¡PRESENTE!

THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE

DIANA TAYLOR



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DIANA TAYLOR

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To my family, who have accompanied me always:
Eric, Alexei, Marina, Gladys Lowe, Jonathan Schuller

And to my grandchildren,
Mateo Taylor Lowe, Zoe Taylor Lowe,
Shoshana Schuller, and Liora Schuller

Walking hand in hand with you, into new times.

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Prologue
Jumping the Fence

An undisciplined student, impatient with my high school classes at the British high school in Mexico City, I used to jump over the fence a few times a week after roll call and walk home. The pounds, shillings, and pence of my math class gave way to the pesos I'd spend on jicama with lime and chile to eat on the way. I'd throw off the outward signs of colonial discipline—the tie, blazer, knee-high socks, Oxford shoes—that I'd been forced to wear since I was a nine-year-old in the Canadian boarding school and now back home in Mexico. I set about to learn in my own haphazard fashion. I loved Shakespeare, Marlowe, and the Russian novelists, but also the Mexican comic and philosopher Cantinflas, who taught me, "Ah! There's the catch: it's neither this nor that, but completely the opposite."[1] In my life, every day was opposite day. If I graduated from high school it was because *Díos es grande* (God is great), as people say in Mexico, and probably more important, because students in the British system had to pass the General Certificate of Education administered out of the University of London. The exams were devised and graded in London, where no one cared if I had jumped over the fence to escape school in Mexico. I passed. Five Ordinary levels and two Advanced levels in literature and history. Not brilliant, but not bad for someone who refused school. And it got me into college, another haphazard adventure beyond the purviews of this prologue. Yet the irony is not lost to me that it was the "neutral" and "institutional" positioning of the authorized reader in London who got me through, outweighing the years of experience my local teachers had endured with the unruly child they deemed unfit for further study.

I have spent much of my professional life finding ways to work beyond the fence. I have never really belonged to (or in) any one field or academic

department, so I tried to create other spaces for thinking and interacting with others. In my earlier years at Dartmouth, historian Annelise Orleck, journalist Alexis Jetter, and I started the Institute for Women and Social Change, bringing female artists, activists, and scholars from throughout the world. What, we wondered, did people do to sustain themselves and their communities exposed to dehumanizing and oppressive conditions when it seemed that very little could be done? We invited thinkers such as Wangari Maathai, Winona LaDuke, Dorothy Allison, and Cherríe Moraga to Hanover, New Hampshire, to imagine more life-sustaining ways of making worlds, making politics. Soon after, I started the Institute of Performance and Politics with my friend and colleague Doris Sommer at Harvard to create spaces of performance interaction and activism that exceeded departmental and even university limits. We launched the Mexican political masked performer SuperBarrio for president in 1996, and in early 1997 worked with Bread and Puppet to fill the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth with images and cardboard figures we made of people from ethnic groups from throughout the Americas who would never be asked to enter that building. After moving to NYU in 1997, I worked with two of my doctoral students—Zeca Ligiéro, a professor from UNI-RIO in Brazil, and Javier Serna, a professor in the Autonomous University of Nuevo León in Mexico—to begin the Hemispheric Institute of Performance and Politics in 1998. Hemi was conceived back then as a cultural corridor throughout the Americas, creating physical, digital, and archival spaces of interaction where scholars, artists, and activists could collaborate on performance-based transdisciplinary, transborder projects and topics. At our first Encuentro in Rio de Janeiro, entitled *Performance* (as we tried to socialize the word as a theory as well as praxis), it was hard to convince people that we had anything to talk about. What, some artists asked, did they have to say to scholars? Activists, maybe. Not sure. But scholars? I noted that many focused their work on "the body": The body as front and center in performance art. The body on the line in activism. Who, I asked, problematized thinking about the body as gendered, raced, sexed, aged, with different kinds of aptitudes and abilities? Okay, okay, you can stay. Money from the U.S.? The empire? This must be another form of cultural and artistic extractivism. Every conversation was like that, negotiating how people who lived in different countries, communities, conditions, languages, and so on could talk in spite of the brutal economic, social, and political divides that separate us. Now, twenty years later, with some sixty academic and cultural organizations as institutional members, the conversations have changed. They're certainly no easier or less painful (as chapter 6 makes clear), but the debates and points of conflict continually shift.

This book, an *amoxohtoca* or "journey of the book" in Nahuatl, traces my meandering journey through the Americas, around, back, and back again as I've engaged in an unsettled and undisciplined approach to scholarship that prioritizes relational and embodied forms of knowledge production and transmission that take us beyond the colonizing and restrictive epistemic grids that some of our Eurocentric disciplines and practices impose on us. Yet transgressing those grids also invites all sorts of tensions and misunderstandings, some more productive than others. One of the most generative for me came in a conversation with Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, who was explaining an Aymara concept of inter-relatedness. I understood her to say that *jaqxam sar* meant "to be me, I have to walk and talk with others." To be me, someone else has to name me, acknowledge me. These words guided much of my thinking as I reexamined colonialist and decolonial notions of subjectivity. When a year or so later I checked back with her to make sure I had used *jaqxam sar* appropriately, she did not remember our conversation and, more disorienting, said that *jaqxam sar* actually meant something else altogether. The concept "to be me, I have to walk and talk with others" made sense, she said, but not the term. So I claim both the misunderstanding and the concept, with the epistemic and political demand it makes on us, as I negotiate my way through these spaces and chapters.

To be me, I've learned along the way, I have to talk and walk with others. The artists, activists, and scholars who have walked and talked beside me on this journey have taught and sustained me in ways I cannot properly credit. This book is an attempt to continue some of the conversations we've started.

My conversations with Juan López Intzin (or Xuno López) added "enhearting" to the walking and talking. The Mayan, specifically Tzeltal, worldview situates the heart at the center of knowing and being with others. He calls this "epistemologies of the heart." Sometimes, like Stefano Harney, I've come to think of myself as an "idea thief." What might pass as a conversation beyond the fence still falls under the codes governing ownership in Academia. For years, I've lived with the regret of not starting *The Archive and the Repertoire* by acknowledging that one of the initial thoughts I had about repertoires as systems contiguous but independent from archives came during a conversation with Rebecca Schneider in a gas station in Wales on the way from PSi to London. On the table, she mapped out how the archive or library had always been physically separate from the theatre in ancient Greek and Roman cities. She was interested in what falls out of the archival, the remains, and cited my example of the missing finger from Evita's corpse in *Disappearing Acts*. For years, I had worried about the "other" of the archival,

what I finally came to call the "repertoire" of embodied practices that survived the erasure wrought by the colonial archive. My interests came not from ancient Greece but out of recognition of the colonial dispossession created by the privileging of archival knowledge. So who owns what? I'd rather think of it as owing instead of owning. I owe Rebecca. I owe Xuno. I owe Silvia, I owe many people many things, even, as Moten and Harney put it, everything. I am deeply in debt. Encumbered. It makes me happy to know it and acknowledge it.

Some people, like Jesusa Rodríguez, have participated directly in much of my meandering. She is a companion and protagonist in much of this *amoxohtoca*. Lorie Novak, as many photographs in this volume attest, has often been a cotraveler, extending vision to places where my eyes could not see. Marianne Hirsch, Richard Schechner, Fred Moten, Marcial Godoy-Anativia, Toby Volkman, Juan López Intzin, Rebecca Schneider, Faye Ginsburg, Leda Martins, and Jacques Servin have been essential to my way of thinking and acting in the world. David Brooks of *La Jornada*, Diana Raznovich, Catherine Lord, Kim Tomsen, Julio Pantoja, Ricardo Dominguez, Benjamin Arditi, Peter Kulchyski, Reverend Billy, and Savitri D. have accompanied and inspired me, each in their own way. Some thinkers, such as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Judith Butler, and Greg Grandin, come up again and again in my travels. Thanks to Manuel R. Cuellar and David Jesus Arreola Gutiérrez for their help with Nahuatl! And to Alexei Taylor, who can draw what I can only imagine. I have learned a considerable amount from Grace McLaughlin and Anthony Sansonetti, the two best research assistants imaginable. I thank you all. The voices of many of my colleagues, students, and Hemi collaborators and co-conspirators accompany me wherever I go. ¡Presentes! ¡Gracias!

Thanks to the Institut D'Etudes Avancée de Paris, which offered me a research fellowship in spring 2017, allowing me to find time to start putting this book together.

Thanks always to Ken Wissoker of Duke University Press, who has stewarded almost all my books, to Liz Smith, the senior project editor who worked on this book, and Macarena Gómez-Barris, coeditor of our series Dissident Acts.

As always, Susanne Zantop, I wish I could walk and talk with you.

ONE

¡Presente!

There can be no discourse of decolonization, no theory of decolonization, without a decolonizing practice.—SILVIA RIVERA CUSICANQUI, "Ch'ixinakax utxiwa"

Not long ago, I received a mass email from Juan Carlos Ruiz, then codirector of the New Sanctuary Movement in New York, asking us to be ¡Presente!, to show up and stand up to U.S. policies of deportation that are currently tearing families apart. I've known and admired Ruiz since we met in 2014, and he invited me to serve as a judge on the Permanent People's Tribunal (PPT), a nonbinding court of opinion that hears and responds to the plight of persecuted peoples whose claims will never be taken up by a court of law. That was the third hearing, this one held in New York City, that accused the Mexican and U.S. governments of crimes against humanity.[1] Several eminent human rights advocates were part of that tribunal—Rául Vera, bishop of Saltillo; Father Alejandro Solalinde, nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for his defense of migrants; and other luminaries deeply committed to the defense of human rights.

During those three days, we listened to migrants tell us of murders, forced disappearances, rapes, kidnappings, and robberies they faced as they headed north to the U.S. through Mexico. We heard from Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals students whose families were threatened with deportation, not knowing then that they too would soon be at risk. Undocumented domestic workers spoke of the violent and degrading conditions in the unregulated labor market. Afro Garifuna women from Honduras said they'd been tricked with rumors that they could safely cross into the U.S. if they came alone with their small children. Instead they were shackled and released to relatives. They had to sit near an outlet during our hearings to

keep their ankle monitors charged—a modern instantiation of black Latinx women in chains. For a moment, the ongoing, state-sponsored or sanctioned brutality made itself painfully visible. I knew of these dehumanizing politics, of course, but seldom so directly and intimately. As each person confided in us, looking us in the eye, she or he trusted us to do something about the cruel injustice. Courts adjudicate, after all. There are supposed to be consequences for criminal acts. While the jury declared the governments guilty of crimes against humanity, as charged, the tribunal's main contribution was more symbolic and informative than juridical. It was, in a sense, "just" a performance, an enacted aspiration for justice. Although the PPT has major standing in human rights circles, we knew that nothing concrete would come of it. These stories too would sink back into invisibility, part of the normalized cruelty in which we carry on our everyday lives. Never have I felt more powerless and responsible to and for people I did not know.

What can we do when apparently nothing can be done, and doing nothing is not an option?

For many involved in the tribunal, however, the performance of listening and fighting for justice was morally and ethically binding. We had to be ¡presentes! Everyone on the jury had a history of sustained, at times life-threatening, activism. Solalinde's early work creating shelters for migrants was inspirational. He would accompany them on occasion as they traveled deadly routes, arguing that his priest's collar offered a modicum of protection. Juan Carlos Ruiz helps organize a sanctuary movement to shield migrants from deportation, often getting arrested in the process. Someone else on the jury was a lawyer who worked tirelessly for migrant rights. I am an academic, a performance studies Latin Americanist—so I decided to do what I do best: research and document and transmit—link my knowing to a doing, to thoughtful and sustained action.

With several colleagues at the Hemispheric Institute (Hemi), we agreed to spend a good deal of time on the road through Central America, Mexico, and the Mexico-U.S. border region interviewing and working with migrants and those who care and advocate for them.[2] This was an act of *acuerpamiento*, learning of a situation by living it in the flesh. We had to walk the walk. We also needed to *hermanarnos* (become brothers/sisters) to build trust, to listen, and to care. We could then create a record of the testimonies of those we encountered in our path. We moved through Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, crossed the Suchate (the border river between Mexico and Guatemala), followed the migrant trails on and off, back and forth, for months that became years. We spoke with migrants and their defenders in shelters,

the volunteers who provided care for amputees who had lost limbs on the train (La Bestia), sought out the unmarked graves of those who died on the way, and met with families of those who have disappeared.[3] At times, the local military kept us in their scopes, threatening anyone who spoke with us. The activists in the region shrugged the hazard off—the government already knew who they were and would eliminate them as they saw fit. The murder of environmental activist Berta Cáceres in Honduras just before we arrived proved that. Things were terrible under Obama, but now under the Trump administration everyone we spoke to knew it would get much worse. How's this going to end? we'd all ask each other.

Marcial Godoy-Anativia, the managing director of Hemi, and I got so tired and heartsick at times on those routes that we noted we were losing our capacity to speak, to form coherent sentences in either Spanish or English. We traced the hemisphere's "vertical border," joined activists and scholars on the border in Arizona and later in New York City to protest against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and call for the release of those detained. We have participated as international observers on human rights missions and brought dozens of graduate students from throughout the Americas to walk the trail with us.[4] At one shelter, the students and migrants—some roughly the same age and a few even from the same countries—started dancing together. It was hard to distinguish between them. At the end of the afternoon, we got back on our air-conditioned bus and they were left to fend for themselves on their dangerous trek north. If they were to ride with us, they would be immediately jailed and deported by the federal and local agents who stopped our bus multiple times a day. We all felt sickened by the wild disparities in terms not just of privilege but of life expectancy. Acuerpamiento only goes so far. Why would they even talk to us? What could they conceivably get out of the exchange? One migrant articulated a powerful stipulation—I will talk to you all, he said, but you promise me you will do something about this. We all agreed, and many of us have worked in various ways to make good on that promise. One of the trans students started working with trans migrants on that journey and never stopped. Others are now lawyers and rights activists. Some devised artistic interventions. At Hemi, we created Ecologies of Migrant Care (https://migration.hemi.press/), a bilingual digital repository of more than one hundred accounts/testimonials by migrants and those who care for them. The videos, allow them to tell their own stories, in their own words. Our project shares the vision articulated by Fray Tomás, who started and runs the "72," the shelter for migrants in Tenosique, Mexico: "We aren't the

voice of anyone. They have their own voice; they're subjects in their own right. They are very brave people."[5] A "human library," as Óscar Martínez, author of *The Beast* called it.[6] We continue to add more interviews, artistic interventions, and teaching resources to extend access to the materials now and into perpetuity (in library terms) in collaboration with NYU Libraries. This, we hope, is one way of protecting the stories from sinking into permanent invisibility. Someone will find them. Some will care.

Being here/there, physically on the route, talking and walking with others makes physical, political, and ethical demands on us. It was painfully clear that we do not know what they know, or experience or share their struggles and fate, but these interactions offered us another powerful way of knowing and acting on what we knew. Since 2014, I have participated as an activist, a professor, and a researcher in a series of interventions concerning the migrant crisis.[7] It's hard to know that we can only do what we can do; harder still to accept that we must to do what we can do. Despair and cynicism are not options.

This study revisits and reperforms the history of state violence born of conquest, colonial histories, imperialist interventions, and neoliberal extractivist practice, reborn continually with new unfolding projects of violence and disappearance. My question: How do we live and respond ethically to this systemic brutality, knowing full well that many of us are embedded in it and benefit from the economic inequalities it produces? While the migration catastrophe is only part of the problem I examine, Ruiz's email asking us/me to be ¡presente! precipitated a political as well as personal reflection—what does it mean to be presente to others and to oneself?

¡Presente!, with and without exclamation marks, depends on context. As much an act, a word, and an attitude, ¡presente! can be understood as a war cry in the face of nullification; an act of solidarity as in responding, showing up, and standing with; a commitment to witnessing; a joyous accompaniment; present among, with, and to, walking and talking with others; an ontological and epistemic reflection on presence and subjectivity as process; an ongoing *becoming* as opposed to a static *being,* as participatory and relational, founded on mutual recognition; a showing or display before others; a militant attitude, gesture, or declaration of presence; the "ethical imperative," as Gayatri Spivak calls it, to stand up to and speak against injustice.[8] ¡Presente! always engages more than one. Sometimes it expresses political movement, sometimes a being together, walking down the street or celebrating and enacting our response, position, and attitude in our encounter with others, even when the other has been disappeared, or hides its face.

While these examples focus on presente as interactive and political, it also has a more self-reflexive dimension—how present am I in my own body, in the dailiness of my own life? Jesusa Rodríguez, one of Mexico's major artists, activists, and now senators, and I have led an exercise in performance pedagogy (which I discuss at length in chapter 3) that makes one critical point: The way you do *this* is the way you do everything. It doesn't matter what the *this* is. The way I decide to meet up with a friend, advocate for justice, look away when I see a homeless person, make a meal, or teach a class is how I do everything. Am I in a hurry? Multitasking? Thoughtful? Thinking of something else? A perfectionist? Good enough is good enough, and almost good enough, I reassure myself, is sometimes fine too? Ruiz's call to be presente suddenly made me reflect on the ways in which I am/not presente in everything I do. Presente to whom? Where? Why? What does it mean ethically and politically? In scholarly and pedagogical terms? Presence, as ¡presente!, as embodied engagement, as political attitude, asks us to reexamine what we (think) we know, how we know, and the obligations and responsibilities that accompany such knowledge.

¡Presente! as an organizing concept informs my project in several key ways: epistemically, politically, artistically, and pedagogically. ¡Presente! performs the methodology (walking), the attitude, and the existential urgency of the argument. It is the argument. We need to be ¡presentes!

These various aspects of ¡presente! mutually reinforce each other to provide the pathways through the chapters, connected through my personal experience in ever-extending networks of activist commitment. No word in English captures the force or the multivalence of this term. The gesture of the raised fist enacts the militancy. The declaration "We're here, we're queer, get used to it" reflects the solidarity and defiance. Shared moments of silence allow us to accompany others. "Say her name" conveys its recuperative gesture. Singing and dancing in a rally capture its joyful, animating quality. Yet it's important to cluster these many meanings in a name and think them through together in this word/act. ¡Presente! allows for that; the chapters here remind us that no one aspect is enough; refusal is not enough, defiance is not enough, critique is not enough, joy—alas—is not enough.[9] Political interventions require a complex play of dispositions, moves, and gestures.

¡Presente!, moreover, immediately conjures up the bilinguality of this project that I have thought through concurrently in Spanish and English. The English lies nested in the Spanish, just one *e* short. The Spanish exceeds the English, especially with the emphatic exclamation marks that reflects attitude and, more often, commitment and determination. If the study moves

between present and presente, it's because I do. As I was born to Canadian parents who relocated to Mexico after living in Cuba, my process of becoming moves between languages. I realize that certain ideas and attitudes take shape in one language or the other, but rarely in both in the same way. Thinking, feeling, gesturing, or acting on them in the (momentarily) "other" language requires an act of embodied, linguistic, epistemic, and emotional translation, estrangement, approximation, or accommodation. Neither language is enough, and even both together fall short. To be clear: there is nothing inherently illuminating or liberating about bi- or multilinguality. We all live simultaneously within various linguistic codes—be they regional linguistic variations, slang, jargon, or other group-specific forms of communication. But becoming between languages, living between here and there, has helped me to understand between-ness, beside-ness, entanglement, and negotiation as integral components of thought and presence itself, not simply instantiations of geographical or methodological located-ness.

Mexican Spanish, for example, has indigenous languages living alongside and within it, pushing the frames of intelligibility to allow native worldviews to express themselves. In Mexico, for example, I live in Tepoztlán, a small indigenous town in the Tepozteco range of sacred mountains and home to Tepoztecatl, the lord of the mountains and the wind. My house is on Cuauhtemotzin, a street named after the last Aztec ruler ("one who has descended like an eagle"), executed by the Spanish conqueror Hernán Cortés. My house too retains its Aztec name, Cuatzonco, meaning "head of the barrio"—and a long, turbulent history. Without speaking Nahuatl, I say these words every day. That constant invocation reanimates a history of conquest and settler colonialism of which I am a part. The same thing happens in English—Spanglish and Black English remind us of the multiple cultures, epistemes, and attitudes that flourish within supposed monolinguality. Ay te watcho. Mucho be careful. Ailóbit.[10] The unsettled, constant back and forth of code-switching, for example, conjures a sense of proximity. Certain words and homonyms bridge languages, allow them to touch (at times infelicitously), and open up multiple interpretations. A well-known example from my youth: Ford Motor Company could not understand why its popular Nova model did not sell in Mexico until someone pointed out that "no va" means "doesn't go" in Spanish. The points of proximity and rupture, the iterations and multilayeredness of language, form part of the dis- re- mis-placements and movement that I mark throughout this study. The constant traversing of historical, national, temporal, and linguistic frames is a thinking/touching/becoming in motion that cannot be thought of as translation proper; it does

not try to reproduce or represent stated ideas faithfully. Translation, in this sense, seems more like an evolving dialogic, citational, and performatic movement that builds on meanings and gestures, highlights the slippages and gaps, and exhausts the potentialities of silences and the unspoken to understand why some concepts, possibilities, and realities come into or fall out of awareness.

My bilinguality and biculturality, moreover, underline another aspect of presente. Traveling back and forth from Mexico to Canada to boarding school ("to learna di inglish") from ages nine to fourteen and then much later to the U.S. for my PhD and now for work, I began to think of myself as a cultural broker, a trafficker in ideas with the privilege, access, and betrayal that implies.[11] Some concepts traveled; others were left behind. Much of what I bring into the discussion is not mine to tell, but the people who should be in the room have been denied entry. The theoretical contributions from indigenous scholars in Latin America often find themselves filtered, not to say pilfered, by Latin Americanists trained and working in the U.S. who use those ideas for their/our own ends. Indigenous scholars have often accused U.S.-based academics of extractivist practices, producing unengaged and ungrounded work that does not reflect their context.[12] But too often I have been the only person in a room to ask, "What about Latin America?" When I speak, I do so as a Latin Americanist trained in Mexico and the United States, not as a Latin American. How can I represent the systemically absented? Or speak for others? I cannot participate in the colonialist gesture of assuming a field absent other voices and perspectives—hence the continuing political urgency of insisting on presence.

By moments I've come to identify with Malinche, the multilingual indigenous woman who was Cortez's translator and lover. She is often depicted as a bridge figure in the chronicles. Mexicans have long hated her, accusing her of giving Europeans entry to Aztec practices and ideologies, thus precipitating the destruction of their empire.[13] If being presente demands an ethical engagement, it seems that the terms of my presentness—racially, through social status, disciplinary training, and institutional location—calls attention to its many complexities. I am simultaneously a Mexican in Canada and the U.S. and a *guerita* (light-skinned, epidermically white) in Mexico. I have a slight Spanish accent in English, which nonetheless has become my dominant language. I am a scholar at a major U.S. university inaccessible to all who cannot afford the high cost of tuition. My retirement funds are invested in the exploitative forces that I work against. I'm an activist of

human rights, and a person of a privilege. Present/e, for me, means owning my mis-fit, mis-translations, and mis-appropriations in a series of interventions and dialogues across disciplinary, linguistic, and cultural/national border crossings.

Mis-fitting has its advantages. Returning recently from Bolivia to Mexico, I forgot that I had a large bag of coca leaves in a jacket I had worn inside the Potosí silver mines—the economic engine that produced the Spanish empire in the sixteenth century and positioned Europe at the center of the known universe, as I argue later. Coca was an obligatory gift for the miners and for the terrifying statue of the guardian figure, El Tio (uncle), who protects the mine. Having offered copious quantities of coca leaves to all, I had slipped the bag of remaining leaves in my jacket pocket and forgotten about it. Claiming my suitcase in Mexico City, I remembered with alarm the jacket and the coca leaves. Passengers exiting customs were divided into two lines—the X-ray machine for luggage, and the line that went past the customs officer and the sniffer dog. I got the dog, who immediately jumped on the suitcase holding my jacket and started barking enthusiastically. The customs officer was bewildered: a well-dressed white lady of a certain age was hardly his idea of a trafficker. The dog kept jumping on my bag. I stood frozen by images of spending the night in a jail or in custody someplace. The customs officer asked if I was carrying food in the bag. No. He looked at me some more, then asked if I owned a dog. Yes. "That must be it," he said, relieved. "Go ahead." I could only imagine the dog's reaction as it saw me wheel my bag out the exit. "Why do you train me if you're not going to take my skills seriously?" I was the grateful beneficiary of the difficulty in overriding assumptions and stereotypes related to race, class, age, and privilege.

But my mis-fits also oblige me to use my scholarly training and access as well as my racial, class, and professional privilege to intervene in every way that I can. We—scholars, artists, and activists—often coemerge from and inadvertently continue to coproduce these colonial scenarios. It's not just a decolonial theory about "it" (be it oppression, inequality, subalternity, and so forth) addressed to "them," it's about a decolonial practice (as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui says) that implicates me and the way I teach, research, write—remembering that the way I do this is the way I do everything. Part of my responsibility is to learn, unlearn, listen, engage, challenge, and if possible change the scenario. Here, then, I venture out and bring back my personal, at times truncated and one-sided, reflections from those interactions.

1.1 Alexei Taylor, *Footprints*, 2019.

This book is a product of many encounters that respond to one, underlying question: How to be present ethically and politically as a scholar, an activist, and a human being—with/to/among the many people struggling against a virulent brew of colonial-imperialist-capitalist-authoritarian-environmental-epistemic violence throughout the hemisphere? What makes this a book rather than a collection of essays is that presencing works as a practice, a methodological as well as theoretical thread. I came to see this inquiry as a form of walking theory, thinking in and through the embodied and discursive acts of transfer. The ideas were generated by the encounters, the predicaments, the physical motion, challenges, and expenditure that I describe. The personal entanglements that arise in each section elucidate different aspects of present/e, ways in which social actors intervene in the violent historical scenarios that constitute our hemispheric Americas.

The chapters and pathways draw on conversations in performance studies, Latin American and hemispheric studies, Native studies, Latinx, Chicana/o studies, de- and anticolonial studies, affect, memory, gender, queer, and trans studies, trauma studies, and other postdisciplines, the overlapping configurations that emerge beyond the fence, to think through the embodied and political aspects of ¡presente! as protest, as witnessing, as solidarity, as the reciprocal process of becoming in place and with others. The presentness and embodied dimensions of presente enable a set of practices developed in performance studies that recognize scholars as coparticipants in the struggles, scenarios, and encounters we engage in. Dwight Conquergood put it succinctly: "Proximity, not objectivity, becomes an epistemological point of departure and return."[14] What we know, in part, depends on our being there, interacting with others, unsettled from our assumptions and certainties, forging at times the conditions for mutual recognition, trust, and solidarity. It's impossible to pretend to be objective or disembodied. The performance itself, as a framework and as a doing, contributes to the meaning.

Instead of further cementing demarcated disciplines and institutions, this study brings together work by people from diverse locations, backgrounds, and disciplines who contest colonialist theories and practices that produce isolated silos of knowledge. The chapters evolve from the point of view of the relational "I" that accompanies others, participates, experiences, responds,

analyzes, and writes down the tentative lessons and conclusions drawn from these interactions. "I" am present to various degrees in each one of the scenarios I lay before you. The "I," however, is not autobiographical. I don't ask that you get to know "me." Rather, it calls attention to the necessary situatedness of knowledge that always emanates from the embodied practices of historically, socially, gendered, racially codified bodies. The located "I," in dialogue with other "I"s, serves as a medium for transmission for the acts, ideas, struggles, and possibilities outlined in the various chapters. Nonetheless, to use Richard Schechner's formulation, the "I" is not *not* autobiographical.[15] My situatedness in both space and professional status, my physical appearance and abilities, my linguistic and experiential limitations present me, affect how others interact with me, and frame what I can and cannot see, can/cannot register, participate in, or transmit. The "I" is, as Michel de Certeau posited, "a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such relational determinations interact."[16] "I" embody and represent all sorts of social forces that exceed my capacity to grasp or control.

Present/e, simultaneously singular and plural in both languages, conveys the ontological condition that one is/we are never fully present alone, and plurality always entails singularity. This "I" is part of a "we," or various "we"s, inextricable from them, yet remembering, again, as Jean-Luc Nancy makes clear, that we are *with*, yet separate.[17] "We" exists in states of besideness and betweenness. We all appear to others, and others appear to us. Yet there is nothing transparent about this process of appearance. We do not just recognize and acknowledge each other in a neutral "space of appearance."[18] The I/we entails complex rituals and politics of recognition. If, as Hannah Arendt argues, "in acting and speaking, men [*sic*] show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world,"[19] we need to ask what happens to those non-Enlightenment, nonliberal subjects—the slaves, the poor, the migrants who will always be a "what" rather than a "who" in certain spaces. Who gets to speak and reveal their "unique personal identities"? Who gets to speak for whom? Do "I" even recognize you as human? As part of my "we"? Do you acknowledge me? How many "we"s do we all belong to? Who is being presented, presenced?

These positions, always negotiated, at times transitory, are never given. Subcomandante Marcos, now known as Subcomandante Galeano, for example, identifies with all struggles and locates himself strategically: "Marcos is gay in San Francisco, Black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, Chicano in San Isidro."[20] In *I AM*, Guillermo Gómez-Peña says that the Sup reperformed his 1992 piece, "Spanglish Lesson" ("an Aztec in Nova Hispania/a Mexican

in San Diego/a Puertorrican in New York") to counter the Mexican government's taunts that Marcos was gay, thinking that might discredit him.[21] Performances of identity are always reperformances—sometimes enactments handed down from above, sometimes oppositional forms of being articulated from below. Who gets to set or redefine the terms? Marcos, always, is and is not Marcos.[22] These performances function as repertoires transmitting genealogies, gestures, acts that allow for multiple identifications, affinities, allegiances, and *saberes* (both "ways of knowing" and "what is known"). I like Schechner's formulation of the not/not. I am not Mexican, but I am not/not Mexican. I am not a Gringa but I am not/not a Gringa. I am not a traitor, but I am not/not a traitor. Mine too is always a reperformance of negotiation and betrayal. I have chosen to live my Malinchismo as a gift, as a form of freedom from nationalisms and imperatives to self-identify in specific ways. I can affiliate, empathize, advocate, and accept responsibility, but I do not identify or belong in any one way. Who we are depends in part on our way of being presente.

Coming into Presence

> We have to work towards [a] political identity [for] migrants as collective subjects and bearers of rights capable of revolutionizing the world—wherever they come from, wherever they pass through, and wherever they are going. A new economic identity for migrants . . . a new social identity from a social fabric that has been destroyed, overtaken by violence. They move from one country overtaken by corruption and impunity to another full of discrimination and humiliation. We must create this new identity by weaving together many cultures, many identities. . . . We describe this small project called La 72 with some irony as a "liberated territory." We are part of a new collective with a powerful identity.—FRAY TOMÁS, founder of the migrant shelter in Tenosique, Mexico, La 72

By what means of subjectification do we come into presence?[23] How does de-subjectification produce absence? How do men, women, and children become stateless "migrants," people without rights, expendable, disposable? How do we come to be Mexican or black or Indian or female, straight, queer, trans, or whatever it is we are? ¡Presente! explores the violent implications of the Western notion of self-reflective subjectivity through a series of scenarios of conquest, colonization, extraction, imperialism, and ongoing state violence in the Americas resonating from colonial histories. The conquest of the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries inaugurated the global

project of capitalism and, powered by the silver coming out of Potosí, established Europe as the center of the modern world. The conquest, too, ushered in notions of subjectivity and race that objectified both Amerindian and the African slave populations. The major political and economic recentering that placed Europeans as the powerful, defining, and conquering "I," Enrique Dussel argues, was "essential to the constitution of the modern ego . . . as subjectivity that takes itself to be the center or end of history."[24] Dussel traces how Descartes's 1636 "cogito" articulates and sustains the Enlightenment view of subjectivity through Kant's "culpable immaturity" of lazy others, through Hegel's dismissal of the New World as "immature and recently formed," through to Habermas's failure to understand the conquest as constitutive of modern subjectivity. Hegel's contempt for inhabitants of the Americas ("the inferiority of these individuals in every respect is entirely evident") and Africa (a "human being in the rough") are the other side of the same coin of the self-defined, self-referential "I." The Europeans alone are bearers of "the Spirit," the Hegelian notion of "the transcendental (interior or temporal) 'I,'" as Denise Ferreira da Silva defines it, and enjoy "the absolute right" over others who have no rights.[25]

The non-"I" is constantly subjected to all forms of racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic assaults and microaggressions that become internalized and accumulate in bodies. We know now of the long-term effects of the ongoing process of subjugation that manifest not only in issues related to self-esteem but also as physical illness. The exterminating "I," however, needs its "not I" to define itself against, obfuscating the fact that the "other" is always also the "not not I" constitutive of the self-defining "I."[26] The "I" coemerges, becomes copresence with the "not I," product of the same violence, embodying the self-blinding and brutality needed to make the "not I" into soulless brutes and "natural slaves."[27] Conqueror/conquered. Victimizer/victim. Slave master/slave. Murderer/corpse. These subjectivities are coextensional. The enactment of current practices of violence, dispossession, and disappearance, I argue in chapter 4, stems from these colonial and imperialist self-definitions and projects that enrich the haves and nullify the have-nots, rationalized in the name of capitalism and modernity.

Presente and present share an etymological root from Latin: *praestāre* (to give, show, present for approval) and *praesēns* (being there).[28] It entails the display or presentation of self and others. In the fifteenth century, this meant the coming into presence of indigenous and African peoples as things in preexisting European regulatory systems. Columbus took nine or ten misnamed Amerindians to Europe as a present or gift to present them

to the Spanish court in 1493 as proof that he had discovered the sea route to Asia.[29] Did the captives' being there, present in their humanity, misrepresented in terms of their origins, override the stunned wonder of those in court? Present, yes, but present as strange, inhuman, found objects. How many survived? Nobody knows.

So began centuries of turning presence into absence for indigenous and African peoples in the Americas, somebodies into nobodies in what Frantz Fanon calls "a zone of nonbeing."[30] Humans mutated into exploitable and disposable property.[31] So began the hemispheric colonial history of being in transit, from the forced transportation of these Amerindians to the Spanish court, to the brutal shipping of Africans through the circum-Atlantic, from the Trail of Tears endured by Native Americans, to the current forced migration of Central Americans escaping violence in their home countries, ravaged in the 1970s by U.S. Cold War practices.[32]

On display, then, from the inaugural scenario of conquest was a new and yet reiterative domain of New Spain, the geopolitical formation of the so-called Americas populated by creatures rendered strange. "New" ushers in a linear, fractured temporality, a before-after, that separates peoples and practices from themselves and allows invaders to conquer and destroy existing worlds, including their notions of time.[33] This violent dis-encounter, rather than "encounter," as scholars have long liked to call the age of conquest,[34] ushered in what Achille Mbembe calls "the ever-presence and phantom-like world of race."[35] Racial categories such as "Indian," "mulato," "mestizo," "creole," and "criollo" came into the world. Racialization proved the "most efficient instrument of social domination in 500 years," according to Aníbal Quijano.[36] As a category of thought and policy, the concept of race emerged earlier than previously recognized by European theorists with little knowledge of the Americas. Even the brilliant Hannah Arendt erroneously argues that race became operationalized as "a principle of the body politic" on the "Dark Continent."[37] Anyone who maintains that "race was the Boers' answer to the overwhelming monstrosity of Africa—a whole continent populated and overpopulated by savages" has not read Columbus's letters or looked at Theodor de Bry's sixteenth-century engravings of America.[38]

If, as Alexander G. Weheliye suggests, we need to think of "racializing assemblages . . . as a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans" rather than race "as a biological or cultural classification," then we need to think how these assemblages were developed in tandem at the time of the conquest.[39] Dozens of Mesoamerican groups collapsed into "Indians." Iberians, accompanied by

1.2 Theodor de Bry, *Americae* (sixteenth century).

African soldiers and slaves, produced new racial categories later codified as *castas*. As Amerindians perished at an extraordinary rate—95 percent of the population died in the first fifty years of contact—more than 110,000 African slaves were brought to Mexico between 1521 and 1624 to do the backbreaking work that, according to Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, the indigenous peoples were too weak to do.[40] From the beginning, and some argue for the first time in human history, racial difference was created, depicted, and naturalized as a biological fact and economic necessity.[41]

The indigenous and African populations were conceived as necessary in providing the "free" labor for imperial capitalist expansion but expendable in terms of all else. Because they vastly overwhelmed the Europeans demographically, the colonizers mandated the absolute subjugation and management of both groups.[42] The newly imposed legal structures cemented the social barriers between conquerors and conquered.[43] Zoning laws along ethnic divides, the strict distribution of labor, and castes kept people separated even though the racializing assemblages created them as expendable others.[44] Instead of the hundreds of ethnic civilizations living in the Americas at the time of the conquest, the indigenous peoples were identified as *indios*, mestizos, *castizos*, *cholos*, and *pardos* depending on reproductive practices and social rank. The caste system similarly stripped Africans and their descendants of their ethnic, linguistic, and regional backgrounds. Thirty-six categories of the castas denoted blacks as *lobos* (wolves), *zambos* (bowlegged), *saltatrás* (a step backward), *tente en el aire* (suspended in the air), and *no te entiendo* (I don't understand you).[45] These words, along with the images that illustrated them, showed Africans and Afro-descendants conjured into presence as dark, brutal, backward, incomprehensible. While many of these terms were not in common use, words such as *negros*, *morenos* (dark), *mulatos*, and *pardos* were used, the last two reserved for mixed-race peoples.

While the intertwined histories of Amerindians, Africans, and their descendants exceed my study, they came into presence as things, property to be exploited. Colonists circumvented existing prohibitions against enslaving indigenous peoples.[46] In some cases, they argued that as pagans, indigenous peoples were not protected by existing laws. Others, like Ginés de Sepúlveda, held the opinion that it was legitimate to enslave indigenous people because they were by nature slaves of "inferior intelligence along with inhuman and barbarous customs. . . . They have established their nation in such a way that no one possesses anything individually, neither a house nor a field, which he can leave to his heirs in his will."[47] Capitalism served as both an instrument and ideology of conquest. Whether they were designated as slaves or peons,

indigenous workers were often placed in conditions of servitude that have continued into the present.

This structural coming into presence of Afro and indigenous peoples, not as subjects but as subjugated and expendable labor, as racialized things, then, needs to be thought together. Like Mbembe, I understand Foucault's definition of racism as being "above all a technology aimed at permitting the exercise of biopower," defined by Foucault as "the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy."[48] We would do well, however, to push the date of the rise of capitalism and the various manifestations of modernity linked to biopower back to the conquest, colonization, and slavery of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries rather than to the eighteenth century as Foucault posits. "The modern world-system was born in the sixteenth century," as Aníbal Quijano, Immanuel Wallerstein, Enrique Dussel, Ramón Grosfoguel, and others have shown, with the geosocial construction of the "Americas."[49] The exercise of biopower to control and annihilate populations during this period remains linked to the rise of capitalism, as Foucault noted. But the rise of "global networks" and alliances, "European capitalists," "armed trade," "a military-fiscal state," "the invention of financial instruments," "the expropriation of land," slavery, and a legal system defending these practices were all put in motion with Columbus's arrival in the Americas.[50]

We also need to extend the paradigm to consider the continuous (and changing) coming into presence of the "Indian" from the fifteenth century throughout what is now Latin America, and a century or so later after the British and French colonists arrived in what is now the U.S. and Canada, to the present.[51] As Linda Tuhiwai Smith states, "Imperialism frames the Indigenous experience."[52] For all their differences, such as indigenous peoples who had city-state polities (Aztec, Inca, Maya) versus the northern "Bush people," gatherers and hunters,[53] many Native American nations and communities (in the hemispheric sense) still share important commonalities: from recognizing "the presence of energy and power [as] the starting point [and cornerstone] of their analyses and understanding of the world,"[54] to an emphasis on communal and relational subjectivity; oneness with the land (or *mapu* for the Mapuche), the cosmos, and everything in it; notions of *mino bimaadiziwin* or the "good life" for the Nishnaabeg that Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes about;[55] to the fight for the *dignidad rebelde* (rebellious dignity) of the Zatapistas and the Sioux activists at Standing Rock. As colonizers and settlers imposed different languages, religions, labor and living conditions, and practices and policies dispossessing native communi-

ties of their land for over five hundred years, the nations and groups have found various ways of coming into presence through "resurgence" that reasserts their names, languages, and traditions through protest and at times armed struggle.[56] This ongoing becoming is best thought through a hemispheric and performance lens. As Simpson notes, "performance art" (and I would argue performance more broadly) proves invaluable to understanding "Indigenous thought . . . obtained through collective truths that are derived from the experience of individuals, relationships and connections (to the non-human world, the land and each other) through action or 'presencing,' and through creative process."[57]

Afro-descendants have also been variously figured in and out of social existence—in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by the loss of their names and places of origin enabled by the castas system and again in the eighteenth century with its dismantling. In Mexico, with the largest number of free blacks and the second largest of slaves in the seventeenth century, the Afro and indigenous populations continued to mix. Ben Vinson III argues that Mexico's attempts to eliminate the caste system upon achieving independence in 1821 led to the "'historical forgetting' of the black population" until about 1940.[58] They fell out of presence officially, if not literally. The vast majority of the population that included Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples were designated mestizos, their individual histories buried once again under nomenclature. Who knew until recently that there even were Afro-Mexicans? Nobody asked.[59] The first time that Afro-descendants could identify as such in Mexico was on the 2015 Intercensus, where 64.9 percent also identified themselves as indigenous.[60] An estimated 15 percent of the Mexican population is indigenous, though a far greater number is of indigenous descent. The names have changed, but the discriminatory logics remain the same. This example of race as a system of desubjectification shows the complex operations and interconnections of coming into and falling out of presence as part of a transpersonal, historical continuum.

Major theorizations of race in the Americas also come in and out of presence in odd ways. Many key anticolonial scholars born in the Americas, people such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, Stuart Hall, and others who identify as Afro-descendants have mostly left the extermination and domination of indigenous peoples out of their thinking about race. Césaire's *A Tempest*, for example, depicts the submissive Ariel as a "mulatto slave" (Afro-European) and the rebellious Caliban as a "black slave."[61] The indigenous presence completely disappears in this version of conquest and coloniality, just as the Taíno and Guanahatabey have almost been erased from the islands

now known as the Caribbean and Antilles. Even the memory of the erasure is erased. Caliban, Shakespeare's "savage and deformed slave," I always assumed, was indigenous. Columbus's reports in his 'First Letter" (1492) of an island named Carabis inhabited by people who are "extremely fierce" and "eat human flesh" inspired Montaigne's essay, *Of Cannibals* (c. 1580), which scholars assume was the basis for Shakespeare's Caliban.[62] Columbus in that letter specifically stated, "They are not Negroes, as in Guinea, and their hair is straight." But then, Columbus thought he had reached Asia. Cuban theorist Roberto Fernández Retamar, in his *Calibán*, sees him as the symbol of mestizo (indigenous/European) America.[63] Theories of race in Latin America and the Caribbean have developed in parallel linguistic and political tracks. Studies of race tend to focus on Afro-descendant populations, primarily in Brazil, while studies of indigenous and mestizo Americas often ignore race.[64] Each assigns different aspects of the same history to oblivion. Colonialism imposes its own geographies of knowledge.

While many reasons contribute to the disconnect, here I will simply point to four. First, colonial metropoles in Britain and France played central roles in training intellectuals from their former colonies and disseminating their findings. Spain played no such role. If anything, it turned its back on the new racial categories and peoples that were produced by its conquest and colonialism of the Americas. The words "mestizo" and *mestizaje* did not enter the official dictionary of the Real Academia until 1992. *Mestizar* appears in the *Diccionario del uso del español* as "adulterating the purity of a race by its cross with others."[65] Not a word about the centuries of Spanish mixing with the indigenous and African peoples they named and dominated. Dictionaries, like histories, perpetuate erasures.

Second, Spain was not a center of philosophical or scientific thought even before its sharp economic decline in the seventeenth century. Secular universities in the late eighteenth century, as Ramón Grosfoguel points out, "used the Kantian anthropological idea that rationality was embodied by the White man north of the Pyrenees mountains."[66] In part, Spain's lack of prestige stemmed from European perception that the Spanish language, suited to emotions and literary expression, was inadequate to the task of rigorous rational inquiry, as Walter Mignolo argues.[67]

Third, colonial spheres of interest and ideology expanded along linguistic, not geographical, lines. Fanon's Martinique, for example, was part of France; Jamaica, where Hall was born and trained, part of Britain. Their positioning as Francophone and Anglophone (as opposed to American in its hemispheric sense) post- and anticolonial scholars accounted for the ways

in which they thought about race and coloniality from the perspective of other, fundamentally different, instances of colonialism developed in relationship to India, Africa, and Algeria.

Fourth, the Americas, including the complexities inherent in the production of "race," do not figure into the ways in which major European theorists such as Arendt and Foucault thought about race as the ideological driver of capitalism. Therefore, the Americas drop out of most reflections on race, coloniality, and biopower when critical discussions of postcolonial theories do not neatly apply. Hannah Arendt excludes the Americas and Australia from her thinking as "the two continents that, without a culture and history of their own, had fallen into the hands of Europeans."[68]

Generalized lack of understanding about the impact of colonialism on both Afro-descendants in Latin America and Amerindians continues to be understood as a deficiency on the part of the ignored.[69] Juan López Intzín (Xuno López), a Mayan Tzeltal speaker, whose work I engage throughout, recently pointed out that in the sixteenth century the Spaniards were arguing about whether Amerindians had souls. Now people argue about whether they're intelligent.[70] My turn to necropolitics and other theories developed in relation to blackness and the slave trade attempts to place the colonial European paradigms in conversation with indigenous perspectives, when possible, to call attention to the historical and theoretical lacuna in the study of ongoing coloniality in Latin America.

Para-presente

What if we considered these overlapping histories and theories of subjectification together, as copresent, coemergent? While annihilating systems of power have systemically denied subjectivity to women and indigenous, black, trans, migrant (and many other) communities for centuries, these histories tend to splinter off into isolated, parallel events and instances. Linguistic and regional separations, spheres of influence, temporal divides, and other factors make it difficult to see this violence as always, already, and everywhere connected. Western linear temporalities and spatial boundaries delimit our understanding.

While ¡presente!, as in present tense, screams out the urgency of the now, its reiterative power points to its ongoing demands, the constant shuffle between the past, present, and future configured differently in different epistemes. In indigenous and African cultures, long considered anachronistic or backward by some commentators, time is plural, multilayered, and coexists

alongside other times—the times of the gods, the natural elements, the ancestors, human time, and so on. Leda Martins writes of "spiral time" in the worldview of Yoruba and Congo descendants in Brazil, in which the "past" lies ahead, in view, and the future sneaks up from behind.[71] Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui notes the simultaneity of past and futurity in the Aymara worldview: "There is no *post* or *pre* in this vision of history that is not linear or teleological but rather moves in cycles and spirals and sets out on a course without neglecting to return to the same point."[72] For the Aztecs, according to James Maffie, "time's passing . . . consists of the successive comings and goings—accompanying and abandoning—of *qualitatively* different kinds of tonally-energy burdens . . . each kind if time has its own kind of energy, character, or personality."[73] The Zapatistas, according to Marcos aka Galeano, think of temporality as an hourglass, "through which one can see time going by and try to understand that, but see the time that's coming at the same time."[74] The particular mix of anachronism, futurity, and existential/political emergency invites us to think of para-times. "Para," as a prefix, attaches itself to other words to denote proximity; para stands along with, by, besides.[75] Paranormal exceeds scientific explanation but remains attached and defined by the normal. Paraphrase signals another way of saying something—not the same words, but closely attached to their meaning. Paramilitary, as auxiliary or unofficial armed forces, might not be military, but they're not not military. Para-times encourage us to think of geological time, historical time, environmental, human, and animal time alongside, within, and with each other rather than as sequential. One time frame does not necessarily account for another. At times the various moments appear together, a palimpsestic layering. At others, they loop as a reiterative, seemingly endless again-ness. Even in the human experience of time, certain phenomena can never be analyzed in and through their own moment. History, tradition, religion, trauma, for example, are not coterminous with the events that gave them rise, whether it be the birth of a savior or a blow or a defining event. The effects and affects come later. In other ways, too, we do not all live in the same moment, and this is not just because we inhabit different time zones. The street vendor in Bogotá selling indigenous food lives in a para-time and space, alongside the one inhabited by her customer, the affluent corporate businessman who drives by in his new car.

Para-times strain the more expansive Western notions of temporality. Even queer and trans temporalities, which I explore in chapter 6, can fracture along racial and ethnic lines as the anachronistic or para-temporal nature of

native queer thought crashes into the exigencies of identitarian politics.[76] Coming into presence for queer Cree artist Tomson Highway means conjuring up a vanishing world of possibilities in front of our Western eyes.[77] The *now*, for Cree speakers like him from northern Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, rehearses its own demise.

In Western cultures, capitalism has reduced the non-Western experiences of time into productive/nonproductive time, work time and time off. From a topological perspective, time is usually represented as linear, a line that ties past to present, to future, though at times the line might be depicted as thoroughly knotted. In addition to the existential condition of "time present and time past . . . both perhaps present in time future" of T. S. Eliot's *Four Quartets*, we now have the temporalities of surveillance systems and political preemptive strategies where, quite literally, "What might have been and what has been / Point to one end, which is always present."[78] Present danger, unlocatable threat, but still linear.[79] By the mid-2010s, preemption becomes the dominant tactical, existential, and ontological regime that Brian Massumi labels *ontopower*: "For a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able to act on the present."[80]

The colonization of the future hijacks the present and obscures other epistemic conditions, other ontologies: the decimation of past and present to preclude a future. Preemptive strikes simultaneously perpetuate the racist, colonialist, imperialist, and extractivist violence of the past, ensuring that nothing will grow there but more violence. These are the "ruins yet to come" that Ricardo Dominguez speaks of.[81] In other words, empire has colonized the future; capitalists can defy limits by sending Teslas into space even as their border officials reinforce boundaries by building walls and placing migrant children in cages. The long- and short-term health effects of traumatic loss ensure that the newly recolonized don't have a future.[82] The Guaraní, Dussel tell us, "understood the end of the world in terms of the end of the forest and the elimination of any future time."[83]

Yet, in the expandable now and porous present of performance, we might find fragments of other ways of being present.[84] Rebecca Schneider builds on historian Howard Zinn's notion of "fugitive moments," moments salvaged from the past to "present us with its own alternative futures—futures we might choose to realize differently." In performance, she argues, reenactment and other forms of repeat show the potential for time to be "malleable political material."[85] Performance, as we shall see, serves a vital role in

opening spaces to breathe and come into presence as a strategic "we" to reimagine other ways of acting and thinking in the world.



Presente, but where? Two enormous housing projects in the southern part of Mexico share the same name. The Siglo XXI Migratory Station, a large and forbidding detention and deportation center, "lodges" and "repatriates" (in the language of the Mexican government) about 250,000 Central American migrants a year who escape the violence in their countries to seek refuge, safety, and work elsewhere.[86] The U.S. has outsourced its militarized policies to keep migrants away from its own southern border. Near that Siglo XXI, the familiar logo for the Century 21 real estate agency reminds the better-off that they can live anywhere. "More Americans have been added to the population of Mexico over the past few years than Mexicans have been added to the population of the United States, according to government data in both nations."[87] Many U.S. citizens in fact move to Mexico precisely not to work. They want to retire with a higher standard of living, cheaper services, and a better climate than they would have back home.

The two projects/discourses exist in an interwoven relationship, and not just because their names mirror each other. Each, representing a different migratory population, points to deep blind spots in our discussions about who gets to be where. Century 21 ads feature images of open spaces and pristine nature to encourage what it calls "relentless moves" to unexplored frontiers.[88] Relentless? As in "constant, continual, continuous, non-stop" expansionism?[89] Anything is possible for their clients; it's all about choice, comfort, safety, and a sense of adventure. Wealthier migrants, part of what a recent *New York Times* piece called "millionaire migration," might own multiple houses around the world in case things get tough back home or they need to park their money and avoid paying taxes.[90] The same online dictionary spells out the second meaning for relentless: harsh, grim, fierce, cruel . . . remorseless, merciless. Siglo XXI offers its inhabitants enclosure, walls, surveillance, abuse, and deportation back to the violence they have risked their lives to leave behind. Migrants have no choice. Everything is impossible.

Here we have it: the seeming contradiction of capitalism's newest frontiers coexisting with the U.S. as a walled state;[91] mobility and immobility; access granted and denied—in short, the world of the liberal individual subject and the nobodies who can be used and discarded. Mirror images; each depends on the other for its existence.

Instead of a contradictory embroilment, however, I would call it paradoxical. Para-, beside, but also "beyond, wrongfully, harmfully, unfavorably, and among."[92] We live in para-worlds, para-spaces, in which the Derridian lament of "crimes of hospitality" have turned a guest, a "person eating at another's table" into a "parasite" (the original meaning of parasite as guest), a criminal, an inmate at Siglo XXI.[93] Even the biological understanding of parasites as only invasive and dangerous has undergone radical change in the last twenty-five or so years. Humans have more bacteria than cells in their bodies—we need them to live—and both bacteria and parasites can be symbiotic and/or pathogenic. Migrants and refugees, according to conservatives, live off the wealth and goodness of all the hardworking Americans.[94] Conversely, the retirees and the wealthy migrants, we might argue, live off the labor of others who help them amass their disposable incomes and who look after them, their children, and their houses, food, and dirty laundry.

In our twenty-first century, neocolonial patterns of settlement, occupation, tourism, and migration are once again being reshuffled, creating ever new para-spaces, times, and worlds nested in and alongside others hidden from view. The getaway, the lockup. Migrants and refugees have often been pushed off their lands as multinational corporations take them over for hydro, mining, agro, and tourist industries, often with the help of paramilitary soldiers. The "para," here, points to the privatization of violence, paid for by industry, needed to maintain both its relentless lateral expansion and its walled enclosures. The bodies of murdered migrants end up in mass pits and unmarked graves.

The understanding of what present/e means unfolds as does the list of who can be present where, when, and how. The material supports for the political space of appearance and, as important, the space of disappearance are the often-ignored aspect of being (not) present. The various elements of presente can override and annihilate the others now and for a very long time. Yet even within necropolitics, this politics of death, we find necro-resistance and necro-art, the politics of life fought in and from the space of death itself, affirming the continuing presence of all those whom biopower has deemed expendable, the "resurgence" of cultural practices Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes of, long ago declared dead.[95]

Epistemicide

Here, I advocate for an embodied form of engagement with others that takes us beyond the disciplined and restrictive ways of knowing and acting that

our Eurocentric traditions offer us. I join fellow travelers working to undiscipline disciplines, to move from the university to the multiversity, as well as those who search for alternative epistemic practices in their academic fields and elsewhere—in art, performance, and other forms of world-making. Performance itself, as Guillermo Gómez-Peña notes, offers "a conceptual 'territory' with fluctuating weather and borders, a place where contradiction, ambiguity, and paradox are not only tolerated but encouraged. . . . Our performance country is a temporary sanctuary for other rebel artists and theorists expelled from monodisciplinary fields and separatist communities."[96] This territory is full of fugitives, artists, scholars, and activists who resist colonialist limitations.

¡Presente! enacts not just an attitude and a defiant stance but also a way of knowing and being in the world that asks us to rethink and unlearn some of the limitations imposed by Western thought and education. Our epistemic, political, and economic institutions were built on the backs of the conquered, the enslaved, the indebted, and the excluded, and not simply because black slaves and indigenous peons built the universities in the Americas that would deny them entrance. The colonialist project coproduced systems of rational thought in which the isolated, individuated subject came into being as a product of his own self-recognition, turning all else into an object of knowledge to be mastered and controlled.[97] This epistemic move annuls reciprocity and relationality. It facilitates the extermination and enslavement of those others, the "not I." The repercussions on the subjugated peoples not included in the defining "I" have been devastating. The coemergence has produced a class of the annihilating or killer "I"s.

Not only were the colonized peoples excluded as subjects and producers of knowledge, but Western educational systems organized knowledge into what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls "monocultures." He coined the term "epistemicide" to signal the damages to ways of knowing that fall outside neat divisions and classifications.[98] Aníbal Quijano makes a similar point, as does Grosfoguel, who links the attack on indigenous systems of knowledge to the expulsion of Jewish and Muslim populations from Spain, the enslavement of Africans, and the burning of women as witches to establish "racial/patriarchal power and epistemic structures at a world scale entangled with processes of global capitalist accumulation."[99] Written documents, beginning with the *Requerimiento*, declared the invaders the rightful owners of the lands.[100] In God's name, the pope bequeathed them to the Catholic king and queen of Spain. The archive, as I argued in *The Archive and the Repertoire*, became an instrument of conquest.

Before the conquest, the indigenous empires (Aztec, Maya, Inca) valued education. The Aztecs, for example, had a formal educational system for both noble and common boys and girls. In the schools or *calmécac*, young nobles were taught by the wise ones, the *tlamatinime*, those of "the transmitted knowledge" who "taught and followed the truth."[101] The youths were expected to dedicate themselves to the priesthood, war, or the arts.[102] The wise, in turn, transmitted the way/road through song and painting (writing in glyphs): "They were in charge of painting all the sciences they knew and had achieved and of teaching by means of memory all the songs that conserved their sciences and histories."[103]

Knowledge, as in painting, memorizing, learning, and practicing skills, is not a thing out there in the world, ready to be found or measured or ingested. Knowing, like memory, like identity, is relational. It's a doing, a learning, hard work that we do with others, a passing on carried out in the present. In Quechua, the word for learning, *yachasun*, exists only in present progressive form because learning always takes place in the present.[104] What counts as knowledge, and who participates in knowledge production, however, has almost always been defined by issues of class, gender, and other ideological factors. Colonization dismissed the noncanonical forms of knowledge of the conquered as well as the people who practiced them as *gente sin razón* (those without reason). The Huarochirí Manuscript, written in Quechua at the end of the sixteenth century by Francisco de Avila, announced, "If the ancestors of the people called Indians had known writing in early times, then the lives they lived would not have faded from view."[105] That he could not see or understand their cultural productions did not mean they ceased to exist or to have lasting value. Many indigenous languages, rituals, fiestas, songs, architectures, embroideries, and culinary, medical, and agricultural practices remain visible today.

Epistemicide produces what Leanne Betasamosake Simpson calls "cognitive imperialism that was aimed at convincing us we were weak and defeated people."[106] The pain and costs of epistemicide continue, excluding many forms of knowledge and knowledge producers, wrecking humans, animals, ecosystems, and cultural systems. Our disciplines often unwittingly sustain the very inequalities some of them purport to address because they have been shaped by that same system of compartmentalization and separation. How much do we need to unlearn so that we can learn again, differently? ¡Presente! envisions knowledge as a relational act, an engaged and located knowing, as a process of being with, literally walking and talking with others with all the theoretical pitfalls and ethical and moral complications

and contradictions in terms of access and power that entails. Not engaging does not solve any of the existing difficulties; it simply avoids them. Being with, in motion, accepts knowledge as a practice developed in transit with others, not knowing what lies around the bend, always developing, never arriving.

This study, in its own way, joins others written in the last decades that have attempted to challenge these self-induced and self-serving blinders that now, many agree, threaten to exterminate us and all else on earth. Knowledge (what it means, who makes it, for whom, toward what end, and so on) in Western thought, it seems, is beginning to emerge from the epistemic lockdown mode that narrows our understanding of subjectivity, agency, even life to everything surrounding "us," meaning not just humans but rather *some* humans. As Critical Art Ensemble declared in 2000, "there is no paradigm, model, or application that is not in some kind of critical trouble."[107] Foucault in 1975 had already noted a shift in theoretical thinking from "the all-encompassing and global theories" to "something resembling a sort of autonomous and non-centralized theoretical production that does not need a visa from some common regime to establish its validity."[108] He recognizes the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" that had previously been "masked" and "disqualified." These "knowledges from below" have always been in evidence for the communities that produced and animated them.[109] Although I would in principle prefer the use of the plural, knowledges, or *saberes* (ways of knowing), Foucault's use of the plural here inadvertently suggests that the all-encompassing, traditional Western knowledge (singular) is being challenged by all these little knowledges. This risks reaffirming the imperial "I"/subjugated "not I" binary that I critiqued earlier, although now the "I" has come under attack. My point here is simple: instead of using singular knowledge for the powerful and plural knowledges for the subjugated, recognize that we all produce knowledge, or knowledges. What's becoming clearer to many of us, however, is that we (the people I walk and talk with) are among those who bear the violence of monocultural thinking. These insurgent knowledges, as Foucault noted, are the product of struggle. They/we form part of the undercommons that Fred Moten and Stefano Harney describe.[110] The recent naming and critiques of the Anthropocene reflect the heightened awareness of the many costs of this patriarchal, capitalist, colonial-centeredness and push for more humane and environmentally sound policies. The new Copernican-esque revolution that situates humans as part of (rather than at the center of) life, obliging us to factor in the externalities of all our actions, requires us to decenter our inherited epistemic systems.

Native studies, critical race theories, feminist, queer, and trans theories, and disability studies, among others, envision knowledge as inseparable from struggle, and they push to decenter the white, masculinist discourse that authorizes a specific type of knower and determines what counts as knowledge. Anti- and decolonial struggles have been all about challenging the centeredness of the West and the Western subject that has relegated all else to the periphery.[111] As Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has been arguing for decades, decolonization includes revalorizing the autochthonous languages that allow us to know, think, communicate, and be outside the colonial framework.

Scholars and scientists from a broad spectrum of traditional disciplines have also joined the struggle to expand what we consider knowledge and whom we deem animate beings. Many entities, we're learning, are alive and interact with everything else. Biological studies in quorum sensing discovered that bacteria—among the oldest known life forms—do not function as a singular organism but communicate, coordinate, and adapt to their environment. The realization that animals, trees, the earth, and all else have agency that exceeds human comprehension has made it into popular culture—trade books, talk radio, television shows, cartoons, podcasts, and blogs teem with findings. Some scholars object to what they see as the overly broad, vitalist form of materialism, objecting that it "is out to decenter the all-sovereign subject into the mesh of material forces that constitute it."[112] Well, yes, as I argue in chapter 8. Exactly.

Various strategies of separation and containment continue. Some are obvious: we continue to separate knowledges into parts, divisions, fields, and subfields of specializations unintelligent to those in contiguous areas, making it difficult if not impossible for people to speak and think beyond these divides. Others less so: our emergent technologies and forms of transmission, such as media culture and digital platforms, further tighten our epistemic grids. Programming and code, Tara McPherson argues, are "lenticular . . . a structural device that makes simultaneously viewing the various images . . . nearly impossible." The lenticular, she continues, "is a way of organizing the world. It structures representations as well as epistemologies. It also serves to secure our understandings . . . in very narrow registers, fixating on sameness or difference while forestalling connection and interrelation."[113] So while we may program inter- and postdisciplinary courses and seminars, the ways in which we conceptualize, organize, and learn knowledge further cements the boundaries.

Indigenous communities learned long ago that the positioning of the colonial patriarchal knowing, thinking subject (*gente de razón*—the people

of reason) over them, the *gente sin razón*, has cost them not only their territory, their livelihood, but also their capacity to self-identify, and even at times their lives. Gradually many others on earth are feeling the impact of the rapacious policies that align self-referentiality and self-interest with control and profit. While I will expand on this later, ¡Presente! allows me to explore how some indigenous thought dovetails alongside (not against, or under) current findings in the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, enabling a rearticulation and reanimation of a politics of presence that draws from various epistemological systems but does not claim the knowledge of any one disciplinary base. The move toward postdisciplinarity invites us to meet and have a conversation on the other side of disciplines, beyond the fence and the academic formations and divisions that have created many of the epistemic black boxes that make certain kinds of knowing possible and others impossible or difficult to apprehend.

Here, then, I join Santos in the practice of a rearguard theory. "Our knowledge," he writes, "flies at low altitude . . . stuck to the body." Rearguard theory, "based on the experiences of large, marginalized minorities and majorities that struggle against unjustly imposed marginality and inferiority," pertains to the pre- and postdisciplinary realms.[114] Many of us are strangers here, having learned certain important skills but forgotten others. Younger physicians in the United States, for example, have been trained and socialized to use increasingly sophisticated diagnostic equipment. The reimbursement incentives and liability environment further enable this trend. This results in a general degradation of history taking and the physical examination of patients. The cornerstones of the doctor-patient relationship, the human interaction skills, are being forgotten. Many economic, social, and political forces across the board shape what we know, what we are taught not to know or value.

Here, jumping the fence beyond our designated, disciplinary area, we've left our expertise at the gate. There are no clear paths or reading lists. Rearguard theory resonates with J. Halberstam's "low theory," a way to think and "locate all the in-between spaces" and negotiate and push through "the divisions between life and art, practice and theory, thinking and doing, and into a more chaotic realm of knowing and unknowing."[115] Not everyone agrees on what these alternative spaces should look like. For Harney and Moten, the undercommons offer a space where no one is correct or corrected. For them, it is a refuge, "'no questions asked.' It is unconditional—the door swings open for the refuge even though it may let in police agents."[116] The Zapatistas, whose

communities are under constant threat of extermination, literally require that people show passports or papers for entry to their territories. They fight to keep the police and military out, even as they forge a utopian, capacious, alternative world: "a world that holds many worlds." For them, it's all about the question—how to live in a dangerous world defined by lack of equality, respect, and care. We all need to answer that in our own ways. So rearguard theory can never operate in the same way everywhere and always. Nonetheless, it needs to include the broader ecosystem of which we are only one part. And in addition to Halberstam's "unknowing," it would demand an active unlearning of some of the training that we've internalized about what matters, and what constitutes acceptable objects of analysis and forums for debate and dissemination.

Time to slow down.

Pause.

Stop in our tracks.

Acknowledge that it's hard to unlearn.

Like learning, it takes practice, and constant repetition.

1.3 Alexei Taylor, *Footprints Standing*, 2019.

Linking Knowing to Acting

Plato, Arendt reminds us, "was the first to introduce the division between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not know . . . so that knowing what to do and doing it became two altogether different performances."[117]

What might a performance that links knowing and acting look like? Taking a lead from performance theorists and artists, ¡Presente! enacts ways of learning and transmitting knowledge by moving through scenarios, dialogues, long table discussions, and various exercises and pedagogies that stage research as performance as well as performance research. If, as I argue, knowledge production is a relational practice, involving action, then how do we perform and exercise these acts of knowing? The separation of knowledge production (authorized educators) and consumption (students) in today's capitalist culture builds on centuries of separating knowing from

doing. Knowledge production, as a cohesive performance, entails elements of interrelationality, of choice, of agency, reflection, and follow-through.

When I asked Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, a feminist sociologist and activist from Bolivia, how to say "I" and "me" in Ayamara, she looked perplexed. Aymara, like many other native languages, does not have a word for "me." There is no "I" but rather *ch'ixi*, a collective subject forged through the negotiation of the individual "I" and the collective "we."[118] To exist as me, I need someone else to point to me, to recognize and acknowledge me. In other words, to be me, I have to walk and talk with others. This is not the self-defining, self-reflexive "I" of the cogito. Indigenous groups, for their differences and specificities, share a sense of a communal subjectivity. The "I" or "me" is always relational, transitive, a being with. In the language of Pangnirtung, spoken in the Arctic, my colleague Peter Kulchyski says that "I" exists as "a suffix, -tunga or -junga (depending on whether it follows a consonant or vowel). Quviasuktunga (I am happy). Uqalimajunga (I am reading)."[119]

The "I" that initiated the conversation is not the "I" that emerges. But we need to be in the conversation. As Rivera Cusicanqui makes clear, there is no anticolonial discourse without an anticolonial practice.[120] The way we do this is the way we do everything.

For me, that means going to meet people in their own spaces, on their own terms, not to study or observe them but to listen and learn from their actions, words, and epistemic systems. This is a stretch for me intellectually and physically, but also affectively, ethically, and politically. The contradictions and ambiguities abound. It is impossible, I agree with my friend Jacques Servin of The Yes Men (chapter 9), to really lead an ethical life. I fly in a plane that burns fuel and enter Mexico with a passport to meet with migrants who hide from the deportation police, their feet blistered from walking. I keenly feel the contradictions and discuss them with the people I encounter. Why, we ask ourselves, do we even want to talk and walk together? What are the stakes? The relative advantages? The answer is not obvious, or a given I can take for granted.

What I/we means, what it can and cannot know, is necessarily linked to those others with whom we walk and talk. Colonial and neoliberal conditions (including of course language, skin tone, educational systems, migratory status, income inequalities, and cultural practices) continue to delimit many of those exchanges. "Ch'ixi" and "Quviasuktunga" can only ever exist in quotations for me. I haven't learned to pronounce these words—my vocal cords, tongue, lips, brain, and even heart would have to undergo training.

If I sense their existential, epistemic, and ontological dimensions and potentiality, it's only because Rivera Cusicanqui and Kulchyski took the time to explain the concepts to me. The forms of rationality these words conjure might, in the final analysis, sound like Nancy's *being with*, but their genealogy differs profoundly. It has nothing to do with the Hegelian notion of "I" as a "pure self-contained unity," as "the philosophical subject" that grounds Western thought and that Nancy parts from, and parts with.[121] This "I" does not "presuppose [. . . the] self-contained Ego" based on differentiation from all other/s: "Relating itself to itself, it relegates the other to a self (or an absence of self) that is different."[122] This is not Heidegger's something that comes from nothing, the self-conscious and self-referential being or *Da-sein*.[123]

What am "I" left with, and where to start, in the search for alternate epistemologies, understandings, genealogies, and practices of rationality, of *hacer presencia*?

Epistemologies of the Heart



1.4 Artist unknown, *Zapatista Heart*. Date unknown. COLLECTION OF DIANA TAYLOR.

The question for me, an academic trained in the Western tradition, is how even to imagine that "I" can begin to unlearn some of the concepts that blind me. How to think from another place that is not only the highly differentiated and isolating "I" of Western thought, reflected in the *Oxford English Dictionary*'s definition of "present": "The state or fact of existing, occurring, or being present." Being present to what? To whom? To what end? I am counting on my bilinguality and biculturality to help me get started on this road.

The Mayan Tzeltal-speaking scholar Juan López Intzín, known to me by his indigenous name, Xuno, has also inspired me, embarked as he is on his own journey to try to think differently, from a different place, through different linguistic possibilities.[124] Inevitably schooled in a colonial system, and given the colonial name Juan López, he turned to his native Tzeltal as a starting point to think other, decolonial ways of being in the world. Sacred texts such as Popol Wuj (or Vuh) offer alternative cosmologies from which he develops his theory of "epistemologies of the heart."[125] This creation story initiates with discussions among various creators, not a singular god. Involved were the Framer, Shaper, She Who Has Borne Children, He Who Has Begotten Sons, Hunahpu Possum and Hunahpu Coyote, Great White Peccary and Coati, Sovereign and Quetzal Serpent, Heart of Lake and Heart of Sea, Creator of the Green Earth and Creator of the Blue Sky.[126]

The multiplicity of gods reflecting cosmic, animal, and personified dimensions of existence avoids the concentration of power in a singular God the Father. At the same time, however, the multiple forces create the deep underlying instability and precarity of the Mesoamerican experience of the cosmos as always on the verge of extinction. The Framers had experimented with earlier worlds, other forms of life that they hoped would invoke their names and sing their praises. As each creation failed, the Framers destroyed their creatures, their world, and their universes. Four suns had already perished amid environmental devastation (flood, fire, hurricane). Everyone expects the fifth to meet a similar catastrophic end. López Inztín goes back to the section in the Popol Vuh, for example, in which the people or effigies made of wood (the second of the Framers' creations) were found wanting and destroyed:

> The small and the great animals came in upon them. Their faces [of the effigies] were crushed by the trees and the stones. They were spoken to by all their maize grinders and their cooking griddles, their plates and their

pots, their dogs and their grinding stones. However many things they had, all of them crushed their faces.

Their dogs and their turkeys said to them:

"Pain you have caused us. You ate us. Therefore it will be you that we will eat now."[127]

The destruction of these wooden people resulted from their lack of *ch'ulel*, the life force that resides in everything. The effigies' inability to honor everything around them—the animals, the trees and stones, their cooking utensils—prompts the uprising against them. They are destroyed by those whom they abused.[128] This is one of the many examples that López takes from the Popol Vuh to argue for the current vitality among contemporary Mayans of an epistemic system reflected in their ancient texts.

Even for him, using ancient texts to sustain his inquiry is a daunting undertaking. The conquest, he says, colonized and domesticated almost all the indigenous peoples of the Americas.[129] How, five hundred years later, can he de-domesticate himself and others? He begins by unthinking (*in-pensar*) and feel-thinking (*sentipensar*) what "respect" and the "good dignified life" or "life with dignity" (*vida digna*) might mean from an indigenous epistemic system. This system assumes the heart, not the head, as the starting point for reflection, knowledge, and understanding. Heart is a noun and a verb—much like the popular logo, x hearts y. The process of decolonization entails "yo'taninel sbentayel snopel sp'ijil jolo'tan[il]," the walking and enhearting reflection toward knowledge of the mind-heart, which bears resemblance to ch'ixi as "parallel co-existence."[130] López calls this the "stalel, ways of being-being-here, think-feel, act and know the world."[131] He credits his bilinguality, as does Rivera Cusicanqui in the *Potosi Principle*, with the expansive dialogic character I alluded to earlier, allowing him to study and build on meanings and gestures to explore other epistemic potentialities.

While being and knowledge can be expressed in multiple ways, English regularly uses one verb each, "to be" and "to know," to express a broad range of emotional, physical, and mental states and identities. In English I/we can be alive, dead, happy, sad, depressed, straight, trans, black, white, brown, strong, weak, sick, slim, or just about anything. Not so in Spanish. Spanish differentiates both being and knowing into two main concepts. *Ser* (to be) transmits a sense of permanence. Certain traits—like gender, sexual orientation, national status and racial identity, height, and religious affiliation—supposedly endure. Others that refer to location (I am here/*estoy aquí*),

mood (we are happy/*estamos felices*), and existential conditions such as alive or dead (*estamos vivos o muertos*), use *estar* (to be) to signal a transitory state. I would love to study some of these designations. Nationality is permanent? So is gender and sexual orientation? I'd especially like to think of how death comes to be a transitory condition in this language, but that is a project for another day.

Spanish also has two words for "to know." *Conocer*, related to cognition, means to be familiar with someone or something, while *saber* is related to wisdom (*sabiduría*), facts, and taste (*sabor*). *Saberes*, plural, captures the multiplicity of knowledges, the many ways of knowing. These differentiations also have far richer epistemic possibilities than I can explore here, and the nuances between the words are endlessly frustrating for English speakers—who can simply be and know everything. While this sounds flippant, this is an example of how the words and grammatical structures we have available to us shape our sense of being in the world. Yet both of these colonial languages clearly fall short of the Maya-Tzeltal quoted above in which *stalel* suggests a broader understanding of the constellation "being-being-here, think-feel, act and know the world" that make knowing/acting/being/feeling/inseparable. But even for Xuno López these Mayan Tzeltal words only approximate the "original" words found in the Popol Vuh in the language of the Maya K'iche. No one, clearly, is exempt from the burden of learning and trying to work things through. So instead of a search for origins, Xuno López seeks approximations, insights, and pathways into alternative ways of being in the world.

Two key elements of the epistemology of the heart, according to Xuno López, are the Tzeltal notions of the ch'ulel and *ich'el ta muk*. Ch'ulel, in play throughout this book, recognizes that everything has a life—humans, animals, plants, mountains, and so forth—and thereby allows for intersubjectivity: "The ch'ulel is what turns everything that exists into a subject, allowing us to interact as subject to subject."[132] The "ich'el ta muk is the recognition of the value, grandeur, and dignity of all that exists, including humans, animals, and the ecosystem." That concept interpolates all living beings as subjects—not the Althusserian state subject, not subjects reduced to commercial or inanimate objects as in my chapter 8, "Dead Capital." The combination of the two elements opens several world-remaking possibilities—anticolonial, communal, and ecologically sustainable. "It is necessary," Xuno López believes, "for us to deconstruct the vision of the world, the mentality, and the subjectivity that have been imposed upon us since the conquest, and instead look at the world from that situated heart that is at the center of our com-

munities and collective processes. This is what we call epistemologies of the heart. The heart is a key element in our Indigenous thought."[133] Knowledge qualifies as organic, a product not just of our brains but of our entire body in relation to other living things. As opposed to the thingification of people, animals, and all else in rapacious capitalism, López's situated heart (he credits Donna Haraway's "situated knowledge") enables the "humanization" of things that animate our world.[134] Sharing this epistemology would require a radical unlearning of much that Westerners know, including the notion of the differentiated I.

Underlying both Rivera Cusicanqui's explanation of ch'ixi and Xuno López's ch'ulel and ich'el ta muk rests the notion of mutual recognition, valorization, and respect among far greater numbers of animate beings or subjects. Becoming itself requires this act of mutual recognition, this being presente, talking, walking, and enhearting with others. The epistemic systems one can glean in these words and practices might allow me/us to envision a more capacious understanding of "present" as "presente," as an ethical and political practice, a way that strengthens intersubjective generosity and mutual recognition. We might end up talking to each other in the undercommons. "We owe each other everything," Moten and Harney acknowledge. This reminds me of the Zapatista saying, "Para todos, todo. Para nosotros, nada." (Everything for everybody. For us, nothing.) It's not about "us" in a narrowly defined way anymore than the "I" is about me. Bruno Latour's recent work expresses his conviction that Western epistemic tools are not up to the task of generative world-making: "To put it as starkly as possible, I would claim that those who intend to survive the coming cataclysms of climate on hope and faith, or who square off against it armed only with the results of externalized and universal knowledge are doomed."[135] It's, as Jack Halberstam acknowledges in the preface to *The Undercommons*, another way of being together, a realization that "we must change things or die. . . . If there is an undercommons, then we must all find our way to it."

For Xuno López (and Rivera Cusicanqui in her way), the ontological exploration is practical and political as well as epistemic. The various dimensions animate each other. The situated heart, nurtured in an expanded environment of recognition (that includes trees, rivers, and mountains that others might consider inanimate objects), cannot tolerate domination, exploitation, and domestication. It becomes *el corazón rebelde*, the rebellious heart of the Zapatista movement. That movement, as I discuss in chapter 3, draws from ancient Mayan teachings and from contemporary research and practice. Scholars such as John Holloway, Noam Chomsky, and Donna Har-

away inform contemporary Zapatista thought. "[Zapatistas] adapt, they say, '*para no dejar de ser*' (so as not to cease being) historical beings."[136] Xuno López, with the Zapatistas, does not subscribe to identity politics or to theories of authenticity. One doesn't have to be indigenous to be a Zapatista any more than one has to be a woman to be a feminist. Nor does he sequester indigenous knowledge; he prioritizes ideas in dialogue and exchange. Traditions inspire, but they need to be revisited and updated by all sides. Xuno López, for example, is a feminist who advocates for greater rights for women even in the Zapatista communities founded on the 1994 Women's Revolutionary Law. Communities adapt in order to survive.

While seemingly occupying a different epistemic universe altogether, N. Katherine Hayles offers a surprisingly congruent notion of an expanded understanding of cognition through cognitive biology. On the other side of disciplinary divides, different conversations become possible. Without alluding to ch'ulel, cognitive biology understands that cognition is more generalized than what we're used to believing.[137] Hayles, following Ladislav Kováč, agrees that "cognition is not limited to humans or organisms with consciousness; it extends to all life forms, including those lacking central nervous systems such as plants and microorganisms."[138] Hayles too divides knowing into two types, though her terms do not map onto the distinctions between "saber" and "conocer." Hayles distinguishes between thinking and cognition: "Thinking, as I use the term, refers to high-level mental operations such as reasoning abstractly, creating and using verbal languages, constructing mathematical theorems, composing music, and the like, operations associated with higher consciousness. Although Homo sapiens may not be unique in these abilities, humans possess them in greater degree and with more extensive development than other species."

"Cognition," for Hayles, "is a much broader faculty present to some degree in all biological life forms and many technical systems."[139] The distinction, for her, is the one she develops to "replace human/nonhuman: cognizers versus noncognizers. On one side are humans and all other biological life forms, as well as many technical systems; on the other, material processes and inanimate objects."[140] Cognizers, she goes on to explain, have choice; they are actors. The word "agents" she reserves "for material forces and objects" in recognition that "noncognizers may possess agential powers that dwarf anything humans can produce; think of the awesome powers of an avalanche, tsunami, tornado, blizzard, sandstorm, hurricane" even though they do not exercise choice.[141] The universe, then, is animated by actors and

agents rather than objects and things, each trying to find ways to adapt and thrive. All life, Kováč argues, "incessantly, at all levels, by millions of species, is 'testing' all the possibilities of how to advance ahead. . . . At all levels, from the simplest to the most complex, the overall construction of the subject, the embodiment of the achieved knowledge, represents its epistemic complexity."[142]

Hayles's inclusion of "technical systems" within the realm of cognition might seem out of line with the indigenous epistemic systems I cited earlier. But I think that technical systems form a vital part of indigenous cognitive universes. The Huichol or more correctly the Wixáritar people of central Mexico make sacred paintings by pressing yarn, beads, or fine thread into wax as they take peyote. The art communicates the pathways, visions, and interactions with the gods and thus becomes a way of knowing, thinking with, and being with in motion, in transit. If, as Hayles suggests, "cognition is a process that interprets information within contexts that connect it with meaning," then the art might well unveil a truth unknown to the Wixáritar and inform other meaning-making practices.[143] The sacred drums, in other communities, speak; they are actors in their contexts. My aim is not to push comparisons, but rather to think of connectivity across these various epistemic frames and beyond disciplinary divides where people are grappling with similar phenomena and asking similar questions. I can imagine a discussion between someone trained in cognitive biology and someone versed in indigenous epistemologies (among many others) to develop strategies for expanding our conversations. The languages may all be different—from computer code to Wixáritar wax paintings to theories of "participatory sense-making" and "distributive cognition"—but the impetus is a common one.[144] All species continually test ways to survive and thrive, as Kováč puts it. The Zapatistas adapt, they say, "para no dejar de ser" (so as not to cease being) historical beings. Western academics like myself attempt to break out of our epistemic lockdown by envisioning other ways of being and becoming in the world. The goals may vary—for me, I strive to know differently, not just to survive but to be less complicit in the colonialist production and practice of knowledge.

1.5 Alexei Taylor, *Walking*, 2019.

Versions of the chapters in this book were written over a period of ten or so years, and I noticed that I was developing a peripatetic strategy for staging the work. My observations and theorizations sprang from my walking and talking with others. In some cases, this practice resembled Aristotle's walking in circles around the outside edge of the grove as he spoke with his students, who literally followed him. The term "peripatetic," from the ancient Greek word *περιπατητικός* (*peripatêtikos*), which means "of walking" or "given to walking about," points to three distinct but related aspects of how I understand walking theory.[145] The first, and most obvious, emphasizes the role of movement in learning as practice that I stress throughout. Second, as Aristotle was not a citizen of Athens and therefore could not own property there, the Lyceum where he gathered with students was a more improvised, less institutional setting for scholarly discussions. And third, the discussions were consequently more informal, though no less deep or challenging. There's an outside quality to this model that interests me and that (without making the connection) I have reproduced in my own itinerant practice—outside the formal boundaries of the Academy, physically outside in an improvised or mobile space, decentering the periphery of the grove, outside the nation-state or not wholly identifying or belonging to it, and beyond the lecture format toward more informal yet challenging conversations.

Walking and talking, or the peripatetic method, underlines the notion of knowledge production as doing—seeing, listening, reading, thinking, talking are all actions that we undertake together. We interact with people and the world around us. Even reading alone, we are in the company of the author. Books, insights, songs, and much else accompany us everywhere we go. But in this study, and in the practices I describe here, we meander through various places for short periods of time—Mexico City, Chiapas,

Guatemala, São Paulo, Santiago de Chile, back through Central America to Chiapas, New York, Montreal. The questions link and cut through all these spaces, including the politics of movement itself. Additionally, several of these pieces developed in dialogue with my students, and often I followed them. Sometimes they led me through fields and issues I wasn't familiar with. At others, we literally moved in zigzag fashion through the south of Mexico, thinking with and through the people and situations we experienced.

Some chapters, such as chapter 7, "Tortuous Routes: Four Walks through Villa Grimaldi," think about walking through multiple acts. "I" walk through the former detention and torture center in Chile at various times over a period of a decade, with different survivors, colleagues, students, and sometimes alone with an audio tour. Each time I see/experience something different. My walks through the space have led me to question who it is for (survivors, visitors?) and what it does. Is the "peace park" a memorial for the thousands who were tortured and hundreds who died there, or has it morphed beyond recognition into a cultural center to draw and instruct the general population? The movement, then, is not necessarily or even usually linear, and even the same space changes over time. Chapter 3, focused on the Zapatistas, unfolds in a slow, spiraling motion. Life is a struggle, as much for contemporary Mesoamericans as for their ancestors. The migrant trails from Central America through Mexico on the way to the United States (chapter 5) are often *caminos de la muerte* or roads of death. In chapter 8, I follow Teatro de Vertigem's disjointed, inside/out performance route for 958 meters, through the underbelly of São Paulo, immersed in an enactment of capitalism that I have long understood but never truly experienced. Some stops, as in chapter 9, exist at the intersection of many spatial practices. Chiapas, Mexico, becomes one more site where the Monsanto Corporation (legally a person) exists and pushes its genetically modified corn even as it practices similar operations throughout the world. Monsanto is simultaneously there and everywhere, a person and disembodied. The intervention we performed there with Jacques Servin of The Yes Men and Jesusa Rodríguez aligned digital space with national activist, legal, and educational organizations in Mexico and the United States. And so, through the movement and tempo that make up this book, the connections among several previously invisible spaces and practices suddenly light up. After writing two or three of these pieces, I began to think of them as walk-throughs, though I hope the term might be repurposed as a move-through. Along with my friends and colleagues with disabilities, I know that walking is no one thing.

My experience of walking, like all else, is shaped by who "I" am and have become: as a baby in northern Mexico, I contracted polio. After years of braces and operations, I eventually assumed my status as the upright mammal Bataille and others take for granted.[146] I continue to live and deal with the sequelae. So walking can never be an abstraction for me, a thinking and being that ignores bodily exertion and situatedness. I'm aware of almost every step I take, even as I walk and talk with others. I measure feasibility in meters and kilometers. Thus, walking for me is not about freedom, leisure, or domination as for eighteenth-century English gentlemen, the embodiment of the individual and differentiated Enlightenment subject: "I cannot see the wit of walking and talking at the same time. . . . The soul of a journey is liberty, perfect liberty, to think, feel, do, just as one pleases."[147] Walking reminds me not only of my physical limitations and dependency at times on those who walk with me, but on how small I am compared to everything around me—the city, the Mayan highlands, the Sonoran Desert. In the desert, with its weaponized nature, a rattlesnake can be more powerful than a mere human.

Walking is a thinking/becoming in motion, a pedagogy and training (peripatetic). Walking is one of those acts that form, rather than result from, thought.[148] The act of walking produces its own way of thinking, unthinking, and thinking-feeling negotiating assuredness and vulnerability, motion along with uncertainty. It demands we pay attention to terrain, to time, to the conditions on and of the ground under our feet, to the limits of our own physical bodies, to our balance and fear of falling, to the politics of access and characteristics of a specific location, to the direction of our movement, to distance and reduced visibility. What lies around that corner, or over that mountain? We need to face, negotiate, and resolve challenges. Decisions need to be made. Walking, for some, can enact possession, a visual control and domination that suggest that everything I see is mine. At times walking confirms and transcends distance, and even our own limitations.

Walking can lead to new insights: "A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch."[149] Deleuze and Guattari take us on a "stroll of a schizo," beyond the repressive boundaries of "the self and the non-self, outside and inside, [that] no longer have any meaning whatsoever."[150]

Walking is also a political practice. The way we do this is the way we do everything.

1.6 Wall mural depicting Central American migrants in Ciudad Hidalgo, Mexico, on the border with Guatemala, 2015. Artist unknown. PHOTO: DIANA TAYLOR.

For Gandhi, coming from a non-Western epistemic system and an anticolonial struggle, walking referred to a specific personal and political practice. As opposed to the leisure and freedom assured by wealth, his walk was a poor practice, one identified with poverty insofar as the poor can afford no other means of transportation.[151] A simple practice (place "one foot in front of the other") also enacted his philosophy of a simple life, one that attempted not to exploit others and their labor.[152] Gandhi's walking entailed determination, endurance, and commitment, an understanding that enabled his political commitment to the slow and steady quality of the walks and marches in the pursuit of independence.[153]

There are so many ways to think about walking, so many places that walking leads us.[154]

For Central American migrants, scurrying and hiding in their attempts to cross the border into southern Mexico to reach its northern border into the United States, walking is a terrifying, lonely, and seemingly endless enterprise. Gaunt from dehydration and exhaustion, their feet blistered and bleeding, they tell of being caught by federal and local agents and shipped back to their home countries, only to depart again, on foot, in search of a safer life.[155] Their children, if they travel with them, refer to themselves as migrants, beings in motion who come into presence with no location or national identity.[156]

"To walk" (*NEHNEM(I)* for the Mexica (Aztecs) shares a linguistic root with "to live" (*NEM(I)*.[157] *Neltiliztli*, from *nelhuáyotl* (meaning cement or foundation) is related to "foot" (*néhuatl*). The concept of truth is based on standing, on having a foundation, on being well grounded.[158] The glyph of the footprint for Mesoamericans represented movement, identity, location, relationality, and history. Mexica maps and writings are dotted with footprints to indicate where people were coming from and where they were headed. Four footprints in a circle signaled the marketplace.[159] The long road signified historical process and struggle.

Tira de Peregrinación, one of the earliest migration documents we have in the Americas, tells of the slow migration over two hundred years of the Chichimeca and the Mexica from Aztlán toward Tenochtitlan, where they would establish the center of their emerging empire. The walkers carried their gods on their backs as they made their way south. The map, like other Mesoamerican maps, does not show the contours of the geographical territory but rather the events, motion, and internal relations between and among beings: divine, natural, human, animal. The footprints condition the



1.7 The *Tira de Peregrinación*, also known as *Codex Boturini* (sixteenth century).

map: "an action permits one to see something," the events and their telling.[160] Presence structures space and the other way around. Practice on the ground creates the contours, from the body's vantage point, as opposed to the bird's-eye view of geographic formations in European maps of the same period. The walkers do not see the goal clearly ahead of them. They follow the promise that they will recognize the place when they come to it. And, as the walkers' bundles make clear, we never walk alone, even when solitary. The Mexica carry their gods, ideologies, supplies, and weapons on their backs; they accompany them everywhere. Their bodies, like ours, transmit traces of familial, group, and territorial affinities, obligations, and belongings. Their clothes signal gender and status; the signs attached to their heads are place markers. They, like us, carry their worlds with them even as they venture into the unknown. In short, walking, as one way of becoming in

motion, is utterly culturally coded. It's never a simple practice, never "one foot in front of the other."

Here I take up Juan Carlos Ruiz's invitation to "join us: say ¡presente!" This writing is a journey, an *amoxohtoca*, a moving from one event and location to another, a bringing into focus, a way of making sense. As I set forth, I hope you'll talk and walk with me.

Notes

Prologue

1. "¡Ahí está el detalle! Que no es ni lo uno, ni lo otro, sino todo lo contrario." Augustina Caferri, "23 frases divertidas del comediante mexicano Cantinflas," About Español, July 2, 2019, https://www.aboutespanol.com/23-frases-divertidas-del-comediante-mexicano-cantinflas-696281.

One ¡Presente!

1. The PPT met in New York City on September 4–7, 2014. See the interview, "Garifuna Woman—Permanent People's Tribunal," Hemispheric Institute, 2015, https://vimeo.com/134332716.

2. The Hemispheric Institute began in 1998 as a consortium between New York University, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, and the Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro to share and promote understanding of performance (broadly understood) in the Americas. Marcial Godoy-Anativia, managing director of the Hemispheric Institute, Pablo Domínguez, a PhD candidate at Princeton University, and I formed the core of the research team, and we convened and met with hundreds of researchers, rights advocates, artists, and religious figures from throughout the Americas working on the issue of migration from 2014 to the present. Thanks to Toby Volkman and the Luce Foundation for helping to support this research. For information about the Hemispheric Institute, see https://hemisphericinstitute.org/en/.

3. See Óscar Martínez, *The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail*, trans. Daniela Maria Ugaz and John Washington (London: Verso, 2013), for a full account of La Bestia.

4. An International Human Rights Observation Mission on the Guatemala-Mexico Border (MODH is its Spanish acronym) was held from November 10 to 16 to document and highlight the situation of systematic violations of human rights in the border region between Guatemala and Mexico. "Mexico/Guatemala: International Human Rights Observation Mission on Guatemala-Mexico

Border," *Sipaz Blog*, accessed January 1, 2020, https://sipazen.wordpress.com/2016/12/01/mexicoguatemala-international-human-rights-observation-mission-on-guatemala-mexico-border/.

5. Tomás González, interview, November 13, 2016, Ecologies of Migrant Care, https://migration.hemi.press/fray-tomas/.

6. "About Us: Praise for EMC," Ecologies of Migrant Care, accessed February 3, 2020, https://migration.hemi.press/about-us/.

7. In summer 2017, Hemi convened artists and activists from Mexico and Central America, including Jacques Servin of The Yes Men and Jesusa Rodríguez, in Chiapas, Mexico, to create satirical digital projects meant to disrupt what we all saw as the xenophobic discourses and practices regarding Central American migrants taking place in Mexico and the United States. Two of the interventions were *Somos el Muro* (We are the wall), https://somoselmuro.com.mx/, depicting a fake right-wing group of Mexicans proclaiming themselves "the wall" needed to keep Central Americans out. "Every time you do nothing to help, you are also part of the wall," one character in the video assures a bystander. *Somos el Muro* enjoyed a tepid reception and then went viral about a year after we created it, causing a massive response and much controversy in Central America, Mexico, and the U.S. See the discussion in "On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Joke," *On the Media*, November 30, 2018, https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/internet-nobody-knows-youre-joke; Zachary Small, "Mexican Anti-migrant Video Goes Viral, before Artists Reveal It as Satire," *Hyperallergic*, December 17, 2018, https://hyperallergic.com/475940/millions-believe-an-anti-migrant-video-from-mexico-was-real-until-artists-exposed-it-as-satire/; and for Mexico, "Muy enojados en Honduras por video con contenido xenofobo," *La Prensa*, October 30, 2018, https://www.la-prensa.com.mx/mexico/361792-muy-enojados-en-honduras-por-video-con-contenido-xenofobo. Migratón Fundación (https://migraton.com.mx/), a parody of the popular money-raising telethons, especially those purporting to help migrants, makes clear that migration is a big business in Mexico (as elsewhere). Everyone makes money, except for the migrants. Migratón's Tours, Kids, and Champions use humor to reflect on especially egregious practices. For my work as a professor, see Diana Taylor et al., *Art, Migration, and Human Rights: A Collaborative Dossier by Artists, Scholars, and Activists on the Issue of Migration in Southern Mexico* (New York: HemiPress, 2015). At Hemi, we have organized, transcribed, and subtitled the interviews and visual materials from these interactions to extend the information and reach of the migrant crisis to other domains—to policy makers, advocates, educators, journalists, artists, and activists. We continue to create a series of encounters and conferences (pedagogical, artistic, hemispheric) and to develop a research and advocacy repository of all these materials (including those from this PPT) that are available freely online to all who work to make this political and humanitarian crisis visible. See Ecologies of Migrant Care, https://migration.hemi.press/.

8. Gayatri Spivak, "Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular," in *An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 440.

9. Rigoberta Menchú said that critique was in fact a "sign of privilege." Quoted in Doris Sommer, *Cultural Agency in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 2006, 4. Sommer adds: "Poor people need a next step."

10. Marlène Ramírez-Cancio, associate director of arts and media at Hemi, coins words such as "Ailóbit" (I love it!) to capture the constant creative flow of cultural codes and expressions.

11. I describe this part of my life and training a little more fully in the preface, "Who, When, What, Why," to my book *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

12. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, for example, calls out postcolonial studies in the U.K. and U.S.: "Without altering anything of the relations of force in the 'palaces' of empire, the cultural studies departments of North American universities have adopted the ideas of subaltern studies and launched debates in Latin America, thus creating a jargon, a conceptual apparatus, and forms of reference and counterreference that have isolated academic treatises from any obligation to or dialogue with insurgent social forces." Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, "Ch'ixinakax utxiwa: A Reflection on the Practices and Discourses of Decolonization," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 111 (winter 2012): 98.

13. For a fuller discussion of Malinche, see Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, ch. 3.

14. Dwight Conquergood, "Of Caravans and Carnivals," in *Cultural Struggles: Performance, Ethnography, Praxis*, ed. E. Patrick Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 13.

15. Richard Schechner, *Between Theater and Anthropology* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 36.

16. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xi.

17. Jean-Luc Nancy, in *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), writes, everything "passes between us. . . . All of being is in touch with all of being, but the law of touching is separation" (5). Nancy adds: "Being cannot be anything but being-with-another" (3). Nancy distinguishes being from presence; being is "opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities, everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants, nails, gods—and 'humans'" (3). Ironically, Nancy links presence in humans to language: "'humans,' that is, those who expose sharing and circulation as such by saying 'we,' by saying we to themselves in all possible senses of that expression, and by saying we for the totality of all being." Presence, in humans, according to Nancy, allows for the articulation of a "we," albeit an oddly totalizing and self-referential one, a "we to themselves."

18. Hannah Arendt calls the "space of appearance" "the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together . . . [whose] true space lies between people living together for this purpose." Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 178.

19. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179.

20. Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, "Comunicado de Prensa del Subcomandante Marcos," *Chiapas*, May 28, 1994, http://www.bibliotecas.tv/chiapas/may94/28may94.html.

> Marcos es gay en San Francisco, negro en Sudáfrica, asiático en Europa, chicano en San Isidro, anarquista en España, palestino en Israel, indígena en las calles de San Cristóbal, chavo banda en Neza, rockero en CU, judío en Alemania, ombudsman en la Sedena, feminista en los partidos políticos, comunista en la post guerra fría, preso en Cintalapa, pacifista en Bosnia, mapuche en los Andes, maestro en la CNTE, artista sin galería ni portafolios, ama de casa un sábado por la noche en cualquier colonia de cualquier ciudad de cualquier México, guerrillero en el México de fin del siglo XX, huelguista en la CTM, reportero de nota de relleno en interiores, machista en el movimiento feminista, mujer sola en el metro a las 10 P.M., jubilado en el plantón en el Zócalo, campesino sin tierra, editor marginal, obrero desempleado, médico sin plaza, estudiante inconforme, disidente en el neoliberalismo, escritor sin libros ni lectores, y, es seguro, zapatista en el sureste mexicano.

21. Guillermo Gómez-Peña, "I AM: A Poetic Conversation," accessed January 6, 2020, http://scalar.usc.edu/anvc/dancing-with-the-zapatistas/i-am. In the early 1990s, I wrote a poem, "Spanglish Lesson," as part of my trilogy *The Rediscovery of America by the Warrior for Gringostroika*, which five years later would inspire Subcomandante Marcos to write his famous poem "Marcos Is Gay." Fifteen years later, I have taken Marcos's text, rewritten it, and made it my own again in "Rewriting Marcos," in *Dancing with the Zapatistas*, ed. Diana Taylor with Lorie Novak (Durham, NC: Duke University Press and HemiPress, 2015), http://scalar.usc.edu/anvc.

22. See Diana Taylor, "The Death of a Political 'I': Subcomandante Is Dead, Long Live the Subcomandante!," in Taylor and Novak, *Dancing with the Zapatistas.*

23. The epigraph for this section is from González, interview, November 13, 2016, Ecologies of Migrant Care, https://migration.hemi.press/fray-tomas/.

24. Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995), 25.

25. Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 17–26. Denise Ferreira da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xxxix. See too Denise Ferreira da Silva's "analytics of raciality" (xviii) that map "the productivity of the racial and how it is tied to the emergence of an ontological context—globality—that fuses particular bodily traits, social configurations, and global regions, in which human difference is reproduced as irreducible and unsublatable" (xix).

26. Ramón Grosfoguel links the violence leading to Descartes's *ego cogito* as building from the *ego conquiro* (I conquer, therefore I am) to the *ego extermino* (I exterminate, therefore I am). Ramón Grosfoguel, "The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 11, no. 1 (fall 2013): 73–90, https://www.okcir.com/Articles%20XI%201/Grosfoguel.pdf.

27. Gines de Sepúlveda called the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas "natural slaves," basing himself on Aristotle's *Politics* (Book 1). See José A. Fernández-Santamaria, "Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Nature of the American Indians," *The Americas* 31, no. 4 (1975): 434–51, doi:10.2307/980012.

28. Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=present.

29. Dussel, in *The Invention of the Americas*, 30–31, notes that Columbus died in 1506 convinced he had discovered Asia. "America" was named after Amerigo Vespucci, the first to realize that the new land was not only unknown but unimagined by Europeans. Francisco López de Gómara, *Historia General de las Indias*, vol. 1 (Barcelona: Orbis, 1985), 50. Esteban Mira Caballos, in "Indios Americanos en el reino de Castilla, 1492–1550," *Temas Americanistas* 14 (1998): 2, states the following: "Fernández de Oviedo writes that Columbus brought 9 or 10 indians, of whom one died at sea and two or three 'dolientes' (mourners, sufferers) stayed in the Villa at Palos, so the six remaining went to the Court of the Catholic kings" (inconsistencies in capitalizing "indians" in the original). Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, *Historia general y natural de las Indias* (Madrid: Atlas, 1992), 1. Girolamo Benzoni affirms that two Indians died in the crossing. Girolamo Benzoni, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo* (Madrid: Alianza, 1989), 88.

30. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove, 1967), 10. The idea of turning a somebody into a nobody defines the process of *ningunear* introduced by Octavio Paz, "Máscaras Mexicanas," in *El laberinto de la soledad* (1950; reprint, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 2018).

31. The practice of putting indigenous peoples on display continued for centuries. Minik Wallace, a translator, and his father and other Inuits who helped Commander Robert Edwin Peary on his explorations of the North Pole, were given to the American Museum of Natural History to be studied at the end of the nineteenth century: "After his father died, museum staff tricked Minik into thinking they had given his father a proper burial—instead they put his skeleton on display to the public." Edward Brooke-Hitching, *The Phantom Atlas: The Greatest Myths, Lies, and Blunders on Maps* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 74.

32. See Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism Project* (New York: Owl, 2006).

33. Ariella Azoulay, in "Unlearning Human Rights" (Modern Language Association panel, Rights under Repression, January 6, 2018), ties the notion of "rights" to the rights to explore and destroy existing worlds and asks who are "we" to extend rights to other people?

34. See Anthony Paglen, *European Encounters with the New World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993).

35. Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Popular Culture* 15, no. 1 (winter 2003): 17.

36. Aníbal Quijano, "¡Qué tal Raza!," *América Latina en movimiento*, September 19, 2000, https://www.alainet.org/es/active/929.

37. Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1976), 185.

38. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*.

39. Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 12.

40. Bartolomé de Las Casas, *An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies with Related Texts*, ed. Franklin W. Knight, trans. Andrew Hurley

(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003); David E. Stannard, in *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), estimates that 95 percent of the native population of the Americas was extinguished in the fifty years following contact. Aníbal Quijano ("Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality," *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2 [2007]: 170) estimates that "65 million inhabitants were exterminated in a period of less than 50 years." Ben Vinson III ("Fading from Memory: Historiographical Reflections on the Afro-Mexican Presence," *Review of Black Political Economy* 33, no. 1 [September 2005]: 60) notes what while the 110,000 African slaves taken to Mexico made up half the slave population taken to all the Americas, the African presence in Mexico was not felt as strongly as might be supposed because of miscegenation: "Blacks had made themselves prominently felt through miscegenation. Indeed, some have cited the period from 1600–1700 as pivotal for transforming the black population from being primarily African-based, to being largely creole and mulato." Herman L. Bennett, in *Africans in Colonial Mexico* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), notes that "New Spain's seventeenth-century demographic distinctiveness—home to the second largest slave and the largest free black populations—may come as a revelation to those unaccustomed to thinking of Mexico as a prominent site of the African presence" (1).

41. Grosfoguel argues that while the conquest of Al-Andalus and the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain on the grounds of "purity of blood" was based on "religious discrimination that was not yet fully racist because it did not question in a profound way the humanity of its victims . . . the conquest of the Americas . . . created a new racial imaginary and racial hierarchy." Grosfoguel, "The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities," 79–80.

42. Europeans made up less than 1 percent of the population. The indigenous peoples (90 percent of the population) and Africans (10 percent) intermixed, cooperated, and even planned and carried out revolts.

43. See Robert H. Jackson, *Race, Caste, and Status: Indians in Colonial Spanish America* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), 3. See also R. Douglas Cope, *The Limits of Racial Domination: Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660–1720* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).

44. Established when Spanish and Portuguese conquers invaded the Americas, the caste system traveled to India in the sixteenth century. Allison Elliott, "Caste Systems in India," Postcolonial Studies, Emory University, 1997, https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/postcolonialstudies/2014/06/20/caste-system-in-india/.

45. Vinson, "Fading from Memory," 64.

46. Indians were bought ("about 650,000 Indians in coastal Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Honduras were enslaved in the sixteenth century") and moved to various parts of the Americas. Alan Gallay writes, "Instead of viewing victimization of Africans and Indians as two entirely separate processes, they should be compared and contrasted. This will shed more light on the consequences of colonialism in the Americas, and how racism became one of the dominant ideologies of the modern world." Alan Gallay, "Indian Slavery in the Americas," *US Slave*, November 28, 2012, https://usslave.blogspot.com/2012/11/indian-slavery-in-americas-by-alan.html.

47. Ginés de Sepúlveda, "Democrates Alter, or, On the Just Causes for War against the Indians" (1544), Columbia University Sources of Medieval History, accessed January 1, 2020, http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/sepulved.htm.

48. "By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower." Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007), 7.

49. Aníbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Americanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World-System," *International Social Science Journal* 134 (1992): 549. See also Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*.

50. Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Vintage, 2014), 30–31.

51. "Indians" was used to denote major ethnic groups and nations such as the Aztecs and Mayas in Mesoamerica, the Aymara and Quechua people conquered by the Incas in the Andean regions of Bolivia and Peru, the Mapuche in southern Chile, Argentina, and Patagonia, and the Guaraní along the Atlantic borders of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. Hundreds of other groups also became Indians.

52. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, 2nd ed. (London: Zed, 2012), 20.

53. Thanks to Peter Kulchyski for this observation.

54. Barbara Deloria, Kristen Foehner, and Sam Scinta, eds., *Spirit and Reason: A Vine Deloria, Jr., Reader* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum, 1999), 356.

55. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back* (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2011), 13.

56. Simpson's word, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back*.

57. Simpson, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back*, 96.

58. Vinson writes: "Trying to reconcile the country's extensive Indigenous presence with the prevailing, 19th- and 20th-century models of 'progress' was a large enough hurdle to surmount without having to add the burden of a black population as well." Vinson, "Fading from Memory," 67.

59. Rafa Fernandez de Castro, "Mexico 'Discovers' 1.4 million Black Mexicans—They Just Had to Ask," Fusion TV, December 15, 2015, http://fusion.net/story/245192/mexico-discovers-1-4-million-black-mexicans-they-just-had-to-ask/.

60. "Afro-Mexicans," Wikipedia, last edited January 4, 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afro-Mexicans.

61. Aimé Césaire, *A Tempest*, trans. Richard Miller (New York:, Theatre Communications Group, 2002), Characters.

62. Christopher Columbus, "Columbus' Letter of His First Voyage," in *Four Voyages of Christopher Columbus*, ed. and trans. J. M. Cohen (Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin, 1969), 121.

63. Roberto Fernández Retamar, *Caliban and Other Essays* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 8.

64. See Christina A. Sue and Tanya Golash-Boza, "'It Was Only a Joke': How Racial Humour Fuels Colour-Blind Ideologies in Mexico and Peru," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 10 (2013): 1584.

65. See Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, 95.

66. Grosfoguel, "The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities," 87.

67. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), ix. Mignolo argues, "If the Spanish Empire declines in the modern/colonial period and Castilian became a second-class language in relation to languages of European modernity (French, English, and German), it was mainly because Castilian had lost its power as a knowledge-generating language. It became a language more suited for literary and cultural expressions" (ix).

68. Hannah Arendt writes, "Colonization took place in America and Australia, the two continents that, without a culture and history of their own, had fallen into the hands of Europeans." Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 186.

69. Neither the history of colonialism nor the history of theoretical critiques of colonialism (post-, de-, anti-) has accounted for the copresence of Africans and indigenous peoples in the colonial Americas. Most historians view the "victimization of Africans and Indians as two entirely separate processes" instead of understanding racism as the leading ideology and mechanism of colonialism. Alan Gallay, "Indian Slavery in the Americas," Gilder Lerhman Institute of American History, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/origins-slavery/essays/indian-slavery-americas. See also Alan Gallay, ed., *Indian Slavery in Colonial America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); and Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). For theories of race and post-, de-, and anticoloniality, scholars in Latin America have long turned to African and Indian scholars trained in the U.K. or France, and intellectuals from the Anglophone (Stuart Hall) or Francophone (Fanon, Césaire) or even Spanish (Roberto Fernández Retamar) Caribbean also trained in France and the U.K., to think through race and coloniality from the perspective of other, fundamentally different, instances of colonialism. Colonial metropoles in Britain and France played central roles in training theorists from their former colonies and disseminating their findings. Spain has played no such role. The particularities on ongoing coloniality in the Americas do not figure into the ways in which people like Arendt and Foucault thought about race as the ideological driver.

70. Juan López Intzín, "La insurgencia del Ch'ulel: Corazonar su potencial político y epistemológico descentrando la hegemonía del saber occidental," paper presented at the Hemispheric Institute of Performance and Politics Encuentro, New York, July 11–19, 2003.

71. Leda Martins, "Performances of Spiral Time," keynote address, Hemispheric Institute Encuentro, New York, July 2003, https://hemisphericinstitute.org/en/hidvl-presentations/hidvl-presentations1/enc2003-leda-martins1.html.

72. Rivera Cusicanqui, "Ch'ixinakax utxiwa," 96.

73. James Maffie, *Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a World in Motion* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2014), 419.

74. "Para explicar los tiempos del zapatismo, [Eduardo] Galeano dijo que su reloj no era ni digital, ni análogo, ni mucho menos un "smartwatch"; su reloj era más como un reloj de arena: uno en el que se podía ver el tiempo transcurrido y tratar de entenderlo, pero en el que también podía verse el tiempo que viene." Sub

Galeano, Raúl Romero, "Los muros del capital, las grietas de la izquierda: El reloj de arena y el mundo organizado en fincas," Subversiones: Agencia Autónoma de Comunicación, April 13, 2017, http://subversiones.org/archivos/128547.

75. Rebecca Schneider, "Appearing to Others as Others Appear: Thoughts on Performance, the Polis, and Public Space," in *Performance in the Public Sphere*, ed. Ana Pais (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos de Teatro/FLUL and Performativa, 2018).

76. See chapter 6.

77. Tomson Highway, "The Place of the Indigenous Voice in the 21st Century," keynote address, Hemispheric Institute Encuentro, Montreal, 2014, http://hemisphericinstitute.org/hemi/en/enc14-keynote-lectures/item/2299-tomson-highway-the-place-of-the-Indigenous-voice-in-the-21st-century.

78. T. S. Eliot, "Burnt Norton," in *Collected Poems, 1909–1935* (New York: Faber and Faber, 1936), lines 1–10.

79. Gary Genosko and Scott Thompson use tense theory to explore the temporalities of the surveillance systems we inhabit, a present "tense fragmented and pulverized into all too fascinating bits" coexisting with the "future perfect" of utopian and dystopian visions and the rapidly developing (in the early 2000s) "political logics of preemption." Gary Genosko and Scott Thompson, "Tense Theory: The Temporality of Surveillance," in *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, ed. David Lyon (Cullompton, U.K.: Willan, 2006), 124.

80. Brian Massumi, *Ontopower* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 7.

81. Ricardo Dominguez, "#FearlessGestures: Disturbing Insecurity States Now," Modern Language Association panel, Rights under Repression, New York, January 6, 2018.

82. Alison Kodjak, "Separating Kids from Their Parents Can Lead to Long-Term Health Problems," *Morning Edition*, National Public Radio, June 20, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/20/621872722/separating-kids-from-their-parents-is-a-recipe-for-long-term-health-problems.

83. Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 110.

84. See Rebecca Schneider, "Protest Now and Again," *TDR: The Drama Review* 54, no. 2 (2010): 7–11.

85. Schneider, "Protest Now and Again."

86. Homero Aridjis, "Migrants Ride a 'Train of Death' to Get to America and We're Ignoring the Root of the Problem," *Huffington Post*, September 7, 2014, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/migrants-train-of-death-america-_b_5568288.

87. Roque Planas, "The Mind-Blowing Fact about Immigration No One Mentions," *Huffington Post*, September 24, 2013, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/americans-immigrating-mexico_n_3984078.html.

88. Century 21, https://www.century21.com/.

89. Google Dictionary, https://www.google.com/search?q=relentless&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-1.

90. Ruchir Sharma, "The Millionaires Are Fleeing. Maybe You Should, Too," *New York Times*, June 2, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/02/opinion/sunday/millionaires-fleeing-migration.html.

91. See Greg Grandin, *The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America* (New York: Metropolitan, 2019).

92. J. Hillis Miller, "The Critic as Host," in *Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader*, ed. David Lodge and Nigel Wood (London: Routledge, 2013), 404.

93. Jacques Derrida, "Derelictions of the Right to Justice," in *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–2001*, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 133.

94. Migrants actually pay billions in taxes and receive very little back. See Melissa Cruz, "Yes, All Immigrants—Even Undocumented—Pay Billions in Taxes Each Year," American Immigration Council, April 16, 2018, http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/04/16/undocumented-immigrants-pay-taxes/.

95. Simpson, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back*, 3.

96. Guillermo Gómez-Peña, *Ethno-techno: Writings on Performance, Activism, and Pedagogy*, ed. Elaine Peña (London: Routledge, 2005), 22.

97. Quijano, "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality," 172.

98. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide* (London: Routledge, 2016), 24.

99. Grosfoguel, "The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities," 86. Quijano, in "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality": "Repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over the resources, patterns, and instruments of formalized and objectivised expression, intellectual or visual" (169).

100. "The Requerimiento [Requirement] was written in 1510 by the Council of Castile to be read aloud as an ultimatum to conquered Indians in the Americas. It asserted the religious authority of the Roman Catholic pope over the entire earth, and the political authority of Spain over the Americas (except Brazil) from the 1493 papal bull that divided the western hemisphere between Spain and Portugal. It demanded that the conquered peoples accept Spanish rule and Christian preaching or risk subjugation, enslavement, and death. Often the Requerimiento was read in Latin to the Indians with no interpreters present, or even delivered from shipboard to an empty beach, revealing its prime purpose as self-justification for the Spanish invaders." Council of Castile, "Requerimiento 1510," National Humanities Center Resource Toolbox, 2006/2011, https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/amerbegin/contact/text7/requirement.pdf.

101. Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxochitl, *Obras Históricas*, vol. 2 (Mexico City: Oficina Tip. de la Secretaría de Fomento, 1891–92), 18, quoted in Miguel León-Portilla, *La Filosofía Náhuatl: Estudiada en sus Fuente* (Mexico City: Ediciones Especiales del Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1865), 74. See too Alfredo López Austin, *Educación Mexica: Antología de documentos Sahaguntinos* (Mexico: UNAM, 1985), 56, 62.

102. Gloria M. Delgado de Cantú, *Historia de México: El proceso de gestacíon de un pueblo*, vol. 1, 5th ed. (Mexico City: Pearson Educación de México, 2006), 220.

103. Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxochitl in León-Portilla, *La Filosofía Náhuatl*, 79.

104. Thanks to Odi González Jimenez and Omar Alejandro Dauhajre for this insight. Thanks also to Alan Durston for continuing to elaborate on the complex meanings of *yacha*, the root of *yachasun*, that can mean to know, to learn, to teach, and to reside, among other possibilities.

105. Francisco de Avila, *The Huarochirí Manuscript: A Testament of Ancient and Colonial Andean Religion*, ed. Frank Salomon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 41.

106. Simpson, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back*.

107. Critical Art Ensemble, "Recombinant Theatre and Digital Resistance," *TDR: The Drama Review* 44, no. 4 (winter 2000): 157.

108. Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–1976*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 6.

109. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 8.

110. Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (New York: Minor Compositions, 2013).

111. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, in "The Potosí Principle: Another View of Totality" (*e-misférica* 11, no. 1 [2014], https://hemisphericinstitute.org/en/emisferica-11-1-decolonial-gesture/11-1-essays/the-potosi-principle-another-view-of-totality.html), expresses her dislike for the term "decolonial," which she finds trendy, "boring," and "practically useless for action in the streets and for engaging with concrete indigenous struggles." She prefers "anticolonial" and "demolition" instead of "deconstruction" because "[she] think[s] it is more coherent to try to connect with the direct language of subalterns, rather than with the word-games of high-brow *afrancesado* intellectuals."

112. Terry Eagleton, *Materialism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 13.

113. Tara McPherson, *Feminist in a Software Lab: Difference + Design* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 52.

114. Santos, *Epistemologies of the South*, 12, 11.

115. J. Halberstam, *The Queer Art of Failure* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 2.

116. Harney and Moten, *The Undercommons*, 38.

117. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 223.

118. Rivera Cusicanqui elaborates in her essay "The Potosí Principle": "In the Andean region, we can see a different configuration of collective subjectivity, which we have termed as a *ch'ixi* subjectivity, located in the middle zone or *taypi* of the colonial confrontation, and which is marked by a particular tension between the individual 'I' and the collective 'we.' We speak of a collective self-fashioning [*autopoiesis*] that lives out of its own contradictions: a dialectic that does not culminate in a synthesis but lives in permanent movement, articulating the autochthonous with the alien in subversive and mutually contaminating ways."

119. Personal communication via email with Peter Kulchyski, January 25, 2019.

120. Allen J. Christenson, trans., *Popol Vuh: Sacred Book of the Quiché Maya People* (Hampshire, U.K.: O Books, 2003), 51–52.

121. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Birth of Presence*, trans. Brian Holmes et al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 9.

122. Nancy, *The Birth of Presence*, 10.

123. *Da-sein*, as defined by Heidegger, "is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned *about* its very being." Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 10, emphasis in original.

124. Rivera Cusicanqui also writes of bilinguality as potentially decolonizing: "The possibility of a profound cultural reform in our society depends on the decolonization of our gestures and acts and the language with which we name the world. The reappropriation of bilingualism as a decolonizing practice will allow for the creation of a 'we' as producers of knowledge and interlocutors who can have discussions as equals with other centers of thought and currents in the academies of our region and also of the world" ("Ch'ixinakax utxiwa," 106).

125. See Juan López Intzín, "Epistemologies of the Heart," in *Resistant Strategies*, ed. Marcos Steuernagel and Diana Taylor (New York: HemiPress, 2020), https://hemisphericinstitute.org/resistantstrategies.

126. López Intzín, "Epistemologies of the Heart."

127. Christenson, *Popol Vuh*, 73.

128. Juan López Intzín, "La primera jornada Carlos Lenkersdorf. De lenguas, prácticas y otros mundos: La interpelación tojolabal a la modernidad," paper delivered at Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales-UNAM (Nacional University of Mexico), Mexico, May 9, 2012.

129. Juan López Intzín, interview with Diana Taylor, Hemispheric Institute, April 29, 2016, https://vimeo.com/164782063.

130. Juan López Intzín, "Ich'el ta muk': Insights from the Construction of Lekil kuxlejal: Towards a Visibilization of 'Other' Knowledges from the Matrix of the Tseltal Feel-Thinking and Feel-Knowing," in Steuernagel and Taylor, *Resistant Strategies*, https://resistantstrategies.tome.press/ichel-ta-muk-insights-from-the-construction-of-lekil-kuxlejal-towards-a-visibilization-of-other-knowledges-from-the-matrix-of-the-tseltal-feel-thinking-and-feel-k/, and an earlier version in "*Ich'el ta muk*': La trama en la construcción del Lekil kuxlejal. Hacia una visibilización de saberes 'otros' desde la matricialidad del sentipensar-sentisaber tseltal," in *Practicas Otras de Conocimiento(s): Entre crisis, entre guerras*, vol. 1 (San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Mexico: Cooperativa editorial Retos, 2015); Rivera Cusicanqui, "Ch'ixinakax utxiwa," 105.

131. "El stalel como modos de ser-estar-pensar-sentir, actuar y conocer-saber el mundo." Juan López Intzín, "El Ch'ulel multiverso e intersubjetividad en el stalel maya tseltal," in *Lengua, Cosmovisión, Intersubjetividad: Acercamientos a la obra de Carlos Lenkersdorf* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2015). For English and Spanish, see Juan López Intzín, "The Ch'ulel-Multiverse and Intersubjectivity in the Maya Tseltal Stalel" (trans. Marlène Ramírez-Cancio), in Steuernagel and Taylor, *Resistant Strategies*, https://resistantstrategies.tome.press/the-chulel-multiverse-and-intersubjectivity-in-the-maya-tseltal-stalel/.

132. "El ch'ulel es lo que vuelve sujeto a todo lo existente, hace que interactuemos de sujeto a sujeto." López Intzín, "El Ch'ulel multiverso e intersubjetividad en el stalel maya tseltal."

133. Steuernagel and Taylor, *Resistant Strategies*, https://hemisphericinstitute.org/resistantstrategies.

134. "Esta humanización de las 'cosas' no es otra cosa que el-re-cono-ci-mien-to a la coesencia y coexistencia del ch'ulel y que hay de darles ich'el-tamuk' (respeto y reconocimiento a su grandeza y dignidad)." López Intzín, "El Ch'ulel multiverso e intersubjetividad en el stalel maya tseltal."

135. Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Six Lectures on the Political Theology of Nature*, Institute for Earthbound Studies, February 2013, http://www.earthboundpeople.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Bruno-Latour-Gifford-Lectures-Facing-Gaia-in-the-Anthropocene-2013.pdf.

136. Taylor and Novak, *Dancing with the Zapatistas*, http://scalar.usc.edu/anvc/dancing-with-the-zapatistas/index.

137. N. Katherine Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious: Enlarging the Mind of the Humanities," *Critical Inquiry* 42, no. 4 (2016): 783–808. Even more generalized in ch'ulel than in Hayles's division of the cognizers versus noncognizers: "I propose another distinction to replace human/nonhuman: cognizers versus noncognizers. On one side are humans and all other biological life forms, as well as many technical systems; on the other, material processes and inanimate objects" (799). She argues against rigid binaries: "To express more adequately the complexities and pervasiveness of these interactions, we should resist formulations that reify borders and create airtight categories. The better formulation, in my view, is not a binary at all but interpenetration, continual and pervasive interactions that flow through, within, and beyond the humans, nonhumans, cognizers, noncognizers, and material processes that make up our world" (801).

138. "In general, at all levels of life, not just at the level of nucleic acid molecules, a complexity, which serves a specific function . . . corresponds to an embodied knowledge, translated into the constructions of a system. The environment is a rich set of potential niches: each niche is a problem to be solved, to survive in the niche means to solve the problem, and the solution is the embodied knowledge, an algorithm of how to act in order to survive. Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious," 789, quotes Ladislav Kováč, "Fundamental Principles of Cognitive Biology," *Evolution and Cognition* 6, no. 1 (2000): 59.

139. Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious," 788.

140. Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious," 799.

141. Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious," 800.

142. Kováč quoted in Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious," 790.

143. Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious," 792.

144. See Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "Appendix: The Extended Mind," in Andy Clark, *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 220–32; Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, "Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 6 (2007): 485–507; Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher, "Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 8 (2009): 465–86; Edwin Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Yvonne Rogers, *A Brief Introduction to Distributed Cognition* (Brighton, U.K.: School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, 1997).

145. "Peripatetic School," Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_school.

146. Georges Bataille, in his short piece "The Big Toe" (1929) calls the toe "the most *human* part of the human body." In *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings,*

1927–1939, ed. Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl with Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 20–23

147. William Hazlitt, "On Going a Journey," *New Monthly Magazine*, January 1822, https://sites.ualberta.ca/~dmiall/Travel/hazlitt.htm.

148. Antonin Artaud, letter to Jean Paulhan, August 15, 1935. Quoted in Luis Mario Schnieder, "Prologue," in *México y Viaje al pais de los tarahumara* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984), 22.

149. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Helen R. Lane, Robert Hurley, and Mark Seem (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

150. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 9.

151. Frédéric Gros, *A Philosophy of Walking* (New York: Verso, 2014), 199.

152. Gros, *A Philosophy of Walking*, 200.

153. Gros, *A Philosophy of Walking*, 201.

154. French philosopher Frédéric Gros's *A Philosophy of Walking* offers other thoughts, including some by thinkers such as Rimbaud, Rousseau, Kant, Nietzsche, and Gandhi. Much of that book reflects on the "I" sometimes sharing solitude with others. At times walking is a form of flight, a "passing through" landscape and life (52). Company is an impediment, as walking establishes a dialogue between body and soul: "When I walk, I soon become two. My body and me" (56).

155. See the interviews with migrants in Diana Taylor et al., *Art, Migration, and Human Rights*.

156. See Taylor et al., *Art, Migration, and Human Rights.*

157. NEM pret NEN, "to live," NEHNEM means "to go along, to walk, to wander." Frances Karttunen, *An Analytical Dictionary of Náhuatl*, rev. ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). Thanks to Manuel R. Cuellar for this connection.

158. See Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 184n17.

159. Elizabeth Hill Boone, *Stories in Red and Black: Pictorial Histories of the Aztecs and Mixtecs* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 50.

160. Boone, *Stories in Red and Black*, 120. A similar observation was made by Dana Leibsohn, "Primers for Memory: Cartographic Histories and Nahua Identity," in *Writing without Words: Alternative Literacies in Mesoamerica and the Andes*, ed. Elizabeth Hill Boone and Walter Mignolo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994). Cited in Boone, *Stories in Red and Black*.

Two Enacting Refusal

1. Carlos Monsivais, "'Somos borregos!' 'Nos llevan!' 'Bee!' 'Bee!' Un relato de ingratitudes y su consecuencia pictórica," Crónica de 1968-VI, June 14, 2016, http://www.mty.itesm.mx/dhcs/deptos/ri/ri-802/lecturas/nvas.lecs/1968-monsi/mco290.htm. Also see Paco Ignacio Taibo II, *68* (Mexico City: Planeta, 1991), 68; and Elena Poniatowska, *Massacre in Mexico*, trans. Helen R. Lane (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992), 46. A similar act, with a different political valence, occurred in 2014 when New York City police officers turned their backs on the large screen showing Mayor Bill de Blasio as he spoke at a funeral for slain officers. Dean Schabner, "Hundreds Turn Their Back on de Blasio at NYPD Officer's