MARKETS OF CIVILIZATION

Islam and Racial Capitalism in Algeria

MURIAM HALEH DAVIS

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For my parents

AFCAL	Association pour la formation et le perfectionnement des cadres agricoles d'Algérie
ALN	Armée de libération nationale
AUMA	Association des 'ulémas musulmans algériens
BNASS	Bureau national d'animation du secteur socialiste
CACAM	Caisse algérienne de crédit agricole mutuel
CAPER	Caisse d'accession à la propriété et l'exploitation rurale
CDC	Caisse des dépôts et consignations
CEDA	Caisse d'équipement du développement de l'Algérie
CGP	Commissariat général au plan
CHEAM	Centre des hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes
CIRL	Centre international d'études pour la rénovation du libéralisme
CREA	Centre de recherches économiques appliquées
DRS	Défense et restauration des sols
ENA	Étoile nord-africaine
FA	Fédération anarchiste
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFS	Front des forces socialistes
FIDES	Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social
FIO	Fédération internationale d'oléiculture

FIS	Front islamique du salut
FLN	Front de libération nationale
GPRA	Gouvernement provisoire de la République Algérienne
ICO	Information et correspondance ouvrière
IEDES	Institut d'études du développement économique et sociale
INA	Institut national agronomique
INSEE	Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques
IRFED	Institut international de recherche de formation éducation et développement
MNA	Mouvement national algérien
MPS	Mont Pèlerin Society
MTLD	Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques
OAS	Organisation de l'armée secrète
OCDE	Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques
OCRS	Organisation commune des régions sahariennes
OECE	Organisation européenne de coopération économique
OFALAC	Office algérien d'action économique et touristique
ONACO	Office national de commercialisation
ONRA	Office national de la réforme agraire
PCA	Parti communiste algérien
PCF	Parti communiste français
SAP	Sections agricoles de prévoyance
SAS	Sections administratives spécialisées
SCET	Société centrale d'équipement du territoire
SEAA	Secrétariat d'État chargé des affaires algériennes
SEDES	Société d'études pour le développement économique et social
SGCI	Secrétariat général du comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne
SIP	Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance
UGTA	Union générale des travailleurs algériens

In transliterating words from Arabic, I have used a modified version of the guidelines of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (*IJMES*), omitting all diacritics except for the ayn (ʿ) and hamza (ʾ). I have adopted the most common spellings for proper names (i.e., Ben Bella rather than Ibn or Bin Balla, Oran rather than Wahran), at times leaving out the ayn or hamza (as with Ferhat Abbas). In general, I have used the more common spelling in the body of the text (fellah, Abdel Nasser), but opted for a more accurate transliteration when citing these terms in the endnotes (fallah, ʿAbd al-Nasir).

Working between common French and English transliteration produced a few inconsistencies. For example, the definite article in Arabic is often written *al-* in English, but I have kept the original spelling when quoting from French sources (as in El Khayen or el baraka). I have followed a similar strategy in my endnotes; when French sources use a spelling different from my transliteration, I remain true to the former. For example, while I have transliterated the term for ex-combatants from the War of Independence as *anciens mujahidin* in the text, the term sometimes appears as *anciens moudjahidine* when I cite French archives. The notes also alternate between French and English titles for organizations. I have opted to use English names when the French translation is clear (Direction of the Plan and Economic Studies, General Planning Commission), but otherwise used the original French (Caisse d'accession à la propriété et l'exploitation rurale). My goal has been to make these terms legible for my readers so they can navigate archival catalogs or follow up on my references. In documenting the many organizations that played a role in economic development, as well as their acronyms, readers will find English translations in parentheses following the original French.

This book analyzes how the market acts as a moral system that permeates the most unexpected domains. As a result, I am reluctant to say that I have accumulated intellectual debts or created obligations of reciprocity. Instead, this work reflects forms of collectivity and the contributions of friends and colleagues who have shared insights, resources, and care. Despite the idealist fantasies that underpin intellectual production, I have benefited from institutional support to complete this research, including grants from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Institute for Maghreb Studies (AIMS). The Institut d'histoire du temps présent (IHTP) and NYU's global research initiative generously offered me an intellectual community in Paris as I finished the dissertation. A Fulbright fellowship allowed me to spend a year at the European University Institute (EUI) as a Max Weber postdoctoral fellow. A Hellman fellowship supported subsequent archival research, and the IMéRA in Marseille provided a space of discussion and camaraderie. The UCHRI and the Humanities Institute (THI) at the University of California at Santa Cruz (UCSC) allowed me to workshop the manuscript and provided assistance with the final publication.

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It must be emphasized that the destiny of modern civilization as developed by the white peoples in the last two hundred years is inseparably linked with the fate of economic science.

Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*

INTRODUCTION

On April 1, 1947, the Swiss diplomat William Rappard gave the opening lecture at the first meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Organized by Friedrich Hayek, the gathering brought together dozens of economists, intellectuals, and politicians who were committed to promoting free enterprise and a competitive market economy. According to Rappard, they sought to reinvent a postwar liberal order during a "tragic age" when economic man "everywhere [had] been obliged to put on a national uniform and seek national security more than general welfare."[1] Rappard had dedicated his career to the principles of economic liberalism, in both Europe and its empire. He had spent eighteen years as the director of the mandates section at the League of Nations, which was responsible for administering the colonies carved out of the Ottoman and German empires after World War I, and headed the Swiss delegation to the International Labor Organization from 1945 to 1956.[2] Though committed to the cause of world peace, he maintained that colonialism was necessary since vital resources were often located in countries whose native populations lacked the capacity to properly exploit these potential sites of development.[3]

It was perhaps these professional experiences that led him to reflect on the alleged universality of Adam Smith's writings, which "assumed that the average man always and everywhere, sought to obtain the maximum of material satisfaction at a minimum cost of effort."[4] In his speech Rappard also recounted his time in Algeria during the landing of the Allied forces in November 1942. He had been "impressed by the sight of the Arabs seated on the curb of the sidewalks," he said, who "seemed quite indifferent to what was going on" and were "absolutely idle." A French friend explained that "the Arabs in Algiers never did any more work than was absolutely necessary," noting that attempts by the French governor general to double their rations

had actually reduced their productivity.[5] This led Rappard to conclude that the figure of economic man—homo economicus—was based on a Scottish template. He was, at heart, an industrious "Nordic mountaineer" who loved freedom and viewed wealth in a positive light. Rappard then asked: Would Smith have defended the universality of homo economicus if he had been "reared among the sun-baked race of Arabs who prefer leisure to work, security on the lowest scale to the insecurity of initiative and therefore equality to liberty?"[6] Rappard's comments echoed the concerns of colonial officials, who had long tried to increase the productivity of native subjects. His comments also revealed a concern that racial differences, and their attendant cultural codes, would be insurmountable sources of resistance to human and economic development. As European countries embarked on colonial development programs after World War II, economists and politicians revisited older debates on the relationship between race and the economy in which cultural superiority was assumed to be the key factor in Europe's material development. In the process, they promoted market exchange as an essential weapon in defending Western civilization and combating the twin threats of totalitarianism and decolonization.[7]

Rappard's musings on cultural difference and the drive to secure material wealth highlight that postwar economic reforms were articulated in the long shadow of empire. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the figure of homo economicus had emerged as a model of human behavior against the foil of Ottoman piracy. Philosophers pointed to the economic and political backwardness of so-called Oriental despotism, which was organized around an "economy of enjoyment" rather than production.[8] Orientalist fantasies about Islam crystallized in the figure of homo islamicus during the nineteenth century. This trope expressed the widespread understanding that Muslims were fundamentally distinct from so-called Western man, the economically self-interested individual who epitomized the liberal subject of European modernity.[9] As I demonstrate in this book, the twin figures of homo economicus and homo islamicus were also invoked by the colonial administrators, economists, and politicians who implemented economic reforms in late colonial and postcolonial Algeria.

This book contends that Algeria provides a useful case study for scholars working outside the Atlantic world interested in how "rights in property are contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with race."[10] The following chapters trace how colonial officials and metropolitan planners identified the economic capacities of Muslims as a key variable in the success of developmental policies.[11] In drafting economic blueprints, they drew on

ethnographic knowledge that reified the existing boundaries between ethnic and religious groups. They also sought to confront the "obstacles" that traditional strategies for organizing families, property, and wealth posed to economic growth.[12] In the process, economism, a belief that economic factors are the motor of social and political action, emerged as a technology of racial difference; the tension between homo economicus, the exemplar of European economic modernity, and homo islamicus, the model of native social practices, provided a basic grammar that structured debates on colonial policy. The tension between these two figures was especially evident in the decades leading up to decolonization, when French officials intensified their attempts to bring Algerian natives into the fold of a productive market economy and redefined French empire as a "modernizing mission."[13] It also influenced Algerian attempts to define national identity after 1962, when Islam was considered fundamental to the creation of revolutionary subjects.

Racial Regimes of Religion

The French state progressively occupied Algerian territory over the course of the nineteenth century, establishing a system of rule in which religion represented a set of origins and imagined bloodlines that structured access to property, citizenship, and livelihood.[14] Islam did not merely justify unequal access to economic value but rather constituted the very terms in which economic policies were envisaged and implemented. This book argues that Islam formed the basis of a racial regime of religion, revealing the porous boundary between race and religion. It considers different moments in which colonial officials, social scientists, French politicians, and Algerian nationalists debated economic policies in light of their understandings of the economic aptitudes and capacities of Muslims. Drawing on archival material and interviews, it analyzes how the French and Algerian states introduced economic and social reforms from the interwar period (1918–39) to the first years of Algerian independence under President Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–65).

The heart of this narrative arc takes place in the late 1950s, when the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) and European integration led French officials to introduce the Constantine Plan, which outlined major economic and social reforms. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, liberal politicians articulated the need to include Algeria in the nascent European Economic Community and insisted on an intimate link between economic develop-

ment and military pacification. After World War II, politicians across Europe adopted liberal economic policies and tried to disavow the importance of racial categories in organizing economic and political inequalities. Rather than demonizing Islam or espousing arguments based on biological racism, observers described Muslims as particularly susceptible to pan-Islamism, a political threat that mirrored the dangers of communism.[15] The French scholar René Jammes, for example, wrote that both Muslims and communists were inherently against free thought and concluded that a Muslim was, in many ways, "very close to a material communist." The difference between them, he argued, was "purely formal"—Muslims proclaimed fidelity to Allah, while communists worshiped the "laws of nature."[16]

Jammes's comments underscore how the geopolitical realities of postwar Europe shaped dominant attitudes to economic orthodoxies and religious attachments. Liberal economists repurposed Smith's writings to address the threat of totalitarianism, which they saw emanating from diverse sources, including communism and fascism.[17] The body of thought they developed from the late 1930s to the 1960s has come to be understood as an early articulation of neoliberalism in France.[18] Yet there are good reasons to study how decolonization shaped these economic debates. Broadening the geographic scope challenges the notion that the history of economic thought is the purview of a narrow circle of intellectuals in Europe and helps foreground the role of race in fashioning the modern subject as one who embodied the values of individualism, progress, and private property. Economists and philosophers long debated whether these principles could apply to so-called Oriental subjects, understanding their alleged fatalism and communalism to be rooted in Islam.[19]

As feminist critics have noted, the figure of the rational European individual (man) was also the subject of property and self-interest.[20] Anxieties about gender also played out in discussions on economic prosperity in Algeria as colonial officials sought to protect the virility of empire against racial degeneration. Issues of sexual practice and the question of polygamy became a pretext for excluding Algerian Muslims from French citizenship after 1865.[21] Liberal notions of the self were defined against subjects—colonized populations and women—who were supposedly governed by dangerous passions rather than self-interest. This provided a ready vocabulary for making sense of pan-Islamism and communism after World War II.[22] From the 1950s to the present, economic reforms promoted by local governments and international financial institutions have ushered in new forms of dispossession, as Julia Elyachar has brilliantly elucidated in the case

of Egypt. Even if organizations such as the World Bank and IMF now shy away from the patently Eurocentric vocabulary of civilization, they nevertheless promote specific social values in the name of an allegedly universal form of economic rationality.[23]

Following the work of Edward Said, postcolonial theory and representations of Islam have often been analyzed separately from the material ways in which capitalism organized the distribution of resources.[24] Yet by insisting that the realm of economic interest was constructed against the passionate attachments of religion and race, this book indicates one possible rapprochement between political economy and postcolonial theory. The notion that universal human interest constitutes a self-evident domain underpins many Marxist approaches, which argue that "no matter what the subjective clothing, objectively constituted needs, aspirations, and capacity will express themselves in resistance to exploitation and oppression everywhere and in all times."[25] These debates intensified after the 2013 publication of Vivek Chibber's *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, which defends the use of universal categories in studying global capitalist development. In particular, Chibber takes issue with postcolonial approaches that highlight the specificity of capitalism in colonial contexts and critique the Eurocentrism of orthodox Marxism.[26]

This argument overlooks the fact that philosophers and political theorists upheld the ability to recognize supposedly objective interests as a mark of European (masculine) individuality.[27] An awareness of material self-interest was understood to be a civilizational capacity that certain people did not possess. Put differently, the ability of Europeans to recognize allegedly universal interests was defined against the inability of colonized subjects to embody the values of economic modernity. In Algeria, appeals to "universal human interests" were part of colonialism's lexicon for maintaining the division between subjects and citizens. Moreover, the conceptual distinction between homo economicus and homo islamicus had concrete effects on how capitalism was introduced and organized.

Muslims were not the only religious group whose racialization dovetailed with economic anxieties regarding the global capitalist order. In the nineteenth century, politicians often conflated Jewishness and communism, resulting in the widespread fear that Judeo-Bolshevism was a major threat to Europe.[28] The figure of the Jew, like that of the Muslim, had been associated with deviant economic behaviors and served as a foil for a French identity grounded in Christianity.[29] Moreover, the consolidation of France's colonization of North Africa in the late nineteenth century coincided with

the rise of the myth of Jewish financial power. This should encourage us to think relationally about anti-Semitism and the racialization of Muslims.[30] If the entanglements between anti-Semitism and French attitudes toward Islam are increasingly well-trodden territory, we might ask why there has been such reluctance among scholars of French history to treat Islam as a racial category.[31] Part of the reason surely resides in a modern attachment to the division between race and religion. For many observers, race is understood to be based on "permanent" features such as skin color, biology, or physiognomy, while religion is presumed to describe the more flexible realm of belief, ritual, and faith.

This analytic division between race and religion underpins current debates in France over Islamophobia and "Islamo-leftism." Those who deny that Islamophobia is a form of racial discrimination often argue that it is fundamentally misguided to draw on the vocabulary of race when discussing religion, which they claim is a personal choice.[32] Yet such a reading reveals a basic misunderstanding of race as an analytical category. As Stuart Hall reminds us, "the discursive conception of race—as the central term organizing the great classificatory systems of difference in modern human history—recognizes that all attempts to ground the concept scientifically… have been shown to be untenable."[33] In this book, I treat religion as a particular expression of racial thought that was used to categorize humanity and that emerged in specific historical contests over symbolic and material resources. Ethnologists and anthropologists often invoked biology, bloodlines, and origin when determining racial categories. But they also referenced religion as a factor that shaped biological reproduction and was responsible for specific cultural or physiological traits.

In recent decades, scholars of the French empire have shown that race was a factor in constructing and policing colonial legal structures, categories of citizenship, and boundaries of national belonging.[34] The field has also seen heated debates over the role of republicanism in promoting inequalities.[35] Focusing on the legal frameworks of the empire, however, risks reproducing the color-blind fantasies of the French state, whose republican values discourage explicit references to the racial categories that structure economic and political precarity. Rather than studying the mechanisms of formal belonging, this work focuses on economic policies to elucidate the functioning of a racial regime of religion. On the basis of religion, Muslims in Algeria were disproportionately subjected to racism as Ruth Wilson Gilmore defines it: "state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death."[36] This is not to

claim that Islam inevitably operated as a racial category wherever European colonialists encountered indigenous Muslims, although a number of scholars have fruitfully investigated the racialization of Islam on a global scale and have questioned the analytic distinction between race and religion. Cemil Aydin argues that the concept of the "Muslim world" has offered a racialized language for understanding Islam from the late nineteenth century to the present, while other scholars have focused on how the American War on Terror has created a global geography of Islamophobia that overlaps with racial categories.[37] My research, however, highlights Algeria's status as a settler colony and the need to remain attentive to specific racial formations.

The history of colonial Algeria elucidates how Islam emerged as a racial sediment or remainder even as the allegedly secularizing force of modernity perpetuated the myth that religion had been expunged from the scientific interpretation of nature.[38] Centuries before the "new imperialism" in Africa, religious prejudice had taken the shape of biological racism in Europe. During the early modern period, Spain and Portugal defined religious categories in terms of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood) and policed what they feared were "false" conversions, revealing how declarations of religious belonging surpassed the frame of theological commitments.[39] Race and religion were also intimately linked in Latin America, where understandings of human differentiation into castes had been imported from the Iberian Peninsula. In colonial India, the notion of caste introduced a social hierarchy centered on religious notions of purity and pollution that were also expressed in biological terms.[40] Other examples of colonization within Europe, such as the British conquest of Ireland, also blurred the line between religious and racial conflicts.[41]

This book places the history of economic development in colonial and postcolonial Algeria within larger discussions about racial capitalism that expose how understandings of human difference determined which kinds of bodies would be subjected to extraction, violence, and legal exception. In the 1970s, South African Marxists used the notion of racial capitalism to theorize the capitalist system's coexistence with, and indeed reliance on, native reserves created for black Africans. Inhabitants of these Bantustans provided occasional wage labor but were mostly dependent on a subsistence economy and extended kin relations. Discussions of capitalist economic organization structured by noncapitalist societies were subsequently revisited by scholars working on the Atlantic slave trade and settler colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. Cedric Robinson, for example, insists that the racialism of the feudal order in Europe was foundational for the emergence of capitalist society.[42] A number of scholars, including W. E. B. Du Bois, Oliver

Cromwell Cox, C. L. R. James, and Stuart Hall, have exposed the intimate relationship between capitalism and race, showing that racial thought cannot be invoked as a mere justification for the inequalities produced by the capitalist system.

A number of questions arise when engaging with these debates in light of the specific racial formation introduced by French colonialism: What does it mean to use the tools of racial capitalism in a context where religion—not skin color—served as the basis for legal exclusion and economic precarity? If debates on race tend to be informed by American history, how can historians working on other racial formations develop a vocabulary for thinking about racial capitalism? We should also be wary of invoking race to describe every instance of human difference, which voids the historical and analytic power of the term.

In bringing the theoretical apparatus of race to bear on religion, my approach differs from ontological approaches to blackness as well as from sociological and phenomenological approaches to Islam. Those looking for a history from below will almost certainly be disappointed. Scholars have documented the fluidity of religious and economic power, notably in the context of *zawiyas*, the religious institutions rooted in popular forms of Islam that were loci of anticolonial resistance in the nineteenth century.[43] Islamic traditions affected patterns of economic power, land use, and even the accumulation of merchant capital. For example, religious notables were exempt from taxation, but they also controlled *hubus* properties, which had been granted as religious endowments.[44] Qur'anic laws relating to inheritance structured land tenure across the region and played an important role in the organization of merchant capital in the Middle East and North Africa from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.[45] Major religious institutions, such as al-Azhar in Egypt, had a hand in managing the flow of wealth and collecting taxes.[46]

Islam established a set of imaginaries that governed aspects of the daily lives of Algeria's inhabitants and contributed to their understanding of geopolitics.[47] Yet religion was not only a lived reality; it was also an object of government. Understandings of racial-religious difference played a central role in how planners, experts, and politicians on both sides of the Mediterranean conceived and implemented economic policies. There is certainly much to say about how individuals navigated categories fabricated by the colonial state and understood their own identities in Algerian society. This book, however, takes a different tack, charting how the French racial state

drew on economic policies to "fashion, modify, and reify the terms of racial expression, as well as racist exclusions and subjection" in Algeria.[48]

The legal status of Algeria, which was not technically a colony but rather incorporated into the French nation as three departments, is fundamental to this story.[49] The establishment of a settler colony relied on a central contradiction: while Algerian territory was assimilated to mainland France after 1848, political rights were nevertheless foreclosed to the majority of the population until the mid-twentieth century. The French state classified native Algerians (i.e., those living in the territory prior to the French invasion) as either Muslim (*indigènes musulmans* or *musulmans d'Algérie*) or Jewish (*israélites indigènes*). When Jews achieved French citizenship *en bloc* in 1870, the adjective *Muslim* became legally synonymous with native status. Stated differently, the epistemic violence of the colonial system made Islam synonymous with the status of an *indigène*—a word with deeply pejorative connotations in French. Meanwhile, the adjective *algérien*—the most obvious descriptor for the original Muslim and Jewish inhabitants—was appropriated by European settlers at the end of the nineteenth century and again during the interwar period. Because this book is interested primarily in the state's production and management of racial categories, it at times employs the term *native* to refer to Muslims who were subjected to the exceptional legal practices reserved for indigenous subjects. The following chapters argue that this slippage must be understood in terms of the material structures of race and work to expose the deep entanglements among religious, racial, and national categories that were fashioned over 132 years of colonial rule.

The Political Economy of the French Empire

Prior to the French invasion in 1830, Algeria was a province of the Ottoman Empire whose rural economy depended on the production of agricultural surplus.[50] Land could belong to the state (*beylik*), be held collectively by groups belonging to a particular lineage (*'arsh*), or be possessed by individuals (*milk*). A sharecropping system, in which workers received a share of the harvest in exchange for their labor, also developed in parts of the territory.[51] In addition, access to the Mediterranean provided a major source of revenue for the Barbary corsairs who ransomed slaves captured as far afield as Iceland or Ireland. Trans-Saharan caravans linked Algeria to its African hinterland, helping Jewish and Ibadi merchants acquire wealth.[52] The increased presence of Europeans in the nineteenth century introduced new commodities and

shifted existing trade routes, though it was not until the twentieth century that "maritime traffic replaced the ship of the dessert."[53]

The French invasion of Algeria in 1830 was driven by domestic political concerns and justified by economic motivations. King Charles X claimed that the conquest would end the activities of Barbary corsairs and settle French debts resulting from the purchase of wheat during the revolutionary wars. It was not until 1848 that Algerian territory was legally annexed to the mainland in a decision that subsequently led to the expropriation of native lands. The settlement of Europeans on Algerian territory required significant economic investment. Direct and indirect taxes disproportionately targeted Muslim Algerians, who financed economic development that largely benefited the settler population, such as the construction of basic infrastructure. Algerians provided cheap labor for Europeans, working as sharecroppers and wage laborers. This trend accelerated after the introduction of vineyards to Algeria in the 1860s.[54] Agricultural capitalism found fertile ground in the expropriation of native labor and benefited from colonial credit structures. While some economists, such as Jean-Baptiste Say, advocated for the introduction of a liberal market economy as part of a call for "virtuous empire" in the early years of colonization, the laissez-faire model of settlement gave way to official colonization in the 1840s.[55] The late nineteenth century saw the consolidation of a system of colonial capitalism in which the large-scale confiscation of land, alongside fiscal measures that disproportionately extracted wealth from indigenous Algerians, led to widespread rural impoverishment.[56]

By the beginning of World War I, the Algerian economy was a classic example of the colonial pact, in which territories in Africa or Asia provided primary materials for Europe and markets for manufactured goods. As Rosa Luxembourg wrote in 1913, "next to tormented British India, Algeria under French rule claims pride of place in the annals of capitalist colonization."[57] This situation led many observers to conclude that Algeria suffered from a so-called dual economy, where a capitalist European sector existed alongside a native economy defined by precapitalist modes of production.[58] It was not until the interwar period that the colonial pact was questioned by colonial officials, who for the first time started to promote a strategy of modernization and state investment.

Scholars remain divided over how to understand the turn to economic development during the interwar period. French historian Jacques Marseille argued that the main sectors of imperial capitalist accumulation ceased to be profitable after World War I, leading to a "divorce" between empire and

metropolitan capital.[59] Empire, he claimed, had become a financial burden rather than a motor of economic growth for the metropole. Algeria was especially to blame for this crisis since the territory was responsible for more than half of all spending in the French empire from 1945 to 1958.[60] Marseille's analysis opened the door to arguments that increased state investment should be viewed as an act of political generosity, not as an indication of economic pragmatism. A student of Marseille, Daniel Lefeuvre, subsequently illustrated France's supposed magnanimity by observing that metropolitan France continued to buy goods from Algeria at inflated prices in the early 1930s despite the global financial crisis.[61]

Specialists of French empire have taken issue with the empirical grounding of Marseille's work.[62] But this revisionist analysis cannot be understood outside of the seemingly inexhaustible polemics in France regarding colonial memory.[63] A parliamentary law passed in 2005 included an article requiring high school teachers to inform students about the "positive role" of colonization, particularly in North Africa. Although the article was repealed by presidential decree, the political debates set the stage for Lefeuvre's second book, published in 2006, which lamented the display of "repentance" for French colonialism.[64] This reading of economic policy is symptomatic of the tendency to prioritize quantitative approaches that view economic history in terms of profitability in order to provide a cost-benefit analysis. These debates generally overlook how economic discourses have "enabled signs of power to function" and offered the promise of sociological transformations.[65] Undoubtedly, colonial officials viewed rising poverty levels after World War I as a threat to imperial rule and felt compelled to introduce economic reforms to bolster native welfare.[66] But colonial officials were not inspired by generosity; they adopted the doctrine of economic development (or *mise en valeur*) because they believed it was necessary to preserve French colonial influence. In tethering political economy to a seemingly rational description of material interests, Marseille and Lefeuvre provide a sanitized account of the economics of empire. A more complete analysis of how their studies were informed by discourses that espoused a "triumphant neoliberal globalization" remains to be written.[67]

Other scholars, less infatuated with quantitative approaches, have taken up William Sewell Jr.'s injunction to study the "economic life" of French empire.[68] This research considers the embedded nature of economic activities to be a rich site for understanding "social ties, cultural assumptions, and political processes."[69] While acknowledging that political economy generated myths about race—positing certain groups as more productive than others,

for example—this approach often treats race as an ideological justification for capitalism's uneven exploitation of the workforce. By contrast, my research insists that the very articulation of economic orthodoxies and the concomitant appeal to capacities, social structures, and moral codes was itself a technology of racial difference. Colonial officials certainly invoked a lack of productivity to stigmatize certain populations, but articulations of liberal economic orthodoxies were themselves inseparable from the genealogy of racial thought.

After World War II, economic development on both sides of the Mediterranean sought to abolish the forces of "conservativism and restriction" associated with state protection.[70] The resulting commitment to a market economy reshaped the understandings of racial difference that had been established in the nineteenth century. Economic planners were increasingly confident about the transformational capabilities of market incentives, thanks to the new social scientific tools at their disposal. They drew on the postwar disciplines of economic planning, rural sociology, and behavioral psychology to improve the material conditions of Algerians. Rather than casting native subjects as fanatical or biologically inferior, however, they focused on the economic capacities of Muslim inhabitants. This reflected a broader shift following World War II, when the Holocaust prompted many scholars and politicians to replace scientific understandings of race with discourses that centered on cultural difference.[71] The transition from biological to cultural racism, which occurred in the crucible of decolonization and the Cold War, also influenced economic orthodoxies. Colonial officials and economic planners subsequently "recast racial difference in terms of economic futures" and articulated a new language for understanding poverty and underdevelopment.[72]

State support for colonial development increased after World War II. Efforts to restructure the French Empire led to the creation of the French Community in 1958, which eliminated references to France's imperial project overseas. This gradual, if largely symbolic, retreat from empire increasingly prioritized liberal colonial development and European integration. The Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique des territoires d'outremer (FIDES; Investment Fund for the Economic and Social Development of Overseas France) was created in 1946 to encourage the modernization of French colonial territories in Africa. Though Algeria was not included in this organization, it became an integral part of the European Economic Community after the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

The close links between mainland France and its three Algerian departments came into stark relief during the Algerian War of Independence

(1954–62). The ensuing political crisis brought down the Fourth Republic in 1958, as right-wing partisans of French Algeria staged a coup against the government. This prompted Charles de Gaulle to come out of retirement in order to lead the country and create the Fifth Republic. The day before the constitution was adopted, he announced an ambitious program of social and economic reform in Algeria, known as the Constantine Plan. He gave the following orders to Paul Delouvrier, who was in charge of its execution: "You must pacify and administer [Algeria], but at the same time, you must transform it."[73] De Gaulle hoped that by bringing Algeria into the orbit of material progress, he would undercut the economic misery that animated the anticolonial uprising. This vision clearly did not come to pass, as Algeria won independence just four years later.

My analysis of the political economy of late colonial Algeria is consistent with the findings of Samir Saul, who rejects the claim that decolonization was driven by the imperatives of French capitalism.[74] Rather than being seduced by the economic profits of empire or clinging to a last-ditch attempt to save colonial rule, French officials hoped that the Constantine Plan would give rise to a symbiotic economic relationship after independence. A sovereign Algeria seemed increasingly probable after de Gaulle's speech on September 16, 1959, which proposed self-determination as a potential solution to the crisis. The extreme violence of the war, which included the exercise of torture, the introduction of regroupment camps, and the use of psychological warfare, has led historians to consider economic development as a palliative measure to maintain French sovereignty. This view, in which the plan was too little, too late, was undoubtedly shared by some colonial officials at the time. Yet the following chapters do not focus on the alleged failures or successes of the Constantine Plan. Instead, they chart how it attempted to transform Muslims into subjects who owned property, used credit, calculated future profitability, and employed heavy machinery to harvest crops.[75] Rather than political arguments about French sovereignty, this book is interested in how late colonial capitalism operated "through racial projects that assign[ed] differential value to human life and labor."[76]

Figures of Economic Modernity

The Constantine Plan is but one example of how debates on political economy relied on assumptions about religious and racial difference.[77] Max Weber famously explained the flourishing of capitalism in Europe in terms of the Protestant belief that material success was a sign of divine

election. The problem with Islam, he argued, was that it emphasized predetermination rather than predestination.[78] While Calvinists were driven to hard work, believing that material success signaled that they were among the elect, Muslims, in contrast, suffered from fatalism. These differences in behavior were not rooted exclusively in religious dogma, however. Weber viewed religion as a force that shaped biological reproduction and explained the geographical isolation and marriage patterns that gave rise to cultural traits. Moreover, in the introduction to *The Protestant Ethic*, he admitted the importance of hereditary and biological factors in creating attitudes toward capitalism, hoping that advances in neurology and psychology would confirm his analysis.[79]

The figures of homo islamicus and homo economicus are figments of a collective imagination; the individual who perfectly embodies the self-interested principles of the market, or who exemplifies the alleged fatalism of religion, cannot be found in the archives. The fact that these subjects are ideal forms rather than identifiable actors does not diminish their ability to shape the course of history. But this does not mean that we should banish them to the world of theory—a realm supposedly separate from "real" empirical events. As Georg Simmel has written, conceptual forms not only provide patterns for social relationships, but they also allow events to be legible over time and space, synthesizing "fundamental categories of life."[80] Homo economicus and homo islamicus emerged through the historical experience of colonization and structured the possible futures envisioned by colonial administrators, social scientists, and Algerian nationalists. Admittedly, colonial officials and economic planners never expressed a singular view of economic development or the capacities of Muslims to contribute to material progress. Despite this lack of consensus, homo economicus and homo islamicus provided a vocabulary for debates on economic policy in Algeria.

Just as focusing on the peasant or proletariat enabled historians to recount disparate events in a singular narrative and join the particular to the generalizable, an account of these two figures reveals assumptions about human nature that shaped colonial governance and economic thought. When Ranajit Guha, one of the founders of the subaltern studies group, argued that the Indian peasant was "denied recognition as a subject of history," he did not mean that Indians refused to engage in agriculture.[81] Instead, he highlighted how colonial mindsets imposed a "cultural value form" that made certain subjectivities illegible.[82] If homo islamicus and homo economicus present a conceptual dichotomy, this is not to deny the

rare historical examples of Algerian natives who were able to accumulate capital or to argue that Islamic thought has remained silent on questions of economic organization.[83] Rather, the coherence attributed to each of these signifiers is the result of a colonial governmentality that depended on an analytic distinction between Western rationality and Eastern spirituality. The partitioning of Islam from economism helps explain why, to quote Max Weber, "certain types of rationalization have appeared in the Occident, and only there."[84] My intent is not to reproduce a reified understanding of the economy and Islam as two separate domains but rather to trace how this worldview undergirded the construction of colonial governance.

Chapter 1 begins by studying the implantation of a settler colony in Algeria over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It demonstrates how French colonial rule established a racial regime of religion that was constructed around Islam and argues that a racial fix reconciled the tension between the two imperatives of encouraging European settlement and introducing a rational capitalist economy. The seizure of native lands was underpinned by a racial genealogy that defined Arab Muslims, in contrast to Berbers, as inherently ill-adapted to agriculture. As Islam became the pillar of legal and economic exclusion over the course of the nineteenth century, European settlers and Algerian Jews experienced a form of whitening. Colonial administrators and metropolitan observers posited an essential opposition between homo islamicus and homo economicus, and their policies also foreclosed Algerian Muslims from the quintessential figure of European economic modernity: the proletariat.[85]

In the aftermath of World War I, colonial officials and metropolitan economists advocated for greater investment in infrastructure as they began to view Algerians as potential sources of human capital instead of mere recipients of French aid. Chapter 2 therefore focuses on the interwar period, in which planners sought to include Algeria in an economically integrated Europe and asked whether a rapprochement between homo islamicus and homo economicus was indeed possible. It traces how the emerging geographic unit of Eurafrica blended a new technocratic vocation with an older racial discourse on the Mediterranean. Writers and colonial officials resurrected the figure of the "Mediterranean man" to describe Algeria as a cultural and racial melting pot, which in reality foregrounded the European settler inhabitants and relegated Arab Muslims to a marginal role. These tropes also had a concrete influence on economic policy: the standardization of crops such as olive oil and wine, symbols of Mediterranean identity par excellence, discouraged the agricultural techniques and preferences associated with

Muslim producers. At the same time, these measures promoted financial support and a system of classification that bolstered European production.

Chapter 3 focuses on the role of social Catholics and colonial administrators such as Paul Delouvrier in French economic planning. After World War II, economists and technocrats—a class of state experts who took the reins of the Fourth Republic—expressed a newfound confidence in the ability of economic planning to transform homo islamicus into homo economicus. This was particularly evident in the Constantine Plan. Consistent with neoliberalism's tendency to forget or "wipe away the terms of reference" that structure racial domination, the Constantine Plan effectively elided the racial regime of religion constructed by the colonial state.[86] In adopting new social scientific tools, often imported from the United States, planners analyzed economic disparities in a color-blind framework that denied the historical link between Muslim natives and poverty.

The modernizing planners of the Fifth Republic nevertheless expressed anxiety that the peasant, an important symbol of French national identity, was vanishing due to postwar reconstruction. In Algeria, colonial officials understood the *fellah* (plural, *fellahin*; Arabic for peasant or farmer) as a particularly stubborn version of homo islamicus. According to this view, their deep connection to religion prevented them from embracing the values that defined the French peasant. In the eyes of French officials, Muslims were resistant to adopting the norms of private property, growing crops for export rather than subsistence, or grasping the notion of credit. This essentialized notion of the fellah, which became a symbol for Algerian nationalism, was also shaped by the work of sociologists and revolutionaries such as Pierre Bourdieu and Frantz Fanon.

Chapters 4 and 5 investigate how a range of actors sought to refashion the relationship between homo islamicus and homo economicus after independence. The fifth chapter focuses on the presidency of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–65) and the policies of agricultural self-management and land reform. These initiatives were the cornerstone of Ben Bella's attempt to introduce an authentically Algerian socialism based on Islam. For the postcolonial regime, questions of planning aimed not only to redistribute economic resources, but more fundamentally to instigate the sociological transformation of Algerian citizens. In 1962, Layashi Yaker, Algeria's representative to the United Nations, argued before the UN General Assembly that "the transformation of colonized man into productive man" would be the basis of Algerian policy.[87] By positing a specifically Algerian socialism rooted in Islam, Ben Bella drew

on the local vernacular of religion to forge an indigenous articulation of economic policy in the context of decolonization.

French experts had cast Islam as inherently resistant to a market economy, but Ben Bella upheld Islamic history as proof that Algerians had an innate propensity for socialism. The politics of the Non-Aligned Movement also forced him to navigate Algeria's sometimes fraught relationship with pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. The racial legacies of French empire had defined a "white" North Africa in contrast to a "black" sub-Saharan Africa, while also isolating Algeria from the eastern Mediterranean. This colonial history helps explain why Islam, rather than Arabness, provided the cornerstone for the revolutionary identity of the model citizen in the new nation-state. Ben Bella's vision deviated from the political aims and economic orthodoxies of colonial development, but it nevertheless perpetuated the assumption that economic planning should express a set of essential civilizational attributes rooted in Islam. This echoed the experience of state-building across the Middle East and North Africa, as intellectuals and politicians debated how the racial formations constructed by imperial policies would be expressed in a national frame after decolonization.

While the ideology of the Algerian nation-state promoted an anticapitalist orientation through appeals to Islam, French leftists understood the implications of Algerian independence differently. The final chapter shows how decolonization fashioned economic orthodoxies in France by analyzing how radical Third Worldists and officials engaged in cooperation policies viewed the place of religion in postcolonial economic development. While secular leftists often viewed official references to Islam as an indication of a feudal mentality, liberal *coopérants* believed that Islam would play an important role in development by providing a cultural framework. Put differently, while French liberals engaged with cultural difference in the service of development programs, the far left understood religious difference as an obstacle to international socialism. While the former adopted a culturalist reading of Islam that overlooked how religion had structured underdevelopment, the latter maintained that religion had no place in a properly revolutionary society. Told from this vantage point, the story of postcolonial Algeria demonstrates how decolonization shaped the analytic models available for thinking about race and capitalism in France.

Algerian intellectuals sought new tools to make sense of national identity and economic underdevelopment after 1962. The epilogue returns to Algeria, focusing on Salah Bouakouir, a technocrat who worked on the Constan-

tine Plan, and Malek Bennabi, a philosopher best known for his notion of colonizability. Despite holding divergent political views on French colonialism, their trajectories demonstrate how debates on economic orthodoxy and technical expertise shaped national identity after independence. While controversies surrounding Bouakouir's place in official narratives reflect contests for nationalist legitimacy, the continued relevance of Bennabi's writings illustrates the tensions resulting from postcolonial developmental policies. His invocation by Algerian protestors and analysts of the Hirak, the popular struggle against the regime that began in 2019, demonstrates how Algerians continue the work of decolonization as they challenge dominant discourses on national identity and economic development.

Introduction

1 "Address by Professor Rappard at the Opening Meeting" (April 1, 1947), folder 12, box 5, Mont Pèlerin Society Records, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (hereafter HIA). I would like to thank Ola Innset for bringing this source to my attention.
2 Susan Pedersen details Rappard's activities in the mandate section at the League of Nations in *The Guardians*, 52–59.
3 Peter, "William E. Rappard and the League of Nations," 227.
4 "Address by Professor Rappard," 3.
5 "Address by Professor Rappard," 3.
6 "Address by Professor Rappard," 4.
7 Whyte, *The Morals of the Market*, 9–10. For more on the link between civilizational discourse and early neoliberal thought, see Elyachar, "Neoliberalism, Rationality, and the Savage Slot."
8 Grosrichard, *The Sultan's Court*, xvi.
9 Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, 74–78.
10 Harris, "Whiteness as Property."
11 There have been rigorous discussions of the definition of economism in colonial contexts as well as of the emergence of a self-evident domain of the economy. See, for example, Jakes, *Egypt's Occupation*, 10–12; Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*; and Goswami, *Producing India*, 335.
12 A number of scholars have studied the role of ethnographic knowledge in colonial governance. See Burke, *The Ethnographic State*. The tendency to use ethnographic knowledge for the purposes of colonial rule in Algeria is documented in Trumbull, *An Empire of Facts*. In *Castes of Mind*, Nicholas Dirks shows how missionaries, anthropologists, and ethnologists fashioned caste as a stable category of rule in India. Ritu Birla demonstrates how colonial administrators and nationalist thinkers turned their attention to "Indian Economic Man" and attempted to reform indigenous merchant capitalists who operated through "ties of kinship, clan, and caste" (*Stages of Capital*, 2).

13 Eckert, Malinowski, and Unger, "Modernizing Missions"; McDougall, "Rule of Experts?," 87–108.

14 Darcie Fontaine argues that the relationship between Christianity and the civilizing mission continued to structure resistance to empire during decolonization in *Decolonizing Christianity*.

15 A number of scholars have highlighted the central role played by the transatlantic slave trade in the development of capitalism. See, for example, Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*.

16 René Jammes, "Études sur l'Islam," July 1960, 151, Inspection générale des affaires algériennes, Ambassade de France à Alger (hereafter 21PO), Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter CADN).

17 Whyte, *The Morals of the Market*, 37.

18 Denord, "French Neoliberalism and Its Divisions," 45; Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France*, 248–71.

19 Jakes, *Egypt's Occupation*, 5. Andrew Sartori and Brenna Bhandar investigate how Lockean notions of property, specifically the capacity to labor, constituted legitimate claims to ownership and influenced colonial policy in the British Empire. Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*; Satori, *Liberalism in Empire*. My own formulation of a racial regime of religion is derived in part from Bhandar's concept of racial regimes of property. Jennifer Pitts's analysis of James Mill in chapter 5 of *A Turn to Empire* also elucidates how a drive to improve colonial subjects trumped the economic burdens that would result from colonial rule.

20 Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*; Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*. J. K. Gibson-Graham argue in *The End of Capitalism* that theories of capitalism have reproduced a phallocentric teleology that makes it difficult to imagine alternative languages of opposition.

21 Surkis, *Sex, Law, and Sovereignty in French Algeria, 1830–1930*.

22 Albert O. Hirschman claims that economic interest, a realm that appeals to man's rationality and morality, has historically served as an antidote for the malevolent passions of power and greed in *The Passions and the Interests*, 31–33.

23 Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession*; Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, 7.

24 Partha Chatterjee locates a division between an outer domain, where anticolonial nationalism "had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully replicated and studied," and a spiritual "inner domain," which bore the "'essential' marks of cultural identity" (*The Nation and Its Fragments*, 6). For a critique of Chatterjee in light of Algerian nationalism, see McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*, 8–9.

25 Vanaik, "Introduction," 12.

26 Vanaik, "Introduction," 12; Chibber, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, 213–14; Nilsen, "Passages from Marxism to Postcolonialism."

27 The notion of the "individual" assumes the values of self-possession and sense of self that have historically been constructed as the domain of masculinity. The individual was one who could possess property and participate in civil society. See Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer*; and Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*.

28 Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe*.

29 Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 26.
30 Bell, *Globalizing Race*.
31 One notable exception is the work of Naomi Davidson, who argues that, in twentieth-century France, Muslim immigrants were seen as "unable to free themselves from their faith's domination of their very bodies" (*Only Muslim*, 5).
32 Davis, "'Incommensurate Ontologies'?"
33 Hall, *The Fateful Triangle*, 33–34.
34 Todd Shepard argues that race was not fundamental in determining who could become a French citizen, noting, however, that "racism's most direct effect was economic" (*The Invention of Decolonization*, 35). This departs from Emmanuelle Saada's claim that questions of filiation, class, and culture were bound to discourses of race in her study of mixed-race children in the French Empire, *Empire's Children*. Emily Marker analyzes the drive to define Europe as white during European integration alongside discussions around the education of Africans in *Black France, White Europe*.
35 Scholars have disagreed as to whether republicanism offered a model for equality or fashioned a set of constitutive discriminations. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*; Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*; Fernando, *The Republic Unsettled*. Reflecting on this debate in terms of colonial political economy, Elizabeth Heath argues that "the economic development of the colonies and the racialized labor regime it promoted served as the foundation of the Republic's stability" (*Wine, Sugar, and the Making of Modern France*, 3).
36 Gilmore, *Golden Gulag*, 28.
37 Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World*; Rana, *Terrifying Muslims*; Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.
38 Amin, "The Remainders of Race."
39 Martinez, *Genealogical Fictions*, 39.
40 Guha, *Beyond Caste*, chap. 1.
41 Writing about Irish immigrants in the United States, Bruce Nelson argues that, "like blackness, whiteness was about far more than skin color; it was about laying claim to a set of cultural characteristics that made one respectable and capable of exercising the rights of citizenship" (*Irish Nationalists and the Making of the Irish Race*, 10). Also see Hickman and Walter, "Deconstructing Whiteness: Irish Women in Britain."
42 Robinson, *Black Marxism*.
43 Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*; Colonna, *Les versets de l'invincibilité*.
44 Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, 41.
45 Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*; Banaji, "Islam, the Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism."
46 This was particularly the case prior to Muhammad Ali's modernizing reforms. Marsot, "The Ulama of Cairo,"153; Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*.
47 As Arthur Asseraf notes, colonial rule did not create the marker of Islam ex nihilo, but rather built on a "pre-existing peculiarity by flattening Algerians into Muslims" (*Electric News in Colonial Algeria*, 90). The fact that Islam served as a moral framework for actors can be fruitfully analyzed as one manifestation of

the tension between the lived experience of race and state imposition of racial categories (Goldberg, *The Racial State*, 104–9).

48 Goldberg, *The Racial State*, 4.

49 A number of excellent studies document how the Algerian War of Independence informed French politics and intellectual life. Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies*; Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*; Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole*; LeSueur, *Uncivil War*.

50 Historians have debated the relative importance of the *corso* (i.e., privateering) versus agricultural production for the Ottoman economy in North Africa. Sadok Boubaker argues that the rural economy was more important for North African elites in the seventeenth and eighteenth century in *D'une Méditerranée à l'autre*. I would like to thank M'hamed Oualdi for his help on this point.

51 McDougall, *A History of Algeria*, 19.

52 Schreier, *The Merchants of Oran*; Stein, *Plumes*; Jomier, *Islam, réforme et colonisation*.

53 Lydon, *On Trans-Saharan Trails*, 110.

54 Following the work of Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism has been defined in terms of a "logic of elimination" that seeks to free up land for settlement ("Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native"). Yet in Algeria the removal of the indigenous population was incomplete, and Algerians were an important source of cheap labor. This observation has led theorists of settler colonialism, such as Jürgen Osterhammel, to consider Algeria an "African" style of settler colony similar to Rhodesia, Kenya, and South Africa (*Colonialism*, 7). For a study of Algerian history in light of Wolfe's framework, see Barclay, Chopin, and Evans, "Introduction."

55 Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 186. For example, French support for wine produced by European settlers in Algeria should be explained by political rather than economic logics (Henni, *La colonisation agraire*, 127). Laura Maravall shows that colonial policymakers in the early 1900s privileged consolidating settlement over encouraging the ideal of small family farms due to the sparse availability of arable land ("Factor Endowments on the 'Frontier'").

56 The term *colonial capitalism* denotes the ways in which capitalism emerged in the context of violence and coercion, thereby questioning our ability to speak of a universal process of capital accumulation. Dipesh Chakrabarty analyzes a "capitalism of the colonial type" in India, arguing that "the secular languages of law and constitutional frameworks coexisted and interacted with noncommensurable strategies of domination and subordination" ("Subaltern Studies and Postcolonial Historiography," 21). Also see Ince, *Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism*. While much of this literature has looked at the particularity of British colonial ideology, the intertwining of capitalism, liberalism, and empire was also fundamental in the French case.

57 Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, 357.

58 For a discussion of this model, see Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 122.

59 Marseille, *Empire colonial*.

60 Marseille, *Empire colonial*, 136.

61 Lefeuvre, *Chère Algérie*, 68.

62 Elise Huillery's empirical research, contra Marseille, concludes that "French West Africa did not place a significant economic burden on French taxpayers" ("The Black Man's Burden," 34). Also see Clément, "L'analyse économique de la question coloniale"; Fitzgerald, "Did France's Colonial Empire Make Economic Sense?"

63 While the scholarship on this topic is voluminous, Jill Jarvis has engaged with literary texts to think about memory without "center[ing] French experiences and narratives of decolonization" (*Decolonizing Memory*, 13).

64 Lefeuvre, *Pour en finir avec la repentance coloniale*. This work instigated a number of polemics, most notably between Lefeuvre and economic historian Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, who deplored the instrumentalization of economic data by Lefeuvre and lamented that he structured an academic study around the theme of repentance, a concept that she argued was eminently political. Lefeuvre, on the other hand, pointed out certain factual errors in her response, accusing her of allowing a Third Worldist orientation to color her analysis. For further discussion of this polemic, see Davis, "Qu'est-ce qu'un échec?"

65 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 225.

66 Thomas, "Albert Sarraut."

67 Woker, "Empire of Inequality," 25.

68 Sewell, "A Strange Career." Owen White and Elizabeth Heath investigate how cultural models influence the writing of economic history in their article, "Introduction: The French Empire and the History of Economic Life."

69 Sewell, "A Strange Career," 157. The term *embedded* is often associated with the work of Karl Polyani, who used it to describe how firms and markets were necessarily informed by social and cultural norms (Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*).

70 Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France*, 252.

71 Winant, *The World Is a Ghetto*.

72 Murphy, *The Economization of Life*.

73 Cited in Chenu, *Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d'agir: Entretiens*, 384. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

74 This position is known as *cartiérisme*, a reference to the thesis initially proposed by the journalist Raymond Cartier in the pages of the French magazine *Paris Match*. Cartier argued that the skyrocketing cost of developing the colonies was a burden on the metropole (Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 270).

75 See, for example, Lefeuvre, "L'échec du plan de Constantine"; and Chapman, *France's Long Reconstruction*.

76 Clarno, *Neoliberal Apartheid*, 9.

77 Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, 216.

78 For a study of Weber's writings on Islam in the framework of religious sociology, see Turner, *Weber and Islam*.

79 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, xlii.

80 Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms*, 192. Similarly, Hayden White notes that the narrative form transforms "events" into "patterns of meaning" ("The Question of Narrative," 22).

81 Guha, *Peasant Insurgency*, 18.
82 Spivak, "The New Subaltern," 325.
83 Two examples of Algerians acquiring notable fortunes are Youssef Hamoud, who started the very successful Hamoud Boualem soda company in the late nineteenth century, and the Tamzali family, which operated an olive oil factory. Gilbert Meynier notes that the visibility and number of Algerian Muslims with significant amounts of capital increased after World War I (*L'Algérie révélée*, 663–64).
84 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, xlii.
85 Du Bois used the term *dark proletariat* to describe racialized subjects who undermined the alleged universality of class politics, which was revealed to be based on the white European proletariat (*Black Reconstruction in America*, 30). Roland Barthes makes a similar point regarding the intractable differences between conceptions of the colonial and Western working classes by analyzing the North Africans in the Goutte d'Or area of Paris (*Mythologies*, 164).
86 Goldberg, *The Threat of Race*, 21.
87 "Intervention de M. Layashi Yaker," October 30, 1962, 29QO/33, MAE.

Chapter One: Settling the Colony

1 Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels, February 21, 1882, in Galissot, Engels, and Marx, *Marx, marxisme et Algérie*, 304.
2 Galissot, Engels, and Marx, *Marx, marxisme et Algérie*, 353. For more on Marx's time in Algeria, see Musto, *The Last Years of Karl Marx*, 105–11.
3 Von Sivers, "Rural Uprisings as Political Movements."
4 Galissot, Engels, and Marx, *Marx, marxisme et Algérie*, 296.
5 Daumas and Fabar, *La Grande Kabylie*, 249.
6 Mezzadra, "Marx in Algiers"; Anderson, "Marx's Late Writings."
7 Galissot, Engels, and Marx, *Marx, marxisme et Algérie*, 163.
8 Rosalind Morris argues that Islam functions as a particular kind of difference for Marx, which explains why he can "ask the question of why the history of the East *appears* as a history of religions, and answer it with reference to the absence of private property in land" ("Theses on the Questions of War," 157).
9 Galissot, Engels, and Marx, *Marx, marxisme et Algérie*, 346.
10 Robinson, *Black Marxism*, xxix.
11 Robinson, *Black Marxism*, xxix.
12 Benachenhou, *Formation du sous-développement en Algérie*, 94–106, 225–31.
13 Harvey, *Spaces of Capital*; Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*; Harvey, "Globalization and the 'Spatial Fix.'"
14 Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 10.
15 This led many liberal economists to oppose colonization due to its high cost during the July monarchy. The early 1860s saw a "reconciliation between liberals and protectionists in favor of state intervention" along with a "softening of anti-colonial stances" (Clément, "French Economic Liberalism," 51).
16 Aydin claims that Sultan Abdulhamid's emphasis on spiritual sovereignty over the *umma* (Muslim community) helped consolidate this vision and that his