 5. I use Jonathan Spence's translation of this passage. See Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 66.