Isaac A. Kamola

MAKING THE WORLD GLOBAL

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*U.S. Universities and the Production
of the Global Imaginary*

ISAAC A. KAMOLA

Cover art: World map with countries scaled to
represent the percentage of foreign students studying
in the United States, by country of origin. Source:
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To Serena, Harvey, and Callia.

You are my world.

Presumably, if one is a factory worker, it is on the factory floor that one's politicization, one's consciousness, comes out in day-to-day struggle. And if I am an academic, and so long as I remain an academic, I must attempt to make the most important political input during those very many hours that I spend contributing to teaching or researching or whatever other aspects of academic life may come into play.
— WALTER RODNEY, *Walter Rodney Speaks* (1990)

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Preface

On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to end its membership in the European Union. This vote, called Brexit, became one primal scream in a growing economic and ethnonationalist rejection of the geopolitical project President George H. W. Bush once termed the New World Order. This global order, based upon a post–Cold War vision of greater cultural integration, free trade, expanded institutions of global governance, and the fluid movements of peoples, commodities, and money, had, until very recently, been assumed by many to be the self-evident and unquestioned trajectory of our shared human future. While many scholars bristled at the particular phraseology of the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1989, 1992) or the arrival of a "flat" world (Friedman 2005), since the last decade of the twentieth century it had become hard to imagine the world as anything other than global. However, in the wake of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, Pankaj Ghemawat—NYU professor of global business management—summed up what many were already thinking. In a piece published in the *Harvard Business Review*, Ghemawat wrote that people "are scrambling to adjust to a world few imagined possible just a year ago," namely that the "myth of a borderless world has come crashing down" (2017, 112). While Ghemawat goes on to demonstrate the empirical robustness of globalization, he nonetheless acknowledges the unexpected fragility of the global imaginary.

I wrote and conceptualized much of this book at a time in which the global imaginary seemed much more stable than it does today. While a graduate student at the University of Minnesota during the 2000s, I was immersed in heady discussions about globalization, global governance, and whether the war on terror constituted a rejection—or an expression—of this emerging

global reality. While everyone seemed to be talking about globalization, I found myself puzzled by the fact that globalization remained an agonizingly ambiguous and incoherent concept. Everyone seemed eager to declare the world global, yet reluctant (or unable) to convincingly explain what globalization actually meant.

My dissertation was an attempt to think through this paradox.[1] I argued that efforts to develop a more coherent understanding of globalization ignored the fact that the concept of globalization depended upon deep contradictions and incoherencies. While academic debates about globalization focused on establishing the specific definitions, causalities, time lines, and qualities of globalization, I argued that these discussions depend upon a prior commitment to imagining the world as indisputably global. Take for example the 2010 KOF Index of Globalization, which ranks countries in terms of their levels of globalization.[2] In this account, Belgium and Austria rank first and second. Interestingly, the Cayman Islands rank 187 out of 208 despite housing a significant portion of the world's offshore banking accounts. Afghanistan and Iraq are similarly ranked very low on the globalization index (183rd and 193rd, respectively) despite being focal points in a global war on terror and the sites of massive multinational military interventions. What makes trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, telephone traffic, tourism, internet usage, and the per capita number of McDonald's and Ikea stores KOF indicators of globalization but not, for example, the number of offshore accounts or foreign troops per capita? What does (and does not) count as global, in other words, is simply assumed to be self-evident such that the scholarly concept of globalization becomes an exercise in studying those things already imagined as global (Kamola 2013). The concept of globalization requires already imagining the world as global, and then applying the term "globalization" to reference this imagined object.

The durability of the global imaginary, despite the conceptual shakiness of globalization, explains how the term "globalization" reached such prominence during the 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, over a short period of time, a diverse ecosystem of concepts attempting to understand the world as a single sociopolitical space became quickly replaced by the "epistemic monoculture" of globalization (Santos, Nunes, and Meneses 2008). For example, during the 1970s many scholars within the disciplinary field of International Relations deployed the term "world politics" to theorize and popularize a rethinking of international politics in contrast to the realists' exclusive focus on politics between nation-states and to including accounts of transnational,

domestic, and subnational actors (for example, see Bull 1977). The same year Hedley Bull published *The Anarchical Society*, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye published *Power and Interdependence*. In their introduction, Keohane and Nye (1977, 3) wrote that "we live in an era of interdependence" which, while "poorly understood," is visible in the "widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing" and that "multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations" are shaping the world into a single unit. By the 1990s and early 2000s, however, debates about world politics and complex interdependence became subsumed by the language of globalization. In their introduction to the 2001 revised version of *Power and Interdependence*, for example, Keohane and Nye wrote that their concept of interdependence was simply a precursor to, and a prophetic statement of, globalization. While interdependence was the buzzword of the 1970s, globalization was that of the 1990s (Keohane and Nye 2001, 228). Globalization simply means more interdependence.

I found the epistemic monoculture of globalization particularly troubling because critiques of globalization often simply turned into demands for a different form of globalization, such as "alter-globalization," "global civil society" (Kaldor 2000, 2003), "grassroots globalization" (Appadurai 2000, 2001), "justice globalism" (Steger 2008), or "globalization from below" (Kellner 2002). Globalization, in other words, has become both the horizon upon which to understand contemporary social life as well as its alternative. Conceptualizing political alternatives using the language of globalization is particularly concerning given that the language of globalization has been largely shaped by Western intellectual traditions, "northern epistemologies" (Santos 2007a), and to the exclusion of "southern theory" (Connell 2007a, 2007b).

Whether Brexit, Trump, and the popular reemergence of the ethnonationalist right are historical blips or the beginning of a scary new chapter of human history remains to be seen. This troubling conjuncture, however, does make shockingly visible the fact that the global imaginary has never simply unfolded toward some predetermined, inevitable, and linear future. *Making the World Global* argues that the global imaginary is something produced, over time, and within particular material conditions. As these material conditions change, so too do our shared political, social, and cultural imaginaries. This book examines how relationships between universities, the American state, philanthropic organizations, and international financial organizations created the conditions within which it became common for faculty, students, administrators, parents, policymakers, business leaders,

and funders of higher education to imagine the world as global. Specifically, this book documents how the state-sponsored Cold War university—which imagined the world as an international system composed of discrete nation-states, with the U.S. at its center—was gradually replaced by more marketized forms of academic knowledge production and, in the process, created the conditions within which globalization became a particular object of knowledge.

Making this argument entails examining academic knowledge about globalization from the point of view of reproduction. This includes examining how, over the past decades, the world of American higher education was remade into a certain site for the reproduction of knowledge about the world as global. Those transformations within the American academy, of course, exist in relation to the restructuring of higher education in Africa as well. Placing these worlds within a contrapuntal relationship helps to demonstrate the structured and material hierarchies and asymmetries that continue to organize not only the production of academic knowledge but also what it means to say the world is global.

The Real Labor of Knowledge

This argument stems from the premise that academic knowledge—the books and articles we read and write, classes we take and teach, the conferences we attend, and curricula we develop—are all products of human labor. Like T-shirts, sugarcane, and automobiles, academic knowledge is similarly produced by specific people working within particular material conditions. These material institutions, social relationships, collective practices, and shared meanings constitute the worlds of academic knowledge production.

This theoretical commitment to understanding academic knowledge in terms of social reproduction was something I first learned through practice. As a graduate student during the first decade of the twenty-first century, I came to see my own practices of study, as well as my teaching and professional training, as occurring in relation to political and economic transformations taking place at the University of Minnesota. During this period, the administration was actively engaged in strategic positioning aimed at making the university more competitive, exclusive, and in line with its so-called peer institutions. This involved prioritizing strategic initiatives, often at the expense of students, clerical and service staff, and graduate employees. It in-

cluded closing General College, the primary point of access for first-generation, minority, and lower-income students. Rather than boldly stating an unwavering commitment to valuing employees and prioritizing an inclusive student population, the administration instead adopted cookie-cutter institutional policies aimed at transforming the university into "one of the top three public research universities in the world" (University of Minnesota 2007, 3), all repackaged within its corporate "Driven to Discover" rebranding effort.[3]

Within this context, a vocal and organized group of staff, students, graduate workers, and some faculty mounted considerable political opposition to these changes.[4] We protested the seemingly inevitable neoliberal transformation of our institution, working tirelessly to highlight, politicize, and theorize the university as a political space. We identified how our institution was becoming less concerned with critical, intellectual life and more obsessed with developing alternative revenue streams, climbing the rankings, and establishing corporate relationships. We critiqued these changes as betraying the democratic potential of higher education, as the commercialization of education and intellectual life, and a forfeiture of the democratic mission of public education. We walked the picket lines, organized a graduate employee union, occupied administrative buildings, went on a hunger strike, published articles, and hosted scholar-activist conferences. In doing so, we came to see the University of Minnesota not merely as a space we passed through en route to a degree and a (rapidly vanishing) tenure-track job, but rather as a complicated political institution, one with long and problematic histories built on exclusion, marginalization, and dispossession. We also saw, however, the University of Minnesota as an institution that, despite its many hierarchies, injustices, and pathologies, also contained democratic possibility and opportunity. We learned that political and economic contestations could open alternative possible futures.

Within this political and theoretical cacophony, I still attended my classes, took my comprehensive exams, and arrived at a dissertation topic. Facing funding constraints and departmental pressures to reduce time to degree, I abandoned my plan to complete field research on the relationship between collapsing coffee prices and genocide in Rwanda, and instead turned to the flashy concept of globalization. This subject could be studied from anywhere and did not require extensive field research or language skills. I was informed that one month in South Africa would be more than sufficient in terms of fieldwork. Instead of hurdles, I found that the University of Minnesota, like most American universities, was undergoing a number of reforms and cur-

ricular changes—in line with its strategic planning—aimed at establishing itself as a global university, which included placing considerable institutional support behind faculty and students doing work on globalization. My dissertation research, for example, was funded by the Office of International Programs (OIP), which, originally established in the 1960s to connect the school's strengths in agricultural research with the broader Cold War development agenda, now served as the catchall office for administrating scholarships, student research abroad, overseeing "system-wide international policies and initiatives," and developing "scholarly initiatives of faculty, colleges, and graduate students."[5] Administrators saw OIP as making it possible to "leverage outside grants for faculty to continue international research" (Katzenstein 2009).

Only in retrospect did the obvious become evident: that the dissertation I ultimately wrote could not be disaggregated from the material conditions within which I was writing it. Later, when applying for academic jobs in the years immediately following the 2008 financial crisis, it continued to be abundantly clear that writing about some things (and not others) was directly affecting access to funding, professional opportunities, and full-time employment. However, while these very practical, financial, and strategic relationships profoundly shape what one writes, they often remain unspoken. I came to see the systemic failure to acknowledge the material relationships making academic practices possible as enabling a vision of the academy as a zero point: that detached vantage from which one can falsely claim to look out, describe, and understand a world existing out there (Mignolo 2011, xvii). If we reject the notion of the university as a zero point, and understand colleges and universities as instead worldly institutions, then we must also take seriously the fact that institutions of higher education are always particular, provincial, and embedded sites of political and economic struggle. However, even in such acknowledgment, there remains a deep desire to imagine universities as universal. After all, it is only from such a lofty vantage that one can write, think, study, and teach about the world as an abstraction, knowable from a point of transcendence. It becomes possible to talk about politics, democracy, or class as concepts and ideas, rather than—as we learned on the picket lines—very real, complex, and unsolvable conflicts, with very real consequences, that ultimately cannot be resolved by a well-argued piece of prose or around the seminar table. Imagining the university as a zero point, in other words, makes it possible to fool ourselves that, as students and scholars, we inhabit an immaculate perch that invests our academic practices as

either engaged in an apolitical quest for truth or as the fountain of critical political engagement playing out at the level of ideas.

However, the hard lesson I learned through practice was that universities and colleges do not exist as detached from some real world, but rather are themselves always structured and structuring, produced and reproduced, and profoundly intertwined with the world or, more accurately, within a plurality of worlds. The university is a real world, just like the sweatshop, the plantation, and the shop floor. However, unlike T-shirts, sugarcane, and automobiles, the primary things being reproduced within the worlds of higher education—in addition to disciplined and indebted students, educated citizens, and skilled workers—are knowledge, expertise, and imaginaries. Drawing from this insight, this book does not seek to better conceptualize what globalization actually means, where it comes from, how it works, or whom it affects, but rather to understand why the world came to be imagined as global within the world of American higher education. Therefore, rather than returning to academic debates for insights into how to better conceptualize globalization, *Making the World Global* instead asks, What was the massive expansion of global-speak a symptom of?

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Being on the job market during the years immediately following the 2008 financial crisis meant that, like so many scholars braving this new world of higher education, I spent several years in academic vagabondage. Dartmouth College's Department of Government showed, especially Bill Wohlforth, considerable hospitality to an unemployed spouse. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Jill Morawski, who, as director of Wesleyan University's Center for the Humanities, took a chance on me during a particularly vulnerable time. I will always be grateful to Jill as well as Joseph Fitzpatrick, Matt Garrett, Margo Weiss, and Nima Bassiri for that critical year as an Andrew W. Mellon postdoctoral fellow. The following two years at Johns Hopkins were all the richer, intellectually and personally, because of Alex Livingston, Merike Andre-Barrett, Drew Walker, Kevin Darrow, Lauren Wilcox, Siba Grovogui, Lori Leonard, Bill Connolly, Jane Bennett, Anatoli and Jacqui Ignatov, Casey McNeil, Tim Vasko, and the colleagues at the Friday Africa seminar. Sam Chambers and Rebecca Brown shared unparalleled hospitality, advice, support, professional guidance, and commiseration. The American Council of Learned Societies' New Faculty Fellows program funded these two years in the great city of Baltimore. This fellowship program was designed to help newly minted PhDs weather the post–financial crisis academic environment—a program just as needed today as a decade ago. I am incredibly grateful to the ACLS for this opportunity.

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Introduction

Globalization and the World

> All academics have participated in gatherings . . . where budget constraints, political decisions, promotion opportunities, off-the-cuff ideas, and institutional strategies are coated with the gloss of intellectual necessity and scientific progress. Yet academics write disciplinary history as if such meetings never take place or have any epistemic effect. The denizens of the cave seem indeed quite reluctant to talk about their natural habit, and they much prefer to have others believe that they inhabit a region of pristine ideas and celestial doctrines.
>
> —NICOLAS GUILHOT, "One Discipline, Many Histories" (2011)

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the American intelligence community—which had experienced years of downsizing and retirements—began actively reassessing its "workforce planning" and developing more vigorous strategies for expanding its "human capital" (Negroponte 2006; Nemfakos et al. 2013). American colleges and universities became important partners in developing the "scholars and scholarship" necessary to populate the "national security, military, and intelligence agencies" with those deemed capable of executing the global war on terrorism (Martin 2005, 27). For example, in 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced, in a speech before the Association of American Universities, the creation of the $60 million Minerva Consortium designed to encourage social scientists to engage in research deemed essential for national security (Gonzalez 2014, 93). Similarly, anthropologists were recruited into the Human Terrain System

and deployed alongside soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide information about "local customs, kinship structures, and social conflicts" (Glenn 2007, 1). The National Academies collaborated with the Office of University Programs at the Department of Homeland Security to develop strategies for better integrating colleges and universities into homeland defense (National Research Council 2005). Security agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), actively recruited on campus—including covering the tuition for students possessing "critical skills" and who agreed to serve in the agency after graduation (Giroux 2008, 69–71; see also Golden 2017a, 2017b). New and well-financed academic and professional programs, centers, and institutes on counterterrorism and homeland security began popping up at a wide range of institutions.[1] College and university campuses also became the domestic front in this global war on terrorism, as scholars with dissenting views were harassed and fired, academic freedom curtailed, and foreign students surveilled (Nelson 2004, 359; Carvalho and Downing 2010).

The recruitment of colleges and universities into this "military-industrial-academic complex" (Giroux 2007) is not unique to the post-9/11 world. In fact, these recent collaborations are explicitly modeled on efforts developed during the Cold War (Martin 2005, 27; National Research Council 2005, 9–13; see also chapter 1).[2] Major differences remain, however. During the Cold War, scholars collaborating with the security apparatus were employed to actively reproduce a vision of the world as a strategic space occupied by discrete nation-states, operating within an international system of states, and with the United States at its center. However, by the early twenty-first century, the social sciences were producing large volumes of scholarship dedicated to studying globalization, globality, globalism, global governance, global capitalism, global supply chains, global communications, global trade, global cities, global security, global policy, and global justice. Scholars and students in 2001 were actively engaged in the practice of imagining the world as a vast, interconnected global space. It was within this horizon that President Bush declared before a joint session of Congress, "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda . . . [but] will not end until every terrorist group of global research has been found, stopped and defeated" (Bush 2001). By December 2001, the war on terror had been officially named the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT for short. In 2005 efforts surfaced to rename the conflict the Global Struggle against Violent Extremism" (G-SAVE) (Gardner 2010, 304). While considerable debate existed within the Bush administration about what constituted a war on terrorism, no one doubted that this was a global

war. The assumption that terrorist attacks necessitated a global response did not arrive spontaneously. Rather, by 2001, it had already become common—if not perfectly banal—to claim that the world existed as a single, global space.

This was particularly true within the world of higher education. In fact, the previous year, Justin Rosenberg observed that "we live today in a veritable 'age of globalisation studies,' in which one academic discipline after another is gaily expanding its remit into the 'global' sphere and relocating its own subject matter in a geographically extended, worldwide perspective" (2000, 11). The "age of globalization studies" Rosenberg describes was clearly evidenced in the massive proliferation of academic writing on globalization during the 1990s and early 2000s as well as the rush to create global studies departments and programs; the expansion of book series, edited volumes, readers, journals, conferences, and professional associations dedicated to the topic; and the rewriting of class titles, textbooks, syllabi, and job postings to include a focus on global issues and globalization.[3] This shift in academic focus went hand in hand with institutional efforts to globalize colleges and universities, including expanded opportunities for students to engage in global experiences abroad, developing interdisciplinary programming with a global focus, and creating global partnerships with universities around the world. By 2003, nearly 50 percent of American colleges had mission statements emphasizing teaching students to "thrive in a future characterized by global interdependence" (Hovland 2006, 11).[4] Today, global studies programming exists at more than three hundred American colleges and universities, some with multimillion-dollar facilities and more than a thousand undergraduate and graduate student majors (Steger and Wahlrab 2017, 14–15).

Despite the considerable embrace of globalization studies all around him, Rosenberg remained skeptical. In his seminal 2005 essay "Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem," Rosenberg argued that the academic obsession with globalization was little more than a faddish response to short-term political and economic trends. Globalization theory, he argued, emerged from a specific and fleeting historical moment defined by the "collapse of the Soviet Union," the "rapid restructuring of the international system," and the "crisis of Keynesianism and Bretton Woods" (Rosenberg 2005, 64). These events, he argued, unleashed a wave of "speculative and transnational capital" that washed over the former communist countries like an engorged river crashing upon a "flood-plain." This "conjunction" resulted in the "frenzied expansions, integrations, realignments and transformations that gave the period

its overwhelming theme of spatial change" (64). By the mid-2000s, Rosenberg argued, the specific historical conditions that gave rise to globalization theory had largely subsided, opening a "new conjuncture" in which the concept of globalization "no longer provide[d] an ideologically plausible guide" (63). Considering these developments, the "*concept* of 'globalization'" had to undergo a "historical post mortem" that involved "an *empirical* reassessment of the 1990s" to explain why "'globalization' became the craze that it did" (5; emphasis in original).

Rosenberg's analysis of globalization is compelling, reminding his readers that concepts are always born within certain political and economic moments. In doing so, he warns against projecting the specific present into an inevitable future. However, Rosenberg's analysis misses two crucial points. First, the rise of global studies was not just an academic response to changes taking place (out there) in the world but, closer at hand, an intellectual adaptation to changes taking place within the world of higher education itself. The end of the Cold War not only remade political and economic relationships between the United States, Soviet Union, and the Bretton Woods institutions, but profoundly altered the relationships of academic knowledge production as well.

Second, while Rosenberg accurately acknowledges that the heated academic debates over globalization have largely subsided from their peak in the 1990s and early 2000s, his argument fails to appreciate the thing actually produced during this period: namely, the global imaginary. While Rosenberg focuses on the limitations of the concept of globalization, the 1990s and early 2000s were, even more importantly, a time when it became ubiquitous, and seemingly self-evident, to imagine the world as global. While academics debated whether globalization was new or old, good or bad, strengthening or weakening the state, singular or plural, spatial or temporal, modern or postmodern, these debates all assumed that the concept of globalization more or less accurately represented the world as it was: global. Even as globalization emerged as a hotly contested concept within the academy, and the social sciences in particular, the claim "the world is global" became self-evident and common sense (Kamola 2013).

Making the World Global, therefore, argues that rather than examining the particularities of the post–Cold War conjuncture as the origin of the concept of globalization (as Rosenberg suggests), we instead focus our attention on the question of reproduction. Rather than concept formation, this book

examines knowledge production. In doing so, it becomes possible to ask a different question: How did the world of American higher education become a particular location within which it became widely possible to imagine the world as global? Answering this question requires establishing a different theoretical terrain. To do so, I first examine the difference between globalization as a concept (a term that claims to represent a unique phenomenon) and the global imaginary.[5] I then examine what it means to study the global imaginary as produced and reproduced within the worlds of higher education.

Imagining the World

Writing about the world as global requires imagining an object of study that cannot actually be seen. No individual can stand outside the social whole and represent a single world from some point outside itself. This is because knowledge about the world is always produced within a world. As such, knowledge about the world, as global or otherwise, reproduces the social relationships that make such knowledge possible. The practice of photographing—or imaging—the earth from outer space provides a useful analogy for thinking about knowledge as always reproduced within a world.

For most of human history, images of earth were speculative and limited to artistic representations, given that "earthbound humans" could only experience a "tiny part of the planetary surface" and therefore relied upon "their imagination" to "grasp the whole of the earth" (Cosgrove 2001, ix). The first photographic images containing the planet's curvature were taken in 1935, from manned aerial balloons floating nearly fourteen miles above the earth's surface (Poole 2008, 56–58). During the early years of the space race, the first photos of earth were taken by manned space expeditions within earth's orbit, and therefore presented earth front and center. Starting with Explorer VI in 1959, unmanned spacecraft were able to take black-and-white images of earth from outer space. However, prior to digital photography, these satellites captured photographs on film, developed the film onboard, converted the images into digital information, and relayed the data back to earth, where the pictures were reassembled into grainy, colorless printouts (Poole 2008, 72–73). This changed when the crew of Apollo 8 took the first color image of earth from outside earth's orbit.

The iconic *Earthrise* photo was shot with a 70 mm handheld Hasselblad

FIG. I.1 Bill Anders, *Earthrise*, December 24, 1968.

camera by Apollo 8 astronauts, on December 24, 1968, as their craft circum-navigated the moon looking for possible future landing locations (Maher 2004, 526).[6] Forty years later, astronaut Lovell recalled that "Bill [Anders] had the camera with colour film and a telephoto lens. That is what makes the picture. Earth is about the size of a thumbnail when seen with the naked eye from the Moon. The telephoto lens makes it seem bigger and gives the picture that special quality" (McKie 2008).[7]

Upon returning to earth, the *Earthrise* photo was cropped and dissemi-nated by NASA, with the first widely replicated color print appearing on the cover of *Life* magazine's January 10, 1969, edition, under the issue title "The Incredible Year '68: Special Issue." This image, however, was significantly modified from the original. The lunar surface was cropped out completely, and the earth rotated 120 degrees counterclockwise. The obscured section of

FIG. 1.2 Cover of *Life* magazine, January 10, 1969. Image courtesy of Getty Images, the LIFE Premium Collection.

the planet—directly above the lunar surface in the original—was tucked under the magazine's banner.[8] In other words, the specificity of the shot, made possible during a lunar fly-by, is erased, and the earth comes to stand in for itself. The context that made the image possible is replaced, leaving only the object earth situated against the black background of space. The modified photograph offers an image of earth as a single, self-evident thing, simply observable as it really is, from a point outside itself.

While it might be tempting to read the *Earthrise* photo as simply a more accurate and objective depiction of earth as a physical space, this photograph always represented "an Earth perspective" (Poole 2008, 29).[9] Since its inception, this image has been given meanings based on its worldly contexts. For example, coming at the end of a year that saw students occupy universities from Paris to Mexico City, black power fists raised on the Olympic podium, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, race riots in major American cities, the Tet Offensive, eroding support for the war in Vietnam, as well as Soviet tanks rolling into Czechoslovakia, *Earthrise* helped construct a certain vision of a world that did not actually exist: a "visual confirmation of American democracy's redemptive world-historical mission . . . [ushering in] the universal brotherhood of a common humanity" (Cosgrove 2001, 260). The edited image on the cover of *Life* became an inspiration among antiwar and environmental activists who appropriated the image to conjure an imagined human community without war or ecological devastation (Weir 2007, 106; Poole 2008, 152). To this day, *Earthrise*, along with the subsequent 1972 *Blue Marble* photograph taken by Apollo 17, remain the two most reproduced images of earth. These images are ubiquitous within advertising, publications, and marketing material, and populate the "symbols of 'global' educational, humanitarian, and ecological issues" (Cosgrove 2001, 257).

While *Earthrise* appears to simply capture the world as it is, the very possibility of this image cannot be disaggregated from Cold War politics. After the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the Kennedy administration responded with a commitment to send a man to the moon by the end of the decade. Former Nazi rocket engineers tasked with designing intercontinental ballistic missiles developed the Saturn V rockets that propelled the Apollo missions. The 1968 Apollo 8 launch was initially scheduled to test the lunar landing vehicle within the earth's orbit. However, foreign intelligence sources learned that the Soviet Union was planning a lunar flyby the following year. If successful, this would give Russia another first in the space

race (in addition to first satellite, first living animal, first man and woman in space, and first space walk, among others). The already scheduled Apollo 8 mission was therefore hastily reassigned as a lunar flyby. As a result, it not only became the first manned craft outside earth's orbit but also lacked the landing module mounted on the front of the craft—the presence of which would have blocked the *Earthrise* photo (Poole 2008, 19). The photo was also made possible by the fact that, starting with the Gemini 9 flight in 1966, all manned space expeditions were required to have a media strategy that included capturing photographs and TV footage for public consumption (Poole 2008, 71).[10]

The practice of photographing earth from outer space is not entirely different from imagining the world as global, as practiced within academic print culture.[11] Unable to exit the earth's orbit, colleges and universities are always and already worldly institutions, grounded in long histories and inscribed within vast economic, social, political, and cultural structures and practices. Despite being located within vast overdetermined social relationships, those students, scholars, and administrators inhabiting the world of higher education often imagine universities as extraworldly spaces from which to orbit—and gaze down upon—the world below. In claiming to simply reflect upon the world, seeing it as it actually is, the university often fades from the foreground, cropped out of the imaginary. In this process, colleges and universities increasingly are perceived as ivory towers located above and outside the world. In reality, however, there is no outside from which to view the world as a single thing, global or otherwise. A university is not a capsule floating outside the world's orbit. As such, academic knowledge is never merely a snapshot of the world outside itself.

Making the World Global is an effort to better understand how the world came to be imagined as global from within the world of American higher education. It is a multidecade and multisited story focusing on individual thinkers, the institutions they inhabit, and the imaginaries rendered possible within—and outside of—the American academy. The book starts by examining the reproduction of a national imaginary within American higher education during the Cold War. During this period, considerable effort went into remaking American higher education, and the social sciences particularly, into a space for imagining the world as a system of discrete nation-states. As the colleges and universities changed during the 1980s and 1990s, so too did the knowledge produced within them. An emphasis on area studies and

national development gave way to regimes of knowledge production that favored imagining different worlds as all parts of a same global whole.

Treating higher education as engaged in the practice of world making offers a substantially different analytic than that found in most studies of higher education. The scholarship on higher education often relies upon an "impact model" (Hart 2002, 12) in which the global forces of globalization, marketization, and corporatization come crashing down upon local academic institutions. Two things—the university and globalization—collide and institutions of higher education adapt to this new reality. Such accounts, based on the assumption of linear causality, have little space for understanding the ways in which colleges and universities are actually active participants in the production, and reproduction, of the world.

The World of American Higher Education

What does it mean to study the academy not as an Archimedean point outside the world—as a transcendent tower from which to gaze at a world existing down below—but rather as itself part of the world? What does it mean, in other words, to study the academy as a site of world making? To answer this question, let me first briefly sketch the broad contours of the academic literature on higher education to mark my significant departure.

This book is an intervention into the growing and important literature documenting the corporatization, commercialization, commodification, privatization, and neoliberalization of higher education (Soley 1995; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Aronowitz 2000; Bok 2003; Kirp 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Washburn 2005; Newfield 2008, 2016; Bousquet 2008; Tuchman 2009; Ginsberg 2013; Giroux 2014; Fabricant and Brier 2016). Much of this literature focuses on the crisis of education taking place within American institutions. For example, studies examine how market forces within higher education increase indebtedness, exacerbate social inequality, and undermine academic freedom (Williams 2006; Adamson 2009a; Mullen 2010; Nelson 2010; Mettler 2014). Other studies explore possible political responses to such marketization, including unionization and the cultivation of the academic commons (Martin 1998; Johnson, Kavanagh, and Mattson 2003; Harvie 2004; Berry 2005; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007; Krause et al. 2008b; Edu-factory Collective 2009; Kamola and Meyerhoff 2009). Some of the best studies document the effects market logics have had on particular disciplines,

and most notability the humanities, where austerity and market rationality have been experienced for many decades (Ohmann 1976, 2003; Guillory 1993; Bérubé and Nelson 1995; Readings 1996; Nelson 1997; Newfield 2003; Donoghue 2008; Nussbaum 2010). There is also a growing effort to demonstrate that this crisis is not new, but an extension of the fact that higher education is deeply entwined with a long history of slavery, colonization, imperialism, and other forms of racialized oppression (Dugdale, Fueser, and Alves 2011; Ferguson 2012; Wilder 2013; Harney and Moten 2013; Pietsch 2013; Chatterjee and Maira 2014; Pietsch 2016; Stein and Andreotti 2016). There is a growing amount of literature examining how market and neoliberal logics have had catastrophic effects on national education systems around the world (Chou, Kamola, and Pietsch 2016b; Mittelman 2018), including in Canada (Côté and Allahar 2007), the U.K. (Holmwood 2011; Pritchard 2011; McGettigan 2013), Latin America (Rhoads and Torres 2006), and Africa (Diouf and Mamdani 1994; Zeleza and Olukoshi 2004; Afoláyan 2007; Mamdani 2007). This largely critical body of work exists parallel to a mushrooming practitioner-led literature that examines the relative costs and benefits that accompany the "globalization of higher education" (Odin and Manicas 2004; Suárez-Orozco and Qin-Hilliard 2004; Altbach 2007; Weber and Duderstadt 2008; Altbach, Reisberg, and Rumbley 2009; Bassett and Maldonado-Maldonado 2009; Wildavsky 2010).

Making the World Global intervenes in these important conversations in three specific ways. First, it breaks down the common narrative of American higher education as "a linear movement of progressive expansion, democratization, and inclusion interrupted" by the marketization of higher education (Stein and Andreotti 2016, 5). Most critical studies of American higher education—especially those organized around the narrative of crisis—imagine the post–World War II period as a golden age of American higher education. The democratization and expansion of higher education during this period, the argument goes, became foreclosed upon as the institutions faced wave after wave of commercialization starting in the 1980s.[12] This narrative, however, does injustice to the fact that American higher education has always been closely tied to practices of coloniality, enclosure, and dispossession (Kamola and Meyerhoff 2009; Wilder 2013). Therefore, rather than using the terms of ascent and decline, or democracy and crisis, this book examines American higher education as a contested world or multiple worlds. In doing so, one can trace the massive expansion of American higher education during the Cold War as explicitly tied to American imperialism, including

efforts to defeat popular anticolonial movements. Parallel to its alliance with the military apparatus, however, the world of American higher education also includes considerable contestation and rebellion. The militarized university exists alongside, simultaneous to, and overdetermined by the utopic demands of students, faculty, and campus workers seeking to imagine a world otherwise. In this way, the institutions we inhabit today can be thought of as the amalgamation of nonlinear histories that include slavery and land dispossession, American colonial and imperial expansion, and shifting practices of capitalist accumulation, as well as powerful political, social, and cultural demands for a more just and inclusive world. The university, in other words, is not one thing; it is many, as it contains multitudes. Consequently, the knowledge produced within the academy is not only shaped by these histories but embodies their deep and living contradictions.

Second, while most literature on higher education focuses on the effects of commercialization on students, faculty, staff, disciplines, democracy, and society as a whole, this book looks at how these changing social and economic relations also shape the production and reproduction of academic—and specifically social scientific—knowledge. In doing so, it becomes possible to understand the world of American higher education not simply as the victim of political and economic changes coming from outside, but rather a location within which the world is continually produced and reproduced at the level of the imaginary. This book examines how the transformation of the world of higher education not only affects the academy and the disciplinary practices we engage in, but also the very concepts, terms, and imaginaries that become widespread across many worlds.

And, finally, this study differs from much of the academic literature on higher education in having a much more expansive understanding of what constitutes the world of American higher education. Much of the literature focuses primarily on colleges and universities, and sometimes government policies. However, scholars who narrowly focus on the university often miss the ways in which nonacademic institutions profoundly shape—and are shaped by—the world of higher education. As chapters 2 and 4 on the World Bank as well as chapter 5 on the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) demonstrate, academic ideas often circulate outside the academy, become adopted and incorporated into policy, and then travel back into the world of higher education. In other words, *Making the World Global* demonstrates how the world of American higher education might be perceived in ways profoundly connected with other sites of social production and reproduction.

Even with this expansive understanding of higher education as a contested and material world, I should note that focusing on American institutions does provide a limitation. On the one hand, the American academy is unlike any other university system. It is a vast, heterogeneous mix of public state institutions (including large flagship research institutions, state colleges, technical schools, and community colleges) as well as private research and professional universities, religious colleges, small liberal arts schools, and for-profit institutions. American higher education is not actually a system at all but rather a "historically specific by-product of the incorporation, adaption, and bastardisation of other university models" (Chou, Kamola, and Pietsch 2016a, 4–5). This heterogeneity is exacerbated by the fact that these vastly heterodox institutions engage in a wide range of activities, which may include providing undergraduate, graduate, and professional instruction; facilitating academic research; delivering sporting, cultural, and extracurricular activities; developing housing and retail properties; engaging in urban revitalization; providing continuing education, military training, and extension services; patenting technology and incubating corporate entities; and so on. Clark Kerr (2001), former President of the University of California, famously preferred to talk of a multiversity rather than a university. While this uniquely American model does not exist elsewhere in the world, it is widely appropriated, also in the "spirit of strategic adaptation, emulation, and incorporation" (Chou, Kamola, and Pietsch 2016a, 5). Therefore, the lessons learned examining American higher education might be particular to this world, or they might speak to broader universal—or multiversal—tendencies.

I should also note that focusing on American higher education is not an endorsement of the claim that universities, in the United States and elsewhere, possess a monopoly on the production of knowledge. Today the production of knowledge is widely dispersed, taking place in numerous locations: everything from the mass media, social media, and blogging platforms to prestigious think tanks, philanthropic foundations, corporations, nonprofit organizations, and data-gathering international institutions. For example, as chapters 2 and 4 demonstrate, the worlds of higher education—in the United States and across Africa—are profoundly affected by knowledge produced within the World Bank. Similarly, in recent decades, think tanks have greatly expanded their influence over policy and public discussion, often through producing and disseminating the specialized, expert knowledge once considered the sole domain of higher education institutions (Rich 2004;

McGann and Sabatini 2011). That being said, the university is still unique in this changing terrain of knowledge production. In addition to providing advanced credentialing, universities also cultivate much of the ideas, personnel, and legitimacy that flows across these dispersed networks of knowledge production.

To study how changes in the world of American higher education shape the practice of imagining the world as global, this book focuses on a small handful of elite institutions, some academic (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard Business School, and New York University), others philanthropic (SSRC) and financial (World Bank). All these institutions are located in a handful of East Coast cities: Cambridge, New York, and Washington, DC. Similarly, the central figures around which I have arranged this narrative are all white men (W. W. Rostow, Robert McNamara, Theodore Levitt, A. W. Clausen, Kenneth Prewitt, and John Sexton). This choice of institutions and leading characters is intended to illustrate—and awkwardly draw attention to—the very real hierarchical organization that continues to shape the world of higher education more generally. The American academy is, after all, still very much organized according to gendered and racial hierarchies. According to the American Association of University Professors, for example, men are still more likely to secure tenure and tenure-track positions, with women constituting just 34.6 percent of full-time faculty in 2009 (down from 38.4 percent in 1976). Women only make up a minority of full professors (28 percent), but a majority of academics on contingent contracts. Within college administration, only 23 percent of university or college presidents are women (Curtis 2011). In terms of racial inequity, 84 percent of tenure and tenure-track professors are white (and 60 percent white males) and only 3 and 4 percent, respectively, are black and Hispanic; among university presidents, the vast majority—89 percent—are white (Hamer and Lang 2015, 906).

If American higher education is a world organized over many decades to facilitate the mass reproduction of a global imaginary, and if hierarchy and exclusion profoundly structure this world, what does this tell us about how we have come to imagine the world as global?

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Worlding the Global within American Higher Education

Walter Mignolo rightly argues that "delinking from coloniality" includes recognizing that the "American and the European Academy are not hubs of the decolonial" (2011, xxvii). Why then write a book about how six white males inhabiting elite East Coast academic, philanthropic, and financial institutions reimagined the world? I argue that there is critical work to be done in destabilizing and denaturalizing the imaginaries produced within these institutions. While not necessarily a work of decolonial theory, I hope *Making the World Global* can be read as an ally—or better yet, an accomplice—to the project of decolonizing the university.

Over the past few decades, and in relation to a dramatic expansion of higher education across the Global South, there is a growing demand that scholars around the world actively engage non-Western, and often nonacademic, sources of knowledge.[13] Raewyn Connell (2007a, 2007b), for example, calls for a greater attention to "southern theory"; Canagarajah (2002, 5–6) critiques the academic research article as reducing the Third World to "raw data" that requires "theorization/interpretation by the West to pass into the accepted stock of knowledge"; Portuguese scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues that "another globalization" (2007b, xvii) is possible but requires moving "beyond northern epistemologies" (2007a) and confronting "the massive epistemicide upon which Western modernity built its monumental imperial knowledge" (Santos 2007c, 29; see also Santos 2014). Jean and John Comaroff argue that taking Africa as one's "point of departure" makes it possible to observe the multiple ways in which the European and American worlds are evolving toward Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 2011, 7). I share an enthusiasm for this critical, political, and epistemic project (for example, Kamola 2014a, 2017; el-Malik and Kamola 2017). Why then write a book focusing on the production of knowledge within American universities? Or, more accurately, why focus on those institutions most complicit in concocting, disseminating, normalizing, and reinforcing "theory from the north"? I do so for three reasons.

First, personally and practically, American higher education is the world within which I live and work. American institutions of higher education are where I learned much of what I know, where I've spent the majority of my life, and what provides the food on my table and a roof over my family's head. In this way, I am compelled by Walter Mignolo's call to recognize and affirm one's locality and embodied practices as the sources of all knowledge claims.

Mignolo argues that a decolonial politics rejects "the *hubris of the zero point*," disavowing knowledge claims (including critical ones) that assume "a disembodied subject beyond location" (2011, xvii, xxiv, emphasis in original). Following Mignolo's mantra that "I am where I do and think" (2011, xvi; see also Mignolo 2000), my engagement with the world of American higher education stems primarily from the fact that I come from this particular world. In fact, everything from how my waking day is spent to what I think (and how) is shaped by the world of American higher education. I sincerely hope that doing my "homework" (Gusterson 2017)—that is, examining the networks of power, influence, and intellectual reproduction that shape the world in which I live—makes it possible to see American higher education not as a locationless platform from which to know the world, but rather as a complex and particular site in which worlds are produced and reproduced, including at the level of the imaginary. Academic knowledge, even if we might desire to claim otherwise, is produced within certain institutions and under specific conditions. Acknowledging this requires, for me, being attentive to the ways in which American higher education has a long history closely entwined with coloniality, imperialism, and finance capital.

Second, as American universities are being emulated and exported around the world, a small handful—the Harvards, MITs, and New York Universities—stand in as the prototypes of the American academy. However, these elite institutions constitute only a small handful of the more than 4,700 post-secondary institutions in the United States.[14] This book seeks to understand how a handful of schools came to be imagined as the totality of American higher education. In asking this question, it becomes evident that the institutions that now constitute the export face of American higher education are themselves coproduced within their shifting entwinements with the American military apparatus and vast amounts of private, and philanthropic, funding.

And, finally, studying the world of American higher education makes it possible to see the global not as a fact but rather as a place-in-the-world. On this point I am deeply influenced by James Ferguson's masterful book *Global Shadows*, which starts with the argument that the tendency to imagine Africa almost exclusively in terms of "crisis," as a "failure," and a "problem" to be solved, has caused scholars to abstain from writing about Africa as a whole, preferring instead "detailed ethnographic knowledge of local communities" (Ferguson 2006, 2–3). He argues that, rather than shying away from writing about Africa, scholars should instead think of Africa as a category "through

which a 'world' is structured" (5). Africa is, in other words, a way of understanding the world produced through the various, heterogeneous, contested, and deeply political practices that surface when one tries to perform the impossible—that is, imagine a diverse, multifaceted, and heterogeneous continent as a coherent whole. *Making the World Global* extends Ferguson's argument to think of the global as also a place-in-the-world. After all, the global, like Africa, is a "historically and socially constructed" category, created in ways that are "in some sense arbitrary" (5). Like Africa, the global is a meaningful and very real term. Businesspeople, politicians, and citizens make decisions about production, governance, migration, warfare, regulation, trade, investment, immigration policy, and military intervention based on how they imagine the world as global. And like Africa, the global is an imaginary constructed and circulated through asymmetrical economic and political relations. However, unlike the category Africa—which Ferguson points out structures a world that is geographically confined and defined in terms of "lacks, failures, problems, and crises" (8)—the global structures a world imagined as transparent, self-evident, geographically boundless, and brimming with (real or potential) abundance and opportunity. Ferguson correctly contends that "we can no longer avoid talking about 'Africa' if we want to understand the wider order of the 'world'" (7). I would add that we also cannot understand the "world" without also understanding "the global" as a particular constructed imaginary.

To study the global as an imaginary, one made possible through the worldly practices of knowledge production, each of the following chapters examines different knowledge producers and the material locations where such production takes place. The book does not claim that these locations and individuals are the originators of such imaginaries. There is no ground zero in the production of the global imaginary. Rather, the production and reproduction of a global imaginary within American higher education emerged over a long period of time, often in asynchronous and haphazard ways. For example, in interviews with some founding thinkers of globalization, Steger and James (2015) find no single answer to the question of when and why their interviewees embraced the language of globalization. For George Modelski, the insight came out of his work on macro-world organization. Arjun Appadurai came across the term "globalization" in the popular press after the fall of the Berlin Wall, around the same time he was invited by Mike Featherstone to contribute to what became the groundbreaking *Theory, Culture and Society* special issue "Global Culture." Growing up speaking French,

Saskia Sassen was first inspired by the French term *globale* but began using the word "globalization" "because it seemed to be an emerging term in the academy. If you wanted to be efficient in a short conversation, or on a panel, or over lunch, or over drinks, 'globalization' was the term you used" (James and Steger 2014b, 462). The following chapters, therefore, should not be read as a linear story, but rather as preliminary sketches covering a handful of vignettes within a vast, complex, and overdetermined set of social relations.

The chapters, however, might also be read contrapuntally—not only with each other, but also with the institutional worlds that the reader inhabits. Edward Said argues that texts cannot be treated as independent of the "certain legal, political, economic, and social constraints" that shape their "production and distribution" (1983, 32). To read a text as coming from a world, Said suggests a contrapuntal method—one that begins by identifying that which is absent or obfuscated within a text and, in bringing it to the fore, juxtaposes these retrieved absences against the original, surface-level reading.[15] Said takes the concept of the contrapuntal from music; the contrapuntal occurs when "various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege given to any particular one" (1993, 51). The existence of different themes allows for one to see both the structure of the music and the variation: "in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work" (Said 1993, 51). The contrapuntal method, therefore, allows one to highlight the particularities as well as the structural ordering of one's object of study. A contrapuntal method does not simply argue for plural and relativistic reading—it does not simply "valorise plurality"—but is instead "a plea for 'worlding' the texts, institutions and practices, for historicizing them, for interrogating their sociality and materiality, for paying attention to the hierarchies and the power-knowledge nexus embedded in them" (Chowdhry 2007, 105).

In reading each chapter against one another, and the book against the reader's own institutional practices, we might begin to see the particularities (as well as the reoccurring structures)—the themes and variations—that organize the worlds of higher education. By understanding academic knowledge as produced and reproduced within such worlds, we are not only better positioned to understanding what we mean when we say the world is global but, more importantly, able to see globalization not as an external force but rather an imagined relation reproduced within our daily activity. Doing so creates an opportunity not only to imagine the world otherwise but also to

imagine, design, and create the kinds of relations, institutions, and practices that might make new imaginaries possible.

Chapter Outline

This book is divided into three sections. The first section examines the production of social scientific knowledge during the decades following World War II. During this period, the Cold War university worked closely with philanthropic organizations, the federal government, and financial institutions to imagine a world divided into nation-states, organized into an international system, and with the United States at its center. Chapter 1 focuses on how the federal government and philanthropic organizations profoundly transformed American colleges and universities into exceptionally well-funded strategic reserves of knowledge used to manage the rise of American empire. Faced with Soviet competition and decolonization across the Third World, the new fields of area studies, international studies, and International Relations received unprecedented funding. As exemplified in the work of W. W. Rostow, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and faculty at MIT's Center for International Studies (CENIS), the national imaginary became the foundation of modernization theory. The chapter demonstrates how, throughout Rostow's writings, the world became imagined as composed of discrete nation-states, each with its own trajectory toward Western-style democratic and capitalist modernization. This national imaginary circulated widely within the academy, the federal government, and development agencies, and shaped not only how the world was imagined but also America's strategic posture toward the rest of the world.

Chapter 2 examines how a Rostowian national imaginary moved into the World Bank in the late 1960s, and the effect this had on shaping higher education policies across the Third World. Trained at Harvard Business School and serving as an Air Force statistician during World War II, Robert McNamara became influenced by modernization theory while in the Johnson administration. During his tenure as president of the World Bank, McNamara not only greatly expanded the institution's lending capacity but also transformed the World Bank into one of the largest producers of economic knowledge. Reproducing a national development imaginary, McNamara profoundly shaped World Bank policy toward newly independent African

countries, including in the realm of education. Seeing education—including higher education—as central to national development, the McNamara Bank made funding African universities a priority. One unintended consequence was the creation of African universities as vibrant centers of anticolonial intellectual thought aimed at imagining the world otherwise.

The second section examines early efforts to reimagine the world as global within business schools and the World Bank. Chapter 3 situates Theodore Levitt's 1983 *Harvard Business Review* article "The Globalization of Markets"—widely credited with popularizing the term "globalization"—within his general approach to marketing. Levitt argued that marketing professionals should not simply ask customers what they want but cultivate a "marketing imagination"—namely, the ability to imagine what the customer wants, even before he or she articulates these desires. Understood in this way, Levitt's article on globalization can be read less as an argument about whether the world is global than as a marketing manifesto encouraging companies to imagine the world as if it were global. The chapter examines how Levitt's global imaginary spread rapidly throughout the business world such that companies began to adapt their marketing strategies. In a very short period, globalization became a powerful heuristic through which business leaders and professional marketers reimagined foreign markets as already prone to, and desirous of, American products.

Chapter 4 returns to the World Bank, examining how the national development imaginary gave way to reimagining the world as a single financial market. McNamara's successor—former Bank of America president A. W. Clausen (1981–86)—arrived at the World Bank with a banker's global imaginary, which shaped all aspects of the institution's response to the Third World debt crisis. The proliferation of structural adjustment, and an emphasis on calculating rate of return, brought about dramatic changes to the world of higher education. Rather than seeing higher education as an essential component of national development, the Clausen Bank envisioned higher education as a market relationship, a private good—"human capital"—quantifiable as the difference in wages between those with and without education. This reimagining of the value of higher education justified a radical defunding of higher education across Africa and, consequently, the further solidification of the United States as an unrivaled center of academic knowledge production.

The final section examines how ideas about globalization, first produced within the business schools and cultivated within the worlds of business, fi-

nance, and development, returned to American universities as the very logic by which higher education is marketed, funded, and administered. Chapter 5, for example, examines how American social sciences adopted the language of globalization during the 1990s within the context of increasing economic pressures on post–Cold War higher education. As the federal government and philanthropic foundations pulled back funding, many colleges and universities began pursuing investments from private donors to offset these considerable losses. Chapter 5 focuses specifically on the debates within the SSRC during the mid-1990s. Publicly, SSRC president Kenneth Prewitt explained the council's shift away from area-based grant funding as driven by the fact that the world was now global, and therefore the institution must change to reflect changing times. However, internal discussions make it clear that the SSRC was facing considerable financial difficulty and saw this reprioritization as a way to please their stakeholders and coinvestors. This chapter contextualizes the rise of global studies as itself a symptom of a changing political economy of higher education.

Chapter 6 examines the rise of study abroad, the practice of recruiting foreign students, and the creation of branch campuses as various strategies for globalizing American universities and colleges. Often talked about as inevitable responses to the fact of globalization, this chapter argues that these practices should instead be read as institutional adaptations to the economic pressures facing the world of higher education. The chapter focuses on the effort by New York University, under President John Sexton, to transform itself into a global network university, through the creation of branch campuses in Abu Dhabi and Shanghai. This chapter identifies an edu-theological global imaginary guiding Sexton's thinking about higher education. Sexton portrays research universities, and NYU particularly, as "ecumenical gifts" to the world, facilitating a new age of cosmopolitan interconnection. This global imaginary, however, renders invisible the very real exploitations that made the building of NYU's global branch campus in Abu Dhabi possible. The chapter argues that the rhetoric around global higher education often fails to reveal the financial incentives at work in shaping how universities imagine, value, fund, and intellectually engage their global commitments.

Making the World Global concludes by arguing that if knowledge about the world is shaped by the material conditions under which such knowledge is produced, then knowing the world differently involves not only developing new concepts, theories, and terminologies but also—and even more funda-

mentally—creating new conditions of academic knowledge production. The conclusion calls for developing a broader cartography and ecology of academic knowledge production, from which it might be possible to produce new ways of knowing the world—ways of imagining the world that resist the assumption that the world is already, self-evidently global.

Notes toward an Investigation (Optional)

While it might be tempting to read *Making the World Global* as an empirical or historical story, I consider it a work of theory, constructed through close—and symptomatic—readings of texts produced within particular conjunctures.[16] While I hope the contours become evident as the book unfolds, I am aware that the broader theoretical argument might remain entangled within a thicket of names, institutions, and events. For those interested in taking the scenic route, a saunter among the trees, please feel free to skip this section. However, for those interested in a more clearly blazed trail through the forest, and who don't mind the mixed metaphor, this section offers a quick look under the hood at the book's theoretical underpinnings.

In answering the question "What is global-speak a symptom of?" the common answer would probably be something like this: growing academic attention to globalization during the 1990s occurred because the world was becoming increasingly global. This answer, however, assumes that what is (and is not) global remains largely self-evident. This assumed self-evident quality of the global rests upon the image of the world as a finite spherical space being drawn ever closer together. In other words, the claim that the world is global depends upon the spatial metaphor of the world as a globe.

This book instead argues that globalization should be studied from the point of view of reproduction. I draw this distinction, between a spatial metaphor and a point of view of reproduction, from Althusser's (2001a) essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes towards an Investigation)." This essay, written in France months after the university occupations of May 1968, examines—among other things—the changing social function "the School" plays in shaping how people imagine the world around them. The essay rejects the economistic Marxist descriptions of ideology, in which economic production (the base) determines all aspects of the superstructure. This essay instead lays out a framework for studying sociopolitical relations as complexly overdetermined. To this end, Althusser critiques the base-

superstructure model—in which capitalist production is directly and causally responsible for reproducing all aspects of social life (the family, religion, the state, etc.)—not because he finds this analysis incorrect, but because it depends upon a limited "spatial metaphor: the metaphor of a topography" (Althusser 2001a, 90). The base-superstructure metaphor assumes, in other words, that a building's foundation determines the shape of all subsequent floors. While Althusser states that this spatial metaphor reveals many important things about the structure of capitalism (such as the fact that "the base . . . in the last instance determines the whole edifice"), it simultaneously limits how the world can be known as a social whole.[17] Althusser argues instead for "go[ing] beyond" the descriptive metaphor of topography in favor of adopting "*the point of view of reproduction*" (91–92, emphasis in original). To do this, he proposes examining how different registers and apparatuses overdetermine each other to reproduce a social whole. Rather than a linear understanding of causality (i.e., base determines superstructure), Althusser argues that the social whole is instead a constantly shifting assemblage of semiautonomous social registers immanent to each other. Different apparatuses and registers, what we might call worlds, constantly overdetermine each other in ways that are organized by the relations of production but not solely determined by them. A certain college or university, for example, is an institution that shapes the kinds of practices possible within it. It is not, however, simply one thing but rather an overdetermined set of relationships between disciplines, departments, students (and families), faculty, administration, alumni, donors, workforces, architecture, curricular decisions, branding, endowments, professional organizations, and geographical location, all shaped by—but not reducible to—broader trends within the political economy of higher education, and the world economy more generally. Overdetermined structure, in other words, is immanent, contested, contradictory, and lived.

Therefore, examining globalization from the point of view of reproduction requires treating globalization or globalism not as simply an ideology reflecting specific class interests (for example, Rupert 2000; Steger 2002) but rather as "*the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence*" (Althusser 2001a, 109, emphasis in original). Produced within the world of higher education, globalization represents an imaginary relationship reproduced by individuals as they collectively ascribe meaning to their social world (the entirety of which cannot be seen, and therefore must be imagined). Because the social whole cannot be objectively seen from some

outside vantage point, subjects must imagine themselves in relation to their real conditions. Althusser illustrates this act of reproduction using the Pascalian example of a person attending church who kneels, prays, makes the sign of the cross, and confesses. It is not some preexisting faith in God, or a false opiate fabricated by the ruling class, that motivates these very real activities but rather the practices themselves, as organized by the apparatus of the Church, which produce belief in an imagined God (Althusser 2001a, 114).

Applying this argument to globalization, one can understand the global imaginary as having "*a material existence*" since it always "exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices" (Althusser 2001a, 112, emphasis in original). In other words, within the apparatus of the university, individuals engage in the material practices that reproduce an imagined relationship to the world as global. Like faith in God, understanding the world as global does not originate from some transcendent truth learned from standing outside the world, but rather from the repeated practices taking place within the apparatus of the university. This book attempts to demonstrate how changes within the world of higher education created the conditions within which it became possible to imagine one's relationship to the world as global. Rather than kneeling, bowing, and praying, for academics and students our daily activities include attending classes, meetings, and talks, applying for grants, writing papers, teaching, studying, and all the other practices that constitute the world of higher education. It is through these changing practices that we reproduce a global world at the level of the imaginary.

I realize that many readers might be skeptical of using the controversial Althusser, and his long out-of-fashion version of structural Marxism, as a guide for understanding the reproduction of national and global imaginaries within American higher education. I hope that the rest of the book, taken as a whole, demonstrates how this approach—and the productive tensions implied within it—might facilitate efforts to understand, contextualize, reimagine, and remake the institutions of higher education within which we live and work. For those who remain skeptical, I have two points of clarification. First, my reading of Althusser is far from conventional. I contend that by "reading Althusser as Althusser reads Marx," it becomes possible to see the limitations within Althusser's own theoretical apparatus as shaped by the conjuncture within which he wrote. If one takes Althusser's essay, originally written within the contested post–May 1968 French university, and rereads it today within the contemporary American neoliberal university,

it becomes possible to identify a different Althusser than the one so widely critiqued during the 1970s and 1980s (for example, Thompson 1995; Rancière 2011). This Althusser is flexible enough to appreciate the multiple, competing, contingent, singular, and contested worlds that exist as overdetermined relationality. In doing so, he presents a theoretical approach that, on the one hand, insists upon the centrality of capitalist accumulation while, on the other hand, avoids the economistic readings of Marx that remain very much prevalent among Marxist scholars as well as their critics. This new Althusser offers a decentered, diffused, immanent, and infinitely contradictory understanding of capitalism. This vision of overdetermined complexity, I argue, destabilizes any claims that the production of knowledge takes place at some point outside the world.

Whether his focus is Lenin (Althusser 2001b), Marx (Althusser and Balibar 1999), Machiavelli (Althusser 1999), Rousseau (Althusser 2007), Montesquieu (Althusser 2007), or even himself (Althusser 2003, 226), Althusser commonly employs the method of reading a theorist within the conjuncture in which they wrote. Doing so makes it possible to identify the limits, absences, and possibilities made possible by that conjuncture. *Making the World Global* models this method, organizing each chapter around reading the work of one individual, and using this rereading to map the conjunctures that make such knowledge possible.

Second, Althusser's analysis pushes back against the notion that political change comes from academics engaged in radical spontaneity originating from elsewhere. Arjun Appadurai, for example, also called for a politics of reimagining globalization. He rightfully claims that "*the imagination as a social process*" is "central to all forms of agency" and therefore "the key component of the new global order" (Appadurai 1996, 31). To explain this process, he articulates the contemporary imagined worlds as shaped by five "global cultural flows"—ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes (Appadurai 1996, 33–43). Making the world differently therefore requires imagining it differently. To this end, Appadurai calls on academics to reimagine globalization in ways that avoid disciplinary constraints and area studies limitations while reinvigorating an analysis of locality. However, this urgent call assumes that political change takes place when individual academics choose to adopt new imaginaries (Appadurai 2000, 3; see also Appadurai 2001). While Appadurai focuses on the academy as one important location for imagining globalization differently and calls upon academics to craft their contributions in ways that might assist grassroots

activism, he nonetheless assumes that poverty and political struggle exists outside the academy. Conceptualized as privileged and nonmarginal, academics in Appadurai's account occupy an elite position from which to assist a politics existing elsewhere. Appadurai's call to imagine globalization differently, however, ignores the fact that the anxiety of falling wages, workplace speed-up, and job precarity is rampant not only outside the university but within it as well. The existing political economy of higher education, with its increasingly competitive job market, debt, precarity, and greater pressure to publish or perish, often punishes those who might otherwise wish to apply their skills to globalization from below. Except for an established academic elite, the choice to develop new global imaginaries outside disciplinary publishing is a difficult choice, with very real consequences. This book, therefore, exists at this tension: a desire for a radical and spontaneous new global imaginary and a caution that what appears individual and agentic is also already structured. This tension is not merely a conceptual academic debate about structure versus agency, but rather an unanswerable political question.

As Justin Rosenberg observes in his classic essay "Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem," one of Althusser's biggest failures—in addition to his "overcomplicated, even tortured" language—was an inability to demonstrate how to engage in a "historical method of conjunctural analysis" (Rosenberg 2005, 32). *Making the World Global* is an effort to take up this challenge and—from within the limits of the neoliberal American academy—use Althusser's insights to rethink why, and how, the world became imagined as global. Because the practices that made this book possible are simultaneously particular and structural, both my own and widely shared, I see the test of this book as whether readers can identify their own institutions and conjunctures reflected here. In doing so, we might begin to collectively see those broader dynamic structural relations—if not specific institutional contexts—responsible for reproducing knowledge about our world. And, in doing so, we might begin to intentionally construct counterinstitutions within which it might be possible to imagine the world otherwise.

Notes

Preface

1 The dissertation has since been published as a series of articles and book chapters (Kamola 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014b, 2016).

2 This annual measure of globalization, published by ETH University, Zurich, Switzerland, can be found online (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch). Other quantifications of globalization, with similar lists of global measures, can be found in "Measuring Globalization" (2001), Heshmati (2006), "The Globalization Index" (2007), and Vujakovic (2009).

3 In 2005 the University of Minnesota Board of Regents adopted a strategic plan declaring: "The University of Minnesota's vision is clear—to transform this great institution into one of the world's top three public research universities within a decade" (University of Minnesota 2007, 3). The institution measured its progress in meeting this goal by compiling a list of ten "comparative group institutions" (e.g., University of California, Los Angeles; University of Michigan; University of Wisconsin; Ohio State) and four "pillars" of comparison—"Exceptional Students," "Exceptional Faculty and Staff," "Exceptional Organization," and "Exceptional Innovation." The institution then compiled qualitative and quantitative data to measure how well Minnesota compared to its peer institutions along these four categories. The number of students studying abroad, international students enrolled, and international scholars on campus were all considered metrics used to establish the category of "Exceptional Students" (University of Minnesota 2007, 35–41).

4 See, for example, Pason (2008), Kamola and Meyerhoff (2009).

5 These quotes are taken from the OIP website. By the time I was finishing my degree in the late 2000s, OIP officially announced that, as part of broader institutional transformations, its new focus to be "preparing global citizens." OIP, last accessed in 2009, http://www.international.umn.edu/ (no longer active). OIP has since become the Global Programs and Strategy Alliance, or GPS (Kamola 2014b, 528). GPS

currently defines its mission as being "the driving force for the University of Minnesota in globalizing teaching, learning, research, and engagement." See "About the GPS Alliance," GPS Alliance, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, accessed October 9, 2018, https://global.umn.edu/about/.

Introduction

1   These programs ranged from Kaplan University's certificates in terrorism and national security management to Syracuse University's Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Center on Terrorism at John Jay, and "homeland security programs at Johns Hopkins, MIT, and so on" (Martin 2005, 29).

2   In introducing the Minerva Consortium, Secretary Gates (2008) stated quite explicitly that this project was based "on the success we had in the Cold War. During that period, we built up the Department of Defense's—and the nation's—intellectual capital with new research centers such as RAND and new mechanisms like . . . the National Defense Education Act."

3   Prior to the mid-1990s, only a handful of academic books and articles took globalization as their object of study. However, between 1993 and 1996 the yearly output of articles on globalization quadrupled and saw a "steep upwards trend" stabilizing at "about 1,000 to 1,200 publications per year" (Busch 2007, 23; see also Busch 2000; Guillén 2001, 241; James and Steger 2014a, 418–19). Of articles listed within the Factiva database, the usage of globalization rose from two mentions in 1981 to 57,235 references in 2001 (Chanda 2008, x, 246, cited in Steger 2008, 179). Only 0.4 percent of all the material with the search term "global" was published between the years 1906 and 1989—the remaining 99.6 percent was published since 1989 (according to a search of the ABI/INFORM database, covering newspapers, journals, magazines, and other documents, conducted March 2013). The Proquest Dissertations and Theses index similarly shows that the annual number of dissertations on globalization increased from single digits in the 1990s to 140 by 2007 (Kamola 2010, 23). For similar results calculated using Google Ngram and JStor searches, see Steger and Wahlrab (2017, 26, 58).

4   Of the colleges examined, schools preferred "global" over "international," "linked global learning with diversity and multiculturalism," and focused on "responsible citizenship, social justice, and leadership." Many schools opted for "global" over "international" because it was deemed "trendier" (Hovland 2006, 12).

5   For a discussion of how concepts are understood in the social sciences, see Goertz (2006) and Sartori (1970).

6   *Earthrise* is officially known as NASA photograph AS08-14-2383.

7   *Earthrise* was taken a few hours before the crew of Apollo 8 televised grainy live images of the lunar surface to an international audience of more than one billion

viewers. This broadcast, the most-viewed broadcast of the time, was accompanied by the three Apollo astronauts reciting the first twelve lines from Genesis (Zimmerman 1998, xi; Maher 2004, 526).

8   Similarly, the image used for the 1969 Earth Day flag took the *Earthrise* photo but added an artistic rendering of swirling clouds to make the earth circular (Weir 2007, 106).

9   It is useful to draw a distinction between "earth," "world," and "globe." According to Cosgrove, each possesses a "distinct resonance": earth "is organic; the world denotes rootedness, nurture, and dwelling for living things"; world "has more of a social and spatial meaning" and "implies cognition and agency . . . humans go 'into the world,' they may become 'worldly'; they create life-worlds or worlds of ideas, worlds of meaning"; and globe "associates the planet with the abstract form of spherical geometry, emphasizing volume and surface of material constitution or territorial organization. Unlike the earth and the world, the global is distanciated as a concept and image rather than directly touched or experienced" (Cosgrove 2001, 7–8).

10   Starting in the mid-1960s, there was growing public demand for pictures of earth from space. During the early years, NASA discouraged astronauts from taking pictures that were not part of the operation (Poole 2008, 67–71). However, the public began clamoring for pictures of earth. Most notably, Stewart Brand, "after ingesting Haight-Ashbury hallucinogens in February of 1966," began to publicly ask "why we as a culture had not yet seen a photograph of the entire planet" (Maher 2004, 529). He believed that if a "color picture of the whole Earth" existed "no one would ever perceive things in the same way" (Maher 2004, 529). He produced hundreds of buttons with the simple question, "Why Haven't We Seen a Photograph of the Whole Earth Yet?" He sold them to "college students at Berkeley, Stanford, Harvard, and MIT. He also mailed them to members of Congress, United States and Russian scientists, and to Marshall McLuhan and Buckminster Fuller. Soon, Brand's buttons were visible on shirt collars and lapels around Washington, D.C., and at NASA" (Maher 2004, 529).

11   Benedict Anderson (2002), of course, argued that the rise of print culture played a critical role in the nation becoming an imagined community. This book argues that changes in academic print culture during the 1990s and early 2000s might similarly explain the rise of the global imaginary.

12   Boggs and Mitchell (2018, 434) have criticized this line of argument as the "crisis consensus," namely, the common claim that the university is "a good in itself" that nonetheless finds its progressive social function hindered by increased exposure to corrosive external and market threats. Calls to save the university from crisis, the authors argue, ignore the fact that for many the university has always been in crisis.

13   Within the field of International Relations (IR), for example, there is also a growing and fast-accelerating interest in postcolonial theory, decoloniality, global IR,

and the politics of worlding and world making. The 2015 ISA conference was called "Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," with a presidential speech (Amitav Acharya) and program chairs (Pinar Bilgin and L. H. M. Ling) who have written extensively on the need to examine the hierarchies and asymmetries involved in the academic production of knowledge. This interest is further evidenced in the success of Routledge's *Worlding beyond the West* series (Tickner and Waever, eds.). Vitalis's stunning book, *White World Order, Black Power Politics* has renewed interest in critical archaeologies of the discipline, demonstrating how the history of International Relations is intertwined with the maintenance and reinforcement of racial and colonial orders (Vitalis 2015; see also Oren 2003; Guilhot 2011b; Hobson 2012; Parmar 2012).

14   "Fast Facts: Educational Institutions," National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, accessed October 2015, http://nces.ed.gov /fastfacts/display.asp?id=84.

15   For example, in his analysis of Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*, Said hones in on a few scattered passages that hint at Mr. Bertram's Caribbean plantations and the slave labor making the idyllic British manor possible. In juxtaposing the slave plantation against the prim and proper Victorian morality vigorously defended within the novel, Said (1993, 84–97) highlights the imperial conditions making the novel, and therefore imperial culture, possible. Said not only helps understand how texts might be understood as worldly, but also how one can see structural tendencies within a careful study of particular works.

16   Symptomatic reading is a method of reading that pays careful attention to understanding how a text was produced within a particular set of social relations. Althusser argues that Marx's most significant theoretical innovation was conceptualizing knowledge as production. For Marx (and Althusser), knowledge does not simply reflect an already existing world but is itself an effect of social reproduction taking place within a particular conjuncture. Contradictions and tensions existing within these social relations can be read as embodied within a text itself (Althusser and Balibar 1999; Kamola 2012).

17   The social whole, or (global) structure, is the totality of social relationships and their effects. For Althusser, the social whole is the mode of production, and can be analytically divided into different registers that overdetermine one another. The social whole, however, cannot be seen or known in itself because the production of knowledge about the social whole is itself reproduced within the very overdetermined structures being studied.