


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Hyaesin Yoon

POSTCOLONIAL
FEMINISMS
IN A
MORE-THAN-HUMAN
WORLD

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P R O S T H E T I C
M E M O R I E S

POSTCOLONIAL
FEMINISMS
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Hyaesin Yoon

DUKE

**UNIVERSITY
PRESS**

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Durham and London

2025

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞

Project Editor: Liz Smith

Designed by A. Mattson Gallagher

Typeset in Minion Pro and Real Head Pro by

Westchester Publishing Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Yoon, Hyaesin, [date] author.

Title: Prosthetic memories : postcolonial feminisms in a
more-than-human world / Hyaesin Yoon.

Other titles: ANIMA (Duke University Press)

Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2025. | Series:

Anima | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2024022136 (print)

LCCN 2024022137 (ebook)

ISBN 9781478031246 (paperback)

ISBN 9781478028017 (hardcover)

ISBN 9781478060222 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Memory—Social aspects. | Postcolonialism. |

Feminist theory. | Technology—Social aspects—Korea (South) |

Technology—Social aspects—United States. | Human-animal

relationships—Social aspects. | Human-computer interaction—

Social aspects. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / Colonialism &

Post-Colonialism | SOCIAL SCIENCE / Women's Studies

Classification: LCC HM1033 .Y66 2025 (print) | LCC HM1033

(ebook) | DDC 303.48/3—dc23/eng/20240808

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2024022136>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2024022137>

Cover art: Minouk Lim (b. 1968), *Wind Seal*, 2022. Wood cane,
cuttlebone, epoxy resin, metal plate, 73¾ × 14⅞ × 12⅝ inches
(186 × 36 × 32 cm). Image © the artist and Tina Kim Gallery.
Photo by Dario Lasagni.

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Note to Readers

When there are already published or existing transliterated forms for Korean proper nouns (including the names of artists, directors, and scholars) and for Korean nouns that are well known to English speakers, I use existing familiar forms even if they are inconsistent with formal transliteration systems (for example, Seoul, kimchi, or Hyaesin Yoon).

For Korean names, I generally put the given name first. Exceptions are political figures or celebrities (for example, Kim Young-sam and Kang Won-rae) whose names might already be familiar in their original Korean order.

In all other cases, I follow the McCune-Reischauer system.

All translations of Korean sources are mine unless otherwise noted.

In the bibliography, for authors of sources in Korean language, I put family name first followed by given name without a comma between. For authors with Korean names of sources written in English, I put a comma between the family name and given name.

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Acknowledgments

The research project that evolved into *Prosthetic Memories* began when I was a graduate student in the Department of Rhetoric at the University of California, Berkeley. I am grateful for the mentorship of Trinh T. Minh-ha and Charis Thompson, whose intellectual brilliance and professional generosity have offered lasting guidance and inspiration. I feel lucky and thankful for the dear friendship and many discussions I have had with the peers I met there, in particular Mark Minch-de Leon and Keerthi Potluri, who also read and commented on several parts of this book at various stages even after we all graduated.

I am thankful for the Department of Gender and Women's Studies (GWS) at UC Berkeley for generously hosting me as a visiting scholar after the completion of my PhD. It offered me a vibrant academic community wherein I had the pleasure of meeting amazing scholars from all over the world visiting GWS or affiliated with the Beatrice Bain Research Group—in particular, Marcin Smietana, Tomomi Kinukawa, Ingvill Stuvøy, Meltem İnce Yenilmez, Teresa Sacchet, Noémie Merleau-Ponty, Meeta Rani Jha, Doris Leibetseder, Sé Sullivan, Christina Hee Pedersen, Chinyere Oparah, Smadar Lavie, and France Winddance Twine. Intellectual exchanges with them helped me envision how to turn what felt like a mercurial constellation of thoughts into a book that has now become *Prosthetic Memories*. It was during this time that Mel Chen told me about the then-new book series ANIMA

(of which they are a coeditor) and encouraged me to make my book a part of it. This conversation meant the world to me and has been a source of strength to keep me dreaming and progressing until today.

At Central European University (CEU), I've received invaluable intellectual and institutional support. I extend my warmest thanks to my wonderful colleagues at the Department of Gender Studies, especially Erzsébet Barát, Francisca de Haan, the late Linda Fischer, Elissa Helms, Nadia Jones-Gailani, Jasmina Lukic, Adriana Qubaiova, Hadley Z. Renkin, Sarah Smith, and Eszter Timár. I wouldn't be the same person without the experience of working with them and supporting each other, especially through the difficult times when the university relocated from Budapest to Vienna due to political pressure, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic. I also thank my former students and now fellow scholars Lieks Hettinga and Ida Hillerup Hansen, who trusted me as their PhD supervisor when I was just beginning my academic career myself and who have provided affective and intellectual refreshments in the process of writing this book. I am grateful for Shreya Bhat, who helped me organize the references and bibliography in my manuscript. My heartfelt thanks to all other former and current students I have been privileged to teach at CEU, who have continually reminded me of the beauty of humanity and of teaching and learning in academia.

A significant part of this book was written during my sabbatical leaves, generously granted by CEU, to stay at the Reproductive Sociology Research Group (ReproSoc) and later at the Center for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge—I deeply appreciate the warm hospitality from both institutions. I especially acknowledge Sarah Franklin and other members of the ReproSoc for their astute questions and suggestions about this book's early chapter drafts, which deepened my understanding of reproductive and regenerative technologies. I must also mention my flatmates during my stay in Cambridge: Francesco Cecchi, Arantxa González de Heredia, and Elizabeth Gasson. Late-night conversations, laughter, meals, and adventures with them added much joy to the process of writing this book.

I have presented early chapter drafts, fragments, or ideas at various conferences, symposiums, and colloquiums: the Critical Global Studies Institute Colloquium at Sogang University, Seoul (online); the European Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts annual conferences in Athens and Copenhagen; the Yun Posun Memorial Symposium at the University of Edinburgh; the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference in Washington, DC; the “Power and the Chthulucene” symposium at Uppsala

University; the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts annual conference at University of Notre Dame; the Colloquium at the Interdisciplinary Program in Gender Studies at Seoul National University; and the “Funny Kinds of Love” conference at UC Berkeley. The helpful feedback and encouragement from panel members and audiences at these venues were vital for revising and developing these presentations into the book manuscript. I am grateful to Nayun Jang, Myojung Bae, Lynn Turner, Youngmi Kim, We Jung Yi, Ann-Sofie Lönngren, Eun-kyung Bae, and Harlan Weaver for these invitations and organizations.

An earlier version of chapter 2 and a brief section from chapter 1 were published as “The Biopolitics of Language in the Cybernetic Fold” in *Journal of Gender Studies* 29, no. 1 (2020) and reproduced as a chapter in C. L. Quinan and K. Thiele, eds., *Biopolitics, Necropolitics, Cosmopolitics* (Routledge, 2021). An earlier version of chapter 4 was published as “Disappearing Bitches: Canine Affect and Postcolonial Bioethics” in *Configurations: A Journal of Literature, Science, and Technology* 24, no. 3 (2016).

I thank Woo Suk Hwang and other scientists at Sooam Biotech Research Foundation, Seoul, for kindly showing me around the facility and explaining and sharing information about their dog-cloning processes. I also appreciate David (a pseudonym) for generously sharing his experience with cloning companion dogs and living with them.

Many thanks to Margaret Rhee’s brilliant interlocution, which has made my writing about her poetry even more delightful. I was also touched by the kindness of Soyo Lee, who generously sent me a copy of her book *Köllō chömmok söninjang* (Ornamental cactus design) by post from Seoul to Vienna—it provided a wonderful source of inspiration in the final stage of writing this book. The Berkeley Art Museum and Pacific Film Archive have kindly allowed me to screen Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s video pieces again and again and to use a still from one of her videos in this book.

I was fortunate to have as my editor Courtney Berger at Duke University Press. I am deeply grateful that she saw the potential of this book and guided me toward its publication with vision, patience, and kindness. I also thank Duke University Press’s anonymous readers, whose incredibly rigorous and encouraging reports on my manuscript made this book better despite my shortcomings. Sincere thanks also to all those at Duke University Press who helped this book appear in the world. Immense thanks to Matthew Jeremy Ritchie, who has read various stages of the manuscript, offering a keen pair of eyes to help me seek a style of writing with clarity, sophistication, and elegance.

I wouldn't have made it this far without the wonderful circle of friends I feel blessed to have. My special thanks to Seunghyun Yang, Jiyeon Kang, Meongwon Choi, and Ju Li for all the conversations, phone calls, travels, and walks together. Also, I am grateful for the animal friends who accompanied me through the ups and downs of writing this book. Sending love to my late dog Jasper and late cat Viola, and to Cielito the cat.

I offer boundless gratitude to my loving family. My brother Seungjun Yoon, sister Haeyoung Yoon, brother-in-law Sunkyu Park, and nephew Ryan Jungmin Park have been both my rocks to stand on and my cheerleaders. Last, this book is dedicated to my late father, Dong-min Yoon, and to my mother, Jung-Mee Wi, whom I owe everything.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Introduction

Prosthetic Memories: Postcolonial Feminisms in a More-Than-Human World explores an emergent mode of collective memory arising from technological assemblages of humans, animals, and machines across and between contemporary South Korea and the United States. It proceeds from the primary stake of embodied memory in an era of advanced biotechnology and informatics: that how we remember is embedded in our entanglements with human and nonhuman others in parasitic/nurturing, exploitive/creative, and unevenly interdependent webs spun beyond human consciousness and control. This book takes up as a postcolonial feminist agenda both the conundrums and the potential that such a state of embodied memory entails, proposing a new approach to prosthetic memory—revising its conventional conception as an artificial supplement to natural (human) memory.

Let me begin with an art project that involves the ancient technology of plant propagation. Seoul-born, Los Angeles-based artist Kang Seung Lee's 2020 work *Untitled (Harvey)* is a 150 × 114 cm graphite drawing of a Christmas cactus in a pot. This drawing is a hyperrealist portrayal of the work of Lee's fellow artist and friend Julie Tolentino, *Archive in Dirt* (2019–). The main component of Tolentino's *Archive in Dirt* is a living plant nicknamed Harvey after Harvey Milk (1930–78), a pioneering openly gay politician and civil rights activist in San Francisco.¹ Harvey was cut from a mother plant that Milk had cultivated at home (cared for by his former roommate after

Milk's assassination), gifted to Tolentino via an archivist friend of hers.² *Archive in Dirt* thus expresses how memories of artists and activists outside conventional boundaries are relayed through collective care and affection, to which Lee's drawing is a performative tribute.³

During Lee's exhibition at the 2021 New Museum Triennial in New York, *Untitled (Harvey)* was accompanied by a piece named after his friend, *Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)*, featuring a living cactus clipped from Tolentino's Harvey and given to Lee.⁴ This new generation of cactus was planted in a pot made of soil from two noted locations: from the garden in Dungeness tended by British filmmaker Derek Jarman (1942–94) as an act of grief and love while he lost close friends to AIDS, until he himself succumbed to AIDS-related complications, and from Topgol Park in Seoul, a historic cruising ground for residents of the city.⁵ In this way, Lee's *Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)* also reverberates with Lee's earlier efforts to entangle the memory of Jarman with the (absent) traces of lesser-known Korean LGBT rights and HIV/AIDS awareness activist Joon-Soo Oh (1964–98), who also died from AIDS-related complications in the 1990s.⁶ As the tender shoot is cut, calluses, and grows in a new pot, carrying the memories of queer connections tracing back to Harvey Milk, a lesser-known South Korean gay activist's trace is grafted onto the memory of a famous British filmmaker, nurturing and haunting the cactus.

Lee's art illuminates key features of the emergent mode of prosthetic memory this book concerns. Different from the conventional portrayal of prosthetic memory as technologically exteriorized memory that transcends the body, Lee's art illustrates memories that arise at and transpose as they circulate through various interfaces of body-technology (even ones as rudimentary as drawing or a plant propagating but, as I discuss shortly, also more cutting-edge information and biological technologies).⁷ Thus, if Lee's *Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)* is "an unexpected living archive," as introduced by the New Museum's official Twitter (now X), it isn't so much a container of memories transplanted from humans as a metonym for the broader matrix of memories—the entanglements of the drawings, the generations of cacti, and the pebbles and soils surrounding the cacti and constituting the pots, as well as the artists, activists, their friends, and the staff at the museum exhibitions who have tended these succulents.⁸

I figure these intra- and interspecies entanglements as *chimeracological*, borrowing Rachel Lee's neologism that merges "the terms 'chimera,' derived from ancient Greek '*Khimaira*,' referring to a hybrid monster composed of several different animal parts, and 'ecological,' a secular subset of the



I.1 A view of Kang Seung Lee's exhibition at the 2021 New Museum Triennial. Lee's *Untitled (Harvey)*, a drawing of Julie Tolentino's *Archive in Dirt* (left), is accompanied by Lee's *Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)*, featuring a living succulent propagated from Tolentino's *Harvey* and given to Lee (right). Source: Screen shot from the New Museum Twitter (now X), November 8, 2021.

cosmological.”⁹ Rachel Lee's usage of *chimeracological* does not refer simply to the medical and pharmaceutical production of chimeric matters, where boundaries between different species and between organisms and technologies blur. It also refers to what biogeneticists and microbiologists have confirmed about interspecies epigenesis and evolution (such as a mammalian embryo's use of cues from intestinal microbes to complete its development) that renders our embodied worldings always chimeric.¹⁰ Thus, the concept of chimeracological highlights both mundane and paranormal milieus that condition the peculiar mode of prosthetic memory that grows more salient in a (post)cybernetic and (epi)genetic postcolonial world.

Thinking of the memories that arise and transpose at these chimeracological junctures, I wonder how then the unexpectedness of *Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)* might denote the inhuman otherness of these memories. Speculation about memories from the perspectives of a cactus stem or a pebble evokes a sense of the unreal (another meaning of *chimeric*), but

such a perceived sense of inhuman alterity does not necessarily mark the ontological division between human and other beings. Rather, it indicates the abyss between Western humanism's scientific reason and other senses and knowledge, which unsettles the privilege given to the rational human subject (often saved for the Anglo-European subject) as a reference point of memory.

Kang Seung Lee's work also helps me portray prosthetic memories in line with Rachel Lee's sought-for femi-queer engagements with the affective and material labor of gestating and nurturing other life (wherein female bodies are figured as chimeracological), the significance of which is even greater with the advancement of reproductive and regenerative technologies.¹¹ Combining a plant's capacity to regenerate with humans' affective care for plants (and for fellow humans connected via the plants) and with the intensive labor put into hyperrealist drawings, Kang Seung Lee's art furthers the political potential of prosthetic memories in a chimeracological world—moving from traumatic memories of necropolitical erasure, displacement, and injury toward the network of care woven through entangled memories.

In my engagement with Lee's art project, I propose a specific mode of prosthetic memory as a working concept for engaging with various body-technology interfaces at the turn of the twenty-first century. This new mode of prosthetic memory emerges in chimeracological milieus that blur body-technology boundaries, entails inhuman otherness beyond the usual human perception and subjectivity, and has potential to generate networks of care and intimacy that counter fragmenting, isolating, and uprooting biopolitical forces. The proposed concept of prosthetic memory is therefore both resonant and dissonant with existing discourses regarding the relationship between human memory and emergent and anticipated technologies at various points in history (from writing to television to artificial intelligence)—and with ideas that the term *prosthetic memory* might initially evoke in the minds of readers. I hope to mobilize such resonances and dissonances to develop a postcolonial feminist mnemonic attuned to the contemporary biopolitical world, where human and nonhuman mind-bodies, alongside their affective forces, are increasingly recruited, modified, assembled, and disposed of in the transnational circuits of biotechnology (BT) and information and communication technology (ICT).

This book engages with prosthetic memories across primarily the United States and South Korea, centering on two clusters of body-technology interfaces around the tongue and the gene. It explores sites of technological intervention into language practices and (epi)genetic materials—such as

tongue surgery (purported to improve English pronunciation), human-machine poetry, commercial pet cloning, and human embryonic stem cell research—that unsettle the assumed grounds of embodied memory and provoke a set of questions about postcolonial feminist mnemonics situated in the contemporary transpacific context.

Both the tongue and the gene are archetypal figures of embodied memory, marking the interchanges between body and mind, biological and cultural. The mother tongue is often seen as the root of culture (especially among diasporas and the colonized), and genetic composition is seen as a bearer of biological data (imprinted with individual identity as well as race and species kinship). Artificial mediations into these figures are therefore typically considered in terms of interruption in (or erasure of) cultural and biological memories. However, what if we instead look at them less as natural sites for preexisting identity and origin and more as compound interfaces, where self, lineage, and relation are composed through technological articulations with others? Can we think about the prosthetic memories that emerge from these articulations, accounting for the emergent assemblages of human, animal, and technology that have become both mundane and phantasmal conditions of life? What onto-epistemological and political visions does such an approach to memory challenge or afford for engaging with chimeracological entanglements across gender, race, species, and geopolitical differences in the context of neoliberal globalization?

To answer these questions, *Prosthetic Memories* proceeds from and interweaves three streams of inquiry. First, this book refigures the concept of prosthetic memory, departing from the long-standing suspicion of prosthetic memory as the technological replacement of human (that is, assumably natural) memory in Western philosophical and literary tradition—and also from its mirror image, the transhumanist celebration of prosthetic memory. My aim here isn't to make a general proposition about the relationship between human and technology alternative to these two prevalent approaches; instead, I hope to put into perspective how prosthetic memory, as a concept, has come to reflect and also shape our understanding of (human) memory within specific techno-cultural configurations at the turn of this century. To build a new stage for this conceptual genealogy of prosthetic memory, the first part of this introduction ("Prosthetic Memory: Rearticulating Humanity, Technology, and Memory") reviews the existing discourses on prosthetic memory as an emerging mode of collective consciousness in late nineteenth and twentieth-century modern societies and introduces key changes in the contemporary techno-cultural and biopolitical landscape

(the chimeracological milieu) that backdrops my proposal for a renewed figure of prosthetic memory.

Second, the particular mode of prosthetic memory addressed in this book is not only contingent on the cultural deployment of technologies such as tongue surgery, machine poetry, genetic animal cloning, and human stem cell research but also haunted by the “imaginary chorus” that the term *prosthetics* evokes.¹² The next part of this introduction (“Recasting *Prosthetic*: An Intersectional Dialogue”) reflects, on one hand, on how discourses about prosthetics often hinge on the metaphoricity of disabled mind-bodies (as the assumed users of assistive technologies) only to disavow their materiality and, on the other, on how gendered, racial, and geopolitical critiques about reproductive and care work (and the interdependency such labor suggests) demand reassessment of the supplementarity underlying the concept of prosthetic memory. This imaginary chorus both guides and haunts my efforts in the following chapters to refigure and engage with prosthetic memories in revising postcolonial feminist mnemonics in the transnational circuits of BT and ICT.

Third, with its revised concept of prosthetic memory, this book aims to advance postcolonial feminist discussions on memory across South Korea and the United States that have been focused on the trauma of Japanese colonialism, the Korean War, and the resultant postcolonial and diasporic experience—expanding the topoi into various body-technology interfaces across the two countries. In doing this, as discussed later in this introduction (“Rethinking Postcolonial Feminist Mnemonics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century”), this book engages with contemporary feminist approaches to embodied memory as a dynamic site for competing ideas about the relationship between bodily experience and language (and the realm of representation in general). I posit a renewed postcolonial feminist perspective by way of critically revisiting the posthumanist narrative of the turn from the linguistic to the material. Here I take the unresolved tension between these two theoretical branches as a call to reflect on the West’s notion of the human and the cognate concepts (such as body, language, and reality) that hover over both approaches despite claims otherwise. In this way, I hope from the chimeracological entanglements to open a space for envisioning a postcolonial mnemonic at the edge of the human and in relation to non-human beings, inviting decolonial and Black critics of the West’s notion of the human and its repercussions as forceful interlocutors.¹³ This does not mean to conflate the coloniality and postcoloniality of South Korea with the colonial and racial histories in which North America-based and

transatlantic decolonial and Black feminist critiques are largely interested. Nonetheless, the historical and conceptual commerce between these two (post)colonial genealogies offers fertile ground to recharge a transnational feminist alliance for reenvisioning how we carry memories of ourselves and others in a chimeracological world. The following parts of the introduction outline the contexts and implications of these three sets of inquiry, followed by chapter overviews.

Prosthetic Memory: Rearticulating Humanity, Technology, and Memory

In its general sense as an artificial supplement to memory, prosthetic memory has been a rich topos for figuring the relationship between human and technology. The ambivalence toward artificial as opposed to natural memory is probably most evident in sci-fi films such as *Blade Runner* (1982), *Total Recall* (1990), and *Her* (2013). It also has a long history in the Western metaphysical tradition, from Plato's hierarchical binary between writing (as a technology that is poisonous to memory) and speech (an effective medicine for living knowledge) in *Phaedrus* to Martin Heidegger's criticism of the typewriter tearing the work of the hand away from writing.¹⁴ Thinkers in this tradition are generally concerned with the double edges of artificial supplementation to memory—that while such technologies extend the capacity of the human mind, they also disempower humans by creating dependence or simply moving beyond our control. This suspicion of artificial (supplementary and alien) memory as opposed to natural (organic and interior) memory is a frequent object of deconstruction by Jacques Derrida, who argues that all memory is supplementary, both familiar and alien to oneself, and therefore prosthetic.¹⁵ For Derrida, the problem of artificiality of memory is the inevitable trace of the other within us that nonetheless cannot be fully incorporated into us (and in this context, let me provisionally define *us* as *humans*). The problem is therefore not something we can opt out of by remaining with natural memory, but rather a reminder of the prostheticity of the self and therefore a demand for hospitality toward the other within us. I take Derrida's critique as guidance for engaging with the moral and political valences of prosthetic memory as I explore a genealogy of how technology of memory has been conceived in relation to its human and posthuman embodiment, from the appearance of electric technology in modern societies to the acceleration of BT and ICT in the contemporary world.

Prosthetic memory is often presented as a conceptual figure for addressing emergent media technologies and their bearing on the relationship between human and technology in modern society. In his influential 1964 book *Understanding Media*, Marshall McLuhan asserts that any medium is an extension of ourselves, and that thanks to electric technology “we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace.”¹⁶ McLuhan further anticipates that “rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of man—the technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human society.”¹⁷ However, he suggests that technological extension happens only at the cost of “self-amputation,” a body’s strategy to countercompensate for the stimulation overload caused by technology.¹⁸ From this perspective, electric technology has made us “numb our central nervous system.”¹⁹ Yet according to McLuhan, “this age of unconsciousness and of apathy” has, strikingly, enabled the final awareness of technology as an extension of our physical body and consequently the “social consciousness” of connectedness and responsibility toward the human race.²⁰ Likewise, while McLuhan does not refer to the term *prosthetics* itself, he approaches electric technology as a sort of prosthetic consciousness with both disabling and enabling power. In this, what McLuhan portrays as the amputating power of electric technology—a numbing of the (individual) human nervous system—turns out to be the very condition and cost for the collective consciousness of our species across the globe.

A few decades after *Understanding Media*, Alison Landsberg reconceptualized “prosthetic memory” as a new form of public memory that emerged through the technologies of mass culture at the beginning of the twentieth century.²¹ Looking at cases of immigration to the United States in the 1910s–1920s, African Americans after slavery, and the Holocaust, Landsberg discusses how a person visiting a movie theater or museum might experience “a deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not live” but which nonetheless “has the ability to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics.”²² Landsberg argues that while the kinship ties (between parents and children and between individuals and the community) in these three populations had been broken, mass cultural technologies made the memories of disenfranchisement and displacement wearable “by anyone, regardless of skin color, ethnic background, or biology.”²³ As such, Landsberg suggests, this kind of mediated, experiential, and commercially exchangeable prosthetic memory in capitalist societies also bears

a political possibility of empathy and alliance—suggesting a new mode of public memory beyond the binding politics of identity.²⁴

Taking up from Landsberg's discussion, this book explores an emergent mode of prosthetic memory enabled by technological assemblages of bodies and images at the turn of the twenty-first century, and the political possibilities it opens. In this, I am not suggesting a clear discontinuity in the history of technology between the period of Landsberg's discussion and of this book (about one century apart), but I do hope to sketch out the constellation of changes and differences that compel a reconceptualization of prosthetic memory. While Landsberg is concerned primarily with a new form of public memory enabled by the technologies of mass culture in modern American society (such as film, television, and experiential museums), I instead ask how the acceleration of ICT and BT—which increasingly incorporate human and nonhuman lives on a planetary level—might bear upon a mode of collective memory of our time in and between South Korea and the United States.

The historical and techno-cultural specificity of Landsberg's discussion is reflected in her reference to the 1908 silent film *The Thieving Hand* as an illustration of prosthetic memory.²⁵ This film revolves around a prosthetic arm given to a beggar by a sympathetic passerby—an arm that of its own accord keeps stealing from other people on the street and eventually turns out to have been owned by a one-armed thief. Much as the beggar's prosthetic arm can be worn by someone who is not the original owner, Landsberg's prosthetic memories can be "worn" by different groups of people thanks to the cultural technologies of modern American society. These memories can therefore shape the identity and consciousness of people who do not have firsthand experience in historical disenfranchisement and displacement.

In comparison, the chains of memories in Kang Seung Lee's *Untitled (Harvey)* and *Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)* allow us to think about prosthetic memory somewhat differently. These memories are not carried by an external device separate from an organic body, but are instead embodied by and through different organisms, matters, and media entangled in an unevenly interdependent network. The memories transform rather than simply transfer within the chimeracological milieus, creating a collectivity that is nonetheless different from Landsberg's public based on mass cultural consumption. Such differences also signal how the reconceptualization of prosthetic memory through Lee's art project (rather ironically, given its use of not-so-state-of-the-art technologies such as drawing and grafting)

reflects rearticulations among human, technology, and memory alongside changed biopolitical conditions shaped by advancing science and technology and globalizing neoliberal capitalism.

This emergent mode of prosthetic memory invites an up-to-date cartography, akin to what Donna Haraway offered in “A Cyborg Manifesto” to revise socialist feminism addressing the Cold War–driven capitalist world order in the late 1980s.²⁶ In particular, Haraway’s insights into BT’s and ICT’s bearing on the breached boundaries between human and animal, organism and machine, and physical and nonphysical are particularly relevant—and also merit updates.²⁷

First, Haraway’s questioning of the boundary between human and non-human animals prefigures the interspecies biopolitical matrix of our time. In particular, *Prosthetic Memories* concerns the interspecies biopolitical matrix wherein reproductive technology and regenerative medicine take part in the governance of planetary life by experimenting on and deriving surplus from human, animal, and other forms of living matter.²⁸ This phenomenon can be approached as what Julie Livingston and Jasbir K. Puar call an “interspecies event,” which concerns “relationships *between* different forms of biosocial life and their political effects.”²⁹ An “interspecies” approach compels a critical inquiry that takes nonhuman actors and their roles as “racial and sexual proxies” seriously, and at the same time is cautious about “an unmarked Euro-American focus” and the attendant resuscitation of “‘the human’ as a transparent category” in much posthumanist thought.³⁰

In addition, such an interspecies matrix speaks to humans’ often racialized and gendered entanglements with other humans, animals, and plants as a grounds for both the colonial production of knowledge and the subversive potential of other subjugated knowledges—as suggested by Neel Ahuja and Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, among other critics of Western-centric modern science, technology, and medicine.³¹ In this light, the transspecies entanglements I explore in this book—most conspicuously in the connections between the dog meat market, the pet-cloning industry, and human stem cell research—are not only an ontological condition of but also a source of chimeric vision for prosthetic memories to counter what Melinda Cooper calls contemporary biotechnology’s delirium of “reinventing life beyond the limit,” per neo-imperialist capitalist aphorism.³²

Second, the infiltration between biological and technological at the epigenetic and molecular turns intensifies the circulation and experience of prosthetic memories without a distinct technological device external to organic bodies. Haraway’s figuration of the cyborg as “a hybrid of ma-

chine and organism”—illustrated by the origin of the term, a mouse with an implanted osmotic pump that served as an experimental animal model for developing a system to remotely control human astronauts during the Cold War space race—offers only a primordial picture given the subsequent advancement of biomedicine and reproductive technology.³³ Nikolas Rose notes that new biomedical technologies have now entered our genes and brains at the molecular level, through which we have become “neurochemical selves” under the new bioeconomic regime.³⁴ We also live in a time when what Sarah Franklin calls “transbiology” (“a biology that is not only born and bred, or born and made, but made and born”) is increasingly becoming “more the norm than the exception.”³⁵ Reflecting on the advancement of genetic cloning, Luciana Parisi offers a Deleuzean assertion that biodigital technology accelerates bacterial (contagious and parasitic) sex, thereby intensifying the potential for unpredictable mutations of bodies-sexes and for feminine desires detached from the order of sexual reproduction and entropic pleasure.³⁶ Parisi’s radical argument seems more intriguing, considering nanoscience’s involvement in cryonics—freezing humans (Walt Disney being perhaps the most famous example) with the prospect of resurrecting them using nanotechnology, which theoretically can reengineer matter atom by atom.³⁷ These scholars offer insightful observations on the boundary breaches between the biological and the technological, with its potential for engineered and unforeseeable mutation of what we presently consider organisms.

In the following chapters, I want to enrich the ongoing conversation by offering and highlighting geopolitical contours of the boundary breakdown between biological and technological. On one hand, a new mode of prosthetic memory concerns how technological infiltration of biological bodies (such as tongue surgery, pet cloning, and stem cell research) is interlaced with postcolonial imaginaries of life and technology and with ethnoracialized recruitment of biological, intellectual, and affective resources.³⁸ On the other hand, in response to the shuffling boundaries between organic and mechanical, it reenvisions our racialized relationship with the technological others and their human proxies (such as robots and “robot-like” Asian workers).

This leads to the refiguration of prosthetic memory that can account for the development of Haraway’s third boundary event. The actual and virtual breakdown of division between physical and nonphysical has been further amplified by the development of ICT and virtual media, offering a larger picture enfolding the second boundary breakdown discussed above.

The development of transbiology is imbricated in what W. J. T. Mitchell calls “biocybernetics reproduction”—a new mode of (re)production in the late capitalist era when “the assembly line begins to produce, not machines, but living organisms and biologically engineered materials” and “image production moves from the chemical-mechanical technology of traditional photography and cinema to the electronic images of video and camera.”³⁹ From another angle, Paul B. Preciado caricatures the biopolitics of postindustrial society that centers around production of the sexual subject/object in intertwined flows of the biomolecular (pharmaco-) and the semiotic-technical (pornographic).⁴⁰ In this era of biomolecular, digital, and high-speed technologies, Preciado argues, we’ve moved past the disciplinary technologies that control bodies from the outside and are now under the regime of “micro-prosthetics” that surveil and control subjects by infiltrating the body until they become indistinguishable from it.⁴¹ Mitchell’s and Preciado’s analyses dovetail where they concern the short-circuit between BT and ICT, articulating the collapsing of planes between physiological and semiotic and between body and mind in contemporary techno-cultural capitalism and presaging a new approach to prosthetic memories beyond these divisions.

However, as they are situated respectively in the post-9/11 US context and in the postmodern Anglo-European context, to what extent the analyses of Mitchell and Preciado might bear upon different parts of the world—such as South Korea—is yet to be examined. In rescaling their theories from a transnational perspective, my aim is more than simply adding transpacific geopolitical specificity but also foregrounding the politico-epistemological conditions of the leaky ontologies that these theories postulate. In other words, I hope to put into perspective the propositions about ontological leveling of the material and immaterial (often translated as body and language) by illuminating the biopolitical operations undergirding Western metaphysical views of what constitutes the material/immaterial, body/mind, and (more fundamentally) real/unreal. In the later part of the introduction, I return to the problem of Western-centric metaphysical views, critically interrogating the contemporary posthumanist narrative of the turn from linguistic to material in conversation with decolonial and Black critiques. This perspective underpins the structure of this book, as I explore prosthetic memories around the tongue and the gene as the porous loci at the boundary where the linguistic and the corporeal encounter each other.

Prosthetic Memories proposes a new understanding of its namesake to rearticulate the relationships among humanity, technology, and memory as they attune to these changing techno-cultural and biopolitical conditions on a global scale—and to explore alternative visions. This new mode of prosthetic memory is thus an iteration of rather than a complete rupture from the long genealogy of prosthetic memory (from Plato to Heidegger to McLuhan and to Landsberg), which is both a burden and a possibility for recasting the concept as a postcolonial feminist mnemonic in a more-than-human world.

Recasting *Prosthetic*: An Intersectional Dialogue

As the brief genealogy of prosthetic memory I sketched out above shows, the meanings of *prosthetic* often hinge on differential capacity, disability, debility, and (inter)dependency of mind-bodies in varying forms and intensities. This section examines the political implications of using the term *prosthetic*, whose meaning operates in habitual reference to the normalization of disabled and trans bodies, and further reassesses the social values attached to the concept of supplementarity through the lenses of the division of labor, of the network of care, and of regulation of intimacy within the intra- and interspecies web of ecology and politics. Mapping the intersections of such semiotic-material exchanges, I would like to explore both the problematic and generative potential that my engagement with prosthetic memories entails, in conversation with critical disability studies, trans and queer theories, and postcolonial and decolonial feminisms.

Metaphoric Prosthetics and Disabled Bodies

Per the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the word *prosthetic* is borrowed from Latin *protheticus*, etymologically tracing back to “Hellenistic Greek *προσθετικός*, adding, furthering, advancing, giving additional power,” and to “ancient Greek *πρόσθετος*, added, additional.” The dictionary lists the definitions as follows:

A. adj.

1. *Grammar*. Of or relating to prosthesis; (of a letter or syllable) that has been prefixed to a word. Now rare.
2. a. *Medicine*. Of or relating to prostheses; of the nature of a prosthesis; employing or caused by a prosthesis.

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- b. *Esp.* in the performing arts: of, relating to, or designating an object or procedure designed to alter a person's physical appearance temporarily.
- 3. *Biochemistry.* Designating a non-protein group forming part of or combined with a protein, and often necessary for biological activity.

B. n.

Artificial replacement of a part of the body; (also) an artificial body part or feature worn as theatrical make-up for special effects.⁴²

Whether they directly use the term *prosthetic* or not, discourses on technologically mediated memory often mobilize the second (medical) sense of the term. As we have seen, both McLuhan's approach to the impact of electricity (and technology in general) as self-amputation and Landsberg's discussion of modern media in reference to the film *The Thieving Hand* draw on an assistive device for physical disability to illustrate a prospectus on new modes of collective consciousness and memory. Thus, an imaginary chorus evoking the phantasmagoria of disabled mind-bodies using assistive devices hovers over my efforts to reconceptualize prosthetic memory.

It is therefore imperative to engage with scholars in disability studies who offer critical perspectives on the prevalent use of the term *prosthetics* in contemporary theories. Sarah S. Jain criticizes popular tropes of prosthetics in which the medical sense of prosthesis is a metaphor for the technological supplement to some sort of physical insufficiency in general.⁴³ Jain argues that this kind of trope "both depends on and disavows a very particular model of physical impairment," as it operates by evoking the figure of people with physical disability but glides over their difference from "other not 'whole' bodies" such as racialized, gendered, and aged bodies in need of technological support.⁴⁴ In a similar vein, Vivian Sobchack interrogates the trend in the recent humanities and arts wherein prosthetics has become "tropological currency for describing a vague and shifting constellation of relationships among bodies, technologies, and subjectivities."⁴⁵ Weary of this kind of metaphorical discourse that has little to do with the material realities of people with disability, Sobchack explores the tension between "*the* prosthetic as a tropological figure and *my* prosthetic as a material but also a phenomenologically lived artifact" in an effort to inform a more embodied sensibility and ethical responsibility in discursive practice.⁴⁶

From a more affirmative perspective, Alison Kafer examines how the cyborg as a feminist figure also mobilizes disability, as illustrated in "A

Cyborg Manifesto” by Haraway: “Perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization,” owing to their reliance on machines and prosthetics.⁴⁷ While taking issue with the ableist deployment of disability “solely as an illustration of the cyborg condition” in feminist cyborg theories, Kafer nonetheless sees value in pushing these theories closer to the promise of a situated, noninnocent, yet responsible feminism from a disability perspective.⁴⁸ In this light, Kafer invites us to rethink the connection between disabled people and cyborgs based on political practices—as in the case of Connie Panzarino, who during Pride marches would attach to her wheelchair a signboard reading “Trached dykes eat pussy without coming up for air.”⁴⁹ In this way, Panzarino turns the normative idea of adaptive technologies for superhuman abilities into a public announcement of her queer bodily pleasure, subverting through a blasphemous sense of humor the perceived lack of (normative) sexuality associated with a disabled woman.

Critiques from scholars of disability studies show both the political and theoretical stakes of using the concept of prosthetics outside the context of disability. While I recognize the risks discussed above and am indebted to these scholars’ insights, I carefully insist on keeping this concept within the repertoire of critical theories even when it isn’t necessarily in immediate reference to the experience of people with disability. One gain from loosening the connection between the concept of prosthesis and people with disability is a space to reimagine this concept in light of what Jasbir Puar calls the biopolitics of “debility,” which aims at and results in a massive scale of abject bodies that are sustained “in a perpetual state of debilitation precisely through foreclosing the social, cultural, and political translation to disability” as a condition for the incorporation of disability into neoliberal states.⁵⁰ Puar’s observation allows us to consider various kinds of technological assemblage of mind-body capacities (such as skills, creativity, productivity, reproductivity, regenerativity, and networking) and debilities (such as injuries, illness, exhaustion, wear and tear, isolation, and state of siege) in the neoliberal and postcolonial context. Furthermore, it sheds light on how the biopolitical recuperation and capacitation of subjects in such an uneven landscape of debilitation goes hand in hand with the neoliberal and postcolonial exceptionalization of prosthetic technologies—through which assessments of who is expected to use, who can access, and what counts as prosthetic devices and systems take place.⁵¹

From this perspective, Black lesbian feminist Audre Lorde’s refusal to wear a prosthesis after her mastectomy is not a rejection of assistive devices

in general but a refusal to accept the nurse's gaze that sees her visibly single-breasted presence as "a threat to the 'morale' of a breast surgeon's office" and to participate in the silence about how breast cancer disproportionately debilitates poor, Black, and other socially marginal women in the United States.⁵² On the other side of the Pacific, the gap between prosthetics that look like "mannequin's limbs" handcrafted in the Garwöl prosthetics district in Seoul and smart skin for prosthetics that captures senses of touch developed at Seoul National University enfolds postcolonial memories of debilitation—from injuries due to the Korean War and the remaining land mines over the past seventy years to amputations due to "illness characteristic of an advanced society . . . caused by 'eating too well' rather than by bombing and malnutrition."⁵³ In this vein, we can think of prosthetic memory in relation to debilitating and recuperating technological assemblages imbricated in the planetary and local production, modification, and disposition of mind-bodies.

Some trans-queer theories offer useful insights for navigating the relationship between human and technology without relying on the model of disabled embodiment as if it were naturally prone to technological supplementation, yet nonetheless account for the normalizing distribution of the political, moral, and aesthetic valences of various forms of technological embodiment within specific biopolitical contexts. In "Animal Trans," Myra J. Hird criticizes how discourses around transsex/transgender have been "deeply concerned with authenticity" based on "a distinction between natural and artificial sexual difference," and how this assumed artificiality in turn relies on the idea of "human-made technology."⁵⁴ Hird instead proposes a different approach to trans embodiment, drawing upon Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan: "Life itself is, and has always been, technological in the very real sense that bacteria, protocists, and animals incorporate external structural materials into their bodies."⁵⁵ Hird's critique helps us to reexamine the notion of the natural (as opposed to artificial) human body as a politically laden human-centric and gendered construct, regarding either concern for authenticity (which trans people lack, according to some discourses) or a celebration of the transgressiveness of artificial bodies (which trans people embody, according to other discourses).

The trans-queer theory of somatechnics offers a further critique on how the social perception and valuation of natural and technological mind-bodies hinges on biopolitical norms of embodiment. The term *somatechnics* highlights "the inextricability of *soma* and *techné*, of the body (as a culturally intelligible construct) and the techniques (*dispositifs* and

hard technologies).”⁵⁶ This concept problematizes the common assumption that technology is something added to the already constituted natural body for the use of an already embodied self, and instead highlights how the corporealization of embodiment “takes place through certain highly regulated (situated) somatechnologies.”⁵⁷ For example, the discourses around transgender surgery and self-demand amputation illustrate how certain embodiments become legible, identified, and integrated into social fabrics within specific contexts (such as a capitalist validation of malleability and a liberalist claim on the body as property) at the cost of foreclosing or denying other modes of embodiment.⁵⁸ Such a somatechnical perspective also informs feminist theorist and critical disability studies scholar Margrit Shildrick’s argument for a posthumanist prosthetic imaginary, focusing on how microbiomes and microchimerisms bear on our understanding and experience of the self in the fields of organ and tissue transplantation, stem cell therapy, and surrogacy.⁵⁹ Shildrick argues that these somatechnical phenomena of what she calls “visceral prostheses” (as opposed to “mechanical prostheses”) not only deconstruct the autonomous notion of the self but also invite a creative imaginary of human embodiment and its ethics.⁶⁰

In a similar vein, a somatechnical understanding of body-technology articulations (as are imbricated in biopolitical recognition and regulation within a specific social and political economy) informs my use of the term *prosthetics* when not directly related to people with disability. This includes the sites of postcolonial and diasporic memories discussed in this book, such as tongue surgery on Korean children (as neoliberal linguistic subjects), poetry machines for capacitating intimacy across species and racial differences, and pet cloning as a nonnormative apparatus of mourning.

Thus, while Jain’s and Sobchack’s criticisms of the tropes of prosthesis offer critical insights into the discourse around prosthetics in contemporary scholarship, sticking to the literal (that is, medical) sense of the word as distinct from its metaphorical sense might not be the only resolution. Jain herself explains, citing David Wills, “First introduced into English in 1553 as a *term of rhetoric* meaning ‘attached to’ or ‘setting forth’ or, literally, ‘adding a syllable to the beginning of a word,’ prosthesis did not come to bear the medical sense of the ‘replacement of a missing part of the body with an artificial one’ until 1704.”⁶¹ As above, the current *OED* also first lists the linguistic (rhetorical) sense of *prosthetic* (as an adjective), followed by the medical sense. My point here is not to argue that the linguistic/rhetorical sense is the primary (literal) meaning or to dismiss the prevalence of references to the medical sense in current discourses on prosthetics in the

humanities and social sciences. Rather, by drawing attention to the historicity and plurality of this term, I propose to explore commerce between the meanings and the associated bodies (beyond the dichotomy of the literal and the metaphorical) as a potential site for revalidation and affinity across difference in addition to being a site for the extraction of metaphorical values from people with disability.

Rethinking Supplementarity: Feminist Reflections

To further the discussion on the potential of prosthetic memory in enabling and debilitating assemblages within the transnational circuits of technology, I reexamine one of the key connotations of the term *prosthetic*—supplementarity. Scholars of disability studies have criticized how the trope of prosthetics often assumes disability as a deficit that needs to be supplemented—corrected—by technology, subtending the long-standing disavowal of disabled people's status as fully human subjects. Critics have also discussed how such disavowal relies on the Western liberalist fantasy of the independent and self-sufficient subject, which obscures the supplementary infrastructure and labor relied on to appear sovereign.⁶² In this light, the concept of prosthetic memory affords a space for conjoining efforts in criticizing and overcoming the normative notion of the sovereign (human) subject by reassessing the notion of supplementarity—in conversation with discussions on the division of labor, ethics of care, and revalidation of interdependence in postcolonial feminist, critical disability, and critical animal studies. Through recasting the political valence of supplementarity, I hope to reenvision prosthetic memory as less attributable to the self-bound individual subject and more situated in and stemming from webs of asymmetrically interdependent entanglements among human and other beings.

Feminist discussions on the complex and changing dynamics of care work in the transnational circuits of BT and ICT are therefore quintessential grounds for engaging with prosthetic memory in the chimeracological milieu of contemporary biopolitics. In particular, feminist, queer, and women of color scholars have been concerned with issues that emerged from the development of assistive reproductive technology (ART) and transnational surrogacy over the past few decades. This techno-cultural development not only has intensified the status of female reproductive body parts as an important source of surplus value in the fertility industry but also has become an important part of the making and breaking of kinship, of the patterns and flows of care labor (including gestational surrogacy), and of the distribution of rights and resources for having and raising children,

at the complex intersections of gender, race, class, nation, and other socio-economic and environmental infrastructures.⁶³ Furthermore, the recent global spread of the stem cell and regenerative medicine industries highlights the role of women in biotechnology because these fields require high volumes of human embryos, oocytes, fetal tissue, and umbilical cord blood beyond the usual sense of reproductive purposes. Catherine Waldby and Melinda Cooper urge theorization of the changing role of women in what they call “regenerative labour” (distinguished from the reproductive-work and ethics-of-care approaches of existing feminist theories) in this kind of emerging practice across both advanced industrial countries and developing nations.⁶⁴ These feminist critics have foregrounded and reexamined care work, often considered supplementary (and thus less important), in ethical, social, and politico-economical debates.

As ICT reorganizes work and lifestyle on a global scale, feminist scholars have discussed the supplementary roles that women and other feminized subjects take in this new context. Some critics have foregrounded how the immaterial, virtual, and cybernetic world is supported by low-skill material labor, which has become increasingly invisible and is disproportionately performed by women, immigrants, people of color, and people in the global south.⁶⁵ Others discuss how the rise of ICT has resulted in the capitalist extraction of women’s immaterial and affective labor across the domestic and public realms on one hand and the automation of conventionally feminized labor (such as clerical, service, and care work) on the other.⁶⁶ Yet other critics look at how discourses around artificial intelligence and robots as potential human replacements (surrogates for humans, in Neda Atanasiowski and Kalindi Vora’s sense) are entwined with gendered, racialized, and colonial discourses.⁶⁷ While the rise of immaterial and affective labor with the global acceleration of ICT might have potential for revalidating social and economic values that have been depreciated as supplementary (such as care, love, and collaboration), the persistent gender and racial hierarchy, the global division of labor, and the biopolitical regulation and commodification of these values complicate its radical potential.

From another corner of feminist inquiries on the ethics and politics of care, Sunaura Taylor turns to the question of “what it means to be *cared for*,” which as a disabled person can be “stifling, if not infantilizing and oppressive.”⁶⁸ Taylor sets out her criticism by asking how the American ideal of independence exaggerates individual physical autonomy and overlooks both human and animal (inter)dependency on “communities, habitats, and ecosystems.”⁶⁹ She further interrogates how such an alluring notion of the

human subject serves as a justification for the exploitation of those historically perceived as dependents (that is, a burden to others) through “slavery, patriarchy, colonization, and disability oppression” and for the slaughter of domestic animals (who couldn’t have been born and cannot survive in the “state of nature”).⁷⁰

Taylor observes that “much of the hostility toward domesticated animals seems to come from the idea they are unnatural,” as illustrated by environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott: “Domestic animals are . . . living artifacts. . . . From the perspective of the land ethic a herd of cattle, sheep, or pigs is as much or more a ruinous blight on the landscape as a fleet of four-wheel-drive off-road vehicles.”⁷¹ Notably, Callicott’s understanding of domestic animals as “another mode of extension of the works of man [*prosthetic*] into the ecosystem” leads him to conclude that these animals are dependent on humans rather than the other way around.⁷² Criticizing this self-serving logic of the naturally independent subject, Taylor suggests a feminist human-animal ethics of care that regards vulnerability and dependence as holding “the potential for new ways of being, supporting, and communicating.”⁷³ And Callicott’s equation of both domestic animals and off-road vehicles as artificial extensions to the ecosystem makes Kafer’s proposal (for politicizing cyborgian feminism from critical and creative disability perspectives) even more relevant in this book’s effort to recast the supplementarity of prosthetics in a more-than-human world.

As a topos for figuring the relationship between human and technology, the notion of prosthesis carries rich biopolitical implications. In a society where the norm of an independent human subject is prevalent, the use of *prosthetic* beyond the context of disability risks deriving the metaphoric values from disability while erasing the cultural and political contexts that frame assistive devices as an indication of dependency—which in turn is used to justify denying the sovereignty and dignity of people with disability. At the same time, this term also allows us to critically intervene into the value system underlying our understanding of the relationships between and among humans, animals, and technologies through reexamination of the notions and values of care, capacity/debility, and autonomy/interdependency. Reflections on this term thus help us to think of prosthetic memory not as an artificial replacement for natural memory but as what emerges from the categorically unstable and politically loaded chimeracological interfaces—in which we are invited to reflect on and reenvision our relationship with others, both familiar and alien.

Rethinking Postcolonial Feminist Mnemonics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century

Prosthetic Memories is indebted to the rich postcolonial feminist discourses that have engaged with embodied memories—most notably of Japanese military “comfort women,” of the sex industry at US military bases, and of transnational adoption—as a site of resistance against, recovery from, and transformation through loss and suffering.⁷⁴ In this kind of discourse, human bodies (especially women’s) are invested with the task of carrying traumatic, oppressed, and minoritarian memories of patriarchy, colonialism, and postcolonial governance during and after the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula, the US Army military government control of the southern part of Korea, the Korean War, and the ensuing Cold War.

However, postcolonial conditions across these two countries have changed alongside the global techno-biopolitical landscape in the early twenty-first century—which Achille Mbembe characterizes as the globalization of markets and the neoliberalism “dominated by the industries of the Silicon Valley and digital technology.”⁷⁵ Mbembe attests to the fictionalization of human subjects (whose new form of psychic life is “based on artificial and digital memory and on cognitive models drawn from the neurosciences and neuroeconomics”), the technological manipulation of living things nearing the elimination of races deemed undesirable “through theriomorphism (hybridization with animal elements) or ‘cyborgization’ (hybridization with artificial elements),” and the delirium evoked by racism that “consists . . . in substituting what *is* with something else, with another reality.”⁷⁶

Mbembe’s observations invite us to revisit “A Cyborg Manifesto,” in which Haraway maps the changing matrix of domination with the advancement of C3I (command-control-communication-intelligence) technologies and genetic science in the 1980s.⁷⁷ Writing at the height of the Cold War, Haraway proposes the cyborg as a figure to reenvision the socialist feminist subject and the corresponding politics of alliance.⁷⁸ At the center of this political vision lies Asian women (including “young Korean women hired in the sex industry and in electronic assembly”)—as illustrated in Lynn Randolph’s painting *Cyborg*, inspired by Haraway’s description of “Asian women with nimble fingers, working in enterprise zones.”⁷⁹ Haraway’s political prospectus still strikes me as prescient but merits revision in light of subsequent geopolitical and techno-scientific changes across

South Korea and the United States within a global context (the revisions of the three boundary events in the first part of this introduction is a part of my efforts to chart such changes). What would a postcolonial feminist painting of a cyborg in this century look like? While Mbembe and Haraway offer conflicting views about the political implications for nonhuman animals and machines of racialized proxying (which I discuss later, especially in chapters 2 and 4), their discussions show the necessity of expanding the postcolonial feminist topos into chimeric and cybernetic body-technology interfaces as emerging sites of collective memory.

Yet a sense of vertigo pervades my efforts to revise the postcolonial feminist approach to memory in the geopolitical and techno-cultural contexts across South Korea and the United States at the turn of the twenty-first century. This is not simply because South Korea (as the world's most networked and automated country and a globally competitive laboratory of advanced biotechnology) is an intense host of the planetary biopolitical changes that Mbembe has reported, demanding a new transpacific cartography of postcolonialities. It is also because the pictures of the current political and cultural states across South Korea and the United States—spinning between the global wave of South Korean pop culture and the rise of national pride in the country on one end, and the escalation of anti-Asian violence in the United States amid the COVID-19 pandemic on the other—render the main time frame of this book (the 1990s and 2000s) both distant and immediately relevant and therefore my search for a transnational feminist alliance both retroactive and prospective at the same time.

In addition, the heightened anti-Asian violence since the outbreak of the pandemic and the globalization of the Black Lives Matter movement illustrate the exigency of reflections on Black-Asian relationship for renewing the transnational feminist alliance across the two countries.⁸⁰ As Lisa Lowe points out, the United States' involvement in neocolonial wars and capitalism in Asia underpins the racialization of Asians as an alien cheap labor force in the United States.⁸¹ It has also cultivated the racial ideologies of white superiority and Black inferiority in Asian countries—which, as Nadia Y. Kim observes, loop back to the United States through Asian immigrants.⁸² Thus, such a circuit of Asian-Black racialization reflects what Lowe calls “intimate” colonial connections among Europe, Asia, Africa, and America since the late eighteenth century, through which the liberalist-as-universal form of “the human” is freed by enslavement, indenture, and dispossession of other humanities.⁸³ This intimate racial structure imbricated in the intercontinental geopolitics makes Black critiques a weighty

companion for envisioning a postcolonial feminist mnemonic at the edge of the human in the transpacific context.⁸⁴ In this light, this book is in dialogue with the Black and decolonialist critiques on racism, coloniality, and the notion of the human, to develop a postcolonial feminist approach to prosthetic memory that addresses new patterns of chimeric and cybernetic entanglements across the two countries.

This approach weighs on several contentious agendas in feminist theories of embodied memory, including the boundary of humanity and the relationship between body and language/image, and how these ideas inform what constitutes reality. Let me sketch out what this approach entails in conversation with two key biopolitical theories of embodied memory in contemporary feminist thought: Judith Butler's ethics of mourning, which concerns the biopolitical derealization of human precarity, and Rosi Braidotti's posthuman ethics, which espouses memory as becoming-minoritarian. Revisiting these two thinkers—whose relationship Braidotti describes as “affirmation versus vulnerability”—I aim to delineate the unresolved tension between these two lines of thinking as a liminal space for conceiving a postcolonial chimeric vision of prosthetic memories.⁸⁵

In *Precarious Life*, Butler proposes an ethics of mourning based on the idea that the possibility and experience of loss through violence is a shared condition we cannot will away because of embodied interdependence among human subjects.⁸⁶ Mourning then indicates the recognition of such primary ties with others in the web of vulnerability, and performatively establishes who counts as a life worth grieving for—which for Butler is essentially the matter of who belongs to humanity as a political community.⁸⁷ From this perspective, disavowal of mourning denies the worth of those who are lost—thus acquiescing to the violence in and through which the victim's humanity is rendered unrecognizable. Here, Butler carefully poses their claim about “a ‘common’ corporeal vulnerability” as something other than a proposition for “a new basis for humanism.”⁸⁸ Butler instead asserts that their critique on the dehumanization in disavowed mourning concerns “not a matter of a simple entry of the excluded into an established ontology, *but an insurrection at the level of ontology*, a critical opening up of the questions, What is real? Whose lives are real? . . . What, then is the relation between violence and those lives considered as ‘unreal’?”⁸⁹

For Butler, this “insurrection at the level of ontology” must come to terms with “the limits of human intelligibility” to recognize the vulnerability of others differentially allocated in the matrix of variable norms of recognition—and thus with the limits of discourse to represent the suffering

and loss of others.⁹⁰ However, while Butler's argument accounts for the violence of derealization in the omission of certain deaths in media representation (such as Iraqi children killed in war), it sends us back to questions about what such a limit of human intelligibility (whereby certain deaths are unmarkable in human discourse) has to do with the derealization of those who are already discursively dehumanized and thus subjected to killing.⁹¹

The ambiguous circuit between the limit of human intelligibility and discursive dehumanization suggests the notion of humanness that underpins Butler's account of insurrection at the level of ontology, despite their critique of normative notions of the human and humanism. This is evident in their reference to Emmanuel Levinas's notion of "face," which mandates the injunction not to kill the other. What about lives that do not have a human face? Can our embodied interdependency or the consequent vulnerability be enclosed in humanity? In a similar vein, Cary Wolfe suggests that "Butler's effort . . . runs aground on the question of nonhuman animals."⁹² Wolfe locates the problems in Butler's reliance on a "mutual striving for recognition," which assumes the model of a (human) subject committed to reciprocal agency and intelligibility.⁹³ Yet, Wolfe argues, if Butler's theoretical coordinates suggest that a truly ethical act is directed toward those who are outside the model of mutual exchange among moral agents (as in her primary example of newborn infants) and that such an act is radical precisely because it recognizes the precarity of "life itself" beyond human conceptualization, then their own theory compels an understanding that "the ham-fisted distinction of 'human' versus 'animal' is of no use" in deciding membership in the community for ethical consideration by which we grieve the loss of others and protect them from violence.⁹⁴

However, critical reflection on the conflict within Butler's own theory leads to more than the inclusion of nonhuman animals in ethical consideration. For Wolfe, the unwitting human-centrism within Butler's own position is even more conspicuous given the history of "the 'animalization' of a population produced as 'dubiously human' by and for a political program."⁹⁵ Then, what Butler posits as "insurrection at the level of ontology" must reckon with how violent in/distinction between nonhuman animals and dehumanized humans subtends the derealization of other humanities. Likewise, while Butler's ethics of grievable life offers rich grounds for theorizing a biopolitics of memory that addresses the differential allocation of precarity alongside differing norms concerning the value of life (and death), it also merits a critical revision from more-than-human perspectives. Here *more* denotes not so much a logic of inclusion or a position of transcendence as

an openness to realities other than the one intelligible per hegemonic humanism. From this perspective, Butler's "insurrection at the level of ontology" calls for a kind of chimeric vision to evoke countermemories in the uneven entanglements of humans and animals in the transnational circuits of advanced technologies.

Prosthetic Memories thus invites a critical conversation with posthumanist approaches to memory, especially Braidotti's proposal for an affirmative ethics geared toward the "qualitative leap through pain, across the mournful landscapes of nostalgic yearning."⁹⁶ Braidotti attempts to overcome the traditional biopolitics of mourning focused on control of the body, emphasizing instead the vital force of Life (life in its inhuman face) that exceeds biopolitical control. With this force that concerns the self-organizing flows of intensities among affective bodies, she envisions a subjectivity that is nonunitary and nomadic yet accountable in the technologically and globally mediated world.⁹⁷ From this perspective, she suggests a nomadic mode of memory that arises through "composition, selection, and dosage" of the flows of Life with a modicum of creative work of imagination, wherein we transform in assemblage with other bodies.⁹⁸ Braidotti portrays nomadic remembering as "the active reinvention of a self that is joyfully discontinuous, as opposed to being mournfully consistent," which destabilizes the authority of linear chronology and "real experience" predicated on the majority subject's centralized data bank.⁹⁹ This approach to memory draws on the Deleuzian concept of minoritarian memory, which "propels the process of becoming by liberating something akin to Foucault's 'counter-memory'"—and thereby opens spaces for "a sort of empowerment of all that was not programmed within the dominant memory."¹⁰⁰ As such, Braidotti's approach affords a powerful theory for engaging with prosthetic memory as an ethical and situated practice in the more-than-human world we inhabit.

However, Braidotti's affirmative proposal for a "leap"—or rather, the trajectory this term evokes—invites some questions from postcolonial perspectives. Braidotti suggests that her proposal is particularly relevant for "diasporic subjects of all kinds," such as migrants, exiles, and refugees who have "first-hand experience of the extent to which the process of disidentification from familiar identities is linked to the pain of loss and uprooting."¹⁰¹ The challenge here is to translate this negative sense of pain and loss into affirmation of "multiple forms of belonging and complex allegiances," which requires "suspending the quest for both claims and compensation, resisting the logic of redistribution" and instead taking a different route for fulfilling "the subject's capacity for interaction and freedom."¹⁰² While

I am intrigued by Braidotti's proposal for an ethics of affirmation, I would like to reflect on a couple of issues as it connects the onto-epistemological proposition on biocentric egalitarianism with the political program for social transformation. Despite Braidotti's repeated address of diasporic subjects, her biocentric egalitarianism lacks the analytic acuity to engage with the biopolitical order of things.¹⁰³

In particular, the turn of this biocentric egalitarianism away from the majoritarian human subject (modeling the white man) does not necessarily offer a more effective tool for addressing the intrahuman relations of power through which some are relegated to the state of inhuman, animal, or thing. As Zakiyyah Iman Jackson observes, appeals to "go beyond" or become "post" human too often presume the West's "Man" as "the originary locus of this call," whereby "potentially transformative expressions of humanity are instead cast 'out of the world' and thus rendered inhuman."¹⁰⁴ As such, posthuman appeals to move beyond the human overlook "race" at the center of the Western metaphysics (and thus the racially hierarchized philosophy of time, knowledge, reality, and the world) founded on and undergirding the historical horizon of slavery, conquest, and colonialism.¹⁰⁵

In a similar vein, I argue that the current posthuman approaches to memory require a more fundamental reflection on the racial and geopolitical constituents of some key concepts that undergird these approaches' claim on realness. This kind of issue arises, for example, when Braidotti links the political proposal for the leap from mourning to affirmation with the theoretical trajectory from linguistic to material, which she describes as how "the return of 'real body' in its thick materiality spells the end of the linguistic turn."¹⁰⁶ By contrasting the "real body" with "textuality, representation, interpretation, and the power of signifier," Braidotti's formulation circumvents the question of how "reality" is predicated on the very body/language binary that she aims to overcome, which itself has racial and colonial genealogies that are nothing but violent. Thus, Braidotti's formulation preempts the possibility of other kinds of language-body assemblage—and by extension, their relation to humanness, reality, and power—outside the frame of Man.

Then, in order to take seriously Braidotti's theory of minoritarian memory, it is imperative to ask, which reality and whose body? Braidotti draws her examples of "the beneficial side effects" of the process of detachment from the cherished identity of "the crucial appraisal of blackness" in Paul Gilroy and Patricia Hill Collins, and her case for the affirmative translation of the negative sense of loss into "multi-locality" from Édouard Glissant.¹⁰⁷

Braidotti also offers “the figure of Nelson Mandela” (and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in postapartheid South Africa) and the works of Cornel West and bell hooks to illustrate an affirmative ethics, in which “those who have been hurt” transcend “the logic of negativity” (claim, compensation, and revenge) and instead collectively construct “positions of active, positive interconnections and relations that can sustain a web of mutual dependence, and ecology of multiple belongings.”¹⁰⁸ The racial bearings in these references are difficult to miss, and so a careful reflection on the assumed “real body” (as opposed to the representations) of these minoritarian subjects is imperative in order to avoid unwitting empiricism about these subjects.

In this light, I consult postcolonial and decolonial thinkers who offer critique on language as a way to criticize the existing order of body, humanness, reality, and power and to imagine alternatives.¹⁰⁹ I argue that postcolonial and decolonial critiques of language help to revise minoritarian memory so as to open a reality conceivable only with articulations between body and language different from those of the hegemonic reality. Posthuman attention to the “real body” demands, rather than supersedes, Butler’s call for “insurrection on the level of ontology” at the limit of normative human recognition.

Prosthetic Memories positions a postcolonial critique on prosthetic memory at the edge of the human in conversation with these two branches of contemporary feminist thought. On one hand, Butler’s meditation on mourning as a performative measure for the life of others reassures the task of remembrance as a feminist ethics for addressing biopolitical precarity and debility at the limit of human representation, which (and, I would argue, at odds with Butler’s intention) is contiguous with the abject territory of animality and mechanicality. On the other hand, Braidotti’s posthumanist approach to memory as becoming through composition of the force of Life with a modicum of imagination offers a useful onto-epistemological frame for engaging with technological assemblages of humans and non-humans in the contemporary world. These two approaches are not easily compatible, but the break between the two signals less a linear leap (from the linguistic to the matter, from representation to becoming, and from human to posthuman) than a liminal space between the margins of humanity and the nonhuman for reenvisioning memory (and its relation to body, language, and reality).

From this perspective, this book mobilizes its two central figures (tongues and genes) not simply as the binary topoi of cultural and biological embodied memory, but as an index pointing to the binary’s Eurocentric

onto-epistemological premise as the horizon of violent derealization. In this, Black critiques offer forceful guidance for approaching the chimeric and cybernetic entanglements around tongues and genes in the following chapters less as evidential flesh and more as the enfleshing of an onto-epistemological aperture. From such an aperture, this book presents a renewed postcolonial feminist approach to prosthetic memories situated in the transnational circuits of BT and ICT at the turn of this century, on one hand revising discourses on prosthetic memory as a form of collective memory in modern society (as suggested by McLuhan and Landsberg) and on the other extending postcolonial discourses that focus on the body as a site of collective (often gendered and traumatic) memory across South Korea and the United States.

Movement of the Book

Prosthetic Memories consists of two parts, corresponding to two figures of embodied memory: the tongue and the gene. This pair enfolds the junctures of discursive and material, cultural and biological, and artificial and natural—the onto-epistemological destabilizations of which backdrop the new figure of prosthetic memory I have discussed above (and explore further in the following chapters).

In response to the political and theoretical pressure under the unracialized posthuman declaration of “the end of the linguistic turn” as sketched out in this introduction, the book begins with the postcolonial and diasporic tongue (both language and organ) as a site of prosthetic memory. Part I, “Mouth to Mouth,” explores the prostheticity of tongues as an essential component for understanding contemporary postcolonial languaging, which I argue is a series of biopolitical events that concern the racial and gendering order of (human) embodiment, kinship, and the reality of worlds.

For this, chapters 1 and 2, on one hand, consider a variety of sites of human-technology interface, including tongue surgery to correct children’s English pronunciation in South Korea, Susan Sontag’s reference to English-accent training at call centers in India in her reflection on the age of computer translation, and Margaret Rhee’s works that play with the queer and diasporic relationships among robot/machine, human, and poetry. On the other hand, these chapters revisit feminist theories of linguistic performativity through the lens of Black and decolonial critiques on the notion of the human and its racialized proxies (such as animals and machines). Interweaving these two moves, I argue that the postcolonial human-technology interfaces of languaging are not forts of human exceptionalism nor loci of

the recovery of identity and origin associated with the mother tongue. Rather, they are performative spaces of a racial, diasporic, and gendered (un)becoming-human, through which chimeric visions for the counter-memories of education-labor, migration, and intimacy emerge at the margin of hegemonic humanity.

Part II, “The Specters of Cloning,” turns in a more “biological” direction—genetic technology. These chapters critically interrogate the prevalent approach to genetic cloning as an artificial replacement for the original (and thus a circumvention of the natural process of mourning) and explore prosthetic memories emerging from the fragmented and supplementary entanglements of humans and animals in transnational pet cloning and human stem cell research (which often involves genetic cloning) in and across South Korea and the United States. Extending my critique on the biopolitical consequences of the Western body/language metaphysical binary (and the exceptionalization of certain realities at the cost of others), part II starts by asking how the original/copy frame is coconstitutive of the somatechnical norms of mourning concerning gender/sexuality, race, species, and disability in the wake of commercial pet cloning. This kind of frame is also a part of the biopolitical derealization that depreciates bodies regarded as artificial/mimetic or otherwise outside the original/copy frame. From this perspective, I trace prosthetic memories in the transnational circuits of cloning technology, attending to the biopolitical spectralization of certain bodies—such as the “used-up” surrogate-mother dogs (said to have been slaughtered for human consumption) in pet cloning, the massive use of female animal bodies in genetic cloning, and the mobilization of women’s bodies for human stem cell research. However, I depart from existing conversations that regard these issues as scandalous indicators of the immaturity of animal welfare and bioethics in South Korea, as I see these discourses as a part of the postcolonial normativization of bioethics. While bioethics is commonly understood to consist of ethical issues arising in the research and application of medicine and the life sciences, I approach it as also part of the biopolitical apparatus that concerns the regulation and governance of human and nonhuman lives. Thus, I trace how women and other female animals are chained through the rubric of substitutability at the heart of global institutionalization of modern (Western) bioethics—which also facilitates increasing experimentalization of human and animal mind-bodies in the biomedical and pharmaceutical industry—in the context of the patriarchal-developmental paradigm of globalization in postcolonial South Korean society.

Prosthetic Memories therefore aims to offer a postcolonial and posthumanist feminist approach to memory in an age when human and nonhuman lives are increasingly incorporated into the transnational circuits of informatics, communication, and biotech situated between South Korea and the United States. I argue that chimeracological assemblages are not simply sites of biopolitical erasure but also affective interfaces for collective memories that might enable new connections of intimacy and care despite the isolating and injurious experience. I also hope to show that attending to animal, technological, and affective bodies does not render critical inquiry into language and representation obsolete, against the grain of the unracialized posthuman and new materialist proclamations of the end of the linguistic turn. Rather, it demands critical reflection on Western-centric, racialized, and gendered understandings of language, body, and the relationships between them. This leads to the recognition that dislocating prosthetic memory from the exclusively majoritarian human realm of representation is an intrinsically postcolonial and feminist project as much as a posthuman one.

In search of feminist mnemonics in the chimeracological entanglements across the Pacific, *Prosthetic Memories* compels critical and creative rearticulations among different theories, methods, and archives. This book therefore choreographs a variety of practices, including close reading of literature, films, and newspapers; archival research; in-person and email interviews; and visits to a biotech research facility—tracing and engaging with the prosthetic memories composed in body-technology interfaces. In this light, the book is an active component of the prosthetic memories it writes, rather than a recording and analysis of already existing memories.

The performative nature of writing about prosthetic memories is telling of the ethical and theoretical risk and potential of this book. This composition of memories that are neither mine nor theirs points to the frailty of the proprietary relationship between subject and memory within chimeracological entanglements as much as to the possibility of a collective memory that carries the traces of encounters among various mind-bodies. If *Prosthetic Memories* is already embedded in a potentially parasitic-caring milieu of embodied memories, then I hope the book's creative surplus becomes a new vision of intimacy in intersectional and interspecies entanglements and of renewed affinity between Black feminist thoughts and transpacific postcolonial feminism, weighing in on the new biopolitical landscape of our time.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 The Artro, “Behind the Beauty: An Interview with Kang Seung Lee,” January 20, 2023, https://www.theartro.kr/eng/features/features_view.asp?idx=5530&b_code=10&page=&searchColumn=&searchKeyword=&b_ex2=.
- 2 Kang Seung Lee and Jin Kwon, “QueerArch Exhibition Essay,” Apexart, accessed August 2, 2023, https://apexart.org/QueerArch_E.php.
- 3 The Artro, “Behind the Beauty.” In collaboration with Tolentino, Lee has also propagated the little plants grown from Harvey and has shared them with various people in the queer community, extending the network of care for this living archive of queer memory.
- 4 New Museum (@newmuseum), “An unexpected living archive, ‘Julie Tolentino (Archive in Dirt)’ (2019-ongoing), now on view in the 2021 Triennial, ‘Soft Water Hard Stone,’” Twitter (now X), November 8, 2021, <https://twitter.com/newmuseum/status/1457750539962310660>.
- 5 Jarman, *Modern Nature*, 55; Tongsön An, “Kei in’gwön’gwa yöksarül pat’angüro chagöp’anün chakka igangsüng” [Kang Seung Lee works based on gay human rights and history], *Harper’s BAZAAR Korea*, October 17, 2021, <https://www.harpersbazaar.co.kr/article/59380>.
- 6 An example of such an effort is *Garden* (2018), which involves soil, pebbles, and debris from both places—and was also exhibited at the

Triennial. For more details on the entwining of Jarman and Oh in Lee's work, see Leslie Dick's introduction to Lee's "Porous Bodies."

7 Here I borrow Rosi Braidotti's conceptualization of "transposition." With a double inspiration from both music and genetics, this term "indicates an intertextual, cross-boundary or transversal transfer, in the sense of a leap from one code, field or axis into another." Braidotti, *Transpositions*, 5.

8 New Museum (@newmuseum), "An unexpected living archive."

9 Lee, *The Exquisite Corpse of Asian America*, 140.

10 Lee, *The Exquisite Corpse of Asian America*, 140.

11 Lee, *The Exquisite Corpse of Asian America*, 140–41.

12 I borrow the phrase "an imaginary chorus" from Judith Butler's explanation about the performative force of the term *queer* as an interpellation. Through this phrase, Butler reminds us of the persistence of the power enacted in and through the repeated invocation of this term *queer* as "accusation, pathologization, [and] insult"—which conditions the possibility for subversive reclamation of the term. Butler, "Critically Queer," 18. Even though the term *prosthetic* is not an interpellation per se, its performative force evokes the social imaginaries of people with disability as the absent referent mind-bodies (i.e., the wearer of prosthetics) and groups of people associated with the supplementarity of prosthetics vis-à-vis the supposed original entity. Butler's theory of performativity helps me to reflect on the imaginary chorus of these associated ideas and affects that haunt the term *prosthetics*—even in attempts to revise and reclaim it.

13 I feel privileged to witness the recent gush of forceful Black, indigenous, and decolonial critiques on the Enlightenment and liberalist figures of the human, which also haunt the prevailing posthumanist and new materialist discourses despite (and in) their claim to go beyond the human/ism. These critiques have analyzed the onto-epistemological and political repercussions of such a tendency in understanding our species' relationship with animals, things, and the world and in comprehending what constitutes body, representation, and reality—which informs my efforts to refigure the concept of prosthetic memory. In this light, I am inspired by and aspire to converse with these critical efforts, especially Zakiyyah Iman Jackson's *Becoming Human*; Julietta Singh's *Unthinking Mastery*; Elizabeth A. Povinelli's *Geontologies*; and Denise Ferreira da Silva's *Toward a Global Idea of Race*, in addition to the works by Toni Morrison, Sylvia Wynter, and Margaret Rhee I discuss in depth in the coming chapters.

14 Plato, *Phaedrus*, 274B–277A; Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 80–81.

- 15 Jacques Derrida's discussion of the supplement appears in many of his works, including "Plato's Pharmacy"; "Freud and the Scene of Writing"; and "The Word Processor," all by Derrida.
- 16 McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 3.
- 17 McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 3–4.
- 18 McLuhan borrowed this idea from medical researchers like Hans Selye and Adolphe Jonas, who conceptualized "autoamputation" as a strategy to which a body resorts "when the perceptual power cannot locate or avoid the cause of irritation." McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 42.
- 19 McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 47.
- 20 McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 47.
- 21 Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory*.
- 22 Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory*, 2
- 23 Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory*, 2.
- 24 Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory*, 20.
- 25 Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory*, 25–28.
- 26 Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto," 157.
- 27 Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto," 151–53.
- 28 For discussions on the increasing and institutionalizing recruitment of humans as biological resources and experimental subjects in biomedicine in a global context, see Cooper, *Life as Surplus*; and Sunder Rajan, "Experimental Values." Richard Twine notes that biotechnology (such as genomics) has become a prevalent paradigm in treating domestic animals, arguing for the importance of biopolitical and bioethical attention to animals in this regard. Twine, *Animals as Biotechnology*.
- 29 Livingston and Puar, "Interspecies," 3.
- 30 Livingston and Puar, "Interspecies," 4–5.
- 31 For example, in his book *Bioinsecurities*, Ahuja offers a critical examination of racialized and gendered medical and biosecurity interventions at human-microbe interfaces in Asia and the Americas, which have shaped the US empire over the decades. In his book *The Mobile Workshop*, Mavhunga looks at encounters between African and European colonial knowledges, tracing local knowledge of the tsetse fly (*mhesvi* in the local language) that European colonizers adapted into methods to control the fly which were exploitive and destructive for indigenous people and the environment in twentieth-century Rhodesia and Zimbabwe.
- 32 Cooper, *Life as Surplus*, 12.
- 33 Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto," 149. According to Ronald Kline, research scientists created the cyborg techniques as means to control the bodies of

- astronauts “so they could survive the harsh environment of outer space, an alternative to providing an earth-like environment for space travel.” For more details about the cyborg mouse and the genealogy of cybernetics, see Kline, “Where Are the Cyborgs in Cybernetics?” 331–32 (quote on 332).
- 34 Rose, “Molecular Biopolitics, Somatic Ethics, and the Spirit of Biocapital,” 3.
- 35 Franklin, “The Cyborg Embryo,” 171.
- 36 Parisi, *Abstract Sex*, 168, 197.
- 37 Milburn, “Nanotechnology in the Age of Posthuman Engineering,” 291–93.
- 38 For more postcolonial and feminist critiques on the contemporary bio-economy surrounding new genetic, regenerative, and molecular science and technologies, see Schurr, “From Biopolitics to Bioeconomies”; Braun, “Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life”; and Foster, “Patents, Biopolitics, and Feminisms.”
- 39 Mitchell, *Cloning Terror*, chap. 2.
- 40 Preciado, “Pharmaco-pornographic Politics,” 108.
- 41 Preciado, “Pharmaco-pornographic Politics,” 110.
- 42 *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “prosthetic (n.),” September 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5859376254>.
- 43 Jain, “The Prosthetic Imagination,” 40.
- 44 Jain, “The Prosthetic Imagination,” 47, 48.
- 45 Sobchack, “A Leg to Stand On,” 19.
- 46 Sobchack, “A Leg to Stand On,” 18–19.
- 47 Kafer, *Feminist, Queer, Crip*, 105. Kafer’s citation is from Haraway, “Cyborg Manifesto,” 178.
- 48 Kafer argues that this kind of feminist cyborg theory often lacks any critical engagement with disability and “analysis of the material realities of disabled people’s interactions with technology.” Kafer, *Feminist, Queer, Crip*, 105.
- 49 Kafer explains that “‘trach’ is an abbreviation of tracheotomy, a medical procedure in which a breathing tube is inserted directly into the trachea, bypassing the mouth and nose. Someone with a trach, then, can in effect breathe through her throat, freeing her mouth for other activities.” Kafer, *Feminism, Queer, Crip*, 122.
- 50 Puar, preface to *The Right to Maim*, xiv.
- 51 According to Limbs International, “only 5% of the approximate 30–40 million amputees in the developing world have access to prosthetic devices or assistance.” Limbs International, “Why Limbs,” accessed May 5, 2023, <https://www.limbsinternational.org/why-limbs.html>. In addition

to unequal access to prosthetic devices, it is also noteworthy that “while the transition from bonesetters to orthopaedic doctors took place almost concurrently in the Western world, most of the developing world was left out of these developments,” such that traditional bone setting has survived “modernization” and remained an alternative source of care, especially for those who are poor and lack access to more expensive Western medicine. Ezeanya-Esiobu, *Indigenous Knowledge and Education in Africa*, 86.

- 52 Lorde, *The Cancer Journals*, 60–61.
- 53 Jeong-yeo Lim, “Herald Interview: Rethinking Amputee Status, Prosthetics Market in Korea,” *Korea Herald*, April 21, 2019, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190421000103>. On smart skin and handcrafted prosthetics, see Harmon Leon, “Visiting Seoul’s Artificial Limb District,” *Vice*, March 14, 2015, <https://www.vice.com/da/article/vdp5z3/visiting-the-seoul-artificial-limb-district-312>.
- 54 Hird, “Animal Trans,” 232.
- 55 Hird, “Animal Trans,” 241.
- 56 Sullivan, “Somatechnics,” 187.
- 57 Sullivan, “Somatechnics,” 188.
- 58 Stryker and Sullivan, “King’s Member, Queen’s Body,” 61.
- 59 Shildrick, *Visceral Prostheses*.
- 60 Shildrick, *Visceral Prostheses*.
- 61 Jain, “The Prosthetic Imagination,” 32, emphasis added, quoting Wills, *Prosthesis*, 215.
- 62 For critiques on the Western model of the independent subject, see Rein-
dal, “Independence, Dependence, Interdependence.”
- 63 Smietana, Thompson, and Twine, “Making and Breaking Families.” In
this introduction, the authors offer a comprehensive and dynamic cartog-
raphy of the issues raised by the development of ART and transnational
surrogacy, in conversation with critical genealogies of queer reproduc-
tion, reproductive justice, and stratified reproduction.
- 64 Waldby and Cooper, “From Reproductive Work to Regenerative Labour,” 3.
- 65 For critiques on invisible labor in the digital and information technol-
ogy industry, see Van Doorn, “Platform Labor”; Huws, “The Hassle of
Housework”; Rand, “Challenging the Invisibility of Sex Work”; and
Chakraborty, *Invisible Labour*.
- 66 For the gendered implications of immaterial and affective labor with the
rise of ICT, see Morini, “The Feminization of Labour”; Fortunati, “ICTs
and Immaterial Labor”; and Hester, “Technically Female.”

- 67 Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora critically examine technoliberalism that promises a revolutionary new future, where robots and an automated labor force (as surrogate humans) will liberate humans from the drudgery of enslaved labor. Atanasoski and Vora, *Surrogate Humanity*, 4. They expose how this liberalist imaginary of human-robot interactions is entrenched in and reproduces the patriarchal, anti-Black, settler colonialist, and US and European imperialist structures of labor, exploitation, and capital accumulation (10). In a similar vein, and as I detail in chapter 2, Margaret Rhee traces the cultural associations between robots and Asians and Asian immigrants as an efficient and hard-working yet not creative labor force, and examines these associations as a site for re-envisioning the human-robot relationship. Rhee, “In Search of My Robot.” Such gendered, racialized, and geopolitical investments in the concept of technology as supplement to human capacity underlie this book’s efforts to rethink prosthetic memory as a postcolonial feminist mnemonic.
- 68 Taylor, “Interdependent Animals,” 109.
- 69 Taylor, “Interdependent Animals,” 112–13.
- 70 Taylor, “Interdependent Animals,” 114.
- 71 Taylor, “Interdependent Animals,” 116. Here, Taylor’s citation is from Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic*, 30.
- 72 Taylor, “Interdependent Animals,” 116.
- 73 Taylor, “Interdependent Animals,” 124.
- 74 They include various kinds of practices such as academic writing, testimony, autobiography, film, painting, and other genres of art, and their spectrum and depth make my attempt to chart them fragmentary at best. Since 1990, there have been immense efforts to testify to and rewrite this history through the embodied memories of former Japanese military “comfort women” against the disavowal of sexual slavery and other colonial violence and exploitation during the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula. To mention just a few, an English translation of comfort women’s oral testimonies, *Voices of the Korean Comfort Women* (ed. and trans. Chungmoo Choi and Hyunah Yang), came out in 2023. Chi-ön Kim discusses how the memories of the war and its scars embodied in the former comfort women’s bodies are represented through body-languages in *The Murmuring (Najün moksori)* trilogy of documentaries (directed by Young-joo Byun)—*The Murmuring* (1995), *Habitual Sadness* (1997), and *My Own Breathing* (2000). Chi-ön Kim, “‘Najün moksori yŏnjak yŏn’gu,” 630–31. Yundük Kwŏn’s video “Mome saegin kiöktül” (2013) shows how the scarred and sick body of a former comfort woman who suffered dissociative amnesia and aphasia carries the memories of traumatic sexual slavery.

Grace M. Cho traces the foreclosed memories of the Korean War through the figure of the *yanggongju* (a pejorative term for prostitutes at US military bases in Korea) turned military bride that haunts generations in the Korean diaspora in the United States. In this, Cho proposes a transgenerational diasporic vision of hearing the hallucinatory voices of the dead, mutilated, and sexually exploited bodies during and after the Korean War, demonstrating mnemonics for engaging with embodied memories foreclosed by physical and psychic traumas between South Korea and the United States. Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora*.

75 Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason*, 3.

76 Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason*, 3, 21, 32.

77 Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto," 151–53.

78 Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto," 151–53.

79 Here, I refer to Lynn Randolph's painting *Cyborg* (1989), which was drawn in response to Haraway's "Manifesto for Cyborgs" (an earlier version of "A Cyborg Manifesto," published in the *Socialist Review* in 1985) and became the cover for Haraway's book *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* (1991). In "Modest Witness," Randolph recalls how Haraway's manifesto inspired her to draw this painting during her residency at the Bunting Institute (now the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies) working on her painting project "Return to Alien Roots: Painting Outside Mainstream Western Culture." Randolph also mentions that a young Chinese woman, Grace Li—one of her late husband's sociology students at the University of Houston—modeled for the painting. Lynn Randolph, "Modest Witness: A Painter's Collaboration with Donna Haraway, 2009," Lynn Randolph (artist's website), accessed August 21, 2023, <http://www.lynnrandolph.com/presentations/?eid=817>.

In the manifesto, Haraway makes a few direct references to Asian women, such as "the nimble fingers of 'Oriental' women," "the unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia," and "Young Korean women hired in the sex industry and in electronic assembly." Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto," 154, 174.

80 The 2021 Atlanta spa shooting that killed eight people, of whom six were women of Asian descent (including one Korean and four Korean Americans), and the public reaction demonstrate the heightened anti-Asian sentiment and violence during the pandemic.

81 Lowe, *Immigrant Acts*, 16. Thus, Lowe presents Asian immigrants "as both symbol and allegory" for Asian Americans within the racial structure of the United States (35).

82 Nadia Y. Kim argues that the US military presence during and after the Korean War has influenced the ideology of white-Black racial hierarchy in

South Korea—which preconditions Korean immigrants’ understanding of race and their identities in relation to the racial hierarchy even before entering the United States. N. Kim, *Imperial Citizens*.

- 83 Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3. In this book, Lowe illustrates the effect of transcontinental colonial intimacies most clearly through the Chinese “coolies” brought to the British-occupied West Indies after the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean, appearing as the figure introducing the “alleged transition from slavery to freedom” (24).
- 84 In this book, my engagement with Black feminist critiques does not directly address the interlacing of Asian and Black racialization per se. However, in the decade since the beginning of the Black Lives Matter movement, there have been dynamic discussions on the long history of tension and solidarity between Black and Asian communities in the United States and beyond. Among other publications, *Scholar and Feminist Online* published a special issue featuring a collection of feminist and queer approaches to Afro-Asian Studies and cross-racial formations. The introduction to this special issue reviews Afro-Asian studies of the past two decades and highlights the importance of feminist and queer leadership and perspectives with the development of the Black Lives Matter movement. Sudhakar and Reddy, “Introduction.”
- 85 Braidotti, “Affirmation versus Vulnerability.”
- 86 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 20.
- 87 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 20.
- 88 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 42–43.
- 89 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 33, emphasis added.
- 90 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 35.
- 91 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 34.
- 92 Wolfe, *Before the Law*, 18.
- 93 Wolfe, *Before the Law*, 19–20.
- 94 Wolfe, *Before the Law*, 20–21.
- 95 Wolfe, *Before the Law*, 21.
- 96 Braidotti, “Affirmation versus Vulnerability,” 242.
- 97 Braidotti, *Transpositions*.
- 98 Braidotti, *Transpositions*, 168.
- 99 Braidotti, *Transpositions*, 169.
- 100 Braidotti, *Transpositions*, 167.

- 101 Braidotti, "Affirmation versus Vulnerability," 242.
- 102 Braidotti, "Affirmation versus Vulnerability," 242, 245.
- 103 There have been similar criticisms of "flat ontology"—a term that has gained currency especially among the Deleuzean branch of new materialist and object-oriented ontology discourses since Manuel DeLanda's use of it in *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* and its variations. Through his posthumanist question of "the animal," Cary Wolfe criticizes flat ontologies "that evacuate the radical discontinuity between qualitatively different orders," as shown in the prevalent discourse of the Anthropocene, and instead proposes a more "jagged" ontology. Wolfe, "What 'the Animal' Can Teach 'the Anthropocene,'" 132. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson's observation—"Antiblackness's arbitrary uses of power do not comply with the hierarchies presumed by critics of anthropocentrism. Furthermore, viruses, bacteria, parasites, and insects all commonly exercise dominance over human populations"—suggests that posthuman flat ontology not only fails to register racial (and other intrahuman) hierarchies but thereby undermines the efficacy of its anti-anthropocentrism. Jackson, *Becoming Human*, 15.
- 104 Jackson, "Outer Worlds," 215.
- 105 Jackson, "Outer Worlds," 216.
- 106 Braidotti, *Transpositions*, 50.
- 107 Braidotti, "Affirmation versus Vulnerability," 242.
- 108 Braidotti, "Affirmation versus Vulnerability," 249–50.
- 109 Here, decolonial and postcolonial approaches to language do not dismiss but rather put into perspective posthumanist formulations of the relationship between human and language. In this, I also heed Julietta Singh's dehumanist perspective that reflects on the colonial and neocolonial narrative of mastery in her book *Unthinking Mastery*. Singh observes that anticolonial thinkers across different geopolitical contexts such as Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Mohandas K. Gandhi "advance forms of [masculine] linguistic 'counter mastery'" as a way of protesting subjectivation through colonial language (82). Nonetheless, Singh sees dehumanist potential in their thoughts as they emerge "from the position of those excluded from the status of fully imbued human" (70). Furthermore, even though postcolonial writers such as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o and Chinua Achebe also "rehearse the violence at stake in claiming or recrafting language in postcolony," they share "a desire for unmasterful ways of formulating the relationship between language and the postcolonial imagination" (88). Decolonial and postcolonial approaches to language are further discussed in chapter 1.