

John Lindsay-Poland

U.S. ALLY ATROCITIES
AND COMMUNITY
ACTIVISM

PLAN COLOMBIA



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Colombia. MAP BY DOUGLAS MACKEY.

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Community Activism

COLOMBIA

John Lindsay-Poland

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For all the members of the
PEACE COMMUNITY OF
SAN JOSÉ DE APARTADÓ
and
FOR HELEN LINDSAY

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACCU	Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá)
ACIN	Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca (Northern Cauca Indigenous Councils Association)
ACOOOC	Acción Colectiva de Objetores y Objetoras de Conciencia (Colombian Collective Action of Conscientious Objectors)
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
ANUC	Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National Peasant Association)
ASFADDES	Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos (Association of Family Members of Detained and Disappeared in Colombia)
ATCC	Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (Peasant Workers Association of Carare River)
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
CCEEU	Coordinación Colombia-Europa-Estados Unidos (Colombia-Europe-U.S. Human Rights Observatory)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency

CINEP	Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (Center for Research and Grassroots Education)
CNP	Policia Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Police)
CSN	Colombia Support Network
DAS	Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department of Security)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DH	Derechos Humanos (human rights)
DIH	Derecho Internacional Humanitario (international humanitarian law)
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army)
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEDEGAN	Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos (Colombian Federation of Cattle Ranchers)
FOR	Fellowship of Reconciliation
GAULA	Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal (Unified Action Groups for Personnel Rescue)
INSITOP	Informe de Situación de Tropas (Troop Location Report)
ISS	Infrastructure Security Strategy
JPM	Justicia Penal Militar (Military Justice System)
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JTF	Joint Task Force
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSA	National Security Agency
OAS	Organization of American States
ONIC	Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (National Indigenous Organization of Colombia)
PBI	Peace Brigades International

Pepes	Personas Perseguidas por Pablo Escobar
PGN	Procuraduría General de la Nación (Inspector General's Office)
RECORRE	Red de Comunidades en Ruptura y Resistencia (Network of Communities in Resistance)
REDEPAZ	Red Nacional de Iniciativas Ciudadanas por la Paz y contra la Guerra (National Network of Initiatives Against War and for Peace)
RIME	Regional de Inteligencia Militar del Ejército (Army Regional Military Intelligence Unit)
SINTRAINAGRO	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria Agropecuaria (National Union of Agricultural Workers)
SOA	U.S. Army School of the Americas
SouthCom	U.S. Southern Command
UN	United Nations
UP	Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union)
WHINSEC	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

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San José de Apartadó. MAP BY DOUGLAS MACKEY.

PROLOGUE

Force does not work the way its advocates seem to think it does. It does not, for example, reveal to the victim the strength of his adversary. On the contrary, it reveals the weakness, even the panic of his adversary, and this revelation invests the victim with patience. Furthermore, it is ultimately fatal to create too many victims. The victor can do nothing with these victims, for they do not belong to him, but—to the victims.

—James Baldwin, *No Name in the Street*

On the morning of the day he was murdered, Monday, February 21, 2005, Luis Eduardo Guerra awoke in the house of his stepmother, Miryam Tuberquia, in a small settlement of Colombia's Abibe Mountains, called Mulatos. For the previous three days, in the dense foliage and steep trails near the house, intense combat had raged between government forces, paramilitary troops allied with them, and guerrilla fighters.

Luis Eduardo had hiked to Mulatos on Saturday afternoon from his home in the town center of San José de Apartadó, together with his son Diener, eleven years old, and his girlfriend, Beyanira Areiza. He visited Miryam every month or so, and he planned to harvest cocoa beans on land he had near her house, where he also grew corn and beans, and return to San José the following day. On Sunday, however, the combat nearby was intense, and they stayed in the house in Mulatos out of caution. The military had killed a guerrilla known as Macho Rusio in a nearby settlement.

Luis Eduardo did not take lunch with him when he left the house on Monday morning at about 7:00 a.m., telling Miryam that he would be back by 3:00 p.m. He left with Diener, Beyanira, and his half brother, Dario, known as El Gurre.¹

The Abibe range, located in northwestern Colombia, is composed of very rugged but fabulously fertile, tropical land. Paths connect settlements in the range, over which people move on foot, mule, or horseback, often through rocky mud that receives more than one hundred inches of rain

annually. (The area of Miryam's house was called El Barro, "the mud.") The district of San José spreads over more than three hundred square kilometers on the western side of the range. The rugged terrain and its location have made it a refuge of choice for civilians fleeing political violence, as well as for insurgents and other armed groups—first Liberals fighting with Conservatives from 1948 to 1956, and beginning in the late 1960s, leftist guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC).² In the 1990s, the army and allied right-wing paramilitary groups contested the guerrillas' control, leading to frequent combat in and around peasant settlements and farmland. In response, Luis Eduardo Guerra and other peasants in San José de Apartadó declared themselves a peace community in 1997. They would not support any armed group, would not join them, sell food, give information, or carry arms. It was a strategy for survival—since armed groups retaliated against civilians who collaborated with their enemies—and for staying and continuing to work the land.

The landscape that Luis Eduardo and his family traversed that day was intensely beautiful, with richly diverse flora and fauna: hardwood trees (ceiba, Colombian mahogany), many palm species, flowering trees that produced spiny husks with an almond-like nut, a rich understory with dozens of kinds of orchids, creeping vines, bromeliads, and bright flowers like the birds of paradise that dangled near the path. The Abibe Mountains are also home to many bird species, and residents sometimes find monkeys and ocelots roaming there. If not for the war, it would be like a national park.³

But that morning, as Luis Eduardo and the others walked through the shallow waters of the Mulatos River, soldiers and paramilitaries spied them from upstream, then hid in order to ambush them.⁴ When they saw the soldiers, El Gurre said they should run, but Luis Eduardo said no, that he had nothing to hide. His son Diener, with a severe leg injury, could not run in any case. El Gurre then fled, and the armed men attacked Luis Eduardo, Beyanira, and Diener with machetes, beheading Diener in the process. They left their bodies on the side of the river, exposed to the tropical heat and animals.

Farther up the mountain, less than an hour's walk away in a settlement called La Resbalosa, another army-paramilitary troop exchanged gunfire that day with a guerrilla militia member named Alejandro Pérez, killing him, and fired a mortar at a house nearby. The mortar crashed through the kitchen roof and hit Sandra Tuberquia in the head, killing her; the explosion was heard from hills around the area.

Her husband, Alfonso Bolívar Tuberquia, was hiding nearby with other local men, but after he heard the gunfire and explosion, he returned to the house. By that time, the armed men already had gotten his two young children, Natalia and Santiago, ages six years and eighteen months, out from under the bed where they had hidden. Santiago was still breast-feeding.⁵ Alfonso begged the men not to kill the children, to take him instead. But they killed all three of them with machetes and covered them with a mound of cocoa leaves.

Two days later, Renata Rendon, Trish Abbott, and Joe DeRaymond were sitting on the back porch of a small wooden house in the village of La Unión, about six hours on foot from Mulatos, when they received the startling news.

Rendon, then twenty-six, grew up in New York City, the daughter of a Medellín native. Abbott, twenty-four, was from Newcastle, England, and had arrived in Colombia only the month before, while DeRaymond was considerably older—fifty-four—a taciturn paralegal from the steel mill region of eastern Pennsylvania. They worked for a U.S. peace organization called the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), which had established a team of two to three volunteers in San José three years before in order to strengthen security for residents of the community.

The day before, in the early afternoon of February 22, they heard an army helicopter launch three rockets and fire machine guns for twenty minutes. The helicopter circled around La Unión, passing in front of a large cross on a hill on the edge of the village, shortly before the combat ended. Then it was calm.

Wilson David, a cherubic-faced community leader who spoke quickly, arrived at the house ashen-faced and shaken, to say that Luis Eduardo Guerra, his family, and five others had been massacred in a settlement farther up in the mountains. Eight people had been killed, including three children. Wilson asked the foreigners if they would accompany him and other leaders to the town center, from where a larger group would go up to the massacre site. They said they would.

Early Friday, a group of about a hundred from the community, as well as Rendon and Abbott, two international health volunteers, and human rights activists departed from the San José town center to hike the steep trails to Resbalosa.

After they arrived at the farm where a witness had discovered the fresh shallow grave in the settlement of Resbalosa, they watched as investigators

disinterred the cut-up bodies of Alfonso Tuberquia's family. But the bodies of Luis Eduardo, Beyanira, and Diener were not there. "For a moment we thought maybe Luis Eduardo had survived," another community leader, Gildardo Tuberquia (no relation), said later.⁶

It was then they heard that the other bodies had been found on the banks of the Mulatos River, an hour hike down the mountain. A delegation separated from the group and made its way there; this group found the remains of Luis Eduardo, Beyanira, and Diener. The boy's skull lay apart from the rest. The community group and international companions held vigil by the bodies to keep the vultures from eating them. They waited that night and all the next day, and again the following night, as the international volunteers' satellite phone battery died and they considered carrying away the bodies themselves. But a legal investigative unit finally arrived Sunday morning to gather the bodies and other evidence.

By the time the massacre occurred, more than 115 members of the Peace Community had been killed since it declared itself in 1997, while others had been forcibly disappeared, bombed, injured, threatened, displaced, tortured, or illegally detained. Paramilitary gunmen who operated with the blessing of the army's Seventeenth Brigade, or army soldiers themselves, had killed 97 members, while guerrillas of the FARC had murdered another 19.⁷

Why did the armed groups, especially the army-paramilitary alliance, single out for such relentless and brutal violence a community that openly committed itself to nonviolence and refused support for any armed group? What threat did they represent? Why did they target Luis Eduardo Guerra and Alfonso Bolívar and the women and children in their families? And why did the military participate so brazenly, not even hiding their uniforms or culpability?

The community represented a thorn in the side of adversaries who could not accept nonaffiliation of communities where they operated. The paramilitaries took over Colombia's northwestern Urabá region by blood and bullet in 1995–98, pushing the organized Left and armed guerrillas out of labor unions, towns, and most of the rural communities where peasants and Afro-Colombians lived. Even villages that during that period also called themselves peace communities with accompaniment by the Catholic Church subsequently lowered their profiles, accommodated guerrillas or paramilitaries, or displaced to larger towns, where their projects of peace and neutrality dissipated. Except for some Afro-Colombian and indigenous

communities, the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó proved to be the sole exception to the army-paramilitary monopoly of force over the region's population.

Yet these responses lead to further questions. What was the role of the United States, both official government policy—represented most prominently by the multibillion-dollar military aid program known as Plan Colombia—and private U.S. citizens who sought to support the community and other initiatives like it? What might have prevented these crimes? And what are the implications of the United States' history in the war in Colombia for its role in the rest of the world?

Answering these questions requires understanding the context of the armed conflict in Colombia and U.S. involvement in it.

INTRODUCTION

CHALLENGING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

Colombia . . . taught us that the battle for the narrative is perhaps the most important fight of all.

—General John F. Kelly, “Colombia’s Resolve Merits Support”

What is the future of the United States’ military engagement around the world? Washington policy makers have increasingly since the Cold War committed the United States to strengthening the military capacity of allies through assistance and arms sales, made explicit in the 2015 U.S. military strategy, which emphasizes “building partner capacity” and “interoperability.” Military leaders stated in the strategy that success “will increasingly depend on how well our military instrument can support the other instruments of power and enable our network of allies and partners.”¹ The first revision of the strategy issued by President Trump in 2017 continued the emphasis on “a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify U.S. power and extend U.S. influence.”²

The model most often cited for such foreign military assistance, proclaimed by a broad spectrum of establishment thinkers, is Colombia. Deploying from above a narrative of the miraculous protégé, U.S. officials point to Colombia as a model to emulate in other conflicts. For the foreseeable future, U.S. military cooperation with Colombia from the late 1990s to 2017, especially the series of aid packages known as Plan Colombia, serves as a principal template for U.S. military strategy and reference for success in the rest of the world.

Unpacking the context of decisions about U.S. intervention—and how policy debates that interpret Plan Colombia inform those decisions—is thus essential to understanding the criteria and values shaping U.S. military

engagement. It is also crucial to understand the outcomes of U.S. policy in Colombia and the reasons why the lessons learned by most Washington policy makers, on the one hand, and by human rights advocates, on the other, are so diametrically opposed to each other.

The United States has increased its reliance on training and equipping foreign armed forces, especially since 2001, and is likely to continue doing so. “Across the globe,” a 2012 version of U.S. military strategy says, “we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America . . . relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”³ This reliance on partners was embodied in U.S. assistance to armed forces and police in at least 152 countries in 2016. From 2010 through 2014, the United States spent more than \$96 billion on international military and police assistance, a nearly three-fold increase from a decade before.⁴

Even so, as *Congressional Quarterly* reported in 2013, “the military brass and its backers often note [that] it’s far cheaper and generally more effective to train others to fight local battles than to send in American forces.”⁵ The massive American troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009 were debacles on several scores, and the lessons from and backlash to those failures established a much higher bar for large deployments of U.S. troops overseas. The enormous legacy costs to the federal budget of those wars will constrain spending further, deepening the incentives to operate more through client states, which bear more of the costs.

Plan Colombia as Model

At the height of U.S. war operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, between 2002 and 2008, Colombia had more military and police personnel trained by the United States than either country where the U.S. was waging war using its own troops. A massive counterdrug military and economic aid package approved in 2000, known as Plan Colombia, was transformed after the September 11, 2001, attacks into an openly counterinsurgent program with high-level U.S. commitment to the Colombian military and state.

Twenty-five years after President George H. W. Bush declared a war on drugs in Latin America in 1989, military monographs and Congressional testimony on Colombia employed phrases like “the Colombian miracle,” “road to recovery,” and “back from the brink.”⁶ Colombia is “the model for winning the fight against violent insurgencies” and “one place where we got

it right,” claimed the top military commander for the region.⁷ Such accolades come routinely from Democrats and Republicans, military and civilian leaders. Colombia is “one of the great stories of Latin America,” said John Kerry in his 2013 confirmation hearing as secretary of state, or “a model for hope,” according to former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director David Petraeus.⁸ U.S. officials also lavished praise on Colombia’s ex-president Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–10) and his ministers, who one Pentagon official told me in 2010 were “the right men at the right time—the great man theory in plural.”⁹

Moreover, the United States now funds Colombian personnel to train military and police forces in Central America, Mexico, and other countries not yet certified as “successes.” Colombia has become, in effect, a super-client of the United States, and its use to train other nations’ armed forces is cited as evidence that U.S. training was a success. The practice of using Colombia to train other nations’ militaries was pioneered at the former U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) in Fort Benning, Georgia, where the number of Colombian instructors nearly doubled between 2001 and 2011, despite the risks that Colombian instruction is replicating the flawed ethics embodied in Colombian police and military collaboration with paramilitary death squads or killings of civilians.¹⁰

Washington reiterated this discourse when President Juan Manuel Santos—Uribe’s defense minister in 2006–9—committed to a negotiated end to the war with the leftist FARC guerrillas in 2012. By 2016, when the accords were signed, the argument was that U.S. commitment to Colombia’s armed forces had brought peace, to be rewarded by Washington. But even in peacetime, that reward included increased military assistance to expand the military’s presence, purportedly in order to prevent “the vacuum” generated by the FARC’s demobilization from being filled by existing criminal organizations.¹¹ The allied state that the United States is rescuing, building, or supporting in its foreign assistance is nearly always military first—followed closely by the state that promotes commerce and the privatization of its own functions.

Plan Colombia came out of a history of U.S. interventions in Colombia and elsewhere and elite premises for those interventions, as we will see. But it also confronted grassroots actors who contested elite premises. This book will demonstrate that the U.S. military assistance carried out during Plan Colombia, while serving as a template for future interventions, had a mostly negative impact on respect for human rights and social equality.

“Boots on the Ground” versus Client Forces

When President Barack Obama’s administration announced the “surge” of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2009, the projected annual cost for deployment of each U.S. soldier was a million dollars, not including postdeployment costs such as veterans’ medical, disability, and other benefits, equipment replacement, interest on borrowed funds, and opportunity costs.¹² The soldiers themselves, of course, were not seeing the vast majority of that money. But costs for long-term health care for veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts—itsself an area contested between cost-cutters and veterans in need—will peak in thirty to forty years after deployment, and add another \$300,000 or more in current dollars per soldier. These costs are greater than in previous conflicts, as more veterans survive with injuries or are diagnosed with disorders resulting from trauma, and health care costs have soared.¹³ In all, the contract costs to transport these soldiers, create new bases and facilities, deliver fuel and other supplies, provide “force protection,” and arm them with the full technological panoply of the twenty-first century were vastly greater than the costs of training, arming, and paying Afghan soldiers on their own soil.¹⁴

It is no wonder, then, that even as Obama sent thirty-three thousand additional U.S. troops for the “surge” in 2010, the United States was rushing to expand the Afghan army and police, funneling large amounts of funds into training and equipping them. Obama made the political calculation that the surge would last only a limited period; then the additional soldiers would be withdrawn, leaving Afghans to fight Washington’s enemies. That is why Afghanistan was during this period the largest recipient of U.S. military and police assistance, by far: from 2010 through 2012, the three years of the surge, it amounted to more than \$30 billion, nearly half of all U.S. military and police aid globally for those years.¹⁵ This cost was, nevertheless, only a fraction of that required for the direct deployment of U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, which consistently topped \$100 billion annually between 2006 and 2012.¹⁶

The emphasis on building up allied militaries continued after Obama’s presidency. In 2017 the U.S. Army established six brigades, with five hundred officers and soldiers each, just to train and advise other nations’ militaries, and even set up an academy to train trainers of foreign forces.¹⁷ One of Donald Trump’s first military policy moves was to signal to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries that they must shoulder more costs of the alliance.¹⁸ Such a shift in payment for international military bills

might replicate the arrangement Washington has with Japan, which pays the United States for the costs of having U.S. military bases on its soil. But it could also lead to reduced U.S. troop levels in Europe and a concurrent reliance on NATO troops to deploy to conflicts where Washington expresses an interest, as they did in Afghanistan.

Compared with U.S. troop deployment, foreign military assistance is frequently financially advantageous for the United States in another way that is not often observed: what begins as grant aid, especially in the form of equipment, graduates to high levels of purchases by the client state of the same equipment from U.S. corporate suppliers. This progression from assistance to sales is consistent with other trades as well: A company gives away a product, the client trains with it and grows accustomed to using it, then needs to replace, repair, or expand it. The client is likely to return to his or her donor to buy additional models.

The five-year periods from 1999 through 2013 for Colombia illustrate the phenomenon (see figure I.1). In the initial years of Plan Colombia and those just preceding it, from 1999 through 2003, U.S. military and police aid totaled \$2.3 billion, more than four times the amount of military sales for the five-year period. Aid peaked from 2003 to 2007, after which it began a steady decline. At the same time, U.S. arms sales to Colombia multiplied, more than quintupling from \$326 million in the 1997–1999 period to over \$1.7 billion in 2012–2014. The growth in sales was not an accident: U.S. officials repeatedly pressed Colombians to change specifications for aircraft purchases that Lockheed Martin desired to supply and that the United States regarded as “skewed” to Brazil’s Embraer, for example.¹⁹ The net result was that the United States supplied even more military equipment to Colombia, through sales, even as grant assistance declined.

The same pattern of large military aid packages followed by vastly increased sales was repeated in Mexico and Iraq. While U.S. assistance to Mexican military and police through the Merida Initiative peaked in 2009 at \$682 million and declined to \$79 million in 2015, arms sales agreements grew to an average of \$1 billion dollars annually for 2012 through 2014. In Iraq, after authorizing no arms sales in the early part of the war, the United States green-lighted more than \$3.9 billion worth of sales in 2008, and another \$17 billion over the following six years.²⁰

The Trump administration gave early indications in 2017 that its arms sales would prioritize wealthy clients such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, while proposing steep cuts in overt assistance to militaries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. And despite Trump’s promises




Fig. 1.1. U.S. military and police aid and arms sales to Colombia, 1997–2014.

SOURCE: SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, [HTTPS://SECURITYASSISTANCE.ORG](https://securityassistance.org).

to build up the U.S. military force, his initial budget for 2018 called for an increase in active-duty military personnel of less than one-half of a percent, still more than 100,000 troops below the levels of 2010, when Obama deployed U.S. forces for the “surge” in Afghanistan.²¹ If the Pentagon under Trump wanted to deploy a large number of new U.S. troops, it was not in a hurry to do so.

Whether the United States focuses on assistance to allied forces or deploying its own forces is also a function of the extent to which the countries share a strategic vision and the level of trust between their militaries. If the leaders of respective nations share a worldview and objectives, and U.S. planners trust them—though such trust and congruity is often partial and fragile—the U.S. partners can be counted on to carry out the objectives for which assistance is intended. Otherwise, imperial policy makers are more likely to turn to direct U.S. troop deployments, either on bases and naval ships or in warfare itself.

Political Costs of Intervention

The antipathy to deploying large numbers of U.S. soldiers in armed conflicts in other countries is not only a preoccupation of the Pentagon or those seeking to balance the federal budget. The human and political costs of harm

and death for U.S. personnel also make the commitment of large numbers of U.S. boots on the ground much more difficult for political leaders. Such deployments typically last several years, and public opinion turned against every U.S. war since the Korean War as they dragged on.²² This opposition from both above and below to massive U.S. involvement in overseas wars has broad implications for the activities of U.S. empire.

In addition, U.S. troops that intervene directly in Muslim countries are likely to be perceived as occupiers and to generate religious and nationalist backlash that strengthens their opponents. A University of Chicago study found that 95 percent of all suicide attacks globally between 1980 and 2010 were in response to foreign occupation.²³ The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq that began in 2009 was largely the outcome of broad Iraqi antipathy to the large U.S. military presence.²⁴

Frequently, military action that falls short of large-scale U.S. troop deployments also provokes opposition. When President Obama floated the prospect of a Congressional authorization for U.S. war in Syria in 2013, in response to chemical attacks that killed hundreds of civilians there, overwhelming popular opposition across a broad political spectrum forced Obama and Congress to drop the plan. A central reason for opposition was the belief that bombing strikes could lead to a long-term commitment in Syria—especially when Secretary of State John Kerry refused to rule out the commitment of U.S. troops and expensive deployments.²⁵

Obama asked the public and Congress to weigh in on a direct military attack, but the public is rarely asked about foreign military assistance. After the administration backed off from direct military intervention in Syria, it undertook assistance to Syrian rebels without seeking a public response. When the public is consulted about training and equipping other nations' militaries, the results are mixed and vary depending on the country receiving aid, news events at the time of polling, and the framing of the question.²⁶ As early as 1989, when President George H. W. Bush launched a highly visible drug war push in Latin America, substantially more U.S. residents who were polled favored giving military aid and sending advisors for Colombians to fight drug traffickers than favored sending U.S. troops. This framed the low level of U.S. troops deployed in Colombia, which was capped at eight hundred from 2004 onward.²⁷

A reckless leader operating without substantial restraints may still undertake major interventions involving ground troops, but the costs—economic, political, diplomatic, and moral—will be prohibitive in an increasing number of cases. Indeed, the report that Trump had, in his first week in office,

casually threatened (or offered) Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto with sending U.S. troops to go after “bad hombres” generated widespread opposition, especially in Mexico.²⁸

Shifting Rationales for Engagement

Supporters of military assistance normally envision its goals as strengthening order, stability, and democratic state authority against illegal, disorderly, violent actors. These goals may be articulated as reduction of overall violence, prevailing over a destabilizing enemy, stemming human rights violations by state forces, or a combination of these aims. A second set of stated goals includes policing the production of narcotics and the movement of both drugs and people, especially across borders. A third set of goals for military engagement is economic in nature. These goals, less often stated openly, include establishing conditions for investment, extraction of resources, and trade.

Plan Colombia encompassed all these goals in varying measures, but the emphasis that U.S. officials placed on each goal changed over time. In the late 1990s, in the countryside where multiple armed and unarmed actors disputed territory for most of the twentieth century, Washington and Bogotá collaborated on the war, an escalation of military intervention that sought to prevail over the insurgency. In addition to counterinsurgency goals and a radical reduction in cocaine production, Plan Colombia also explicitly aimed to strengthen respect for human rights in Colombia through training and other aid for the military, police, prosecutors, judicial investigators, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the protection of witnesses and human rights groups.²⁹ Plan Colombia will focus especially on evaluating outcomes for this policy goal.

After 2010 the drug war, which was the principal driver for the initial U.S. commitment to Plan Colombia, was no longer the main mission by which the plan's success was measured in official circles, since the drug war was also widely discredited, with even the Colombian president calling it a “stationary bike.”³⁰ “The basic premise of our war against drugs has proved to have serious shortcomings,” former Guatemalan president Otto Pérez Molina told the United Nations (UN) in 2012.³¹ As more U.S. states legalized marijuana for medical and recreational uses, a trend with national and even international momentum, the logic and coherence of global prohibition became increasingly broken. As a result, the human costs for enforcing it on the supply side in Latin America were progressively less acceptable to Latin

American governments, including very militarized ones, leading to a reform-oriented UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs in April 2016.

Even some U.S. military analysts involved in nominally U.S. counter-narcotics programs in Latin America have expressed reservations about the drug mission. A RAND analyst noted, “In Colombia, strategic cooperation and large amounts of U.S. aid failed to stem the production of narcotics.”³² An otherwise glowing evaluation by the conservative Center for Strategic and International Studies recognized by 2007 that “the original eradication goal established in Plan Colombia has not been met.”³³

The centerpiece of Plan Colombia’s counterdrug operations was aerial fumigation—defoliation, essentially, of coca crops, which had begun in the mid-1990s. (The coca leaf is an essential ingredient in the production of cocaine, and grows only in the Andean region.) In these operations, pilots of DynCorp contracted by the U.S. State Department sprayed glyphosate, produced by Monsanto Corporation, paired with U.S.-trained Colombian counterinsurgency troops in U.S.-produced Blackhawk helicopters. Peasant communities and environmentalists from the beginning asserted that the fumigation was generating health, environmental, and agricultural damage. The World Health Organization eventually ratified the claim that glyphosate is “probably carcinogenic to humans” in a study published in 2015.³⁴ The Colombian government suspended aerial spraying of the defoliant shortly thereafter.

Coca growers adapted to fumigation by moving to new areas of Colombia and other countries, by planting coca in smaller plots that were harder for pilots to detect, and by techniques such as washing leaves, rotating plots, and isolating leaves from the effect of glyphosate.³⁵ As a result, after an initial decline in coca production, aerial fumigation failed, and by 2007 Colombia produced nearly as much coca as when Plan Colombia kicked in. But as the Colombian state won control over more territory, it was able to deploy manual eradicators who cut down plants on the ground, a method that had greater success in destroying coca fields. Nevertheless, by 2014, while reduced from peak levels of 2001, by all measurements Colombia was still growing a lot more coca leaf than it was in the mid-1990s, when U.S. fumigation operations began.³⁶

Instead of counternarcotics results, military aid supporters cite other metrics: reduced numbers of massacres and kidnappings, demobilized paramilitaries, economic growth, and weakened guerrilla forces. In effect, if the state is able to weaken armed opposition enough to claim a monopoly on the use of violence, military proponents assert, this is a victory for legitimacy and for the strategy used in Colombia.

Deconstructing the Stated Goals for Assistance

The increased U.S. support for the Colombian Army in 1999–2002 occurred at precisely the time when paramilitary forces committed the largest number of atrocities of any actor or any period of the war. These forces were organized in the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), which had grown out of earlier generations of private armed groups in the 1950s and 1960s that the armed forces used against Liberal Party, peasant, and insurgent groups. The paramilitaries were allied with regional political elites and broad sectors of the army, prompting Human Rights Watch in 2001 to call the AUC an additional division of the army.³⁷ Paramilitaries were responsible for nearly three of every four political killings for which an author was identified in 1998.³⁸ Paramilitary as well as guerrilla and army violence led to the displacement of between 200,000 and 400,000 Colombians every year from 1997 through 2011.³⁹ The proponents of U.S. assistance to the armed forces in Colombia thus supported state actors that were allied with disorderly, violent paramilitary organizations acting illegally.

Since U.S. aid to “security” forces benefited groups that sowed disorder in Colombia, what other criterion explained or rationalized military support? Washington’s economic agenda was central: economic development can take place only *after* security is established by the state, the thinking went. “If you don’t have security, you don’t have anything,” one U.S. military advisor told me in 2010. This premise has dominated U.S. aid policy since the late 1950s, when U.S. military assistance in the hemisphere began its long, steady growth. “Without internal security, and the general feeling of confidence engendered by adequate military forces, there is little hope for any economic progress,” concluded a commission appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁴⁰ Indeed, six years into Plan Colombia, Washington and Bogotá signed a trade agreement that would ratify a neoliberal model of economic development.

Many scholars concur in this economic analysis and assert that the conflict in Colombia is fundamentally about control of the country’s rich natural resources, and therefore territorial in nature.⁴¹ Colombia is a large and biologically diverse country, with tropical lowlands both coastal and inland, lush valleys, snowy peaks, flat savannah, and desert regions. Its subsurface holds extensive coal, oil, gold, and emeralds, while above ground it has rich agricultural land and extensive water resources. According to critics’ analysis, that is why nonviolent and unarmed communities in areas of exploit-

able resources are targeted for violence: some are actively organizing for community control, and whether or not they resist, communities' displacement by terror benefits those with economic interests in the lands of those who flee.⁴²

Plan Colombia proponents' claims that it fulfilled human rights goals strained credulity. From 2004 through 2008, in the wake of the peak of U.S. assistance to the Colombian military, the army committed widespread killings of unarmed persons, known as "false positives." In these crimes, army units announced combat killings that were actually executions of civilians, carried out in order to claim larger numbers of "positive" kills, which were the military's primary measure of battlefield success. Though the murders initially received little attention, Colombian prosecutors and human rights groups have documented more than 5,700 alleged executions by Colombian armed forces between 2000 and 2010.⁴³

In the San José massacre of 2005 recounted in this book, the military could not claim that the child victims were killed in combat, so its leaders used a different technique: they attributed the murders to guerrillas, although this narrative collapsed in 2007, when an army captain confessed his participation in the killings. The massacre was one of several cases that eroded the Colombian military's claims to legitimacy, ultimately impacting U.S. assistance.

Supporters of U.S. military involvement claim that the "false positive" killings were an anomaly in an otherwise progressive arc toward greater respect by the Colombian military for human rights. From this perspective, the Colombian military in the 1970s and 1980s was both brutal and ineffective (these two being related to each other), leading it to become known internationally for its poor human rights record. In the 1990s, the military began adopting human rights training and standards and then, with accelerated training, support, and disincentives from the United States,⁴⁴ substantially improved its human rights record over the following decade, reducing both ties to paramilitaries and the direct commission of serious abuses.

Indeed, this argument continues, the number of reported army killings of civilians from 2008 to 2015 was just a fraction of those reported from 2002 to 2008 and an even smaller fraction of those committed in the 1990s by paramilitaries allied with the army. Supporters of the decade of escalated U.S. involvement insist that the reduced army violence against civilians was the result of its greater commitment to human rights. "Every place that we've given aid and sustained aid, human rights abuses have gone down. And that's a fact. El Salvador and Colombia are pretty good cases," said a man

who worked as a U.S. military trainer in Colombia and Pentagon coordinator of Colombia policy.⁴⁵

An unstated but implicit assumption in this narrative is that U.S. human rights doctrine also improved after the Cold War and Vietnam War. Most serious military observers recognize that U.S. bombing and the ground war in Southeast Asia led to many thousands of civilians killed. Many also accept that the doctrine taught to Latin American officers at the SOA during the 1970s and 1980s did not distinguish between civilian activists and armed insurgents. Since most Colombian Army leaders in the 1980s were trained in U.S. doctrine at the SOA and other U.S. military schools, it would be hard to argue that U.S. influence on Colombian human rights practices only came into play in the twenty-first century.

Instead, the premise appears to be that the U.S. post-Cold War embrace of human rights laws and training, as well as technology designed to minimize civilian casualties, were reflected in its influence on Colombia. In other words, the idea is that the nature of U.S. influence changed and incorporated greater respect for human rights than was reflected in the Cold War doctrines promoted in the hemisphere.

American exceptionalism—the belief that the United States has a uniquely positive influence in the world—implies that U.S. military doctrine is the most professional and respectful of human rights in the world, which can only be a good thing for human rights in nations whose militaries it assists. Such an imagined standard is often referenced indirectly: “not even the United States has such a standard.” As one Pentagon official said in 2004: “American Army personnel don’t need to go into the same depth of human rights and democracy training [as Latin Americans] because US personnel have a pre-existing cultural understanding of this before they get anywhere near training.”⁴⁶

Conversations with both Colombian and U.S. military officers, however, suggest that it was not U.S. material assistance or training that had the most impact, even though helicopters facilitated the Colombian military’s mobility. Instead, it was Washington’s high-level and sustained political and moral support, confirmed by the substantial aid packages, when Colombia was increasingly isolated on human rights issues. Colombian leaders experienced this support as a vote of confidence in their war against insurgents. General Mario Montoya, who was army commander from 2006 to 2008, told me that the most important support from the United States was moral and political: “They have been our number 1 ally. The United States is the only country that has supported us openly. They have been our unconditional allies.”⁴⁷

Equally important to evaluating human rights claims is an analysis of the causes for decreases in state violations. Human rights conditions on U.S. assistance and other U.S. actions may have played a part in the decline in “false positive” killings, but the United States acted after other actors, both Colombian and international, documented and denounced the pattern of killings. When the United States did speak, its message was mixed with continued military support.

A closer reading of events strongly suggests that other actors played a more important role than the U.S. government in the initial steep decline in killings. First, many family members of those killed decided to publicly denounce the killing of their children, husbands, and other family members. Beyond the fact of killing, many times it was the lie that the military told about their loved ones—that they had been guerrillas—that especially made families indignant, similar to the fury generated by lies and disrespect for the dead in cases of police killings of black men in the United States and the forty-three students from Ayotzinapa, Mexico, killed in September 2014.⁴⁸ Army participants in civilian killings in Colombia testified that the practice there targeted individuals who were marginalized, and whom the army believed no one would miss.⁴⁹ In this respect, the military miscalculated the political cost of these killings.

Moreover, there were strategic military reasons to reduce the number of civilian killings. In late 2008, when the military cut off the widespread practice of “false positives,” the guerrillas operated at a substantially reduced level, compared to 2002–6, when the practice was growing. The government had established a permanent police presence in nearly every county, and the FARC launched the smallest number of combat actions in the previous twelve years.⁵⁰ By 2012, when the decline in army killings could be seen as sustained over time, the FARC was at the negotiating table and corporate gold and coal mining of Colombian territories was in the ascendant. In that context, the reduced state violations may be more a consequence of mostly undisputed state territorial control than of either supposed changes in the military’s organizational culture or influence by the United States.

Debating the Effects of U.S. Assistance

So what impact has the United States—its government and people—had on state violence against civilians in Colombia, and what impact could it have? Does U.S. military involvement increase or worsen such violence, or have no effect at all? What did the United States have to do with the massacre that

occurred in San José de Apartadó? Can and did the responses of nongovernmental citizens from a superpower positively affect such a community confronting political violence? How would we know the answers to these questions? What assumptions guide our responses? Addressing these questions requires inquiring deeply into the history of the relationship of the United States with Colombia, which is one of the main goals of this book.

The debates on these issues are frequently infused with a kind of magical thinking. Neither elites nor opponents present systemic empirical evidence for their claims about the effects of military aid. Proponents often cite inputs (the number of soldiers trained, the amount of money provided) or the ascendance of protégés as their metrics of success, while discarding evidence of wrongdoing as aberrations, a “bad apple” or two.⁵¹

Very few people or agencies have collected relevant data on the operational outcomes of U.S. military and police assistance—either positive or negative. Even fewer have sought to credibly examine the impacts of this aid on armed forces’ respect for the basic human rights of the local population. As a consequence, both critics and supporters of the U.S. role generally rely on anecdotal data. Many observers conflate correlation of U.S. assistance and positive or negative changes in human rights violations with causality.

Critics of security assistance start from an assumption of skepticism. “Instead of helping secure just democratic institutions, U.S. aid left countries with a legacy of repression and violence,” one critic concluded.⁵² Bolivian president Evo Morales said that U.S. military schools were training militaries to “destabilize democratic governments and defend imperialist and capitalist interests.”⁵³

The very vocabulary of the debate has embedded bias. The Pentagon refers to military aid as “building partner capacity,” an adept use of three words with positive connotations. The even more common phrase “security assistance” strongly implies that the assistance will increase the security of people in the country whose armed forces receive assistance, but this is obviously not always the case. Instead, where possible, I use the descriptive phrases “military assistance” or “police assistance.”

Above and Below

Above and *below* are types of vantage points from which people experience and understand the conflict in Colombia and U.S. policy, and they are also attitudes and approaches to conflict and policy. Some people move between these perspectives and attitudes, literally through travel, and over time

through changes in their approach and ideas. Others stay firmly within their chosen or given vantage points. The helicopters that represented the largest U.S. investment in drug war and counterinsurgent strategy in Colombia, and were used to give tours for visiting U.S. officials, operated always from above, as did the satellites that guided bombs to guerrilla camps. Those who are “above” have important knowledge, which may be cold, detached from its consequences on the ground; so too do those who are “below,” whose visceral experience may contribute to deep understanding, limit cognitive capacity through trauma, or both. Perspectives from below are typically tangible, particular, vivid; they are concerned with immediate threats, with individuals and parcels of land, and with the *practice* of policy. Perspectives from above are more abstract and macro, and use words like “democracy” and “judicial reform”; acronyms for bureaucratic agencies, funding streams, or organizations; and in the academic world, words such as “problematize” and “sites.”

Such abstraction is a source and frequently an indicator of power—institutional power over others, but also the intellectual power to extrapolate, to move between situations, to generalize. Generalization can be an analytical weakness as well, which is why the material particulars of perspectives from below are so valuable, even to those looking from above. For those on the ground, there is also a temptation to generalize from a lived situation that may be much less than universal or even characteristic. Nevertheless, we can never understand the human dynamics of a conflict or a policy unless we witness how it is lived by people—and this living is specific and personal as much as it is linked to larger social, political, and economic forces and processes. It has names, places, and history, emotions and uncertainties, commitments and responsibilities. That is why in this book I discuss my own experiences with policy makers, military officers, and communities that have experienced political violence: in such direct encounters we can begin to understand how power, which is personal as well as structural, is exercised in practice.

What is a model for most of Washington has been a humanitarian and policy disaster for many communities and U.S. critics who experience Colombia from outside these dominant assumptions, especially those who live and work *below* the policy rhetoric, in conflict zones. Many are also critical of guerrilla practices in these regions. They point to army-paramilitary collaboration, civilian killings made to look like combat operations, more than five million Colombians forcibly displaced from their homes, failed counterdrug fumigation that damaged legal crops and human health, and trade

agreements with the United States, Canada, and Europe that favor multinational corporate interests over economic sustainability by the majority, especially rural producers.

The responses to violence in Colombia from below, of grassroots activists, churches, and unions in the United States and Colombia, were built on a narrative that was different from those constructed from above, and led to many actions of solidarity in war zones and persistent advocacy in the United States throughout the early twenty-first century. In the boldest of these, international observers physically accompanied Colombian human rights defenders, communities, and organizations threatened with political violence, as a measure to strengthen their security and the prospects for continuing their work inside the country. Some groups organized dozens of delegations to regions in Colombia impacted by the war and the U.S. military role in it.

These groups often focused on Colombian communities and organizations whose vision and work opposed the dominant paradigm of war, corporate control, and patriarchy. Because of that opposition, the Colombian state harbored a special hatred for some of these communities and organizations. Crimes committed against prominent Colombian communities, like the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, invoked especially strong activism for justice but also encountered persistent resistance to criminal prosecution by forces with influence over the Colombian state. For policy makers in Washington, it was typically easier to express support for justice in cases of specific human rights abuses than to reexamine the overall policy. Sometimes, however, activists were able to leverage this support to chip away at policy approaches that focused U.S. commitments on the Colombian military.

Advocacy organizations in Washington working with Colombian human rights groups developed a strong voice against the overwhelmingly militarized policy. As Latin Americans elected more leftist governments in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the counternarrative had powerful allies that isolated Colombia in the region and were decisive in turning back an agreement to host U.S. troops on military bases in Colombia over the long term.

This Book's Method

In these pages, I will explore the dynamics of U.S. military assistance in Colombia: its aims, history, and changes; its financial beneficiaries and material implementations; its geography and the conflicts in Colombia into which it was inserted; the military units and leaders who received U.S. aid; and

their human rights records and attitudes. I measure human rights outcomes primarily by extrajudicial executions, which are more reliably documented than other gross rights violations; the Colombian Army allegedly committed over 5,700 such executions between 2000 and 2010. I will examine what U.S. citizens and nongovernmental groups did in relation to the conflict in Colombia; their acts of solidarity, advocacy, and accompaniment; and the impacts of these actions. I will also explore in detail the lived example of one community's trials: the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó. The book proceeds chronologically, alternating between the micro-dynamics of events in San José and the macro-dynamics of the U.S.-Colombian military relationship. Like most things, the war in San José and the U.S. relationship to the war in Colombia as a whole become more complex as you get more intimate with them, if no less tragic and compelling.

My method is driven by experience, qualitative research, and quantitative data. I spoke with victims of human rights violations, military officers, human rights workers, legislators, and journalists. Working to change U.S. policy has not required me to suspend my curiosity in order to pursue an objective. On the contrary, I want to understand policy better, and the experience of activism offers insights through encounters with people who design, execute, report on, and are impacted by policy. I have sought out ways to meaningfully measure U.S. involvement and respect for human rights in Colombia, and to compare and map these between different times and places. Conversations informed my research on data, and findings from quantitative research helped me formulate questions in interviews.

I come to this topic as a U.S. citizen, a descendant of *Mayflower* passengers and of a naval captain who led the first U.S. foreign military intervention, authorized by the Continental Congress, in 1775. And I live and work in the tradition of generations of U.S. citizens who have opposed U.S. military intervention, especially in the Americas. In the 1980s, I was immersed in the mass protest movement for human rights and against the Ronald Reagan administration's interventions in Central America. In 1986 and 1988 I participated in international unarmed teams that accompanied relatives of the disappeared and other activists threatened with political violence in Guatemala and El Salvador, as a way to strengthen their security.⁵⁴ In the 1990s, I worked on campaigns to close U.S. military bases in Panama and Vieques, Puerto Rico.

These experiences taught me some important lessons. I learned from reading, through testimonies of Central Americans and Puerto Ricans, and in interviews with active and former U.S. officials themselves about the

destructive role the United States has often played in Latin America. I joined others to witness the environmental and health legacies of bombs dropped by the U.S. Navy on the populated island of Vieques. I documented U.S. military experiments with mustard gas in Panama to determine whether Puerto Rican and white soldiers would respond differently. I met and read the work of Jesuit priests who were murdered by Salvadoran troops recently trained by the United States, and interviewed U.S. military officers who were haunted by what they had done in Latin America. I spoke with U.S. engineers of Gatling guns used in the war in El Salvador, and with activists getting in the way of the guns' production in Vermont. Many U.S. officials and arms producers believed they were doing positive things that benefited Latin Americans, but the outcomes, as measured in violence or social indicators, were at best ambiguous. More often they were setbacks, and often devastating to populations in the region—a lesson about how those of us raised to believe we are good can self-deceive, and about how good intentions are not enough, including for activists who oppose intervention.

I learned about the complicated and persistent resistance—both unarmed and armed—of Latin Americans to U.S. intervention. Such resistance normally focused on local economic and political elites and their military or police enforcers, perceived to be in close alliance with—or at the bidding of—U.S. institutions and capital. Because people governing both the United States and countries in the region never valued Latin American lives as much as U.S. lives (or often, even, U.S. property), this resistance was carried out at great risk. Most media attention focused on armed resistance, on guerrilla movements from those of Emiliano Zapata in Mexico and Agosto César Sandino in Nicaragua in the early twentieth century to those of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s throughout Latin America inspired by Cuba's revolutionary success, liberation theology, and global anticolonial movements. But the many nonviolent movements, campaigns, and actions in Latin America for human rights and an end to war were arguably at least as pervasive and important for change as armed insurgents.⁵⁵ It was these movements whose people I met while traveling and working in the region.

I also learned that grassroots movements inside and outside the United States (and especially in combination) can have a substantial impact on limiting or stopping U.S. military intervention. International human rights advocacy led the dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil to end several policies of abuse or release political prisoners in the 1970s.⁵⁶ While Central America experienced massive suffering from the wars supported by the United States in the 1980s, the Central America movement in the United

States made a direct U.S. invasion of Nicaragua (of the kinds in Grenada, Panama, or Iraq) impossible, and limited the resources of the United States in El Salvador. Grassroots movements had even more success in movements to close U.S. military bases: in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1980s; in Kaho‘olawe, Hawai‘i, where the navy operated a bombing range; in Panama, despite an attempt to negotiate continued U.S. bases after 1999; in Vieques, where nonviolent civil disobedience combined with legal protest, media work, and legislative advocacy to stop naval bombing; and eventually in Manta, Ecuador, site of a U.S. military facility that was moved from Panama when bases there closed.

Finally, I learned that I have a passion for detailed and deep research about U.S. intervention. I found that such research can be useful to activists, to Latin American officials, and to U.S. policy makers, in work to make the U.S. military less expansive and more accountable for the effects of its activities.

Thus, when it came to working for human rights and affecting U.S. policy in Colombia, I brought both some insight into how bad war is for people and a sense of agency, that collective and sustained commitment to making things better could do something meaningful. Colombia is a large country, whose history of internal conflict and of military alliance with the United States is long, and its war is endlessly complex. As one friend involved in human rights work in Guatemala said to me before joining a human rights project in Colombia, “I’m afraid I’ll fall in love with another country.” That could mean a long commitment.

Still, I was ready to enter the stream of U.S. relations with Colombia when I visited the Urabá region in northwestern Colombia in 2000. I knew that as a U.S. citizen, I already had a relationship with Colombia; I just needed to be more aware and informed about it. Any attempt to understand that relationship requires knowing more of the history of the country, the Urabá region, and how the United States has impacted them. We turn now to that history and region.

NOTES

PROLOGUE

1. Miryam Tuberquia, testimony, Fiscalía General de la Nación, Bogotá, Radicado 2138, December 9, 2005, Cuaderno 6, 258–61; December 20, 2007, Cuaderno 11, 180–86.
2. García, *Urabá*, 48.
3. World Wildlife Federation, “Northern South America: Northern Colombia,” accessed February 11, 2018, <http://www.worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/ntor137>.
4. Jorge Molano, “Demanda de casación,” unpublished manuscript, June 5, 2012, in author’s possession, 11.
5. Molano, “Demanda de casación.”
6. Translations from the Spanish are by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
7. Some of those killed were not formal Peace Community members, but they are listed in the community’s database. CINEP, *San Josesito de Apartadó*, 119–32.

INTRODUCTION

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