The AFTERLIFE *of* REPRODUCTIVE SLAVERY

Biocapitalism and Black Feminism's Philosophy of History

Alys Eve Weinbaum

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I have carried the ideas that compose this book with me in numerous forms for so long that accumulated intellectual and personal debts stretch far back in time. It began as an idea for a project on contemporary reproductive cultures and politics that I ended up putting aside for a number of years when I instead opted to write a book on "the race/reproduction bind" that subtends modern transatlantic thought—a book whose central claims I needed to elaborate in order to arrive at the related arguments that I present here. It is thus with pleasure (if also a little worry about inadvertently leaving someone out) that I extend heartfelt thanks to those who have engaged in dialogue and debate as the traces of a long thought process congealed enough so that they might eventually be released into the world on the printed page.

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As it happened, my deepest immersion in the worlds of surrogacy, human cloning, and the organ trade, in neo-slave narratives and speculative fictions that represent these biocapitalist processes of extraction, and in black feminist texts that reflect and refract them, coincided with the first decade of my daughter's life. Her arrival into the world not only transformed my research and writing habits but also profoundly reshaped my understanding of the complexity and beauty of reproductive labor in all its forms. It is to my amazing Amara, and to Matt Aalfs, who makes all good things seem possible, that I dedicate this book. Without the two of them in the world, writing books would be a far less meaningful undertaking.

Introduction

HUMAN REPRODUCTION *and the* SLAVE EPISTEME

> It is the enslavement of Blacks that enables us to imagine the commodification of human beings, and that makes the vision of fungible breeder women so real.
>
> —DOROTHY ROBERTS, *KILLING THE BLACK BODY* (1997)

> If slavery persists as an issue . . . it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery.
>
> —SAIDIYA HARTMAN, *LOSE YOUR MOTHER* (2007)

This book investigates Atlantic slavery's reflection in and refraction through the cultures and politics of human reproduction that characterize late twenty-first-century capitalism. Through close readings of a range of texts—literary and visual, contemporary and historical—I demonstrate that slavery, as practiced in the Americas and Caribbean for roughly four hundred years, has a specifically reproductive afterlife. Slavery lives on as a thought system that is subtended by the persistence of what Saidiya Hartman calls "a racial calculus and a political arithmetic," and what I will refer to throughout this book as *the slave episteme* that was brewed up in the context of Atlantic slavery.[1] Like all thought systems, the slave episteme produces material effects over time. In rendering reproductive slavery thinkable it enables continued—albeit continuously recalibrated—forms of gendered and racialized exploitation of

human reproductive labor as itself a commodity and as the source of human biological commodities and thus value. The slave episteme manifests in contemporary cultural production. In this book, I demonstrate how such cultural production mediates gendered and racialized capitalist processes that the slave episteme, in turn, subtends.

My argument is predicated on and posits the existence of a largely unacknowledged historical constellation. There are two periods in modern history during which in vivo reproductive labor power and reproductive products have been engineered for profit: during the four centuries of chattel slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean and now, again, in our present moment. And yet proof of neither historical repetition nor simple continuity is my primary aim. In contrast to studies of human trafficking and what is sometimes referred to as neoslavery, I do not amass empirical evidence or document resurgence of human enslavement. And I never argue that enslavement has proceeded in a linear fashion over time.[2] My argument is neither positivist nor teleological. Rather, I offer an epistemic argument about the afterlife of a thought system that renders human reproduction's devaluation and extraction *conceivable* in both senses of that biologically laden term. This is a story about the emergence of what Walter Benjamin has called "the time of the now"—in this case, a story about contemporary reproductive cultures and politics that exposes the epistemic conditions that will, if left uninterrogated and unchecked, continue to enable slavery's reproductive afterlife.[3] In telling a story about human reproduction in biocapitalism and thus about the episteme's endurance, my aspirations are modest. I hope to generate nothing more (and hopefully nothing less) than what Raymond Williams once referred to as an "extra edge of consciousness"—in this case, consciousness about the conflicts and contradictions that shape the time of the now, a time characterized, in part, by the reproductive afterlife of slavery.[4]

My argument begins by building on previous scholarship that has sought to convene a discussion of the long and intertwined histories of slavery and capitalism. Such scholarship argues that slavery is an urform of what the political scientist Cedric Robinson famously called "racial capitalism." As Robinson explained, slavery ought not be construed as historically prior to the emergence of capitalism proper; it is not part of a finite process of primitive accumulation. Rather, slavery is part of racial capitalism's ongoing work of racialized and gendered extraction.[5] In chapter 1, I treat Robinson's ideas and those of historians of slavery who have expanded upon them to demonstrate that slavery and capitalism are not and have never been antithetical or discrete

formations neatly arranged in temporal succession. As we shall see, accounts of the historical development of capitalism that were initially offered by Marx and Engels (and perpetuated by a legion of traditional Marxists) constitute an antiquated approach to capitalism that is myopically European and falsely teleological. In contrast to such an approach, I follow Robinson in arguing that slavery and capitalism were co-emergent and co-constitutive, and are continuously bound together in complex relations of historical reciprocity whose dynamics have changed over time. In the past, such relations produced the wealth of nations and empires. In the present, they subtend biocapitalism by shaping ideas about race and reproduction as these are manifest in the racialization and feminization of reproductive labor in contexts in which life itself is commodified.

In engaging with the concept of racial capitalism, I ally myself with the radical project that Robinson dubbed "black Marxism"—a way of thinking about the intersection of class formation and racial formation that Robinson regards as most fully realized in the writings of well-known black radicals such as W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James. At the same time, I challenge and expand Robinson's genealogy of black Marxism by calling our attention to its presumptive masculinism. Indeed, throughout this book I push against prevailing constructions of the black radical tradition in order to move understanding of this tradition in a new direction that encompasses black feminist thinkers whose writings, in multiple idioms, have not often been recognized as contributions to black Marxism but ought to be. Of special interest in the pages that follow are contributions by black feminists who began writing about enslaved women's insurgency against reproduction in bondage and the implications of this insurgency for substantive reproductive freedom in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. With a focus on the unprecedented intensity of black feminist publication across these three decades—those that witnessed, not coincidentally, the rise of neoliberalism and the flourishing of biocapitalism—this book identifies and contributes to a distinctly *black feminist philosophy of history*.

I have coined this term to draw attention to a unique materialist and epistemic knowledge formation, expressed in multiple idioms, including history, theory, and literary fiction, that constellates the slave past and the biocapitalist present and thus examines the reproductive dimensions of racial capitalism as it has evolved over time. Although it is inaccurate to suggest that the masculinism of the black radical tradition is an express target of the black feminist writings that I treat throughout, the black feminist philosophy of history

that I limn and contribute to must nonetheless be recognized as a powerful critique of Robinson's idea of the black radical tradition because of the way it consistently and persistently centers slave breeding in its discussion of both economic and cultural reproduction in slavery and beyond. This is something that the black radical texts written by the men who are elevated by Robinson (and many others) simply do not do.

Building on a dialogue about black women's writing initiated by literary scholars such as Hazel Carby, Barbara Christian, Valerie Smith, and Hortense Spillers (to name only a few), who were among the first to train our attention on representations of black motherhood in fictional writings by and about black women, I suggest that black feminists worked together to clear space for arguments about black motherhood but also for arguments specifically attentive to the issues of reproduction and sex in slavery.[6] In this way they keyed black feminism in its present moment of production to forms of female insurgency in the slave past, effectively linking their own knowledge production to knowledge produced in and through the actions of insurgent enslaved women. The upshot: black feminism has offered forward a profound and profoundly collective analysis of the forms of reproductive extraction that began to emerge in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and, simultaneously, an understanding of how reproductive extraction and women's resistance to it in the present are connected to the forms of extraction that characterized Atlantic slavery as well as to the forms of racialized and gendered insurgency that sought to challenge slavery's reproduction.

Racial Capitalism and Biocapitalism

Today myriad forms of human biological life are objects of speculative investment and development. Ranging from the microscopic (stem cells, sperm, and oocytes) to the large and fleshy (organs and babies), life is routinely offered for sale in the global marketplace. As numerous journalists and social scientists have documented, nearly all parts of the human body can be purchased, as can an array of in vivo biological processes, including gestation and birth of human beings by so-called surrogates.[7] Precisely because so many aspects of contemporary capitalism involve commodification of in vivo labor and of human biological products, over the past decade scholars in science and technology studies have identified what they variously describe as "the tissue economy," "the bioeconomy," "lively capital," and, most succinctly, "biocapital."[8] In chapter 1, I treat the genealogy of the concept of *biocapitalism*, the titular

concept used throughout this book, and highlight feminist contributions to its development. For present purposes, suffice it to note that I use biocapitalism to describe, by way of shorthand, the ascent of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, genomics, and reprogenetics as primary areas of contemporary capitalist investment and expansion. Following other feminist scholars, in using *biocapitalism* I seek to stretch and retool the concept so that the otherwise implicit reproductive dimensions of the *bio* prefacing *capitalism* surface. I also seek to extend existing feminist approaches to biocapitalism by employing the concept to name the pervasive *sublation*—by which I mean the simultaneous *negation and preservation*—of the history of slavery and the practice of slave breeding by forms of capitalism that are involved, as is contemporary biocapitalism, in extraction of value from life itself. Along with other scholars, I argue that human biological commodities, especially reproductive labor power and its products, are required to maintain biocapitalism. To this I add that the perpetuation of the slave episteme is required to make biocapitalism go. As I will elaborate, slavery is epistemically central to biocapitalism even when biocapitalist processes and products do not immediately appear to depend upon slavery as antecedent. Chapters 4 and 5 and the epilogue, expand this claim through treatment of novels and films that mediate the rise of neoliberalism and the disavowal of the persistence of the slave episteme that is part and parcel of neoliberal celebrations of the freedom to consume reproductive processes and products.[9] As we shall see, when biocapitalism sublates slavery and neoliberalism celebrates consumer choice, cultural texts provide a window onto all that transpires. When read critically, such texts allow us to perceive biocapitalism's dependence on reproductive extraction, reproductive extraction's dependence on the persistence of the slave episteme, and, not least, the slave episteme's role in enabling conceptualization of human reproduction as a racializing process through which both labor and products are rendered alienable.[10]

Given my focus on what may initially appear to some readers to be two distinct historical formations—slavery and biocapitalism—I pause here to address any possible assumptions about the existence of an absolute distinction between the two. As feminists across the disciplines have shown, women's reproductive labor, broadly construed as the reproduction of workers and the relations of production, has powered dominant social and economic formations in diverse geographic locations. As scholars of antiquity reveal, nearly all forms of slavery, beginning with those practiced in the Ancient world, have involved sexual subjection and reproductive dispossession and have

created distinct domestic and political regimes. As we know, in the Roman Empire slave women reproduced slaves for their masters and were often valued for their reproductive capabilities.[11] Indeed the doctrine of *partus sequitur ventrem* ("that which is brought forth follows the womb"), which determined the slave status of children born to enslaved women in the Americas and the Caribbean beginning in the seventeenth century, originated not in American colonial law, as is commonly thought, but rather in Roman law.[12]

As Marxist feminists such as Maria Mies and autonomist feminists such as Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Silvia Federici, and Leopoldina Fortunati have argued, demonization of women and attempts to wrest control of reproductive capacity from women was a precondition for capitalism's emergence.[13] Historians of domestic labor and homework such as Evelyn Nakano Glenn and Eileen Boris have shown in their now classic scholarship that since the advent of industrial capitalism, exploitation of women's reproductive labor has functioned as a form of continuous primitive accumulation.[14] In instances in which reproductive labor functions as paid labor (as opposed to unremunerated subsistence labor) it is racialized. Although the race, ethnicity, or nationality of the bodies tasked with this labor continues to change as trends in outsourcing shift, it is from poor women of color around the globe that reproductive work is most readily and frequently extracted. Today hyperexploitation of domestic laborers, care workers, and sex workers living in or migrating from the Global South is predicated on devaluation of reproductive labor and the inextricable process through which this labor is racialized.[15] In globalization, wages for all forms of reproductive labor are continuously driven down. For example, Rhacel Salazar Parreñas demonstrates that devaluation of women's work requires women from the Philippines to migrate abroad to receive livable wages, a practice that compounds the ongoing feminization of global poverty by forcing migrant laborers to rely on "care-chains" in which the children whom they leave behind must either be looked after by relatives or placed into the hands of women who are less mobile than their absent employers.[16]

Notably all of the feminist arguments about reproductive labor that I have mentioned explicitly or implicitly begin from Marx and Engels's watershed observation that capitalism relies on the reproduction of the relations of production, and on subsequent Marxist feminist observations about the manner in which the reproduction of the means of production—including the reproduction of the bodies that compose the labor force—is biologically, socially, culturally, and ideologically maintained through the domination and subjugation of women and women's reproductive labor. As should be clear,

this book's argument would be impossible to envision were it not for the immensely rich Marxist and Marxist feminist traditions of engagement with reproductive labor over capitalism's longue durée and in the precapitalist past that preceded it.[17]

And yet the ideas about human reproductive labor that I examine here are also distinct. As I elaborate in greater detail in chapters 1 and 2, in which I discuss black feminist historical scholarship on slave breeding and black feminist legal scholarship on slave breeding's relationship to contemporary surrogacy, in biocapitalism the reproductive body creates surplus value in a manner that has epistemic precedent neither solely in industrial capitalism nor in the global service-based economy ushered in by post-Fordism and outsourcing. It also has precedent in chattel slavery as practiced in the Americas and the Caribbean. It was, after all, in the context of Atlantic slavery that, for the first time in history, in vivo reproductive labor was deemed alienable and slaves bred not only for use and prestige (as they were in the Ancient world) but also expressly for profit. As historians amply document, slave breeding in the Americas and the Caribbean was increasingly important to the maintenance of slavery as time wore on, and thus slave women's wombs were routinely treated as valuable objects and as sources of financial speculation. Most important for present purposes, after the 1807 closure of the Atlantic slave trade, slave breeding was pursued with urgency (it was now the only source of fresh slaves) and carefully calculated efficiency. Whereas previous feminist work has theorized the centrality to capitalism of reproductive labor and its dispossession, the forms of reproductive labor and dispossession that exist in contemporary biocapitalism recall—even as the afterlife of reproductive slavery is disavowed—the reproductive extraction that enabled reproduction of human biological commodities in black women's wombs. Put otherwise, while contemporary capitalism depends upon the exploitation of reproductive labor to sustain and create laborers (as have all forms of capitalism throughout history), biocapitalism also depends on the prior history of slave breeding as an epistemic condition of possibility. Although the historians whose work on reproduction in slavery I discuss at length in chapter 1 do not write about the implications of their research for the study of contemporary biocapitalism (notably, the concept had not yet been proposed when they wrote), black feminist legal scholars studying surrogacy recognized slave breeding as a conceptual antecedent for surrogacy, and thus also the fact that it is the slave episteme that renders the racialized capacity to reproduce human biological commodities thinkable across time.

Because this black feminist insight is so central to my argument, it is important to be clear at the outset on its scope and parameters. The black feminist argument that I take up and to which I add is *not* that biocapitalism and chattel slavery are the same or that they ought to be treated as analogical. The argument is that in all situations in which human biological life is commodified, processes of commodification must be understood as subtended by the long history of slave breeding as it was practiced in the Americas and Caribbean. When human biological life itself is commodified, reproductive labor is invariably conceptualized as a gendered process that can be undervalued and thus hyperexploited (this is the argument made by Marxist feminists outlined earlier). Simultaneously, when human reproduction is commodified it is as a *racializing process* that transforms reproductive labor and its products into commodities that may be alienated. As in slavery, commodities that may best be described as *(re)produced* are construed as alienable because they are conceptualized as "rightfully" separable from the bodies that (re)produced them. They do not "naturally" belong to these bodies. Historically the alienability of reproductive labor power and its products has been guaranteed by the racialized dehumanization that was slave breeding and the fungibility of the lively products that so-called breeding wenches (re)produced.

In the 1980s, when black feminists first analyzed the surrogacy arrangements that had begun to emerge in the United States, they began to theorize what I call *the surrogacy/slavery nexus*. Their insights were largely speculative. After all, at the time they wrote, surrogacy was not a widespread practice. It was only due to a few high-profile cases in which surrogates sought, and failed, to retain custody of the children to whom they had given birth that surrogacy became part of a national dialogue and the object of intense scrutiny by media pundits and academics alike. I discuss the two most important surrogacy cases, the so-called Baby M case (1986) and *Johnson v. Calvert* (1990), in chapter 1. Today the number of so-called surrobabies born each year remains relatively small. US agencies that attempt to track an unregulated and therefore elusive market estimate that although roughly 12 percent of all people in the United States (and many more globally) struggle with infertility, and three to four billion US dollars are spent annually on a full spectrum of infertility treatments, in 2015 only fifteen hundred of the 1.5 percent of babies born using assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) were surrobabies.[18] Given these numbers, it would be foolish to argue that surrogacy ought to be studied because it is a statistically significant phenomenon or that the philosophical importance of black feminism's theorization of the

surrogacy/slavery nexus rests on the pervasiveness of surrogacy as a practice. Instead my argument turns on acknowledgment of surrogacy's hold on the public imagination (in part, a function of the media's preoccupation with the surrogate industry and the sensationalizing of cases that go awry), on what this hold on the public imagination suggests about surrogacy's cultural significance, and on what it is that black feminist approaches to surrogacy enable us to understand about contemporary biocapitalism's relationship to racial capitalism that those analyses of surrogacy that do not contribute to elaboration of black feminism's philosophy of history cannot.

In building on and contributing to black feminism's analysis of the surrogacy/slavery nexus, this book intervenes into prevailing theories of racialization. To risk a necessarily reductive generalization, within critical race studies, critical ethnic studies, and black studies, race is most often theorized as a social construct that is mobilized and attached to individual bodies and populations as power is arrayed hierarchically in the service of the nation-state, capitalism, and other forms of racial hegemony. Depending on the political orientation of the analysis (and the disciplinary preoccupations of the analyst), race is neither regarded as a biological truth (though it may be parsed for how it is equated with phenotype and thus naturalized or for how it functions as a biosocial formation) nor as a genetically stable category (as amply confirmed by studies of the human genome which assert that race is not genetic).[19] Rather race is construed as a product of globalizing capitalism, regimes of racial nationalism (white racial nationalism and other forms of ethnic nationalism), colonialism, empire, or some combination of these.

In situating black feminist work on surrogacy as the fulcrum on which my analysis of human reproduction in biocapitalism pivots, I suggest that the race a priori ascribed to individuals and populations is often irrelevant to the extraction of value from in vivo reproductive labor and its products. This is a crucial point of departure from theorists of racialization who imagine that it is only racialized reproductive bodies that exist as racialized prior to their exploitation whose exploitation is racialized. Instead it is an argument predicated on the idea that so long as the performance of reproductive labor is construed as a *racializing process*—as it was in Atlantic slavery—laborers who engage in reproductive labor are racialized by their labor, and their racialization (via their labor) used as the pretext to further extract labor and products. Additionally, as we shall see in my discussion of speculative fiction in chapters 4 and 5, a focus on *reproduction as a process* rather than on the perceived or ascribed gender identity that belongs a priori to the reproductive

laborer makes it possible to imagine worlds in which reproductive labor is no longer performed by bodies that are sexed as female. Just as it is the reproductive process that racializes reproductive labor and laborer, this same process can retroactively feminize a body that has not previously been gendered thus.

The proposed approach to reproductive labor and its racialization in biocapitalism makes sense given available information about the women who currently participate in surrogate arrangements. Although in recent years the comparatively high price of surrogacy in the United States has led to outsourcing of reproductive labor and therefore to the performance of surrogacy by poor women in India, Thailand, Mexico, and elsewhere, when surrogacy is performed in the United States—which at the time of writing remains the world's largest market for surrogate labor—it is predominantly performed by white women.[20] The existence of a global, multiracial surrogate labor force suggests that it is not primarily the ascribed or perceived racial identity of these women that racializes reproductive labor and renders labor and products alienable.

And yet this formulation also raises an irrepressible question: What happens to "blackness," as it functioned in Atlantic slavery, in the context of contemporary surrogacy as it functions within biocapitalism? Put differently, how can we understand "blackness" as one but not the only modality through which we can trace the forwarding of the slave episteme into biocapitalism? Over the course of this book, and especially in chapter 1, in which I explore the racialization of surrogate labor even when the surrogate is not herself a recognizably black woman, I engage these complex questions from several vantage points. I calibrate my response to what can best be described as the *flickering off and on of blackness* (as what Saidiya Hartman calls "the racial calculus and political arithmetic entrenched centuries ago") in the context of an emergent neoliberal hegemony that sometimes successfully, and at other times unsuccessfully, disavows, and thus seeks to erase from view, the historical processes of racialization on which reproductive extraction relies. These are of course the processes of racialization, buttressed by the doctrine of partus sequitur ventrem, that transformed enslaved reproductive laborers into racialized "black" bodies from whom both labor and children could be stolen.[21]

As alluded to earlier, the verb *to sublate* is especially germane and instructive for the present argument. As a philosophical term, it has been most fully developed by Hegel, subsequent Hegelian philosophers, and Marxist theorists. In their usage, as opposed to the colloquial usage, it is not synonymous with that which has disappeared or been repressed. It is instead an active verb that describes the seemingly paradoxical movement by which ways of being

in the world (Hegel) and systems of power such as feudalism or capitalism (Marx) are simultaneously *negated* and *preserved* by historical forces that transform the status quo by transcending it over time. In certain strands of Marxist theory, the term has been used to describe processes that challenge and reshape hegemony, not by toppling it in one fell swoop but rather by taking up new positions of power within an ongoing struggle for dominance. The bourgeois revolutions that led to the birth of industrial capitalism are the most well-known example of this dialectical process of sublation. The proletarian revolution that Marx believed would eventuate in the end of the system of private property as we know it is perhaps the most anticipated example of sublation as a dialectical process. The *Oxford English Dictionary* neatly captures the Marxist idea of sublation in one of its definitional quotations: "It is the actualization of the system that makes it rational, and *sublates* its past history into a rationally-necessary moment of the whole."[22] To return to the question of blackness and what I describe as its flickering off and on in our contemporary moment with these ideas about sublation in mind, I venture the following formulation: biocapitalism sublates slavery by producing the *flickering off and on of blackness*. This is especially so in the context of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism requires that forms of racial power rooted in slavery be understood as antiquated and thus disavowed as irrelevant, even though they have been not only negated but also preserved. Borrowing and tweaking the definitional quotation from the OED, we might say that blackness flickers off and on in our neoliberal present because biocapitalism is a form of racial capitalism that sublates the history of slavery by rendering it a "rationally-necessary moment of the whole," even though this rationally necessary moment must be systematically disavowed for the system to function smoothly.

In advancing this argument, I do not mean to suggest that other histories are not also sublated (that is, negated and preserved) and then disavowed in contemporary biocapitalism. It is imperative to recognize the afterlife of Euro-American colonialism and imperialism when treating surrogacy, especially when surrogate labor is performed by women residing in former colonies such as India, which was until recently the world's second largest surrogacy market. Nor do I wish to downplay the impact of postcolonial theory on my thinking about reproduction.[23] Rather this book, which is resolutely based in a US archive, treats the slave episteme rather than what might be referred to as a colonial or imperial episteme in order to underscore the importance of slave breeding as a historical phenomenon of epistemic importance precisely because slavery and its reproductive afterlife have not been taken up

by other scholars of contemporary reproductive labor and its outsourcing, and, just as important, because slavery has not been treated in scholarship on biocapitalism, the larger area of scholarly inquiry into which all work on surrogacy fits.[24]

In arguing that the racialization of reproductive laborers skews neither "black" nor "white" in any simple sense and does not solely or necessarily depend on the ascribed or perceived blackness of the bodies tasked with performing reproductive labor, this book's argument resonates with recent critiques of biopower offered by black studies scholars who have pointed out that racialization is a form of dehumanization that operates in context-specific ways depending on the biopolitical organization of the population in question. Theorists such as Achille Mbembe and Alexander Weheliye, for instance, observe that it is imperative to recognize slavery and colonialism as biopolitical formations (something neither of the two most famous theorists of biopower, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, acknowledge) and also that blackness is not the only racial cut or caesura (to use Foucault's original term) that is capable of creating the distinction upon which biopower depends: that between individuals and populations entitled to full humanity and those who are denied it; those who are made to live, and those who can be killed with impunity.[25] For Mbembe and Weheliye, being "human" invariably equates with being white or European; however, those who are racialized as less than human are never exclusively black. Indeed both theorists refuse to create hierarchies of oppression among the individuals and populations they discuss, including South Africans, African-descended slaves, historically colonized populations, Palestinians, Jews, Roma, and queers. As Weheliye explains, "If racialization is understood not as a biological or cultural descriptor but as a conglomerate of sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full human, not-quite-human, and nonhuman, then blackness designates a changing system of unequal power structures that apportion and delimit which humans can lay claim to full human status and which cannot."[26] As in the present analysis of biocapitalism, in their analyses of biopower, theorists regard blackness as a foundational form of racialized dehumanization, but never as the only form that racialized dehumanization takes. Inspired by the agility and flexibility of this work, I argue that it is a mistake to explore the endurance of the slave episteme solely by looking for the visible "blackness" of the laborer. Instead we must look for the processes through which reproductive labor and products are racialized, how these processes of racialization are recalibrated over time, and, thus too, at those

processes through which racialization is disavowed and prior histories of racialized dehumanization erased from view.

The conventional, positivist approach to understanding the racialization of labor risks positing race as a biological and thus empirically verifiable identity that preexists the labor process. As the historians of labor David Roediger, Theodore Allen, and Moon-Ho Jung have shown, the labor that individuals and collectivities engage in or are forced to perform racializes labor, renders the labor performed as a racializing process, and transforms the laborer into an individual who may, as a consequence of his or her place in the division of labor, be identified as "white," "black," or "Asian," or, as the case may be, as a "coolie" or a "nigger."[27] Just as static theorizations of race as a pregiven identity are too rigid to account for historical processes of racial formation in industrial capitalism, they are too rigid to account for current biopolitical and biocapitalist realities. On the one hand, such rigid ideas about race foreclose awareness of the historical relationships among racial slavery, colonialism, and empire—the relationships that enabled the development of the global capitalist modernity we have inherited. On the other hand, they foreclose consideration of the flickering off and on of blackness in contemporary neoliberalism and thus of the ways in which market-driven reproductive practices and politics build upon, disavow, and erase racialized historical violence. In sum, they foreclose our ability to see that labor processes create observable racial formations and not the other way around.

One last caveat is required. In venturing the argument about the reproductive afterlife of slavery I do not wish to imply that the slave episteme determines the totality of social and economic relations in contemporary biocapitalism. The history of slave breeding and the persistence of the slave episteme that four hundred years of slave breeding left in its wake necessarily but not exclusively shape contemporary social and economic relations. At the risk of being both too obvious and redundant, biocapitalism relies on *reproduction as a racializing process* that creates human biological commodities and itself functions as a commodity. This is a process that is powered by the slave episteme that was inherited from Atlantic slavery, itself an economic formation that was world shaping, even though its implementation, in the form of plantation slavery, was geographically restricted. As the black feminist legal scholar Dorothy Roberts observes, "It is the enslavement of Blacks that enables us to imagine the commodification of human beings, and that makes the vision of fungible breeder women so real."[28] Translating Roberts's deceptively straightforward insight into the conceptual language developed thus far, it is the prior

existence of slave breeding as a racializing process that today makes the vision of breeder women and surrobabies a reality. The history of racial slavery may not be the exclusive antecedent of contemporary biocapitalism—such an argument is reductive. However, if scholarship on biocapitalism looks at the commodification of life itself from the vantage point of contemporary surrogacy and thus from the vantage point of breeding as labor and children as products, it becomes clear that slavery is a "necessary moment of the whole" that has been sublated, and is today quite often disavowed.

As with any argument about epistemic endurance, the present argument has implications for knowledge production about the past and present, the relationship between the two, and how we imagine the future. If biocapitalism functions by sublating slavery, it behooves us to recognize that we cannot fully comprehend biocapitalism unless we examine its relationship to slavery as a way of knowing and being in the world. Reciprocally we cannot come to terms with the history of the present unless we recognize that slavery was not only a racial capitalist formation (as Robinson and others argue) but also an emergent biocapitalist formation, as I argue. When we recognize that biocapitalism constitutes a new naming and framing of the reproductive extraction upon which slavery turned, we are also compelled to consider that such a new naming and framing requires revision of how we understand the impact of the past on the present and on a future yet to come.

Despite the advantages of what might be characterized as two-way epistemic traffic, it is noteworthy that the linkages between slavery and biocapitalism that interest me here have not been treated by other scholarship on capitalism's past or present formations. Most historians of slavery hew to historical archives and, unsurprisingly, eschew presentism. Most theorists of biocapitalism focus exclusively on the present and leave slavery out of the discussion. Both practices result in the narrowing of the temporal frame in a manner that buttresses arguments about biocapitalism's newness and occludes arguments about dialectical processes of sublation, and thus about constellation of past and present. In fact, save for the black feminist writings discussed throughout this book, the relationship of slave breeding to reproduction in contemporary capitalism has been entirely neglected.[29] I speculate about some of the reasons for this in chapter 1, in which I discuss feminist scholarship on biocapitalism. In the remaining chapters I respond to the conceptual aporia that is generated by demonstrating what a cultural studies approach focused on close reading of imaginative literary and visual texts can offer us when we seek to produce a counterhistory of the present that places

the history of slavery and its reproductive afterlife front and center. In doing so I trace the workings of the slave episteme across a range of cultural texts and explore how each differently enables *critical speculative engagement* with slavery and its reproductive afterlife—a form of engagement that, I argue, is methodologically useful and politically necessary.[30]

Although the works of creative imagination, mainly novels and films, that I treat are not often read as works of philosophy, I argue that each contributes to black feminism's philosophy of history. Moreover I suggest that such works reveal the unique part played by *imagination* in accounting for slave women and other reproductive laborers as insurgent theorists of power, historical actors who considered how their choices, although individual and constrained by circumstance, might constitute resistance to sexual and reproductive extraction. While I leave a description of specific authors and texts until the chapter overview with which I close this introduction ("What Lies Ahead"), suffice it to note that what I am calling critical speculative engagement neither replaces nor substitutes for feminist historical work on women in slavery or for social scientific work on biocapitalism. Contributions of historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and ethnographers have been invaluable to development of my argument and are engaged throughout this book. Rather I focus on works of creative imagination and engage in critical speculation to supplement existing methodological approaches that are less able to track the work of the slave episteme. While the argument I advance is not empirically verifiable, I believe it is worth considering because it has the capacity to transform current understanding of the reproductive cultures and politics by which we are surrounded and the reproductive practices in which we participate.

In the first part of this book (chapters 1 through 3) I track the slave episteme as it appears in black feminist texts that highlight the reproductive dimensions of slavery. In these texts, many of which are novels referred to in genre criticism as neo-slave narratives, reproduction and sex in bondage are thematically and formally central. In placing these novels alongside black feminist nonfiction, I argue that, when taken together, all collectively elaborate a philosophy of history, one that takes up questions of reproductive extraction and reproductive insurgency in slavery and in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—the three decades of black feminism's most robust production and publication. For instance, in chapter 3, I offer an extended reading of perhaps the most famous neo-slave narrative, Toni Morrison's *Beloved*. However, instead of situating *Beloved* as exceptional, I place it within a wider field of engagements with slave women's participation in what W. E. B. Du Bois

called "the general strike" against slavery.[31] When contextualized thus, it becomes clear that Morrison was working alongside other black feminists with whom she sought to shake up received histories of slavery and of women's resistance to it, effectively contributing to a collective argument articulated across textual idioms.

In the second half of the book (chapters 4 and 5 and the epilogue) I engage in critical speculation somewhat differently. Here I treat the relationship of the slave past to the biocapitalist present through a reading of speculative fiction (sf)—fiction, I argue, that reveals to readers the relationship between today's reproductive scene and that which characterized four hundred years of slavery *even though racial slavery is not fully manifest on the surface of any of the texts in question*. In contrast to the late twentieth-century writings by black feminists that I treat in the first half of the book, the sf treated in the book's second half has been selected for consideration precisely because it appears superficially to be engaged in the *disavowal* of the history of slavery, and because it therefore mutates and in so doing distorts the representation of slavery in a manner that begs the question of the singularity of racial slavery. In other words, the sf selected provides a window onto biocapitalism's sublation of slavery, a process involving negation and preservation, and, as already discussed, disavowal and erasure.[32]

In sf from which racial slavery is absented from the textual surface—and thus in sf in which reproductive commodities are not imagined to be reproduced by enslaved black women, or even, as may be the case, by living beings sexed as female—it is nonetheless possible to demonstrate that the text in question meditates on the slave episteme. Indeed my purpose in treating speculative fictions that depict reproductive extraction but do not link it to slave breeding is to show that in neoliberalism, active textual engagement—what has often been referred to, in a nod to Benjamin, as reading against the grain—is imperative to discernment of biocapitalism's sublation of slavery and thus its simultaneous negation and preservation of slavery in our time.[33] In the texts of neoliberalism, disavowal of slavery can and should be read as symptomatic, as revelatory of the mechanisms by which biocapitalism sublates slavery and obscures from view the fact that the slave episteme subtends the neoliberal world that the texts in question depict and mediate. For this reason, when I read sf, my attention is trained on what Jacques Derrida has called the text's *démarche*—on the way in which each text enacts the disavowal of slavery that it can also be read to diagnose. For even when slavery disappears from the surface of a text, it is simultaneously preserved beneath it, where, I argue, it lies latent and waiting.[34]

In engaging in critical speculation, I follow scholars of slavery in embracing the possibility that knowledge about the slave past and the afterlife of slavery in the present may come to us through our interaction with unanticipated archives, genres, and textual idioms. The historian of slavery Jennifer Morgan observes, "To depend upon archival collaboration to rewrite the history of black life can route you back to the very negations at which you started."[35] For these reasons, I follow Hartman in embracing the idea that "critical fabulation" may be necessary if we are to summon "unverifiable truths" that would otherwise remain unavailable.[36] While Morgan and Hartman treat documents created in the slave past—for instance, plantation record books, slave laws, records from slave ships, and transcripts of trials in which slave women were criminalized for refusing sexual and reproductive violence against their persons—the "archives" I treat throughout this book comprise recent and contemporary texts that have been deemed too politically biased (too feminist and too black), too fantastical, too elliptical, or too multivalent to function as evidence in support of arguments about history, political economy, and relations of power by those seeking answers to the hard questions that besiege us. And yet it is precisely through engagement with such alternative archives of biocapitalism and neoliberalism that it becomes possible to perceive contemporary cultures and politics of reproduction as part and parcel of the afterlife of slavery and, too, to perceive the forms of disavowal that make it possible to offer for sale the array of reproductive commodities that are consumed by those who elect to reproduce genetically related progeny, biological kinship, and genealogy through the purchase of human biological commodities, in vivo reproductive labor, and its products. In sum, it is in a close reading of cultural texts that make a *proleptic* gesture by casting back into the slave past to reveal contemporary biocapitalism as enslaving, alongside a close reading of texts that make an *analeptic* gesture by reading the past through the lens of an imagined world yet to come, that it becomes possible to discern that four hundred years of slavery ought to be recognized as biocapitalist, and that contemporary biocapitalism ought to be recognized as a form of racial capitalism that is predicated, as was Atlantic slavery, on the racialized extraction of reproductive labor and its products. This is so even though the processes of racialization that are operative in contemporary biocapitalism do not skew black or white in the same way that they did during slavery, and even though processes of racialization are often distorted beyond superficial recognition or altogether disavowed.

Surrogacy as Heuristic Device

Historians argue that racial slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean entailed the simultaneous exploitation of women's productive and reproductive labor. On plantations women worked in the household and in the fields and were used to reproduce biological commodities. When we examine the contemporary reproductive horizon, the practice of surrogacy stands out as structured by related forms of hybridized exploitation. In contemporary surrogacy arrangements, which are currently almost entirely gestational, surrogates, all of whom are already mothers with children of their own (and thus engaged in conventional forms of reproductive labor such as housework and childcare), carry and deliver a child (and, sometimes, multiples) whose genetic material belongs to others.[37] In most surrogacy arrangements, surrogates are obligated, by contracts that are signed going in, to turn the children to whom they give birth over to those who have paid to have them (re)produced. Recognizing the relationship between women's work as breeding wenches in the slave past and their work as surrogate mothers in the present, one legal scholar writing about contemporary surrogacy observed, "All African American slave women before the Civil War were surrogate mothers for their owners, gestating and giving birth to children who would not belong to them but became the property of their masters."[38]

Although this insight is shared by many black feminists living and writing in and about the United States, it has neither been understood as germane by US courts that have adjudicated surrogacy disputes, nor been taken up by scholars who treat surrogacy practiced elsewhere around the globe. Chapter 1 thus tells the heretofore untold story of how black feminist legal scholars first theorized the historical relationship between slave breeding and contemporary surrogacy, considers how their contributions might be taken up in contexts beyond the United States, and argues that surrogacy ought to be regarded as a *heuristic device* that allows us to see that the history of slave breeding in the Atlantic world and the slave episteme that is its contemporary echo ought not be left out of evolving discussions about biocapitalism and outsourced or transnational reproduction. When engaged as a heuristic device, I argue, surrogacy makes visible relationships between the slave past and the biocapitalist present that other approaches to surrogacy and biocapitalism have not. For surrogacy holds the key to unlocking the imbricated workings of race and gender in biocapitalism and to revealing how the slave episteme shapes contemporary cultures and politics of reproduction despite

neoliberal pieties about the irrelevance of the slave past to life in our market-saturated, consumer-oriented present.

Although it will by now be evident that my primary focus is on historical constellation, epistemic endurance, echoes and hauntings (all descriptions of the afterlife of reproductive slavery employed throughout this book), before moving on I wish to consider the question of *discontinuity* and thus the apparent distinction between women who reportedly choose to labor as surrogates (as is most often the way that surrogate arrangements are represented today), and those on whom surrogate labor was forced, as it was in racial slavery. To treat this apparent distinction, at various points in this book I examine the relationship of slave labor to wage labor, and thus the relationship of bondage to contract. In slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean, when women were compelled to labor by their masters and overseers they were forced to endure sexual and reproductive violence, and thus a specifically gendered version of what the sociologist Orlando Patterson calls "natal alienation" and what the literary scholar Hortense Spillers insists on describing as slave women's forced reproduction of their own kinlessness.[39] For these reasons, in chattel slavery reproductive extraction must be understood as specific. And yet, even as we acknowledge this, we must also foreground the intellectual and political dangers of overlooking the epistemic proximity between slave breeding and contractual reproductive labor and, thus, the dangers of failing to examine the afterlife of reproductive slavery because such an examination appears to wrench a unique historical experience out of context.

The division of slave and contract labor is predicated on a distinction that is part of (bio)capitalist ideology. For this reason, rather than begin from the assumption that surrogates freely choose to engage in contractual labor, I begin from an insight neatly if too implicitly encapsulated in Marx's quip that contract labor ought to be recognized as "wage slavery." In creating his oxymoron, Marx challenges us to consider wage or contract labor on a continuum with the labor performed by slaves. He suggests that entrance into wage labor, even when it appears to be freely chosen, is all too often necessitated by life-threatening material desperation and coercion. He argues, nowhere more plainly than in the *Communist Manifesto*, that the concept of freedom propagated within capitalism—and, I would add, within racial capitalism and thus biocapitalism—is the bourgeois freedom to own and dispose of property, including property in the self. This is a supposed freedom that Stephanie Smallwood, a historian of slavery, urges us to label "commodified freedom" as it does not allow those who possess it to exit the system that

requires the commodification of things (and people regarded as things) in the first place.[40] Similarly the political theorist Carole Pateman connects the freedom to enter in to contract to slavery when, in her now classic treatise on "the sexual contract," she asserts that contract always creates relationships of command and obedience. The capitalist is situated by contract in the role of master, he who possesses the right to decide how the worker's labor is used and objectified. As Kathi Weeks observes in her assessment of Pateman's contribution, the relationship between capitalist-master and worker-slave "is not so much the byproduct of exploitation as its very precondition."[41]

The paradoxical character of the supposed "freedom of choice" that characterizes capitalism is especially evident when we consider the genealogy of liberalism and the predication of the universality of human rights on the exemption of slaves, the colonized, and indigenous peoples from possession of such rights and therefore from exercise of substantive freedom. In the course of theorizing the interlinked forms of violence that subtend liberalism, Lisa Lowe explains, "Social relations in the colonized Americas, Asia, and Africa were the condition of possibility for Western liberalism to think the universality of human freedom."[42] On the flip side of liberal freedom, Lowe continues, one finds racialized governance and political, economic, and social hierarchies deployed in the management of all peoples (she includes the enslaved, the colonized, and the indigenous) who have been and often continue to be thought of as less than human.[43] This paradox of liberalism becomes stark in the aftermath of manumission in the United States as one of the principal outcomes was resubjugation of the enslaved by new regimes of unfreedom. The historians Amy Dru Stanley and Sarah Haley, the black studies scholars Salamishah Tillet and Dennis Childs, and the sociologists Loïc Wacquant and Naomi Murakawa all concur (albeit from different disciplinary vantage points and in relation to varied institutions and archives): the emancipated were compelled to endure continued and frequently exacerbated forms of dehumanization through subjection to vagrancy laws that criminalized those unwilling to enter into wage labor; through incarceration on chain gangs on which death rates among leased convicts (male and female) were higher than they had been on the plantations on which slaves had formerly labored; and, not least, through the recruitment of former slaves into sharecropping and other forms of debt bondage and indenture that curtailed the capacity of putatively free individuals to exercise actual freedom of domicile or movement.[44]

Like freedmen and free women, many of today's reproductive laborers, especially those in the Global South, have little control over the circumstances in which they live, circumstances that compel them to alienate in vivo reproductive labor and its living products.[45] As all ethnographies of Indian surrogacy document, in this market as in other outsourced or transnational reproductive markets, women who elect to engage in surrogacy do so in order to survive and to help their families to survive. Surrogacy pays for food, shelter, and clothing, and sometimes also for children's education or daughters' dowries. While some women elect surrogate labor over the other options available to them, others are pressured into it by in-laws and husbands. Either way, poor women are actively sought out by clinics and recruiters who work for the numerous international agencies that arrange surrogacy across national borders. Ethnographies detail that surrogates are housed in dormitories that separate them from their children and families; they are subjected to painful and often dangerous medical procedures and drug protocols; and, most important, they are required to give up the babies they gestate and to whom they give birth. In surrogacy arrangements maternity is fragmented into oocyte vendors (euphemistically called egg "donors"), gestators or birthers, and socializers, and legal contracts are drawn up and signed to enforce the surrogate's status as a nonmother, effectively restricting her to sale of her (re)productive labor and its products. Like the bills of sale that mandated that slave women reproduce their own kinlessness by rendering mother and child chattel, the contracts that are used in surrogacy ensure that the reproductive labor of the surrogate is alienable and fungible and that the children born to surrogates are treated as property belonging to others—that is, until the transfer of the baby-commodity to those who have paid for their (re)production. Although the media and surrogate agencies characterize outsourced surrogacy as a win-win situation for poor, enterprising women, the full weight of the legal establishment (and its ability to enforce contracts and protect consumer's genetic property) is imposed to ensure that surrogates surrender the products they have (re)produced to their supposed owners.

Although surrogacy exchanges in the United States are typically cloaked in a discourse of altruism in which both surrogate and consumer characterize surrogacy as "a labor of love," reproductive extraction is as amply evident in the United States as in India or elsewhere in the Global South.[46] In Baby M and *Johnson v. Calvert*, the watershed surrogacy disputes I examine in chapter 1, courts forcibly removed children from the surrogates (one white, one black and Native American) who gestated and gave birth to them and who

sought to mother them rather than exchange them for payment. While it is rare for surrogates who breach contract by refusing to give up children to whom they have given birth to become known to the public either in the United States or abroad, the fact that even a few are known to have protested reproductive extraction and legally enforced kinlessness is not an aberration that we can afford to dismiss. Rather the existence of broken contracts and legal precedents must be regarded as an index of the persistent potential for surrogate insurgency and the violent measures that biocapitalism deems necessary to stave off crises that would otherwise disrupt its smooth functioning.

Unwittingly invoking and simultaneously disavowing the work of the slave episteme in contemporary surrogacy, in the early days of surrogacy pro-surrogacy propaganda frequently cited the Old Testament figure of Hagar, the handmaid, as the first surrogate mother. In Judeo-Christian tradition, Hagar bore a child to Abraham when his wife, Sarah, appeared to be barren. By invoking Hagar's story, pro-surrogacy forces seek to provide religious and moral precedent for women to serve other women as surrogates, and thus to participate in what pundits such as Oprah Winfrey tout as a "beautiful" instance of "global sisterhood."[47] Instructively the fact that Hagar was neither Sarah's equal nor her sister goes unacknowledged when the biblical handmaid is trotted out in support of surrogacy. Hagar was a slave, as black feminist theologians underscore. And she was not just any slave. Hagar was an Egyptian who was forced under penalty of exile into the wilderness, to surrender her body for reproductive use and to part with her child. And she was also an insurgent slave. Hagar neither acceded to her assigned role as nonmother nor to Abraham's eventual disinheritance of her son. Instead she went rogue, found a way where there was no way, and eventually journeyed with Ishmael across the desert of Beersheba to freedom. For these reasons, as I discuss in greater detail in chapter 4, black feminist theologians elevate Hagar as a fugitive foremother who rose in struggle and today represents all women who refuse racialized sexual and reproductive dispossession.

Taking cues from black feminists, I treat contemporary surrogates and other reproductive laborers as Hagar's daughters. I do so in two distinct ways. First, as already discussed, I recognize that understanding of the slave episteme in biocapitalism necessitates treatment of surrogacy as a heuristic device that centers reproduction as a form of labor and as an in vivo commodity productive of other living commodities. Following in the footsteps of those discussed throughout this book—Hartman, Roberts, Spillers and

Darlene Clark Hine, Deborah Gray White, Angela Davis, Jennifer Morgan, and others—I take the slave woman and her experience in slavery not as an incidentally gendered standpoint but rather as *the point of reference* in constructing a story about the slave past and in imagining the relevance of this story for the present and future.[48] Second, in treating contemporary surrogates as Hagar's daughters, I recognize the importance of slave women's past insurgency not only because recognition reshapes received understandings of the history of slavery but also because it expresses what the historian Robin D. G. Kelley refers to as "freedom dreams"—dreams expressed in multiple idioms by those who have turned to slave women's lives to locate prior forms of refusal. As Kelley notes, freedom dreams are transformative of conventional understandings of human agency and resistance, and therefore of the connection of both "agency" and "resistance" to Marxist materialist mainstays such as "work," "worker," and "class consciousness." To conceive of freedom dreams in the past, Kelley elaborates, is to "recover ideas—visions fashioned mainly by those marginalized black activists who proposed a different way out of our contradictions." However, he cautions, the point of recovery is not to "wholly embrace . . . [past] ideas or strategies as the foundation for new movements." Rather it is to engage recovered ideas so that we may "tap the well of our own collective imaginations" and consider, under present circumstances, how we might conceive of "freedom" as unbound from free enterprise.[49]

In insisting on the relevance of black feminist analysis of and response to racial capitalism's current biocapitalist configuration, it is important to point out that many historians of feminism have considered black feminism somewhat differently than I do here. They have situated black feminism in the context of the long civil rights movement, the rise of Black Power, and the ascendance of dominant forms of (white) feminism. And they have cast black feminism as a negotiation of the sexism and masculinism and sometimes, though less often, the heterosexism of black nationalism, and as a response to the racism and classism of second wave feminism.[50] With their research into the frequently overlooked history of black feminist involvement in the reproductive rights movement, they have demonstrated how, beginning in the 1970s, black feminists, working alongside other antiracist activists, pressured the movement to expand its narrow focus on access to abortion to include the full spectrum of reproductive freedoms, including the freedom to elect when to bear children, the economic freedom to raise and care for them, and the freedom to call out sterilization abuse and refuse all forms of racist, sexist, and ultimately eugenic medical coercion.[51]

What historians have not considered is how black feminism articulated freedom dreams that were specifically if not always expressly keyed to the biocapitalist economy of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—that is, to the form of capitalism that emerged as black feminists wrote. Consequently most have not read black feminism as a social and political formation that necessarily, but not always explicitly or self-consciously, mediates the conflicts and contradictions that characterized the exploitation of in vivo reproductive labor in black feminism's moment of production and publication. Relatedly, they do not read black feminism as constituting a philosophy of history that reflects and refracts the rise of biocapitalism and the forms of neoliberalism that emerged alongside it. In regarding the black feminism articulated across three decades as a philosophy of history, I underscore black feminism's contributions to a full-scale critique of racial capitalism and position it as an insurgent response to the question of human futurity in biocapitalism and neoliberalism. As already noted, chapter 1 does so by examining black feminist contributions to the scholarship on surrogacy. Chapter 2 does so by analyzing black feminist ideas about slave women's participation in a general strike against slavery. Chapter 3 does so by reading Morrison's *Beloved* as a manifesto for substantive sexual and reproductive freedom. Chapter 4 does so by demonstrating how Octavia Butler's black feminist sf of the late 1970s and 1980s constitutes a prescient meditation on the rise of neoliberalism and the racialized reproductive cultures and politics that it ushered in. In short, across this book's chapters I engage black feminism in and through its multiple idioms of expression to demonstrate how it has persistently and imaginatively mobilized the history and image of the slave past to challenge received understandings of this past and to recast the present in which the past is being recalled in a new light. For it is only when past and present are constellated that it becomes possible to imagine a more liberated future.

The suggestion that black feminism accesses the freedom dreams of enslaved women who refused or dreamed of refusing sexual and reproductive extraction is not meant to be triumphalist. Along with others, I am cautious of recuperative and frequently sanguine attempts to redeem a story of agency, solidarity, and liberation from a past so violent that it may well have foreclosed all three.[52] Alongside other scholars of black feminism, I too lament the sizable struggle involved in resurrection of black feminism as an intellectual and institutional intervention in the face of its neglect or overt dismissal.[53] For all of these reasons the second half of this book treats dystopian sf that rings out an alarm about the manner in which black feminist freedom dreams can be and

have been incorporated, co-opted, or entirely eviscerated in the context of neoliberalism. Such sf mediates the same material conflicts and contradictions that animated black feminist production in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, but instead of imagining reproductive refusal, it depicts futures so devastatingly bleak that it appears that acquiescence to racialized reproductive extraction has been and remains the only option. Through engagement with dystopian fictions—three by Butler (chapter 4), a novel by Kazuo Ishiguro (chapter 5), and Alfonso Cuarón's apocalyptic film *The Children of Men* (epilogue)—I argue that it is possible to put on display, and thus put up for critical inspection, the myriad obstacles to robust imagination of resistance and refusal, and therefore to achievement of substantive sexual and reproductive freedom. As we shall see, in such dystopian texts space for alternative imaginings comes under pressure as the reproductive laborer's freedom dreams are actively colonized by neoliberal economic imperatives and the proliferation of empty ideas about reproductive choice as an end in itself. And yet, as I hope is already apparent, I do not conclude this book with dystopian sf to suggest throwing in the towel. Rather I do so because I am just utopian enough to imagine that when dystopian sf is juxtaposed with black feminist manifestos for freedom that dare to imagine refusal of sexual and reproductive extraction, the boldness of black feminist freedom dreams will appear newly resonant. Although such freedom dreams are quickly becoming historically distant and fragile—keyed as they are to a prior moment of radical possibility that today can too often feel out of reach—they also strike me as urgent.

What Lies Ahead

Chapter 1 explores contemporary surrogacy, develops the idea of surrogacy as a heuristic device, and argues for recognition of the workings of the slave episteme in biocapitalism. I treat historical scholarship on women in slavery that reveals the centrality of reproductive extraction to the entire slave enterprise. Through examination of feminist contributions to debates about biocapitalism I examine what is yet to be gained by including an account of slave breeding in theories of the biocapitalist extraction of life itself. Most important, I engage feminist scholarship on surrogacy, explore feminist responses to the two most controversial surrogacy cases in US history, and detail the groundbreaking contributions of black feminist legal scholars who sought to theorize surrogate labor as a racializing process. In so doing, I explore how black feminists conceptualized what I call the surrogacy/slavery nexus—the

dialectical relationship between past and present that characterizes black feminism's philosophy of history. In conclusion I speculate that attention to the surrogacy/slavery nexus can enrich our understanding of the forms of outsourced or transnational surrogacy that are available today.

Chapter 2 develops the argument about the importance of black feminism's philosophy of history for analysis of biocapitalism by expanding my previous discussion to include a wider range of black feminist texts, especially so-called neo-slave narratives. Reading across a range of meditations on women in slavery, I demonstrate how they collectively situate sexual and reproductive extraction at the center of their accounts of racial capitalism's transformation over time. I further argue that black feminists writing in the 1980s and 1990s did this by gendering the Du Boisian idea of the general strike against slavery and, in the process, positioning sexual and reproductive insurgency as central to slavery's overthrow. In so doing black feminism made a major though often unrecognized contribution to the black radical tradition, which has generally been construed as male. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that black women's neo-slave narratives be read as manifestos for freedom from sexual and reproductive dispossession in slavery and beyond, and, therefore, for recognition of black feminist neo-slave narratives as an indispensable component of not only black feminism's philosophy of history but also the black radical tradition.

Chapter 3 deepens the preceding argument about the importance of neo-slave narratives by treating the most famous black feminist neo-slave narrative published to date, Morrison's *Beloved*, and its retelling of the story of a fugitive slave mother who murdered her daughter to save her from enslavement. Through an extended close reading of *Beloved* I concretize the idea that critical speculative engagement is central to the project of constellating past and present and thus to development of black feminism's philosophy of history. In Morrison's case, the present—the 1970s and 1980s—is also the period that witnessed the ascent of the surrogate industry in the United States and the global biocapitalist economy of which surrogacy was to become a constitutive part. I conclude the chapter with a speculative provocation: although Morrison's protagonist, Sethe, is a figure heretofore exclusively linked to Margaret Garner, she ought to be linked to Joan Little, the young black woman who murdered the white prison guard who raped her in 1974. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Little was at the symbolic center of an interracial feminist mobilization against criminalization of women's violent refusal of sexual and

reproductive exploitation. In juxtaposing Sethe's and Little's insurgency, *Beloved* advances the radical idea that insurgent violence can defy incorporation into hegemonic systems of understanding; and thus, together with the black feminists with whom Morrison was in dialogue, she ought to be seen as meditating on the place of violent insurgency in the fight for substantive sexual and reproductive freedom.

Chapter 4 commences the second major argument of the book, complicating our understanding of the struggle for freedom from reproductive exploitation in the context of neoliberalism through a reading of dystopian sf by Butler. While the black feminist neo-slave narratives treated in the previous two chapters explore insurgency against sexual and reproductive extraction, they do not account for neoliberalism's disavowal of slavery and ideological embrace of postracialism. In contrast, Butler's fictions, which were written alongside black feminist neo-slave narratives, offer an extended meditation on reader complicity in the perpetuation of the slave episteme through its disavowal. They do so by calling attention to racial and gender violence as by-products of the contemporary preoccupation, facilitated by the availability of reproductive technology, with pursuit of forms of kinship that are rooted in notions of racial or genetic relatedness. As Butler makes plain, such forms of kinship depend on forms of racialized reproductive extraction that ought to be pursued (through consumption of surrogacy and ARTs) with great caution. Building on Hartman's observation that "telling the story of women in slavery necessarily involves an intersection of the fictive and historical," or work in a "subjunctive tense" that ventures "toward another mode of writing," the chapter includes a discussion of Butler's work in a "subjunctive tense" through treatment of her use of the trope of time travel.[54] Through this trope, Butler illuminates how reproductive revolts have already been and will continue to be stymied by uncritical pursuit of forms of kinship that are rooted in racial or genetic connection.

Chapter 5 treats human cloning and the international trade in human bodily organs as part of the phenomenon of reproductive extraction in biocapitalism. I examine how and why cloning (a form of reproduction that sidelines the necessary contribution of the female body by transforming reproduction into a technological process performed by men) and the organ trade are routinely represented as bound. I read Ishiguro's 2005 novel *Never Let Me Go* and its portrait of clones bred to be organ donors as a story about disavowal of the afterlife of reproductive slavery in our time. And I explore how the form

of Ishiguro's novel, its hallmark slow-reveal and unreliable first-person narration, provide readers with an experience of complicity in perpetuation of the slave episteme—in particular, of complicity with the racialized dehumanization of in vivo labor upon which the organ donation program that is depicted in the novel, like the forms of surrogacy depicted in Butler's work, depends. Although cloning is a form of reproduction that is generally construed as unmoored from the female body (notably, Ishiguro's clones appear to be motherless and are sterile), through engagement in critical speculation I argue that the slave mother and thus the slave episteme operate beneath the surface of the seemingly autochthonous world that the novel depicts. Consequently, Ishiguro's novel serves as a platform from which to consider how a neoliberal text that disavows the slave episteme might nonetheless be recognized as a contemporary slave narrative, albeit one that erases blackness as it calibrates itself to the neoliberal ideology of postracialism.

The epilogue examines fears that spring from our impending failure to rescue the human reproductive process from immanent destruction by disease and environmental catastrophe and explores how fantasies about universal human infertility—a crisis I call "the end of men"—lead to celebration of the black surrogate as the fount of human life on earth. This is an idea expressed in a spate of popular films, novels, and TV dramas. In concluding the book's argument about the importance of critical speculative engagement, I treat Cuarón's *The Children of Men*, a film in which humanity is saved from extinction by a black African prostitute-surrogate who appears, against all odds, to have conceived a miracle child, the last child to be born on earth. My reading of *The Children of Men*, a film often celebrated for its portrayal of a black Madonna as humanity's savior, demonstrates that even superficially progressive representations of racialized reproduction warrant scrutiny. In the film, all political factions vie for control over the black mother and her girl child; and, despite apparent differences, all factions fail to imagine rescue of human civilization through anything but racialized reproductive extraction. Insofar as it allows for apprehension of the endurance of the slave episteme, my reading of the film prods us to consider how we might exit the reproductive death spiral it represents. For, if we allows ourselves to be guided by black feminism's philosophy of history and refuse resolution of the immanent crisis of human futurity through racialized reproductive extraction, we might well be able to imagine heretofore unimagined ways to reproduce and sustain life on planet Earth.

NOTES

Introduction

1 Saidiya Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 6. Hartman concludes, "I, too, am the afterlife of slavery." Hartman's formulation resonates throughout other texts on the afterlife of slavery that have informed my thinking. See Christina Sharpe, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Salamishah Tillet, *Sites of Slavery: Citizenship and Racial Democracy in the Post–Civil Rights Imagination* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012); Kimberly Juanita Brown, *The Repeating Body: Slavery's Visual Resonance in the Contemporary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Dennis Childs, *Slaves of the State: Black Incarceration from the Chain Gang to the Penitentiary* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Alexander Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Simone Browne, *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Jared Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," *Social Text* 28.2 (2010): 31–56.

2 I return to a discussion of neoslavery in chapter 5.

3 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940), in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 253–64, quote 263.

4 Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 24.

5 Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 1–28.

6 Barbara Christian, *Black Women Novelists: The Development of a Tradition, 1892–1976* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980), *Black Feminist Criticism: Perspectives on Black Women Writers* (New York: Pergamon, 1985), and "The Race for Theory," *Cultural Critique* 6 (1987): 51–63; Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17.2 (1987): 65–81, and *Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Hazel V. Carby, *Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Valerie Smith, *Self-Discovery and Authority in Afro-American Narrative* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

7 While adoption might appear to fit within the scope of the present argument, it doesn't. Babies put up for adoption are infrequently (re)produced through the express engineering of reproductive labor that interests me here. See Laura Briggs, *Somebody's Children: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational Adoption* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

8 See Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, *Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Melinda Cooper, *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby, *Clinical Labor: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Kaushik Sunder Rajan, *Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Kaushik Sunder Rajan, ed., *Lively Capital: Biotechnologies, Ethics, and Governance in Global Markets* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

9 I use *neoliberalism* to refer to processes by which unfettered markets, brought forth and sustained by deregulation of corporations and financial institutions, privatization, proliferation of free trade policies, and decline of the social welfare state, determine economic and social relations. In neoliberalism, labor unions, social programs, and democratic processes are dismantled and individuals burdened with survival, self-care, and self-governance. For present purposes, the most salient features of neoliberalism are the burdening of women with excessive responsibility (but less and less compensation) and the hyperexploitation of people of color—processes that coincide with neoliberalism's promotion of an ideology of official race neutrality, color-blindness, and thus what I call throughout this book postracialism. See David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Wendy Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization," *Political Theory* 34.6 (2006): 690–714, and "Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," *Theory & Event* 7.1 (2003), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/48659; Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Immanuel Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: New Press, 1995).

10 Elsewhere I argue that race and reproduction are bound together when the maternal body is conceptualized as the source of racial identities and racial formations, including modern nations. I have called the conceptual edifice that racializes reproduction the "race/reproduction bind." See Alys Eve Weinbaum, *Wayward Reproductions: Genealogies of Race and Nation in Transatlantic Modern Thought* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

11 *Spartaco: Schiavi e Padroni a Roma*, Museo dell'Ara Pacis, March 31–September 17, 2017. This is a multimedia exhibit on Roman slavery since Spartacus.

12 See Jennifer L. Morgan, "*Partus Sequitur Ventrem*: Law, Race, and Reproduction in Colonial Slavery," *Small Axe* 55 22.1 (March 2018): 1–17. Also see Joseph Dorsey, "Women without History: Slavery and the International Politics of *Partus Sequitur*

Ventrem in the Spanish Caribbean," *Journal of Caribbean History* 28.2 (1994): 167–69. For discussion of practices prior to the official implementation of the doctrine, see Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), especially 128–35.

13 See Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation* (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), and *Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle* (New York: Autonomedia, 2012); Leopoldina Fortunati, *The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital* (1981), trans. Hilary Creek (New York: Autonomedia, 1995); Mariarosa Dalla Costa, "Capitalism and Reproduction," *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 7.4 (1996): 111–21. Also see Kathi Weeks, *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), especially 92–96. Autonomist feminists first launched the critique of housework as reproductive labor and developed the "wages for housework" platform. See Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma Jones, *The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community* (Bristol, UK: Falling Wall, 1973); Wendy Edmond and Suzie Fleming, eds., *All Work and No Pay: Women, Housework, and the Wages Due* (Bristol, UK: Falling Wall, 1975); Harriet Fraad, Stephen Resnick, and Richard Wolff, *Bringing It All Back Home: Class, Gender, and Power in the Modern Household* (London: Pluto, 1994).

14 See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor," *Signs* 18.1 (1992): 1–43, and *Forced to Care: Coercion and Caregiving in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Eileen Boris, *Home to Work: Motherhood and the Politics of Industrial Homework in the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein, *Caring for America: Home Health Workers in the Shadow of the Welfare State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

15 On racialization of care work, domestic work, and sex work see Grace Chang, *Disposable Domestics: Immigrant Women Workers in the Global Economy* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000); Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Outsourced Self: Intimate Life in Market Times* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012); Eileen Boris and Elisabeth Prügl, eds. *Homeworkers in Global Perspective: Invisible No More* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Eileen Boris and Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, eds., *Intimate Labors: Cultures, Technologies, and the Politics of Care* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

16 See Parreñas, *Servants of Globalization*.

17 I am indebted to Marxist and socialist feminists who parsed and critiqued Marx and Engels's writings on reproductive labor and their subsuming of reproduction within the supposedly broader category of production. See Zillah R. Eisenstein, ed., *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978); Heidi Hartmann and Lydia Sargent, eds., *The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: A Debate on Class and Patriarchy* (London:

Pluto Press, 1981); Lydia Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism* (Boston: South End Press, 1981); Shulamith Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970); Michèle Barrett, *Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis* (London: Verso, 1980); Rosalind Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations* (Boston: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1983). Building on world systems theory, Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986) and Swasti Mitter, *Common Fate, Common Bond: Women in the Global Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 1986) developed the account of the international division of reproductive labor upon which so much current feminist work on the global economy is based.

18 Heather Jacobson, *Labor of Love: Gestational Surrogacy and the Work of Making Babies* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2016), 16, 177. Also see Debora L. Spar, *The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006).

19 See, for instance, Jenny Reardon, *Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in an Age of Genomics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Dorothy Roberts, *Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics and Big Business Re-create Race in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: New Press, 2011); Catherine Bliss, *Race Decoded: The Genomic Fight for Social Justice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

20 Daisy Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction: Race, Kinship and Commercial Surrogacy in India* (New York: New York University Press, 2016); Laura Harrison, *Brown Bodies, White Babies: The Politics of Cross-Racial Surrogacy* (New York: New York University Press, 2016); France Winddance Twine, *Outsourcing the Womb: Race, Class, and Gestational Surrogacy in a Global Market* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

21 I have chosen the word *flicker* because it is a visually laden term that alludes to the historical association of blackness with racial visibility. The term suggests the episodic waning of the old racial imaginary that sought to consolidate this association in a context in which race retreats from view through its attribution to "invisible" sources of genetic determination. *Flicker* tells us that "blackness" is not visible and never has been, though it was construed as visible when visibility could be used to objectify and dehumanize. In this sense this formulation refuses the overdetermination of visible blackness in contemporary biocapitalism. Thanks to Sonnet Retman and Chandan Reddy for the lengthy engagements that resulted in this precise formulation and to Sue Shon for her work on the historical consolidation of blackness and visuality. See Shon, "Making Sense: Race and Modern Vision," PhD diss., University of Washington, 2016. As I have argued elsewhere, despite the fact that there is no single gene that determines the visibility of race, genetic ideas about racial visibility inform the practice of biotechnology, especially when eggs and sperm are selected for use. See Alys Eve Weinbaum, "Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work of Art in a Biotechnological Age," *Literature and Medicine* 26.1 (2007): 207–39. Finally, *flicker* is meant to resonate with and

depart from Benjamin's *flash*, the concept he uses to describe how the historical past makes itself evident in a present moment of danger in which the forgetting of the past appears likely. In our present biocapitalist moment, slave breeding is the past that threatens to disappear irretrievably. This noted, it should be clear that the "flickering off and on of blackness" I describe happens *inside* capitalist abstraction. By contrast, when slavery "flashes up," this represents a rupture with capitalist abstraction and the forms of historicism to which, Benjamin argues, it is wed. See Benjamin, "Theses."

22 Entry for "sublate," *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3rd ed., accessed online August 20, 2017, University of Washington. In Marx's writings *aufhaben* is the German verb that is often, though not exclusively translated as *to sublate*. Though it is beyond the scope of the present discussion, Marxist scholars continue to debate how best to translate the term in Marx's writings and how best to conceptualize the historical and dialectical process it describes.

23 My ideas about reproductive exploitation remain grounded in conversations years ago with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and, in particular, in formative readings of "French Feminism Revisited," in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 158–92, and "Diasporas Old and New: Women in the Transnational World," *Textual Practice* 10.2 (1996): 245–69.

24 As Lisa Lowe explains, recognition of the imbrication of colonialism, empire, slavery, and global capitalism ought to move us beyond platitudes about the global division of labor (that it is feminized and racialized) and toward an understanding of labor as a process that produces gendered and racialized identities mobilized by capitalism(s). See Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 1–41. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak makes a similar observation in "In a Word: An Interview," interview by Ellen Rooney, *Differences* 1.2 (1989): 124–56.

25 Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*; Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15.1 (2003): 11–40. I return to a discussion of scholarship on biopower in chapters 4 and 5.

26 Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*, 3.

27 See David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1991); Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race*, vol. 1: *Racial Oppression and Social Control* (London: Verso, 1994); Moon-Ho Jung, *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

28 Dorothy Roberts, *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty* (New York: Pantheon, 1997).

29 Though they do not treat biocapitalism, scholars who read black feminism of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s as a response to late capitalism and neoliberalism are fellow travelers. See Grace Kyungwon Hong, *The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) and *Death beyond Disavowal: The Impossible Politics of*

Difference (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Roderick A. Ferguson, *Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Katherine McKittrick, *Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*.

30 I am indebted to an anonymous reader for offering this description of my method.

31 W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880* (1935; New York: Free Press, 1998).

32 On *disavowal* and its function in neoliberalism, see Hong, *Death beyond Disavowal*.

33 Benjamin, "Theses," 257.

34 Jacques Derrida, *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 292–337. I return to the question of "surface reading" in chapter 4.

35 Jennifer L. Morgan, "Archives and Histories of Racial Capitalism: An Afterword," *Social Text* 33.4 (2015), 156.

36 Saidiya Hartman, "Venus in Two Acts," *Small Axe* 12.2 (2008), 7, and *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 79–112.

37 I return to the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy in chapter 1.

38 Carla Spivack, "The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States," *American Journal of Comparative Law* 58 (2010): 97–114, quote 97.

39 Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 5–10; Spillers, "Mama's Baby," 73–74.

40 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), trans. Samuel Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Smallwood, "Commodified Freedom: Interrogating the Limits of Anti-Slavery Ideology in the Early Republic," *Journal of the Early Republic* 24.2 (2004): 289–98.

41 Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 149; Weeks, *The Problem with Work*, 23.

42 Lowe, *Intimacies*, 16. Also see Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

43 Lowe, *Intimacies*, 24.

44 Amy Dru Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Sarah Haley, *No Mercy Here: Gender, Punishment, and the Making of Jim Crow Modernity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Tillet, *Sites of Slavery*; Childs, *Slaves of the State*; Loïc Wacquant, "Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh," *Punishment and Society* 3.1 (2001): 95–134; Naomi Murakawa, *First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

45 This account of outsourced and transnational surrogacy in India is indebted to ethnographic scholarship by Amrita Pande, *Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Kalindi Vora, *Life Support: Biocapital and the New History of Outsourced Labor* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Sharmila Rudrappa, *Discounted Life: The Price of Global Surrogacy in India* (New York: New York University Press, 2015); Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction*; Sayantani DasGupta and Shamita Das Dasgupta, eds., *Globalization and Transnational Surrogacy in India: Outsourcing Life* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014). Also see Harrison, *Brown Bodies*. I return to a discussion of outsourced and transnational surrogacy in the last section of chapter 1.

46 Jacobson, *Labor of Love* is the only book-length ethnography of gestational surrogates in the United States. Jacobson demonstrates that surrogates and consumers of surrogacy alike hold fast to the idea that neither children nor labor are being sold. In her earlier study of traditional surrogates, Heléna Ragoné found that most describe their labor as altruistic. See *Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994). Such obfuscations are part and parcel of the disavowal of the history of slavery and thus the persistence of the slave episteme.

47 See Natalie Fixmer-Oraiz, "Speaking of Solidarity: Transnational Gestational Surrogacy and the Rhetorics of Reproductive (In)Justice," *Frontiers* 34.3 (2013): 126–63.

48 Spillers, "Mama's Baby"; Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*, especially 85; Roberts, *Killing*; Angela Davis, "The Legacy of Slavery: Standards for a New Womanhood," in *Women, Race, and Class* (New York: Vintage, 1981), 3–89.

49 Robin D. G. Kelley, *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination* (Boston: Beacon, 2002), xii.

50 Kimberly Springer, *Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations 1968–1980* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Bettye Collier-Thomas and V. P. Franklin, eds., *Sisters in Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights–Black Power Movement* (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Kimberly Springer, ed., *Still Climbing, Still Lifting: African American Women's Contemporary Activism* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Deborah Gray White, *Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894–1994* (New York: Norton, 1999); Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York: William Morrow, 1984).

51 Jennifer Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement* (New York: New York University Press, 2003); Jael Silliman et al., eds., *Undivided Rights: Women of Color Organize for Reproductive Justice* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2004); Kimala Price, "What Is Reproductive Justice? How Women of Color Activists Are Redefining the Pro-Choice Paradigm," *Meridians* 10.2 (2010): 42–65.

52 Walter Johnson, "On Agency," *Journal of Social History* 37.1 (2003): 113–24; Hartman, "Venus in Two Acts"; Sharpe, *In the Wake*.

53 Hong argues that black feminism has had difficulty surviving, not least because so many black feminist academics have passed away prematurely (*Death*, 125–49). Also see Ferguson, *Aberrations*.
54 Hartman, "Venus in Two Acts," 7.

1. The Surrogacy/Slavery Nexus

1 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1 (1867), trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 926.
2 As discussed below, the latter term is Walter Johnson's.
3 Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 51–52.
4 Amy Dru Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xi.
5 Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
6 Stanley limns the relationship between labor and marriage contracts and argues that the latter was enslaving for black women, predicated as it was on men's "domestic rule" over all dependents (*From Bondage to Contract*, especially chapters 1 and 4).
7 The term had previously been used to discuss the South African economy under apartheid. Robinson's innovation was to expand the concept as it was used previously to encompass the racial character of capitalism in all its iterations.
8 Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (1983; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), xxix; hereafter cited parenthetically.
9 Robinson notes that even though Marx and Engels did not recognize racism as a globe-shaping force, they understood its import in the intra-European context (*Black Marxism*, 79–80, 339–40).
10 Jodi Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1.1 (2015): 77.
11 Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," 77.
12 Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 1–90.
13 See Edward Baptist, *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Walter Johnson, *Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), and *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Stephanie Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Moon-Ho Jung, *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

14 Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*, 14.

15 Although I considered coining and using the concept "racial biocapitalism" throughout, I eventually elected to stick with the already existent "biocapitalism." The latter holds the potential prefacing term ("racial") under erasure, effectively marking the neoliberal disavowal of racial violence that interests me.

16 See Deborah Gray White, *Ar'n't I a Woman? Female Slaves in the Plantation South* (New York: Norton, 1985); Darlene Clark Hine, *Hine Sight: Black Women and the Reconstruction of American History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Marietta Morrissey, *Slave Women in the New World: Gender Stratification in the Caribbean* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989); Barbara Bush, *Slave Women in Caribbean Society, 1650–1838* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Stephanie M. H. Camp, *Closer to Freedom: Enslaved Women and Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Sharla M. Fett, *Working Cures: Healing, Health, and Power on Southern Slave Plantations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Thavolia Glymph, *Out of the House of Bondage: The Transformation of the Plantation Household* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). This scholarship was presaged by the emergence of social historical scholarship on the slave family and quotidian forms of resistance. See Herbert Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925* (New York: Pantheon, 1976); John W. Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Vintage, 1972).

17 See Hilary McD. Beckles, *Natural Rebels: A Social History of Enslaved Women in Barbados* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989); Jennifer L. Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Both are hereafter cited parenthetically. Sasha Turner's *Contested Bodies: Pregnancy, Childrearing, and Slavery in Jamaica* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017) was published after completion of this book. Had I had it in hand, I would have included discussion of it here. Turner explores not only how reproduction functioned as the motor of slavery but also the complicity of those abolitionists who imagined that slave women might reproduce a free population of laborers capable of performing the work previously done by slaves.

18 Although men proved stronger physically, women demonstrated greater stamina, a requirement in harsh tropical conditions. Beckles observes that management's initial refusal to shelter women from arduous tasks indicates that "productivity differentials were not expected to exist between the sexes" (*Natural Rebels*, 31). First gang women hoed soil, dug drains, and cut, bundled, and planted canes (33–34).

19 Beckles notes that urban slave owners also "encouraged" slave women to reproduce as a means of future securitization (*Natural Rebels*, 92). In instances in which slaves were leased for sexual use they generated three income flows: from labor, from sex work, and from reproduction (144).

20 Thus Morgan's focus on representations of black women's breasts, supposedly slung over shoulders so that children might suckle while perched on laboring backs (*Laboring Women*, 12–49).

21 Descendants of Eve, unlike African women, were thought to be cursed with pain in childbirth. Such ideas paved the way for polygenesis and related discourses about European racial superiority in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Morgan, *Laboring Women*, 40–47. Heather Jacobson's ethnography of gestational surrogacy in the US, *Labor of Love: Gestational Surrogacy and the Work of Making Babies* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2016), reveals that contemporary surrogates are generally women thought to be "good" at pregnancy because pregnancy and birth are "easy" for them. She shows that this discourse (which, notably, she does not historicize) covers over the arduousness of surrogate labor (56).

22 With her astute analysis of wills that instructed planters' heirs on how to distribute property, Morgan renders reproductive speculation tangible. Wills reveal that planters created notions about transfer of wealth through speculative transfer to future generations of enslaved women's reproductive capacity. When little was left behind, the bequest of a female slave allowed the slave owner to produce the semblance of munificence in the face of actual scarcity (*Laboring Women*, 92).

23 The formulation is Morgan's, *Laboring Women*, 167.

24 Kaushik Sunder Rajan, *Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); hereafter cited parenthetically.

25 On the genealogy of the concept see Stefan Helmreich, "Species of Biocapital," *Science as Culture* 17.4 (2008): 463–78. Helmreich's critique of Sunder Rajan resonates with my sense that Sunder Rajan misses "the bio side of things" due to exclusive focus on the "capital side" (465). Helmreich's genealogy stretches back to the 1980s, and includes contributions by Hortense Spillers and Donna Haraway. Other overviews trivialize feminist contributions. See, for instance, Kean Birch and David Tyfield, "Theorizing the Bioeconomy: Biovalue, Biocapital, Bioeconomics or . . . What?" *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 38.3 (2012): 299–327.

26 Melinda Cooper elaborates similar arguments in *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 20.

27 See Sarah Franklin, *Biological Relatives: IVF, Stem Cells, and the Future of Kinship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

28 Sarah Franklin and Margaret Lock, "Animation and Cessation: The Remaking of Life and Death," in *Remaking Life and Death: Toward an Anthropology of Biosciences*, ed. Sarah Franklin and Margaret Lock (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2003), 7. Franklin and Locke attribute their ideas about reproduction's importance to their exchanges with Charis Thompson and Hannah Landecker. At the symposium upon which their anthology is based Landecker argued that biocapital is not simply dependent on reproduction but is constituted by it (7, 10).

29 Maria Mies argues similarly in *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986). As she explains,

global capitalism relies upon the exploitation of the female body and labor and simultaneously disavows the female body's productivity.

30 Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, *Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Debora Spar, *The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2006); Sarah Franklin, *Dolly Mixtures: The Remaking of Genealogy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), and *Biological Relatives*; Cooper, *Life as Surplus*; Donna Dickenson, *Body Shopping: The Economy Fueled by Flesh and Blood* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008); Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby, *Clinical Labor: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Kalindi Vora, *Life Support: Biocapital and the New History of Outsourced Labor* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Outsourced Self: Intimate Life in Market Times* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012).

31 In a much earlier engagement with surrogacy I explored it through the lens of Marx's labor theory of value and argued that in surrogacy (re)productive labor power as a commodity and the (re)productive product are exchanged. The surrogate supplies a measurable quantity of social labor power that is "congealed" (to borrow Marx's uncannily biological terminology) in the object consumed. In this exchange (re)productive labor in its "fluid state" is transformed into a commodity that is quite literally delivered to the consumer in its "solid state," in "object form." As in other exchanges, the relationships between people are transformed into relationships among things and the social nature of labor power is obfuscated by the fetishism that attaches itself to the baby commodity. In surrogacy the fetish character of the commodity is its babyness. See Weinbaum, "Marx, Irigaray, and the Politics of Reproduction," *Differences* 6.1 (1994): 98–128.

32 Cooper and Waldby write of hearing Sunder Rajan speak, "We both realized that we, and the rest of the field, had neglected the question of labor. While there was an extensive body of work on the expert cognitive labor of the scientist and its centrality to the knowledge economy, the labor of those who provide the *in vivo* platforms for clinical experimentation and tissue provision did not figure in any account as labor" (*Clinical Labor*, vii).

33 Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper, "The Biopolitics of Reproduction: Post-Fordist Biotechnology and Women's Clinical Labor," *Australian Feminist Studies* 23.55 (2008): 58.

34 Waldby and Cooper, "The Biopolitics of Reproduction," 60; Cooper and Waldby, *Clinical Labor*, 34.

35 The baby was named Sara Elizabeth by Whitehead and Melissa Elizabeth by the Sterns. Although the media's references to "the Baby M case" suggest bias in favor of the Sterns, I follow popular usage to underscore the hegemonic construction.

36 My account is based on feminist scholarship and reportage in the *New York Times* from 1986 to 1988. See Katha Pollitt, "The Strange Case of Baby M," *The Nation*,

May 23, 1987, 688; Lorraine Stone, "Neoslavery—'Surrogate' Motherhood Contracts v. the Thirteenth Amendment," *Law & Equality: A Journal of Theory and Practice* 6.2–3 (1988): 63–73; Judith T. Younger, "What the Baby M Case Is Really All About," *Law & Equality: A Journal of Theory and Practice* 6.2–3 (1988): 75–82; Valerie Hartouni, "Reproductive Technologies and the Negotiation of Public Meanings: The Case of Baby M," in *Provoking Agents: Gender and Agency in Theory and Practice*, ed. Judith Kegan Gardiner (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 115–32; Carol Sanger, "(Baby) M Is for the Many Things: Why I Start with Baby M," *Saint Louis University Law Journal* 44.4 (2000): 1443–63 and "Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M," *Harvard Journal of Law and Gender* 30.1 (2007): 67–97; Ellen Faulkner, "The Case of 'Baby M,'" *Canadian Journal of Women and the Law* 3.1 (1989): 239–45; Sonia Jaffe Robbins, "When Is a Mother Not a Mother? The Baby M Case," *Women and Language* 13.1 (1990): 41–46. The following articles from the *New York Times* were consulted: Elizabeth Kolbert, "A Dispute on Baby M," October 6, 1986; Robert Hanley, "Wife in Baby M Dispute Recalls Tearful Appeal," January 7, 1987; "Reporter's Notebook: Grief over Baby M," January 12, 1987; "Father of Baby M Thought Mother Had Been Screened," January 14, 1987; "Bonding Is Described at Baby M Hearing," February 28, 1987; "Testimony Ends at Baby M Hearing," March 10, 1987; "Father of Baby M Granted Custody; Contract Upheld; "Surrogacy Is Legal," April 1, 1987; "Court Restores Baby M Visits by Whitehead," April 11, 1987; "Baby M's Mother Wins Broad Visiting Rights," April 7, 1988; Iver Peterson, "Baby M, Ethics and the Law," January 18, 1987, "Baby M and Controversy over Fertility," January 31, 1987, and "Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists," February 24, 1987; James Barron, "Views on Surrogacy Harden after Baby M Ruling," April 2, 1987; "Baby M: Groping for Right and Law," April 2, 1987; E. R. Shipp, "Parental Rights Law: New Jersey Supreme Court Will Examine If Standard Rules Affect Baby M Case," April 8, 1987.

37 Whitehead nursed the baby until the Sterns took custody. Whitehead appealed the court's ruling in 1988, suing baby broker Noel Keane for failure to properly screen her. She won an out-of-court settlement and gained limited visitation rights as the baby's "natural" mother. As I discuss later, when surrogacy becomes predominantly gestational, the surrogate's "natural" motherhood is taken off the table. See "Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, Is Dead," *New York Times*, January 28, 1997.

38 As expressed in the language of the court: "We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it conflicts with the law and public policy of this state. While we recognize the depth of yearning of infertile couples to have their own children, we find payment of money to a 'surrogate' mother illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to women." See C. J. Wilentz, "The Matter of Baby 'M,'" New Jersey Supreme Court, N.J., 537, *Atlantic Reporter*, 1234 (1988), quoted in Kelly Oliver, "Marxism and Surrogacy," *Hypatia* 4.3 (1989): 95.

39 The terminology used to refer to participants in surrogacy is diverse and contested. As Daisy Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction: Race, Kinship and Commercial*

Surrogacy in India (New York: New York University Press, 2016) explains, choice of terminology "reflects a particular stance on assisted reproduction. The terms are value laden and vary in accordance with one's social position, culture and discipline. Many . . . indicate bias either in favor of or opposed to commercial surrogacy" (14–15). Here I elect terminology that highlights rather than disavows the exchange relationship at the heart of surrogacy and the surrogate's relegation to the status of nonmother. For similar reasons, though *birth mother* and *gestational mother* are often used in discussions of surrogacy, I use *surrogate*, *surrogate laborer*, or *reproductive laborer*, save when I wish to express a surrogate's express desire to be recognized as a mother.

40 Pollitt, "The Strange Case of Baby M," 682.

41 Pollitt, "The Strange Case of Baby M," 682.

42 Pollitt reports that Whitehead was condemned thus by Sorkow. As Sorkow additionally noted, Whitehead was a high school dropout, her husband a garbage collector. He sought the "best interests" of the child and this required placement of Baby M with the educated and resource-rich biochemist William Stern and his wife.

43 Stone, "Neoslavery," 67; hereafter cited parenthetically.

44 Pollitt, "The Strange Case of Baby M," 684. Pollitt's piece, published prior to the verdict, set the terms of debate for many feminist commentators.

45 Genea Corea, *The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 276. Although Corea discusses "breeder women" as a class, she never discusses slavery.

46 Noel Keane, who brokered the contract, received $15,000 for his services. This was a fraction of the $300,000 he earned in surrogate contract fees the year Baby M was born. Keane would go on to negotiate six hundred surrogacy contracts worldwide before his death in 1997. His firm, the Infertility Center of America, was taken over by his son, also a lawyer specializing in surrogacy. See "Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Case Is Dead."

47 For instance, Kelly Oliver asserts that "most people do not perform their services 24 hours a day *unless they are slaves*. And most people only sell their labor, labor performed by the body, but perhaps distinguishable from it. 'Surrogates' on the other hand, perform their services 24 hours a day and sell the body itself" ("Marxism and Surrogacy," 97–98). For Oliver, surrogates and slaves are "estranged laborers" (as opposed to "alienated laborers"). Their social being is denied through visceral exploitation that transforms the body into "the machinery of production over which the contractor has ultimate control" (106). As a beast of burden, the surrogate's putative freedom becomes "an illusion" (108). Also see Mariarosa Dalla Costa, "Capitalism and Reproduction," *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 7.4 (1996): 111–20, especially 111–12. Like other Marxist feminists, Oliver and Dalla Costa treat slavery as an analogue rather than as a historical instantiation of racial capitalism.

48 France Winddance Twine observes, "With few notable exceptions US public policy debates about the ethics of commercial surrogacy have been framed in

ways that avoid the obvious histories of commodification of slave children and the contemporary commodification of white children." She notes that only black feminist legal scholars have taken up slavery as precedent for surrogacy. See Twine, *Outsourcing the Womb: Race, Class, and Gestational Surrogacy in a Global Market* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8, 16. Patricia J. Williams was among the first to treat the Baby M case in relationship to slavery, in "On Being the Object of Property," *Signs* 14.1 (1988): 5–24, reprinted in *The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 216–38, and the title essay in *The Rooster's Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

49 See Anita Allen, "Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life," *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy*, 13.1 (1990): 140n9; hereafter cited parenthetically.

50 Angela Davis excoriates Stowe's sentimental figuration of Eliza, pointing out that Eliza's flight was portrayed as a maternal act of courage but never as an attack on slavery. In contrast to Eliza, Davis argues, slave women "were driven to defend their children by their passionate abhorrence of slavery. The source of their strength was not some mystical power attached to motherhood, but rather their concrete experiences as slaves." See *Women, Race, and Class* (New York: Vintage, 1981), 29. I return to a discussion of Davis and slave women's insurgency in chapter 2.

51 See Allen, "Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life," and "The Black Surrogate Mother," *Harvard Blackletter Journal* 8 (1991): 17–31. Allen discusses Polly in both articles.

52 Allen does not use the Latin term but is clearly discussing *partus sequitur ventrem*, the doctrine codified in Virginia Law in 1662. See Jennifer Morgan, "*Partus Sequitur Ventrem*: Law, Race and Reproduction in Colonial Slavery," *Small Axe* 55 22.1 (March 2018): 1–17, and "'The Breedings Shall Goe with Their Mothers': Gender and Evolving Practices of Slaveownership in the English American Colonies," in *Laboring Women*, 69–106.

53 Dorothy Roberts, "Reproduction in Bondage" and "Race and the New Reproduction," in *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* (New York: Pantheon, 1997), 22–55, 246–93; hereafter cited parenthetically. Charlotte Rutherford, "Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women," *Yale Journal of Law and Feminism* 4 (1992): 255–90; Deborah R. Grayson, "Mediating Intimacy: Black Surrogate Mothers and the Law," *Critical Inquiry* 24.2 (1998): 525–46; April L. Cherry, "Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood," *Texas Journal of Women and the Law* 10.2 (2001): 83–128.

54 Patricia J. Williams presaged Roberts's arguments when she linked her great grandmother's treatment as a breeder to that of a contemporary surrogate: "On Being the Object of Property," 15.

55 The practice was previously documented by Angela Davis in "Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of Slaves," *Black Scholar* 3.4 (1971): 2–15, and *Women, Race, and Class*, 9.

56 As Cheryl J. Sanders puts it in "Surrogate Motherhood and Reproductive Technologies: An African American Perspective," *Creighton Law Review* 25.5 (1992): 1709, in the "current discussion of surrogate motherhood" there is little or no acknowledgment of "the *actual* abuses and exploitation that took place in this country when slave mothers and children alike were regarded as someone else's property." The suggestion "is made that the modern surrogate arrangement is a 'rented womb,'" but this glosses over "the fact that as recently as four generations ago, white Americans 'owned' the entire bodies of African American women of childbearing age, and routinely exploited them for sexual pleasure, physical labor, procreative productivity, and profit."

57 Crispina Calvert's prior hysterectomy left her unable to gestate a child but able to produce fertile eggs.

58 See Grayson, "Mediating Intimacy"; Robyn Wiegman, "Intimate Publics: Race, Property, and Personhood," *American Literature* 74.4 (2002): 859–85; Valerie Hartouni, "Breached Birth: Reflections on Race, Gender, and Reproductive Discourse in the 1980s," *Configurations* 2.1 (1994): 73–88; Mark Rose, "Mothers and Authors: *Johnson v. Calvert* and the New Children of Our Imaginations," *Critical Inquiry* 22.4 (1996): 613–33; Ruth McElroy, "Whose Body, Whose Nation? Surrogate Motherhood and Its Representation," *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 5.3 (2002): 325–42; Heather Dillaway, "Mothers for Others: A Race, Class, and Gender Analysis of Surrogacy," *International Journal of Sociology of the Family* 34.2 (2008): 301–26; Lisa C. Ikemoto, "Destabilizing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation," *University of San Francisco Law Review* 28.3 (1994): 633–645; Rutherford, "Reproductive Freedom and African American Women"; Cherry, "Nurturing in the Service of White Culture"; Allen, "The Black Surrogate Mother." In the popular press see Seth Mydans, "Science and the Courts Take a New Look at Motherhood," *New York Times*, November 4, 1990; "Surrogate Denied Custody of Child: Judge in California Rules for Genetic Parents and Bars Two-Mother Situation," *New York Times*, October 23, 1990; "Parental Rights Denied to a Surrogate Mother," *New York Times*, May 22, 1993; "Psychiatrist Testifies in Surrogate Birth Case," *New York Times*, October 11, 1990; "Surrogate Is Denied Custody," *New York Times*, September 22, 1990; "Surrogate Mother Sues for Baby's Custody," *New York Times*, August 15, 1990; Bruce L. Wilder, "Surrogate Exploitation," *New York Times*, November 22, 1990; Katha Pollitt, "When Is a Mother Not a Mother?," *The Nation*, December 31, 1990, 1, 840, 842–5, 846; Martin Kasindorf, "And Baby Makes Four: *Johnson vs. Calvert* Illustrates Just About Everything That Can Go Wrong in Surrogate Births," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, January 20, 1991, 10–34; Scott Armstrong, "California Surrogacy Case Raises New Questions about Parenthood: Mother Seeks Custody, but She Has No Genetic Link to Child," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 25, 1990; Dan Chu, "A Judge Ends a Wrenching Surrogacy Dispute, Ruling That Three Parents for One Baby Is One Mom Too Many," *People*, November 5, 1990; Susan Tifft, "It's All in the (Parental) Genes," *Time*, November 5, 1990, 77; Jeremy Rifkin and Andrew Kimbrell, "Put a Stop to Surrogate Parenting Now," *USA Today*, August 20, 1990.

59 Although I regard genetic reasoning and protection of racial status property by the lower court as decisive, it should be noted that some argue the final ruling was also based on the intent of the parties involved.

60 On Aristotelian ideas about the female body and their misapprehension by those inattentive to the aleatory force of becoming, see Emanuela Bianchi, *The Feminist Symptom: Aleatory Matter in the Aristotelian Cosmos* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014); Irina Aristarkhova, *Hospitality of the Matrix: Philosophy, Biomedicine, and Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). On the biological contributions made by Johnson's maternal body see Laura Harrison, *Brown Bodies, White Babies: The Politics of Cross-Racial Surrogacy* (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 104–28.

61 Slave women nursed and raised slave children for masters and fostered black and white children on plantations and in the master's home. On the historical continuation of the racial division of reproductive labor see Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor," *Signs* 18.1 (1992): 1–43. On racially "stratified reproduction" in the context of care work, domestic labor, and affective labor see Shellee Colen, "'Like a Mother to Them': Stratified Reproduction and West Indian Childcare Workers and Employers in New York," in *Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction*, ed. Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 78–102; Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Eileen Boris and Elisabeth Prügl, eds., *Homeworkers in Global Perspective: Invisible No More* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Eileen Boris and Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, eds., *Intimate Labors: Cultures, Technologies, and the Politics of Care* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Neferti X. M. Tadiar, *Things Fall Away: Philippine Historical Experience and the Makings of Globalization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). Today, as in the nineteenth century, impoverished women produce breast milk for sale rather than for consumption by their own children. See Carolina Buia, "The Booming Market for Breast Milk," *Newsweek*, May 23, 2015. Buia depicts milk vendors as black women.

62 The dissenting judge in the case pointed out the problem: "This case is what critics who oppose surrogacy have been warning legislators [about]. . . . What we are going to see is a wealthy couple like the Calverts preying on the poor, which generally translates into preying on blacks. I hope this is recognized as a civil rights issue and a classic case of exploitation and a slave contract." Justice Kennard quoted in Rutherford, "Reproductive Freedoms," 272.

63 Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17.2 (1987): 68. On "disinheritance" as an apt description of intergenerational transmission in slavery, see Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights*, 216–17. Notably scholars have focused on the stereotypes of black motherhood on which Parslow's ruling draws, arguing that Johnson's maternity was perceived through the lens of discourses consolidated in the prior decade and composed

of several intertwined strands: ideas about so-called black welfare queens; ideas about supposedly pathological black families; and related ideas about supposedly emasculating mothers abandoned by black men. As Grayson argues in "Mediating Intimacy," 530, Johnson's black body signified on preexisting meanings and ideas of black mothers as breeders whose (re)productive role in augmenting the master's property was necessarily severed from the cultural and social functions of motherhood. Also see Hartouni, "Breached Birth" and "Containing Women: Reproductive Discourse in the 1980s," in *Technoculture*, ed. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 27–58; Ikemoto, "Destabilizing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation"; Harrison, *Brown Bodies, White Babies*, 106–18. Though most critics note that Johnson's visible blackness informed the case's outcome, they argue that it was determined by the court's insistence on maintenance of the heteronormative family and thus its refusal of a two-mother legal solution. On the discourses in question, see Ana Teresa Ortiz and Laura Briggs, "The Culture of Poverty, Crack Babies, and Welfare Cheats: The Making of the 'Healthy White Baby Crisis,'" *Social Text* 21.3 (2003): 39–57; Wahneema Lubiano, "Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means," in *Race-ing Justice, En-Gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Pantheon, 1992), 323–63.

64 Hartouni, "Breached Birth," 83.

65 The letter is cited in Kasindorf, "And Baby Makes Four" and Grayson, "Mediating Intimacy."

66 Johnson's letter to Geraldo recalls Frederick Douglass's "What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?," in *The Oxford Frederick Douglass Reader*, ed. William A. Andrews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 108–30. Like Douglass, Johnson questioned rather than affirmed the promise of freedom by revealing enshrined legal hypocrisy.

67 Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*.

68 Here I retool a phrase coined by Carey McWilliams in his influential 1943 treatise, *Brothers under the Skin: African Americans and Other Minorities* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943).

69 This is Balibar's term for the ethnicization of difference that takes place in racial nationalist contexts in which nationalism is predicated on racial exclusion or inclusion. See Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (New York: Verso, 1999), 60.

70 See Kasindorf, "And Baby Makes Four."

71 Twine, *Outsourcing the Womb*, 10. The cult of "desperateness" is an adjunct of "the cult of genetic entitlement," in that the infertile imagine that the "need" for a genetically related child justifies recourse to ARTs. See Sarah Franklin, "Deconstructing 'Desperateness': The Social Construction of Infertility in Popular Representations of New Reproductive Technologies," in *The New Reproductive Technologies*, ed. Maureen McNeil, Ian Varcoe, and Steven Yearley (London: Macmillan, 1990), 220–29.

72 Here I suggest that Crispina Calvert's genetic contribution was "whitened" and subsumed by her husband's such that her "Filipina genes" became part of a patriarchal property claim made by the Calverts as a legally recognized marital unit. Though it is beyond the scope of my argument to expand the idea fully, such paternally predicated whiteness renders inaccessible the long history of Filipina domestic labor and care work that might otherwise connect Crispina Calvert and Anna Johnson. See Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, *The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization* (New York: New York University Press, 2008), and *Servants of Globalization.* For an alternate reading that stresses the importance of the Calverts as a biracial couple creating mixed-race progeny see Wiegman, "Intimate Publics."

73 Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106.8 (1994): 1709–91. Also see Lisa Cacho, *Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected* (New York: New York University Press, 2012).

74 Elsewhere I argue that although there is scientific consensus that race is a statistically insignificant genetic variation, race persists as the lens and logic through which meaning is made in a genomic age in which use of reproductive technology is informed by mistaken ideas about the visibility of "genetic" blackness. See Weinbaum, "Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work of Art in a Biotechnological Age," *Literature and Medicine* 26.1 (2007): 207–39. Also see Michael Omi, "'Slippin' into Darkness': The (Re)Biologization of Race," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13.3 (2010): 343–58; Howard Winant, "Race and Racism: Towards a Global Future," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29.5 (2006): 986–1003; Dorothy Roberts, *Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-create Race in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: New Press, 2011); Alondra Nelson, *The Social Life of* DNA*: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation after the Genome* (Boston: Beacon, 2016). In a fascinating twist, Johnson's attorney sought to use the Indian Child Welfare Law to prevent the Calverts from gaining custody, arguing that the baby could not be adopted by them because it was born to an Indian woman. Tribal officials who were brought in as experts undercut this argument, arguing that the logic of blood quantum translates into the language of genetics and trumps maternal connection to the child. Like the court, these experts did not view gestation or parturition as formative. See Harrison, *Brown Bodies, White Babies*, 125.

75 Throughout this section I have elected to use the compound terminology *outsourced or transnational surrogacy* to indicate that when reproductive labor is outsourced, transnational reproduction is taking place. In general, when ethnographers discuss outsourcing, they are referring to use of surrogates in geographic locations at a distance from the consumers of surrogacy, although the term is on some level redundant when we recall that all surrogacy technically involves the outsourcing of reproductive labor. When ethnographers discuss transnational reproduction, they are referring to arrangements in which multiple parties are involved, as for instance when an egg is supplied by a white woman in Johannesburg and gestated by an Indian woman in Anand for a gay couple in California. In almost all outsourced surrogacy arrangements in which the consumer is unable to supply

an oocyte, eggs from vendors are used. These vendors may be flown to the gestational surrogate for egg retrieval, fertilization, and implantation since unfertilized eggs cannot be frozen and transported. Alternatively vendor eggs may be fertilized for subsequent transport to a second, distant location where the surrogate resides. Though discussion of the reproductive labor involved in oocyte vending is beyond the scope of this book, it is worth noting that the most lucrative markets involve eggs collected from college-educated white women in the US, white women from Eastern and Southern Europe, white South African women, and Asian women. Prices are driven upward by the vendor's "possession" of supposedly heritable cultural capital, including educational achievement, musical talent, athleticism, and so forth. Prices are crudely determined by "possession" of light skin, blond hair, and blue eyes—that is, by supposedly heritable qualities that consumers caught up in the ideology of genetic infallibility and the desirability of lightness (mistakenly) imagine will find phenotypic expression in the child that is (re)produced from "light" or "white" eggs. Ironically consumers who prefer "black" eggs find them difficult to procure and especially costly. See Cooper and Waldby, *Clinical Labor*, 62–83; Donna Dickenson, *Body Shopping*, 63–89; Twine, *Outsourcing the Womb*, 30–36; Sven Bergmann, "Fertility Tourism: Circumventive Routes That Enable Access to Reproductive Technologies and Substances," *Signs* 36.2 (2011): 280–89; Lisa C. Ikemoto, "Eggs as Capital: Human Egg Procurement in the Fertility Industry and the Stem Cell Research Enterprise," *Signs* 34.4 (2009): 763–81; Rene Almeling, *Sex Cells: The Medical Market for Eggs and Sperm* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction*, 95–122; Harrison, *Brown Bodies, White Babies*, 129–164.

76 Several scholars have challenged the Eurocentrism of Foucault's and Agamben's accounts. Achille Mbembe and Jared Sexton call for reconsideration of the concentration camp as what Agamben refers to as "the *nomos* of the modern." Alexander Weheliye critiques Foucault's Eurocentric conceptualization of racism (influentially developed in *Society Must Be Defended*). I am sympathetic to these interventions and inspired by Weheliye's suggestion that we need not replace the camp with the colony or plantation but ought to instead focus on the relationships among the various forms of dehumanization that together shape the category of "the human." See Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* (1978), trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), and *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2003); Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15.1 (2003): 11–40; Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," *Social Text* 28.2 (2010): 31–56; Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).

For-profit clinics exist in the United States, India, Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, Mexico, Guatemala, Russia, and Belarus. Surrogacy is widely practiced and

subsidized by the state in Israel. However, single Israeli men and male couples must seek surrogacy arrangements abroad because the state bans all male participation in surrogacy. See Elly Teman, *Birthing a Mother: The Surrogate Body and the Pregnant Self* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Susan Martha Kahn, *Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

77 Heléna Ragoné first observed the racial dynamics heralded by the shift to gestational surrogacy in the US. She explained, "Racial difference is [now viewed as] . . . a positive factor, one that actually facilitates the process of separation between surrogate and child." "Of Likeness and Difference: How Race Is Being Transfigured by Gestational Surrogacy," in *Ideologies and Technologies of Motherhood: Race, Class, Sexuality, and Nationalism*, ed. Heléna Ragoné and France Winddance Twine (New York: Routledge, 2000), 66. Subsequent scholarship confirms these trends globally. See Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction*; Harrison, *Brown Bodies, White Babies*.

78 Grayson expressed a shared worry: "Gestational surrogacy invites the singling out of black women for exploitation not only because a disproportionate number of black women are poor and might possibly turn to leasing their wombs as a means of income, but also because it is incorrectly assumed that black women's skin color can be read as a visual sign of their lack of genetic relation to the children they would bear for the white couples who seek to hire them" ("Mediating Intimacy," 540). Grayson's concerns were presaged by Gena Corea, who speculated about "reproductive brothels" selling wombs alongside vaginas, mouths, and anuses (*The Mother Machine*, 275–76), and Barbara Katz Rothman, who speculated about "baby farms" full of young "Third World women" in *Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in Patriarchal Society* (New York: Norton, 1989), 237, and "Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life," in *Embryos, Ethics and Women's Rights: Exploring the New Reproductive Technologies*, ed. Elaine Hoffman Baruch, Amadeo F. D'Adamo, and Joni Seager (New York: Harrington Park, 1988), 95–100.

79 It is telling that poor women in the Global South and women of color in the US have the highest rates of infertility and are the least likely to access reproductive technology and assistance. In general, infertility is a function of exposure to environmental pollutants, malnutrition, and lack of access to adequate health care, including prenatal and obstetrical care. In the United States (which has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the developed world) and in India (where one quarter of all annual maternal deaths occur worldwide) women are exposed to risk simply by engaging in gestation and childbirth without access to health care and other necessities such as clean water. Whereas two thirds of Indian women receive little or no prenatal or postnatal care and deliver their babies at home, Indian surrogates receive medical care, nutrition, and rest throughout the pregnancies that they undertake on behalf of consumers. See "Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www

.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pmss.html; "Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2015: Estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and the United Nations Population Division" (Geneva: WHO Document Production, 2015); Alison Bailey, "Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy," *Hypatia* 26.4 (2011): 715–41.

80 See Amrita Pande, "'It May Be Her Eggs but It's My Blood': Surrogates and Everyday Forms of Kinship in India," *Qualitative Sociology* 32.4 (2009): 379–97; "Not an 'Angel,' Not a 'Whore': Surrogates as 'Dirty' Workers in India," *Indian Journal of Gender Studies* 16.2 (2009): 141–73; "Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect Mother Worker," *Signs* 35.4 (2010): 969–92; "'At Least I Am Not Sleeping with Anyone': Resisting the Stigma of Commercial Surrogacy in India," *Feminist Studies* 36.2 (2010): 292–312; and *Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Kalindi Vora, "Indian Transnational Surrogacy and the Commodification of Vital Energy," *Subjectivity* 28.1 (2009): 266–78, and *Life Support*; Daisy Deomampo, "Transnational Surrogacy in India: Interrogating Power and Women's Agency," *Frontiers* 34.3 (2013): 167–88, and *Transnational Reproduction*; Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta, "Parenthood in the Era of Reproductive Outsourcing and Global Assemblages," AJWS 18.1 (2012): 7–29; Natalie Fixmer-Oraiz, "Speaking of Solidarity: Transnational Gestation Surrogacy and the Rhetorics of Reproductive (In)Justice," *Frontiers* 34.3 (2013): 126–63; Sharmila Rudrappa, *Discounted Life: The Price of Global Surrogacy in India* (New York: New York University Press, 2015); Sayantani DasGupta and Shamita Das Dasgupta, eds., *Globalization and Transnational Surrogacy in India: Outsourcing Life* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014). Also see Amana Fontanella-Khan, "India, the Rent-a-Womb Capital of the World," *Slate*, August 23, 2010; Abigail Haworth, "Surrogate Mothers: Womb for Rent," *Marie Claire*, July 29, 2007; Tamara Audi and Arlene Chang, "Assembling the Global Baby," *Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2010; Judith Warner, "Outsourced Wombs," *New York Times*, January 3, 2008.

81 Though costs of surrogacy in India fluctuate based on a clinic's reputation and a surrogate's prior success rate, an arrangement with an Indian surrogate costs roughly one-third of a comparable arrangement with an American surrogate residing in the US. Pande, *Wombs in Labor*, 12; Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 5.

82 Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 124–125; Vora, *Life Support*, 118; Fixmer-Oraiz, "Speaking of Solidarity," 131; Bailey, "Reconceiving Surrogacy," 718. When a surrogate is left with postpartum complications, she is often responsible for her own medical care. If she miscarries, she must forego the bulk of her payment, which is predicated on successful delivery.

83 Surrogacy is banned in Australia, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and in some US states. There are partial bans in Brazil, Israel, and the UK. There exists regulation in India, Belgium, Finland, and Greece. See Twine, *Outsourcing the Womb*, chapter 1. Indian commercial surrogacy was legalized in 2002. Government guidelines meant to streamline business practices were announced in 2008 and updated in 2010 and

2013, at which time surrogacy arrangements involving gay couples and single men were banned. Rudrappa estimates that in 2012, approximately one third of the ten thousand clients who visited India were single or gay. See Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 39–40; Pande, *Wombs in Labor*, 13–14. On November 4, 2015, India imposed a ban on US citizenship for children born to Indian surrogates, effectively shutting down a large part of the market: see "Surrogacy, ART, and IVF," U.S. Embassy and Consulates in India, accessed January 30, 2017, https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/birth/surrogacy-art-and-ivf/?_ga=1.252220873.1173353544.1482467571. The Israeli state subsidizes surrogacy for heterosexual couples and all women (Teman, *Birthing a Mother*). Since 2013 gay couples and individuals from Europe, the UK, and North America have circumvented Indian regulations by paying Indian surrogates to migrate to neighboring countries such as Nepal for the duration of their pregnancies. See Jey Saung, "Reproducing the Nation-State: Surrogate 'Gaybies,' Queer Family, and Biopolitics of Colonialism," presented at the Biopower and Biopolitics Graduate Seminar, Seattle, Washington, March 3, 2016. On factors that lead consumers to travel abroad see Gupta, "Parenthood in the Era of Reproductive Outsourcing"; Bergmann, "Fertility Tourism." Surrogacy is unevenly regulated in the United States. Most states have no restrictions; some ban commercial surrogacy; others ban all forms of payment but not the practice of surrogacy. The state of California is entirely unregulated. Many predict that outsourcing or transnational surrogacy is fast becoming dominant. See Hochschild, *The Outsourced Self*, 101.

84 Pande treats surrogates as "agents" who make "constrained choices" to lessen hardships. She rejects Eurocentric portrayals that do not incorporate discussion of surrogacy as a chosen survival strategy. Similarly, though she describes surrogacy as "undoubtedly exploitative," Rudrappa casts surrogates as "active participants in emergent intimate industries, shaping a new ethics of caring and giving a whole new meaning to the social and economic value of babies and motherhood" (*Discounted Life*, 8, 56, 65, 86–98). Fixmer-Oraiz examines obfuscating media rhetoric in "Speaking of Solidarity." Deomampo analyzes how foreign consumers of surrogacy buy into the "rescue narrative" by believing that they are saving poor women from dire circumstances by employing them (*Transnational Reproduction*, 59–94). Vora finds that clinics overplay the benefit to surrogates of payment and advance a discourse of "rehabilitation through surrogacy" that relieves consumers of anxiety about the stark economic inequalities at the heart of the exchange (*Life Support*, 117–19, 121).

85 Pande, "'At Least I'm Not Sleeping with Anyone,'" 302.

86 Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 72.

87 Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 60.

88 Pande, "Commercial Surrogacy in India," 12.

89 Surrogacy clinics generally prohibit unmediated interactions between surrogates and consumers; many refuse to facilitate contact after delivery. See Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 135, 137.

90 Rudrappa, *Discounted Life*, 5.

91 When Indians living abroad or wealthy Indian citizens consume surrogacy in India, the exchange is shaped by religion, caste, and race. As Vora argues, the "vital energy" that is transferred from surrogate to consumer follows circuits of exchange set in place by colonialism, by India's history of bonded labor, and by culturally specific reproductive practices that have for centuries compelled household servants and extended family to reproduce children who will be parented by those able and willing to provide for them (personal communication and *Life Support*, 25–42, 103–40). Vora stands strongly on one side of the ongoing debate about the relevance of the history of slavery and bonded labor in South Asia to the practice of surrogacy. Also see Indrani Chatterjee, *Gender, Slavery, and Law in Colonial India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999); Indrani Chatterjee and Richard M. Eaton, eds., *Slavery and South Asian History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

92 Deomampo's discussion of the "racial reproductive imaginaries" that inform the interactions between consumers of outsourced surrogacy in India and the surrogates whose labor they consume moved me to speculate thus. She discusses consumers' production of the surrogate as a "racialized Other"—a term that, she argues, encompasses the consumer's Orientalization of the Asian surrogate. Here I suggest it might also include the consumer's imposition of ideas about women of color as "natural" breeders, ideas that emerge from Atlantic slavery. See Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction*, especially chapter 2. Relatedly Kalindi Vora observes that foreign consumers of surrogacy bring with them to India ideologies and expectations about reproduction that are often foreign to Indian women. See "Re-imagining Reproduction: Unsettling Metaphors in the History of Imperial Science and Commercial Surrogacy in India," *Somatechnics* 5.1 (2015): 88–103, especially 90.

93 Deomampo, *Transnational Reproduction*, and Vora, *Life Support*, most robustly take up the racializing work of the colonial episteme, though neither uses this terminology.

94 Laura Harrison's *Brown Bodies, White Babies* is the first study to bring together discussions of the racial politics of outsourced surrogacy in India and cross-racial surrogacy in the US. Harrison focuses on the perceptible (ascribed and self-identified) racial differences among the individuals involved in surrogacy arrangements and explores how these shape surrogacy arrangements. She convincingly demonstrates that cross-racial surrogacy arrangements shore up the interests of the dominant racial group as they are predominantly used to create wealthy, white, heterosexual families that reside in the Global North.

95 See Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 3.

2. Black Feminism as a Philosophy of History

1 Mark Reinhardt, "Introduction: An Extraordinary Case?," in *Who Speaks for Margaret Garner? The True Story That Inspired Toni Morrison's* Beloved (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 5; hereafter cited parenthetically. Garner was given voice only through this oft-repeated account of her intent. As Reinhardt notes, because slaves could not provide testimony Garner never took the stand.

2 Darlene Clark Hine, "Foreword: Gendered Resistance Now," in *Gendered Resistance: Women, Slavery, and the Legacy of Margaret Garner*, ed. Mary E. Frederickson and Delores M. Walters (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013), x; hereafter cited parenthetically.

3 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940), in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 255; hereafter cited parenthetically.

4 Though two charges were brought, one for destruction of property and one for violation of the Fugitive Slave Act, Garner was tried only in relation to the latter despite abolitionists' attempts to expose the Slave Act's hypocrisy by having her instead tried for murder. As Stephen Best observes, supporters of slavery regarded fugitives as criminals involved in theft of self. *The Fugitive's Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 81–82.

5 The Southern press paid Garner scant attention; Reinhardt interprets this as political censorship (*Who Speaks for Margaret Garner?*, 30–31).

6 Douglass cited in Reinhardt, *Who Speaks for Margaret Garner?*, 32.

7 Douglass cited in Reinhardt, *Who Speaks for Margaret Garner?*, 41.

8 Stone cited in Reinhardt, *Who Speaks for Margaret Garner?*, 40–41. Recent scholars who follow Stone's lead observe that Garner's daughter was light skinned and thus especially vulnerable to sexual abuse. Others claim Garner's actions were compelled by the fact that her children were fathered by her master. See Delores M. Walters, "Introduction: Re(dis)covering and Recreating the Cultural Milieu of Margaret Garner," in Frederickson and Walters, *Gendered Resistance*, 8–13; Steven Weisenburger, *Modern Medea: A Family Story of Slavery and Child-Murder from the Old South* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 47, 75–76.

9 In a survey of literary representations of the 1850s Sarah N. Roth argues that slave infanticide was treated as suicide, as violence against the mother rather than infant. Slave mothers who committed infanticide were thus viewed as self-sacrificing heroines. Roth places Garner's story alongside novels by Stowe, Jollife (Garner's lawyer), and M'Keehan. "'The Blade Was in My Own Breast': Slave Infanticide in 1850s Fiction," *American Nineteenth Century History* 8.2 (2007): 169–85.

10 Garner's second daughter, Cilla, was drowned when the steamboat on which the Garners were traveling to Mississippi capsized. The possibility that Cilla's drowning was also an act of infanticide lends credence to Garner's assertion that she was committed to execution of her initial plan even after her capture. Walters, "Introduction," 5.

11 M. A. Harris, Bill Cosby, and Toni Morrison, eds., *The Black Book* (New York: Random House, 1974), a compilation of news clippings and archival materials that Morrison shepherded through publication. Morrison claims that the account of Garner included therein inspired *Beloved*. See Cheryl A. Wall, "Toni Morrison, Editor and Teacher," in *The Cambridge Companion to Toni Morrison*, ed. Justine Tally (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143–46.

12 *Beloved* is routinely assigned in high school and college; there is a popular cinematic adaptation starring Oprah Winfrey, an opera based on Garner's life that features a libretto by Morrison, and a daunting amount of scholarship on the novel, including nearly nine hundred entries in the International Modern Language Association database.

13 See Joy James, "Profeminism and Gender Elites: W. E. B. Du Bois, Anna Julia Cooper, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett," 69–95, and Hazel Carby, "The Souls of Black Men," 234–68, collected in *Next to the Color Line: Gender, Sexuality, and W. E. B. Du Bois*, ed. Susan Gillman and Alys Eve Weinbaum (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

14 Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 185–240; W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880* (1935; New York: Free Press, 1998); hereafter both cited parenthetically.

15 See Cedric Robinson, "A Critique of W. E. B. Du Bois' *Black Reconstruction*," *Black Scholar* 8.7 (1977): 44–50, and *Black Marxism*, 199–203.

16 In this way, Robinson continues, Du Bois positions slavery as a subsystem of world capitalism, and the Civil War (and the crushing of the revolutionary impulses that animated it) as world historical events that set the stage for the violent modernity we have inherited—a modernity grounded in a racialized global division of labor. Also see Moon-Ho Jung, "*Black Reconstruction* and Empire," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 112.3 (2013): 465–71.

17 Susan Gillman and Alys Eve Weinbaum, "Introduction: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Politics of Juxtaposition," in Gillman and Weinbaum, *Next to the Color Line*, 1–34; Alys Eve Weinbaum, "The Sexual Politics of Black Internationalism: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Reproduction of Racial Globality" in *Wayward Reproductions: Genealogies of Race and Nation in Transatlantic Modern Thought* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 187–226.

18 See chapters by Joy James, Hazel Carby, and Michele Elam and Paul C. Taylor, all collected in Gillman and Weinbaum, *Next to the Color Line*, quote 209. Also see David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919–1963* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), 267.

19 *Black Reconstruction* exhibits a textual form that I elsewhere describe as Du Bois's "politics of juxtaposition." In placing unremarked discussions of gender and sexual exploitation and violence "right next to" discussion of racist and imperialist exploitation and violence, Du Bois demonstrates the need for (but does not offer) an intersectional analysis of racism, sexism, and capitalism. See Gillman

and Weinbaum, "Introduction: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Politics of Juxtaposition," and Weinbaum, "Interracial Romance and Black Internationalism," in Gillman and Weinbaum, *Next to the Color Line*, 1–34 and 96–123.

20 Deborah Gray White explains, "For those fugitive women who left children in slavery, the physical relief which freedom brought was limited compensation for the anguish they suffered." *Ar'n't I A Woman: Female Slaves in the Plantation South* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1985), 71; hereafter cited parenthetically. John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger estimate that roughly 20 percent of runaways were women: *Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 210. As Cheryl Janifer LaRoche observes in "Coerced but Not Subdued: The Gendered Resistance of Women Escaping Slavery," in Franklin and Walters, *Gendered Resistance*, 49–76, feminist historians question reliance on advertisements for fugitives as the basis for such statistics as advertisements were less frequently posted for missing women than missing men. Women's absences were often regarded as temporary "lying out" and thus of less concern. La Roche adds that the tendency to define temporary or unrealized escape attempts as statistically insignificant also diminishes the agency of slave women and their complex negotiations of familial ties.

21 Du Bois observes that the planter's "only effective economic movement . . . could take place against the slave. He was forced, unless willing to take lower profits, continually to beat down the cost of slave labor. . . . One method called for more land and the other for more slaves" (*Black Reconstruction in America*, 41).

22 Du Bois writes, "Child-bearing was a profitable occupation that received every possible encouragement, and there was not only no bar to illegitimacy, but an actual premium put upon it. Indeed, the word was impossible of meaning under the slave system" (*Black Reconstruction in America*, 44).

23 When Du Bois mentions women in the war he undercuts their role by noting that they "accompanied" husbands. Thavolia Glymph clarifies that from the beginning of the conflict black women with children fled to Union lines without men and that enlistment of black men as soldiers in the Union Army left wives especially vulnerable, a situation that led to "swelling" numbers of black women among those Du Bois describes as "swarming." Personal communication. As Stephanie Camp argues, it was the absence of men on plantations that led slave women to rely mainly upon each other when organizing escape. *Closer to Freedom: Enslaved Women and Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 123–27.

24 On the distinction between "fact" and "truth" see Toni Morrison, "The Site of Memory" in *Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures*, ed. Russell Ferguson (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1990), 299–305, and chapter 3 below. Also see Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 44.

25 This global culture has led to a global racial division of labor predicated on exploitation of those whom Du Bois described as "the darker peoples of the world." On the reproductive politics of Du Bois's black internationalist vision see Alys Eve

Weinbaum, "The Sexual Politics of Black Internationalism," in *Wayward Reproductions*, 187–226.

26 In his introduction to *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880*, by W. E. B. Du Bois (New York: Free Press, 1998), xiii, David Levering Lewis designates *Black Reconstruction* "propaganda for his people," observing that Du Bois's book instantiates slaves and former slaves as historical agents. Also see Charles Lemert, "The Race of Time: Du Bois and Reconstruction," *Boundary 2* 27.3 (2000): 215–48.

27 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1977), in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 76–100.

28 The term is Robin Kelley's. See the discussion in my introduction.

29 Angela Y. Davis, "Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of Slaves," *Black Scholar* 3.4 (1971): 2–15; hereafter cited parenthetically. This essay was reprinted in *The Black Scholar* in 1981 as part of the special issue "The Black Woman"; parts of it subsequently appeared as "The Legacy of Slavery: Standards for a New Womanhood," chapter 1 in *Women, Race, and Class* (New York: Vintage, 1983), 3–29; hereafter cited parenthetically. Also see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (1965), in *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy*, ed. Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), 47–94.

30 Davis cites *Black Reconstruction* and *Darkwater*. While she does not use the term *strike*, she picks up Du Bois's terminology when she refers to slaves as "workers."

31 Here and elsewhere Davis singles out E. Franklin Frazier's *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) as the account of the slave family upon which Moynihan based his "tangle of pathology" argument. Davis, "Reflections," 4.

32 I draw on contemporary social scientific scholarship on care work in crafting my understanding of its devaluation, feminization, and racialization. Some social scientists implicitly link women's slave labor and care work. As Rhacel Salazar Parreñas notes, one of the contradictions of the outsourced care work that Filipina migrants perform is that they care for the children of their employers rather than their own. See Eileen Boris and Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, eds., *Intimate Labors: Cultures, Technologies, and the Politics of Care* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), and *The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization* (New York: New York University Press, 2008). Elsewhere Parreñas critiques the conceptual efficacy of "care work," arguing for the term's replacement by "reproductive labor": "The Reproductive Labour of Migrant Workers," *Global Networks* 12.2 (2012): 269–75.

33 Some query Davis's ideas about domestic life in slavery and her emphasis on women's domestic role. Others take issue with attribution of agency to slaves in general. In *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* (New York: Pantheon, 1997), 55, Dorothy Roberts cautions that slave women's work was easily co-opted, as masters "ultimately profited from their care of other slaves."

Walter Johnson cautions against the presumption of slave agency in social historical scholarship produced in the 1970s, noting the need, at that time, to romantically redeem the past: "On Agency," *Journal of Social History* 37.1 (2003): 113–24. Notably, Davis reworks this part of her argument a decade later. In "The Legacy of Slavery" she argues that because women's field labor was the same as that performed by men, slave women were ungendered. Paradoxically gender irreducibly conditioned slave women's subjection to counterinsurgency in the form of rape and "other barbarous mistreatment that could only be inflicted on women" (6). "Expediency governed the slave holders' posture toward female slaves," she further clarifies. "When it was profitable to exploit them as if they were men, they were regarded, in effect, as genderless, but when they could be exploited, punished and repressed in ways suited only for women, they were locked into their exclusively female roles" (6). In this expanded argument, Davis notes her reservations about imagining the domestic space as female, observing that slave men engaged in domestic labor and men and women—working side by side in the field and home—possessed "positive equality" (18). See Davis, "The Legacy of Slavery," 6–8. Such corrective arguments have also provoked criticism.

34 In an against-the-grain reading of Aptheker, Davis locates evidence of black women as members of fugitive and maroon communities, as insurgents within plantation households, and as participants in organized rebellions. As she laments, if reigning (male) historians would only interpret their own evidence "correctly" they would discover that women were "the most daring and committed combatants" and thus "the custodian[s] of a house of resistance" ("Reflections," 8–9).

35 When Davis updates these arguments in 1981 she does so by comparing the rape of slave women to the rape of Vietnamese women by American troops. In both instances rape is a "weapon of domination . . . designed to intimidate and terrorize" ("The Legacy of Slavery," 23–24). Davis has elsewhere written about how personal sexual violation fuels her imagination of slave insurgency against rape and her focus on the gendered linkages between plantations and prisons. See "Rape, Racism, and the Capitalist Setting" (1978), "JoAnne Little: The Dialects of Rape" (1975), "Violence against Women and the Ongoing Challenge to Racism" (1985), all in *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*, ed. Joy James (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 129–60, and "How Gender Structures the Prison System," in *Are Prisons Obsolete?* (New York: Seven Stories, 2003), 60–83.

36 See Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17.2 (1987): 65–81.

37 In the first major black feminist anthology, Erlene Stetson details a course taught on the history of slavery that focused on female slaves prior to the emergence of black feminist histories of slavery. Instructively Stetson begins her course by juxtaposing Davis's essay and Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction*. See Stetson, "Studying Slavery: Some Literary and Pedagogical Considerations on the Black Female Slave," in *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave: Black*

Women's Studies, ed. Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith (Old Westbury, CT: Feminist Press, 1982), 62–84.

38 Hine cites scholarship by field-shapers such as Herbert Aptheker, Eugene Genovese, and Winthrop Jordan. Though she does not cite Davis, the solidarity of their projects is evident. See Darlene C. Hine, "Female Slave Resistance: The Economics of Sex," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 3.2 (1979): 123–27; hereafter cited parenthetically.

39 In the 1990s black feminist scholars began to examine how nineteenth-century slaves and midwives used herbs (tansy, rue, cotton root and seed, pennyroyal, cedar gum) and other techniques to prevent or destroy pregnancy. See Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 47; Sharla M. Fett, *Working Cures: Healing, Health, and Power on Southern Slave Plantations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Marie Jenkins Schwartz, *Birthing a Slave: Motherhood and Medicine in the Antebellum South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Liese M. Perrin, "Resisting Reproduction: Reconsidering Slave Contraception in the Old South," *Journal of American Studies* 35.2 (2001): 255–74. Hine argues that some acts of reproductive resistance (including abortion) ought to be recognized as collaborative, if not collectively organized ("Female Slave Resistance," 125).

40 See White, *Ar'n't I a Woman?*

41 White begins her book with a discussion of the figures of Jezebel and Mammy. Here I suggest that in so doing she reveals not only the stereotypes that informed the master's treatment of slave women but also the gendered ideology to which slave women had to actively respond. See White, "Jezebel and Mammy: The Mythology of Female Slavery" in *Ar'n't I a Woman?*, 27–61.

42 White argues that although "few sources illuminate the interaction of slave women in their private world," they shared knowledge about sex and motherhood cross-generationally, especially when working on "trash gangs" composed of children too young, women too pregnant, and elders too weak to endure the heaviest aspects of field work. White further imagines that because they were forced to rely on each other, slave women would have been closer to each other than to their children or their men—both of whom were likely transient (*Ar'n't I a Woman?*, 23, 119–41).

43 See Mia Bay, *The White Image in the Black Mind: African American Ideas about White People, 1830–1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Barbara Bush, *Slave Women in Caribbean Society, 1650–1838* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Camp, *Closer to Freedom*; Fett, *Working Cures*; Mary Farmer-Kaiser, *Freedwomen and the Freedmen's Bureau: Race, Gender, and Public Policy in the Age of Emancipation* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010); Thavolia Glymph, *Out of the House of Bondage: The Transformation of the Plantation Household* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Tera W. Hunter, *To 'Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women's Lives and Labors after the Civil War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Jacqueline Jones, *American Work: Four Centuries of Black and White Labor* (New York: Norton, 1998), *The Dispossessed: America's Underclasses from the Civil War to the Present* (New

York: Basic Books, 1992), *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), and *A Social History of the Laboring Classes from Colonial Times to the Present* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999); Jennifer L. Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Marietta Morrissey, *Slave Women in the New World: Gender Stratification in the Caribbean* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989); Nell Irvin Painter, *Sojourner Truth: A Life, a Symbol* (New York: Norton, 1996), and *Southern History across the Color Line* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Amy Dru Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

44 Here I follow Robinson's observation that "the general strike had not been planned or centrally organized. Instead, Du Bois termed as a general strike the total impact on the secessionist South of a series of actions circumstantially related to each other. . . . These events were a consequence of contradictions within Southern society rather than a revolutionary vanguard that knit these phenomena into a historical force." Robinson continues, "With respect to class consciousness, Du Bois perceived that official Marxism had reduced this complex phenomenon to a thin political shell consisting of formulae for the dominance of state and/or part of workers' movements. In resisting this tendency, Du Bois sought to reintroduce the dialectic in its Hegelian form as the cunning of reason. No party could substitute itself for the revolutionary instrument of history: a people moved to action by the social and material conditions of its existence" ("A Critique," 48, 50).

45 Saidiya Hartman, "Venus in Two Acts," *Small Axe* 12.2 (2008): 11.

46 Rushdy and Bell invented the generic label. Ashraf H. A. Rushdy, *Neo-Slave Narratives: Studies in the Social Logic of a Literary Form* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Bernard W. Bell, *The Afro-American Novel and Its Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987). Subsequent feminist critics expanded the criterion for generic inclusion. See, for example, Angelyn Mitchell, *The Freedom to Remember: Narrative, Slavery, and Gender in Contemporary Black Women's Fiction* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002); and Jenny Sharpe, *Ghosts of Slavery: A Literary Archeology of Black Women's Lives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). Rushdy takes the feminist critique to heart in *Remembering Generations: Race and Family in Contemporary African American Fiction* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), which can be read as a supplement to and revision of his earlier study.

47 See Robin Marantz Henig, "In Vitro Revelation," *New York Times*, October 5, 2010.

48 Most famously Gena Corea and members of FINNRAGE called for a moratorium on the use of all reproductive technologies and all forms of baby selling. See Corea, *The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985); Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli-Klein, and

Shelley Minden, eds., *Test-Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?* (London: Pandora, 1984).

49 Angela Y. Davis, "Surrogates and Outcast Mothers: Racism and Reproductive Politics in the Nineties," in Joy James, *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*, 212; hereafter cited parenthetically.

50 See my discussion of outsourced and transnational surrogacy in chapter 1.

51 See Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 278. I examine this observation fully in the previous chapter, which takes Roberts's passage as its epigraph.

52 Of the hundreds of critical articles and chapters on *Beloved*, two make the connection between *Beloved* and the Baby M case: Mark R. Patterson, "Surrogacy and Slavery: The Problematics of Consent in Baby M, *Romance of the Republic*, and *Pudd'nhead Wilson*," *American Literary History* 8.3 (1996): 448–70; Elizabeth Tobin, "Imagining the Mother's Text: Toni Morrison's *Beloved* and Contemporary Law," *Harvard Women's Law Journal* 16 (1993): 233–73. I thank Mark Patterson for bringing his essay to my attention. Notably Davis makes a related argument when she recommends that misguided historians of slavery "would do well to read Gayl Jones' *Corregidora*" ("The Legacy of Slavery," 26). Like Morrison, Davis was an early promoter of Jones's work.

3. Violent Insurgency, or "Power to the Ice Pick"

1 See Toni Morrison, foreword to *Beloved* (New York: Vintage, 2004), xvii; hereafter cited parenthetically. *Beloved* was first published in 1987, the year after the Baby M case became a national sensation.

2 See Jennifer Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement* (New York: New York University Press, 2003); Deborah R. Grayson, "'Necessity Was the Midwife of Our Politics': Black Women's Health Activism in the 'Post'–Civil Rights Era (1980–1996)," in *Still Lifting, Still Climbing: African American Women's Contemporary Activism*, ed. Kimberly Springer (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 131–48; Byllye Y. Avery, "Breathing Life into Ourselves: The Evolution of the National Black Women's Health Project," in *The Black Women's Health Book: Speaking for Ourselves*, ed. Evelyn C. White (Seattle: Seal Press, 1990), 4–10; Angela Y. Davis, "Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: The Politics of Black Women's Health," in White, *The Black Women's Health Book*, 18–26; African American Women Are for Reproductive Freedom, "We Remember," in Springer, *Still Lifting*, 38–41; Wahneema Lubiano, "Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means," in *Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Pantheon, 1992), 323–63.

3 Toni Morrison, "The Site of Memory," in *Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures*, ed. Russell Ferguson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 302; hereafter cited parenthetically.

4 Barbara Christian notes that "Morrison has said that she did not inquire further into Garner's life other than to note the event for which this slave woman became famous." She further observes that Morrison frequently stated her interest in writing about events "too horrible" or "too dangerous . . . to recall" by slave narrators. "Beloved, She's Ours," *Narrative* 5.1 (1997): 39, 40.

5 Christian writes, "Morrison allows her character to be 'freed' so that she must confront her own act" ("Beloved, She's Ours," 41).

6 Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 63–69, quotes 63 and 66. Gilroy concludes of his observations about Garner, "It is impossible to explore these important matters here" (68).

7 In "Love and Violence/Maternity and Death: Black Feminism and the Politics of Reading (Un)representability," *Black Women, Gender and Families* 1.1 (2007): 94–124, Sara Clarke Kaplan argues that to retrieve women's violent agency, we must treat infanticide as a form of radical resistance that has a long tradition among female slaves who were engaged in undoing the philosophical foundations of slavery and the liberal humanist project more generally. Also see Carole Boyce Davies, "Mobility, Embodiment and Resistance: Black Women's Writings in the US," in *Black Women, Writing, and Identity: Migrations of the Subject* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 130–51; Amanda Putnam, "Mothering Violence: Ferocious Female Resistance in Toni Morrison's *The Bluest Eye*, *Sula*, *Beloved*, and *A Mercy*," *Black Women, Gender and Families* 5.2 (2011): 25–43.

8 Clarke Kaplan takes up *Beloved* to expose the difficulty that historical scholarship on slavery has had in grappling with enslaved women as instigators of "counter-hegemonic fatal violence" ("Love and Violence," 101). Employing Orlando Patterson's conceptual terminology, she argues that Sethe's "choice of death is . . . an embodied political refusal to live under the conditions of . . . 'Social Death,' the status of social nonentity produced and maintained by the material and discursive structures of slavery" (99).

9 Valerie Smith argues thus in *Toni Morrison: Writing the Moral Imagination* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 61–63. Smith identifies James Berger and Dennis Childs as critics who explore how *Beloved* operates within the discursive contexts of the 1980s and thus in relation to President Ronald Reagan's denials of systemic racism and black incarceration. I add to this list Kathryn Stockton's work on *Beloved* and AIDS and Darieck Scott's work on *Beloved* and black queer studies. James Berger, "Ghosts of Liberalisms: Morrison's *Beloved* and the Moynihan Report," PMLA 111.3 (1996): 408–20; Dennis Childs, "'You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet': *Beloved*, the American Chain Gang, and the Middle Passage Remix," *American Quarterly* 61.2 (2009): 271–97; Kathryn Bond Stockton, "Prophylactics and Brains: *Beloved* in the Cybernetic Age of AIDS," *Studies in the Novel* 28.3 (1996): 435–65; Darieck Scott, *Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), especially 1–32.

10 Mae G. Henderson, "Toni Morrison's *Beloved*: Re-membering the Body as Historical Text," in *Comparative American Identities: Race, Sex, and Nationality in the Modern Text*, ed. Hortense J. Spillers (New York: Routledge, 1991), 82. Henderson points out that "Sethe" recalls the Old Testament figure Seth, the prophetic soothsayer, and that Morrison offers Sethe's actions as prophesy (78).

11 While originally intended as a group escape (like Garner's), Morrison highlights Sethe's individual agency when she escapes Sweet Home alone.

12 W. E. B. Du Bois, "Of the Passing of the First Born," in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), ed. John Edgar Wideman (New York: Vintage, 1990), 155. The theme of maternal sacrifice of the slave child as merciful is reworked in *A Mercy*, which can thus be read as a rejoinder to *Beloved*.

13 Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 108.

14 Dean Franco argues (employing Spillers) that Sethe stakes a property claim when she murders *Beloved*, effectively turning the "discourse [of property] against itself, from the inside out." "What We Talk about When We Talk about *Beloved*," *Modern Fiction Studies* 52.2 (2006): 423.

15 Hortense Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17.2 (1987): 79.

16 The Nephew, who is wedded to Manichaean oppositions and racial science's pseudo-rationality, remains flummoxed. As he tellingly repeats, each time evincing the distortion that characterizes his (il)logic, "What she go and do that for?" (*Beloved*, 177).

17 Linda Krumholz asserts that Baby Suggs "represents an epistemological and discursive philosophy" that shapes Morrison's work. "The Ghosts of Slavery: Historical Recovery in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*," *African American Review* 26.3 (1992): quote 398. I would add that it is because Baby Suggs never judges Sethe that Sethe longs for her as she rememories her mother.

18 Morrison produces an image of insurgent rationality by preserving the image of Garner's decisiveness in Sethe's. In contrast to media portraits of Mary Beth Whitehead and Anna Johnson as pathologically confused, Morrison refuses to represent women forced to surrogate as unduly emotional, unscrupulous, or in any way unfit for motherhood. McDaniels-Wilson suggests that one manifestation of posttraumatic stress in incarcerated women who have been victims of racialized sexual violence—women whom she treats in her clinical practice and whom she compares to Garner—is "dissemblance" (as opposed to "dissociation"), "a façade of calm as a way of coping . . . and resisting stigmatization." See Cathy McDaniels-Wilson, "The Psychological Aftereffects of Racialized Sexual Violence," in *Gendered Resistance: Women, Slavery, and the Legacy of Margaret Garner*, ed. Mary E. Frederickson and Delores M. Walters (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 201.

19 Stuart Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (London: Macmillan, 1978), 181–217.

20 For instance, see Krumholz, "The Ghosts of Slavery," 395: "History-making becomes a healing process for characters, the reader, and the author." Krumholz also suggests that Morrison constructs a parallel such that Sethe's psychological recovery is tantamount to historical and national recovery. This idea has been further developed by trauma studies scholars. See Naomi Morgenstern, "Mother's Milk and Sister's Blood: Trauma and the Neoslave Narrative," *Differences* 8.2 (1996): 101–26; Jean Wyatt, "Giving Body to the Word: The Maternal Symbolic in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*," PMLA 108.3 (1993): 474–88, and "Identification with the Trauma of Others: Slavery, Collective Trauma, and the Difficulties of Representation in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*," in *Risking Difference: Identification, Race, and Community in Contemporary Fiction and Feminism* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 66–84. Avery F. Gordon offers a robust refutation of what I shorthand "the healing argument": "Not Only the Footprints but the Water Too and What Is Down There," in *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 137–92. For additional critique of the trauma studies approach to the novel, see Franco, "What We Talk about When We Talk about *Beloved*."

21 Kathi Weeks, *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics and Postwork Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 96–101, 113–37. I am indebted to an anonymous reader of my manuscript for noting the relevance to my argument of Silvia Federici's and Leopoldina Fortunati's ideas. Feminist autonomists view women calling for recognition of their reproductive labor as capitalism's truest antagonists. As Weeks observes, although the "wages for housework" movement to which Federici and Fortunati were dedicated has been too readily discredited, it contains political insights useful in crafting a robust feminist politics that disavows normative work discourse and effete ideas of equality (as opposed to substantive freedom). The refusal of housework and the demand for wages for the reproductive labor unacknowledged as labor by other Marxists is performative and demands both self-valorization and the radical invention of power. I take this chapter's epigraph from Federici's interview with Matthew Carlin. Silvia Federici, "The Exploitation of Women, Social Reproduction, and the Struggle against Global Capitalism," interview by Matthew Carlin, *Theory & Event* 17.3 (2014), http://muse.jhu.edu/article/553382. Also see Federici, *Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle* (New York: Autonomedia, 2012); Leopoldina Fortunati, *The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital* (1981; New York: Autonomedia, 1995).

Autonomists share some of the concerns voiced by subaltern studies scholars who examine insurgency and refusal from below, and who have prodded historians to recognize politics whose forms of materialization and mobilization differ from and are relatively independent of elite modes of organization and politics and may have distinct aims. This is not surprising given the indebtedness of both autonomist theory and subaltern studies to Antonio Gramsci. For instance, in *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Dipesh Chakrabarty influentially discusses how heterogeneous political forms of subaltern resistance elude available or hegemonic tools and methods and calls for attentiveness to "History 2," the history that he associates with the subaltern. History 2 interrupts the universalizing thrust of History 1 (the history associated with capitalist hegemony) and reveals the bearer of labor power as a human being living a life that is filled with meaning beyond the capacity to (re)produce value for capitalism.

22 Weeks, *The Problem with Work*, 26.

23 Rachel Lee notes that Sethe's rememory of Nan's words is prefaced by Sethe's observation that Nan spoke in a language that she no longer understands. For this reason, Lee suggests that Nan's meaning is as much fabricated by Sethe as spoken by Nan. This suggestion strengthens my claim that Sethe *constructs* rather than finds in Nan's words a connection to her mother. See Rachel C. Lee, "Missing Peace in Toni Morrison's *Sula* and *Beloved*," in *Understanding Toni Morrison's Beloved and Sula: Selected Essays and Criticisms of the Works by the Nobel Prize–Winning Author*, ed. Solomon Ogbede Iyasẹre and Marla W. Iyasẹre (Troy, NY: Whitston, 2000), 277–96.

24 Christian, "Beloved, She's Ours," 42.

25 This is another way in which Morrison revises the Garner story. As others suggest, the pale faces of Garner's children intimate that they are her master's. Morrison differentiates Sethe from Garner by refusing to question Halle's paternity. See Mark Reinhardt, *Who Speaks for Margaret Garner? The True Story That Inspired Toni Morrison's* Beloved (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 40–41; Steven Weisenburger, *Modern Medea: A Family Story of Slavery and Child-Murder from the Old South* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 48.

26 Williams writes that structures of feeling are akin to "undeniable experiences of the present," but that the difficulty of the term *experience* (and thus his preference for *feeling*) is that *experience* implies the past tense while feeling conveys the immediacy and indeterminacy of the formation in question. Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 128–35.

27 It is possible to read *Beloved* as a response to Gayl Jones's *Corregidora*, a novel that Morrison edited as she worked on *The Black Book*. In an interview with Robert Stepto, Morrison claims that Jones's stories are without joy or pleasure. By contrast, in *Beloved* she sought to express both amid exploitation and violence. See Morrison, "Intimate Things in Place: A Conversation with Toni Morrison," interview by Robert B. Stepto, *Massachusetts Review* 18.3 (1977): 485. Thanks to Habiba Ibrahim for directing me to this interview.

28 This neologism is akin to *rememory* in its combination and reappropriation of common components to say something new. *Disremember* expresses neither failure to remember nor mistaken recollection. Rather it connotes refusal to share memory.

29 When Ella first meets Sethe and her newborn on the banks of the Ohio River she admonishes Sethe, upon seeing Denver's face "poke out of the wool blanket,"

that Sethe should not "love anything" (108), a sentiment that foreshadows her identification with Sethe.

30 Psychoanalytically oriented criticism has the unfortunate if unintentional effect of casting Sethe's relationship with her children as pathological. As a mother, critics argue, she must learn that her progeny are separate (rather than a "part" of herself). As a consequence, psychoanalytic readings of the novel inadvertently duplicate some aspects of Moynihan's pathologization of the black family.

31 It is also argued, if less often, that the alliance between Sethe and Amy Denver constitutes an optimistic form of interracial solidarity that signals the possibility for alliance (if not community) between white and black women. Krumholz explains, "The similarity between the two women's situations supercedes their mutual, racially based mistrust" ("The Ghosts of Slavery," 399).

32 Gordon predicates her reading on "The Story of a Hat," the actual hat belonging to the abolitionist Levi Coffin, and on recognition of the many hats that catalyze Sethe's response: Coffin's, School Teacher's, and Bodwin's. Gordon, "Not Only the Footprints," especially 143–64.

33 As has been argued, the scene reveals liberalism's inability to eviscerate the property system that sustained slavery and made it possible to commodify human beings in the first place (Berger, "Ghosts of Liberalism," 416; Gordon, "Not Only the Footprints"). Berger believes "Bodwin shares with twentieth-century liberals the features that led the civil rights moments of the late 1960s to reject the Moynihan Report and the tradition of Frazier and Myrdal" (417). For Gordon, Sethe's attack on Bodwin materializes a critique of the abolitionist project and of liberal modes of redress in general.

34 This reading of the complicity of liberalism and slavery resonates with Lisa Lowe's account in *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015) of how liberalism manifests the persistence of the property relation forged in the crucible of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism. As Lowe explains, because liberalism is wedded to the property relation, we continue to grapple with a shabby notion of freedom, or what Stephanie Smallwood labels "commodified freedom." "Commodified Freedom: Interrogating the Limits of Anti-Slavery Ideology in the Early Republic," *Journal of the Early Republic* 24.2 (2004): 289–98.

35 Given Morrison's involvement with Davis as an editor of her work we can speculate that Morrison read Davis's essay on Little and was aware of her activism on Little's behalf. See Davis, "JoAnne Little: The Dialectics of Rape," *Ms. Magazine*, June 1975, 74–77, 106–8, reprinted in *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*, ed. Joy James (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 141–60. On Morrison's editorial work see Cheryl A. Wall, "Toni Morrison, Editor and Teacher," in *The Cambridge Companion to Toni Morrison,* ed. Justine Tally (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 142–43.

36 Danielle L. McGuire offers a comprehensive account of the Little case and of the organizing against sexual abuse and rape that grew out of it. See *At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance—A New History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power* (New York: Knopf, 2010), 202–28. In "Les-

sons in Self-Defense: Gender Violence, Racial Criminalization, and Anticarceral Feminism," *Women's Studies Quarterly* 43.3–4 (2015): 52–71, and chapter 2 in *All Our Trials: Prisons, Policing, and the Feminist Fight to End Violence* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2019), Emily Thuma examines the response to the case and its role in the formation of multiracial alliances that drew attention to the problem of racialized incarceration as an answer to sexual violence. I am indebted to Thuma for sharing her ongoing work on the case, and for alerting me to the political slogan that Little's supporters emblazoned on a T-shirt Thuma found preserved in an archival box at the Sophia Smith Collection at Smith College (see fig. 3.1). In "'I'm Gonna Get You': Black Womanhood and Jim Crow Justice in the Post–Civil Rights South," in *U.S. Women's History: Untangling the Threads of Sisterhood*, ed. Leslie Brown, Jacqueline Castledine, and Anne Valk (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017), 98–123, Christina Greene explores the excessive sentencing to which Little was subject (fourteen to twenty years in a five-by-seven-foot cell for a nonviolent property offense) and the danger of allowing triumphalist accounts of the case's outcome to direct our attention away from examination of the Little case as a representative story about widespread abuse in policing, sentencing, and imprisonment of black women.

37 Davis, "JoAnne Little: The Dialectics of Rape," 74–77, 106–8; 149–60 in the reprint. All further citations are to the reprint and will be made parenthetically. A range of national groups rallied around Little, including the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the Feminist Alliance against Rape, the Rape Crisis Center, the National Black Feminist Organization, and the National Organization for Women. See McGuire, *At the Dark End of the Street*, 214.

38 In "'Joanne Is You and Joanne Is Me': A Consideration of African American Women and the 'Free Joan Little' Movement, 1974–75," in *Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights–Black Power Movement*, ed. Bettye Collier-Thomas and V. P. Franklin (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 259–79, Genna Rae McNeil offers an analysis of the Little case that is based on interviews with several of the figures in the Free Joan Little campaign, including Davis. McNeil observes that Davis committed to the campaign "because of her sense of gratitude to those who had championed her cause as a political prisoner only a few years before" (268–69), and because she saw activism on behalf of Little as an opportunity to connect her antiracist work to her feminism in a manner that was distinct from the direction then being pursued by the white middle-class women's movement.

39 For discussion of Johnson Reagon's involvement in the Free Joan Little campaign, see McNeil, "'Joanne Is You and Joanne Is Me,'" 270–71.

40 Most critics analyze the final page in *Beloved* and Morrison's repeated and multivalent declaration that "this is not a story to pass on." Here I weigh in on the meaning of "pass on" by affirming those readings that regard the declaration as prescriptive rather than descriptive: this is not a story to pass on in that it is not a story that we can *refuse* to tell and retell to future generations.

41 "'Joanne Is You and Joanne Is Me,'" 260–61.
42 Toni Morrison, "Author Toni Morrison Discusses Her Latest Novel *Beloved*," interview by Gail Caldwell, *Boston Globe*, October 6, 1987, 67–68, reprinted in *Conversations with Toni Morrison*, ed. Danielle Kathleen Taylor-Guthrie (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1994), 239–45.

4. The Problem of Reproductive Freedom in Neoliberalism

1 Dorothy E. Roberts, "Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies: A New Reproductive Dystopia," *Signs* 34.4 (2009): 783–84.
2 Roberts, "Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies," 784–85.
3 Roberts, "Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies," 791. Roberts recognizes that in the new dystopia "the biological definition of race is stronger than ever," but she argues that in the supposedly postracial context of neoliberalism, class rather than race structures consumption of reprogenetics, leaving "the masses" to "suffer most" (799–800). Also see Dorothy E. Roberts, "Privatization and Punishment in the New Age of Reprogenetics," *Emory Law Journal* 54.3 (2005): 1343–60, and her update of the argument in *Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-create Race in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: New Press, 2011).
4 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940), in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 253–64; hereafter cited parenthetically.
5 In "On Failing to Make the Past Present," *Modern Language Quarterly* 73:3 (2012): 453–74, Stephen Best critiques "melancholic historicism" that roots the unresolved loss of the present in the slave past and is thus able to view the past in the present only as a wound. To think the past as resource he turns to Benjamin's "Theses." Like Best, I argue that Benjamin's observations allow historical inquiry to animate hope, or, as Best expresses it, "to rouse the dead from their sleep" so that our dialogue with them might inflect our understanding of what is to be done, not only what has been done (464). Also see Lisa Lowe's related argument in *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 135–75.
6 Foucault suggests that biopower began to gain a hold in the late seventeenth century, became consistently visible through the emergence of a discourse on population in the eighteenth century, and flowered in the form of nineteenth-century governance. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* (1978), trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990); *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2003); and *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*, trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
7 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 135–59. Notably Foucault does not treat slavery as a form of biopower.

8 Madhu Dubey also argues that slavery is defamiliarized through a process of mutation that operates across Butler's novels. As a consequence it comes to refer to a wide range of abusive practices that are no longer "reducible to race . . . even when race does operate as a central axis of inequality." Dubey suggests reading these mutations as a meditation on the "perplexities surrounding the category of race in the post–civil rights decades." "Octavia Butler's Novels of Enslavement," *Novel* 46.3 (2013): 346. Here I suggest reading them as a meditation on the afterlife of reproductive slavery in biocapitalism and neoliberalism.

9 On the persistence of racist and geneticized racial projects in supposedly postracial times, see Alys Eve Weinbaum, "Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work of Art in a Biotechnological Age," *Literature and Medicine* 26.1 (2007): 207–39; Michael Omi, "'Slippin' into Darkness': The (Re)Biologization of Race," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13.3 (2010): 343–58; Roberts, *Fatal Invention*.

10 Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 4, 121–27; hereafter cited parenthetically.

11 I take the concept of articulation from Stuart Hall, who writes, "The object of analysis is always the specificity of this 'structure-superstructure' complex—though as a historically concrete articulation." "Race Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 332.

12 Benjamin, "Theses," 255.

13 Saidiya Hartman treats *Kindred* as feminist theory. As in the previous chapter, I find inspiration in Hartman's call for "critical fabulation" in the face of the historical archive's silences. See "Venus in Two Acts," *Small Axe* 12.2 (2008): 12. On *Kindred* see Dubey, "Octavia Butler's Novels of Enslavement"; Linh U. Hua, "Reproducing Time, Reproducing History: Love and Black Feminist Sentimentality in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," *African American Review* 44.3 (2011): 391–407; Christine Levecq, "Power and Repetition: Philosophies of (Literary) History in Octavia E. Butler's *Kindred*," *Contemporary Literature* 41.3 (2000): 525–53; Philip Miletic, "Octavia Butler's Response to Black Arts/Black Power Literature and Rhetoric in *Kindred*," *African American Review* 49.3 (2016): 261–275; Angelyn Mitchell, *The Freedom to Remember: Narrative, Slavery, and Gender in Contemporary Black Women's Fiction* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 42–63; Marisa Parham, "Saying 'Yes': Textual Trauma in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," *Callaloo* 32.4 (2009): 1315–31; Ahsraf H. A. Rushdy, *Remembering Generations: Race and Family in Contemporary African American Fiction* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 99–127; Sarah Eden Schiff, "Recovering (from) the Double: Fiction as Historical Revision in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," *Arizona Quarterly* 65.1 (2009): 107–36; Marc Steinberg, "Inverting History in Octavia Butler's Postmodern Slave Narrative," *African American Review* 38.3 (2004): 467–76; Lisa Yaszek, "'A Grim Fantasy': Remaking American History in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," *Signs* 28.4 (2003): 1053–66.

14 Stephanie Turner, "'What Actually Is': The Insistence of Genre in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," FEMSPEC 4.2 (2004): 259–80, and Nadine Flagel, "'It's Almost Like Being

There': Speculative Fiction, Slave Narrative, and the Crisis of Representation in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," *Canadian Review of American Studies* 42.2 (2012): 217–45, argue that *Kindred* ought to be read as generically hybrid (as what Turner calls "historiographic metafiction"). Both seek to liberate it from the genre straightjacket.

15 Dubey makes a similar point in "Octavia Butler's Novels of Enslavement."

16 Octavia Butler, *Kindred* (Boston: Beacon, 1979), *Wild Seed* (New York: Warner, 1980), and "Bloodchild" (1984) in *Bloodchild and Other Stories* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1995); hereafter all three are cited parenthetically. As in chapter 1, here I follow scholars of biocapitalism who argue for its emergence in the 1970s and its synergy with neoliberalism.

17 The series includes *Patternmaster* (New York: Warner, 1976), *Mind of My Mind* (New York: Warner, 1977), and *Clay's Ark* (New York: Warner, 1984).

18 Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15.1 (2003): 11–40.

19 Jared Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," *Social Text* 28.2 (2010): 31–56. Ladelle McWhorter, "Sex, Race and Biopower: A Foucauldian Genealogy," *Hypatia* 19.3 (2004): 39–62, critiques extension of the analysis of biopower to slavery.

20 Sarah Wood, "Subversion through Inclusion: Octavia Butler's Interrogation of Religion in *Xenogenesis* and *Wild Seed*," FEMSPEC 6.1 (2005): 93; Ingrid Thaler, *Black Atlantic Speculative Fictions: Octavia Butler, Jewelle Gomez, and Nalo Hopkinson* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 19–43. Wood suggests that Anyanwu is based on Atagbusi, an Onitsha Igbo healer and shapeshifter.

21 Grace Kyungwon Hong, *Death beyond Disavowal: The Impossible Politics of Difference* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 15, 63–64.

22 See Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 1–14.

23 Dubey argues that Butler critiques the alignment of black women with nature and animality through depiction of Anyanwu's capacity to become animal. In the process, Butler impugns scientific rationality for its predatory exploitation of black women's bodies. "Becoming Animal in Black Women's Science Fiction," in *Afro-Future Females: Black Writers Chart Science Fiction's Newest New-Wave Trajectory*, ed. Marleen S. Barr (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2008), 31–51.

24 Lauren J. Lacey, "Octavia E. Butler on Coping with Power in *Parable of the Sower*, *Parable of the Talents*, and *Fledgling*," *Critique* 49.4 (2008): 383.

25 Thomas is enslaved by Doro because his mind-reading abilities represent a genetic resource. They also make it impossible for Thomas to exist in proximity to other human beings, though not Doro, whose mind Thomas cannot open and destroy.

26 As Anyanwu explains, these kindred feel "more comfortable" masquerading as slaves on her plantation "than they had ever [felt] . . . elsewhere" (235).

27 Butler challenges the idea of Canaanites found in the Old Testament. These are not cursed children of Ham; they are blessed. See Thaler, *Black Atlantic Speculative*

Fictions, 29–34. Prior struggles temper Doro's initial impulse to destroy Anyanwu's Canaan. In implicit recognition of Anyanwu's capacity for resistance, Doro wages a war of position, rechanneling his desire to kill into temporary alliance. Although a lull results, war is reignited when the toxic progeny Doro sets upon Canaan destroy its exceptional residents.

28 It is worth observing the partial anagram embedded in the protagonist's and antagonist's names—Anyanwu, "a new way," and Doro, "door" or portal—and speculating about the narrative irresolution these names portend.

29 Darko Suvin, *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 3–15. Here I extend the discussion of science fiction to sf.

30 Fredric Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions* (New York: Verso, 2005), and "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," *Social Text* 1.1 (1979): 130–48; Carl Freedman, *Critical Theory and Science Fiction* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 2000); Tom Moylan, *Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).

31 See Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*; Melinda Cooper, *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008).

32 In this sense Dana refuses to raise the question that Audre Lorde first posed: "In what way do I contribute to the subjugation of *any part of those who I call my people?*" Grace Kyungwon Hong suggests that in raising this question Lorde advances a politics of difference that "pushes past the limits of the political as it is conventionally defined." Such a politics "holds in suspension the conflicting goals of the preservation or protection of the political subject *and* the recognition of the others at whose expense that subject is protected" (*Death and Disavowal*, 15).

33 There are two exceptions: Dubey, "Octavia Butler's Novels of Enslavement," and Hua, "Reproducing Time, Reproducing History." Both explore Dana's complicity in perpetuation of Alice's enslavement. In Hua's reading, as in the one I offer here, Dana's inability to imagine that the call to travel back in time emanates from Alice (as opposed to Rufus) is of paramount importance and represents a failure of political imagination that is repeated rather than corrected in the criticism on the novel.

34 Instructively, this scene lies at the center of the novel and thus in the same structural position as the scene in which Doro brings Anyanwu to Thomas. In both novels, sexual exploitation targeted at reproductive engineering constitutes the pivot around which the plot turns. Hua argues, as I do here, that Dana and Alice ought to be read as antagonists. See Hua, "Reproducing Time, Reproducing History."

35 In readings focused on the master-slave relationship, Rufus and Dana's white husband are frequently paired and the modern interracial relationships read as mired in slavery. See, for example, Carlyle Van Thompson, "Moving Past the Present: Racialized Sexual Violence and Miscegenous Consumption in Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," in *Eating the Black Body: Miscegenation as Sexual Consumption in African American Literature and*

Culture (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 107–44; Diana R. Paulin, "De-Essentializing Interracial Representations: Black and White Border-Crossings in Spike Lee's *Jungle Fever* and Octavia Butler's *Kindred*," *Cultural Critique* 36 (1997): 165–93.

36 On the uncritical embrace of forms of futurity moored in heterosexual reproduction see Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 1–32; Gillian Harkins, *Everybody's Family Romance: Reading Incest in Neoliberal America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Chandan Reddy, *Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

37 On choice and agency in neoliberalism, see Jane Elliott, "Suffering Agency: Imagining Neoliberal Personhood in North America and Britain," *Social Text* 31.2 (2013): 83–101; Nikolas S. Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

38 See Rushdy, *Remembering Generations*, 107–8; and Lawrie Balfour, "Vexed Genealogy: Octavia Butler and Political Memories of Slavery," in *Democracy's Literature: Politics and Fiction in America*, ed. Patrick Deneen and Joseph Romance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 178–79.

39 For discussion of autonomists' ideas of freedom, see Kathi Weeks, *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), especially 22.

40 See Delores Williams, *Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), hereafter cited parenthetically; Renita J. Weems, *Just a Sister Away: A Womanist Vision of Women's Relationships in the Bible* (San Diego: LuraMedia, 1988), 1–24; Wilma Ann Bailey, "Black and Jewish Women Consider Hagar," *Encounter* 63.1–2 (2002): 37–44; Phyllis Trible and Letty M. Russel, eds., *Hagar, Sarah, and Their Children: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2006). The list of Hagar's trials is Williams's in *Sisters in the Wilderness*, 4.

41 Numerous writers before and after Butler have invoked Hagar as a heroine. See, for instance, Pauline Hopkins, *Hagar's Daughter: A Story of Southern Caste Prejudice* (1902), in *The Magazine Novels of Pauline Hopkins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 1–284; Mary Johnston, *Hagar* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913); Margaret Laurence, *The Stone Angel* (New York: Knopf, 1964); Charlotte Gordon, *The Woman Who Named God: Abraham's Dilemma and the Birth of Three Faiths* (New York: Little, Brown, 2009).

42 Much criticism on "Bloodchild" finds redemption in its story of interspecies relations, or what some regard as collaborations. See, for instance, Kristin Lillvis, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Slavery? The Problem and Promise of Mothering in Octavia E. Butler's 'Bloodchild,'" MELUS 39.4 (2014): 7–22; John Carlo Pasco, Camille Anderson, and Sayatani DasGupta, "Visionary Medicine: Speculative Fiction, Racial Justice and Octavia Butler's 'Bloodchild,'" *Science Fiction and Medical Humanities* 42 (2016): 246–251; Stephanie A. Smith, "Octavia Butler: A Retro-

spective," *Feminist Studies* 33.2 (2007): 385–92; Amanda Thibodeau, "Alien Bodies and a Queer Future: Sexual Revision in Octavia Butler's 'Bloodchild' and James Tiptree, Jr.'s 'With Delicate Mad Hands,'" *Science Fiction Studies* 39.2 (2012): 262–82. Less often scholars interpret the text as a critical meditation on capitalism, the exploitation of labor, and the treatment of the human body in property law. See Eva Cherniavsky, *Incorporations: Race, Nation, and the Body Politics of Capital* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 41–47; Karla F. C. Holloway, *Private Bodies, Public Texts: Race, Gender, and a Cultural Bioethics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 32–36.

43 For a redemptive reading of Butler's aliens as "queer" beings see Thibodeau, "Alien Bodies and a Queer Future." By contrast, I read Tlic queerness as readily incorporated into Tlic hegemony.

44 As Louis Althusser observes, ideology is "not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live." "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review, 1971), 165. Althusser also argues that "ideology has no history" (159), an ideological proposition about ideology that accounts for the erasure of the history of slavery by the Tlic and the humans living among them.

45 On the use of love in defining and legitimizing political actors of various stripes see Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 122–41.

46 Douglass observes that in the moment in which he elected to move into direct battle with Mr. Covey he found both his sense of freedom and his manhood rekindled and revived. *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an African Slave* (1845), in *The Classic Slave Narratives*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (New York: Signet Classics, 2002), 394.

47 Here I again take inspiration from Benjamin: "To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was.' . . . It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger" ("Theses," 255).

5. A Slave Narrative for Postracial Times

1 These include the Booker, Arthur C. Clarke, and National Book Critics Circle awards. *Never Let Me Go* was named best novel of 2005 by *Time* magazine and adapted for film by Mark Romanek in 2010. Kazuo Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go* (New York: Vintage, 2005), hereafter cited parenthetically; Mark Romanek, director, *Never Let Me Go*, DVD (Century City, CA: Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2010); Michael Bay, director, *The Island*, DVD (Universal City, CA: DreamWorks Pictures, 2005).

2 These events are routinely invoked to mark the emergence of popular concern with and intensified media attention to cloning. Dolly was cloned in 1996 and

her birth announced in 1997. Her birth is widely thought to herald human cloning. In *Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning* (New York: Norton, 1998), 11, Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein explain, "The arrival of Dolly made it clear that human beings would soon have to face the possibility of human cloning—and it has been this idea . . . that has caused public anxiety. To many, if not most of us, cloning represents a possible turning point in the history of humanity." Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton lauded the completion of the map of the human genome as a monumental accomplishment in 2000. The article announcing cloning of thirty human embryos was quickly followed by an article on the creation of eleven stem cell lines from adult human skin cells. A report disclaiming both accomplishments as fraudulent was published in 2006, at which time legal actions were taken against Hwang Woo-Suk, the leader of the Seoul University team responsible. Although less well publicized, cloning for purposes of research was legalized in the United States in 2002. See Joan Haran et al., eds., *Human Cloning in the Media: From Science Fiction to Science Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 13–43, 67–92; Sarah Franklin, *Dolly Mixtures: The Remaking of Genealogy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Gina Kolata, *Clone: The Road to Dolly and the Path Ahead* (New York: William Morrow, 1998).

3 In *Never Let Me Go* individuals from whom clones are derived are known as "originals" or "normals." In *The Island* they are called "sponsors," and clones are referred to as "life insurance policies," falsely represented to "sponsors" as unconscious, vegetative beings or "agnates."

4 On rupture of distinctions between natural and technological reproduction see Sarah Franklin, *Biological Relatives: IVF, Stem Cells, and the Future of Kinship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), and "Life Itself: Global Nature and the Genetic Imaginary," in *Global Nature, Global Culture*, ed. Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury, and Jackie Stacey (London: Sage, 2000), 188–227. On organ scarcity see Lawrence Cohen, "The Other Kidney: Biopolitics beyond Recognition," *Body & Society* 7.2–3 (2001): 9–29; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Commodity Fetishism in Organs Trafficking," *Body & Society* 7.2–3 (2001): 31–62, and "Rotten Trade: Millennial Capitalism, Human Values and Global Justice in Organs Trafficking," *Journal of Human Rights* 2.2 (2003): 197–226.

5 *The Island* can be regarded as representative of a range of popular depictions of cloning, including *Boys from Brazil* (based on Ira Levin's novel), *Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang*, *Parts: The Clonus Horror*, *The 6th Day*, *Alien Resurrection*, *Cloud Atlas* (based on David Mitchell's novel of the same name), *Code 46*, *Moon*, and *Orphan Black*. For discussion see Haran et al., *Human Cloning in the Media*. See Franklin J. Schaffner, director, *Boys from Brazil*, DVD (Los Angeles: 20th Century Fox, 1978); Levin, *Boys from Brazil* (New York: Random House, 1976); Kate Wilhelm, *Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); Robert S. Fiveson, director, *Parts: The Clonus Horror*, DVD (Los Angeles: Group 1 International Distribution Organization, 1979); Roger Spottiswoode, director, *The 6th Day*, DVD (Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, 2000); Jean-Pierre Jeunet, director, *Alien Resurrection*, DVD (Los Angeles:

20th Century Fox, 1997); Lana Wachowski, Tom Tykwer, and Andy Wachowski, directors, *Cloud Atlas*, DVD (Burbank: Warner Bros. Pictures, 2012); David Mitchell, *Cloud Atlas* (New York: Random House, 2004); Michael Winterbottom, director, *Code 46*, DVD (Beverly Hills: MGM, 2003); Duncan Jones, director, *Moon*, DVD (New York: Sony Pictures Classics, 2009); Graeme Manson and John Fawcett, *Orphan Black: Season 1–Season 4*, DVD (New York: BBC America Home Entertainment, 2016).

6 This reading accords with the overview of popular representations of cloning offered by Haran et al., *Human Cloning in the Media*, 56, 64.

7 In Foucault's conceptualization of biopolitics death enters the deployment of power as state racism. Mbembe deepens Foucault's point by developing the concept of necropolitics, a form of power in which racism divides the population into those whose lives may be sustained and (re)produced by killing others with impunity, and those who are subjected to premature death, effectively creating a state of permanent war. See Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15.1 (2003): 11–40. Several scholars engage Foucault and Agamben in relation to Ishiguro's novel; to my knowledge no other treatment of the novel takes up racial slavery. See Shameem Black, "Ishiguro's Inhuman Aesthetics," *Modern Fiction Studies* 55.4 (2009): 785–807; Arne De Boever, "Bare Life and the Camps in Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," in *Narrative Care: Biopolitics and the Novel* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 59–91; Sara Wasson, "'A Butcher's Shop Where the Meat Still Moved': Gothic Doubles, Organ Harvesting, and Human Cloning," in *Gothic Science Fiction, 1980–2010*, ed. Sara Wasson and Emily Alder (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 73–86; Gabriele Griffin, "Science and the Cultural Imaginary: The Case of Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," *Textual Practice* 23.4 (2009): 645–63.

8 Notably cloning was made illegal in the UK under the Human Reproductive Cloning Act of 2001. Although there is a national embargo on federal funding for research involving human cloning in the US, there is no legal prohibition. While some states ban cloning and gestation of cloned embryos, others allow it. See Haran et al., *Human Cloning in the Media*, 37.

9 Romanek cinematically reinforces the presumptive whiteness of clones by casting all characters as white. To my knowledge, Rachel Lee offers the only other reading focused on the novel's racial formation. As she explains, "The clones' 'species-being' is not commensurate with race read off the body's surface—the 'old raciology' tied to the visual scale of epidermal phenotype." As in the present analysis, Lee argues that the clones' difference is tied to their "manner of reproduction" rather than to gross morphology. What she describes as a continuum of "minoritizing patterns" that moves from racial phenotype to biopolitical technique, I describe as "the flickering off of blackness." Whereas Lee's analysis views the clones as akin to Asians, the "model minority" that complies with the performance demands made on them, I seek to underscore the historical connections between visible blackness and racial difference (visible or invisible) and the clones' enslavability. The fact that both readings are made available by the same

text suggests the complexity of the overlapping processes of racialization that operate in and through biocapitalism and neoliberalism. See *The Exquisite Corpse of Asian America: Biopolitics, Biosociality, and Posthuman Ecologies* (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 59–64, quote 61. I thank Rachel for her feedback on an early version of this chapter.

10 On reader complicity see Anne Whitehead, "Writing with Care: Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," *Contemporary Literature* 52.1 (2011): 54–83.

11 Following M. I. Finlay, Sandra Joshel, "Ancient Roman Slavery and American History" lecture, University of Washington, Seattle, October 23, 2013 (delivered as part of the Slavery and Freedom in the Making of America public lecture series), distinguishes "societies with slavery" from "slave societies" in the ancient world. In the former, slaves are owned as property and work alongside other laborers. In the latter, 20 to 30 percent of the population is enslaved and produces the bulk of the income. In a slave society, slavery is economic, social, cultural, and ideological. As Joshel argues, Romans thought with slaves; they defined themselves, their social relations, and their ideas of freedom in relation to slaves and their ideas about slaves and slavery. I follow Joshel in making this distinction and here extend it to the world of the novel—which, I argue, is a biocapitalist society with slavery.

12 My use of *constellation* throughout this chapter builds on my reading of Benjamin's "Theses" in chapter 4. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940), in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 253–64; hereafter cited parenthetically.

13 Rereading inevitably alters the novel's impact. Each textual encounter is increasingly self-reflexive in that readers know in advance that the narrative obscures the truth. Consequently rereading leads to a perception of complicity in banalization of violence that is, on first reading, more obscure. On banalization of the evisceration of the welfare state in the novel, see Bruce Robbins, "Cruelty Is Bad: Banality and Proximity in *Never Let Me Go*," *Novel* 40.3 (2007): 289–302. Also see Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963; New York: Penguin, 1994).

14 See Martin Puchner, "When We Were Clones," *Raritan* 24.7 (2008): 36; Louis Menand, "Something about Kathy," *New Yorker* 81.6 (2005): 78–79; Claire Messud, "Love's Body," *The Nation*, May 16, 2005, 28; Justine Burley, "A Braver, Newer World," *Nature* 425.7041 (2005): 427; Valerie Sayers, "Spare Parts," *Commonweal* 132.13 (2005): 27; Joseph O'Neill, "Never Let Me Go," *Atlantic Monthly* 295.4 (2005): 123.

15 Thanks to Alexandra Deem for feedback on this chapter and to the many undergraduate students who have taken up this text in my Marxist Theory class and shared their responses to it.

16 For present purposes, the most important distinction between novel and film is that in the latter clones wear identification bracelets that make surveillance possible. No such repressive apparatus exists in the novel; the clones simply self-govern.

17 De Boever argues that Hailsham is a world "that can only exist on the condition that one does not ask too many questions," an idea that resonates with the present argument ("Bare Life and the Camps," 63).

18 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1 (1867), trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977); hereafter cited parenthetically.

19 In *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 47–71, Dipesh Chakrabarty notes that Marx mistranslated (from Greek) and replaced "shoes" with "beds," a mistake that renders operations of equivalence still more mysterious. My reading of the passage is influenced by Chakrabarty's.

20 Aristotle lived in what Joshel, "Ancient Roman Slavery and American History," calls a society with slavery. A so-called slave society did not come into existence until the first century BCE, nearly two hundred years after Aristotle lived. See note 11.

21 Marx writes, "The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness." Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), in *Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton, ed. Quintin Hoare (New York: Vintage, 1974), 425.

22 Arguments in favor of the organ trade are made by free-market economists and physicians who profit from harvests and transplants. Quote is from Scott Carney, *The Red Market: On the Trail of the World's Organ Brokers, Bone Thieves, Blood Farmers, and Child Traffickers* (New York: William Morrow, 2011), 3. Also see Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby, *Clinical Labor: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Donna Dickenson, *Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008); Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, *Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Lori Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin, *Body Bazaar: The Market for Human Tissue in the Biotechnology Age* (New York: Crown, 2001); Stephen Wilkinson, *Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Andrew Kimbrell, *The Human Body Shop: The Engineering and Marketing of Life* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1994); and Nancy Scheper-Hughes's pioneering work: "The Tyranny of the Gift: Sacrificial Violence in Living Donor Transplants," *American Journal of Transplantation* 7.3 (2007): 507–11; "Organs Trafficking: The Real, the Unreal and the Uncanny," *Annals of Transplantation* 11.3 (2006): 16–30; "Parts Unknown: Undercover Ethnography of the Organs-Trafficking Underworld," *Ethnography* 5.1 (2004): 29–73; and "Rotten Trade."

23 Marx, *Capital*, 152.

24 Although theorists of racial capitalism previously discussed do not treat biocapitalism, formulations advanced by Cedric Robinson and others implicitly suggest that biocapitalism, like all iterations of capitalism, ought to be recognized as

a form of racial capitalism that necessarily bears a relationship to slavery. See Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Barbara Fields, "Ideology and Race in American History," in *Region, Race and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward*, ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 143–78; Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 305–45; Walter Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Stephanie Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Moon-Ho Jung, *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Edward Baptist, *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

25 In this way, the neglect of slavery reduplicates that already noted in scholarship on biocapitalism. See chapter 1.

26 On contemporary slavery and trafficking, see Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), hereafter cited parenthetically; Alison Brysk and Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, eds., *From Human Trafficking to Human Rights: Reframing Contemporary Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Joel Quirk, *The Anti-Slavery Project: From the Slave Trade to Human Trafficking* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Siddharth Kara, *Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Christien van den Anker, ed., *The Political Economy of New Slavery* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Denise Brennan, *Life Interrupted: Trafficking into Forced Labor in the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). Quirk challenges Bales's division between new and old slavery, and Brennan rejects the use of the term altogether. In so doing Brennan joins African activists who have argued for restricted use of slavery in the contemporary context.

27 Apparently Bales overlooks Caribbean slavery. Ishiguro's portrait of clones' extermination through repeated donation necessarily recalls the slaves who were worked to death, especially on Caribbean sugar plantations.

28 The New UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children is one of two supplements to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in November 2000. It constitutes the first internationally agreed upon definition of trafficking and was expressly adopted to make international law more successful in combating transnational organized crime involving organ theft. The new definition of trafficking it puts forth includes "recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons . . . for the purpose of slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or removal of organs." See Christien van den Anker, "Introduction: Combatting Contemporary Slavery," in *The Political Economy of New Slavery*, 5, and "Con-

temporary Slavery, Global Justice and Globalization," in *The Political Economy of New Slavery*, 30; David Ould, "Trafficking and International Law," in Anker, *The Political Economy of New Slavery*, 55–74.

29 The other argument that can be made against Bales is that almost all the new slaves whom he discusses are people of color, most from the Global South. While slaveholders are no longer necessarily white, slaves are Thai, Filipino, Brazilian, Pakistani, Indian, Turkish, Chinese, and so on.

30 Benjamin, "Theses," 261.

31 It is argued that depth reading developed in response to the combined hegemony of Marxist and psychoanalytic frameworks in literary criticism. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or You're So Paranoid You Probably Think This Essay Is about You," in *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 123–51; Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, eds., "The Way We Read Now," special issue, *Representations* 108 (2009); Heather Love, "Close but Not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn," *New Literary History* 41.2 (2010): 371–91.

32 Best and Marcus, "Surface Reading: An Introduction," in "The Way We Read Now," 3, 9.

33 Best and Marcus implicitly invoke the criticism on *Beloved* here. See also Love, "Close but Not Deep." For a reading of *Beloved* that insists on engagement with ghosts and haunting and thus resonates with the present argument see Avery Gordon, "Not Only the Footprints but the Water Too and What Is Down There," in *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 137–92. Notably, slavery is one of the historically repressed contexts most frequently uncovered when scholars read symptomatically. This begs the question: Which histories go missing when we opt for surface reading?

34 Ishiguro has explicitly said this about his own fiction. In a 2015 interview he observed, "You have to leave a lot of meaning underneath the surface." Alexandra Alter and Dan Bilefsky, "Genre-Spanning Author of *The Remains of the Day* Wins Noble," *New York Times*, October 6, 2017.

35 See Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

36 Significantly the clones never discuss birth or parentage. Instead they seek out their "originals"—those from whom they have been derived. I treat the clones' provenance and motherlessness in my epilogue.

37 Here I follow Louis Althusser in arguing that literature allows us to see, perceive, and feel ideology. "A Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspre," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review, 1971), 151–56.

38 See Jane Elliott and Gillian Harkins, "Introduction: Genres of Neoliberalism," special issue, *Social Text* 31.2 (2013): 1–17; hereafter cited parenthetically.

39 Jane Elliott, "Suffering Agency: Imagining Neoliberal Personhood in North America and Britain," *Social Text* 31.2 (2013): 84; hereafter cited parenthetically.

40 See Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). Melamed argues that the postwar period is characterized by "race liberal projects," including "neoliberal multiculturalism"; here I suggest that the postwar world of the novel is more aptly characterized by neoliberal postracialism.

41 See Mbembe, "Necropolitics"; Jared Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," *Social Text* 28.2 (2010): 31–56; Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). The idea of a multicentury continuum stretching back to slavery and colonialism and forward to fascist totalitarianism has been theorized by others. In *The Origins of Nazi Violence*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 2003), Enzo Traverso examines the origins of Nazi violence, locating the racism that animated National Socialism in the history of colonization in Africa. For Traverso the concentration camp is not anomalous but rather the logical outcome of a Western colonial mind-set capable of orchestrating mass extermination and industrialized killing. Paul Gilroy examines "the camp" and argues that "camp mentality" informs contemporary racism: *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). Several sf scholars argue similarly. For Maria Varsam, all dystopian worlds strip away individual freedom, especially women's reproductive freedom. For this reason, depictions of slavery constitute "living memory" and may be used to catalyze realization of "the present as history." "Concrete Dystopia: Slavery and Its Others," in *Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination*, ed. Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan (New York: Routledge, 2003), 203–24.

42 Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*, 37.

43 Foucault's work on biopolitics is arguably the most influential, and thus its focus on the Holocaust and its omission of slavery and the practice of slave breeding are instructive in relation to this argument. In the 1975–76 lectures given at the Collège de France and collected in *Society Must Be Defended* and the 1978–79 lectures collected in *The Birth of Biopolitics*, as well as in *The History of Sexuality, Volume I* (1976), Foucault describes the emergence of biopolitical governance. Biopolitical statecraft took root as early as the late eighteenth century; however, it is not until the mid-twentieth century that biopower reaches its apotheosis. Foucault writes that "the entry of the phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques" signaled a decisive historical conjuncture. During World War II, "for the first time in history . . . biological existence was reflected in political existence," and "the life of the species . . . wagered on its own political strategies" (*Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana [New York: Picador, 2003], 254–55, quotes 142–43; hereafter cited parenthetically as SD). Biopolitics targets the population, through

the individual, who is, in turn, abstracted and managed through deployment of norms, standards, and values—the precise forms of governance that Miss Emily describes as emergent in the wake of the Morningdale scandal. As the new methods of statistics, epidemiology, and the biological sciences (including genetics) develop, governance through correction, normalization, and health optimization supersedes discipline and punishment (read: sovereign power), and allows for division of the population into those whose lives are protected and those whose lives may be taken with impunity. This division, was and remains fundamentally racial in character.

In an oft-traversed passage, Foucault explains that racism allows for the entrance of death into biopolitics by "introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control." Racism fragments the field of the biological that power controls, as "it is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population . . . a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain" (SD, 255). For this reason, Foucault concludes, racism, above all else, justifies "the relationship of war" by distinguishing the "enemy" biologically: "The death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer" (SD, 255). In short, in a biopolitical society, "racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable" and that justifies "the murderous function of the State" (SD, 256). Notably, Foucault pinpoints fascist totalitarianism as the historical formation through which older forms of power have passed on their way to becoming racist: "If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty . . . that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist" (SD, 256). Underscoring the centrality of the Nazi example, Foucault observes that "no state could have more disciplinary power than the Nazi regime," as no other state has "so tightly, so insistently, regulated [the biological]" (SD, 259).

As others have pointed out, Foucault never considers four hundred years of racial slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean within the geotemporality of modern biopolitics and his discussion of racism. This omission reifies a Eurocentric worldview, and is enabled by Foucault's complete neglect of the science of slave management and breeding in the new world, the form of plantation governance necessitated by the closure of the transatlantic slave trade and the subsequent transition from continuous importation of new slaves to slave breeding. Although the historians of slavery discussed in chapter 1 do not use Foucauldian language, their research suggests that maximization of life for the master class was exercised through imposition of a "biological caesura" (SD, 255) that was racial in character, and that governance of the slave population was orchestrated through reproductive controls that resulted in the extraction

of reproductive labor and its living products from slaves whose labor was racialized and racializing.

44 On "transvaluation" see Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1977), in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 76–100.

45 The question of the engineered being's capacity to love is a motif rooted in romantic fiction (i.e., *Frankenstein*) and reproduced in modern classics (e.g., *Blade Runner*). See Nussbaum and Sunstein, *Clones and Clones*; Haran et al., *Human Cloning in the Media*.

46 Although Tommy does not produce deferral-worthy art when at Hailsham, he later creates miniature animal portraits in the hope of making a strong case for deferral. The equation of clone art with humanness rings changes on the equation of human ingenuity with patentability. In contemporary patent law, establishment of property in the body is dependent on demonstration of human invention. See Donna Dickenson, "Genomes Up for Grabs: or, Could Dr. Frankenstein Have Patented His Monster?," in *Body Shopping*, 90–114.

47 Stephanie Smallwood, "Commodified Freedom: Interrogating the Limits of Anti-Slavery Ideology in the Early Republic," *Journal of the Early Republic* 24.2 (2004): 289–98.

48 Patterson makes a similar observation from the vantage point of the slave: "Freedom is born, not in the consciousness of the master, but in the reality of the slave's condition" (*Slavery and Social Death*, 98).

49 On choice in neoliberalism, see Nikolas S. Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Elliott, "Suffering Agency." On the irrelevance of rational choice theory to understanding the global organ trade see Scheper-Hughes, "Parts Unknown."

50 Other scholars have examined the adaptation of the slave narrative in speculative or postmodern fiction. What distinguishes the present analysis is the idea that the slave narrative need not be populated by phenotypically black bodies, nor need it expressly depict the historical enslavement of Africans. See A. Timothy Spaulding, *Re-forming the Past: History, the Fantastic, and the Postmodern Slave Narrative* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005); Madhu Dubey, "Speculative Fictions of Slavery," *American Literature* 82.4 (2010): 779–805. Also see Isiah Lavender III, *Race in American Science Fiction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). Lavender advances the universal claim that race need not be expressly depicted for racial difference to impose the principal structuring effect on the genre's narrative strategies. I do not wish to go so far here.

51 See John Sekora, "Black Message/White Envelope: Genre, Authenticity, and Authority in the Antebellum Slave Narrative," *Callaloo* 10.3 (1987): 482–515. Notably, contemporary slave narratives are often curated, as they were in the nineteenth century, by abolitionists. See Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd, eds., *To Plead Our Own Cause: Personal Stories by Today's Slaves* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

52 Georg Lukács, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 83–222.

53 I follow Benjamin in using the term apperception—the perception of our materially altered perception—thus.

54 The song to which Kathy listens was created by Luther Dixon and Jane Monheit for Mark Romanek's and Alex Garland's filmic adaption of the book. The fictional album from which it is taken, *Songs after Dark*, appears to be inspired by the work of Julie London, though some speculate that "Judy Bridgewater" is a clever amalgam of Judy Garland and Dee Dee Bridgewater, and others that Bridgewater is a cover for Ishiguro's real-life musical collaborator, the London-based songwriter Stacey Kent. Ishiguro cowrote four songs for Kent's 2007 album, *Breakfast on the Morning Train*. Though interviews with Ishiguro deny the Kent-Bridgewater connection, she includes an old jazz favorite entitled "Never Let Me Go" on her album.

Jane Monheit's vocal performance of "Never Let Me Go" was released September 14, 2010, on *Never Let Me Go: Original Motion Picture Soundtrack*, by Rachel Portman, Varèse Sarabande, compact disc. See Peter Howell, "The Hunt for the Elusive Judy Bridgewater," *The Star*, September 30, 2010. Thanks to Christina Walter for alerting me to the song's provenance.

55 Benjamin's description resonates powerfully: "A Klee painting . . . shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. . . . This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress" ("Theses," 257–58).

Epilogue

1 Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (1932; New York: Harper Perennial, 1946).

2 At the time of writing, two types of cloning, therapeutic and reproductive, are possible. In the former, cell lines and pluripotent stem cells are reproduced through cloning techniques and multiplied outside of the human body for use in various regenerative therapies. In the latter, gestation of cloned embryos *inside* a female body is the only existent means by which a living organism can come into the world.

3 This requires qualification: unlike the sterile clones in Ishiguro's novel, the clones in *The Island* provide wombs, among other organs. In one pivotal scene, a woman uses her cloned self to deliver a child; as soon as the child is born, the clone is euthanized.

4 Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). In contrast to Edelman, who focuses on "the Child" in discourses of reproductive futurism to the exclusion of the reproductive body, I seek to restore the reproductive body (though not heterosexuality) to the center of the discussion of futurity.

5 See Slavoj Žižek, "*Children of Men* Comments," *Children of Men*, directed by Alfonso Cuarón, DVD (Hollywood: Universal Pictures, 2007); "The Clash of Civilizations at the End of History," Scribd, accessed January 21, 2017, https://www.scribd.com/document/19133296/Zizek-The-Clash-of-Civilizations-at-the-End-of-History. Žižek claims that "the background persists," becoming the real text. For him the story of infertility as a biological problem is merely an extended metaphor for the crisis of Western civilization. Also see Zahid Chaudhary, "Humanity Adrift: Race, Materiality, and Allegory in Alfonso Cuarón's *Children of Men*," *Camera Obscura* 24.3 (2009): 73–109. Chaudhary offers a reading of the background text as a post-9/11 text, one that constitutes a dialectical image and messianic prophesy.

6 On the film as post-9/11 commentary see Žižek, "*Children of Men* Comments"; Chaudhary, "Humanity Adrift"; Jayna Brown, "The Human Project: Utopia, Dystopia, and the Black Heroine in *Children of Men* and *28 Days Later*," *Transitions* 110 (2013): 120–35. On the centrality of reproductive dispossession see Heather Latimer, "Bio-Reproductive Futurism: Bare Life and the Pregnant Refugee in Alfonso Cuarón's *Children of Men*," *Social Text* 29.3 (2011): 51–72; Sayantani DasGupta, "(Re)Conceiving the Surrogate: Maternity, Race, and Reproductive Technologies in Alfonso Cuarón's *Children of Men*," in *Gender Scripts in Medicine and Narrative*, ed. Marcelline Block and Angela Lafler (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 178–211; Sarah Trimble, "Maternal Back/grounds in *Children of Men*: Notes Toward an Arendtian Biopolitics," *Science Fiction Film and Television*, 4.2 (2011): 249–70. Brown and Trimble root Kee's reproductive dispossession in slavery; DasGupta roots it in colonial violence against "Third World women," including Indian surrogates.

7 As critics who take up the novel in relation to the film point out, the main distinction between the two is the racialization of the mother of the future. See DasGupta, "(Re)Conceiving the Surrogate"; Soo Darcy, "Power, Surveillance and Reproductive Technology in P. D. James' *The Children of Men*," in *Women's Utopian and Dystopian Fiction*, ed. Sharon R. Wilson (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2013), 88–111.

8 See Barbara Korte, "Envisioning a Black Tomorrow? Black Mother Figures and the Issue of Representation in *28 Days Later* (2003) and *Children of Men* (2006)," in *Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000+: New Perspectives in Literature, Film and the Arts*, ed. Lars Eckstein et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 315–25; Jonathan Romney, "Green and Pleasant Land," *Film Comment* 43.1 (2007): 32–35; Žižek, "*Children of Men* Comments." Other readings see multivalent possibilities at film's end. Sara Ahmed argues that the bleak and promising are conjoined through the haptic nature of the narrative: "Happy Futures, Perhaps," in *Queer Times, Queer Becom-*

ings, ed. E. L. McCallum and Mikko Tuhkanen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 159–82.

9 Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 51–52.

10 Jennifer Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 12–49.

11 Terryl Bacon and Govinda Dickman, "'Who's the Daddy?' The Aesthetics and Politics of Representation in Alfonso Cuarón's Adaptation of P. D. James's *Children of Men*," in *Adaptation in Contemporary Culture: Textual Infidelities*, ed. Rachel Carroll (New York: Continuum, 2009), 147–59.

12 See DasGutpa, "(Re)Conceiving the Surrogate"; Latimer, "Bio-Reproductive Futurism"; Korte, "Envisioning a Black Tomorrow?" DasGupta argues that Theo's ex-wife may be likened to Elizabeth Stern, the intending mother in the Baby M case. Korte regards Theo as the biblical Joseph and thus as a "surrogate father."