Architecture and the Right to Heal
Resettler Nationalism in the Aftermath of Conflict and Disaster

Esra Akcan

Architecture and the Right to Heal

BUY

Architecture and the Right to Heal

Resettler Nationalism in the
Aftermath of Conflict and Disaster

Esra Akcan

In the memory of my father,
and to my grandmother and mother,
who endured this history

Contents

Acknowledgments

When I started *Architecture and the Right to Heal* in 2017, there was no global pandemic, no recent earthquake in Turkey, no active war in Gaza or Sudan, and yet the historical forces at the root cause of almost all of these conflicts and disasters had been unfolding. Many individuals and institutions helped me conduct this research. The book was undertaken with residential fellowships and research grants at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard University, the Canadian Center for Architecture in Montreal, the Mui Ho Center for Cities Research Grant at Cornell-AAP, and the Mellon-funded Migrations Grant at Cornell University. Additional funding was provided from my Michael A. McCarthy Professorship (2019–24) research budget and the Institute for Comparative Modernities at Cornell University. I am indebted to these institutions for their financial support without which none of the travel for fieldwork or archival research would have been possible, and to the anonymous reviewers for these grants who trusted me even when the idea was in its premature stages. And, of course, I thank my cofellows and research fellows whose intelligence and own research in arts and academic disciplines quite different from mine inspired and motivated me to find my own place in the universe.

This research was conducted on sites and archives in Canada, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I am indebted to all the librarians and staff who steward the documents in the archives whose list you will find in the bibliography. I would like to extend additional thanks to the individuals who guided me through the documents and places much beyond my expectations, and without whose help you would not be able to read the following pages. Let me list them in alphabetical order of countries where I met them.

In Canada, as I was conducting research at the Canadian Center for Architecture (CCA) for *Abolish Human Bans*, I stumbled across hints that prompted me to look further for *Architecture and the Right to Heal*. Among them, I am most proud of embarking on research about the brilliant but previously unacknowledged Sudanese architect Abdel Moneim Mustafa. After

my research in Sudan, I made the connection with Moneim Mustafa's office and the CCA, which culminated in the digitalization of the architect's drawings and their placement in Wikimedia Commons for public use. In addition to the individuals in Sudan listed below, I would like to thank, on behalf of us all who are interested in architectural knowledge, Martien de Vletter, Albert Ferré, and Rafico Ruiz. Little did we know back then that this initiative to preserve architectural drawings beyond the norms of colonial collecting would gain additional urgency, given the war that exploded in Sudan shortly after. As I watched the fragmented videos broadcasted by war journalists, I wondered if the drawings or the buildings that I photographed a couple years earlier still stood. To this day, I do not know the answer to this question.

In Egypt, Balsam Abdul-Rahman stepped in enthusiastically to guide me through the Hassan Fathy papers and other materials during my limited time in the Rare Books and Special Collections Library at the American University in Cairo.

In Greece, I cannot thank enough Giota Pavlidou at the Doxiadis Archives, whose broad knowledge about Constantinos Doxiadis and the documents in the collection has been guiding scholars tremendously. Additionally, Giota helped me navigate all the other archives in Athens with kindness, good will, and pleasant demeanor. I would also like to thank Barbara Kontogianni at the Center for Asia Minor Studies for their generosity with the permissions to publish images, in addition to all the other archives in Athens. Ioanna Theocharopoulou's and Şükrü Ilıcak's moral support and tips in traveling around Greece and in understanding different urban layers of neighborhoods in Athens were matchless (in addition to their own scholarship, of course). Finally, my heartfelt gratitude goes to one of my Airbnb hosts, Kostas, who accompanied me through the entire Evia island, and worked his magic to enter the churches and houses of Nea Sinasos and Nea Prokopi—not to mention his tips for all the other marvels along the coastal villages.

In Iran, what would I have done without the wonderful Yaser Parsa and Sepideh Khabiri, and Anbar Fereshteh Oreizi, who made these contacts? While I ended up including only one project intended for but never implemented in Tehran, the site visits to similar projects across many cities in Iran allowed me to have a better understanding. I would also like to thank Pamela Karimi for her welcoming and encouraging comments about my work, and Nader Ardalan for his responsiveness and generosity in image permissions.

In Iraq, I would like to thank my colleagues Saba Sami and Mohammed Kassim for their time and willingness to share during my visit to Baghdad,

and Caecilia Pieri for facilitating my introduction to Iraqi colleagues. I hope the publications that came out of these encounters, and the collaborations we have cultivated since then, pay due tribute to your generosity. I cannot wait to continue these partnerships. I also thank Zaydoon Munir for giving image permissions for his father Hisham Munir's work.

In Sudan, I have a very long list of individuals whom I am indebted to. My colleague Salah Hassan at Cornell University has not only been an inspiration with his scholarly work and institution building skills, but also a vital support in my introduction to networks. Migdad Bannaga accompanied me to all buildings designed by Abdel Moneim Mustafa, and I am forever grateful. Additionally, I would like to thank Adil Mustafa Ahmad for sharing his ideas and own experience about architecture and architectural education in Khartoum; the Technocon office for making Moneim Mustafa's drawings available; Amira Swar-El-Dahab, Osman M. El Kheir, and Elamin Osman for their intellectual hospitality and knowledge; Ilham Abdalla Tagelsir Ali for her help in Khartoum; and the Mansour Khalid, Bedridi Suleyman, Mahmood Abdelrahim, and Haj Al-Safi families for their hospitality and opening their houses. Once I started publishing about Sudan, Suha Hasan, Mohieldin Gamal, and Mai Abusaleh reached out as they were establishing a Docomomo chapter in Sudan, and the Modern Sudan Collective. Their work for the documentation and preservation of modern architecture continues to inspire me. As I was writing the manuscript, the war displaced almost all of these individuals, and foreclosed the possibilities we had imagined—a case in point for the wounds created by historically and globally inflicted conflicts and disasters that this book tries to expose and to heal.

In Turkey, it is impossible to list all the individuals who prepared me for this book, including my grandparents and parents who lived through this history and planted seeds of curiosity in my mind with real-life stories that they told in passing. Even though I deliberately did not turn this research into an autoethnography, trace family lineages, or seek DNA tests, I assume a piece of me can be found on the lands that this book covers from West Asia to Northeast Africa and to Southeast and Northeast Europe, given the mass and family migrations that took place due to the international treaties, compulsory or voluntary displacements, and slave trades that this book records during the long dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of successor states. For the particular research that went into this book, I can hardly give due acknowledgment to Aslı Özbay, who generously shared her work and introduced me to key actors in Cappadocia, including those who opened doors of closed churches, chapels, mosques, museums, cisterns, and

hotels. Cappadocia is very lucky to have you, Aslı. I am indebted to all Saturday Mothers in Istanbul, and especially Maside Ocak, Sebla Arcan, and Aylin Tekiner, who inspire me with their human rights activism, their integrity, and their artwork, and who helped me in reaching visual documents of their movement. I would like to thank Mehmet Kentel for his help in researching Istanbul Research Institute's Collection, and Aslıhan Günhan for the documents on Sudan in Ottoman Archives. Finally, I am grateful to Ayfer Mertler and Hatice Küçükakyüz for their incredible generosity during my research in Zeytinburnu Municipality's archives. Even though they may be disappointed with some of my criticism of the municipality's policies, I like to think they would appreciate this book. On a personal level, I can't express enough my indebtedness to Aybars Aşçı, a migrant from Turkey to New York like me, for years of friendship that always reminded me of what really matters.

In the United Kingdom, I would like to thank the entire staff of the Archives and Special Collections of Durham University, and especially Francis Gotto, whose tips in searching through the Sudan Archives led to marvelous discoveries. He also helped me get permissions for images that are being published here for the first time.

In the United States, I am indebted to the archivists and librarians of the Frances Loeb Special Collections, and numerous Gropius collections at Harvard University; and of those in the Architectural Archives of the McHarg Center at the University of Pennsylvania. I would especially like to extend my thanks to William Whitaker for his tips in searching the McHarg collection that led me to the understanding of a very complex international project.

At Cornell University, I officially consulted experts for this book, including Magnus Fiskesjö, who advised me on the Uyghur refugees from China in Turkey; and Amanda Rodewald and Christopher Dunn, who guided me in matters related to wildlife biology and botanical studies. A feedback structure was established with the support of a generous Mellon grant so that the intellectual labor for this expert consultation gets compensated. This structure acknowledges the need for more collaboration between humanities scholars and scientists to bear on issues of the designed environment, both architectural and natural, in settlements with more-than-human residents. I thank all the scientists and academics who helped me understand the complexities of architecture in its relation to other disciplines. My talented and hard-working research assistant Farzana Hossein drew the speculative maps of Zeytinburnu for chapter 3; and Ronishka Sabu Nalpathil helped in formatting the bibliography. Needless to say, my students at Cornell University gave priceless feedback when I presented parts of this work in seminars. I would like to thank

all the faculty and doctoral students at the History of Architecture and Urban Development (HAUD) PhD program, who were erudite, careful, and stimulating commentators, and especially my primary doctoral advisees Salvatore Dellaria, Lara Fresko, Filip Galic, Aslıhan Günhan, Eun Jeong Kim, Gökhan Kodalak, Michael Moynihan, Elizabeth Muller, Ana Ozaki, Sergio Preston, Ecem Sarıçayır, Priyanka Sen, Alican Taylan, and Asya Ece Uzmay for the opportunity to think together. I cherish the feedback and conversations with Cornell colleagues after I made presentations on this book, including, again in alphabetical order, Begüm Adalet, Leslie Adelson, Caitlin Blanchfield, Iftikhar Dadi, Naminata Diabete, Seema Golestaneh, Maria Gonzalez-Pendas (special thanks to you, Maria), Saida Hodzic, Pamela Karimi, Lori Khatchadourian, Farzin Lotfi-Jam, Fouad Makki, Natalie Melas, Mostafa Minawi, Susan-Buck Morss, Viranjini P. Munasinghe, Caroline O'Donnell, Aziz Rana, Rachel Beatty Riedl, Suman Seth, Deborah Starr, Ashley Stockstill, Eric Tagliacozzo, Chantal Thomas, Wendy Wolford, and others. These faculty and students continue to inspire me with their talent, brilliance, commitment, and research. My heartfelt thanks to Andrei Marmor, who had to sit through listening and responding to hours of doubt, and who accompanied me to some of the site trips in Athens and Cappadocia, where we sometimes ended up finding no trace of the buildings I had promised to visit.

I shared some parts of this book's work in progress in departmental lectures, conference papers, and publications, and I thank my colleagues who invited me or accepted my application to these venues. They include, in alphabetical order, Annemarie Adams, Hoor al Qasimi, Angela Andersen, Daniel Barber, Basile C. Baudez and Aaron Shkuda, Victoria Beard, Sibel Bozdoğan, Peter Christensen, Sheila Crane, Iftikhar Dadi, Mohieldin Gamal, Reto Geiser, Berin Gür and Neşe Gürallar, Elie Haddad, Salah Hassan, Steffen Haug, Jocobe Huet, Ruba Kana'an, Farhan Karim, Vladimir Kulic and Amit Srivastava, Enno Maessen, Reinhold Martin, Conor Moynihan and Jamie DiSarno, Maria Luisa Palumbo, Spyros Papapetros, Petros Phokaides and Fatina Abreek-Zubiedat, Panayiota Pyla, Sonia S. Ralston, Pari Riahi, Sean Roberts and Radha Dalal and Jochen Sokoly, Avinoam Shalem, Ufuk Soyöz, Martino Stierli, Alican Taylan and Elisa Iturbe, Ipek Türeli, Jim Williamson, Meejin Yoon, and Claire Zimmerman. Your trust in my work in progress led to valuable feedback and gave me the wherewithal to situate it in multiple fields.

At Duke University Press, I owe a lot to the four anonymous blind reviewers of the manuscript, whose praise gave me self-confidence and motivated me to become more ambitious about the book's relevance

DUKE

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Introduction

This book explores architecture's role in healing after conflicts and disasters by discussing buildings and spaces in relation to transitional justice and energy transition. It locates spaces of political and ecological harm, and makes a call to repurpose them as healing places where violence and violations are confronted and accountability and reparations are instituted. While working on the manuscript in the past few years, I frequently came back to the premise that started this research: To insist on imagining the future is sometimes the only resistance against the destructive powers in times of crisis. How reversible is damage due to state or social violence? How does a postdisaster society accomplish justice? As professions of futurity, architecture and planning are involved in healing, but they have also been historically responsible for building a world where a majority of the human population lives in unjust and disaster-prone environments. The book therefore critically examines the causes of and opportunistic responses to crises that foreclose the right to heal, and at the same time demonstrates architecture's potential for a meaningful reckoning and repair. As chapters proceed from the healing of an individual to that of a rural community, an urban district, the world, and the earth, they demonstrate that sudden shocks have deep roots in history and trace the real cause of present wounds to intertwined processes where colonizing empires dissolved into industrializing and purist nation-states and later became integrated into the neoliberal world order.

Architecture is sometimes an offender, at other times a healer in conflicts and disasters. Many of us must have experienced or imagined, at least once, what it means to watch one's home burn down in a fire, to be evacuated from one's flooded house with a rescue helicopter above the roof, to return to the rubble of one's neighborhood after a civil war, or to wait for days for rescue workers in the dark void of a collapsed building after an earthquake while dying slowly with a sense of abandonment by inhaling toxic dust. A pandemic and three wars took place during the time that I worked on this book on lands that relate to it. News outpoured frequently about the hottest

year and the hottest day in history as well as climate refugees. After the disastrous earthquake that hit Turkey and Syria on February 6, 2023, as I was writing this book, I kept being haunted by a self-made video that circulated on social media. It showed a family, trapped in a claustrophobic alcove of a collapsed building, who sent love and apologies to their friends outside, unable to move even minimally, next to their lifeless child who they did not include in the camera's frame to spare us from seeing the deceased body. Less than a year later, the voices and images of those trapped in Gaza shook the world, as well as my immediate university campus environment, due to the military violence that the International Court of Justice described as a plausible genocide, and the United Nations Special Rapporteur reported as an actual one. We feel not only pain but also collective guilt and anger coming face to face with such accounts, because deep down we know that many conflicts and disasters could have been avoided through better planning and architecture, not to mention better theories, governments, and policies.

There is considerable literature on the reconstruction of cities after international wars and attacks, but transitions after internal social-, state- or business-led aggressions are not explored. There are ample journalistic essays on state violence and climate change, but they do not trace the interconnected historical causes of traumas or theorize right to heal as a simultaneous struggle toward social, global, and environmental justice. Connected to one another both conceptually and episodically, each chapter of *Architecture and the Right to Heal* brings new archival and on-site research to an unknown story about an ongoing struggle toward healing on lands at the intersection of Afro-Euro-Asia (ex-Ottoman lands referred to as "Middle East," "northeast Africa," and "Balkans") while also referring to similar examples around the world.

Architecture and the Right to Heal substantiates the argument that seemingly singular and isolated shocks have deep roots in intertwined history. Chapter 1, "Enforced Disappearance," tells the story of a mother whose child did not return from state custody; chapter 2, "Partition," follows two rural communities that were subject to forced mass migration; chapter 3, "Collapse," focuses on an urban district where residents lost their houses due to civil wars, state demolitions, and earthquakes; chapter 4, "Climate Disaster," discusses famine, flood, sandstorm, and other catastrophes; and chapter 5, "Extinction," discusses architects' responses after realizing the terminal loss of animals. Each chapter illustrates that these traumatic conflicts and disasters are in fact caused by much longer and entangled processes, commonly referred to as colonization, nationalization, capitalization, and industrialization.

The book suggests and elaborates on the concept of *resettler nationalism* to come to terms with these seemingly benign but actually violent historical processes on the lands that it covers throughout the long twentieth century.

Architects were frequently complicit in serving ruling powers including governments, businesses, and ethnic or economic elites in maintaining their control and advantage over the environment at the expanse of natural and social fabrics. Healing is a long and often incomplete process that erases the damaging impacts of these processes of command over individuals, communities, and nature. Beyond the limits of the debates over "the past torn and the past restored," or the journalistic essays that describe state violence, natural disasters, or international hypocrisy ahistorically, *Architecture and the Right to Heal* demonstrates that a more extensive and layered spectrum of social, global, and environmental issues may be addressed through architectural history. Each type of conflict and disaster calls for a discussion on related architectural programs—housing is implicated in healing after mass displacement and earthquakes; memorials matter for repairing state violence; master plans and campuses are implicated in climate disasters; gardens, parks, and ruderal landscapes matter for preventing the loss of biodiversity.

While "right to heal" reflects conceptual ambitions, the book's historical contribution foregrounds the transition of the Ottoman Empire into post-imperial national orders after European colonization throughout the twentieth century. I aim to write the global history of modernism in architecture in higher resolution and to highlight the historical layers on lands that are still excluded from current narratives. Part of my reason for choosing this focus was my dissatisfaction with the formulaic global history of the recent years, which has created a simplified narrative about the colonization and decolonization of the world based mostly on the history of British, French, and Spanish colonization. While correcting earlier accounts and exposing the entanglement of modernity, capitalism, and coloniality, this history excludes large sections of the globe. It ignores differences between lands before and after they were colonized by the European imperial powers, and the political and ecological harms of modernity's other dark sides that were reliant on or followed colonialism, such as national partitions, religious divides, and ethnocentrism. The British Empire's post-Ottoman interests, such as colonies and mandates in today's Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Sudan, and targets of intervention such as Greece, Turkey, and the Balkans provide good examples in order to trace the intertwined history of colonization, nationalization, and carbonization or, to put it in other words, to show the explanatory power of resettler nationalism in global history. Racist constructs

of European Orientalism against the Ottomans and extractive economies of industrial capitalism, on the one hand, and the rising racist and classist tensions among the Muslim and non-Muslim *millets* and *unsurs* of the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, converged with major consequences on the built environment. This book discusses the long dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the geometric center of Africa, Asia, and Europe, when culturally and religiously mixed populations were divided during the making of the modern world order. This history at the intersection of Afro-Euro-Asia demonstrates that modernity partitioned this land into three continents and built physical and imaginative borders between and within them.

Healing as a Matter of Rights

Healing is used as an umbrella term in this book, which encompasses but differs from *repair*, *restoration*, *reparation*, or *restitution*. As distinct from mechanistic or financial metaphors such as repair and reparation, *healing* refers to the improvement of human and nonhuman organisms. Healing takes place not only due to the actions of responsible institutions but also through self-improvement. Healing foregrounds architecture's worldmaking abilities, but it does not always involve repair or restoration. It sometimes means choosing not to repair. The phrase *right to heal* acknowledges healing as a human and nonhuman species right, and identifies individuals and institutions that hold the responsibility to deliver this right. Healing as a matter of rights alludes to both a lengthy and intertwined process of struggle toward social, global, and environmental justice, and an extended definition and practice of rights that fosters international solidarity. This book starts and ends with an advocacy on the expansion and implementation of human and nonhuman species rights. Chapters in between discuss the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire's dissolution by offering the idea of resettler nationalism as a framework to explain the political and ecological harms of the period. All chapters demonstrate how healing (or the lack thereof) manifests in different situations, after distinct types of traumas, and how it may take diverse forms.

There is a recent momentum in the world to reckon with the injustices of the past, including those of military regimes, apartheids, civil wars, colonialism, and slavery—and a growing anxiety over and backlash to reparations. The term *reparations* originally referred to monetary compensations paid to countries after wars and to individuals after legal procedures. Recent discussions call for broadening this nomenclature of diplomacy and law, and for searching for ways to implement not only material compensations

but also nonmaterial restitutions. This book responds to this call for finding more approaches that invite societies to take accountability for political and ecological harms of the past. In this sense, *reparations* means justice achieved retroactively. *Architecture and the Right to Heal* foregrounds the accentuated role of history writing in matters of justice, while not using the term *justice* monolithically. Instead, it foregrounds the distinctions between penal and nonpunitive forms of justice, as well differences within nonpunitive or restorative justice. For instance, distributive justice seeks to close the present gaps in a society, such as income gaps, education gaps, or incarceration gaps by allocating current resources more evenly, but right to heal is invested in tracing the historical causes of this gap much more precisely and bringing justice against past violations of fairness for a better justification of redistribution. As Ta-Nehisi Coates, whose essay "The Case for Reparations" brought new momentum to the idea of Black reparations, would say, one cannot close an achievement gap without closing the injury gap.[1] These discussions on reparations call for a more holistic approach to justice to be achieved retroactively, and to healing through justice. This book elaborates on a prolonged and delayed notion of transitional justice for this healing process—a sphere in human rights and international law that was officially recognized in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

But what exactly is "human" and what exactly are human rights? I do not take the concept of "human" lightly. A new and expanded practice of human rights first needs to confront and overcome the definition of the "human," which, as Sylvia Wynter warned, had been constructed as if it is synonymous with "Man" (i.e., "Western" and "white") during European colonial modernity. In Wynter's words, "Our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources . . . are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle."[2] Building on the work of Wynter, Christina Sharpe, Katherine McKittrick, and others, part of my intention is to trace the real cause of sudden social conflicts and environmental disasters to the historical process that is predicated on this association between human and "Man" and to argue that healing depends on their deassociation.

I do not take the concept of "human rights" lightly either. Despite its omnipresent use in daily language, the definition of human rights as a concept remains unresolved. Ever since human rights crystallized with eighteenth-century peoples' revolutions around the world, it has implicitly become a reference point in discussions about space. The concept of human rights has

received its own share of suspicion and reproach from authors at different ends of the political spectrum. The far-right press portrays human rights as an alibi to protect criminals.[3] Jeremy Bentham ridiculed the foundational premise of human rights that all human beings are born free—perhaps to be expected from the inventor of the panopticon who attempted to discipline bodies through an architectural device—and rebuked the idea that natural and inalienable rights should be distinct from legal rights because, he claimed, that would be an invitation to anarchy.[4] Karl Marx famously opposed human rights for their egoistic preoccupations that protect individuals instead of political communities, and for reducing the definition of the "true" human being into a bourgeois individual.[5] Despite Marx's initial objections, however, nowhere has the concept of human rights been more acknowledged in architectural and urban theory than in left-wing circles. Henri Lefebvre's "The Right to the City"[6] has served as a guide to reflect on architecture's relation to uneven development in the capitalist city, and to turn the city into a platform of revolutionary transformation.[7] As early as Olympe de Gouge's and Mary Wollstonecraft's appeals, feminist critique has exposed the hypocrisy of gender discrimination in the initial declarations that advocated for the rights of "man and citizen."[8] Another common critique of the current human rights regime has been the assertion that the concept is a Western invention and therefore its universalization is an imperialist expansion—an accusation that Amartya Sen defined as cultural critique.[9] The worst scandals of human rights history happened when Western superpowers used human rights as an excuse for military intervention that destroyed cities and buildings in order to serve other interests. Discussions continue on the possible distinctions between human rights as a moral issue aiming to define basic universal ideas about human dignity, and as a matter of international law identifying the legitimate international response to a state government that is deemed to be violating those rights.[10] Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, and others have exposed the limits of the continuing attachment between human and citizenship rights in protecting refugees and their housing.[11]

With some of these fallacies corrected but others left unresolved, the concept of human rights continues to be relevant today in architectural theory for moral commitment to rectify injustice and ensure equality, or political action to protect human dignity, enable participatory democracy, and foster progressive change, or still, to build empathy for the oppressed. Despite numerous challenges from skeptics and authors with different philosophical convictions, "the claim to 'natural rights' has never been quite defeated," as Margaret MacDonald summarized; "It tends in some form to be renewed in

every crisis in human affairs, when the plain citizen tries to make, or expects his leaders to make, articulate his obscure, but firmly held conviction that he is not a mere pawn in any political game, nor the property of any government or ruler, but the living and protesting individual."[12]

Even though the topic of human rights is relevant for architecture, not to mention multiple other social sciences and humanities fields,[13] it has been overwhelmingly perceived as a legal matter administered by the United Nations (hereafter UN) after the second half of the twentieth century. The perception of human rights as an exclusively legal and governmental matter assumes that there should be a responsible institution whose duty is to deliver human rights, and operates as if something could be defined as a human right only if it can be combined with a correlating obligation. This may be important in the legal implementation of human rights, but it has tapered down the epistemological, ethical, and cultural discussions about the topic. Narrowly speaking, the legal debate on human rights has paid attention to architecture only in relation to the right to housing. Ever since the first deliberations at the UN that resulted in 1948's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there has been international discord over what constitutes a human right. Housing has been one of them.[14] Even though the UN admits that the situation of housing around the world is dire, housing in particular or architecture in general has not necessarily become a top priority for human rights. Preventing discrimination, forced evictions, and war crimes involving the unjustified destruction of housing have come to be the only legal human rights considerations when it comes to architecture.[15] This book urges us to cast a wider net, not necessarily as a legal but cultural discussion: Chapter 1 discusses how the recent human rights conventions of the twenty-first century may open new potentials for architecture's relevance; chapter 5 advocates for the recognition of species' rights beyond humans.

Recovering from the contested history of human rights and building on the corrections of the definition of "human" as a concept, *Architecture and the Right to Heal* suggests that healing from conflict and disaster is contingent on the local and international solidarity movements and institutions that expand and protect human and species rights. The examples in the following chapters give evidentiary support that this process has already started. A familiar and justified critique of the human rights regime and the international organizations such as the UN is their originary Eurocentrism and the hierarchical structure between nation-states. However, I qualify this critique by referring to a global history of human rights that gives due acknowledgment to all its makers. Historically, the concept of human rights has been mobilized

and improved in several episodes of anticolonial, antiracist, feminist, anti-slavery, and antiapartheid struggles, and continues to expand with grassroots activism taking place with actors and in countries outside "the West," like the ones exemplified in chapter 1. This chapter explores the relation between physical space and right to truth as a foundational concept of transitional justice. Indirectly recognized by international law and the UN, the right to truth oversees the right of relatives to know the truth about individuals who had been subject to state violence and human rights violations in the past, which have been obscured due to denial of accountability and distortion of facts in official narratives. Chapter 1 discusses truth and the recognition of suffering as a prerequisite of healing.

The Global South played a foundational role in the emergence of transitional justice. As elaborated further in chapter 1, the accountability for abuses in the past came to the forefront of human rights movements with the grassroots protests in South America and South Africa since the 1980s, and culminated in a new UN human rights convention (adopted in 2006) on the protection from enforced disappearance. The field continues to expand to account for other historical crimes. In July 2021, UN Special Rapporteur Fabian Salvioli issued a report that suggests transitional justice mechanisms to examine the human rights violations committed during colonial times.[16] Building on international law scholars of transitional justice such as Ruti Teitel and Pablo De Greiff, I reflect on the multiple, conciliatory, and long-term goals that go much beyond monetary compensations and material reparations, but include the role of architectural history and design in harm recognition and reconciliation.[17] This book identifies several measures for the right to heal, not only prosecutions, reparations, and repatriations, but also truth-telling, institutional reforms, memorials as official apologies, adequate housing and city services, and other artistic and educational steps for nonrecurrence and "never again" movements.

The discussion on transitional justice as a new sphere of human rights in chapter 1 helps crystallize ideas about the healing of the human, both individual and communal (bonded or imagined communities of a town or a nation-state). Additionally, I carry the problematization of the concept of "human" to the final chapters on the healing of the planet. The book's structure moves from the healing of the individual to that of the communal and the planetary. Recently, scholars such as Bram Büscher and Robert Fletcher, William Cronon, Donna Haraway, Emma Marris, and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing have unsettled the nature/culture and human/nonhuman division, suggesting that environmental problems can only be addressed by leaving

behind the mainstream epistemology that separates humans from other species in "nature," and by acknowledging that all are part of the same ecosystem. Similarly, I scrutinize in chapter 5 the constructed definition of the "human" to imagine a new understanding that potentially heals the damaged relation between humans and nonhumans.[18]

The history outlined in this book makes a case for the need to conceptualize the relational logic between the wounds of capitalism, colonization, nationalization, and carbonization. Several authors have inspired this conclusion. Ann Laura Stoler's foundational volume *Imperial Debris* reveals the multiple aftermaths of imperialism as sedimented violence.[19] *Architecture and the Right to Heal* demonstrates sedimented violence caused by not only competitive imperialism and nation-state formation but also the carbonizing industrial capitalism that motivated the nineteenth-century British colonization of Ottoman lands in northeast Africa and West Asia. Adding to the traditional Marxist labor history by evaluating the impact of industrial capitalism on climate change, Andreas Malm shows the cumulative effect of carbon emissions, which means that carbon's impact in causing climate change is augmented with the passage of time, and that each carbon emission harms future victims even more so than the present ones.[20] In other words, debris and sedimentation that postcolonial scholars discuss in relation to imperialism are also fitting concept metaphors for carbonization. The final chapters of this book discuss the relations between dominant politico-economic convictions and climate change, by building on Malm, Naomi Klein, Ashley Dawson, and T. J. Demos, among others.[21]

I join a group of authors who reveal the relations between multiple oppressive forces of history. Lisa Lowe demonstrates the intertwined history between the settler colonialism on Indigenous lands, the slavery of African peoples, and the exploitation of Asian immigrants; Rinaldo Walcott alludes to the pitfalls of denying the relations between different episodes of white violence in delivering freedom to Blacks; and Max Liboiron exposes environmental degradation and settler colonial violence as twin problems.[22] These authors bring us face to face with the fact that the wounds in North America can only be addressed with the writing of global intertwined history. I build on these ideas, albeit with caution, because their untranslated transportation to a book on lands previously part of the Ottoman Empire— where some slaves were white and where competitive imperialism and nationalist violence complicated the domination dynamics—runs the risk of epistemic imperialism. Instead, this book adds to these debates on North America by exposing the missing "other" in these formulations. It returns to

authors such as Edward Said, who analyzed the transformation of European Orientalism into North American area studies that continues to dictate the mainstream foreign policy decisions and the "clash of civilizations" ideology.[23] The Middle East—whose definition is quite vague but usually refers to the Ottoman lands in West Asia and Africa during and after their transition from the imperial regime—has continued to be construed as the ultimate "other" of the West for almost the entire timespan covered in this book and today. I demonstrate this process of "othering" by visiting historical episodes during British colonization, the partitions after the Ottoman Empire's dissolution, the failure of postimperial nation-states in delivering freedom, and the rise of American power, soft and military.

Each chapter focuses on one type of traumatic experience and on a relatively small group of victims, but shows that these wounds have been long in the making through globally connected events. Giving a name to conflicts and disasters as a matter of human *and* political rights is a prerequisite of healing. A mother may mourn in isolation over her child who never returned from state custody, but it is only when this trauma is named as enforced disappearance that it can be identified as a human rights violation, gain public visibility, and become a social movement. A community may be deported from one land and resettled in another, but it is only when this forced migration is named as partition that its perpetrators can be identified as national leaders and diplomats of international institutions. A society may conceive an earthquake or a famine as God's will, but it is only when this building failure or food insecurity is named as human-made urban or climate disaster that one can identify its root causes and see it as injustice rather than misfortune. All of us can mourn the extinction of a charismatic animal, but it is only when international institutions and nation-states recognize and ratify the rights of nature and rights of nonhuman species that humans might reverse the alarming rates of mass extinction. A chain of conflicts and disasters that extends to the entire book shows that a mother's right to mourn is also a society's right to heal from state violence; a village community's right to heal from enforced migration also involves struggle against xenophobia and violent transgressions of international law; a city's struggle to recover from deadly earthquakes is the same struggle to avoid economic crashes; a country's right to feed its population is also its right to heal from colonization and environmental extraction; another country's right to heal from global war is also the world's right to recover from global warming; and the planet Earth's species' right to live is also the nations' struggle to live together. This structure is a demonstration of the intersectionality of social, global, and

environmental justice, and that one cannot confront climate change and mass extinction—harms against nature—without understanding harms against peoples and communities.

Resettler Nationalism

Of all the migration stories that I heard in passing from my grandparents while growing up in Turkey, the most unbelievable was that of a grand-aunt who had lived on a distant island on the Danube River, an island so small that it was forgotten in an international treaty and accidentally remained part of the Ottoman Empire until it submerged under the waters. At first, I thought this story of a small, sunken island that grown-ups did not care enough to remember was a fairy tale. I realized only later that it used to be a real place: Adakale was indeed forgotten in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, and it did indeed sink under the Danube's waters due to a Romanian-Yugoslav cobuilt hydraulic plant, which forced its remaining habitants to emigrate in 1967. Such displacements and desertions were hardly unique in my family and many around me whose great-grandparents migrated during the transition of the Ottoman Empire into different nation-states. This book foregrounds the stories of these migrants either as part of communities that were displaced and resettled on new lands or as experts who contributed to the built environment of new nation-states. It suggests the concept of resettler nationalism to come to terms with this transition.

Though not exclusively, *Architecture and the Right to Heal* focuses on a few post-Ottoman lands that became independent nation-states either directly during the empire's dissolution or after the British colonization. The long dissolution of the Ottoman Empire triggered countless incidents at the geometric center of Afro-Euro-Asia that eventually divided this land into three continents and numerous nation-states. For instance, al-Idrisi's world map of the year 1154 CE famously depicted the continents we call Africa, Asia, and Europe as one continuous and connected landmass (figure I.1). In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire still extended to parts of the three continents as one entity, before they were perceived as divided in the twentieth. This process brought significant population movements into the Ottoman Empire,[24] including, according to rough estimates, the 500,000 Tatars who moved to Ottoman lands between 1789 and 1800; 400,000 Crimeans between 1860 and 1864; 1 million North Caucasian Muslims who sought refuge in the empire between the 1850s and World War I; 1.5 million people from the Balkan countries after the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War, when thousands of

Armenians moved in the other direction to Russia; and 640,000 more people during the Balkan War of 1912–13. Justin McCarthy prepared a map showing the forced displacements of 5 million Muslims and 1.9 million Christians between Ottoman and neighboring lands from 1770 till 1923 (figure I.2).[25] These population movements significantly altered the cultural, social, and built environments of the lands of departure and arrival. They turned the Ottoman state into an "empire of refugees" in Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky's words, and many parts of the empire into "refugee countries," such as the modern city of Amman that was founded as a consequence of the arrival of north Caucasian refugees.[26] The ethnic and religious homogenization of post-Ottoman Turkey is a case in point of resettler nationalism: While in 1870, there were 2.3 million Armenians, 2.1 million Greeks (*Rum*), and 4 million Arabs within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, these numbers dropped to 65,000, 120,000, and 135,000, respectively, within the borders of the Republic of Turkey in 1927.[27] As a consequence of these forced mass migrations that continued well into the late twentieth century, "the age of co-existence" on the lands of the Ottoman Empire, in Ussama Makdisi's terms, was replaced with what I name the age of resettler nationalism.[28] Today, there are still unresolved territorial claims over the lands that were once the Ottoman Empire: Armenia, Israel, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, and Palestine continue as states with limited recognition at the UN. Uncertainties due to armed conflicts are continuing in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Syria, and Sudan. As I was writing, I read the news about the destructions of Gaza and Sudan, including the buildings in Khartoum that are portrayed in this book and that I had visited a couple of years earlier.

The transition of the Ottoman Empire into a postimperial order that triggered these episodes of mass migration also polarized the world as a conflict between "Islam" and "the West." *Architecture and the Right to Heal* writes the complicated and layered history of this divide between the major world events that fortified it, namely, between the Balkan War (1912–13) and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1978–79) that coincided with the rise of neoliberalism. Population transfers and migration of refugees or families continued during much of this timespan. Those that are addressed in the following pages include the 1915 Tehcir (relocation) law with significant consequences on the non-Muslims, especially Armenians, of the Ottoman Empire; the 1919 Greek-Bulgarian population transfer convention; the 1923 Greek-Turkish Exchange of Populations Treaty; the 1950 Bulgarian decree to expel Muslim Turks; the 1953 Yugoslav migration agreement that lifted the prohibition to leave the country; the 1964 Turkish decree to expel Christian

Figure I.1
Al-Idrisi, world
map, 1154 CE.

Figure I.2 Forced displacements of 5 million Muslims and 1.9 million Christians during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Map by Justin McCarthy.

Greeks; the 1974 war in Cyprus as a result of which many families in both Turkey and the Greek islands were forced to emigrate; and the 1989 Bulgarian decree to expel Muslim minorities. Moreover, Kazak, Afghan, Uzbek, Uyghur, and other Central Asian refugees and asylum seekers from the Soviet Union and China migrated to Turkey from the days of the first military invasion of Xinjiang in 1949 till today. In February 2025, US President Donald Trump suggested a similar resettlement plan for Gaza.

This book shows that the diplomatically supported compulsory population transfers and the forced mass or family migrations throughout this period have created urban debris that is still visible and usually still in need of healing. For instance, I look at the afterlife of buildings and entire villages that were completely abandoned despite being located in striking landscapes. Chapters 2 and 3 write the urban history of modern Athens and modern Istanbul as refugee-arrival cities. They discuss the aftermath of these population movements by tracing the experience of those who were displaced because of an ideology that emerged as if it was a remedy to ethnic violence—an ideology I term *resettler nationalism*. I offer resettler nationalism as a concept with more explanatory power than those used in established histories and popular media. Much like settler colonialism, resettler nationalism relies on the mass migration of peoples and causes forced dislocations and dispossessions. However, unlike established and popular history that casts nationalism as an anticolonial idea, this book demonstrates the wounds of resettler nationalism. By *resettler nationalism*, I refer to the double ideology of religious rift and national fault line that stirred race-based nationalist and religious sentiments, escalated ethnic violence, and eventually caused mass dispossessions.

Architecture and the Right to Heal identifies the root cause of social conflicts and environmental disasters as resettler nationalism while it converged with European industrialist colonization, authoritarian states, and capitalism. These include enforced disappearance (chapter 1), forced mass migration (chapter 2), civil war (chapter 3), dispossession and poverty (chapters 2 and 3), slum development (chapters 2 and 3), death in earthquakes (chapter 3), pollution (chapter 3), racial urban segregation (chapter 4), sandstorm, flood, and famine (chapter 4), and the inability to respond to ecocide (chapter 5). Moreover, resettler nationalism perpetuated partition along perceived ethnic, religious, and racial lines and hindered cosmopolitan ethics. By criticizing resettler nationalism, I seek to disassociate *cosmopolitanism* in a multireligious and multilingual society from its pejorative nineteenth-century connotations, when the word was scorned due to the rise of ethnocentrism outlined in this book. Instead,

cosmopolitan ethics could become a prerequisite for a new culture of welcoming and peace to come.[29]

I have selected the Ottoman imperial capital, and cities to its south, north, east, and west as case studies in order to discuss resettler nationalism as a major cause of conflicts and disasters. This section of the introduction overviews the historical events during this transition as a background for buildings and spaces discussed throughout this book, as well as the current scholarship about this transition to clarify the book's contributions.

In the south, Khartoum in today's Sudan provides an understudied but telling example.[30] Modern Sudan is curiously absent from the scholarship on both "African" and "Islamic architecture." The history of Khartoum unsettles the conceptualization of Africa as a separate and singular continent whose nations gained independence after being colonized by Western European powers. One of my historiographical aims is to put the neglected Ottoman Empire into the histories of Africa and to see the competitive imperialisms and extractive economies as well as the layered postcolonial struggles on these lands. A map in the Ottoman Archives dated 1883–84 indicates a fortressed settlement in Khartoum, across the river from Omdurman (Ümmü Derman), the Tutti Island, and Halfaya (today's Khartoum North, see figure 4.1).[31] The first fortified urban settlement in Khartoum is traced to 1821 and accredited to Mehmet Ali Paşa's conquest (also known as Muhammad Ali), after which the city became the capital of the Ottoman Sudan province during the time locally named as the *al Turkiya* period. Most relevant for this book is the fact that Mehmet Ali connected southeastern Europe and northeastern Africa during the late Ottoman Empire in multiple ways. Born in 1770/71 in Kavala in today's Greece as a descendant from a Turkish family who did not speak Arabic, Mehmet Ali used to earn his living in the tobacco trade before he became the Ottoman governor in today's Egypt—a post he held for four decades—when he served the Ottoman authority in regaining order and power in North Africa after the French invasions. A modernizer of many towns in today's Egypt, his rule also made an impact on his hometown in the Balkans, as Kavala became the beneficiary of the taxes collected after he stopped rebellions on behalf of the Ottoman rule.[32] In addition to Egyptian Ottomans, Greek, Kurdish, and Armenian Ottoman administrators and builders were part of Governor Mehmet Ali's inner circle.[33] During the reign of Ismāʿīl Bāshā of Ottoman Egypt (1863–81, also known as Khedive Ismail), British representatives were also added to the high military and civil officials, such as General Charles George Gordon, who left an important imprint on Khartoum. The time of Khedive Ismail is characterized by

the struggle against the slave trade that was finally abolished with the 1877 Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention, and infrastructure projects including railways, river transportation lines, and telegraph systems.

Understudied until recently, Ottoman Africa has raised questions about the competitive imperialisms of the nineteenth century. The industrial-colonial ambitions of the European powers affected the Ottoman Empire intensely, as British, French, and Italian militaries took hold of the Ottoman lands in Africa and the "Middle East," and as their economic power affected the remaining cities of the empire due to the rise of capitalism. I build on historians such as Selim Deringil and Mostafa Minawi, who treat the Ottomans in Africa as both colonizer and colonized as well as traditional imperialists who tried to maintain competitiveness in the new European colonial order while having to fight against it. While local subjects had agency, governing and negotiating power under customary Ottoman rule, the situation changed by the late nineteenth century under Abdülhamid II's regime.[34] Ottoman intellectuals aspired to insert themselves into the modern world order so as to be part of perceived advanced civilization, on the one hand, and yet they held anti-imperialist sentiments against European Orientalism, on the other hand. In Deringil's words, the ruling elite of the late Ottoman Empire in a world now ruled by Britain, France, and Germany "adopted the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperialists, and came to conceive its periphery as a colonial setting."[35] Against the established narrative that the Ottoman Empire was an inward-looking and defensive state after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, Minawi studies the Ottoman Empire's rigorous, albeit failed, participation in the Scramble for Africa during the Berlin Conference of 1884–85.[36] The Mahdist state took over the rule in Sudan after the uprising against Ottoman Egypt led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn'Abdallah, who claimed himself as the expected religious leader Mahdi (1881–85). The Mahdist imperial rule for the spread of Islam continued after his untimely death with his son, Khalifa Abdallah, till 1898.[37] Mahdi settled his headquarters with a mosque and housing complex in Omdurman across the river from Khartoum, which was a small village at the time, but grew into a large town with the migration of peoples from multiple directions in Africa during the Mahdist rule.

After the Battle of Omdurman of 1898, the rule was transferred from the Mahdi regime (1886–98) to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898–1956). Despite the name of the condominium, absolute civil and military powers were combined under the sovereign British governor-general (until 1924) who reported to London's Foreign Office through the British representative

in Cairo, which had been under British colonization since 1882. The balance of powers changed over the course of the twentieth century with the rise of Egyptian and Sudanese nationalism, and the British interests after World War I that sought to eliminate Egypt's involvement in Sudan, on the one hand, and to contain the growth of Sudanese national consciousness, on the other.[38] Eve Troutt Powell defines the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium as a "triangle of colonialism marked by Great Britain, Egypt and Sudan" and analyzes Egyptian politicians, intellectuals, and authors within the psyche of the "colonized colonizer." She posits her explanation of the Sudanese colonization as a necessary nuance to the established framework of imperialism that conceives the global history of modernity and colonization as a binary between the West and the rest.[39] The following pages in this book also complicate this picture as a polygonal equation by discussing not only architects and planners of British colonial forces but also Greek-Ottoman builders in Africa. They also trace the post-Ottoman and local professional networks into the years of independent Sudan.

While Khartoum's urban and architectural history exposes the north–south divide of the modern world order, the east–west divide that materialized during the transition from imperial to national order has been no less impactful. I focus on the Balkan regions such as Athens, Skopje, and Evia Island on the west side of the European border, and Istanbul, Cappadocia, Baghdad, and Tehran (even though Tehran was never part of the Ottoman Empire) on the east side to discuss this divide in this book. Among the wars and insurgencies that caused the eventual end of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan War (1912–13) has come to be the most unforgettable for the founders of the nation-states that emerged out of the empire. In the First Balkan War of the autumn of 1912, which lasted for six weeks, the Ottoman Empire fought a loose coalition from Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia; in the Second Balkan War of the summer of 1913, which lasted for four weeks, these states fought each other for the ownership of lands that were no longer Ottoman territory after the first war. Many see World War I, which started less than a year later, as the continuation of the Balkan War, and the conflict that culminated in the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 as its reemergence.[40]

The historians of Great Powers immediately construed the Balkan War as justice restored. In 1914, only one year after the ceasefire, Jacob Gould Schurman wrote, "The expulsion of Turks from Europe was long ago written in the book of fate. . . . A little clan of oriental shepherds, the Turks had in two generations gained possession. . . . What happened, however, was the revolt of subject provinces and the creation out of the territory of European Turkey

of the independent states. . . . There is historic justice in the circumstance that the Turkish Empire in Europe met its doom at the hands of the Balkan nations themselves."[41] Schurman posited the Balkan War as a natural extension of the Greek War of Independence for which "Powers now recognized that nothing but intervention could save Greece for European civilization."[42] He did not only interpret the Balkan War as the fight between civilization and barbarism or the Christian-Muslim rift. Following the common Western perception of the relation between race, nation, and territory at the time, he also regarded it as a "race" war: The Ottoman Empire had failed to accommodate the alleged racial distinctions among the Balkan states and the "ties of blood and language."[43] The British colonialists regarded the Ottoman towns and cities as the unnatural mixing of different races that needed to be unmixed for a stable world order. Lord Curzon famously described the Greek-Turkish partition as the "unmixing of peoples." In Isa Blumi's words, "Cast in these terms, living under the Ottoman Empire was a tragic story of Oriental 'enslavement' of essentially 'white' European Christians whose national ambitions could only be served when they lived in distinctive enclaves from 'others' not of their denomination."[44]

Assuming "mixed" religions and languages in multicultural societies would unavoidably break into pieces, and instead of tracing the precise history of the emergence of ethnic violence that forecloses cosmopolitan ethics, the established historiography wrote the Balkan War as the final evidence of modern nation-state's inevitability. Atrocities against civilians and forced migrations were normalized, even glorified, as the unavoidable human cost in the name of nationalism, struggle against guerrilla warfare and invasion, or liberation from despotism, rather than ethnic cleansing or demographic engineering.[45]

The double ideology of religious rift and national fault line not only determined the borders in Europe but also stirred race-based nationalist and religious sentiments and escalated ethnic violence within the remaining borders of the Ottoman Empire as well. Even though the Ottoman Empire had already been losing ample territories in Central Europe and North Africa, it is indeed curious that the ejection from the Balkans made a devastating mental impact on a group of intellectual and military leaders commonly known as the Young Turks and founders of the Republic of Turkey. Erik Jan Zürcher points out that 82 percent of the ruling members of the early republic were migrants from the West, and that 41 percent of them were born on lands lost to the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan War. This means that the Republic of Turkey was founded and ruled for its first twenty-three

years by Balkan refugees, including the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from Salonica, and the director of refugee resettlement, Şükrü Kaya from Kos, both in today's Greece.[46] Scholars have argued that the Balkan migrants consequently turned to Anatolia as their homeland and cultivated the idea of Turkishness as race-based nationalism.[47] Many authors, novelists, and poets of the time contributed to the sense of loss and insecurity that they associated with the loss of lands in the Balkan War.[48] For example, the novelist and activist Halide Edip Adıvar wrote in her memoirs that the Balkan War "intensified nationality in Turkey, . . . the feeling that in order to avoid being exterminated, the Turks must exterminate others."[49] The race-based nationalism after the Balkan War replaced the Young Turks' short-lived ideas about Ottomanism (the parliamentary governance of a multicultural society with mechanisms of representation, conflict resolution, and cohabitation).[50] The move from diverse Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism with the adaptation of Anatolia as the territorial core could not have been an instant process for everyone, but it was effective.[51] Scholars including Fuat Dündar and Taner Akçam demonstrate that the leadership around Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) consequently participated in Anatolia's demographic engineering and the Armenian genocide.[52] In scholars Ümit Kurt and Doğan Gürpınar's words, "The Balkan Wars were the turning point in the rise of an anti-liberal, anti-cosmopolitan pessimist culture, as well as a new radical and ethnic Turkish nationalism."[53]

Those traumatized by the Balkan War were not limited to the founders of the Turkish Republic. In an extensive study about the immediate debates following this war, Eyal Ginio has analyzed the memoirs, press articles, novels, poems, monuments, photographs, and postcards produced by Turkish-, Arabic-, and Ladino-speaking communities from Istanbul to Salonica to Plovdiv and to Cairo.[54] There was indeed a wide range of responses. While many expressed themselves with apocalyptic words, their topics included such various and at-times competing themes as Ottoman decline, military weakness and repair, European colonization, the atrocities against and the suffering of Ottoman refugees, the building of national and patriotic awareness, the similarity of the Balkan defeat to the expulsion of the ancient Israelites from their lands, the failure of Ottomanism, the betrayals of Ottoman non-Muslims, the restoration of the Ottoman Empire and Islam in Europe, irredentism and revenge, the disappointments with European hypocrisy in the face of atrocities against Muslims, the building of a stronger national economy with Muslim capitalists by diminishing the leadership of non-Muslim entrepreneurs, and many more.

In addition, the Balkan War sparked trends of Islamism in and out of the Ottoman Empire. There was a strong reaction to the perception of Islamic civilization as inferior and the maltreatment of Muslim subjects in the Balkan states.[55] The Balkan War stirred up the use of Islamic motifs and the call to solidarity of the Islamic *ümmet* (community). Referring to it as a new episode in the aggression of Crusaders was a common metaphor. The trope of Crusaders and the sentiment that the Ottoman Empire was the only fortress that protected Muslims against European colonization echoed in the Egyptian and Indian press as well, and Egyptian Red Cross and its Indian counterpart poured aid into Istanbul.[56] It is generally accepted that the populist rise of Islamism after the nineteenth century within the borders of the Ottoman Empire was not unconnected to the cycles of wars in the Balkans and European colonization around the world.[57]

The next episode in resettler nationalism was the Exchange of Populations Treaty of 1923, administered by the League of Nations, which is discussed at length in chapter 2. The exchange treaty mandated the compulsory migration of all Christian "Greeks" in today's Turkey to Greece and all Muslim "Turks" in Greece to Turkey (see figure 2.2). It also legitimized the refugee status of those who had already moved between lands due to wars before 1923. Even though the precise numbers have been disputed, the treaty affected close to 2 million people. Greece's Muslim population decreased from approximately 20 percent to 6 percent as a result, while Turkey's non-Muslim population decreased from roughly 20 percent to 2.5 percent due to the sum of population transfers, massacres, and wars. Thus the partition and population transfers between Europe and Anatolia at the end of World War I marked the irreversible dividing of the Christian and Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire. The Exchange Treaty also served as a model for future compulsory population transfers instituted by the UN as the League of Nations' successor, such as the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, and the Partition Plan for Palestine adopted on November 29, 1947. While this book is not suggesting to flatten out the differences between these specific cases, it joins a group of scholars who work toward a more connected picture of the global history of partitions, ethnic cleansings, and forced migrations during the transitions from colonial/imperial to national orders. I hope that the methodological insights of this book might be relevant for other internationally administered resettler-nationalist policies.[58]

The story of resettler nationalism is also one of dispossession—a term whose extensive use to refer to different world events has raised questions about conceptual clarity. I have decided to employ this word by building on

Robert Nichols's discussion of dispossession as a core term of critical theory that mediates criticism of capitalism and settler colonialism.[59] Nichols disassociates the theory of dispossession in settler colonial contexts from the unprovable claims to "first occupancy" and from reliance on possession that goes against the moral aims of the critique. Dispossession is predicated on the conceptualization of land as property and involves theft through the very act of instituting a property regime that benefits the white settlers or creates unfair primary accumulation in a capitalist order. Any partition of land is indeed a making of property and territory along which comes a dispossession. Nichols brings together Marxist and Indigenous studies that concern geographies that are different from the ones in this book, and yet this theory of dispossession resonates considerably well here. The making and transition of property regimes during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire involved processes that also generated seizures of land and possessions that were far from fair.[60] Chapters 2 and 3 write histories of dispossession that occurred both instantly through the expulsion of communities from their lands by turning their homes and farms into exchangeable commodities, and over long stretches of time through the unofficial occupation of land followed by property legalization.

It is indeed possible to trace similar patterns of thinking among the re-settler nationalists then and now. In a mirror image of the Greek nationalists who see the "Asia Minor Disaster" of 1922–23 as the expulsion of Greeks from their exclusive ancient homeland, the Turkish nationalists see the Balkan War of 1912–13 as the "final episode in the tragedy of Turkish migration" when they "had to leave the lands they [their nomadic and sedentary ancestors] considered home for at least 450 at most 1400 years."[61] I acknowledge the trauma of forced emigration but criticize the entitlement to exclusive ownership of land and the anticosmopolitanism in such agendas. I am also cognizant of the fact that the critical decolonial scholarship written in the last two decades has been weaponized for the advance of other oppressive ideologies, such as the neo-Ottoman imperial fancy combined with political Islam in Turkey. The reign of Abdülhamid II has become the political symbol of the Islamic Right who praise the sultan's anticolonial policies as a way of holding on to the territorial, educational, and cultural relevance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe without confronting his oppressive decisions.[62] This neo-Ottoman nostalgia and the equally common Ottoman abjection are the two opposite ends of a spectrum. I use *Ottoman abjection* here as an umbrella term to refer to the dismissal, trivialization, suppression, denial, or subconscious forgetting of facts about the Ottoman Empire while explaining

modern architecture throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I also refer to the lack of acknowledgment of the local struggles that were connected—by way of opposition or solidarity—to Ottoman citizenship and subjectivity. This book distances itself from these ideas by providing a critical history of the resettler-nationalist patterns of thinking as part of a longer history of the post-Ottoman nation-state era. Rather than taking sides with either of the national or religious official historiographies, I speak politically outside the polar narratives by writing the people's history of architecture under resettler nationalism (more on this below).

The chapters below show the architectural reverberations of the long-lasting patterns of thinking both immediately after these markers of resettler nationalism and their aftermaths that extend to the present. Chapter 1 alludes to the enforced disappearance of Armenian and Kurdish intellectuals as part of the resettler-nationalist ideology. Chapter 2 explores the intertwined histories of dispossession, transportation, and resettling of two communities in today's Greece and Turkey, one departing from and the other arriving in the same Cappadocian village due to the enforced population exchange of 1923. As an example of struggle toward healing, it analyzes a rare group of architects and residents who restitute the erased memory of expelled communities. Chapter 3 traces the hundred years of Istanbul's Zeytinburnu district as the arrival space both of Balkan refugees from Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and of Uygur, Kazak, Azeri, and other Central Asian refugees from China and the Soviet Union. It follows the transformation of refugee settlements to slum developments as a reflection of capitalist urbanization, and the subsequent transformation of these illegal houses into legal but earthquake-vulnerable buildings as a result of the government's negligence while it was advancing Turkish-Islamist cultural agendas. Chapter 4 comments on the continuities between settler colonialist and resettler-nationalist logic by contrasting British colonization and postcolonial struggles in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, and cotton plantations in its countryside, Gezira. Parts of chapters 4 and 5 discuss the continuing impact of Ottoman professional networks after the empire's dissolution and the work of architects who were subject to population exchange, including the prolific Greek architect Constantinos Doxiadis in Sudan. Chapter 5 exposes the roadblocks to healing from planetary disasters of the twenty-first century in a world divided into nations. Established accounts of British colonization, of nation building, and of midcentury modernization are challenged when one writes the global history of architecture by registering the impact of Ottoman succession.

The research for this book prompted me to think about the definition of perpetrator and victim, or offender and healer, in a much longer spectrum of history. Perhaps the real distinction in these examples is the one between those who divide and those who connect. The dividers in the following pages include the leaders who did not allow for self-governance; the competitive and opportunistic imperialist forces that perpetuated race-based categorizations; the authors who insisted on the nation-state's inevitability and the unmixing of peoples; the ethnoreligious demographic engineers who exerted genocide or cultural extinction with the pretext of saving their own nation and faith; and the architects who were complicit with the dividers' ideologies. These victors of history bring to mind Walter Benjamin's Angel of History, and make one suspect that there might indeed be no document or monument of history that is not at the same time a document of violence.[63] The connectors in these episodes, on the other hand, include those who could not be exterminated by history's victors: the migrants who carried their memories and cultural artifacts from their departure places and hybridized them with those in their arrival places; the builders who crossed the borders of partition; the architects who used building materials to empower migrant economy; the refugees from the Balkans, Central Asia, or Anatolia who remembered fondly the days when they coexisted in solidarity with their neighbors of a different faith; the first responders to earthquakes and wildfires; and the ordinary citizens who sent food, supplies, and blood to the other side of the border in order to ease the suffering of the grandchildren of those that their own grandparents once shared citizenship with. Architecture as the debris of erased peoples is indeed a connector between those who stayed and those who were expelled.

Climate Determinism, Consciousness, and Reparations

"The division of the global ecosystem into nation states is ecocidal," as Franz Broswimmer warns against the harms of nationalism on the environment.[64] The final two chapters of this book suggest that the process set in motion by resettler nationalism is one of the root causes of climate change and mass extinction. The planetary healing cannot be conceived without the communication, agreement, and solidarity between nation-states. As disappointed as multiple generations are with the hypocrisy, passivity, and bureaucratic cumbersomeness of the UN, the struggles against climate change and biodiversity loss would be unthinkable without this institution since the UN

Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in June 1972. Coming back to the discussion on healing as a matter of rights, the recognition of the rights of future generations and species beyond humans at the UN is part of the struggle for planetary healing.

In his article "Geology of Mankind" (2002), where he is usually credited with coining the term *Anthropocene*, Paul Crutzen identified the built environment as one of the five causes that made humans a geological force on the planet and put an end to the 11,700 years of the Holocene.[65] On the one hand, my book joins the work of scholars like Dipesh Chakrabarty who call for new approaches to the discipline of history writing as a result of the realization that we live in the age of Anthropocene, namely, that humans have become a geological force that causes climate change.[66] On the other hand, it also joins the work of Donna Haraway, T. J. Demos, and others who find the term *Anthropocene* insufficient, even a dangerous misnomer, for not showing the responsibility of dominant nations in climate change.[67] The undifferentiated category of the "human" as an entire species fails to come to terms with the bigger responsibility and accountability of dominant rulers and businesses than countries and communities who were not decision-makers but who are now the most vulnerable to climate disasters. I resist gothic literary representations or utopian architectural engineering projects that capitalize on horror, monstrosity, and apocalyptic moods.[68] Instead, I analyze climate disasters and mass extinction as the result of political and economic decisions that are deceptively seen benign or unavoidable. Those who suggest dark imaginaries or utopian, geoengineering-type solutions are, for the most part, authors and architects of the global elite, whereas climate disaster has become part of the everyday experience of the Global South and the global poor—a condition Rob Nixon warns against in one of the first books on climate change and cultural representation.[69]

One may misleadingly infer from the data on the built environment's responsibility in causing climate change that architects have not paid attention to climate. To the contrary, however, there is hardly any other criterion as ordinary and as omnipresent as climate in architectural design. From Vitruvius to guidebooks of corporate environmentalism, references to environmental regulation and considerations of the sun and wind, heat and cold, rain and snow have been regular inputs for designers of buildings around the world. This does not mean there has been a univocal approach to climate. The challenge for architectural historians today, therefore, is to evaluate architecture's role in climate justice by writing about climate in the history

of architecture in such a way that architecture's role in the history of climate (climate change) is also revealed.

Established architectural historians have provided a large spectrum of definitions for climate, ranging from a criterion to be controlled to one that inspires difference. In his book *Architecture of the Well-Tempered Environment*, Reyner Banham wrote the entire history of modern architecture as a chain of technological inventions that control the climate in order to "provide comfort and well-being of humans," and one that moves toward hermetically sealed buildings that can be reproduced anywhere.[70] The telos of modern architecture, seen in this light, is a seamless closed interior, a perfect artificial environment, in the name of human comfort, which is made possible with climate-management fixtures. The realization of the environmental crisis with the 1972 UN Conference did not change Banham's mind. "Rather than calling for more efficient air-conditioning, the call was for the abandonment of air conditioning all together, no matter who might suffer," he said, while expressing his disappointment with the rising interest in traditional modes of construction.[71] In contrast, for Kenneth Frampton, thinking with rather than against climate was one of the criteria for "critical regionalism," which he suggested as a movement to resist the homogenization of the world and the erasure or trivialization of cultural heritage in a given location.[72]

Recently, Daniel Barber has written the history of Western modern architecture by foregrounding the facade as the mediator between the interior of a building and the climate of its exterior.[73] The facade mitigates, mediates, or negotiates with the climatic conditions outside. Barber has collected ample examples of shading devices, brise-soleil, screens, and other ways of controlling the sun's entry into the building, which amounts to a thick set of evidence that demonstrates midcentury modernists' attention to climate. Against the perception of Le Corbusier as the mastermind of sealed interiors—given the architect's fascination with engineers and machines to live in—Barber claims "climatic modernism followed from him," after the brise-soleil proved the adaptability of the modernist architectural language in the Global South.[74] By drawing attention to "climatic modernism," Barber also made a call to architects and scholars to engage more consciously with climate in the age of environmental crisis.[75]

Architecture and the Right to Heal contributes to this scholarship but takes issue with many historians' soft antagonism toward climatic modernism's complicity with colonialism and resettler nationalism. Climate has indeed served as a proxy for nation and race for much of the modern and

colonial period. At the height of the European colonial power and the age of energy transition into carbon-based technologies, architecture in the ex-Ottoman lands was mobilized to sustain the British Empire's industrial capitalist power. Chapter 4 analyzes the precise moments when climate served as an ideological tool to exert power and reify racial segregation, in order to distinguish between climate determinism for the sake of the perpetuation of hierarchies, as opposed to climate consciousness for the sake of sustainable architectural practices and climate debt (not loan) for the sake of reparations. Climate determinism frames humans in essential identity categories according to the climates of the lands that they come from—that is, climate acts as a proxy for race and nation—whereas climate consciousness means envisioning the racial justice and planetary healing that would arise if climate is duly employed in professions such as architecture. Climate reparation aspires for a just energy transition by giving dues to those who have been subjugated because of climate determinism in the past.

I have chosen Sudan as a focus to discuss the right to heal from climate disasters. Chapter 4 shows the relation between colonization and climate disasters such as sandstorms, floods, and famines, and reveals implicit criticisms formulated by independence-era figures, including architects who were descendants of the Ottoman professional networks. It traces the cause of climate disasters to climate determinism, and shows the connections between colonization, carbonization, and creation of agrarian monocultures whose slow violence in causing climate disasters and mass extinction is being realized today. It demonstrates both the continuities and the discontinuities between the colonial and nation-state periods, and excavates latent ideas about climate consciousness so that healing from climate determinism may start. Climate determinists imagined Africa and the Middle East as hostile climates and maintained the Orientalist conviction against the Ottoman lands that the locals needed European civilizing technologies. The hierarchy constructed between moderate and tropical climates, north and south, Europe and its colonies, "white" and "native," affected architecture to such an extent that cooling for "white comfort" became a major design goal and thus produced the residential typology, urban morphology, and plantation logic in European colonies during the age of industrial capitalism. By joining architectural historians such as Jiat-Hwee Chang, Ana Ozaki, and Ola Uduku, who discussed "tropical architecture" in the context of southeast Asian colonies, Brazil and Portuguese African colonies, and West African postcolonial architecture, respectively, I discuss the problematic implementation of tropical architecture in Sudan.[76] By building on scholars such as Victoria Bernal, Judith Shklar,

Christian Parenti, Sven Beckert, and Jenny Edkins, I look at an intersection between architecture and water infrastructure, which reveals that famine is a historically caused injustice rather than the misfortune of a natural disaster.[77] Looking at the Gezira plantations in Khartoum's southern countryside discloses how architecture helped in the creation of cotton monocultures during colonization, whose harms on biodiversity and attempted remedies are discussed further in chapter 5. This final chapter analyzes two early historical episodes where a variant of the word *Anthropocene* was coined much before its common use today, and where the garden metaphor was used for planetary healing against extinction in projects located in Sudan and Iran but undertaken by international teams of architects.

The lands that concern this book complicate the established history of climate and architecture beyond Sudan and Iran.[78] Discussions include confronting the colonial history of climatization; race-based imperial urbanism and the dismissal of local wisdom in climate control; politics of climate-specific modernism during colonial times, and its difference, if any, from midcentury climate responsive architecture during independence; environmentalist concerns following the UN Conference of 1972 in Stockholm; production of ignorance on passive heating and cooling techniques as air-conditioning became the norm; and the entanglement of global warming and global wars for the extraction of oil.

The relation between modern architecture and the sun gets complicated when viewed from this perspective. Bruno Taut's work in Turkey provides a strong falsification against the general perception that interwar modernists paid attention to solar orientation but dismissed climatic differences. Taut's book *Mimari Bilgisi* (Knowledge of architecture, 1938) was an early criticism of homogenization through modernization, for reasons of not only cultural imperialism but also climate imperialism.[79] He objected to the claims that attributed a universal significance to a form of expression that originated from a limited region. Even the most successful building would melt or freeze in a different climate. The deadly mistake of modernism was to ignore this fact, an argument Taut illustrated with the drawing of a morphing zeppelin as it tours around the world. Taut's complicated theory of climate—which sometimes bordered on climate determinism[80]—was as geopolitical as it was functionalist. Far from merely considering the securing of human comfort through the careful organization of sunlight and wind, he was equally concerned with his colleagues' moods in Japan and Turkey that he found "melancholic" and "tormented" due to the hierarchies imposed by colonial modernity. Taut realized that environmental problems were inseparable from

social and geopolitical ones, and suggested a climate-conscious modernism to sustain difference around the world. Elsewhere, I have argued that Taut's interest in climate carried him to a call for cosmopolitan architecture as a prerequisite for perpetual peace. To distance himself both from importing modernism from Europe and from reactionary nationalism taking command in countries such as his native Germany, Taut theorized "climate" as a matter of not only architectural design but also international solidarity.[81]

The perceived benefits of the sun changed over time, especially during the transition from colonial to postcolonial eras. "It has been shown that the greatest enemy of white men in the tropics is the sun," W. H. McLean said as one of the town planners of British Khartoum and British Palestine, summarizing a very common perception at the time.[82] As demonstrated comprehensively in chapter 4, British architects and residents were on a mission to block the sun during their settlement in Sudan. When one compares colonial climatization of the early twentieth century with the advocacy for solar energy today, one would indeed be surprised by the relative standing of the sun. The sun was the "enemy of the white man" during the British colonization in the Global South, but it was the North Star for interwar modernists who considered light and orientation as their main design criteria. Modern sanatoriums were designed with the premise of the healing powers of the sun. The sun was the major renewable energy resource for the solar house scientists of the 1950s, until it was replaced with oil infrastructures during the Cold War era. The scientific and commercial success of the solar house in the 1950s, albeit brief, crystallized the status of the sun as a friend of the state-of-the-art and technologically advanced home.[83] The sun enjoyed renewed attention as a major energy resource after the 1973 oil crisis. The *Sorry, Out of Gas* exhibition and the accompanying catalogue brings together a myriad of creative architectural designs using the sun, wind, and earth as alternative energy resources when some members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo against the United States during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.[84]

The feeling of cool and warm must have also changed over time, especially after air-conditioning became the norm. The dissemination of air-conditioning after the 1980s as a fossil fuel–dependent technology put a hiatus to passive climate control in design that had enjoyed a momentum with midcentury modernism.[85] The design and construction of the University of Baghdad (1954–81) is a perfect example demonstrating both the midcentury modernist attention to climatic difference and the transformation from passive to air-conditioned climate control. A British mandate following

the Ottoman Empire (as were Sudan and Palestine), Iraq provides significant albeit underacknowledged episodes for the global history of modern architecture. During the British mandate (officially 1917–32, but continued till 1958, given the British-established Kingdom), the government buildings were designed by military engineers with personnel who had served British colonization in India.[86] After the 1951 agreement that diminished British control in oil revenues, and after the 1958 Revolution, a group of architects in Iraq wanted to take matters into their own hands and to replace the British mandate's cultural symbolism with another that would come out of their collaboration with international architects.[87] As a result, Walter Gropius, a name strongly associated with established modernism as the director of Bauhaus in Germany, and the director of the Harvard Graduate School of Design at the time, received the commission for the University of Baghdad.

Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that the encounter between Iraqi, American, British, and German architects, scholars, rulers, elites, and policymakers resulted in an architectural language with passive climate control techniques in the University of Baghdad (figure I.3). The campus is composed of freestanding clusters with ample green spaces in between, which seems, at first sight, to be at odds with the tight urban fabric associated with traditional Baghdad neighborhoods. The exposed reinforced concrete buildings with modular facades recall the aesthetic of industrialization. However, the architects of the campus—Gropius and The Architects Collaborative (TAC) in Boston and Hisham Munir in Baghdad—paid special attention to climatic differences and passive climatization, by referencing what they called "the old Baghdad houses." Buildings were placed close to each other in their own clusters in order to provide maximum shade as in traditional urban fabric. The ramps and covered streets-in-the-air provided a network of shaded spaces. Extensive cantilevers created shadows beneath; deep set-back facades protected the interior from the sun's rays. In gender-specific dormitories, the buildings created a courtyard with an L-shaped street circling two sides of the square cluster so that outdoor spaces were shaded and rooms had correct orientation and privacy. Vertical screens with bricks were meant to cast shade on inner walls and protect them from excessive sun, like the windows of *ursi* rooms in traditional houses. Courtyards and water fountains replicated the climate control techniques of *tarma* houses in Baghdad. The roofs were to be irrigated with a vaporized water sprinkler system, which the team associated with the local custom of pouring water to cool down in dry heat. An air-cooling system would be placed in window openings to drip water and allow the prevailing wind to blow inside, like the *bagdir* openings in traditional

Figure I.3 Walter Gropius and TAC, and Hisham Munir, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, 1954–81. Perspective drawing of the Engineering Library, 1960. Courtesy Zaydoon Munir.

houses. I traced the choice of these passive cooling techniques to episodes of learning from the local wisdom, both past and contemporary. Namely, the invention of a new midcentury modernist vocabulary that emphasized sun-protected surfaces and shaded outdoor spaces, covered walkways, sun-shading devices at the facade, courtyards, and umbrella roofs—often credited to powerful men such as Gropius, Oscar Niemeyer, and Le Corbusier—was actually the result of a multidirectional and multinational translation process with many agents in Baghdad.[88]

The British Orientalist scholars treated Baghdad's history as nothing but a broken link between the ancient glory of al-Mansur's Round City and the British Empire. Everything in between, including the "old Baghdad houses" built during the Ottoman Empire, was treated as a decline.[89] Namely, the University of Baghdad's design team chose an inspiration that went against the grain of the British historiography. The team developed these passive climate control techniques by hybridizing local wisdom and high modernist aesthetics in a context, ironically, invested in American soft power so that the American-Iraqi oil deals would not be disrupted by the Iraqi popular revolution of 1958. William Polk, the director of the Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard, a consultant to the US State Department, and a scholar in Gropius's team, worked hard for the continuation of the project when it faced

cancellation, because, he said, "What, in effect, do we want from the Middle East? . . . . At the present, the answer seems to me to be sufficient peace to prevent a world war and a sufficient flow of oil."[90] Polk was never dishonest about the fact that his motivation in continuing diplomatic and professional relations with Iraq was the US interest in oil, not necessarily climate responsive design.

The midcentury climate consciousness—an example of which came out of the multinational collaboration in Baghdad—was short-lived because of the rise of oil-dependent air-conditioning after the 1980s. Air-conditioning enables what Barber calls "a planetary interior," the ability to have a thermally controlled interior at any season, anywhere in the world. Ironically, the world got hotter by cooling itself.[91] The Iraqi government commissioned Gropius's office TAC, after the architect's death, for an extension to the University of Baghdad in 1981 as part of a new development leap. Ironically, the new project amplified air-conditioning in lieu of passive climate control techniques, at a time when references to cultural identity had become the norm in architectural discourse. The drawings that had been named "Chilled Water Distribution" in the 1960 version were now readjusted to reflect the advanced HVAC systems. The new design for the Fine Arts buildings did not employ the passive cooling techniques of the midcentury version.[92] Air-conditioning units were installed over time all around campus, between or under brise-soleil and shading devices, making facades a forest of boxes that blew cold air inside while dripping water outside (figure I.4).

Iraq holds an additional symbolic place in global history due to the unjustified US-led invasion of this country in 2003. The US-led reconstruction after this assault has failed all transitional justice standards. Judging from the economic and ecological waste spent on Iraq's conflict and postconflict eras,[93] it would not be surprising to hear that the US military is a bigger polluter than 140 other countries today.[94] While reconstructing the country after occupation, US companies ignored the passive cooling techniques that had been developed during midcentury architecture in Iraq. They imported concrete materials and labor, disregarding Iraq's own advanced reinforced concrete industry that had produced some of the world's most noteworthy brutalist buildings. Iraq's reconstruction exposes a tendency that extends much beyond the thinking patterns of military intervention. The dominance of fossil fuel–dependent architectural technologies in the interest of oil and coal companies is a blatant example of "agnotology" in architecture. In *Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance*, the editors define *agnotology* not simply as ignorance but as the active production of nonknowledge.[95]

Figure I.4 Walter Gropius and TAC, and Hisham Munir, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, 1954–81. The image shows shaded common spaces and added A/C units. Photograph: Esra Akcan, 2018.

Much like oil companies that concealed Indigenous peoples' knowledge of land, or much like climate-change deniers during the Cold War who equated regulations with communism and claimed global warming was a lie to abolish capitalism, the producers of desire for fossil fuel–dependent appliances and construction methods in architecture foreclosed the advancement of passive heating and cooling techniques and the use of renewable energy. Agnotology is the conscious manufacturing of ignorance, the suppression of knowledge production, and the disenfranchisement of existing wisdom. The discontinuation of traditional and midcentury passive cooling techniques in favor of air-conditioned climate control in the University of Baghdad is a typical example. Chapters in this book demonstrate how similar types of climate agnotology are responsible for climate disasters.

Climate agnotology, in the sense of the trivialization and dismissal of climate-conscious architecture in favor of luxury and fuel-dependent climatization technologies, also invites discussions on climate adaptation. Recent debates differentiate between adaptation and mitigation as two distinct ways of responding to climate change. While the former involves changing projects to get ready for the rising temperatures and sea levels, the latter advocates changing policies to prevent climate change. Both are clearly necessary, but

climate activists rightly caution against climate adaptationists for igniting a climate fatalism of sorts that sees global warming as an unavoidable fait accompli. What is often overlooked in this discussion, however, is the low-carbon architectural practices that have long served as climate adaptation techniques before fossil fuel–dependent technologies took over. Part of chapter 5 reveals the ideas of a multinational group of architects who theorized architecture as the most effective medium for humans to adapt to their environment. Pardisan, a park in Tehran, Iran, and a collaboration between Ian McHarg, Eskandar Firouz, Nader Ardalan, Laleh Bakhtiar, Charles Eames, and Buckminster Fuller among others, sought to fight the extinction of the Persian lion while exhibiting world architectures as a matter of climate adaptation. It is partially the erasure of these passive climate adaptation techniques that has brought the carbonization of the environment and climate change. Architecture has a long, albeit obliterated, history of climate adaptation that can be remobilized along with climate mitigation.

Trivialization of climate-conscious architecture also invites us to question ideas that posit dry cities or interiors with moderate temperatures as signs of progress. Modernism globalized Western standards of living and dictated a narrow definition of progress to other parts of the world. While colonial architects who worked with climate-determinist ideas construed dryness and moderate temperature as modern norms of civilization and progress, they also eradicated long-standing ways of living with water or heat in communities that did not necessarily codify wetness or hotness as an inferior condition. It was the imperial mindset that imposed dryness and moderate temperatures as universal norms, and thereby devised climate engineering systems for the Global South that intervened in the planetary ecosystem.

Case studies can be multiplied. Scrutinizing the relation between climate and architecture in the context of the post-Ottoman British colonies before World War II and in the context of US soft power during the Cold War in chapters 4 and 5, this book concludes that healing from resettler nationalism and from climate disaster are connected. When one comes face to face with the interrelated history of state violence against peoples and human violence against nature, one realizes that the successes of transitional justice and energy transition depend on each other. Acknowledging the convergence of carbonization and colonization due to climate determinism, as well as the links between global war and global warming, I hope, fosters a call for climate reparations that the first industrializing nations of the Global North owe to the Global South.[96]

A People's History of Architecture

There are ample episodes in the past when societies turned to architecture in order to heal after conflicts and disasters. Pandemics provide a good example. The nineteenth-century cholera outbreak exposed the liability of water-distribution systems and eventually brought the improvement of sanitary infrastructure in London; it necessitated the update and extension of underground sewage system in Paris; and fostered the removal and transfer of existing cemeteries to the outskirts in Istanbul. Fires motivated orthogonal and wider city streets so that emergency technologies could reach disaster areas, as well as indoor plumbing and fire-escape regulations in buildings. The garden-city as a settlement model employed in modified forms around the globe—from Germany to Japan, from Turkey to Uganda—was devised partially with the conviction that the re-establishment of human contact with nature in industrial times would prevent contemporary public health hazards. Interwar and midcentury public housing were designed around the world with hygiene and health priorities in mind, as freestanding building blocks in open space were meant to provide ample sun, air, and greenery to all habitants. Architects with early twentieth-century modernist design sensibilities advocated minimal, unornamented, and functional spaces and surfaces partially because they were easy to clean. Architecture was believed to cure tuberculosis in sanatoriums with large balconies that were open to sun and air flow.

The list can be expanded. However, most of these solutions did not pay enough attention to, and even constructed, the socioeconomic, ethnic, and global inequalities, and discriminatory and disciplinary structures. To refer to a classic book, Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* analyzed how plague prevention during the end of the seventeenth century evolved into panopticism, where the modern prison as an architectural type serves as a metaphor for surveillance society.[97] The modernization and sanitization of Paris under the Baron Haussmann was famously brutal in destroying the city fabric and displacing the poor. Today, many world cities are segregated along class and racial lines, and push disenfranchised populations to zones with worse environmental conditions and fewer healthcare opportunities compared to affluent neighborhoods. Modern planning and architectural design that invented sanitary cities also produced ruthless inequalities.

One of the major intentions of *Architecture and the Right to Heal* is to write the architectural history of conflicts and disasters from the viewpoint of the wounded, and devise mechanisms to do so in the absence of

conventional documents. Methodologically, this extends my previous book *Open Architecture* that gave voice not only to architects and policymakers but also to immigrant residents of an urban renewal initiative. Oral history was my preferred method in writing *Open Architecture*, because an oral historian refrains from representing an entire ethnicity or group, and adds the name of the underrepresented individual to history. Rather than saying "a Muslim migrant," or reducing migrants to numbers and percentages, I used the preferred names of the individual migrants to give credit to their agency in making our cities. Many researchers in current conflict zones conclude their studies with a similar request from refugees: "See me"—as a human being, as an individual. In this approach, architectural history does not end when the building leaves the hand of the architect. Oral history extends the narrative by combining the time of a building's design with the time of a specific occupation. The contingency and partiality that result from this specific amalgam of the two time periods acknowledge the necessarily open and unfinished nature of architectural history.

Architecture and the Right to Heal extends this method of architectural history writing to a past where conducting oral history is no longer possible. It tells the story from the viewpoint of both designers and habitants of architectural spaces; from the perspective of peoples, rather than merely planners, architects, and policymakers. Even where oral history is not within reach, it is possible to write the people's history of architecture by excavating this voice in literatures, ad hoc interviews, archives of ethnographic works, family photographs, and diaries. Chapter 1 foregrounds the voices of mothers whose children have been subject to enforced disappearance. Chapter 2 tells the history of nation formation by focusing on the memoirs, photographs, and belongings of two expelled migrants and their communities. Chapter 3 quotes extensively from the memoirs of refugees and exchanged migrants who settled in Istanbul. Chapter 4 writes the urban history of Khartoum with family photographs and declarations of previously colonized individuals. Chapter 5 contests the premise that planetary healing requires hyperopic and top-down environmentalism, and acknowledges the role of nonhuman actors in healing the cities that humans built. All chapters thereby challenge the preconceptions of the knowing subject in architectural studies.

In his book *A People's History of the United States*, Howard Zinn shows that the past written from the perspective of Indigenous peoples, slaves, women, members of the working class, and migrant laborers overthrows myths of great men and national glory, but still highlights the most meaningful struggles in the United States.[98] In *Architecture and the Right to Heal*, such a bottom-up

history proves to significantly transform existing narratives as well. For example, in chapter 2, the people's history of the Exchange of Populations Treaty exposes a big contrast between the declarations of state agents and the experiences of those involved. Reading migrant testimonies on both sides of the European border, and tracing architectural histories, this chapter characterizes this foundational decision in nation formation as a trauma imposed on these lands. Against the official historiographies of nation-states that identify partitions as tough but necessary solutions to the problem of ethnic conflict, aided by state-sponsored architecture, this chapter writes partition's architectural history from the ground up. This leads to a reconceptualization of the partition as the rift between the rulers and the peoples, and not the rift between the two communities. This history from below guides us to a transformative de-polarization and a new solidarity between actors of the previously polarized communities. Moreover, chapter 3 unsettles the current scholarship on slum development. By uncovering the past from the memoirs of refugees and migrants, it traces the birth of squatter settlements in Turkey to early resettler nationalist ideology, rather than to midcentury urbanization. While analyzing the British colonization in Sudan from the viewpoint of climate change, chapter 4 refrains from a very common and convenient method in architectural history that writes the colonial history, critically or not, only with the documents in the colonizer's archive, and therefore from the viewpoint of the colonizer. This book advocates the postcolonial view that the responsibility to analyze colonialism critically also brings the responsibility to write the (previously) colonized people's history of architecture to be excavated from beyond colonial and military archives. To that end, this chapter brings the history of colonial violence and independence struggles together, and raises the voice of those who criticized colonial planning and architecture from the viewpoint of local residents. Additionally, chapter 4 revises the established accounts about the era of developmentalist modernization. It does so by registering the role of the Ottoman Empire's dissolution in the history of modern architecture and by following the work of architects who were citizens of the new Ottoman successor states.

In his book *The Last Ottoman Generation*, Michael Provence exposes the historiographical shortcomings of writing different national histories of countries that came out of the Ottoman Empire. Such histories not only maintain uncritically the Western epistemologies of the "national idea," but also obscure these lands' commonalities till the mid-twentieth century. Provence follows the careers of officers who were educated in the Ottoman military schools and took posts in Ottoman province capitals such as

Damascus, Beirut, Adana, and Salonica, and who later built the resistance against European mandates in Ottoman successor states and, eventually, participated in the governance of independent nations.[99] While Provence's book compiles a history of military and government personnel, *Architecture and the Right to Heal* looks instead at the makers of cities, buildings, and spaces. The following chapters trace the work of architects from Ottoman lands who migrated into new nations during the empire's dissolution, including those from Alexandria, Asenovgrad, Giresun, Istanbul, Karpathos, Kavala, Sinasos, and others. Tracing the post-Ottoman professional networks reveals unexpected connections that unsettle dominant area studies categories and current academic compartmentalization. For example, Greek builders, as well as merchants, moneylenders, shipbuilders, jewelers, artisans, and farmers, had established themselves in Sudan and North Africa during Mehmet Ali's rule.[100] Chapter 4 reveals the continuing Greek presence in Khartoum much after the end of the Ottoman Empire, and its impact on the architectural profession during the independence period as an example of the dissemination of post-Ottoman professional networks. It shows that the established accounts on the relation between European coloniality and midcentury developmentalism are challenged when history is written by registering the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

As a result of this research, art historical categories such as the "Islamic city and architecture" appear in a new a light. In her overview of the changing frameworks in the historiography of the "Islamic city," Giula Annalinda Neglia draws attention to the 1920s when art historical interest shifted from the monuments to the urban fabric of the Ottoman Empire. Scholars started suggesting common attributes of the "Islamic city," which they derived from studies of a few cities, but extended to an entire imagined "Islamic world."[101] Scholars in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States pursued a range of methods for freezing a definition for the "Islamic city." They employed morphological analyses and descriptions of as-found physical features on the ground or religion-based speculations about how and why these cities developed historically. Only in the 1980s, the field questioned in a self-reflective way whether there was anything that could be actually named an "Islamic city" and suggested alternative nation-based terms.[102] However, the term and the field continued to exist, and the alternative names did not terminate but were prone to create new identity-based essentialisms. Till the mid-1980s, the late Ottoman era was overwhelmingly portrayed as a period of decline and was identified with a lack of progress (lack of infrastructure, lack of modernism, etc.)—a narrative that subconsciously validated

British colonial historians cited in this book. These historians of the colonial and mandate periods had glorified ancient Iraq and Sudan, and claimed that only European colonizers could save them from decline due to the Ottoman rule and could bring them back to "civilization." It was only in the mid-1980s that the Ottoman-era modernization started receiving a closer look in Western academia, and diversified after the integration of scholars and works from the region.[103] *Architecture and the Right to Heal* builds on the work of scholars who have written on late Ottoman cities, but foregrounds these cities' cosmopolitan and post-Ottoman histories in a way that exposes their national and religious homogenization during this time, both socially and epistemologically. The naming and historiography of the "Islamic city" is premised on the compartmentalization of the world and of the scholarship with the ideology of resettler nationalism that this book criticizes. *Architecture and the Right to Heal* unsettles the category of the "Islamic city," by adding previously unstudied settlements to scholarship and by demonstrating their shared history with cities in Africa and Europe.

Timelines and Itineraries of the Book

A book on healing from sedimented violence and historical debris requires a specific consideration of time and space to account for the unfolding of events and arguments. The five chapters are organized thematically so that each concentrates on a shock, but *Architecture and the Right to Heal* creates a forward momentum to show that sudden traumas have deep roots in history and are connected globally. The book starts with one woman's story looking for justice in the present-day Istanbul. Tracing threads of this story of transitional justice and energy transition from one chapter to the next carries the readers as far back as the late nineteenth century, and takes them to locations in Anatolia, Southeast Europe, Northeast Africa, and West Asia, and by extension to similar struggles around the world.

There are two timelines in the book. This enables the simultaneous discussion of the overarching global challenges of our present time and the detailed historical events unfolding at the geometric center of Afro-Euro-Asia during the twentieth century. The first timeline focuses on unknown historical episodes to which the book brings new archival research and fieldwork. The chapters tell textured stories of architectural artifacts and spaces with a narrative that starts from and returns to Istanbul via stops in Cappadocia, Evia, Athens, Khartoum, Gezira, and Tehran. When migrants and travelers to these regions are included, the geography extends to Baghdad, Cairo,

Kavala, Salonica, and Skopje in the Ottoman lands and successor states, and to China, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the East, as well as to Argentina, Chile, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the West. The book starts at the end of this timeline—the coup d'état in Turkey in 1980—but the narrative carries the readers from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the upsurge of British colonialism on these lands at the end of the nineteenth century to the rise of a new West-Islam divide and of neoliberalism in 1980. The narrative does not unfold in chronological order but recounts chronological markers such as the British colonization of Sudan following the Ottoman Empire (1898), the enforced disappearance of Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul (1915), the British mandate in Iraq following the Ottoman Empire (1917), the cycles of migration between the Balkans and Anatolia (1912–89), the Greek-Turkish partition (1923), the independence of Sudan and Iraq from the British rule (1956 and 1958), the rise of American soft power and collaborations in the Middle East (ca. 1960), the Islamic Revolution and the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran (1978–79), and the coup d'état in Turkey that increased state violence against Kurdish minorities among other things (1980). The intention is not to tell a complete and causal history but to focus on architectural episodes that take place during the modern restructuring of the world.

The second timeline is what might be termed our present age from roughly the 1980s onward. Namely, the first timeline carries the reader from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the second timeline. Chapter 1 ("Enforced Disappearance") discusses the ongoing struggles toward healing from human rights violations and state violence; chapter 2 ("Partition") looks at present-day architects and habitants who seek healing from the continuing wounds of the international world order and nation formation; chapter 3 ("Collapse") confronts the aftermath of civil war, earthquakes, and market crashes in neoliberal cities as related events; chapter 4 ("Climate Disasters") discusses the role of architecture in climate change; and chapter 5 ("Extinction") comments on contemporary conservation debates that aim to preserve nature by striking the right balance between the built and the unbuilt environment. Chapters move from individual to societal to planetary healing. Each chapter has its own conclusion; all together they suggest a new ethic of cosmopolitan, democratic, and bottom-up healing, which imagines in the horizon the extension of human and species rights, a broadened and holistic notion of justice and reparations, and the elimination of national partitions and of human/nonhuman divisions.

Notes

Introduction

1   Coates, "Case for Reparations." The term *reparations* has recently attracted interest in architectural discussions as well. For instance, a recent issue of *Journal of Architectural Education*, the official publication of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, was themed on reparations. McEwen et al., "Reparations."

2   Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality," 260–61. Also see Sharpe, *In the Wake*; McKittrick, *Sylvia Wynter*.

3   Even though many readers may recognize this perception of human rights in numerous countries, the United Kingdom is a good example. See Clapham, *Human Rights*, 133–37.

4   Bentham, *Anarchical Fallacies*.

5   Marx, "On the Jewish Question."

6   Despite Karl Marx's criticism, Henri Lefebvre is invested in the actualization of human rights through social justice: "concrete rights come to complete the abstract rights of man and the citizen inscribed on the front of buildings by democracy during its revolutionary beginnings: the rights of ages and sexes (the woman, the child and the elderly), rights of conditions (the proletarian, the peasant), rights to training and education, to work, to culture, to rest, to health, to housing." Like Marx, Lefebvre posits the working class as the principal "agent, social career or support of" a revolutionary transformation. Yet, unlike Marx, Lefebvre includes the realization of human rights in this transformation as well: "The pressure of the working class has been and remains necessary (but not sufficient) for the recognition of these rights, for their entry into customs, for their inscription into codes which are still incomplete." Lefebvre, *The Right to the City*.

7   The literature on Lefebvre is too extensive to cite here, especially by well-known authors such as David Harvey, Edward Soja, Saskia Sassen, and Manuel Castells. For authors writing in the discipline of architecture, see

McLeod, "Henri Lefebvre's Critique"; Stanek, *Henri Lefebvre on Space*; Feldman, *From a Nation Torn*.

8   De Gouges, "Declaration of the Rights of Woman"; Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*.

9   For a discussion, see Sen, "Culture and Human Rights"; Sen, "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights"; Sen, "Human Rights and Capabilities."

10 For a review, see Tasioulas, "Human Rights."

11 Arendt, "We Refugees," 77; Agamben, "We Refugees." For a revised version, see Agamben, "Biopolitics and the Rights of Man." For more reflections of this on architecture, see Akcan, *Open Architecture*.

12 MacDonald, "Natural Rights," 21.

13 For a discussion of human rights in other disciplines, see Freeman, *Human Rights*.

14 Article 25 of the Declaration reads: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services." The UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights gives a vague definition of "adequate housing," which involves security, availability of services, habitability, accessibly, location and cultural adequacy. However, the governments' obligations as to what level these standards should be provided are unclear, and the evaluation criteria for states that fail to keep up with these obligations are even less defined.

15 Clapham, *Human Rights*, 133–37. In the sphere of architecture, the most impactful field that brings these issues to the attention of the world is forensic architecture. Weizman, *Forensic Architecture*.

16 Salvioli, *Promotion of Truth*, 22.

17 Teitel, *Transitional Justice*; Teitel, *Globalizing Transitional Justice*; De Greiff, "Theorizing Transitional Justice."

18 Cronon, "Trouble with Wilderness"; Marris, *Rambunctious Garden*; Tsing, *Mushroom at the End of the World*; Haraway, "Tentacular Thinking"; Haraway, "Making Kin"; Tsing et al., *Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet*; Büscher and Fletcher, *Conservation Revolution*.

19 Stoler, *Imperial Debris*.

20 Malm, *Fossil Capital*.

21 Klein, *This Changes Everything*; Demos, *Decolonizing Nature*; Demos, *Against the Anthropocene*; Dawson, *Extreme Cities*.

22 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*; Walcott, *Long Emancipation*; Liboiron, *Pollution Is Colonialism*.

23 Said, *Orientalism*.

24 For books that are specifically on migrations due to the Ottoman-Russian and Balkan War, see Ladas, *Exchange of Minorities*; Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler*; Pentzopoulos, *Balkan Exchange*; İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*; Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında*; Toumarkine, *Migrations des populations*; Dündar, *Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası*; Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands*; İpek, "Balkans, War and Migration"; Hamed-Troyansky, *Empire of Refugees*.

25 I am using Justin McCarthy's illustration because his mapping and numeric estimations still provide one of the sharpest visualizations of the forced migrations during this time. But his statements about the Armenian killings have been conveniently used by the denialist Turkish nationalists.

26 Hamed-Troyansky, *Empire of Refugees*, 124–34.

27 Dündar, *Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası*, 56, 252.

28 Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*.

29 Therefore, this book is a continuation of the idea of welcoming, translatability from below, and open architecture that I explored in previous books by theorizing on cosmopolitan ethics. Akcan, *Architecture in Translation*; Akcan, *Open Architecture*.

30 For general histories of Ottoman and British Sudan written during the periods, see Mihri, *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*; Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan*. For more recent scholarship, see Holt and Daly, *History of Sudan*; Daly, *Modernization in the Sudan*; Collins and Deng, *British in the Sudan*; Troutt Powell, *Different Shade of Colonialism*.

31 "Osmanlı Afrikası-Kuzeydoğu, Der Kriegsschauplatz Im Aegyptischen Sudan," Ottoman Archives, Istanbul, Document No. HRT.h.._651-_3, Document Location: 651, Document Date: H-03-05-1301.

32 Mazower, *Greek Revolution*, 277.

33 These included Halid Paşa, who was the governor general of Sudan provinces; he hosted European travelers through their travels in the province of Sudan such as John Petherick. Mahu Bey, of Kurdish origin, who was the governor of Berber since 1822, had a habitual residence near Khartoum. When Ali Khurshid Aga took over the office in 1826, he focused on developing the city by attracting families to move and have permanent houses here. During this time, a mosque was built in 1829–30 and replaced with a larger one in seven years; barracks, military storehouses and a dockyard were constructed; commerce and trade routes were encouraged. Ivory trade soon made several Ottoman subjects wealthy, some of whom lived in Khartoum, where the slave market remained open until

1854. Arakil Bey, who was an Armenian, was appointed as the first governor of Khartoum and the Gezira region to its south until 1858. Holt and Daly, *History of Sudan*, 47–82; Petherick, *Egypt, the Soudan and Central Africa*, 127.

34 Deringil, "They Live in a State."

35 Deringil, "They Live in a State," 311.

36 Minawi, *Ottoman Scramble for Africa*.

37 When Mahdi (the awaited one in Muslim faith) passed away a few months after the revolt, the rule was passed on to his successor, Khalifa Abdallah al-Tayushi.

38 P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly identify Lord Curzon as one of the architects of this political equation, who was also one of the masterminds of Greek-Turkish partition treaty. Holt and Daly, *History of Sudan*, 130–31.

39 Troutt Powell, *Different Shade of Colonialism*.

40 See, for example, Hall, *Balkan Wars*.

41 Schurman, *Balkan Wars*, 3, 8.

42 Schurman, *Balkan Wars*, 22. As a result, Prince Otto of Bavaria was designated as the first, and King George (originally a Danish Prince) as the second king of Greece until his assassination in 1913.

43 Schurman wrote: "Of all perplexing subjects in the world few can be more baffling than the distribution of races in Macedonia [where] classified population with religion. Accordingly, Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians are the same. . . . Race being thus merged in religion—in something that rests on the human will and not on physical characteristics fixed by nature—can in that part of the world be changed as easily as religion. . . . In that land, race is a political party with common customs and religion who stand for a 'national idea' which they strenuously endeavor to force on others. . . . Each 'race' seeks to convert the people to its faith by the agency of schools and churches, which teach and use its own language." He claimed that the "Turkish Sultans are responsible" for the hostility of Slavs and Bulgarians against Greeks, because all Christians were collected under one *millet* in Ottoman Empire, and until 1870, the Greek Patriarch had jurisdiction over Bulgarians. Schurman, *Balkan Wars*, 80–81, 17–18.

44 Blumi, *Ottoman Refugees*, 12

45 The dispute over whether to call the Balkan War genocidal or not continues. One might compare two recent articles, where the first interprets it as the starting point of radicalized warfare, systematic attack on civilians and ethnic cleansing, while the second refrains from calling it ethnic cleansing due to the "legacy of the Ottoman Empire," the impossibility of drawing lines between combatants and civilians, and the "inability or the

unwillingness of the [Ottoman] Porte to impose the rule of law." Biondich, "Balkan Wars"; Delis, "Violence and Civilians During the Balkan Wars," 558.

46   Zürcher, "Balkan Wars and the Refugee Leadership."

47   Against the initial narratives that assumed a break with the Ottoman Empire, the continuities between the late Ottoman elite around the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Republic of Turkey are now well known. Ahmad, *From Empire to Republic*; Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War in 1914*; Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*; Akçam, *From Empire to Republic*.

48   Recently, scholars have textually analyzed the writings of Yahya Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Ömer Seyfettin, and Halide Edip Adıvar to show the psychological impact of the Balkan War on the Turkish intellectuals. Şirin, "Traumatic Legacy of the Balkan Wars"; Arisan, "Effects of the Balkan Wars."

49   Halide Edib [Adıvar], *Memoirs of Halidé Edib*, 333.

50   Keyder, "Ottoman Empire"; Kieser, Öktem, and Reinkowski, *World War I and the End of the Ottomans*.

51   For example, the following article warns against the assumed consensus that CUP members were involved in a "senseless defeat of imperial self-destruction" immediately after the Balkan War. Instead, the defeat opened an era of debate that included ideas about the imperialist expansion and restoration of Ottoman Empire in Europe, irredentism, and revenge. The Young Turks did not embrace Turkism and the myth of Anatolia as the fatherland immediately, and Ottomanism maintained relevance well into 1920. Öztan, "Point of No Return?"

52   Some scholars take a soft antagonistic tone against ethnic cleansing as if the trauma of Muslim expulsion from the Balkans could serve as an excuse. Among those who unapologetically identify demographic engineering and genocide, see especially Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*; Akçam, *Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

53   Kurt and Gürpınar, "Balkan Wars," 350.

54   Ginio, *Ottoman Culture of Defeat*. Eyal Ginio takes the term "culture of defeat" from Wolfgang Schivelbusch, who analyzed the interplay between trauma, mourning, pessimism, and sentiments of glory and power after catastrophes.

55   İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya*.

56   For instance, in 1912, the Azerbaijani author Ahmet Agayev (Ağaoğlu) characterized the Balkan War as one between the Cross and the Crescent and reminded his readers that the Ottoman Empire was the only territory for independent Muslims (along with Iran and Morocco), who otherwise

were under European colonization. Ginio, *Ottoman Culture of Defeat*, 100–102, 126.

57   According to Stanford Shaw's survey, "stories of persecution and savagery from Crimea to Belgrade and Sarajevo were mingled with accounts of oppression from India to Algeria, and contrasted with the toleration and good treatment provided for non-Muslims in great Muslim empires including that of the Ottomans. . . . Soon these feelings were translated into a movement to establish contacts with all oppressed Muslims of the world, including those in British India and Egypt, Russian Central Asia and French Algeria and Tunisia." Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 259.

58   See Panayi and Virdee, *Refugees and the End of Empire*; Bashir and Goldberg, *Holocaust and the Nakba*; Siddiqi, *Architecture of Migration*.

59   Nichols, *Theft Is Property*.

60   For the translation of property definitions between Russian and Ottoman Empires, and its impact on urban and rural environment, see my doctoral advisee's dissertation: Sarıçayır, "Property in Transition."

61   Çavuşoğlu, "Yugoslavya-Makedonya Topraklarından," 145.

62   Selim Deringil explains the cultural project of the Hamidian regime as follows: "Communication with his people and the outside world had therefore to be made through a world of symbols. These were based almost entirely on Islamic motifs. . . . It was Islam that would provide the store of symbols which could compete with the national symbols of the Greeks and the Serbs." Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 18.

63   Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History."

64   Broswimmer, *Ecocide*, 8.

65   These five causes were: human activity has transformed 30–50 percent of the land surface of the planet; most major rivers have been dammed or diverted; fertilizer plants have been producing more nitrogen than terrestrial ecosystems; fisheries have removed more than one third of production of coastal waters; and humans use more than half of world's freshwater runoff. Crutzen, "Geology of Mankind," 108.

66   Chakrabarty, "Climate of History."

67   A series of terms have been offered in search for a more accurate root cause of climate change, such as Capitalocene, Plantationocene, and Plasticene. Malm and Hornborg, "Geology of Mankind," 67; Haraway, "Tentacular Thinking"; Demos, *Decolonizing Nature*; Demos, *Against the Anthropocene*.

68   Edwards et al., *Dark Scenes from Damaged Earth*. In recent years, several architects have imagined utopian projects, such as The Line in Saudi Arabia, or *Planet City*, a film by Liam Young.

69   Nixon, *Slow Violence*.

70   Banham, *Architecture of the Well-Tempered Environment*, 9.

71   Banham, *Architecture of the Well-Tempered Environment*, 13.

72   Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism."

73   Barber, *Modern Architecture and Climate*.

74   Barber, *Modern Architecture and Climate*, 25.

75   Barber, *Modern Architecture and Climate*, 12–13.

76   Uduku, "Modernist Architecture and 'the Tropical'"; Chang, *Genealogy of Tropical Architecture*; Ozaki, "Brazilian Atlantic."

77   Bernal, "Colonial Moral Economy"; Shklar, *Faces of Injustice*; Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*; Parenti, *Tropic of Chaos*; Edkins, *Whose Hunger?*

78   Eyal Weizman and Fazal Sheikh have famously described colonialism as climate change in the Negev Desert in today's Israel, rather than seeing climate change as a consequence. Weizman and Sheikh, *Conflict Shoreline*.

79   Taut, *Mimari Bilgisi*.

80   Bruno Taut suggested that almost all external conditions of architecture were a function of climate, the only basis for all the other real factors. Climate not only gave "a specificity, a tonality, a musical color to the building," but also mirrored the ethnic differences in body proportions and human expressions. Here, Taut came dangerously close to the racial theory where climatic differences in the world were used to claim an argument about racial difference, and subsequently, the superiority of one race over another. Taut, *Mimari Bilgisi*, 62, 65.

81   Akcan, *Architecture in Translation*.

82   McLean, *Regional and Town Planning*, 225.

83   Barber, *House in the Sun*.

84   Borasi and Zardini, *Sorry, Out of Gas*.

85   Basile, *Cool*; Sisson, "How Air Conditioning Shaped Modern Architecture"; Koheji, "Thermal Comfort and (Im)possible Futures."

86   Sultani, "Architecture in Iraq." See also Crinson, *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire*.

87   On architecture in Baghdad during this time, see Fethi, "Contemporary Architecture in Baghdad"; Isenstadt, "Faith in a Better Future"; Nooraddin, "Globalization and the Search"; Azara and Martinez, *Irak Restored*; Isenstadt and Rizvi, *Modernism and the Middle East;* Bernhardsson, "Faith in the Future"; Pieri, *Baghdad;* Al Chalabi, موسوعة العمارة العراقية; Akcan, *Abolish Human Bans.*

88   Akcan, "Democracy and War."

89   Coke, *Baghdad*.

90   William Polk also said, "Our reasons for identifying ourselves with [the former Iraqi government] were three: it existed, it was prepared to agree to join our side in the Cold War, and it was able to assure the flow of oil." Polk, "Lesson of Iraq."

91   Barber, *Modern Architecture and Climate*.

92   "The University of Baghdad: The Master Plan = Jami'at Baghdad, 1981," Rare LG 338.B33/U641X, Frances Loeb Special Collections, Harvard Graduate School of Design, Cambridge.

93   Klein, *Shock Doctrine*, 325–84.

94   "US Military Is a Bigger Polluter."

95   Proctor and Schiebinger, *Agnotology*.

96   Akcan, "North to South"; "Reparations for Colonization/Carbonization."

97   Foucault, *Surveiller et punir*.

98   Zinn, *People's History of the United States*.

99   Provence, *Last Ottoman Generation*.

100   Mazower, *Greek Revolution*.

101   Neglia, "Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City."

102   Neglia, "Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City," 14–15.

103   This is a list of major books and anthologies that collect scholarship from different countries: Raymond, *Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri*; Dumont and Georgeon, *Vivre dans l'empire Ottoman*; Yerasimos, "Tanzimat'ın Kent Reformları Üzerine"; Hanssen et al., *Empire in the City*; Raymond, "French Studies"; Eroğlu et al., *Osmanlı Vilayet Salnamelerinde Bağdat*; Çelik, *Empire, Architecture and the City*; Holod et al., *City in the Islamic World*; Arnaud, "Modernization of the Cities"; Ceylan, *Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq*; Pieri, *Baghdad*; Reilly, *Ottoman Cities of Lebanon*; Flood and Necipoğlu, *Companion to Islamic Art and Architecture*.

Chapter 1. Enforced Disappearance: Urban Squares, Cemeteries, Memorials

1   "Mehmet screamed when he saw a photograph of a body whose face was cut into pieces with a knife, left shoulder burnt, armpits bruised, and neck strangled with metal." Günçikan, *Cumartesi Anneleri*, 134.

2   Hasan Ocak's story of reburial were recorded in articles in the daily newspaper *Milliyet*. "Ocak ailesi İstanbul Valisiyle görüştü," April 24, 1995 ; "Ocak için CHP işgali Sürüyor," April 24, 1995; "Kayıp Ocak Gömülmüş," May 17, 1995; "Ocak'ın Mezarı Belirlendi," May 19, 1995;