A. Ricardo López-Pedreros



Makers of Democracy

A Transnational History of the Middle Classes in Colombia

Makers of Democracy

Radical Perspectives: A Radical History Review Book Series

A series edited by Daniel Walkowitz and Barbara Weinstein

Makers of Democracy

A Transnational History of the Middle Classes in Colombia

A. Ricardo López-Pedreros

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Durham and London
2019

Printed in the United States of America on
acid-free paper ∞
Designed by Matthew Tauch
Typeset in Warnock Pro by Westchester Publishing
Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: López, A. Ricardo, [date] author.
Title: Makers of democracy : a transnational history of the middle classes in Colombia / A. Ricardo López-Pedreros.
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2019. | Series: Radical perspectives | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018033897 (print)
LCCN 2018042750 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478003298 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478001775 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 9781478002857 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Middle class—Colombia—History—20th century. | Colombia—Politics and government—1946– | Democracy—Colombia—History—20th century. | Neoliberalism—Colombia—History—20th century. | Social classes—Colombia—History—20th century.
Classification: LCC HT690.C6 (ebook) | LCC HT690.C6 L67 2019 (print) | DDC 305.5/509861—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018033897

Cover art: Charles P. Fossum, Colombia aid mission director, and Fabio Robledo, manager of the Colombia Territorial Credit Institute, celebrating the construction of apartments for the middle class in Bogotá, early 1960s. Courtesy National Archives (photo no. 286-CF-39-18), College Park, MD.

For **María Isabel** and **Valentina**

Contents

Abbreviations

ACEB	Asociación Colombiana de Empleados Bancarios
ACIA	Asociación Colombiana de Ingenieros Agrónomos
ACOPI	Asociación Colombiana Popular de Industriales
ACPO	Acción Cultural Popular
ADE	Asociación Distrital de Educadores
Alliance	Alliance for Progress
ANAPO	Alianza Nacional Popular
ANDI	Asociación Nacional de Industriales
ANEBRE	Asociación de Empleados del Banco de la República
ANUC	Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos
APUN	Asociación de Profesores de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia
ASDECOS	Asociación de Empleados de Compañías de Seguros
ASMEDAS	Asociación de Médicos al Servicio de Instituciones de Asistencia Social
ASPU	Asociación Sindical de Profesores Universitarios
ATSS	Asociación de Trabajadores de Sudamericana de Seguros
AVIANCA	Aerovías Nacionales de Colombia
BP	Banco Popular
BR	Banco de la República
CAFAM	Caja de Compensación Familiar
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CAV	Corporaciones de Ahorro y Vivienda
CCAIM	Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero
CEDE	Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Económico

CELAM	Conference of Latin American Bishops
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CGT	Confederación General de Trabajo
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINVA	Centro Inter-Americano de Vivienda y Planeamiento Urbano
CMC	Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca
CNMH	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica
Colseguros	Compañía Colombiana de Seguros
CSTC	Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia
CTC	Confederación Colombiana de Trabajadores
DAI	Departamento Administrativo Industrial
Davivienda	Corporación de Ahorro y Vivienda
DMCB	Dutch Middle-Class Bank
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación
ECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
ENC	Escuela Nacional de Comercio
ESAP	Escuela Superior de Administración Pública
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FAVI	Fondo de Ahorro y Vivienda
FECODE	Federación Colombiana de Educadores
FEDECAFE	National Federation of Colombia Coffee Growers
FEDEPROCOL	Federación de Sindicatos de Profesionales de Colombia
FEDESARROLLO	Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo
FENALSTRASE	Federación Nacional de Profesionales del Estado
FENASIBANCOL	Federación Nacional de Sindicatos Bancarios Colombianos
FF	Ford Foundation

FN	Frente Nacional
FU	Frente Unido
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBF	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar
ICSS	Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales
ICT	Instituto de Crédito Territorial
IFI	Instituto de Fomento Industrial
INCOLDA	Instituto Colombiano de Administración
INCORA	Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria
INCP	Instituto Nacional de Contadores Públicos
ISI	import substitution industrialization
JUCO	Juventud Comunista
LMMC	Movimiento de Liberación de la Clase Media
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril
MOCLAM	Movimiento Aliado de la Clase Media Económica de Colombia
MOIR	Movimiento Obrero Independiente y Revolucionario
MUNIPROC	Movimiento Universitario de Promoción Comunal
OAS	Organization of American States
ONSC	Oficina Nacional de Servicio Civil
PCC	Partido Comunista Colombiano
PCC-ML	Partido Comunista de Colombia, Marxista-Leninista
PUJ	Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
RIAS	Rosca de Investigación y Acción Social
SENA	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SINTRASE	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Rama Activa Aseguradora
SSROPU	Social Science Research Office of the Panamerican Union
UN	United Nations
UNAL	Universidad Nacional de Colombia

UNC	Unión Nacional de Contadores
UNCLAMECOL	Unidad Nacional de Clase Media Colombiana
UNEB	Unión Nacional de Empleados Bancarios
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIANDES	Universidad de los Andes
UPAC	Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo Constante
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USOTA	US Office of Technical Assistance
UTB	Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano
UTC	Unión de Trabajadores Colombianos

Acknowledgments

This book has been long in the making. When I began to think about writing it, in the halls of academia, class as a category of historical analysis seemed to no longer matter. It was the beginning of this century, and the middle classes had yet again been deemed to represent "the end of politics." The catechism of democracy dictated that a society of one class, presumably a forever-expansive middle class, had made capitalism unquestionable. In 2008, at the very moment when I finished an early iteration of this book, a new global economic crisis ignited an intense interest in questions of class. Histories of capitalism took over the historiographical market, addressing what is usually defined as the major crisis of Western liberal democracies: the growth of material inequalities, the virtual disappearance of the middle classes, and the consolidation of a small global oligarchy.

This context made this book possible but also made its writing quite difficult, as the conjuncture posed pressing questions unreceptive to the critique that I wanted to offer about the historical formation of the middle classes. As neoliberalism dismantled democracy, I was often asked, who did not want to live in a society defined by an expansive middle class? Among some colleagues and interlocutors, I encountered either outright rejection or skepticism about the study's political importance. Some encouraged me to be politically wise and focus on the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the real class conflict of our times. Others invited me to take a more critical stand, in the belief that I was succumbing to the myth that the middle classes in fact existed in Latin America. I was supposedly imposing American or European realities on a region where the middle class had been at best a chimera, a desire that had been impossible to achieve. In disappointment, they often asked me how I could study—let alone write an entire book on—an illusion.

Such questions produced a degree of self-doubt, an occasional writer's block, and conceptual uncertainty. Yet they also invited me to think harder about why studying the middle classes produced such responses. I began to ponder how these interlocutors defined the middle class when deciding to ignore it as an object of study. How could I reconcile their admittedly difficult

questions with my ethnographic work, in which a multiplicity of actors embraced—and defended—their belonging to a middle class? Was it possible that the defining of the middle class in Latin America as a chimera—a myth imposed by all-powerful oligarchies in their effort to consolidate rule—was part and parcel of the production of a middle-class identity? Did I have to ignore the fact that writing and teaching about the middle class have allowed me to earn a living as a member of this very class?

Certain authors suggested a way out of the rut that I felt stuck in. Stuart Hall's studies on identity proved crucial for understanding the role of the unconscious in class struggles. Tomás Gutiérrez Alea's visual masterpieces made evident how politically consequential the crafting of narratives about histories of class struggle could be. J. M. Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians* highlighted the need for awareness of the paradoxes of democracy and power. Cedric Robinson's proposal to critically understand the roles of the petite bourgeoisie in revolutionary movements proved inspirational. And Gilles Deleuze reminded me to see teaching and writing as a way to become a traitor to one's regime, sex, and class.

I am profoundly grateful to those people who graciously allowed me into their lives in order to have difficult conversations about history, politics, society, family, and life. They let me into their homes and their archives. And they trusted me with their stories. I have told this history as I see it. Some will be disappointed. Others will disagree. I have done my best to remain true to their experiences and perspectives, but it is clear to me that we must question ourselves as members of the middle class in order to learn how to act, feel, and think differently in the world.

I want to thank friends, family, colleagues, and students who cheered me on, discussed extensively this book's ideas, and asked me difficult questions along the way. Daryle Williams lent support and encouragement at early stages of this process. Mary Kay Vaughan's scholarship, advice, and insights have always proved stimulating. Brian Owensby's exemplary study of the middle classes has influenced much of what I have to say here. Barbara Weinstein has been very generous. I believe that I have discussed every single idea in this book with her. She practices so well what Romand Coles calls "receptive generosity," a shared space in which both she and her colleagues are receptive to disagreements and open to being convinced by each other. It is a space through which both positions can be reciprocally transformed precisely because of those disagreements. Barbara's scholarship and friendship have been formative to my work as a historian.

I had the good fortune to present different parts of this book to engaged audiences at New York University, Princeton University, Humboldt University of Berlin, the Universidad de Antioquia in Medellín, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogotá, Tel Aviv University, the Colegio de México in Mexico City, the Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala in Guatemala City, and the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales of the Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social, and the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas in Buenos Aires. I have also presented drafts of sections of the book at multiple conferences. In particular, I want to thank the members of the Latin American History Group in the Northwest—Gabriela Aceves, Alejandra Bronfman, Ben Bryce, Anna Casas Aguilar, Alec Dawson, Bill French, and Stuart Parker—who read parts of the manuscript and offered perceptive comments. These experiences were a reminder that knowledge production is not an individual endeavor but rather a collective one. We carry along references, evoke conversations, and cite discussions with friends and colleagues as we craft narratives. Knowledge production should be defined as a labor of friendship and solidarity, not a competition over the ownership of ideas in a historiographical market. Thus whatever I have to say here depends on the work of those who have been writing about the Latin American middle classes with me: Ezequiel Adamovsky, Isabella Cosse, Iñigo García-Bryce, Enrique Garguín, Elizabeth Hutchison, Brian Owensby, David Parker, Claudia Stern, Sergio Visacovsky, Louise Walker, and Barbara Weinstein. I have also relied on those who have discussed with me various arguments about the histories of Colombia: César Ayala Diago, Mario Barbosa, Tania Luna Blanco, Viviane Brachet, Herbert Tico Braun, Lina Britto, Oscar Calvo, Valeria Coronel, Marta Isabel Domínguez, Matilde González-Izás, W. John Green, Medófilo Medina, Catalina Muñoz, Lida Núñez, David Orrego, Wilson Pabón, Mary Roldán, Manuel Ruiz, Eduardo Sáenz, Bernardo Tovar Zambrano, and Mónica Uribe. I am sad that Luz Gabriela Arango, my undergraduate adviser, whose scholarship molded my interest in the middle classes, cannot see this book in print. She is dearly missed.

I also acknowledge productive discussions about political economy and class formation with Susana Romero Sánchez. Claudia Stern has been a critical interlocutor and, above all, a good friend. Rob Karl has been a source of support along the way. We have remained engaged in discussions about archives, translations of historical documents, and arguments over the 1960s. Mauricio Archila Neira has been an intellectual companion. I have regularly turned to his friendship for feedback, guidance, perspective, and solidarity.

Mark Healey has been a wonderful reader of this manuscript, which he has gone through at least twice. He knows how to deliver an instructive critique, and the manuscript has greatly improved thanks to his generous reading. Others who were willing to discuss the challenges of writing while teaching include Leandro Benmergui, Herbert Brewer, Thomas Castillo, Shane Dillingham, Paula Halperin, Thanayi Jackson, Linda Noel, and Shari Orisich. I also want to offer special thanks to my dear friend Claire Goldstene. Claire has been a trusted colleague whose collegiality, intellect, and integrity have supported me all along the way. Unspeakably important has also been her deep interest in theory, politics, and class formation.

I am grateful as well to the many archivists and librarians at multiple repositories. Without their work, this text would have been impossible. Research for this book has been generously supported by grants and fellowships from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Library of Congress. The Department of History at the University of Maryland provided a year off for writing as well as financial support for a summer of research. The Research and Sponsored Programs at Western Washington University also provided funding for summer research and writing. And Western Washington's Department of History granted me a sabbatical, which proved crucial for finishing the manuscript.

My academic career has been possible thanks to public institutions across the Americas, which have provided spaces for critical and creative inquiry. I want to thank my students at Western Washington. So many of this book's ideas and arguments were tried out in my classes. And my students' questions often challenged me to be clear in what I had to say. In particular, Kelsey Gilman provided comments for the introduction and transcribed some interviews. Her work on neoliberal rule in Ecuador has also inspired me to think harder about power. I am indebted to my stimulating colleagues and friends, particularly Blanca Aranda Gómez García, Pedro Cameselle-Pesce, Kate Destler, Kristen French, Steven Garfinkle, Kevin Leonard, James Loucky, Ed Mathieu, Polly Myers, Johann Neem, Niall Ó Murchú, Shirley Osterhaus, Luis Gonzalo Portugal, Jennifer Seltz, Tamara Lea Spira, Joan Stamm, Maria Timmons Flores, and Verónica Velez. All of them have made this public institution of higher education a welcoming place for discussion about teaching, research, politics, and life.

I want to thank Sean Mannion, who edited this manuscript several times. Undoubtedly, his careful work has tremendously improved the text. Rafael Puyana worked diligently to produce several parts of the appendix

and the illustrations. I am grateful to the anonymous readers who took the time to offer detailed comments, careful suggestions, and thoughtful criticisms that improved the manuscript drastically. It is a pleasure to thank Gisela Fosado for her support of the book. I must also thank her for our discussions about producing a concise manuscript and for her advice on how to get a teachable book published. Lydia Rose Rappoport-Hankins has guided me through the publication process.

Closer to home, Alex, Reyna, Wendy, and Julian have always made me feel at home in the United States, critical for those of us who are immigrants in the current political context. Their generosity is politically inspiring. Pedro, Jessyca, Nico, and Mateo have also provided perspective on what is important in life. My father, Abel Ignacio, would not be surprised to learn that, as for all of his other students, his teachings have proven foundational in my work as a historian. My mother, Myriam, has been a major inspiration in my life. She has continuously reminded me not to fall into an isolated academic life that promises the universal but delivers the particular. Teté, Juanita, and Gerardo have been enormously supportive. My in-laws—Matilde, Héctor, Sandra, Hernán, Felipe, and Sergio—have cheered me on along the way.

Last but not least, I owe deep thanks to María Isabel Cortés-Zamora, *una compañera de vida*. I am profoundly grateful for her candor, humor, solidarity, generosity, and intellectual creativity. Our shared commitment to teaching as a critical methodology for changing this world fills my life with hope, love, and meaning. Here I lack words to express how important she has been in this book's materialization. Not only did she provide economic support at a crucial moment of the writing, but her indefatigable belief in my ability to finish this study also proved pivotal. My journey with her has indeed been the pleasure—and the happiness—of my life. Valentina López-Cortés is my favorite daughter. Her enormous creativity, immense warmth, and unflagging commitment to making things different in the world have changed my approach to life. It is a joy to read her poetry and find that she too thinks that language is critical for social change. It is with a profound and unshakable love that I dedicate this book to María Isabel and Valentina in the hope that the history of the present can shed light on new futures through which all people of different genders, nationalities, religions, languages, ages, beliefs, races, ethnicities, and classes can fully participate in the equal distribution of the world's wealth. Con los Zapatistas decimos: queremos un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos.

Figure Intro.1 Charles P. Fossum, Colombia AID mission director, and Fabio Robledo, manager of the Colombia Territorial Credit Institute, celebrating the construction of apartments for the middle class in Bogotá, early 1960s. Courtesy National Archives (photo no. 286-CF-39-18), College Park, MD.

Introduction

"There Is No Other Class in Democracy"

The middle classes are the past, present, and future of democracy, or so we are continually told. Francis Fukuyama, who in the late 1980s proclaimed the triumph of Western liberal democracy as the end of history, has revisited his manifesto to declare the need for a new ideology "that could provide a realistic path toward a world with healthy middle-class societies."[1] As the middle classes have shrunk in the "developed world," and particularly in the United States, Fukuyama has critiqued the globalized economy for provoking de-democratization, through which societies across the global North have increasingly become divided into two homogeneous poles: elites and popular classes.[2] Contrary to what Karl Marx had predicted for his "communist utopia," Fukuyama contends, history has shown how "mature capitalism" generated "middle-class societies, not working-class ones." Marx's famous proletariat, the political scientist has proclaimed, became a global middle class.[3] But if the middle classes continue to decline, Fukuyama fears, the future of democracy is doomed. Thus, he calls for the reconstitution of "middle-class societies" that, although neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for liberal democracy, have proven crucial in averting the emergence of "oligarchic domination or populist revolution."[4] In a word, if at the Cold War's end the expansion of a middle-class society was seen as the unquestionable triumph of Western liberal democracies—that

is, the *end* of history—now the middle classes must resuscitate themselves in order to secure the *future* of democracy globally.

Fukuyama is not alone. In the United States some scholars and policymakers deem the US middle classes "the losers of globalization," which is already transforming an irresistible empire for democracy into a "third-world country" because of not only "unwelcome" immigrants but also the widening of economic inequality, political polarization, and class struggle.[5] This, some proclaim, brought Donald Trump to the White House.[6] It is indeed the vanishing middle classes, some argue, that are behind moral and political panic, as democracy is losing political currency in the so-called developed countries. Thus, some wonder whether the US government should stop setting up the "American way of life" as an example for the world and should instead focus on reviving the American middle class at home.[7]

And yet, in a seeming contradiction, US development institutions and international organizations position the middle classes as the bastion of neoliberal democracy throughout the world, the foundation for societies that will finally resolve economic inequalities, social instability, and extreme political belligerence.[8] Studies supported by development institutions provide extensive but mixed statistical evidence for how throughout the developing world—from the Middle East to Africa and Latin America—"new" middle classes have emerged to enhance democracy's prospects.[9] Amid a perceived threat to "the West," policymakers and commentators in the United States and Europe urge a "re-Westernization"—by invitation if possible or by military means if necessary—in which the expansion of middle-class societies could secure once and for all the superiority and distinctiveness of Western liberal democracies in the world.[10]

In Colombia, at a crucial moment when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government have reached a peace agreement, President Juan Manuel Santos has advocated Colombians toward a future—dubbed "the age of the postconflict"—in which all efforts are dedicated to strengthening an extensive middle class as "the driving force for a full democracy," a needed buffer between the rich and the poor.[11] Álvaro Uribe Vélez—former president, senator, and the most outspoken critic of the peace accords—cannot but agree with his "political enemy" that a "cohesive society" comes with an expanded middle class.[12] When Uribe categorizes the peace agreement as an antidemocratic takeover by communist forces, he evokes the destruction of middle-class society—grounded in foreign investment, private property, militarized social relations, and heteropatriarchal family values. Thus while differing on the means, Santos and

Uribe Vélez share the end: the middle classes should take the nation from a conflict-driven, violent, and antidemocratic past into a conflict-free, peaceful, and democratic future.

These discussions, far from mere abstractions, structure how certain people see themselves as part of a middle class and what role they play in society's democratization. Take Hernando Bahamón Soto, a professional for many years with the Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), who assured me that "there is no other class in democracy as indispensable as the middle class."[13] Mobilizing these transnational discourses, he proclaimed, "No middle class, no democracy." After our conversations, he felt compelled to write an acrostic titled "This Is the Middle Class" to both describe the class to which he proudly belonged and claim democracy as the middle classes' exclusive possession.

Comunidad organizada del mismo grado (Community organized on an equal level)

Libre y con ideales definidos e iguales (Free and with defined and equal ideals)

Animada como población activa del país (Animated as the country's active population)

Sembrando bienestar, alegría y paz (Planting welfare, happiness, and peace)

En todos los lugares del mundo (Everywhere in the world)

Masa que surge a conseguir igualdad (Mass that strives for equality)

Entre todos los habitantes del país (Among all the country's inhabitants)

De acuerdo a las diferentes capas sociales (In accordance with different social strata)

Individuos de la tropa que marcha adelante (Individuals of the rank and file moving ahead)

Activado siempre con gallardía y arrojo (Always enabled by bravery and fearlessness)

¡Que viva la clase media! (Long live the middle class!)[14]

Long live the middle class? Most scholars would dismiss this acrostic as exemplifying how people such as Bahamón Soto remain unaware of their own true interests and therefore susceptible to an antidemocratic neoliberal

order that only benefits what philosopher Alain Badiou calls "capitalist oligarchies."[15] In these accounts, the middle classes are treated as an "embodied lie . . . a myth . . . an act of camouflage" that disguises the true—and authentic—class struggle at the core of an undemocratic global order.[16] Others would add that amid growing material inequality, the important question is measuring whether the middle classes really exist.[17] Another group would counter that Latin American societies, in Göran Therborn's words, "have already learned through bitter experience . . . that there is nothing inherently democratic about the middle class, [as] its members actively oppos[ed] democracy."[18] Others, like James Scott, would urge that although "the petit bourgeoisie rarely, if ever, speaks for itself, [it] performs vital social and economic services under *any* political system."[19]

Despite their disagreements, these responses concede too much at the outset by assuming as self-evident the meanings and practices of democracy. They continue to ask how democratic—or undemocratic—the middle classes are at a given moment, thereby ossifying democracy as a transcendental evaluator to be used in a transhistorical manner. All these responses equally presuppose the existence of the middle classes as a reality through which the robustness of democracy can be measured. In the process, the putatively ontological relationship between democracy and the formation of a middle class readily goes unquestioned. What definitions of democracy, I ask in this book, do we often invoke but seldom specify when labeling the middle classes as anti-, less, or more democratic? What was the historical process through which we came to understand the middle classes as the normative foundation for democracy? How and why did different social actors—in particular, self-identified middle-class women and men like Bahamón Soto—participate in making the relationship between the middle class and democracy so appealing, to the degree that democracy now appears to be an "obvious" property of the middle classes?

Makers of Democracy is an attempt to historicize the material circumstances, discursive conditions, collective subjectivities, social struggles, and political battles through which a middle-class reality came to represent what democracy was supposed to deliver. The book does so by investigating how the transnational formation of the middle classes in Bogotá during the 1960s and 1970s both influenced and was shaped by the expansion of US power in Latin America, the implementation of development programs, the normalization of modernization theories, the growth of the service sector, increased urbanization, the reconfiguration of the state's role, the consolidation of radical politics, and the emergence of an early iteration of

neoliberal rule. At the book's core are those professionals, white-collar employees, and small-business owners who engaged in multiple hard-fought political struggles, among themselves and against working-class groups and elites, over what shape democracy would take after the Second World War. In so doing, *Makers of Democracy* historicizes democracy not as an ideological chimera of total emancipation or a utopia without hierarchy but as an effect of political conflicts through which middle-class women and men attempted to at once question and naturalize class stratifications and gender hierarchies at the core of what democracy was supposed to do.

Democracy as a Question

As scholars have argued, the study of democracies has historically been associated with the experiences of Europe and the United States, from where democracy has long been understood as originating and then spreading to the rest of the globe.[20] Indeed, democracy is usually depicted as a selfless gift from "the West."[21] This has perpetuated a teleological narrative of an exclusively Western and universal democracy in which divergent historical realities can only be understood as deviations, failures, or, at best, derivatives.[22] Recent studies have criticized this normativity by examining the multiple experiences of democracy outside what is considered the proper West.[23] Although this has been a crucial move to challenge the triumphalist narrative of an exclusively Western democracy, scholars tend to particularize, even exoticize, those cases perceived to be outside a putative normativity of democracy. For example, in their pathbreaking collection of essays, Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein argue that "instead of viewing violence as indicative of democratic failure," one must see how a "violent pluralism" has been "critical to the foundation of Latin American democracies, the maintenance of democratic states, and the political behavior of democratic citizens."[24] This allows scholars to understand how "violent pluralism" was neither a social aberration nor emblematic of a state fallen from "the (implicitly Western) democratic ideal," which "even occidental democracies would have a hard time living up to." Rather, these multiple forms of violence have been fundamental "in preserving or challenging a particular form of lived democracy" that must be understood in Latin American terms.[25] In the wake of such reality, Arias and Goldstein invite scholars to recognize that "pluralist political practice in Latin America . . . may very well depend on a tolerance for privatized violence and ongoing abuses of larger segments of

the population . . . unique forms of political practice, order, and subjectivity that need to be studied on their own terms."[26]

Although *Makers of Democracy* is part of this effort to deterritorialize the multiple histories of democracy, I would nonetheless argue that these studies tend to retain the dichotomy that has for so long rendered the world outside Europe and the United States alternative, vernacular, hybrid, and, in this case, violent. While US foreign policy toward Latin America has historically been crucial in perpetuating what Arias and Goldstein call "violent democracies," violence is too often historicized as a unique experience that must be understood in "Latin American terms." This leads Arias to conclude that "understanding politics in Latin America depends on us recognizing the limitations of applying the concept of democracy to the region."[27] Thus we reaffirm the imperialist histories that the United States and Europe want to tell about themselves, in which "Northern democracies" are original, superior, and more authentic because they are less violent or have incorporated a "legitimate" form of violence to enforce a social and political order.

It is through this framework that a normative idea of middle-class society serves as a barometer for democracy. The histories of democracies are hierarchically territorialized, with middle-class societies deemed properly democratic (superior, universal, global, exportable, class-harmonious, and legitimately violent) and those societies characterized by struggle between popular classes and elites deemed less, or anti-, democratic (inferior, local, alternative, class-antagonistic, and illegitimately violent). Because Latin America has often been understood as the latter, the middle classes are historicized as either absent or a failure, unable to democratize their societies—that is, make them more like the United States and Europe.[28] In the process, a middle class is defined as the barometer to measure the imperial *difference* between a global North (the West) and a global South (the rest of the world). Thus, the West is squarely located as the owner of—and original benefactor for—democracy as Europe and the US fully developed a putative exemplar middle class to be exported while other places in the world have historically provincialized the gift of democracy by trying to emulate those middle-class societies.

This assumption is at the core of how scholars understand the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America in general and its development programs in particular. Consider how we have historicized perhaps the most important development program of the twentieth century's second half, the Alliance for Progress. For some, the Alliance was a typical policy of containment,

with US policymakers trying to export a ready-made middle class—"the American way of life"—as a way to push Latin American societies, in danger of succumbing to communism, toward liberal, democratic, and capitalist modernity.[29] And yet study after study argues that such development programs were, from their very inception, colossal failures, lost causes, or "the most portentous social experiments . . . a grand design [that went] sour."[30] Despite their noble intention "to improve" the lives of the people of "the Third World" by making them middle class, the argument goes, US officials "misled themselves trying to apply dubious social science theories" alien to Latin American realities.[31] Echoing policymakers and intellectuals during the 1960s, these historians conclude that "Latin America was not Europe" and thus was inimical to US-style middle-class democracy.[32] Mired in two-class struggle, Latin American societies rejected US development programs, which further perpetuated political radicalization and social polarization.[33] For other scholars, the creation of a middle class in the Americas failed because policymakers did not put into practice the social polices they preached. Instead, US foreign policy turned from these development programs—or used them as smoke screens for "real" imperial policies—and weakened democracy by "fortif[ying] illiberal forces, militariz[ing] societies," and limiting the social definitions of democracy.[34] The Alliance was simply a manifestation of imperial hypocrisy.[35]

Such analysis is further reproduced in critical decolonial theorizations of the relationship between what are deemed the local (i.e., Latin American) experiences of modernity and the global (i.e., North Atlantic) designs of a modern-colonial matrix of power. And although my arguments in this book are inspired by this effort to decolonize histories of Latin America, such theorizations tend to dehistoricize power relations and systems of domination, thereby erasing any political or social role for the middle classes in "local" spaces.[36] Indeed, the local—or what is seen as outside a proper "Europe"—is thus subsumed into transhistorical "subaltern authenticity" positioned against a dominant—and perennial—Western colonial matrix of power. Any Latin American middle class is perceived as an inauthentic, "Americanized" formation, a deviation from what is considered a proper Latin American subalternity.

Thus, the problem is not so much that the formation of the middle classes has historiographically been elided.[37] As will become clear in this book, since at least the 1950s scholars across the Americas have discussed nonstop the middle classes in a comparativist narrative that frames them as failures, as lacking, as social and political actors unimportant to the histories

of Latin America. This "enduring episteme" has trapped historical analysis of the middle classes in a quandary: either the middle classes are too Europeanized or US-influenced and thus presumably not exotic enough to be a worthy topic to understand the perceived radical alterity of Latin America, or the middle class is depicted as diverging from Europe and the United States and thus closer to a "subaltern" reality, which by implication means the consolidation of a two-class society where the middle classes as social or political realities are unimportant to historicize power relations in Latin America.[38] It is in this context that John Charles Chasteen writes in perhaps one of the most popular textbooks about Latin American history in the US that in this region "where the idea of a middle class majority is not a reality but, rather, a fond aspiration for the future" the prevalent free-market policies will only consolidate the division between "rich and poor. Conquerors and conquered. Masters and slaves . . . the old . . . conflict at the heart of Latin American history."[39]

Thus, despite the increasing amount of scholarship committed to critically examining the histories of the middle classes, to which this book contributes, the systems of domination are still framed via polarities: ruling classes and masses, oligarchies and popular classes, subalterns and hegemonic forces, local and global.[40] In his seminal works on the revolutions in twentieth-century Latin America, for instance, Greg Grandin, following José Nun's arguments in the 1960s, identifies among the Latin American middle classes a "susceptibility to manorialism" that propelled them to embrace the ideology of the oligarchy and "its heroes, its symbols, its culture, and its laws."[41] Thus the middle classes, "too structurally and ideologically dependent on the oligarchy," could not develop a universal ideology—or what Nun called "hegemonic vocation"—to transcend "an unsustainable model of exclusionary nationalism, restricted political institutions, [and] persisting rural clientelism."[42] Therefore, the middle sectors failed to become proper middle classes—hegemonic, democratic, Western-like—because for the most part they were co-opted by oligarchical rule. This co-optation soon translated into a key base of support for several dictatorships throughout the region in the second half of the twentieth century. This is why we have come to understand Cold War revolutionary politics and the global 1960s and 1970s in Latin America as a *dialectical* struggle between revolution and counterrevolution.[43] The former, originating mostly in Latin America, is historicized as vibrant, egalitarian, and collective, sustained mostly by subaltern groups and on a few occasions joined by certain middle-class sectors. The latter, emanating from the United States, is char-

acterized as illiberal, antidemocratic, tepid, and backed by a coalition of the middle classes and oligarchies.[44] Thus, scholars still think of Cold War society as an already politically polarized space in which the middle classes, presumably removed from this polarization, were forced to side with either popular groups in support of a revolutionary project (usually categorized as a manifestation of democratization) or reactionary oligarchies in support of a counterrevolutionary one (often labeled an antidemocratic manifestation)—if they engaged in political struggle at all.[45]

This dominant narrative largely serves to protect an ideal account of democracy and middle-class development. In an influential Colombian history textbook, Frank Safford and Marco Palacios note that "despite the growth of urban middle classes during the twentieth century, profound social differences still can be observed in a continuing breach between the ideal of citizenship and political equality and the reality of continuing privileges and inequalities before the law and justice of the state."[46] This captures how many historians distinguish between an ideal middle-class democracy and the social reality of being middle class, a distinction put at the center of the middle class's historical formation because those actors who identified as middle class could never comply with the ideal of a middle-class democracy.[47] The ideal is therefore criticized for its incomplete enactment or distortion in practice. If this democratic ideal had been fully materialized, the assumption goes, then no dissonance, no hierarchies, and no contradictions would have existed. This argument also protects a fantasy of democracy by compartmentalizing class stratifications and gender hierarchies as in fundamental contradiction with democratic rule. More class hierarchies and gender stratifications imply antidemocracy; authentic, proper, or "democracy to come" is imagined as the overcoming of gendered and classed hierarchical rule.[48] Thus, we tend to treat democracy as a transcendental—context-free, nonhierarchical, and universally inclusive—fantasy of total emancipation presumably not yet materialized in practice. In the process, democracy, however idealized, remains unquestioned.[49]

Makers of Democracy conceptualizes democracy as contingent rather than preordained. It invites us to move from assessing where the middle classes could be more democratic to a historical critique of democracy itself.[50] It does so by historicizing the struggles over the meanings, subjectivities, practices, and rationalities of democracy. More specifically, *Makers of Democracy* offers a historicized explanation of how in 1960s and 1970s Bogotá middle-class women and men fought against working classes and elites to naturalize a hierarchical definition of democracy. Some struggled

to couple the "legitimate" access to private property with middle-classness. Others emphasized that the right to represent "the people" in democracies needed to be associated with a professional competence central to middle-class status. Others tried to naturalize politics as the administration of hierarchical differences. Still others privileged economic success as synonymous with (masculine) middle-class entrepreneurial individual endeavor. Yet others defended affective labor in the tertiary sector as a commodity to be performed by those who could be categorized as middle-class women and men. And all of them saw education as an investment in middle-class status, fostering entrepreneurial individuality key to proper democracy. The book also problematizes how other middle-class women and men struggled to materialize different but equally hierarchical visions of democracy in which education was both a common social good and a central prerequisite for representing "the proletariat," economic success the result of a collective yet gendered project, access to land a question of labor, health a right, labor relations the product of conflict, public assembly fundamental to political participation, and social relations marked by solidarity. In so doing, *Makers of Democracy* historicizes how the first set of definitions of middle-classness—the one we now assume natural to a "global middle class"—began to gain transnational normativity and legitimacy while eclipsing other visions of middle-class democracy as unreasonable, impracticable, and disposable. The book demonstrates how competing class hierarchies, contested gendered stratifications, and conflicting forms of domination, far from exceptions to a true democracy, were constitutive of the multiple struggles for democracy during the twentieth century's second half.

An (Un)Avoidable Question

What is the middle class, anyway? This is the most common question asked of those studying the middle classes, a question that often precludes, rather than provokes, historical analysis. It is assumed that the middle classes cannot be clearly located in a sociological description of society between those who own the means of production and those who do not. While the elites and working classes, presumably because of their clear structural locations, represent homogenous, clear-cut interests, the middle classes are deemed too heterogeneous to constitute a category for rigorous historical analysis.[51] This invites us to understand middle-class identities and subjectivities as transparent reflections of social configurations, economic developments, and

structural changes.[52] But if we accept this, we face a complicated and ultimately self-defeating task in which certain fixed assignations, attributes, and characteristics have to be found in different historical contexts in order to confirm—or disprove—our assumptions about what the middle classes are.

This does not mean, however, that the middle classes are discursive or metaphorical creations, floating signifiers, merely projects with no material purchase in reality. As Michel Foucault long ago argued, we can no longer sacralize "the social as the only instance of the real," with what people think, do, and say as less real.[53] This assumption sanctifies a hierarchical distinction between objectivity (a hard, pristine, and thus finished reality) and subjectivity (a soft, messy, and therefore less important actuality).[54] Drawing on recent historical and anthropological studies on the middle classes, I seek to understand the middle class not as a descriptive, self-contained index, metaphysical category but as historical formations.[55] My fundamental premise is that "middle classes . . . are not real *because* they exist in theory but rather because people exist in classed ways that can be theorized."[56] This must account for, rather than neglect, the heterogeneous, messy, and contradictory practices through which women and men have historically experienced their middle-class lives.

With this in mind, I appropriate Foucault's concept of genealogy as a way to historicize the conditions and practices that allowed certain historical subjects—and not others—to define themselves as middle-class women and men.[57] My main purpose is to historicize the formation of the middle class in Bogotá as a question of subjectivity. But such an effort, far from ignoring what is perceived as the objectivity of class, requires understanding middle-class formation as simultaneously a structural condition, a rationality of rule, a material reality, a gendered social experience, a political claim, and a collective movement. Thus, my working definition of the middle classes encompasses three inextricable aspects and several subsets.[58] First, the formation of the middle classes in Bogotá of the 1960s and 1970s was an effect of specific structural conditions: the intensification of urbanization, the growth of the service sector, the reconfiguration of the state's role in society, the consolidation of small and medium industries as part of industrialization, the increase in educational opportunities for certain social actors, and the expansion of development programs in a context of radicalization and decolonization. These are the structural conditions of possibility that lead me to focus on three main social actors as representative of middle-class formation: professionals, white-collar employees, and small-business owners.

Second, such structural conditions were mediated by what I call gendered and classed rationalities of rule. On one level, such rationalities of rule are a product of knowledge/discourses—modernization theories (in the 1960s), left revolutionary theories, and neoclassical economic principles (in the 1970s). On another level, rationalities of rule are translations of those discourses into specific development policies, revolutionary discussions about social and political change, and neoliberal strategies that attempted to mobilize different but closely related "fantasies" about the social and political role of middle-class women and men in democracies.[59] Amid concern about the spread of communism, such fantasies, not to be mistaken for falsehoods, activated certain historical subjectivities and not others to think, do, and speak as middle class and, as such, empowered these subjectivities to perform as if they were the sovereign representatives of "the people" in democracies.

Third, the middle classes were also a product of subjective formation through which some women and men engaged in multiple practices to define what it meant to be—and live as—middle class. But rather than employing a notion of rational individuals who exercise agency as they please, I understand middle-class subjectivities as involving interrelated questions of identity claims, conscious interests, and unconscious desires that depended on but were not reducible to shared gendered and classed fantasies activated by those structural conditions and rationalities of rule.[60] Such an approach might help us overcome narratives of Latin American history in which the middle class is either a class for itself (true consciousness) or in itself (false consciousness).[61] Such readings acknowledge the social existence and structural consolidation of a middling group or even a middle-class identity but assume that middling groups did not coalesce as political subjects as they could not materialize a unified project, develop common social interests, and form a class consciousness.[62] I propose that even when subjects are unaware of their class interests, their practices of being middle class are part of a collective economy of desires/practices that constitute a sense of (un)conscious commonality against gendered and classed others. Here gender can be defined as "a historically and culturally specific attempt to resolve the dilemma of sexual difference, to assign fixed meaning to that which ultimately cannot be fixed."[63] Thus heterogeneous middle-class subjectivities were practiced through mutable, hierarchical antagonisms. Such antagonisms, I conclude, shaped a sense of middle-class political identity that, as part of a larger political mobilization, enabled certain middle-class women and men to make a claim to represent "the people" and struggle for

a legitimate right to dominate in democracy.[64] It is through these struggles and relationships that middle-class women and men also challenged the very practices of what it meant to be middle class, redefining what democracy was supposed to do.

This approach relies on an eclectic array of newly uncovered archives and sources—from transnational-imperial and development organizations, Colombian state agencies, private companies, middle-class political organizations, and personal collections comprising diaries, teaching lesson plans, professional reports, and annotated readings. As Ann Stoler argues, scholars have developed sophisticated critical perspectives with which to read state and elite archival documents "against the grain" in order to shed light on how subalterns left evidence revealing how they resisted, appropriated, and negotiated systems of domination.[65] But when studying middle-class formation, this approach must be combined with a sustained engagement with those archives as both catalogs of hierarchical class rule in the making and ethnographic sites of disparate notions of what defined democratic practices and middle-classness. Following Stoler, I propose seeing archival activity not just as a process of extracting authentic middle-class voices but as an ethnographic exercise through which one can historicize power relations from the middle.[66]

I also conducted numerous interviews with self-identified middle-class women and men, not to reclaim marginalized voices—or to recuperate the role of a silent majority in democracies—but to critically engage with these historical actors' contested memories in order to illuminate why and how they think, act, and speak as they do. As Bahamón Soto's memories, cited at the beginning of this introduction, suggest, this reveals how certain women and men became convinced that middle-classness meant democracy and that democracy meant the consolidation of a middle class.[67] I discuss how these memories became gendered and classed claims through which women and men legitimized a specific way to remember the 1960s and 1970s that was intimately connected with competing hierarchized visions of democracy in the present.

Tragic Histories of the Middle Classes

While the middle classes continue to appear as a democratic or antidemocratic force, *Makers of Democracy* proposes, following David Scott's important arguments, a tragic narrative of middle-class historical actors in order

to offer a historical critique of democracy itself.[68] The book's first part, "Conscripts of Democracy," describes how an idea of middle-classness became one of the most contested fields of knowledge in the late 1950s and 1960s. Global policymakers, Latin American state welfare program representatives, spokespeople for privately sponsored social programs, politicians, state policymakers, and elite university professors across the Americas tied the middle class to a hierarchical definition of democracy while demarcating popular groups and oligarchies as the bases for antidemocratic populism and feudal society, respectively. Such transnational discussions shaped development projects under the umbrella of the Alliance, which envisioned the middle classes as "the last democratic hope for the world." I demonstrate how these programs of community building, agrarian reform, education, housing, and financial literacy, crafted by intellectuals and policymakers across the Americas, supported by private foundations, sponsored by the United States' development offices, and put into practice as state policies during Colombia's National Front (FN), elevated this hierarchical vision of democracy to the status of common sense. In so doing, I historicize how an idea of the middle class, far from a false ideology intended to obscure the realpolitik of empire, legitimized the exercise of US imperial rule on a transnational terrain. Responding to the violence of the 1950s in Colombia and the Cuban Revolution, the Alliance sought not to weaken democracy in the region but to naturalize a particular classed and gendered definition of democracy.[69] I also show how during the FN in Colombia, a bipartisan coalition between the Liberal and Conservative Parties, this definition of democracy became an everyday reality for certain women and men charged with bringing a new era of peace after a decade of violence. Through meticulous yet contradictory processes of selection and schooling in state offices, universities, small and medium industries, and service offices, professionals, small-business owners, and white-collar workers were conscripted, and thus empowered, as transnational democratic subjects.

The second part, "Contested Democracies," proposes to understand the middle classes as a social movement of class politics. My arguments build on recent studies of the Cold War in Latin America and cultural approaches to the global 1960s, though such studies tend to take the middle classes' political roles as given and to sidestep what was particularly middle class about their political participation in revolutionary projects.[70] I ask what it was like to live through revolutionary/counterrevolutionary times, to make a political claim to middle-classness, and to struggle for a

democratic society. I show how state professionals, white-collar employees, and small-business owners, in their struggle to become part of a middle class, partially consented to Alliance and FN social policies. Such consent did not, however, merely mean an "Americanization" of the middle classes in Bogotá, a reproduction of an elite master plan, or support for a counterrevolutionary project. Rather, these historical actors mobilized in disorganized yet meaningful collective action as a class in order to structure their vision of a democratic middle-class society.

Such collective action was rooted in three interrelated demands. Against perceived oligarchical elites, professionals demanded that hierarchies in a proper democracy stem not from lineage or blood but from effort, education, and competence, virtues squarely reserved for the middle class. Small-business owners demanded political recognition as representatives of an entrepreneurial state that could democratize the economy for everyone's benefit. And white-collar employees demanded recognition as society's productive class for promoting understanding and interdependence among employers and employees, the cornerstone of a democratic social order characterized by labor harmony. Yet these varied political demands produced what I dub a gendered and classed chain of equivalence through which these three middle-class actors aggregated their particular demands to struggle against "the oligarchs" and "the laboring classes" for material rewards hierarchically distributed according to gendered and classed notions of intellectual labor, professional competence, and economic productivity.[71] In so doing, they opposed the middle—disciplining—position in a three-class society prescribed by development programs and pushed instead to be hierarchically located *above* the elites, the working class, and the peasantry. In so doing, some joined a populist oppositional party, the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), to claim sovereign representation of "the people." Gender featured centrally in these demands, with middle-class men joining forces to silence their female counterparts, who were increasingly participating in professional associations and white-collar unions. Indeed, these gendered claims fomented a certain degree of commonality among otherwise heterogeneous middle-class demands, strengthening the political call for a hierarchical, masculine, and classed vision of domination—and democratic representation—over those whom they considered feminized forces: elites, working-class unions, and middle-class women.

The book's second part also historicizes how and why some professionals and white-collar employees, both by deploying their conscription as democracy's representatives and through their classed and gendered

encounters with a transnational left, challenged the sociopolitical order that had empowered them in the first place. This new radical petit bourgeoisie—as they consciously and unconsciously began to see themselves—reconfigured the meanings, practices, and rationalities of proper democracy by advocating education as a common good, knowledge production as a means of radical critique and the proletariat's revolutionary awakening, health as a fundamental right of modern society, economic success as a collective endeavor to own the means of production, and land distribution as predicated on labor. In this new democratic order, communal solidarity and generosity would typify social relations, and labor would be properly compensated. This radical petit bourgeoisie struggled to make public assembly a central aspect of democracy. Women contributed to this dismantling of patriarchal practices via equal pay, childcare services for professionals, gender solidarity at home, and sexual, economic, and bodily autonomy. Yet like their middle-class counterparts, this petit bourgeoisie endeavored to make dominant their particular classed and gendered visions of revolutionary change. As they questioned oligarchical elites, they simultaneously sought to erect a hierarchical vision of society in which they themselves, as petit bourgeoisie, properly represented "the proletariat" and thus held the right to dominate in a true democracy.

In the last chapter of the book the narrative shifts to discuss the historical emergence of an early iteration of neoliberal rule. It traces how, in response to middle-class oppositional movements and petit bourgeois radicalization, the administrations of the 1970s attempted to normalize a particular definition of democracy that we now call the "global middle class." In so doing, these administrations sought to further conscript a specific middle class as the exemplar of a postclass, postpolitical, and postideological society. And, unlike the second half of the 1960s, middle-class women and men consented to this by locating themselves in the middle of a socially cohesive three-class hierarchical society. In the process, a middle class was further associated with the primacy of private property, the holiness of economic individualism, the postpolitical management of classed differences, and the sanctity of the free market as the legitimate organizer of social hierarchies. This is the tragic, complex history that would allow us to historicize Cold War politics as a struggle between and among heterogeneous classed and gendered mobilizations, happening *within* revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements, through which competing conceptions of class rule as well as opposing forms of domination were contested and legitimized.[72]

Deprovincializing Histories of Colombia

Rex Hudson, mobilizing a widely shared narrative, has claimed that the history of Colombia is "paradoxical." It is a country, he writes, with "a distinguished tradition of political stability" and "one of Latin America's longest-functioning democracies, with a lasting record of usually fair and regular elections and respect for political and civil rights."[73] Historians usually understand the second half of the twentieth century as the moment when Colombia secured this tradition of political stability, relative social and economic growth, and an expanded urban middle sector, all while avoiding a major military dictatorship or authoritarian regime. And yet scholars simultaneously characterize Colombia as fragmented, regionalized, polarized, and violent. Despite a formally civilian democratic government with presidential elections held every four years, the argument goes, during the second half of the twentieth century Colombia became home to Latin America's oldest and largest leftist guerrilla insurgency, paramilitarism, and illicit drug trafficking. It is these "genuine anomalies . . . unusual [and] peculiar" in Cold War Latin America, that lead scholars to understand Colombian democracy as paradoxical, if not enigmatic.[74] Indeed, Colombia is often depicted as a country of "cities without citizens," "a nation in spite of itself," a "democracy without the people," a society in which modernity is forever "deferred," and an idiosyncratic political culture in which "modernization works against modernity."[75]

At the risk of overgeneralization, one might posit an overarching narrative employed by scholars to explain this "anomaly." Some have historicized the 1960s and 1970s as cementing an antidemocratic, exclusionary pact between the two traditional parties via the FN that defended the oligarchies' political and economic interests by excluding the majorities from political power. For this reason scholars historicize the state as a *failure*, unable to secure, following Antonio Gramsci's understanding of hegemonic rule, popular consent.[76] Other historians, evoking Max Weber's analysis of "modern societies," characterize the FN as a *weak* state unable to secure a full monopoly of violence to control social and political unrest. In this reading, the FN embraced development policies to mystify its *lack* of interest in improving the lives of the popular classes.[77] This oligarchical state turned instead to violence, coercion, and the co-optation of a politically *apathetic* middle class that did not play a role in correcting an exclusionary, elite-driven system. Indeed, since the 1970s scholars have defined the failure of the middle classes to become a democratizing force as the "critical fissure"

at the core of a *peculiar* model of modernity.[78] In such a model, modernization materialized different social sectors—strata, groups, segments—in the middle of the society, but modernity/democracy was forever deferred since the same middling sectors joined, rather than challenged, what Antonio García called a "manorial republic."[79] In such a political reality, the argument goes, the country's "oligarchs did not *need* to call on crude military dictators."[80] In this foundational narrative of the second half of the twentieth century, antidemocracy (particularity, tradition, exclusion) is coupled with oligarchical rule, whereas democracy (universality, modernity, inclusion) is intimately attached to a proper middle class.[81]

By historically critiquing what is usually celebrated as a democratizing force but failed experience in Colombian reality—again the formation of an urban middle class—*Makers of Democracy* contributes to deprovincializing histories of Colombia.[82] It is an effort to tell the histories of Colombia beyond nationalized narratives of failure, lack, and deficiency by critiquing power relations and forms of domination from the middle so that we can unsettle the way we think about histories of democracy. In so doing, it proposes that the meanings and practices of middle-classness have a bearing on questions about democracy that cannot be approached through local detail alone—although such detail is at the core of my analysis. The book experiments with not only telling different stories but also telling stories differently—stories of how a state becomes gendered and classed, the productivity of knowledge in the pragmatics of development programs, the complex formation of class and gender subjectivities, and the making of social and political legitimacy in democratic systems of domination. Thus, *Makers of Democracy* highlights the contestations, accommodations, fragile but durable pacts of domination, and inclusionary and exclusionary practices engaged in by a middle class and constitutive of, rather than incompatible with, democratic rule. The stories told here matter not only to a place called Colombia but also for a larger, universal question about democracy. This allows us to understand those histories not as anomalies but rather as contributions to how democracy was heterogeneously experienced in Cold War Latin America. I historicize democracy not as a gift from the West to the rest of the world but as a worldwide question over which different historical actors engaged in hard-fought battles over its meanings, practices, subjectivities, and institutions.

Notes

Introduction

1 Fukuyama, "Future of History," 60; Fukuyama, *Political Order*, 445.
2 Fukuyama, "Future of History," 61.
3 Fukuyama, *Political Order*, 445.
4 Fukuyama, "Future of History," 56.
5 Huffington, *Third World America*; Temin, *Vanishing Middle*.
6 Luce, *Retreat of Western Liberalism*.
7 Hacker, *The Great Risk Shift*.
8 Nasr, *Forces of Fortune*, 110–114.
9 Pew Research Center, *A Global Middle Class*.
10 Luce, *Retreat of Western Liberalism*.
11 Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins*, 258; *Semana*, "Colombia." For a recent statistical description of class distribution in Bogotá, see Angulo et al., *La década*.
12 Uribe Vélez, "Manifiesto."
13 Interview with Hernando Bahamón Soto.
14 Interview with Hernando Bahamón Soto.
15 Badiou, "Twenty-Four Notes," 29.
16 Žižek, *Ticklish Subject*, 187; Moretti, *Bourgeois*, 21.
17 Vivas Pacheco, "Colombia."
18 Therborn, "Class," 28.
19 James Scott, *Two Cheers*, 84–85.
20 Paley, "Introduction," in *Democracy*, 3–20.
21 Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*. There is a revival of studies reclaiming the middle classes as the product of Europe and the United States. See Piketty, *Capital*, 21–22; Sitaraman, *Crisis*, 53–105, 201–220; Moretti, *Bourgeois*, 1–24.
22 López (with Weinstein), "We Shall Be All," 1–11; Paley, "Introduction."
23 Paley, *Democracy*.
24 Desmond Arias and Goldstein, "Violent Pluralism," 5.
25 Desmond Arias and Goldstein, "Violent Pluralism," 5.
26 Desmond Arias and Goldstein, "Violent Pluralism," 27. For similar arguments, see Zeiderman, *Endangered City*, 129–130.
27 Desmond Arias, "Conclusion," 258.

28 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization*; Pandey, "Can There Be a Subaltern Middle Class?," 322, 326–327.

29 Ekbladh, *Great American Mission*; Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area*; Gilman, *Mandarins*; Rabe, *Killing Zone*; Rabe, *John F. Kennedy*; Taffet, *Foreign Aid*; Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*.

30 Escobar, *Designs for the Pluriverse,* xiii.

31 Rabe, *John F. Kennedy,* 82; Escobar, *Encountering Development.* For a different reading, see Field, *From Development.*

32 Rabe, *John F. Kennedy,* 82.

33 Williams, *Understanding,* 190–211.

34 Grandin, *Last Colonial Massacre*, xvi; Rabe, *Killing Zone*; Fontana, *Por el bien del imperio*, 15; E. Torres Rivas, *Revoluciones*, 111, 167–168.

35 Coronil, "After Empire," 248.

36 Mignolo, *Local Histories*; Mignolo, *Darker Side*, 47, 213–251; Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, *El giro*; Dussel, *Politics of Liberation*, 452, 549–552; Escobar, *Territories*, 20.

37 This is how Michael Jiménez's influential article posed the problem. Jiménez, "Elision of the Middle Classes," 207–228. Following Jiménez, the recent iteration of middle-class studies has legitimized the interest in this topic as a need to fill out a historiographical void.

38 For "enduring episteme," see Mudimbe, *Invention of Africa*, x.

39 Chasteen, *Born in Blood and Fire*, 9. On this point, I draw on Said, "Politics of Knowledge"; Lee, *Unreasonable Histories*, 1–21; Spivak, "How Do We Write"; Robinson, *Black Marxism.*

40 Adamovsky, *Historia*; Parker, *Idea of the Middle Class*; Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile*; O'Dougherty, *Consumption Intensified*; Gilbert, *Mexico's Middle Class*; Owensby, *Intimate Ironies*; Walker, *Waking*; López and Weinstein, *Making*; Parker and Walker, *Latin America's Middle Class*; Carassai, *Argentine Silent Majority*; Cosse, "Clases medias"; Visacovsky and Garguin, *Moralidades*; Sánchez Salcedo, *Los empleados*; García Quesada, *Formación*; Vrana, *This City Belongs to You.*

41 Grandin, "Living in Revolutionary Time," 23, 24.

42 Grandin, "Living in Revolutionary Time," 23, 24, 28, 29. This argument has a thick pedigree across the Americas. See Nun, *Latin America*, 363; León de Leal, "Las clases medias"; O'Donnell, *Modernization*; Guillén Martínez, *El poder*; García, "Las clases medias."

43 Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, 14, 169–198, and "Living in Revolutionary Time"; Archila, *Idas y venidas*, 421–430; Sánchez, *¡Huelga!*; Fontana, *Por el bien del imperio,* 377–405, 503–509; Torres Rivas, *Revoluciones*, 138–141, 176–179.

44 As an exception, see Cosse, "Clases medias."

45 Grandin, "Living in Revolutionary Time," 12–13, 23; Archila, *Idas y venidas*, 428, 429; Adamovsky, *Historia*; Pécaut, *Crónica*; Sánchez, *¡Huelga!*, 275–315, 317–358;

Carassai, *Argentine Silent Majority*, 3–4, 268–269; García, "Las clases medias"; Vrana, *This City Belongs to You.*

46 Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, x; Escobar, *Territories*, 20.

47 Joshi, *Fractured Modernity*, 181; Watenpaugh, *Being Modern*, 303–308. In his influential work on Brazil, Owensby invited scholars to think the ideal of the middle class as a productive myth for certain people who identified themselves as middle class in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet he located this ideal as a reality outside Latin America. Owensby, *Intimate Ironies*, 8.

48 Derrida, *Specters of Marx*.

49 This argument is inspired by Zuleta, *Elogio*; Eley, *Forging Democracy*; Paley, *Democracy*; Spencer, *Anthropology*; Joan Scott, *Fantasy*.

50 My transnational approach is informed by Shukla and Tinsman, *Imagining Our Americas*.

51 Sick, "El concepto," 21–54; Maza, *Myth of the French Bourgeoisie*, 4.

52 Sitaraman, *The Crisis*, 12–52.

53 Foucault, "Is It Really Important to Think?," 172.

54 Butler, "Performativity Social Magic," 113–128; Bourdieu, *State Nobility*, 1–7; Hall, *Familiar Stranger*, 16.

55 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 7; Farnsworth-Alvear, *Dulcinea*, 24–33.

56 Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty, "Charting," in *Global Middle Classes*, 13; Wacquant, "Making Class," 39–64.

57 Foucault, "What Is the Enlightenment?," 54.

58 This approach is informed by Parker, "All-Meaning Middle," 13–29; Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty, "Charting," in *Global Middle Classes*, 1–29; Joan Scott, *Fantasy*, 45–67; Butler, *Psychic Life*; David Scott, *Stuart Hall's Voice*, 85–114.

59 Joan Scott, *Fantasy*, 1–67.

60 Joan Scott, *Fantasy*, 19.

61 Adamovsky, "'Clase media,'" 115–138.

62 Adamovsky, "'Clase media,'" 135–136; Garcia Quesada, *La Formación*, 413.

63 Joan Scott, *Fantasy*, 49, 5.

64 Butler, *Notes,* 1–23; Chatterjee, *Lineages*, 140–153; Olson, *Imagined Sovereignties*, 1–17.

65 Stoler, "Colonial Archives," 87–109.

66 Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 19–53.

67 Stern, *Battling*, xxviii.

68 David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity.*

69 See note 34.

70 Joseph and Spenser, *In from the Cold*; Zolov, "Expanding," 48, 51; Archila, *Una historia inconclusa*; Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent*; Pensado, *Rebel Mexico*; Guerra, *Visions of Power*, 14, 17; Gould, "Solidarity under Siege," 349.

71 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 17; Chatterjee, *Lineages*, 140–143.

72 Here I follow Wolford, *This Land*; Degregori, *How Difficult*; Mallon, *Peasant and Nation.*

73 Hudson, *Colombia*, li; Jiménez Burillo et al., *La búsqueda*.

74 Gutiérrez Sanín, *El orangután*, 7; Hylton, *Evil Hour*, 8; Moncayo, *El leviatán*.

75 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence*, 228; Bushnell, *Making*; Pearce, *Colombia*, 207; Jaramillo Vélez, *Colombia,* 3–50; Zubiría Samper, "Dimensiones," 230; Melo, *Historia miníma.*

76 Hylton, *Evil Hour*, 11–12.

77 Archila, *Idas y venidas,* 346–347; Hartlyn, *Politics*; Sánchez, "Bajo la égida," 253; Salazar, "Nostalgia y aspiraciones"; Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence*, 228; Moncayo, "Hacia la verdad," 145–146, 151–152.

78 For "critical fissure," see Guillén Martínez, *El poder*, 445–469; Zubiría Samper, "Dimensiones," 224–230.

79 García, "Las clases medias," 37–38. Such an argument has proven foundational; see Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence*, 180; Murillo Posada, "La modernización," 278; González, *El poder*, 324; Tirado Mejía, *Los años 60*; CNMH, *¡Basta ya!*

80 Bushnell, *Making*, 285.

81 Historians have naturalized this narrative as the historical context—indeed, as historicity itself—to which every history of the second half of the twentieth century must refer. As I show elsewhere, such a narrative is a historical and political product of a petit bourgeois identity in the 1970s and 1980s. See López-Pedreros, "The Class and Gender of De-coloniality."

82 I draw on Weinstein, *The Color of Modernity*, 192–221; Yarimar Bonilla, "Ordinary Sovereignty," 152–165. This is a collective effort: Britto, "Marihuana Axis"; Roldán, *Blood and Fire*, and "Acción Cultural Popular," 27–44; Karl, *Forgotten Peace*; Calvo Isaza and Parra Salazar, *Medellín*; Garzón, *Del patrón-estado*; Farnsworth-Alvear, *Dulcinea*; Braun, *Assassination of Gaitán*; LeGrand, "Legal Narratives of Citizenship."

Chapter 1. A Bastard Middle Class

1 Koner, "Neighbors," 88.

2 Koner, "Neighbors," 88

3 Koner, "Neighbors," 89.

4 Guzzardi, "Crucial," 98.

5 Guzzardi, "Crucial," 98–99.

6 Guzzardi, "Crucial," 98.

7 Guzzardi, "Crucial," 215.

8 Stoler, "Intimidations of Empire," 5–7.

9 For surveys of US policies toward the postcolonial world, see Hanhimäki and Westad, *Cold War*; Latham, *Right Kind of Revolution*.

10 Harry Truman, "Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949," 297.
11 NARA59, Record relating to Colombia, Intern.Tech.Assit., 250/63 104 12–3 (1955–59).
12 NARA59, Record relating to Colombia, Intern.Tech.Assit., 250/63 104 12–3 (1955–59).
13 NARA59, Record relating to Colombia, Intern.Tech.Assit., 250/63 104 12–3 (1955–59).
14 NARA59, Record relating to Colombia, Intern.Tech.Assit., 250/63 104 12–3 (1955–59).
15 Reports, Misión.Colombia, Miscellaneous, Subject files (1952–59), US Mission to Colombia, 1948–1961, NARA469.
16 In this context the notion of "the culture of poverty" emerged as a transnational discussion. Rosemblatt, "Other Americas."
17 Romero Sánchez, "Ruralizing"; Corcoran, "Infrastructure."
18 Kennedy, Depart.State.publication7164, InterAmerican.series, March 1961, Off .Public.Services Bureau of Public Affairs, 4.
19 Kennedy, Depart.State.publication7164, InterAmerican.series, March 1961, Off .Public.Services Bureau of Public Affairs, 4–5.
20 Taffet, *Foreign Aid*, 5.
21 Grandin, *Last Colonial Massacre*, 10; Coronil, "After Empire," 248.
22 David Scott, "Political Rationalities," 1–22.
23 On development, see Ferguson, *Anti-politics Machine*; Cooper and Packard, *International Development*; Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*.
24 John F. Kennedy, Department of State publication 7164, 4, 5.
25 Tech.Assist.Colombia, 1956, UNA, TE 322/1col-s0175-0310-06.
26 Comm.Organ.Develop, Colombia (Colo, 250), 1956, UNA S 0175-03334-02.
27 Letter from William H. Olson to José Ricaute García, August 5, 1959, Prog .Rurales.Desarr.Comunidad, Proj.Colombia IV and Colombia XXV, Min.Agriculture, STACA.
28 NARA469, House.Programs, project.IV.Colombia XXV.Misión.Colombia, Off .Chief.Subject.Files (1952–59).
29 This reading is influenced by Wilder's critique of "colonial humanism." Wilder, *French Imperial Nation-State*, 43–145.
30 UNA, Notif.Com.Nacional.Reforma.Pública.Colombia, Comm.Org.Devel. Bogotá, December 13, 1956, Col.Technical.Assist.Program (250) S 0175-03334-02.
31 OASAR, Proced.organ.clase media.
32 Pan-American Union and Crevenna, *Materiales*.
33 OASAR, Proced.organ. ES.PS.
34 OASAR, Proced.organ. ES.PS.clase media.
35 CEPAL, *El desarrollo social*, 95–96.
36 Bryson, "Introduction," 6.
37 Bryson, "Introduction," 7–8.
38 Bryson, "Introduction," 7.

39 Bryson, "Introduction," 7–8.
40 Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," 24, 26.
41 Bryson, "Introduction," 6.
42 Bryson, "Introduction," 10.
43 Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, and Umaña Luna, *La Violencia*; Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," 18.
44 PA, Letter Poston to Lleras Camargo, 12, December 1960.DSP.CE.1960–1961.
45 Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, 191.
46 US Department of State, *Intervention*, 36.
47 US Department of State, *Intervention*, 41–45; Adams, "Social Change in Guatemala," 276.
48 Ivor Bulmer Thomas, "Conclusions de la age session de l'INCIDI," 480–481.
49 US Department of State, *Intervention*, 41–42.
50 US Department of State, *Intervention*, 36.
51 Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," 14, 18, 57.
52 Draper, *Castro's Revolution*; Draper, *Castroism.* Draper criticized, among others, Mills, *Listen, Yankee.*
53 Draper, *Castro's Revolution,* 11.
54 Draper, *Castro's Revolution*, 21–23.
55 Draper, *Castroism,* 57.
56 Draper, *Castro's Revolution*, 49, 43–44.
57 Draper, *Castroism*, 125.
58 Novás Calvo, "La tragedia," 76.
59 Hugh Thomas, "Middle Class Politics," 259.
60 Hugh Thomas, "Middle Class Politics," 261–263.
61 Johnson, *Political Change*, ix.
62 Johnson, "New Armies," 14; Alba, "The Latin American," 50–51.
63 Johnson, "New Armies," 14; Johnson, *The Military*, 150–152.
64 Johnson, "New Armies," 14.
65 Johnson, "New Armies," 97.
66 Johnson, "New Armies," 98.
67 Johnson, *The Military*, 149–154.
68 Johnson, "New Armies," 98, 2.
69 *Hanson's Latin American Letter*, no. 1024, November 7, 1964.
70 Laserna, *Estado*, 92; Guillén, *El poder.*
71 Geithman, "Middle Class Growth," 55.
72 JFKL, Memorandum, Schlesinger to Kennedy, March 10, 1961, Schlesinger Paper, Wh14, "Latin America, Report 3/10/61," 1.
73 JFKL, Memorandum, Schlesinger to Kennedy, March 10, 1961, Schlesinger Paper, Wh14, "Latin America, Report 3/10/61," 2.
74 JFKL, Memorandum for the President from Arthur Schlesinger, March 14, 1961, 115-008.

75 JFKL, Department of State from Schlesinger to Kennedy, 1961, first part is on the current crisis in Latin America, 2, 121-033.
76 Bagley, "Political Power," 82–84.
77 Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 324.
78 Bagley, "Political Power," 82.
79 Karl, *Forgotten Peace*, 33.
80 Partido Liberal Colombiano, *Programa;* Gallón Giraldo, *Quince años*.
81 PA, Letter Lleras Camargo to Poston, December 12, 1960.DSP.1960–1961.comercio .exterior.
82 ESAPAR, Camilo Torres Restrepo, "Una educación para el mundo," 1961.
83 Taffet, *Foreign Aid*, 149.
84 Rojas, "La Alianza," 98.
85 Helg, "La educación," 135–158. See figure 2.4.
86 Henderson, *Modernization*, 323–347.

Chapter 2. An Irresistible Democracy

1 CINVAR, ACMTC, December.1954–July.1955; APAR, letter from Valencia to his mother.February.1955.
2 Here I am inspired by Ferguson and Gupta, "Spatializing States," 981–1002.
3 Smith, "Observations," 3, 4, 10.
4 Smith, "Observations," 3, 4, 10; Lipset and Solari, *Elites*.
5 Smith, "Observations," 5.
6 Smith, "Observations," 3.
7 Smith, "Observations," 12.
8 Smith, "Observations," 14.
9 Reichel-Dolmatoff, "Notas sobre la clase media en Colombia (una réplica al Dr. T. Lynn Smith)."
10 Reichel-Dolmatoff, "Notas sobre la clase media en Colombia (una réplica al Dr. T. Lynn Smith)," 48.
11 Reichel-Dolmatoff, "Notas sobre la clase media en Colombia (una réplica al Dr. T. Lynn Smith)," 51, 53, 54.
12 Aristotle, *Politics* IV.11.1295b4–6.
13 Aristotle, *Politics* IV.11.1296a7–9.
14 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites," 75; Lipset, *Political Man*, 31; Hoselitz, "Economic Growth."
15 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites," 83.
16 Johnson, *Political Change*, 180.
17 Johnson, *Political Change*, 181.
18 Johnson, *Political Change*, 182; Alba, "La nueva clase media," 781–789.
19 Johnson, *Political Change*, 182.

20 Johnson, Bushnell, and McAlister, "An Interview," 653.
21 Johnson, *Political Change*, 194.
22 Johnson, *Political Change*, 194–195.
23 Johnson, *Political Change*, 10.
24 Germani, *Política y sociedad*, 241; Di Tella, *El sistema político argentino*, 118–121.
25 Germani, *Política y sociedad*, 245–247.
26 Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, and Umaña Luna, *La Violencia*.
27 PA, Public Letter from Alberto Lleras Camargo to the Professionals of Colombia .DSPCRL.Feb.15.1960.
28 PA, Public Letter from Alberto Lleras Camargo to the Professionals of Colombia .DSPCRL.Feb.15.1960.
29 PA, Public Letter from Alberto Lleras Camargo to the Professionals of Colombia .DSPCRL.Feb.15.1960.
30 For an expanded argument on this selection process, see López, "Conscripts of Democracy," 177–195.
31 Atcon, *Latin American University*, 6.
32 Atcon, *Latin American University*, 127.
33 ESAPAR, Nannetti.Administración.Directores.DI.Jul.2.1962.1.
34 ESAPAR, Nannetti.Administración.Directores.DI.Jul.2.1962.1.
35 ESAPAR, Duverger and Tannembaum.CEP.CP.1962.1.
36 ESAPAR, Mora y Mora.Publ.RH.Serie.admin.personal.[1963].1–2.
37 ESAPAR, Mora y Mora.Publ.RH.Serie.admin.personal.[1963].1–2.
38 VGPRPAR, Gabriel Isaza, SE.tugurios.3073364C718.ICT.Dec.1966.3.
39 ESAPAR, Ruth Argandoña, La neutralidad.pública.PC.PD.1963–1964.3.
40 ESAPAR, Buen funcionario.MAP.1964–1967.3.
41 ESAPAR, Fals Borda, El liderazgo rural.SD.Nov.1962.1.
42 ESAPAR, Fals Borda, El liderazgo rural.SD.Nov.1962.1.
43 ICTAR, Caroline Ware, Lideres.mañana.Apuntes.adiestramiento.SG.GSG.DP.
44 CINVAR, Caroline Ware, Material.entrenamiento.AC.1957.
45 CINVAR, Caroline Ware, Material.entrenamiento.AC.1957.
46 CINVAR, Caroline Ware, Material.entrenamiento.AC.1957.
47 ICTAR, Caroline Ware, Lideres.mañana.Apuntes.adiestramiento.SG.GSG.DP.
48 ICTAR, Caroline Ware, Lideres.mañana.Apuntes.adiestramiento.SG.GSG.DP.
49 ESAPAR, Fals-Borda, El liderazgo rural.SD.Nov.1962.1.
50 ESAPAR, Torres Restrepo, problema.estructuración.sociología.latinoamericana .MC.IAS.1961.2.
51 ESAPAR, Torres Restrepo, problema.estructuración.sociología.latinoamericana .MC.IAS.1961.2.
52 ESAPAR, Torres Restrepo, problema.estructuración.sociología.latinoamericana .MC.IAS.1961.2.
53 ESAPAR, José Joaquín Salcedo, Conclusiones.congreso.interuniversitario.desarrollo .comunidad.MC.IAS.1963.4.

54 ESAPAR, José Joaquín Salcedo, Conclusiones.congreso.interuniversitario.desarrollo .comunidad.MC.IAS.1963.5.
55 CINVAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Endoculturación.sociólogos.antrópologos .SE .105a/9.PV.2.
56 CINVAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Introducción.antropología. SE.105a/1.PV.19 60.1–4.
57 CINVAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Introducción.antropología.SE.105a/16.PV.8–9.
58 CINVAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Introducción.antropología.SE.105a/16.PV.8–9.
59 Fals Borda, *Soluciones sociales*, 5–7, and *Campesinos de los Andes*, xiii, xviii, xix.
60 ICTAR, Material.entrenamiento.profesional.progr.vivienda.urbana.rural.SG.GSG .DP.1957–1959.
61 ICTAR, Material.entrenamiento.profesional.PV.urbana.rural.SG.GSG.DP.1957–1959.
62 ICTAR, Material.entrenamiento.profesional.PV.urbana.rural.SG.GSG.DP.1957–1959.
63 VGPRPAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Los.problemas.culturales.hombre colombiano .Charlas.ICT.Jul.2.1963.11.
64 VGPRPAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Los.problemas.culturales.hombre colombiano .Charlas.ICT.Jul.2.1963.11.
65 VGPRPAR, Gutiérrez de Pineda, Los.problemas.culturales.hombre colombiano .Charlas.ICT.Jul.2.1963.11.
66 ICTAR, Material.entrenamiento.profesional.PV.urbana.rural.SG.GSG.DP.1957–1959.
67 UNA, Propuesta.establecimiento.depart.selección/comisión de recrutamiento .profesionales.servicio.estado, febrero 9, 1959, progras.apoyo.técnico, (250), S-0175-0334-02.
68 ESAPAR, Lucrecia Tello-Marulanda and Matilde González, Mujeres.administrando.justicia.Sem.admin.AP.IAS.Aug.1962.2.
69 ESAPAR, Lucrecia Tello-Marulanda and Matilde González, Mujeres.administrando.justicia.Sem.admin.AP.IAS.Aug.1962.4.
70 ESAPAR, Lucrecia Tello-Marulanda and Matilde González, Mujeres.administrando.justicia.Sem.admin.AP.IAS.Aug.1962.2.
71 IFIARC, Carmen Torres Media, Progr.relac.humanas.orientación.OD.RP.1964.2.
72 Fals Borda, *Soluciones sociales*, 5.
73 IFIARC, Relaciones humanas.OD.RP.1963.2.
74 ICTAR, Apuntes.adiestramiento.SG.GSG.DP.1957–1959.
75 CINVAR, Apuntes.clase.Apuntes.entrenamiento.ICT.1957–1959.
76 CINVAR, Apuntes.clase.Apuntes.entrenamiento.ICT.1957–1959.

Chapter 3. The Productive Wealth of This Country

1 Drinot and Knight, *The Great Depression*.
2 Interview with Alejandro Hurtado.
3 Interview with Alejandro Hurtado; AHPA, Solicitud [1965].
4 Interview with Alejandro Hurtado.

5 For a historiography see Brando, "Political Economy," 103–111; Avella et al., "La consolidación del capitalismo moderno"; GRECO, *El crecimiento económico*; Robinson and Urrutia, *Economía colombiana*; Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 312–315.

6 Brando, "Political Economy," 99.

7 Kalmanovitz, "Colombia: La industrialización a medias," 71. For works on state/government failure, see Krueger, "Government Failures"; Brando, "Political Economy," 14–15, 16, 98–99.

8 Brando, "Political Economy," 111, 16.

9 Topik and Wells, *Second Conquest*; Kalmanovitz and López Enciso, *La agricultura*; Drinot and Knight, *The Great Depression*.

10 Brando, Political Economy.

11 Ocampo and Ros, *Oxford Handbook*; Bertola and Ocampo, *The Economic Development*; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, 6–7.

12 CEPAL, *El desarrollo*, 99–100.

13 Henderson, *Modernization*.

14 Henderson, *Modernization*, xiv, xv; GRECO, *El crecimiento económico*.

15 Benjamin Spiro Associates, *Credit*.

16 DANE, *La importancia*.

17 BP, *Small and Medium Industry*, 2; DAP, *Programa*, 11.

18 CEPAL, *El desarrollo*, 99–100; DANE, *La importancia*, 12.

19 Kilby, "Preface," v.

20 Hagen, "Transition in Colombia," 112, 124; see also Safford, "Significación."

21 Hagen, "Transition in Colombia," 125.

22 McClelland, "Achievement Motive," 110.

23 McClelland, *Achieving Society*.

24 Schultz, "Investment in Man," 109; Schultz, "Human Capital," 1–17.

25 In his proposal for a Latin American University, Atcon followed Schultz's notion of human capital. Atcon, *Latin American University*.

26 De la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos*, 4; de la Cadena, *Formaciones*, 16–27; Wade, *Race*, 124–125.

27 Schultz, "Investment in Man," 110.

28 Schultz, "Investment in Man," 110.

29 UNALAR, Lipman, "Las clases sociales y la economía colombiana," 111.

30 Lipset and Solari, *Elites*, viii.

31 Hirschman, *Strategy of Economic Development*, 14–19; Cardoso, *El empresario*, 35–39.

32 Lipset, "Values," 23; Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects*, 62.

33 Lipman, *Colombian Entrepreneur*, 23; Fals Borda, *La educación*, 20.

34 Lipman, *Colombian Entrepreneur*, 37, 52.

35 Hagen, *On the Theory*, 96–122; Schaw, *Bonds of Work*.

36 Laserna, *Estado*, 95.

37 Lipset, "Values," 23; Hagen, "Transition in Colombia."

38 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *La familia en Colombia* and *Familia y cultura en Colombia*.

39 See also Parsons, *Antioqueño Colonization*.
40 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 21.
41 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 136–137.
42 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, xv, 236.
43 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia,* 367; Hagen, *El cambio social*. Fals Borda also said that Antioquia witnessed the emergence of "a rural middle class, the first in the country, and perhaps in all Latin America as well." Fals Borda, *Subversion and Social Change,* 96.
44 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 367.
45 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 41.
46 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 42.
47 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 166–168.
48 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 169–172.
49 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 272–273, 225–352.
50 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 374.
51 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 374.
52 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 384–385.
53 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 403–404.
54 Gutiérrez de Pineda, *Familia*, 404–409.
55 Kalmanovitz and Rivera López, *Nueva historia,* 285–308.
56 UN, Tech.Assist.mission.Colombia TE 322/1col, Resolution 73, June 8, 1962, S 0175-0310-06, UNA.
57 Staley and Nanjundan, *Economic Research*; Davenport, *Financing.*
58 BP, *Small and Medium Industry*, 2.
59 BP, *Small and Medium Industry*, 2.
60 BP, *Small and Medium Industry*, 2.
61 ACOPIAR, Letter from Staley, Davenport and Morse to Eduardo Nieto Calderón .ES.pequeña.mediana empresa.Estudios1960–1964.Sep.15.1962.
62 ACOPIAR, Letter from Staley, Davenport and Morse to Eduardo Nieto Calderón .ES.pequeña.mediana empresa.Estudios.1960–1964.Sep.15.1962.
63 ACOPIAR, Letter from Staley, Davenport and Morse to Eduardo Nieto Calderón .ES.pequeña.mediana empresa.Estudios.1960–1964.Sep.15.1962.
64 For allocation of loans, see appendix figures 8–9.
65 ACOPIAR, RE.FI.1964–1966.2.
66 ACOPIAR, RE.FI.1964–1966.2.
67 CGAIMAR, Requisitos.minimos.prestamos.DCI.1966.
68 CGAIMAR, Requisitos.minimos.prestamos.DCI.1966. Loans usually lasted from one to ten years with a 10 to 15 percent interest rate on an annual basis.
69 CGAIMAR, Requisitos.minimos.prestamos.DCI.1966.
70 CGAIMAR, Solic.informes.SIV.CIS.1966.
71 CGAIMAR, Solic.informes.SIV.CIS.1966.
72 CGAIMAR, Solic.informes.SIV.CIS.1966.
73 CGAIMAR, Solic.informes.SIV.CIS.1965.

74 CGAIMAR, IVI.supervisión.CIS.DCI.1967.
75 CGAIMAR, IVI.supervisión.CIS.DCI.1967.
76 CGAIMAR, IVI.supervisión.CIS.DCI.1965.
77 CGAIMAR, Rafael Pardo, IVI.supervisión.CIS.DCI.1965.
78 CGAIMAR, IVI.supervisión.CIS.DCI.1965.
79 CGAIMAR, Los negocios.Colombia.CIS.DCI.1965.
80 CGAIMAR, Los negocios.Colombia.CIS.DCI.1965.
81 CGAIMAR, Seminarios.crédito.orientado.CIS.DCI.1965–1967.
82 CGAIMAR, Seminarios.crédito.orientado.CIS.DCI.1965–1967.
83 CGAIMAR, Seminarios.crédito.dirigido.CIS.DCI.1966.
84 CGAIMAR, Seminarios.crédito.dirigido.CIS.DCI.1966.
85 CGAIMAR, Seminarios.crédito.dirigido.CIS.DCI.1966.
86 CGAIMAR, Seminarios.crédito.dirigido.CIS.DCI.1966.
87 ACOPIAR, INCOLDA, Empresario.moderno.ES.pequeña/mediana empresa.ES .1960–1964.5.

Chapter 4. Beyond Capital and Labor

1 Flórez, *Las transformaciones*, 101–128; Jaramillo and Cuervo, *La configuración*, 114–117, 213–225; Palacios, *Between Legitimacy*, 220; see also figure 1.
2 Interview with Jorge Ortiz.
3 Marx, *Economic*; Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty, "Charting," in *Global Middle Classes*, 22–27.
4 Brennan, "Latin American Labor History," 360. As exceptions see French, "Laboring," 328; Parker, *Idea of the Middle Class*; López, "It Is Not Something," 151–170; Porter, *From Angel to Office Worker.*
5 Heidi Tinsman argues that working-class labor histories in Latin America have mainly focused on production rather than consumption. Tinsman, *Buying into the Regime*, 14.
6 Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty, "Charting," in *Global Middle Classes*, 21.
7 Economic histories mostly ignore the role of the service sector. Kalmanovitz and López Enciso, *La agricultura*; Robinson and Urrutia, *Economía colombiana*.
8 Drucker, *Landmarks of Tomorrow*, 98.
9 Schultz, "Investment in Man," 16.
10 Ratinoff, "Algunos," 5–26.
11 Ratinoff, "Algunos," 7, 25.
12 UNALAR, Williamson, unpublished paper.
13 UNALAR, Williamson, unpublished paper.
14 UNALAR, Williamson, unpublished paper.
15 UNALAR, Williamson, unpublished paper.
16 UNALAR, Lipman, "Las clases sociales y la economía colombiana," 311.
17 UNALAR, Lipman, "Las clases sociales y la economía colombiana," 315.

18 UNALAR, Lipman, "Las clases sociales y la economía colombiana," 78.

19 UNALAR, Lipman, "Las clases sociales y la economía colombiana," 78. By creating a sharp distinction between an old and a new middle class, C. Wright Mills strived to restore a proper middle-class masculinity away from the monotony of the office work and closer to revolutionary politics. Mills, *White Collar*.

20 Salazar, *Study*, 76.

21 Salazar, *Study*, 76.

22 UNESCO, *La vida laboral*, 45, 78.

23 Salazar, *Study*, 76.

24 Salazar, *Study*, 58.

25 First quote is from Salazar, *Study*, 58. Second and third quotes are from CAFAR, ACD.Sep.12.1964t.

26 CAFAR, ACD.Sep.12.1964t.

27 COLARCH, ACD.Apr.10.1961.

28 For the role of scientific management in the experience of factory labor, see Arango, *Mujer*; Farnsworth-Alvear, *Dulcinea*; Mayor Mora, *Ética*.

29 COLARCH, ACD.May.11.1962.

30 Alianza para el Progreso (n.d.), Annex: Cuadro C, p. 3.

31 Barnard, *Dilemmas of Leadership*.

32 Maslow, *Motivation*.

33 COLARCH, ME.ORH.1961–1965; CAFAR, Sem.vinculación.laboral.OP.1966.

34 COLARCH, Memorias.seminarios.selección.ORH.Feb.15.1963.

35 BRAR, MS.OP.1961.

36 COLARCH, Memorias.seminarios.selección.ORH.Feb.15.1963.

37 COLARCH, Memorias.seminarios.selección.ORH.Feb.15.1963.

38 COLARCH, MS.ORH.Sep.1961.

39 COLARCH, MS.ORH.Sep.1961.

40 COLARCH, MS.ORH.Sep.1961.

41 COLARCH, MS.ORH.Sep.1961.

42 COLARCH, Código.ética.ORH.1962.11.

43 Flórez, *Las transformaciones*, 116–125.

44 CAFAR, ME.OP.1966.1–2.

45 COLARCH, Colseguros.empresa.pionera.ACD.Mar.4.1962.2.

46 COLARCH, ME.ORH.1966.1–2.

47 CAFAR, PS.OP.1964–1965.

48 COLARCH, IS.ORH.1959–1963.5.

49 COLARCH, IS.ORH.1959–1963.5.

50 COLARCH, IS.ORH.1959–1963.5.

51 CAFAR, letter Arcesio Guerrero to ORH.OP.Nov.11.1966.1. These conclusions on hiring preferences come from a reading of 4,000 CVs in the companies' archives under study, about 174 CVs per year. For statistical descriptions of these hiring policies see https://www.aricardolopezpedreros.com/.

52 CAFAR, PS.OP.1964–1965.

53 COLARCH, MP.ORH.1963.12.
54 CAFAR, CAFAM.familia.OP.1965.4.
55 COLARCH, MP.ORH.[1963].11.
56 AAR, MP.OP.[1964].5.
57 BRAR, MS.ORH.
58 COLARCH, MP.ORH.[1963].11.
59 CAFAR, CAFAM.familia.OP.1965.3.
60 COLARCH, MP.ORH.1963.13.
61 CAFAR, CAFAM.familia.OP.1965.3.
62 CAFAR, CAFAM.familia.OP.1965.3.
63 CAFAR, CAFAM.familia.OP.1965.4.
64 AAR, MP.OP.1964.9.
65 COLARCH, ACD.Mar.4.1962.2.
66 COLARCH, ACD.Mar.4.1962.2.
67 COLARCH, Info.conf.selección.ORH.1963–1965.
68 COLARCH, Info.conf.selección.ORH.1963–1965.
69 COLARCH, Info.conf.selección.ORH.1963–1965.
70 COLARCH, Info.conf.selección.ORH.1963–1965.
71 COLARCH, MP.ORH.1964.21.
72 COLARCH, ACD.June.12.1961.
73 COLARCH, MP.ORH.1963.21.
74 COLARCH, MP.ORH.1964.17.
75 BRAR, *Revista Relaciones*, V1.1ol.2, Apr.1963.4.

Chapter 5. In the Middle of the Mess

1 Henderson, *Modernization*, xiv, xv.
2 For quote see Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 297; Henderson, *Modernization*, 342–343. Following the Lebret report of 1958, Robert Dix estimated the size of the middle class at about 15 percent of Colombians. Robert Dix, *Colombia*, 56. According to the census of 1951, which grouped together independent employees, white-collar workers, and professionals, the middle class could comprise almost 45 percent. Workers comprised 32 percent. And in 1964 the percentage of the middle class increased to 52 percent. See Archila, "El Frente Nacional," 212; see figure 1 and https://www.aricardolopezpedreros.com/.
3 Interview with Alberto Valencia.
4 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy*, 179–180.
5 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy*, 171.
6 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy*, 226.
7 Henderson, *Modernization*, xiv, xv.
8 Henderson, *Modernization*, xiv, xv, 342. See appendix figures 2 and 4.
9 González, *Educación*, 110–111.

10 Flórez, *Las transformaciones*, 90.
11 Flórez, *Las transformaciones*, 90.
12 Arias Trujillo, *Historia de Colombia contemporánea*, 311–362.
13 Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 307.
14 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
15 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
16 MJPA.
17 In his study on UNAL students in 1961, Williamson reported that 80 percent of the students considered themselves part of the middle class. The lower middle class was reported at 5.4 percent, the upper middle at 7.6 percent, and the upper class at 6.7 percent. Williamson, *El estudiante*, 13–16.
18 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
19 Interview with Marta Flórez.
20 Interview with Marta Flórez.
21 Interview with Alicia Perdomo.
22 Interview with Alicia Perdomo.
23 APAR; see figure 4 in the appendix.
24 Interview with Alicia Perdomo.
25 Interview with Alicia Perdomo.
26 Interview with Alicia Perdomo.
27 APAR, Untitled.paper.[1962].3–4, 7–8; APAR, Mujer.hoy.[1963].
28 APAR, PN.[1960].
29 APAR, PN.[1960].
30 APAR, PN.[1960].
31 APAR, PN.[1960].
32 ICTAR, Eval.lab.SC.DSS.SA.1963–1965.
33 ICTAR, Letter José Tarazona to Arturo Bernal, DSS.SA.Feb.11.1962.
34 ICTAR, Letter José Tarazona to Arturo Bernal, DSS.SA.Feb.11.1962.
35 ICTAR, Letter José Tarazona to Arturo Bernal, DSS.SA.Feb.11.1962.
36 ICTAR, Letter José Tarazona to Arturo Bernal, DSS.SA.Feb.11.1962.
37 ICTAR, Letter José Tarazona to Arturo Bernal, DSS.SA.Feb.11.1962.
38 ICTAR, Eval.lab.SC.DSS.SA.1963–1965.
39 ICTAR, RTC.IN.DI.ST.1961–1962.
40 CVPAR, RTC.AR.DP.ST.1961–1964.
41 ICTAR, RTC.IN.DI.ST.1961–1962.
42 ICTAR, RTC.IN.DI.ST.1961–1962.
43 IFIARC, Notas.encuentros.JD.GG.Feb.15.1959.2–3.
44 Here I am inspired by Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 57–102.
45 IFIARC, Inf.material.fábricas.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1963–1965.
46 IFIARC, Inf.material.fábricas.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1963–1965.
47 IFIARC, Inf.material.fábricas.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1963–1965.
48 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bta.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
49 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bta.DEE.ST.1961–1963.

50 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
51 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
52 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
53 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
54 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
55 IFIARC, Info.prof.industrias.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
56 IFIARC, RTC.metalúrgico.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1963.
57 IFIARC, Notas.campo.cementos.DEE.ST.1959–1963.
58 IFIARC, Notas.campo.cementos.DEE.ST.1959–1963.
59 IFIARC, Visitas.campo.automotriz.Bogotá.DEE.ST.1961–1962.
60 IFIARC, Conf.profesionales.acero.Boyaca.DEE.ST.1963.
61 IFIARC, Conf.profesionales.acero.Boyaca.DEE.ST.1963.
62 IFIARC, Eval.personal.OP.1959–1963.
63 IFIARC, Eval.personal.DP.ST.1961–1963.
64 IFIARC, letter Jesús Antonio Toro and Gabriel Millamarín to Alfredo Vanegas .DP.ST.Sep.7.1963.
65 IFIARC, letter Jesús Antonio Toro and Gabriel Millamarín to Alfredo Vanegas .DP.ST.Sep.7.1963.
66 IFIARC, letter Jesús Antonio Toro and Gabriel Millamarín to Alfredo Vanegas .DP.ST.Sep.7.1963.
67 Interview with Alberto Valencia.
68 Interview with Alberto Valencia.
69 Interview with Alberto Valencia.
70 AVPA, Report.trabajo.campo.[1958].
71 AVPA, Report.trabajo.campo.[1958].
72 Interview with Alberto Valencia.
73 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.AR.ST.1959–1961.
74 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.AR.ST.1959–1961.
75 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.AR.ST.1959–1961.
76 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.AR.ST.1959–1961. See also STACAR, MA.RE, veredas.cundinamarquesas.SD.PRD.1959–1963.
77 ICTAR, Notas.campo.Quiroga.AR.ST.1958–1965.
78 ICTAR, Notas.campo.DV.ST.1960–1966.
79 ICTAR, Informes.eval.trabajo.DP.SG.1959–1963.
80 ICTAR, Informes.eval.trabajo.DP.SG.1959–1963.
81 ICTAR, Eval.laborales.SC.DSS.SA.1963–1965.
82 ICTAR, Eval.laborales.SC.DSS.SA.1963–1965.
83 ICTAR, Eval.laborales.SC.DSS.SA.1963–1965.
84 ICTAR, Notas.campo.Quiroga.AR.ST.1958–1965.
85 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.DP.SG.1959–1961.
86 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.PRU.DPG.ST.1959–1961.
87 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.material.entrenamiento.PRU.DPG.ST.1959–1961.
88 ICTAR, Notas.trabajo.campo.DV.PRU.ST.1961–1966.

89 INCORAR, NTC.EN.SA.1960–1965.
90 Interview with Clemencia Casas.
91 Interview with Clemencia Casas.
92 Interview with Clemencia Casas.
93 Interview with Jorge Ortiz.
94 Interview with Jorge Ortiz.
95 Interview with Margarita Delgado de Ortiz.
96 Interview with Margarita de Martínez.
97 Interview with Margarita de Martínez.
98 Interview with Margarita de Martínez.
99 Interview with Isabel Delgado de Téllez.
100 Interview with Isabel Delgado de Téllez.
101 COLARCH, Concursos.internos.ORH.DA.1963.
102 COLARCH, Concursos.internos.ORH.DA.1963.
103 COLARCH, Concursos.internos.ORH.DA.1963.
104 COLARCH, Concursos.internos.ORH.Requisitos.1964.11.
105 COLARCH, Concursos.internos.ORH.Requisitos.1964.12.
106 COLARCH, Concursos.internos.ORH.Requisitos.1964.12.
107 COLARCH, Julio Vaca.DA.ORH.1963.2.
108 COLARCH, Julio Vaca.DA.ORH.1963.2.
109 COLARCH, Jorge Franco.DA.ORH.1964.1–4.
110 COLARCH, Jorge Franco.DA.ORH.1964.1–4.
111 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1961–1965.
112 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1961–1965.
113 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1961–1965.
114 CAFAR, Sem.servicio.cliente.OP.1964.
115 CAFAR, Sem.servicio.cliente.OP.1964.
116 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1962–1966.
117 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1962–1966.
118 BRAR, Carlos Salcedo.GP.OP.1964–1967.
119 BRAR, Jorge Pineda.GP.ORH.1964–1967.
120 COLARCH, José Ramirez.GP.ORH.1962–1966.
121 COLARCH, Grupo.discusión.GP.ORH.1961–1965.3.
122 COLARCH, Grupo.discusión.GP.ORH.1961–1965.3.
123 COLARCH, Hernán Pulido.GP.ORH.1962–1966.
124 COLARCH, Hernán Pulido.GP.ORH.1962–1966.
125 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1962–1966.
126 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1962–1966.
127 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1962–1966.
128 COLARCH, GP.ORH.1962–1966.

Chapter 6. A Revolution for a Middle-Class Society

1 MOCLAMAR, CCB.SC.Sep.1959.3.
2 MOCLAMAR, CCB.SC.Sep.1959.5.
3 PA, Letter Vasco Vejarano to Fernando Londoño.MG.Nov.27.1961; PA, CCCME .Declaración.principios.clase media.colombiana.MG.1961.1.
4 MOCLAMAR, MOCLAM, Organismo.servicio.intereses.clase.media.SC.1963.2–3.
5 MOCLAMAR, MOCLAM, Organismo.servicio.intereses.clase.media.SC.1963.2–3.
6 MOCLAMAR, CCCME, Declaración.principios.clase media.colombiana.MG.1961.4.
7 MOCLAMAR, MOCLAM, Organismo.servicio.intereses.clase.media.SC.1963.2–3.
8 Adamovsky, *Historia*; Gilbert, *Mexico's Middle Class*; García Quesada, *Formación*; Guillén Martínez, El poder; Torres Rivas, *Revoluciones*, 136, 176.
9 Archila, *Idas y venidas*, 421–422; Sánchez, *¡Huelga!*
10 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy*, 180; González, *El poder*, 324; Pécaut, *Crónica*; Tirado Mejía, *Los años*, 60.
11 Archila, *Idas y venidas*, 131–142.
12 MOCLAMAR, CCB.SC.Sep.1959.12.
13 MOCLAMAR, CCB.SC.Feb.1961.21.
14 MOCLAMAR, Manifesto.SC.1963.4.
15 MOCLAMAR, Manifesto.SC.1963.4.
16 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Jan.1962.11–14.
17 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Jan.1962.11–14.
18 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Jan.1962.11–14.
19 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Jan.1962.11–14.
20 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Jan.1962.15.
21 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Jan.1962.15.
22 MOCLAMAR, CTCC.SC.Mar.1962.28–35.
23 RMPAR, Letter Régulo Millán Puentes and Vasco Vejarano to Guillermo León Valencia.Dec.1962.2.
24 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.Feb.19.1962.3.
25 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.Feb.19.1962.3.
26 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.Feb.19.1962.3.
27 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.SC.July.1964.
28 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.SC.July.1964.
29 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.SC.Mar.1962.3.
30 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Com.trabajo.exterior.SC.BR.SC.Mar.1962.3.
31 MOCLAMAR, SECB.SC.Sep.1963.7–9.
32 MOCLAMAR, SECB.SC.Sep.1963.7–9.
33 Interview with Régulo Millán Puentes.
34 Interview with Régulo Millán Puentes.
35 RMPAR, Por la clase media.1963.
36 RMPAR, Una clase vibrante.1964.
37 RMPAR, Una clase vibrante.1964.

38 RMPAR, Una clase vibrante.1964.
39 RMPAR, Democracia.1963.
40 Interview with Régulo Millán Puentes.
41 Interview with Régulo Millán Puentes.
42 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Secretaría.clase media.SC.1964.
43 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Secretaría.clase media.SC.1964.
44 MOCLAMAR, CCB.GuillermoLeónValencia.SC.Sep.1964.
45 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Vida democrática.SC.Jan.1965.
46 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Vida democrática.SC.Jan.1965.
47 MOCLAMAR, CCB.Vida democrática.SC.Jan.1965.
48 LMMCA, Carta a la nación.[1961].
49 Interview with Fernando Agudelo.
50 LMMCA, Editorial.NSP.May.1964.1.
51 LMMCA, Israel Guerrero, Nuestra.lucha.NSP.May.1964.
52 LMMCA, Israel Guerrero, Nuestra.lucha.NSP.May.1964.
53 LMMCA, Israel Guerrero, Nuestra.lucha.NSP.May.1964.
54 LMMCA, Israel Guerrero, Nuestra.lucha.NSP.May.1964.
55 LMMCA, Antonio Vega.Orgullo profesional.NSP.Aug.1963.8.
56 Interview with Germán Giraldo.
57 Interview with Germán Giraldo.
58 Interview with Germán Giraldo.
59 GGPA, La.importancia.nuestro.país.[1965].
60 Interview with Germán Giraldo; interview with Clodomiro Rodríguez.
61 CRPA, Discurso.inaguración.Congr.Bolivariano.contadores.Jul.24.1964.
62 CRPA, Discurso.inaguración.Congr.Bolivariano.contadores.Jul.24.1964.
63 CRPA, Discurso.inaguración.Congr.Bolivariano.contadores.Jul.24.1964.
64 CRPA, Discurso.inaguración.Congr.Bolivariano.contadores.Jul.24.1964.
65 CRPA, Discurso.inaguración.Congr.Bolivariano.contadores.Jul.24.1964.
66 Interview with Guillermo Ramírez.
67 Interview with Luis Torres Castro.
68 Interview with Emilio Guzmán.
69 ANEBRE was founded in 1964, first in Medellín and then in Bogotá.
70 ANEBRAR, AN.May.1966.1.2.2.
71 ANEBRAR, AN.May.1966.1.2.2.
72 ANEBRAR, AN.May.1966.1.2.2.
73 ANEBRAR, AN.May.1964.1.2.4.
74 COLARCH, RAS.July.1965.3.1.3.
75 ANEBRAR, AN.May.1996.1.2.4.
76 COLARCH, RAC.Aug.1967.3.4.1.
77 COLARCH, RAC.Aug.1967.3.4.1.
78 COLARCH, RAC.Aug.1967.3.4.1.
79 ANEBRAR, AN.May.1966.1.2.2.
80 Interview with Alejandro Hurtado.

81 Interview with Alejandro Hurtado.
82 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.
83 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.
84 ACOPIAR, Roberto Carbonell, Tributación.milimétrica.DS.DP.
85 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.1.
86 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.1.
87 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.1.
88 ACOPIAR, Petición.año.nuevo.PT.DP.Dec.1965.
89 ACOPIAR, Petición.año.nuevo.PT.DP.Dec.1965.
90 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.1.1.3.
91 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Nov.1965.1.1.3.
92 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Feb.1966.2.4–5.3.
93 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.Feb.1966.2.4–5.3.
94 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.2.3.3.
95 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.2.3.3.
96 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.2.3.3.
97 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.2.3.3.
98 ACOPIAR, CI.PU.May.1966.2.7.12.
99 ACOPIAR, Empresas.modestas.SE.Apr.1966.
100 ACOPIAR, Colombia Industrial.SE.PU.Nov.1975.12.
101 ACOPIAR, Colombia Industrial.SE.PU.Nov.1975.12.
102 ACOPIAR, Colombia Industrial.SE.PU.Nov.1975.12.
103 ACOPIAR, Colombia Industrial.SE.PU.Nov.1975.12.
104 AHPA, El futuro de la nación.
105 AHPA, El futuro de la nación.
106 AHPA, El futuro de la nación.
107 ACOPIAR, Estadocantinero.PR.VA.
108 ACOPIAR, Estadocantinero.PR.VA.
109 UNCLAMECOLAR, Aristobulo Forero, Democracia.para.pueblo.Oct.1971.
110 UNCLAMECOLAR, La clase media.contribuye.democratización.pais.AH.3.
111 LMMCA, Guillermo González, Manifestaciones.antidemocráticas.NSP.Dec.1964 .7–8.
112 LMMCA, Guillermo González, Manifestaciones.antidemocráticas.NSP.Dec.1964 .7–8.
113 LMMCA, Juan Vargas, Llamamiento.cordura.NSP.Oct.1964.1–2.
114 LMMCA, Juan Vargas, Llamamiento.cordura.NSP.Oct.1964.1–2.
115 LMMCA, Juan Vargas, Llamamiento.cordura.NSP.Oct.1964.1–2.
116 LMMCA, Juan Vargas, Llamamiento.cordura.NSP.Oct.1964.1–2.
117 LMMCA, Más.capaces.NSP.Dec.1964.7–8.
118 Ruiz Novoa, "Resucitar," 28.
119 Ruiz Novoa, "Resucitar," 28.
120 ACOPIAR, Estado.cantinero.PR.VA.
121 ACOPIAR, Estado.cantinero.PR.VA.

122 *La Nueva Prensa*, February 26, 1965, 61.
123 UNCLAMECOLAR, Discurso Gustavo Rojas Pinilla; Ruiz Novoa, "La reforma," 92.
124 Ruiz Novoa, "La organización," 136.
125 Ayala Diago, *La explosión*.
126 FEDEPROCOLAR, JDN.PR.Sep.12.1965.1–13.
127 PA, Letter Gabriel Castaño to Lleras Camargo.AD.SG.Oct.3.1961.1–19.
128 PA, Letter Gabriel Castaño to Lleras Camargo.AD.SG.Oct.3.1961.1–19.
129 FEDEPROCOLAR, Oscar Duque, Minutes.conferencia.tripartita.CF.VG.Feb.1967.1–15.
130 ANEBRAR, AN.May.31.1966.2.4.4.
131 ANEBRAR, AN.May.31.1966.2.4.4.
132 ANEBRAR, AN.May.31.1966.2.4.4.
133 UNCLAMECOLAR, Nucleos.familiares.MNF.NF.[1977].1.
134 UNCLAMECOLAR, Nucleos.familiares.MNF.NF.[1977].1.
135 ICTAR, José Manual Sandoval, Familia.moderna.RL.SA.Oct.17.1977.
136 UNCLAMECOLAR, Discurso.Gustavo.Rojas Pinilla.
137 UNCLAMECOLAR, Discurso.Gustavo.Rojas Pinilla.
138 *Asociación*, August 1967, 2.
139 *Asociación*, August 1967, 2.
140 *Asociación*, August 1967, 2.
141 *Asociación*, August 1967, 2.
142 UNCLAMECOLAR, Discurso.Gustavo.Rojas Pinilla.

Chapter 7. A Real Revolution, a Real Democracy

1 Ghodsee, *Left Side of History*.
2 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
3 Interview with Alberto Otalora.
4 Interview with Marta Espinosa.
5 Interview with Hernando Rincón.
6 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
7 Interview with Carlos Restrepo; interview with Arcadio Benavides; these memories evoked Arenas, *La guerrilla*.
8 Interview with Leonardo Betancour.
9 Interview with Leonardo Betancour.
10 Interview with Roberto Solano.
11 For exceptions see Archila, *Una historia inconclusa*; Aguilera Morales, *Subjetividades*; Aguilera Peña, *Contrapoder*.
12 Gaviria, *Sofismas*.
13 Posada Carbó, *La nación*; Caballero Argáez et al., *Cincuenta años*. The following studies are published in *Contribución*: Duncan, "Exclusion," 254–256;

Giraldo Ramírez, "Política," 473–480; Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, 82, 97; Pécaut, *Guerra*.

14 Vanegas, *Todas son iguales,* 384–437. For a critical reading, see Beverley, *Latin Americanism,* 95–109.

15 Hylton, "Experience of Defeat," 23–24; González, *Poder*, 366; Delgado Guzmán, "El experimento," 121–140; Bergquist, "La izquierda colombiana." For an expansion of this argument, see López, "De debilidades, fracasos y paradojas."

16 Vega Cantor, *Gente muy rebelde,* 30.

17 Several interviews.

18 On this point, I have found inspiration in Ghodsee, *Left Side of History.*

19 Vega Cantor, *Gente muy rebelde*, 30.

20 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy*, 170–213.

21 Palacios, *Between Legitimacy,* 190.

22 CCPA, Notes.

23 CCPA, Notes.

24 CCPA, Notes.

25 IFIARC, Notas.campo.cementos.DEE.ST.1959–1963.

26 IFIARC, Actas.visitas, SG.DA.MT.Feb.11.1965.

27 I am drawing on David Scott, *Stuart Hall's Voice*, 85–115.

28 CRPA, Diaries.1969.

29 CRPA, Diaries.1969.

30 CRPA, Diaries.1969.

31 CRPA, Diaries.1969; CRPA, Diaries.1970.12, 21–23.

32 CRPA, Diaries.1969.

33 CRPA, Diaries.1969.

34 COLARCH, ICP.ORH.Mar.4.1967.2.

35 COLARCH, ICP.ORH.Apr.29.1969.7.

36 ADPA, Letter Antonio Díaz to office of HR.May.11.1968.1.

37 ADPA, Letter Antonio Díaz to office of HR.May.11.1968.1.

38 ADPA, Letter Antonio Díaz to office of HR.May.11.1968.1.

39 Urrutia, *Winners*, 107.

40 PA, Letter Ramón Arévalo to Lleras Restrepo.238.SP.Jan.15.1968.2.

41 PA, Letter Ramón Arévalo to Lleras Restrepo.238.SP.Jan.15.1968.2.

42 Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 331.

43 Mace, "Ways of Reading."

44 CLPA, Notes.1966–1968.

45 ANEBRAR, AD.DS.May.15.1966.

46 ANEBRAR, AD.DS.Apr.12.1967.

47 ANEBRAR, AD.DS.Apr.12.1967.

48 CRPA, Notes.1969–1970.12, 21, 22, 23.

49 CRPA, Punto de partida.1968.

50 CRPA, Diary.1970, 12.

51 CRPA, Diary.1969, 11; Diary.1970, 12, 21–23.

52 CRPA, Marta Harnecker, Concepto.Marxista.Clases.Sociales.1969.2; CRPA, Marx y Engels, The Communist Manifesto.1965.42–43.
53 CRPA, Marta Harnecker, Concepto.Marxista.Clases.Sociales.1969.2; CRPA, Marx y Engels, The Communist Manifesto.1965.42–43.
54 CRPA, Diary.Dec.1969.
55 CRPA, Diary.Dec.1969.
56 CRPA, Diary.Dec.6.1970.
57 CRPA, Louis Althusser.Leyendo el capital.1969.JUCOROJO.3–8.
58 CRPA, 1969.
59 CRPA, 1969.
60 CRPA, 1969.
61 Interview with Cecilia Serrano; CRPA, NT.1969
62 CSPA, Guevara, *Guerrilla.Warfare*.NT.[1964–1967].
63 CSPA, NT.[1964–1967].
64 CSPA, NT.[1964–1967].
65 CSPA, NT.[1964–1967].
66 CRPA, Profesores independientes.DC.N1.[1975–1976].
67 Calvo Isaza and Parra Salazar, *Medellín.*
68 Lernoux, *Cry of the People*, 37.
69 Lernoux, *Cry of the People,* 37.
70 RSPAR, PN.1968–1971.
71 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
72 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
73 MJPA, PN.[1969–1971].
74 ICTAR, Profesionales.servicio.estado.ND.DP.GSG.SG.1968–1971, 2.
75 PCC-ML, *Combatiendo*, 45.
76 PCC-ML, *Combatiendo*, 91.
77 M19AR, Encuesta.EC.1975. This analysis is informed by Robinson, *Black Marxism*, and Rancière, *Proletariat Nights*.
78 CRPA, PCC-ML.Proletarización.1969.
79 PCC-ML, *Combatiendo*, 69, 253.
80 CRPA, Carlos Duplat, *Siete.pecados.capitales.pequeños burgueses.*[1969].
81 CRPA, Carlos Duplat, *Siete.pecados.capitales.pequeños burgueses.*[1969].
82 CRPA, Mao Tse-tung, *Las Tres Permanentes*.[1971].
83 CRPA, Carlos Duplat, *Siete.pecados.capitales.pequeños burgues.*[1969].
84 PCC-ML, *Combatiendo*; CRPA, Moral revolucionaria.moral burguesa.[1969].
85 RSPA, Diary.1972.
86 For such description, see Aguilera Morales, *Subjetividades*; Archila, *Idas y venidas.*
87 CRPA, Una educación.economia.moderna.material.discusión.1972.5; Ministerio de Educación Nacional, *Proyecto de ley*.
88 CRPA, Plan.Univer.democrática.APUN.1972; M19AR, Educación.masas.CE.1975; FECOCAR, CI.July.21.1973.6.

89 CRPA, Plan.Univer.democrática.APUN.1972.
90 FECOCAR, CI.July.21.1973.6.
91 M19AR, Educación.masas.CE.1975.
92 M19AR, *¿Qué somos y qué debemos hacer?* CE.[1976].
93 FECOCAR, Declaración.princ.educativos.DP.VA.Aug.1974; Paulo Freire, *Pedagogía del oprimido.*
94 M19AR, *¿Qué somos y qué debemos hacer?* CE.[1976].
95 CRPA, Análisis.Rockefeller.1969.1–5.
96 CRPA, Análisis.Rockefeller.1969.1–5.
97 CRPA, Profesores independientes.DOCUMENTO N1, signed as Juan sin miedo, [1975–1976].
98 CRPA, Profesores independientes.DC.N1.[1975–1976].
99 M19AR, *¿Qué somos y qué debemos hacer?* CE.[1976].
100 CRPA, Profesores MOIR.Avance.Profesoral.1976(1).Nov.1976.5.3.
101 RSPA, Educación.masas.[1974].
102 CRPA, Convocatoria.prof.universitarios.1976.Nov.5.1976.
103 CRPA, Profesores.independientes.Agonia.academia.1972(2).Apr.3.1976.
104 CRPA, Profesores.independientes.Agonia.academia.1972(2).Apr.3.1976.
105 CRPA, Profesores independientes.Documento.1975.6.1975.
106 CRPA, Profesores independientes.Teoría.no.volumen.pamfletos.1976(2).Apr.3.1976.4.
107 CRPA, Profesores independientes.Politizar.Universidad.1976.Apr.3.1976.5.
108 M19AR, Cuadros.preparados.CE.1974.
109 Victor Bonilla et al., *Causa popular*, 17–18.
110 Victor Bonilla et al., *Causa popular*, 17–18.
111 Rappaport, *Intercultural Utopias*, 86–87. Elsewhere I expand these arguments; see López-Pedreros, "Class and Gender of De-coloniality."
112 Victor Bonilla et al., *Causa popular*, 18.
113 Fals Borda, *Ciencia propia,* 113.
114 M19AR, Papel.hacia afuera.CE.15.1975.
115 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976. 4. For a study on feminist movements in Bogotá, see Gómez, *Dinámicas.*
116 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.4.
117 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.4.
118 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.4.
119 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.3.
120 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.3.
121 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.3.
122 CRPA, Nosotras las maestras.1976(2).Sep.4.1976.3.
123 CRPA, L Unita.Louis Althuser.1970.Jan.28.1970.35.
124 CRPA, L Unita.Louis Althuser.1970.Jan.28.1970.35.
125 CRPA, L Unita.Louis Althuser.1970.Jan.28.1970.35.

126 FECOCAR, Unidad.revolucionaria.SE.EP.July.1973.5.
127 FECOCAR, Unidad.revolucionaria.SE.EP.July.1973.5.
128 FECOCAR, Educación.proletaria.ES.SE.Sep.1974.5–7.
129 FECOCAR, Educación.proletaria.ES.SE.Sep.1974.5–7.
130 Molano Camargo, "El campo es leña." For a history of ANUC, see Zamosc, *Agrarian Question*.
131 Alvarez, "Empresa," 124.
132 Alvarez, "Empresa," 126.
133 Alvarez, "Empresa," 126.
134 Naranjo and Ruiz, "Problema," 15.
135 Naranjo and Ruiz, "Problema," 21.
136 RIAS, *La historia*.
137 *Alternativa*, no. 1, February 18, 1974, 1.
138 *Alternativa*, no. 19, October 28–November 10, 1974, 8, 11.
139 *Alternativa*, no. 19, October 28–November 10, 1974, 8–11.
140 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
141 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
142 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
143 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
144 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
145 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
146 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
147 AOPA, los burgueses.ayer.hoy.1976.6–7.
148 Gabriel García Marquez, "Chile, el golpe y los gringos," *Alternativa*, no. 1, 1974.
149 RSPA, PN.1975–1980.[1975].
150 RSPA, PN.1975–1980.[1975]; see also Mariño et al., *Lucharemos*.
151 RSPA, PN.1975–1980.[1975].
152 RSPA, PN.1975–1980.[1975].
153 M19AR, Pongámonos.acuerdo.CE.[1976].
154 M19AR, Pongámonos.acuerdo.CE.[1976].
155 CRPA, Nosotras.maestras. *¿De qué hablamos nosotras?.* 1976(2).June1976.1.
156 CSPA, Mujer.Hoy.1975–1980; Belotti, *Little Girls*.
157 CSPA, Mujer.Hoy.1975–1980.
158 CSPA, Mujer.Hoy.1975–1980.
159 CSPA, Mujer.Hoy.1975–1980.
160 CSPA, Mujer.Hoy.1975–1980.
161 For an account of the strike, see Greco, *Unionized Professionals*.
162 ASMEDASAR, Paro.médico.PR.1976.Dec.1976.6.
163 *Acción Médica*, March 1976, 3.
164 "Cuatro inquietudes," *El Espectador,* September 19, 1976, 2-A.
165 "El monstruo por desmontar," *El Espectador*, October 5, 1976, P2A.
166 *Tribuna Roja*, no. 4, December 1976.

167 ASMEDASAR, Paro.médico.PR.1976.Dec.1976.1–3; see Vasco Uribe, *Estado*; Fergusson, *Esquema crítico*.

168 ASMEDASAR, Paro.médico.PR.1976.Dec.1976.4.

169 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes somos?PR.1976.Sep.1976.2–3.

170 ASMEDASAR, *La.industralización.medicina*.PR.1976.Oct.4.1976.

171 ASMEDASAR, Miseria.pobreza.PR.1976.Nov.1976.1.

172 ASMEDASAR, Medicina.PR.1976.Nov.1976.11.

173 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Nov.1976.2–3.

174 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Nov.1976.2–3.

175 ASMEDASAR, Paro.médico.PR.1976.Oct.1976.1–3.

176 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Nov.1976.2–3.

177 ASMEDASAR, Miseria.pobreza.PR.1976.Nov.1976.2.

178 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Sep.1976.2–3.

179 ASMEDASAR, Verdad.paro.CP.AM.Sep.1976.

180 ASMEDASAR, Verdad.paro.CP.AM.Sep.1976.

181 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Dec.1976.3–4.

182 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Dec.1976.3–4.

183 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Dec.1976.3–4.

184 ASMEDASAR, Dirigentes obreros.piden.mitin.CP.1976.11.

185 ASMEDASAR, ¿Quiénes.somos?PR.1976.Sep.1976.2–3.

186 ASMEDASAR, Instransigencia.obrera.CP.1976.Sep.1976.2–3.

187 ASMEDASAR, Instransigencia.obrera.CP.1976.Sep.1976.2–3.

188 ASMEDASAR, Indiferencia.médicos.VA.Oct.1976.1.

189 ASMEDASAR, Miseria.probreza.PR.1976.Nov.1976.2.

190 ASMEDASAR, Eduardo Díaz, Medicina.cultura.proletaria.ES.[Dec.1976].3.

191 ASMEDASAR, Eduardo Díaz, Medicina.cultura.proletaria.ES.[Dec.1976].3.

192 ASMEDASAR, Diario.quehacer.paro.PR.1976.Sep.1976.2.

193 ASMEDASAR, Esquirolus.virulencis.PR.1976.Oct.1976.1.

194 ASMEDASAR, Esquirolus.virulencis.PR.1976.Oct.1976.1.

195 ASMEDASAR, Esquirolus.virulencis.PR.1976.Oct.1976.1.

196 ASMEDASAR, Esquirolus.virulencis.PR.1976.Oct.1976.1; ASMEDASAR, Diario .quehacer.paro.PR.1976.Sep.1976.2.

197 ASMEDASAR, No.esun.paro.mas.OP.1977.Sep.1976.1–2.

198 FEDEPROCOLAR, Lilia Forero, Cartaabierta.VA.CG.Oct.10.1976.1–2.

199 FEDEPROCOLAR, Lilia Forero, Cartaabierta.VA.CG.Oct.10.1976.1–2.

200 ASMEDASAR, Mujer.medicina.social.ES.EMS.Nov.1976.1.

201 ASMEDASAR, Letter Clementina Sánchez to Eduardo Arévalo Burgos.CR.CG .Oct.1.1976.1.

202 ASMEDASAR, Letter Clementina Sánchez to Eduardo Arévalo Burgos.CR.CG .Oct.1.1976.1.

203 ASMEDASAR, Mujer.ética.médica.ES.EMS.Nov.1976.3–4.

204 ASMEDASAR, Mujer.ética.médica.ES.EMS.Nov.1976.3–4.

205 ASMEDASAR, Economía.medicina.sociedad.ES.EMS.1976.2.
206 ASMEDASAR, Ampl.progr.educación.PR.PED.1977.3–4.
207 ASMEDASAR, Ampl.progr.educación.PR.PED.1977.3–4.
208 These descriptions are based on *El Bogotano*, May 6, 1976, 2; May 13, 1976, 9–10; May 18, 1976, 8–9.
209 *El Bogotano*, May 6, 1976, 2.
210 *El Bogotano*, May 6, 1976, 2.
211 CRPA, Profesores comunistas, Elem.análisis.crisis.Univ.Pública.1976.Nov.1976.11.
212 ASMEDASAR, Llamado.unidad.revolucionaria.1978.Oct.1978.4.
213 *El Bogotano*, May 6, 1976, 2.
214 *El Bogotano*, May 6, 1976, 2.
215 ANEBRAR, FEBOR, Angela Gonzales Montes, Algo.para.mujer.April–May.1975.4.
216 ANEBRAR, FEBOR, Angela Gonzales Montes, Algo.para.mujer.April–May.1975.4.
217 ANEBRAR, FEBOR, Aura Mejía, Falta.reconocimiento.laboral.OP.1978.1.

Chapter 8. The Most Important Gift to the World

1 Ferguson, *Give a Man a Fish*, 1.
2 Klein, *Shock Doctrine*; Vega Cantor, *Los economistas*; Estrada Álvarez, "Élites intelectuales"; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*; North and Clark, *Dominant Elites*; Zeiderman, *Endangered City*, 21.
3 As an exception see Tinsman, *Buying into the Regime*; Offner, "Anti-Poverty."
4 Duménil and Lévy, *Crisis*, 22; Harvey, *Brief History*, 15, 19.
5 Ferguson, "Uses of Neoliberalism," 166.
6 Piketty, *Capital.*
7 Dargent, *Technocracy and Democracy*, 76, 78, 88; Flórez Enciso, "Colombia," 197–226; Torres del Río, *Colombia*, 253.
8 This argument is inspired by Tinsman, *Buying into the Regime*; Freeman, *Entrepreneurial Selves*; Boltanski and Chiapello, *New Spirit of Capitalism*.
9 Stengers, "Cosmopolitical Proposal," 994.
10 Flórez Enciso, "Colombia," 201–203.
11 Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 297–308, 332–334; Torres del Río, *Colombia*, 251–272.
12 FEDESARROLLO, *Serie documentos de trabajo*, June 1974, 11.
13 Shaw, *Financial Deepening*, viii.
14 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance.*
15 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance*, 307.
16 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance*, 307.
17 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance*, 23.
18 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance*, 308, 29.
19 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance*, 308–309.

20 Levinson and de Onis, *Alliance,* 308–309.
21 PA, Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Infor.señor.presidenteAlfonso.López.Michelsen .DSP.SG.11.Apr.11.1976.2 1976, Secr.General, 1976, Box, 11, PA.
22 PA, Cepeda Ulloa, Clase media.inestabilidad.política, Info.señor.presidente.Alfonso.López.Michelsen.DSP.SG.2.Feb.1976.8, 5.
23 PA, Cepeda Ulloa, Clase media.inestabilidad.política, Info.señor.presidente.Alfonso.López.Michelsen.DSP.SG.2.Feb.1976.8, 5.
24 PA, Cepeda Ulloa, Clase media.inestabilidad.política, Info.señor.presidente.Alfonso .López.Michelsen.DSP.SG.2.Feb.1976.8, 5.
25 PA, Cepeda Ulloa, Clase media.inestabilidad.política, Info.señor.presidente.Alfonso.López.Michelsen.DSP.SG.2.Feb.1976.8, 5.
26 Simons, *Colombia*, 44.
27 PA, Rafael Pardo Buelvas to Alfonso López Michelsen, SG.2.Nov.12.1976.
28 PA, Rafael Pardo Buelvas to Alfonso López Michelsen, SG.2.Nov.12.1976.
29 Sáenz Rovener, "Estudio de caso," 14.
30 Lleras Camargo, "La Revolución subvencionada: El enclave marxista," *El Tiempo,* May 26, 1972, 4A.
31 Sáenz Rovener, "Estudio de caso," 14.
32 Fernando Landazábal Reyes, "Educación en manos de la subversión," *Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas*, December 28, 1981, 3.
33 ICTAR, Servicio Civil, El.problema.humano.estado.DP.GSG.SG.1974.4.
34 ICTAR, Servicio Civil, Problema.profesional.servicios.estado.GSG.SG.1974.12.
35 ICTAR, Servicio Civil, Problema.profesional.servicios.estado.GSG.SG.1974.11.
36 ICTAR, Servicio Civil, Problema.profesional.servicios.estado.GSG.SG.1974.8.
37 ICTAR, Servicio Civil, Exige.professionalismo.hoy.DP.GSG.SG.1975.2.
38 Fernando Landazábal Reyes, "Educación en manos de la subversión," *Tiempo*, January 19, 1982, 8a.
39 Ministerio de Educación Nacional, *Proyecto de ley.*
40 Blaug, *Education*, 38.
41 Alfonso López Michelsen, "Cinco reporteros y personajes de la semana," September 18, 1977, as cited in López Michelsen, *Administración López*.
42 Currie, "Advice on Growth and Development," 23–40.
43 Currie, *Operation Colombia.*
44 Currie, "Colombian Plan 1971–74," 69–72.
45 Currie, "Advice on Housing," 143–148; Giraldo Isaza, "Currie y la sociedad," 428.
46 Amy Offner argues that some of these policies made Currie, "unwittingly, a pioneer of gentrification." Offner, "Anti-Poverty Programs," 136.
47 Silva, "Housing Finance," 10.
48 Currie, "Advice on Housing," 136.
49 Currie, "Wants," 47–48.
50 Currie, "Wants," 47–48.
51 Currie, "Wants," 48.
52 Currie, "Wants," 52–53.

53 Currie, "Wants," 55, 57.
54 Currie, "La política."
55 Currie, "La unidad," 5.
56 DAVAR, MA.SO.SA.PF.1973.11.
57 DAVAR, Principios.finalidades.actividades.UPAC.SO.SA.AH.1974.1.
58 This comes from the reading of around 540 applications, five applications per month from 1973 to 1982; Sandilands, *Life*, 258.
59 DAVAR, GuiaUPAC.SO.SA.PF.1973.15.
60 DAVAR, GuíaUPAC.SO.SA.PF.1973.15; Ocampo Zamorano and Villamizar Cajiao, *El ahorro*, 353.
61 DAVAR, Aspectos.crédito.UPAC.SO.SA.AH.1973.4.
62 DAVAR, Casita.roja.Davivienda.SO.CP.1974.11–16.
63 DAVAR, Casita.roja.Davivienda.SO.CP.1974.11–16.
64 DAVAR, Crédito.vivienda.SA.HF.1976.4.
65 DAVAR, Aspectos.crédito.vivienda.SO.SA.PA.11–12.
66 Sandilands, *Life*, 258.
67 López Michelsen, "Discurso," 421–432.
68 López Michelsen, "Discurso," 421–432.
69 UNCLAMECOLAR, Inmensa.masa.clase.media.TG.May.3.1976.2–3.
70 UNCLAMECOLAR, Llegaremos.meta.final.TG.March.1978.5.
71 UNCLAMECOLAR, Llegaremos.meta.final.TG.March.1978.5.
72 ICTAR, Vladimir Mariño, Infor.labores.barrios.marginales.RT.DI.ST.1976.
73 Antonio Beltrán, "Desarrollo equilibrado," *Bitacora*, April 1974:89, 13–14.
74 COLARCH, "Sociedad.libre.democrática.ORH.Año, 14:3 July 1975, 4–5.
75 Colombia, *Para cerrar la brecha*.
76 ACOPIAR, Por.Colombia.industrial.PU.Nov.1975.11.
77 Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful.*
78 ACOPIAR, Papel.pequeña.empresa.ES.1977.1.
79 ACOPIAR, Papel.pequeña.empresa.ES.1977.1; Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful,* 4, 36.
80 ACOPIAR, Por.Colombia.industrial.PU.Nov.1975.17–20.
81 ACOPIAR, Por.Colombia.industrial.PU.Nov.1975.17–20.
82 UNCLAMECOLAR, Comentario.horaactual.CG.Feb.1975.5.
83 UNCLAMECOLAR, Comentario.horaactual.CG.Feb.1975.5.
84 UNCLAMECOLAR, Comentario.horaactual.CG.Feb.1975.5.
85 Pécaut, *Crónica*, 309. For a description of the strike, see Medina, *La protesta*, 123–186.
86 Julia Preston, "Colombian General Strike," NACLA, 1.
87 Torres del Río, *Colombia*, 255.
88 UNCLAMECOLAR, Clase media.democratización.AH.3.
89 UNCLAMECOLAR, Luis Díaz, Hora.actual.AH.Nov.5.1977.2.
90 UNCLAMECOLAR, Luis Díaz, Hora.actual.AH.Nov.5.1977.2.
91 COLARCH, Raúl Mantilla, Tribuna.libre.democrática.VA.ES.July.1975.9–11.
92 ACOPIAR, Pequeños.industriales.caos social.ES.1977.1.

93 UNCLAMECOLAR, López Michelsen, Programa.cinco.reportajes.AH.1.
94 López Michelsen, Programa.cinco.reportajes.AH.1.
95 UNCLAMECOLAR, Visita.presidencial.Apr.1978. CCM.
96 ACOPIAR, Discurso.presidencial.XXIII.conferencia.ACOPI.FPM.1978.1–15.
97 FECOCAR, Estatuto.docente.ED.Sept.14.1978.
98 ASMEDASAR, Normas.ética.médica.Ley 23 de 1981.RS.Feb.1981.18.
99 Interview with Roberto Solano; RSPAR, PN.[1978].
100 FECOCAR, ED.Sept.14.1979.1–2.
101 FECOCAR, ED.Sept.14.1979.1–2.
102 FECOCAR, ED.Sept.14.1979.1–2.
103 BRAR, FEBOR, Aura Mejía, Falta.reconocimiento.laboral.OP.1978.1.
104 BRAR, FEBOR, Aura Mejía, Falta.reconocimiento.laboral.OP.1978.1.
105 Interview with Cecilia Serrano.
106 Interview with Cecilia Serrano.
107 Interview with Pedro Garzón.
108 Interview with Marta Jaramillo.
109 Interview with Marta Espinosa.
110 Interview with René Sánchez.
111 Several interviews. See also Amnesty International, *Violación*.
112 RSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
113 CSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
114 RSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
115 RSPA, Cartas.1979–1981; Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth*, 73.
116 RSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
117 CSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
118 RSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
119 RSPA, Cartas.1979–1981.
120 Winifred Tate, *Counting the Dead*.
121 *Alternativa,* February 18, 1974.
122 UNCLAMECOLAR, Violentos.no.pasarán.OP.Sep.25.1977.1–2.
123 UNCLAMECOLAR, Violentos.no.pasarán.OP.Sep.25.1977.1–2.
124 UNCLAMECOLAR, Violentos.no.pasarán.OP.Sep.25.1977.1–2.
125 Interview with Pedro Garzón.

Epilogue

1 Nasr, *Forces of Fortune*, 110–114.
2 As examples see Huffington, *Third World America*; Vahab, *America's Shrinking Middle Class*.
3 As an example, see Madland, *Hollowed Out*.
4 White House, "Remarks."
5 María Ángel, phone interview.

6 Pedro Neira, phone interview.

7 CNMH, *¡Basta ya!*, 20. Francisco de Roux, the president of the Truth Commission created as a result of the peace agreement between the FARC and Santos's government, has argued that "the urban nation" remains oblivious to the war. This urban nation only sees the war as a movie rather than an everyday reality. See de Roux, "El pais urbano."

8 CNMH, *¡Basta ya!,* 20, 22.

9 Castillejo, "On the Question," 17–20.

10 Antonio Guzmán, phone interview.

11 Gabriel Vega, phone interview.

12 Carlos Cantor, phone interview.