

The Making and Unmaking of
Spain's Atlantic Empire

THE
NEW
KINGDOM
OF
GRANADA

Santiago Muñoz-Arbeláez

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Spain's Atlantic Empire

SANTIAGO MUÑOZ-ARBELÁEZ

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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Colonialism partly consists of a flawed vocabulary to speak of non-European societies. The Spanish established a rigid taxonomy that encompassed and simplified Indigenous societies for legal and administrative convenience. All Native societies of the Americas could be called *indios*, a term that re-created medieval imaginaries of the peoples living on the other side of the world, while their leaders were deemed *caciques*, which the Spanish took from the Caribbean and applied indiscriminately to refer to Indigenous authorities throughout the continent. *Indio* was often accompanied by other adjectives, like *amigo* (friend or ally), *caribe* (cannibal, enemy), *de paz* or *de guerra* (of peace or of war, depending on whether they were waging war against the Spanish), *ladino* (meaning “latinized,” referring to someone who speaks Spanish), *bozal* (someone who does not speak Spanish), or even *útil* (useful). Those adjectives frequently clarified their relationship to and status vis-à-vis the empire. Some of that blunt colonial vocabulary survives today in terms like *Indians*, *natives*, *tribes*, and *chief*.

I use the terms *Indigenous* and *Native* to refer to the many peoples and ethnic groups aboriginal to the Americas. By contrast, “*indio*” refers to the demeaning colonial imaginary and stereotype that pigeonholed Indigenous peoples into a common term and assigned them a legal identity. *Indigenous* and *Native* will be capitalized, just like *Spanish*, *Iberian*, and *European*, which refer to the peoples aboriginal to Spain, Iberia, and Europe. In translated quotes from primary sources, I keep the original terms in Spanish to refer to Indigenous peoples (often *indio* or *naturales*, along with qualifying adjectives).

I use *New Kingdom of Granada* and *New Kingdom* as synonyms, for convenience; both were common expressions in the sixteenth century. In contrast, I avoid using *New Granada*, which became prevalent in the eighteenth century after the establishment of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (first established in 1717 and then reestablished in 1739).



FIGURE 1.1. The New Kingdom of Granada, sixteenth century. Map by Santiago Muñoz-Arbeláez, based on Herrera Angel, "Poblamiento," 68.

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INTRODUCTION

A Kingdom in the Mountains

This book is an ethnography of the building of empire in a place where the odds were stacked against it. In the early sixteenth century, the mountainous landscapes of what is today central Colombia—a remarkably diverse site that extended over three different Andean ranges and was delimited by the Caribbean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the rainforests of the Amazon and Orinoco river valleys—were inhabited by myriad ethnic groups with different cultural backgrounds who spoke hundreds of different languages (figure I.1). They were roughly divided between the Muisca peoples of the high plateau of the eastern Andean range, where power was tied to kinship, and the lowlands, occupied by peoples of Carib and other linguistic families, where leadership was gained through strength in battle. After the Spanish invasion in the 1530s, conquistadors named these lands the New Kingdom of Granada—el Nuevo Reino, the New Kingdom.¹ Until then, Indigenous inhabitants had no label to define the area as a whole; rather, they conceived of their identities and territories at smaller geographic and political scales. By introducing this term, officials set out to remake those diverse Indigenous areas into a “kingdom”—a centralized political entity that, paradoxically, did not have a king of its own but was rather an appendage of the Spanish monarchy. In the century that followed, roughly between 1530 and 1630, a range of people from Indigenous, European, and mixed backgrounds designed and co-produced an administrative schema to incorporate that ethnically diverse and politically decentralized network of Indigenous groups into the Hispanic monarchy under a unified political and economic structure. The result was a distinctive political system in the Iberian Atlantic. *The New Kingdom of Granada* is the history of the making of that kingdom, both as a political ideal, one that people could debate, praise, and

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condemn, and as an infrastructure of governance—a spatial system that regulated the movement of people, information, and things.

The book traces the consolidation of this early modern political system as it strove to transform Indigenous lives and landscapes from the 1530s, when Spaniards first arrived in this area, to 1630, when the kingdom culminated a long-awaited expansion. I argue that after a painstaking, century-long process, an unstable kingdom was woven into the contentious geographies of the northern Andes through the often tense and violent intercultural interaction between peoples of Indigenous and European descent. Between the 1530s and 1550s, imperial officials installed an infrastructure of governance both grounded on and modifying the Muisca's organizational logic: a system of cities, villages for "indios," and *encomiendas*—grants of Indigenous labor—that absorbed Indigenous ethnic divisions into the monarchy's institutional framework and installed a system of managing justice through flows of paper in which letters connected vassals to the king.

Santa Fe de Bogotá, the kingdom's capital, was located far from the coast and deep in the eastern mountain range in Muisca territory. Control was much harder to achieve in the lowlands, where emerging Indigenous political projects challenged the kingdom's sovereignty and its capacity to communicate to other imperial centers like Quito, Lima, or Seville. These lands were mastered by peoples like the Pijaos, who developed a thriving anticolonial project in the Magdalena River valley and the central Andean range. By the 1570s, these competing political visions had pushed the kingdom near collapse. Political advocacy at the royal court by Indigenous intellectual and leader Don Diego de la Torre, who personally delivered two maps and a report with advice for good government to King Philip II, paved the way for major reform in the governance structure of the kingdom in the late 1580s, which paradoxically led to further loss of Indigenous autonomy. During a final juncture between 1590 and 1630, newly arrived kingdom officials made the genocide of the Pijaos a governmental priority and envisioned transforming the lowlands into thriving mines by introducing enslaved people from Africa and experimenting with novel techniques to police the most intimate dimensions of Indigenous minds and bodies (their sexuality, customs, and thought), reallocate their homelands as property, and make their labor available for purchase by settlers. By the mid-seventeenth century, the kingdom functioned as a political and economic unit that extended from the highlands to the lowlands.

The New Kingdom of Granada reveals what empire-making looked like in a zone where there were no previous models of political centralization. Much of what

we know about the Spanish empire is modeled on the cases of the viceroyalties of New Spain (Mexico) and Peru, where colonial governance and territories built on infrastructures developed by the Mexica and Inca empires, respectively. The officials of the Spanish empire reproduced Indigenous power structures and relied heavily on Nahuatl and Quechua as “general languages,” re-creating imperial geographies of power that looked like the preexisting Indigenous empires—often with the same centers and borderlands.² In contrast, the New Kingdom was a new scale of governance built on a site of decentralization, where there was no common language or encompassing governance systems, and in a place that crosscuts the spatial categories we have traditionally used to make sense of colonial Latin American history (the Andes, the Caribbean, the Amazon). Colonial officials frequently classified the New Kingdom as the “third” kingdom because, while it trailed the viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru in wealth and importance, they saw potential for great profit in the combination of its highland populations and lowland mines.

The history of this polity poses deep questions about the nature and technologies of early modern Spanish imperial power, about Indigenous participation in and contestation of imperial rule, and about the creation of geographies of rule and dissidence. Throughout the book, I lay out the techniques of Spanish imperial power and the ways in which Indigenous peoples participated in, disrupted, and negotiated the making of the kingdom. I reveal what it meant for many Indigenous people to suddenly become the vassals of a king who lived across the Atlantic—whom they heard about but never really met—and I study their appeals for freedom and justice, as well as how they intervened in politics, even disputing the very nature of imperial rule.

Colonizing Downhill

From its inception, the New Kingdom had a specific geographic projection, with its epicenters of power up in the cold highlands of the Andes, aiming to spread downward into the hot lowlands, especially into the Magdalena River valley. In an equatorial region, with wet and dry seasons rather than a four-season cycle, altitude created notable geographic contrasts.³ Societies with different forms of social, economic, and political organization inhabited the cold highlands of the Andes and the warm river valleys and coastlands. A people who called each other *Muisca* (meaning “people”) inhabited the high plateau of the eastern range of the Andes, making it the most densely settled area. They were organized politically in *cacicazgos* (chiefdoms) and had an active industry of producing cotton textiles, salt, ceramics, and objects worked in

gold, as well as agricultural products like maize and tubers.⁴ Peoples from the Carib linguistic family, like the Panches, Muzos, Coyaimas, and many others, lived in the neighboring Magdalena River valley and the central Andean range. They produced cotton and gold, among other products, which they traded with the peoples of the highlands for textiles and salt. These groups had a flexible understanding of politics, as individual leaders often gained followers through success in war and prophetic messages.⁵ Despite their differences and clashes, the peoples of the highlands and lowlands kept close economic ties, but they did so without a centralizing power and in a very diverse cultural and ethnic landscape, to the extent that some anthropologists and archaeologists believe their organizational logic was designed to prevent the concentration of power and development of state structures.⁶

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the empire's officials used a lexicon of heat to describe the kingdom. They called the highland plateaus of the eastern mountain range *tierra fría*, or cold land, while they referred to the lowland, inter-Andean river valleys as *tierra caliente*, or hot land. The officials conceptualized the highlands and lowlands as separate worlds. The earliest definition of the kingdom came in the first account of the conquest. It stated: "The New Kingdom is all flat land closed in by peaks and mountains and by a nation of indios called Panches, who eat human flesh, different from those of the New Kingdom who do not, and their lands are different because those of the Panches are hot and the New Kingdom is cold or at least temperate."⁷ For the earliest conquistadors, the kingdom consisted of the cold areas occupied by the Muisca, surrounded by peoples they could not control. For centuries, settlers and officials complained that the Spanish empire in the northern Andes looked like a cold island, a kingdom in the mountains encircled by Indigenous rebels and insurmountable geographic obstacles. Juan de Castellanos, the author of the longest poem ever written in the Spanish language, an elegy for conquistadors, wrote that the kingdom was like a "cloister," a "box surrounded and defended by a rugged terrain."⁸ In the mid-sixteenth century, a Spanish settler added that the problem was not only geographic but also ethnographic: the "kingdom [is] enclosed in the mountains by warlike natural indios."⁹

The political backbone of the kingdom was the Audiencia of Santa Fe, a judicial tribunal in charge of government and representing the Spanish king's authority, which gave the kingdom an amorphous, irregular geographic character. The audiencia was installed in 1547 in Bogotá, the political heart of the cipa, the highest level of Muisca authority. During the entire sixteenth

century, Indigenous peoples called the *audiencia* magistrates *cipas*, revealing the overlap of Indigenous and European politics. While the Iberian Peninsula was divided into sixteen kingdoms, principalities, and manors, the Crown expected the *audiencia* to govern a territory four times the size of the entire Peninsula, spanning some of the planet's most diverse environmental regions. The *audiencia* combined two different jurisdictions: the smaller governorship of the New Kingdom of Granada and the broader district of the court, which included three governorships (Santa Marta, Popayán, and the New Kingdom of Granada) and four bishoprics (Quito, Santa Fe, Santa Marta, and Popayán). In this sense, the New Kingdom was not the *audiencia*'s sole district but rather a compact governorship within the *audiencia*'s broader jurisdiction. However, the *audiencia* was responsible for the administration of the governorship of the New Kingdom of Granada and oversaw the surrounding governorships.¹⁰

The dense Muisca settlements of the cold plateaus—with predominantly textile and agrarian economies—contrasted with the hot river valleys, which were rich in gold and silver but whose peoples were deemed backward. If cold was a synonym for the kingdom and the setting of the empire's headquarters, hot implied the unruly—the kingdom's opposite, a land of *behetría*. *Behetría* was a derogatory term used to describe the attitudes of those peoples who, rather than blindly following a lord or cacique, only accepted temporary rulers. In the first dictionary of the Spanish language, Sebastián de Covarrubias devoted an entire page to the concept, using a series of historical examples to illustrate it. He explained that in old Castile, some towns had the odd custom of changing rulers as they pleased until 1309, when King Alonso XI revoked those liberties and started collecting royal tributes. Covarrubias assured readers that history proved that the freedom to pick and change lords brought confusion and chaos to government. Although some had argued that the term *behetría* had its origins in Arabic and Hebrew, Covarrubias pondered whether the concept had derived from the old Castilian term *herria*, which meant “confusion,” “mess,” and “mixture.”¹¹ *Behetría* meant the absence of unquestioned compliance with rules and authorities. The imperial officials often used the term to describe lowland peoples. According to them, the peoples of the hot lands had “no lords or caciques” and they “obeyed nobody.”¹² The officials also referred to them as *bárbaros*, peoples who did not know any form of authority.¹³ In the hot lands, imperial dreams and metaphors were inverted. Hot became synonymous with places where Native sovereignties emerged to challenge imperial

rule and where European empires acted from a position of weakness and fear.

With its headquarters high in the eastern Andean range, far away from the ports of the Caribbean and the Pacific, the *audiencia* depended on internal transportation arteries that ran through rivers and crossed mountains, deserts, and rainforests to reach other imperial centers in the Indies and the Iberian Peninsula. The Magdalena River endured for centuries as the kingdom's primary artery to ports in the Caribbean Sea. Every single letter, decree, or piece of cargo that reached the heights of the *audiencia* moved upriver by human force, then traveled on the backs of Indigenous *cargueros* (porters). The *boga* system, in which people of Indigenous and African descent propelled these boats upriver, was a painful, muscular means of labor extraction. Indigenous Atlantic traveler Don Diego de la Torre wrote in the 1580s that this system had consumed all Indigenous peoples of the Magdalena River Valley. During the sixteenth century, the roads were usually inadequate for horses to traverse. Instead, travelers walked or, more often, rode on the shoulders of Indigenous *cargueros*.

Perched on the plateaus of the eastern Andean range, the kingdom was weakest along its avenues of communication. As a cold island that thrived in the heights of the Andes, its capacity to enforce its power diminished precipitously along the winding, precarious paths that connected the *audiencia* not only to Seville and Madrid but also to Popayán, Quito, and Lima. Throughout the sixteenth century, imperial officials wrote that the Magdalena River was plagued by Indigenous bandits who stole merchandise from travelers. The hazardous path to Peru that crossed the central range, the most irregular in its topography, was often called the “impenetrable mountain”: it had steep drops, snowy peaks, and the highest precipices of the three ranges (figure I.2). There, Spaniards risked not only having their merchandise stolen but also being taken captive by the powerful Pijaos.

This topography of rule of a colonial administrative center unable to climb down the mountains was atypical in relation to other imperial spaces. Legal historian Lauren Benton has shown that early modern empires did not cover space evenly but rather spread their tentacles irregularly across oceans, rivers, islands, jungles, hills, and mountains. These polities were porous, uneven, and “stitched together out of pieces.” Benton argues that while rivers and sea lanes created corridors that connected commercial networks, the verticality of hills and mountains interrupted circulation, causing early modern agents of empire to see them as “legally archaic places, and as zones of primitive sovereignty.”¹⁴ The idea of mountains as places of limited state rule has





FIGURE 1.2. Profile of altitude and topography of the three northern Andean ranges, sixteenth century. Map by Santiago Muñoz-Arbeláez, based on Guhl, *Colombia*, 67.

a long historiographic tradition, from historian Fernand Braudel, who famously argued that the sixteenth-century Mediterranean civilizations were the product of cities in lowland plains and deemed the “currents of civilization” unable to climb hills of only a few hundred meters of altitude, to social theorist James C. Scott, who argued that the hills and mountains of Southeast Asia were lands of possibility, zones of refuge for people seeking to escape the pressures of the lowland agrarian states. While Braudel posited mountains were archaic, remnants of the past, and obstacles to civilization, Scott argued they were the product of the political choices of escapees and that the history of the mountains was “the history of deliberate and reactive statelessness.”¹⁵ In Peru, the Spanish empire inherited from the Incas a vertical form of organization based on kin communities that spread themselves across different layers of the Andean mountain.¹⁶ In contrast, the New Kingdom was neither a remnant of the past, a zone of statelessness, nor a vertical empire with ancient roots, but rather an outpost of the early modern Spanish empire enclosed in the cold plateaus of the Andes, and it struggled to colonize its way down. The European settlers who lived in the kingdom felt isolated and enclosed. They were encircled by Indigenous rebels who inverted power relations, rebuffed imperial aspirations, and constantly seized the corridors that linked the kingdom to Peru, to the Caribbean, and, ultimately, to the Iberian Peninsula. This book examines how this entity of governance, entrapped in the Andean highlands, deployed institutions, practices, and technologies to colonize its way down, carving out a distinctive political space in the global constellation of the Spanish empire.

The New Kingdom of Granada and Spanish Colonialism

By examining the making of this unusual geographic formation, *The New Kingdom of Granada* joins a robust historiography that asks how colonial spaces were imagined, governed, and contested in everyday practice in the New World during the early modern period. Historians of early modern Iberian empires have revealed the polycentric and multidirectional flow of imperial power that gave rise to diverse geographies, spreading from the Americas into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.¹⁷ The Spanish called its overseas possessions “the Indies”—a complex concept that included Asia and the Americas and that early modern Spanish authors imagined as a continuous space.¹⁸ This encompassing terrain broke down into smaller areas delineating coherent, if not self-contained, geographic zones. The viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain were centers of power in their own right, built on the ruins of the Inca and Mexica empires, respectively, with access to the rich silver mines of

Potosí and Zacatecas and configuring large continental areas that largely reproduced the territories of pre-Hispanic empires. In fact, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century most of Spanish South America fell into one large spatial system—extending from Ecuador to Chile and Argentina—that essentially replicated the Tawantinsuyu (the Inca empire). This “Andean economic space,” as Carlos Sempat Assadourian called it, depended politically on the Viceroyalty of Peru and was full of internal regional markets that revolved around the silver production of Potosí in a way that connected the textile production of Quito and the mule-herding of Argentina into a large geographic ensemble.¹⁹

Within the Spanish empire’s geographic expanse, the Spanish Caribbean formed an aqueous space of connection and circulation relying on port cities that to a large extent were operated by people of African descent, where Spanish fleets would cyclically pick up mining yields from the Americas and ship them to Iberia, fending off pirates and advances from rival empires.²⁰ The Pacific offered access to another global market, especially after the founding of Manila in 1571, when, through a fleet departing from Acapulco, China became the main consumer of South American silver to support its silver-based tributary system. Other places, like Guatemala, Northern New Spain, Venezuela, the Amazon, and Rio de la Plata, perceived as “distant” from decision-making entities and with numerous sovereign Indigenous peoples repelling Spanish governance, were more obviously marginal to imperial rule.²¹

The New Kingdom was a peculiar formation within the Iberian Atlantic and Pacific—it fell out of the orbit of these large geopolitical spaces. It was not a complete backwater or periphery like Rio de la Plata or Guatemala, but it lacked the opulence of Peru and New Spain and the centrality of the Caribbean. It was not part of the continental economic system structured around Potosí, nor did it respond to any viceroyalty; instead it reported directly to the king’s advisory council for the governance of its overseas territories, the Council of the Indies. Despite having some sugar plantation areas, it did not develop a plantation economy like Brazil or other Caribbean areas. Instead, it had its own mining centers, textile complexes, and agrarian economies linked to the Iberian Peninsula; its own centers and margins, its own political and economic space.²² This does not mean that it was isolated or disconnected from global networks. On the contrary, the precious stones and metals extracted there ended up halfway across the globe: emeralds in Middle Eastern courts, silver in China, and gold in Europe, just as Chinese silks were present even in remote Indigenous chapels.²³

Historians have overlooked the novelty, fragility, and sheer contingency of this political formation. Long trapped in a conceptual scheme that viewed power as emanating in one direction from one strong, despotic monarchical center in Spain to its margins, peripheries, or fringes, historians have taken the existence of colonial territories for granted. While historians interested in the making of territories often seek answers in imperial treaties and decrees, it was people on the ground, often fighting for rights or seeking new opportunities, who appealed to different imperial frameworks and established commercial routes, who brought these imaginary lines to life and defined their contours, or made them collapse; peoples of all backgrounds, acting against the backdrop of enduring Indigenous territories and infrastructure.²⁴ Historian Marta Herrera Angel, one of the only scholars to consider the origins of colonial borders and territories in the New Kingdom of Granada, argued that the Spanish empire adopted many pre-Hispanic ethnic territorial contours at a smaller, regional scale. For Herrera Angel, the territorial divisions that demarcated the imperial provinces almost invariably could be traced back to the precolonial period.²⁵ Building on Herrera Angel's work, this book examines how the New Kingdom came together as a new political configuration, tying these many Indigenous territories into a new scale of governance.

In this sense, I examine the process of creating a distinct spatial system that, in contrast to Peru or Mexico, was built not on the ruins of an Indigenous empire but in a decentralized Indigenous area where there were no dominant languages like Quechua or Nahuatl, nor any centralized institutions of governance. This intermediate, transitional area was an experimental formation that came to be through the quotidian encounters and collisions between people of different backgrounds who were suddenly forced to exist alongside each other.²⁶ Though they had unequal access to power, Indigenous people, Africans, and Europeans all shaped the kingdom, but it was not what any specific group of actors intended it to be. Examining the process of making and unmaking this geographic ensemble—how it was built, negotiated, and contested—sheds light on what people understood imperial power to be and how they engaged with it. It invites us to reflect on the meaning of Spanish colonialism.

What is an empire and how does it work? Considering this question means wading through a sea of flawed concepts and reconciling diverging historiographic traditions. Historian Tamar Herzog has shown that our conceptual vocabulary is built on a series of dichotomies that explain the emergence of the modern state by detaching politics from society. But nineteenth-century

models of the “state” and its “bureaucracy” as a rational and impersonal organization of government are too narrow to account for a time in which “there was no true distinction between a state and a society as we imagine it today.”²⁷ This has led scholars to acknowledge that the language of modern colonialism, structured around an opposition between a powerful metropole and a series of colonies exploited for its profit, cannot be uncritically applied to the early modern Spanish empire, which was composed of different kingdoms attached to a composite monarchy that ruled them according to their own legal traditions.²⁸

As a result, scholars have presented conflicting images of Iberian imperial politics: at once a baroque world of politics meant to provide justice, evoking complex rituals that enacted the king’s presence throughout the globe, and a robust knowledge-producing enterprise that pioneered in natural history, cosmography, and navigation, ultimately contributing to the sixteenth-century empirical revolution.²⁹ Though both approaches have furthered our understanding of the early modern Spanish empire, they also have potentially problematic implications—namely, that by focusing on the specificity of baroque politics we fail to see its similarities to modern colonialism or that by stressing its modern elements we neglect the uniqueness of this imperial project.

By examining the making of a “kingdom”—a concept that has fallen out of use in our modern political vocabularies—amid the irregular topographies of the northern Andes, this book merges these two, apparently contradictory approaches: it reveals the rituals of monarchical politics in the New World and how the monarchy deployed a system to govern Indigenous lives and landscapes, as well as how Indigenous peoples contested it from within and without. The kingdom was, in a way, an image, an idea, and a concept.³⁰ It was a way of seeing, depicting, classifying, and identifying others. The term *kingdom* was rooted in an early modern Christian tradition of how to rule and build polities. In fact, officials, friars, and bishops of the New Kingdom of Granada evoked the idea of building a kingdom using a lexicon of domestication.

Quite literally, Spaniards perceived the building of the kingdom as an act of taming beasts. They spoke of empire-building as making a spiritual garden blossom amid the diabolic wilderness. They described themselves as ministers who needed to tame the wild and as gardeners who struggled to remove the weeds from the hearts and minds of the “indios.”³¹ They saw themselves as shepherds who had to correctly guide flocks of Native peoples to calm and

peaceful meadows, to be organized in villages like sheep in corrals. Under the same logic, they described the peoples in the hot lands as fierce, untamed beasts; they saw them more as wolves than sheep, more as weeds than crops, more as predators than prey. When an animal or group of animals escaped from the corral and roamed freely, they were called cimarrones or maroons, the same term that came to be used to talk about former enslaved or Indigenous people who fled the villages in search of new opportunities and possibilities. Other idioms used to classify bodies and organize the social worlds of the kingdom, like *mestizo*, *mulato*, and *zambo*—and even *raza* (race)—also emerged from those applied to the animal world.

The term used to describe the process of confining Native peoples into villages, *reducir*, had a double meaning: it meant to simplify diversity and “to order” or “to bring to reason.”³² Catholicism and its invented Roman classical tradition provided a universal order, a framework to organize societies. Everything that did not fit this mold was thought to be chaotic, hellish, and in need of correction. Hence, building a kingdom meant giving order to that which they believed had none. It meant dissecting and restructuring Indigenous languages using Latin as a universal language, making Indigenous peoples live in monogamous families, and replacing Indigenous rituals with Catholic practices. *Reducir* was the verb that alluded to creating the kingdom. It meant, to paraphrase Bruno Latour, to “keep the social flat,” to eliminate diversity and shape all forms of existence into a single mold.³³ From this point of view, the landscapes and peoples of the New World were chaotic and ungodly adversaries to be tamed and conquered, and empire-building meant remaking these different peoples so they would live a “life in good order” (*vida en policía*)—an urban and civic life according to Catholic precepts.

The early modern Iberian lexicon of empire-making, like that of many modern states, was built on metaphors of pastoralism and gardening, in which natural chaos was domesticated by institutional order.³⁴ Thus, to see the kingdom as an idea or an illusion, as Philip Abrams would put it, is to miss more than half the picture—the half in which the basic, pastoral image of social relations gave way to an infrastructure of governance that aimed to regulate people’s thoughts and actions, how they defined property, and where they were required to work. This infrastructure was largely a spatial system, consisting of fixed nodes on the landscape intended to control the flows of people, things, and information, ultimately allowing for the establishment of a relatively coherent structure of governance that provided a platform for different ideas of the kingdom to be displayed and discussed, while also installing a series of routines and instruments of rule.

Indigenous politics were central to the making and unmaking of the kingdom. Yet in the New Kingdom they do not easily conform to the categories scholars have proposed for other areas. For instance, historians of the new conquest have emphasized that the fall of the Mexica empire in Mesoamerica was also the work of Indigenous allies of Spaniards, like the Tlaxcalans, who saw the Aztecs as a foreign power and held the prestigious position of “indios conquistadores” after the conquest.³⁵ Historians of borderlands and Indigenous politics in North America have challenged traditional models of colonialism to reveal the many situations in which power fluctuated in a sort of middle ground between Europeans and Native groups, or where Indigenous people were firmly in control, even establishing full-blown empires.³⁶ Scholars of maroon societies have revealed the political ambitions of the communities of African and Indigenous escapees, who imagined new futures at the margins of colonial control.³⁷ Indigenous politics in the Northern Andes were equally radical and creative, developing full-fledged anticolonial projects, as in the case of the Pijaos (chapter 4), or battling with paper weapons in the halls of the king’s court in Madrid, as in the case of Don Diego de la Torre (chapters 5 and 6).

I aim to historicize Indigenous engagements with empire, inquiring about the meaning of colonialism and anticolonialism, but I am cautious not to paper over the kingdom’s colonial violence, project illusions of success, or assimilate its power dynamics into categories developed for other areas. As we will see, by the early seventeenth century Torre’s litigation had given way to a new model of economic governance that significantly diminished Indigenous autonomy, and the anticolonial Pijao project was squashed by a genocidal campaign spearheaded by the audiencia president. These projects did not lead to Indigenous control; rather, they had bitter consequences for all. But the fact that colonialism was harsh should not stop us from acknowledging the many ways in which Indigenous peoples conceived of politics and confronted colonialism.

Africans and their descendants, too, played an increasingly important role in the making of the kingdom. They arrived with the first conquistadors, lived in rural and urban settings, learned Indigenous languages, served as interpreters and encomienda managers, and worked as healers, miners, and peasants, among many other occupations, thus leaving imprints on every aspect of the kingdom.³⁸ To put it in historians’ common parlance, the sixteenth-century New Kingdom of Granada was not a slave society—a society in which slaves are the main demographic force and slavery is the main system of distributing labor—but a society with slaves, profoundly influenced by the presence of

enslaved peoples from Africa and of African descent.³⁹ Some regions strongly connected to the New Kingdom were in fact slave societies, like Cartagena de Indias, South America's main slave trading post in the seventeenth century, or the governorship of Popayán, later in the eighteenth century.⁴⁰ However, given the predominance of Indigenous politics in shaping the New Kingdom, my focus here is primarily on Indigenous engagement with the empire.

The early history of the New Kingdom of Granada was one of expansion and consolidation. Between 1530 and 1620, the kingdom emerged as a new social ensemble that forced people to define their identities in preestablished molds—as indios, mestizos, negros, or españoles—then delineated the obligations and privileges of each type of vassal, to finally enforce them by law. The subjects of the empire had to reimagine themselves and redefine their lifestyles within the tropes used by others to name them. As a category of being defined by the Spanish, “indios,” in particular, were forced to adapt to legal, political, and economic regimes that conceptualized them as “miserables”—wretched people who could not rule themselves, like minors or disabled persons. The only alternative to a subjugated existence was to take up arms against the largest empire of the time. The results were violent: Native peoples faced one of the highest mortality rates in human history and confronted the expropriation of their lands and installation of compulsory labor systems. In spite of this, the kingdom's history was not only one of exploitation and cultural loss. It was also a story of contestation, participation, and transformation, one in which Indigenous peoples—both rebels and vassals of the empire—envisioned, intervened in, and transformed the meaning of the empire. In this scenario, the kingdom was both an idealized image of politics, one that people used to make claims and to seek redress for hardships, and the institutional matrix that placed them under unfavorable, violent, and coercive conditions in the first place.

In essence, the imperial institutions devised to police Indigenous intimate spaces, social lives, and thought consolidated an administrative rationale and infrastructure that triggered dispossession, economic encroachment, and genocide. In this sense, the history of the kingdom intersects in many ways with that of modern colonialism. That the kingdom's ultimate goal was to provide justice should not eclipse the fact that what it offered was a kind of imperial justice that aimed to remake Indigenous peoples according to its own notions of virtue and economic needs. In this way, it was a colonial venture.

But even if the history of the kingdom is one of expansion, we cannot lose sight of the fragility and complexities of the historical processes that led to this outcome. A coordinated rebellion of Native peoples or Iberians—even of the

audiencia's own magistrates—was always a possibility, hovering on the horizon of functionaries' expectations. The whole system was often on the verge of collapse, and we cannot neglect these uncertainties of empire. One of the principal aims of this book is to restore contingency to the making of the New Kingdom of Granada as a political unit: a kingdom that was a kind of fabric in a continuous process of creation, destruction, and re-creation; a pliable blanket, with its gaps and holes, that expected to blend into the topography of the northern Andes; a human product, woven together by the circulation of objects and by the action of an eclectic cast of people of Indigenous, African, and European descent who sought to build, reform, or destroy the kingdom.

An Ethnography of History

A historical approach to the making of a kingdom over the course of a century—a problem of broad temporal and spatial scale—inevitably requires an eclectic methodological and narrative strategy. Rather than providing a static theoretical framework for empire-building that divides and gives pre-eminence to realms such as economics, culture, or politics, I have sought to create a layered approach to the different human experiences involved in the definition of the empire. Instead of discrete realms, I have tried to evoke the messy bundles of empire, in which economics and politics are entangled with cultural and social arrangements.

Through this approach, the empire acquires concrete shapes and meanings. We see empire in the tribute collector, in the newly built villages for Indigenous vassals, in the cows and sheep roaming in their fields, and in the efforts to translate Catholic concepts into Indigenous languages. Indigenous people, people of African descent, and Europeans appeared in the tribunal's courts to fight passionately for and against the kingdom, advocate for its transformation, or debate whether it had gone awry, and if it was legitimate or not. Native people, mestizos, and Africans played central roles in the transatlantic bureaucracy, as scribes, caciques, interpreters, and soldiers. To address the tangible faces of empire, I have chosen to focus on the histories of specific people and objects—an imperial official, an Indigenous intellectual, Indigenous textiles, a map of the Bogotá savannah or the Magdalena River. Each of these has a particular story to tell about the kingdom, showing the plurality of voices that participated in its making. The focus on biographies and objects reveals the kingdom as a process, as a product of history made by people in their everyday lives as they dealt with things like building a home, choosing clothes to wear, paying taxes, and keeping records.

A diverse group of vassals and officials, including Indigenous interpreters, scribes, and intellectuals, built the kingdom's infrastructure through apparently simple acts like numbering, listing, drawing, and mapping—what I call “textual technologies.” Through the marks they made with ink on paper, officials and vassals incorporated the kingdom into their visual regimes, using familiar codes and conventions. These depictions implied a theory of politics. They rendered the kingdom visible by defining how societies should be organized and what people—their bodies, families, beliefs, and homes—should look like. On paper, officials and vassals of the monarchy could draw, describe, name, measure, and organize the kingdom. Indigenous people and people of African descent often wrote letters and outlined maps appealing to monarchical justice and their own (often contradictory) notions of vassalage and freedom, or found a way to express their discontent precisely by interrupting paper flows and channels of communication.⁴¹

Historians have called attention to the constraining logics of document production, collection, and storage that underlie the building and maintenance of archives, showing at once the limitations of written sources and the inherent violence of their creation. Spanish archives are full of stereotypical, archetypical figures like “indios” and “caribes” (cannibals), who in these simplistic terms existed only in the imagination of imperial officials and settlers. Even when they took care in describing, explaining, and recording Indigenous practices, officials and settlers accommodated those practices in their own categories and reproduced their own biases. Inversely, when Indigenous people of the New Kingdom of Granada left written records in colonial archives, they were usually addressing colonial magistrates or officials, often through the mediation of translators and scribes, and crafted their words for their audience, tailoring their message to what they thought colonial authorities expected to hear.⁴² In other words, when you read historical archives you get not hard facts but rather a series of stories indicative of how people strove to narrate their lives and the lives of others, how they tried to make sense of complex and fluid realities. For this reason, a big part of what was happening fell out of the formulaic narratives preserved in the archive, remaining unretrievable for us today.⁴³

Informed by these debates, *The New Kingdom of Granada* aims to offer an ethnographic approach to history, reconstructing different visions of colonialism as inscribed in archival texts and images. It interrogates disjointed, fragmented, incomplete documents incorporated into colonial archives as a way to understand what people of multiple backgrounds thought they were up to; what they considered just and unjust, moral and immoral; what they imagined their range of possibilities to be; and how their interpretations informed their

actions. The book draws from a corpus of more than seven hundred archival documents, including correspondence, visitation reports, judicial records, maps, land titles, and accounting and legal books kept in archives and research libraries in Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I pay special attention to how the kingdom was sketched from contested visual regimes in maps, drawings, manuscripts, and prints.⁴⁴ Rather than taking these sources as neutral representations of the social and natural worlds of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century South America, I document the diverging ways in which Indigenous peoples and Europeans depicted and iterated the kingdom. I take these gestures and inscriptions as performative, as instruments for the consolidation and negotiation of power. Through these renderings they were not merely depicting an existing entity but producing the kingdom itself.

The greatest challenge has been to uncover Indigenous politics, with its nuances, ambitions, and motivations, from records created by imperial agents who did not realize the full scope and scale of Indigenous peoples' actions, but rather underestimated them and pigeonholed them in conceptual straitjackets. Inspired by experimental methodologies that aim to advance a series of speculative arguments based on meticulous reading of colonial archives, such as Saidiya Hartman's "critical fabulation"—"playing with and rearranging the basic elements of the story . . . [and] re-presenting the sequence of events in divergent stories and from contested points of view"—I reread archival evidence through a deeply contextualized approach that draws on archaeology, material culture, and ethnography, situating colonial archives in a larger spectrum of evidence to shake the contours of what was possible and envision new possibilities. Hartman deploys critical fabulation to get to a level of individual experience—what a murdered Black teenage girl's experience of slavery might have been like and how it destabilizes historical narratives.⁴⁵ I use it as a means to uncover political practice: to reconstruct the political notions that inspired some of the most important political movements of the New Kingdom in the sixteenth century, but which have seldom been recognized as such—like the Carib anticolonial project of the Pijaos or the events surrounding Don Diego de la Torre's quest for freedom. Through this interpretive method, I reveal how Indigenous peoples' frameworks for political action and economic interaction shaped the kingdom, making it a truly transcultural assemblage.

The book is divided into three parts and eight chapters, organized in chronological order from the conquest in the 1530s to the moment in the 1620s in which the kingdom took its first recognizable shape. The first part examines the setup of the kingdom's institutions between the 1530s and 1550s. Chapter 1 reframes the "conquest" as a structural interaction between the cold lands and

the hot lands that resulted from the Spanish effort to transform Indigenous commercial networks into a centralized polity, rather than a short phase of military expansion. The second chapter examines the creation of the *audiencia*—a royal judicial tribunal that enacted the presence of the king—through the disillusionment of Tomás López Medel, a humanist-turned-bureaucrat who initially was firmly convinced of the empire's benefits for Indigenous peoples but whose convictions were shaken when faced with the on-the-ground realities of the empire. Chapter 3 examines the creation of an imperial economy based on Indigenous textiles, which emerged as the main good for tribute and one of the primary engines of the kingdom's economy.

Part II explores two different Indigenous political projects that deploy radically different notions of freedom and reactions to the kingdom from the 1550s to 1580s and beyond. Chapter 4 examines the history of the Pijao peoples, who formed a multiethnic Indigenous coalition that destroyed the kingdom's infrastructure and offered a viable alternative to the kingdom, growing exponentially during the second half of the sixteenth century. In contrast, chapters 5 and 6 consider the history of Indigenous intellectual Don Diego de la Torre, a Muisca cacique who visited Philip II and offered advice regarding the good government of the New Kingdom of Granada, based on his readings of the empire's legal frameworks. While Pijao anticolonialism threatened to destroy the kingdom, Torre's legalism culminated in the replacement of all the *audiencia* magistrates and laid the groundwork for a new phase of reform that gained predominance at the turn of the seventeenth century.

Part III explores transformations in governance that took place between 1590 and 1630. These reforms installed a new system to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their homelands, assign those lands to European settlers, and forcibly distribute the Native peoples' wage labor—an early example of the enclosure of the commons that had lasting implications for Indigenous lives and landscapes (chapter 7). Chapter 8 examines the efforts to transform the hot lands into wealthy mines by waging a genocidal war against the Pijaos and importing Indigenous laborers from the cold lands and enslaved people from the African continent. These measures in many ways culminated a century-long process of establishing the kingdom, giving it an orientation and a recognizable shape, if not a completely coherent and hegemonic dominance. In the centuries that followed, new efforts to centralize the diverse landscapes and peoples of the northern Andes would ensue. The epilogue frames the history of the kingdom in subsequent projects of centralization during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, revealing the long-standing tensions between topography and centralizing schemes in the northern Andes and arguing that

the active engagement of Indigenous peoples with the kingdom has been obscured by the constraining republican narratives of the past.

This book explores the creation of an abstract entity (a “kingdom”) that had concrete implications in people’s lives. The history of this kingdom is a broader meditation on how political entities—empires, states, monarchies—work. It is an inquiry into their ethereal existence. They live in our imaginations, but they also establish strict procedural manuals and routines that endow them with an objective quality. They promote beliefs that privilege some over others, unleash violence, establish tacit agreements regarding how people should live their lives, channel their most innate desires, and model their interactions with one another. These abstract entities develop mechanisms that encroach on people’s lives, sometimes silently, sometimes loudly and dramatically. Some people are integral participants in these imagined polities and some are partially included, while many others are excluded and outlawed.

In this way, this book is a history of politics in its broadest sense. I follow common practice among historians of monarchical politics, who have sought to disentangle our understanding of early modern politics from our conceptual vocabularies for modern states. But I differ in my conviction that, in their rawest form, modern and early modern forms of political practice have common threads. When viewed from the perspective of Indigenous peoples—who were subjected to the consolidation of new tributary economies and to systems that allocated and claimed property, rights, legal responsibilities, and values—the kingdom shares some characteristics of modern colonialism and states. To shed light on these commonalities, we need not impose our contemporary vocabulary or project back the functioning of the modern state. But I do propose we focus on how empire-builders solved concrete problems, like surveying, classifying, taxing populations, or consolidating jurisdictions and bounding territories, in order to reveal the basic structure of the empire, its very fabric.

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PART I PRODUCING INDIOS

On a bitter day in 1540, the bodies of between three and four hundred Indigenous people hung in the central square of the city of Tunja. It all started when some Spaniards noticed a series of odd behaviors among Indigenous people in the region. Antonio Cardoso was near Tunja, recruiting soldiers to fight against rebels of Tinjacá, when he overheard two Muisca men whispering. Cardoso played dumb but sent a young interpreter of the Muisca language to talk to the two men. His subterfuge unveiled a secret plan to kill the Spaniards of the cities of Tunja, Santa Fe, and Vélez. The Muisca conspirators had established separate appointments to meet their Spanish encomenderos (masters) at their residences one night in Tunja. Once they were face-to-face with their encomenderos, each one would slay his encomendero in the intimacy of his own home. It was a bold plan that aimed to put an end to Spanish colonialism, which was then a very

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recent phenomenon. In the four years since Spaniards first arrived in the Andean highlands, the Muisca peoples' world had changed dramatically: their communities were now expected to obey and serve Spanish *encomenderos* and reject their own beliefs. Their radical plan was an attempt to eradicate the foreigners and regain their ordinary lives.¹

Cardoso returned to the city to inform Hernán Pérez de Quesada, interim governor of the kingdom, but Pérez de Quesada had learned about the rebellion on his own, when he was near the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá, and was preparing to retaliate. The result was a violent, performative massacre: Pérez de Quesada and his men encircled the Native conspirators as they entered the city, took them to the main square, and hanged them symbolically in the city's most notorious landmark, the central plaza. Juan Izquierdo calculated that seven or eight *caciques* and three to four hundred commoners died that day, while García de Malvaceda believed the death toll was well over four hundred men. The display of brutality aimed to suffocate any illusions of freedom and to instill fear in those who desired a way out of the kingdom. It was a statement to prove there was no going back. When asked by the authorities if he thought the reaction was excessive, Antonio Cardoso posited that Pérez de Quesada had served God and the king with his deeds. Had he not, the Muisca conspirators might have succeeded, exterminating the settlers and erasing the kingdom.²

Indeed, the kingdom was under constant, imminent threat. This was only one of at least fifteen uprisings that took place in the Andean highlands between 1539 and 1549, fourteen of which took place between 1539 and 1543.³ Indigenous resistance came in all shapes and colors. The Indigenous people of Tinjacá were in full-fledged rebellion during this period. Saboyá, Saquencipa, and several other *caciques* had fled to the forests and hills, leaving traps and poisoned arrows hidden along the road, hoping to harm the newcomers. An Indigenous man named Tisquisoche had killed his Spanish *encomendero*.⁴ Many of those efforts were largely individual and revealed the fragmented political landscape left by the deaths of the most prestigious preconquest Indigenous leaders.

The last Muisca ruler—named Sagipa and identified in the Indigenous political lexicon as the *cipa*, the highest level of authority—died after he was tortured by the conquistadors. They claimed that Sagipa concealed a huge treasure of gold that had belonged to the previous ruler of Bogotá, and which the conquistadors claimed was theirs by right of conquest. In a scene mimicking Pizarro's seizure of Atahualpa five years earlier, Jiménez de Quesada and his men took Sagipa captive and requested that he fill an entire hut (*bohío*) with gold before they would free him. The conquistadors had heard and read

about Cortés and Pizarro, and modeled their actions on that example. In a sense, the conquest consisted of a series of images and practices that reproduced themselves, as conquistadors rehearsed and repeated common tropes. It was a scripted conquest that, nevertheless, could yield unexpected results.⁵ Sagipa, ordered to fill a hut with gold to save his life, instead filled it with figures made from bones, feathers, and seashells—all of them extremely valuable items from distant and exotic regions, crafted by Indigenous artisans and brought together by Indigenous traders. The circulation of material objects like these stitched together the rugged geography of South America's northern end. Not only were they a testament to these lively Indigenous networks, but they were also some of the most valuable objects of distinction anyone could own.

Yet conquistadors did not interpret it that way: they wanted gold and silver. Feeling duped, Jiménez de Quesada initiated a sham lawsuit against Sagipa for hiding the treasure. He named his brother, Hernán Pérez de Quesada—who would lead the Tunja massacre a few years later—to be Sagipa's attorney and defender. When confronted, Sagipa pled for his life and claimed that "he valued those items as gold itself."⁶ During the trial, Sagipa was brutally tortured. They disjointed his limbs by pulling him with ropes and cut the soles of his feet open before burning them. He died a few days later.

A brutal world emerged from such encounters between Indigenous peoples and Europeans. Scholars have already remarked on the centrality of justice procedures to imperial politics—even if sometimes sham, as the trial against Sagipa, legal formality was a pillar of Spanish power. But the promise of wealth and the meticulous display of violence also shaped the kingdom's institutions and the status of Indigenous peoples in it—a problem of imperial scale as the Spanish monarchy turned global. In fact, the killing of Sagipa occurred simultaneously with a cross-Atlantic debate that scrutinized Indigenous emotions and bodies to cope with questions about their humanity.⁷ Theologians and scholars asked whether "indios" were the embodiment of Aristotle's category of natural slaves or whether they could be considered fully human, capable of rational thought. Imperial officials transformed these abstractions into legislation, officially defining what it meant to be an "indio" in the global Spanish empire and assigning "indios" a special legal status as members of the empire.⁸ "Indios" were conceptualized as "miserables," wretched people who needed to be protected and instructed in the holy faith and, in exchange, were required to pay "tribute" to both their encomenderos and the king. Officials laid out a new institutional architecture to convert the kingdom's Native inhabitants into tribute-paying, Catholic vassals of the king. They created narratives about how Native peoples should live their lives, design their spaces, worship,

have sex, and die, and then designed routines of surveillance to make sure they adopted these behaviors. Native peoples were not left at the margins of the empire, nor did they passively accept these strictures. On the contrary, they reshaped nascent imperial institutions through their daily actions. Indigenous people were active litigants, petitioners, and even lawmakers.

The muddled, violent encounters between Spanish and Native peoples resulted in the creation of a political system that in discourse promoted itself as warrantor of justice and protector of “indios”—a motto at odds with the realities of colonialism and the desire for wealth extraction. The result was a complex, contradictory governing scheme and economic system suspended between different forms of social organization and regimes of value. Part 1 examines the conquest and the creation of the kingdom’s administrative architecture. I consider the installation of institutions, routines, and instruments of rule that defined the legal condition of “indios” as members of the Spanish empire and the obligations they had vis-à-vis the imperial administration between 1530 and 1560. The first chapter describes how the initial confrontations between Indigenous peoples and Europeans set the foundation for the kingdom, with its divisions between cold lands and hot lands. Chapter 2 focuses on the creation of the *audiencia* through the story of Tomás López Medel, an imperial official educated in a humanist university in Spain who carried out some of the most important policies of the sixteenth century, shedding light on what colonialism meant to its practitioners. Chapter 3 considers the establishment of the tax system in Indigenous textiles and how these goods were repurposed to become a platform for negotiations and disputes over the meaning of colonialism. Overall, part 1 shows the functioning of an infrastructure of governance that largely reproduced Indigenous spatial organization, was primarily oriented to provide justice, and was built around economic circulation of Indigenous objects.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION. A KINGDOM IN THE MOUNTAINS

1. Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada named these lands the New Kingdom of Granada, inspired by the native architecture that evoked the alcázares, or palaces of Islamic rulers in his native Granada. Colonial naming practices followed a common imperial pattern that replicated European place names in the New World to mark possession. By naming this area the New Kingdom of Granada they were labeling it as part of the Iberian monarchy, just like they had done with New Spain and the British would later do with New England. Harley, *New Nature*.
2. On the long process of co-optation that took place in Mexico and Peru during the sixteenth century, see López-Portillo, *Another*; Covey, *Inca*.
3. Guhl, *Colombia*, 45.
4. The Muisca have been commonly called Chibchas, a term that refers to a broader linguistic family that includes many Indigenous peoples between the contemporary territories of Costa Rica and Colombia. Recent studies have demonstrated that the Muisca were in no way a homogeneous cultural group. A basic historiography includes Friede, *Chibchas*; Londoño Laverde, “Cacicazgos”; Londoño, *Muisca*; Colmenares, *Provincia*; Villamarín, “Encomenderos”; Gamboa, *Cacicazgo*; Muñoz-Arbeláez, *Costumbres*.
5. Whitehead, “Native Peoples”; Clastres, *Society*; Clastres, *Land-without-Evil*.
6. These diverse cultural zones were part of a large territory between the Aztec and Inca empires, which extended roughly from the contemporary territories of Honduras and El Salvador to Colombia and Ecuador, where there were no Indigenous states or empires. While some archeologists have tended to view this region in negative terms—as lacking some essential characteristic for the rise of states—others have suggested that the main trait of the societies that inhabited this region was avoidance of the state, rather than its absence. Willey called the entire zone the Intermediate Area. He shared the assumption of many in his discipline that evidence of state apparatus (large cities, monuments, and wealthy elites) revealed that some societies were more “complex” than others, and argued that the societies of

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the Intermediate Area had traits very similar to those in Mesoamerica and the Inca empire, though it remained one step behind them. In contrast, Lange was among those who suggested that the main trait of the societies that inhabited this region was avoidance of the state, rather than its absence. He suggests these political formations privileged diversity over centralization, in which the differences between the wealthy and nonwealthy were less pronounced than in places with centralized Indigenous empires. Finally, other archaeologists have preferred the term *circum-Caribbean*, first coined by Julian Stewart, to highlight the connections between the mainland and the Greater Antilles. While the term *Intermediate Area* places a strong emphasis on the groups related to the Chibcha linguistic family on the mainland, *circum-Caribbean* stresses their connections to Arawak and Carib groups of the Antilles and Venezuela. The difficulty in classifying this region as a “cultural area” is a testament to its complexity and heterogeneity. Lange, *Wealth*; Lange, “Gordon Willey”; Curet, “Interaccionar”; Gassón and Wagner, “Cuestión”; Constenla Umaña, *Lenguas*; Lippi and Gudiño, “Rompiendo”; Hoopes, “Atravesando”; Fonseca, “Concepto.”

7. “Epítome,” 171.
8. Restrepo, *Nuevo*, 196.
9. AGI, Justicia, 502, n. 3, 8v–9r.
10. Pérez de Arteaga, “Relación.”
11. Covarrubias Horozco, *Tesoro*, 1:128–29.
12. AGI, SF, 65, n. 56.
13. Weber, *Bárbaros*.
14. Benton, *Search*, 224–25.
15. Braudel, *Mediterráneo*, 40; Scott, *Art*, x.
16. Murra, *Formaciones*; Mumford, *Vertical*.
17. Cardim et al., *Polycentric*; Ruiz Ibañez, *Indias*.
18. Padrón, *Indies*.
19. Assadourian, *Minería*; Assadourian, *Sistema*.
20. I borrow the expression “aqueous territory” from Bassi, *Aqueous*. On the predominance of people of African descent, see Wheat, *Atlantic*.
21. Lockhart and Schwartz, *Early*; Sellers-García, *Distance*; Erbig, *Caciques*; Roller, *Amazonian*.
22. Colmenares, *Historia*.
23. On emeralds, see Lane, *Colour*.
24. Herzog, *Frontiers*.
25. Herrera Angel, “Transición”; Herrera Angel, *Ordenar*.
26. I borrow the expression “transitional area” from Lockhart and Schwartz, *Early*.
27. Herzog, *Upholding*, I–II, quote from 9.
28. It was only in the eighteenth century, when administrators started to develop a language of colonies. Elliott, “Europe”; Burkholder, “Spain’s America.”
29. For Iberian political culture, see Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragments*; Cañeque, *King’s*; Osorio, *Inventing*; Mazín, *Representaciones*. These scholars reacted against another trend that argued that the Spanish empire was a centralized, rational-

ized model of governance that gave birth to the modern state, like Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions*. For a useful review essay, see Cañeque, “Political.” Historians of Iberian science reveal the often unacknowledged epistemic and methodological innovations in the production and transmission of knowledge, which anticipated the better-known development of new “scientific” methodologies, usually attributed to English, French, Dutch, and German contexts. These studies reveal that the networks of information and knowledge production were integral to the administrative structure of the empire and were coordinated from entities of governance like the Casa de Contratación and the Consejo de Indias. Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing*; Brendecke, *Empirical*; Portuondo, “Cosmography.” Gómez considers the production of knowledge outside of imperial institutions; Gómez, *Experiential*.

30. Philip Abrams highlighted a tension between a state-system (a cluster of institutions of government) and a state-idea (an illusion that gives coherence to the chaos of political practice); Abrams, “Notes,” 81–82. “The state . . . is not an object akin to the human ear. Nor is it even an object akin to human marriage. It is a third-order object, an ideological project. It is first and foremost an exercise in legitimation”; Trouillot, “Anthropology,” 128.
31. Cobo Betancourt and Cobo, *Legislación*. On British and Iberian views of colonization as spiritual gardening, see Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan*, chap. 5.
32. Covarrubias Horozco, *Tesoro*; Rappaport and Cummins, *Lettered*, 221–27.
33. Latour, *Reassembling*.
34. Blackbourn, *Conquest*.
35. Restall, “New Conquest.”
36. White, *Middle*; Hämäläinen, *Comanche*; DuVal, *Native*.
37. Kars, *Blood*; Brown, *Tacky’s*; Schwartz, *Slaves*; Reis and Gomes, *Liberdade*; Price, *Maroon Societies*; Tardieu, *Cimarrones*.
38. Valencia Villa, *Alma*; Díaz Díaz, *Esclavitud*; Wheat, *Atlantic*; Brewer-García, *Babel*.
39. On the importance of slavery as a means of governance in Quito, where slaves were also not the main demographic force, see Bryant, *Rivers*.
40. Colmenares, *Popayán*.
41. Stoler, *Archival*; Latour, “Drawing”; Dery, “Papereality”; Rama, *Ciudad*; Burns, *Into the Archive*; Rappaport and Cummins, *Lettered*.
42. In contrast to the Native peoples of Mesoamerica, such as the Nahuas, Mayas, or Mixtecs, who used the Roman alphabet to write their own languages and left extensive archives in Native languages, documents created in the New Kingdom of Granada are mostly in Spanish, with the exception of some dictionaries, grammars, and catechisms created as part of the evangelization project. See, for example, Lockhart, *Nahuas*; Terraciano, *Mixtecs*; Restall, “History.” Nor do we have works by Indigenous and mestizo authors describing their visions of the past and colonial society, like those of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega or Guamán Poma in Peru. Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios*; Poma de Ayala, *Nueva coronica*; Adorno, *Guáman*. For other interesting examples of this written tradition, see Dueñas, *Indians*.
43. Trouillot, *Silencing*; Hartman, “Venus.”

44. I build here on a geographical literature on maps, vision, representation, and geographical imagination. See Harley, *New Nature*; Cosgrove and Daniels, *Iconography*; Cosgrove, *Geography*; Cosgrove, *Social Formation*.
45. Hartman, "Venus," II; Hartman, *Lose*.

PART I. PRODUCING INDIOS

1. AGI, Justicia, 502, n. 2, r. 1.
2. AGI, Justicia, 502.
3. Gamboa, *Cacicazgo*, 286–313.
4. Avellaneda, *Conquerors*, 120.
5. My use of the concept "scripted conquest" is inspired by Baker and Edelstein's notion of the scripts of revolution. Baker and Edelstein, *Scripting*.
6. AGI, Justicia, 502; Friede, *Chibchas*, 189; Francis, *Invading*.
7. Pagden, *Fall*; Davies, *Renaissance*.
8. Hanke, *Spanish*; Adorno, *Polemics*; Brading, *First*.

CHAPTER I. LABYRINTHS OF CONQUEST

1. Pérez de Arteaga, "Relación," 131.
2. Francis, *Invading*.
3. Diamond, *Guns*.
4. Todorov, *Conquista*. On the "spiritual conquest," see Ricard, *Spiritual*.
5. Restall, *Seven*. For useful review of works in English, see Restall, "New Conquest."
6. Matthew and Oudijk, *Indian*; Yannakakis, "Allies."
7. Schroeder, *Conquest*.
8. Hämäläinen, *Comanche*.
9. "Epítome," 171.
10. "Epítome," 170.
11. Friede, *Adelantado*, 39.
12. Schwartz, *Implicit*, introduction.
13. "Epítome," 170.
14. Lenik, "Carib."
15. Sauer, *Early*, 109. On the active Indigenous slave trade during the Caribbean phase, see Stone, *Captives*. Specifically on the New Kingdom of Granada: Melo, *Historia*, 90–91.
16. Sauer, *Early*.
17. Díaz Ceballos, *Poder*.
18. The Crown first granted the region between the Magdalena River and Panama to Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo and then to Pedro de Heredia—since Oviedo did not attend to the grant. Castillo Mathieu, *Descubrimiento*.
19. Throughout the next centuries Native groups like the Malebúes would be able to take advantage of the arbitrariness of that administrative boundary. Herrera Angel, *Ordenar*, chap. 3.
20. Hershenzon, *Captive*.