ELISABETH JAY FRIEDMAN, EDITOR

SEEKING RIGHTS FROM THE LEFT

Gender, Sexuality, and the Latin American Pink Tide

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TO THE NEXT GENERATION OF SEEKERS

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FOREWORD

AMY LIND

When we first began to witness Latin America's shift away from neoliberalism and toward socialism in the late 1990s and early 2000s, so many of us—feminist, queer, antiracist, antiglobalization, decolonial scholars and activists—held high hopes for social transformation in the region. After living through the "lost decade" of the 1980s, which exacerbated long-standing economic and social inequalities through neoliberal policies focused on servicing foreign debt, and after witnessing the deeper, far-reaching institutionalization of the neoliberal logic of "free market" development in the 1990s, with its emphasis on privatization, decentralization, and NGOization, the promise of new left experiments was exhilarating, albeit often combined with a healthy dose of skepticism. As scholars and activists imagined "another world," many assumed that gender and sexual rights, and queer imaginings of economy, nation, citizenship, and sustainable life, would be concretely realized.

To reflect their newly proposed socialist and/or decolonial agendas, some Pink Tide governments passed national referendums to change their constitutions. Ultimately, whether such changes occurred through constitutional reform, broader legal reforms, or changes in public policy, a general aim was to share resources more equitably and increase citizen access to states' socialist-inspired redistributive projects. Through this process, there have been some exciting innovations, some of which are explored in this collection. The shared dissatisfaction among Pink Tide governments with the region's neoliberal legacy, and the global financial architecture that catalyzed and sustained it, led to an array of moderate and more radical antineoliberal and/or socialist projects. Unfortunately, as this volume documents so well, these projects have been incomplete, often fraught with tensions and contradictions. We have learned much since the inception of the Pink Tide, and have perhaps lost some hope. Yet we have also found some key political openings, fissures, and spaces in which to imagine a more just world, thanks to Pink Tide political movements and sometimes despite them as well.

This volume shatters Cold War binaries that many scholars still hold about capitalism versus socialism, and religion versus secularism, as they affect women's and LGBT rights and social movements. Feminists and queers have been attacked by all ideological sides in different historical moments and spaces, but little research has been conducted to analyze how this has occurred within Latin America's Pink Tide. *Seeking Rights from the Left* provides a deeply grounded framework for analyzing gender and sexual rights in Latin America's shift to the left, raising difficult questions about the relationships between ideology and governance, and highlighting how feminists and LGBT/queer people are often scapegoated in broader nationalist, antineoliberal, and antiimperialist struggles. Some chapters in this book take head-on the ways in which Cold War assumptions continue to haunt scholarly work on gender and sexual rights. Indeed, as several contributors point out, what we tend to see is a complex blend of pro- and anti-women's and LGBT rights discourses and practices, often converging in the same state. For example, Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa (2007–17) supported an explicit decolonial queer rights agenda early on in his administration, yet is notorious for his neglect of women's rights and his outright misogyny. A same-sex civil union bill was passed in Chile in 2014, yet despite Chilean president Michelle Bachelet's (2006–10, 2014–to date) leadership on women's and to a lesser extent LGBT issues (as former UN Women executive director, 2010–13), in Chile, indigenous women's rights lag far behind and indeed have at times been directly challenged by the state.

Despite the excitement of imagining a more just world—one that has inspired some Pink Tide states to adopt an intentional "decolonization" agenda, and even a "depatriarchalization" agenda in the case of Bolivia—these persistent paradoxes demonstrate that ideology and party politics do not determine how gender and sexual rights are or are not addressed in Pink Tide contexts. Indeed, in our increasingly globalized world, the transnational flow of resources, labor, and information about family, gender, and (homo)sexuality plays as much into leftist leaders' visions, and leftist states' articulations, of heteronormative socialism as do internal politics and alliances. Right-wing, often religiously inspired discourses claiming that "gender ideology" is "dangerous" to the traditional family are now prominently embedded in political processes in places as diverse as France, the United States, Uganda, and Malawi, as well as Chile, Ecuador, and other Latin American countries. Not surprisingly, some Pink Tide countries are thus more influenced by religion than during earlier waves of socialism, and this greatly affects

how women and LGBT people are represented in public policy, law, and state programs.

So, how do we make sense of these contradictions? This volume is the first of its kind to directly focus on these complex relationships, cultural and political movements, and processes as they occur in eight countries. Interestingly, when we analyze gender and sexual rights "after" neoliberalism (remembering that many Pink Tide states still utilize and promote neoliberal development frameworks), we find many inconsistencies across time and within the Pink Tide era: in some countries, for example, more rights were extended to women and/or LGBT people during the neoliberal period than during the more recent socialist period. Women have benefitted more from Pink Tide policy and legal changes in countries such as Uruguay and Argentina than in other nations. Moreover, Pink Tide states often prioritize one set of rights over another. For example, some states have utilized a pro-LGBT rights discourse to defend their modernization projects and brand themselves as "modern" and "civilized," while simultaneously eroding women's and indigenous rights. Such "trade-offs" potentially pit the advances of one group against the losses faced by another and create uneven access to socialist redistributive projects.

I invite you to read this provocative volume, which grounds and transforms our understanding of how gender and sexuality matter to and are represented in forms of Pink Tide governance and development in Latin America. These generative analyses will inspire new conversations about the central place of feminist and queer studies in (post)neoliberal politics and Latin American social movements, and remind us how notions of gender and sexuality are always present, even when unnamed.

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INTRODUCTION

Contesting the Pink Tide

ELISABETH JAY FRIEDMAN
AND CONSTANZA TABBUSH

The beginning of the twenty-first century promised a profound transformation in Latin American politics. By 2005, the vast majority of the region's citizens were governed by states whose executives, if not their legislatures, identified as being on the left of the political spectrum. Whether inspired by socialist, social democratic, liberal, decolonial,[1] or other ideologies, they sought to challenge deep-seated social, political, and economic inequalities. Such an experience offers students and analysts focused on Latin America as well as on other world regions a unique opportunity to explore and understand the impact of left governance. More than a decade later, with the "Pink Tide"[2] of left-leaning governments ebbing, it is time to take stock.

This collection offers a central, yet largely ignored, contribution: a comparative assessment of the Pink Tide's engagement with feminist, women's, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movements and demands. Focusing on eight national cases—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela—chapter authors map out and evaluate the ways in which the contemporary Left addressed gender- and sexuality-based rights through the state, from roughly 2000 to 2015. They find that while Pink Tide administrations transformed the everyday lives of women and LGBT populations in the region, advancements were highly uneven among the central policy arenas covered in this collection: social welfare, political representation, violence against women, women's bodily autonomy, and LGBT relationship and identity recognition. Beyond "an impact of left governance" approach, the book's focus on state-society relations reveals how gender and sexuality have been fundamental to the political projects of the Latin American Left—but in often unexpected ways.

This focused comparison of the achievements in women's and LGBT rights and the experiences of their proponents departs from a fascinating conundrum. Some have found that inclusion of women and LGBT groups, as well as attention to gender and sexual inequality, is most likely under democracies governed from the Left (Esping-Anderson 1990; Stetson and Mazur 1995). But while previous studies suggested the Pink Tide would offer new opportunities to advance gender and sexual justice, historically, Latin American left and center-left parties, movements, and governments have had a variable record, and state agencies also perpetuated previous policy legacies and institutional practices (Díez 2015; Htun 2003; Htun and Weldon 2010). Moreover, studies of gender and sexuality and the state show that political transformation does not always result in the transformation of gender and sexuality-based inequalities (Dore and Molyneux 2000; Molyneux 2001; Díez 2015; Htun 2016). Instead, continuities in norms and practices across political cycles may be as important as policy changes. Has this period of left governance offered a unified narrative of progress concerning gender and sexuality? To answer this question, we build on comparative analysis that insists that we disaggregate policy arenas based on the degree to which they challenge deeply rooted cultural values and the power of their proponents (Htun and Weldon 2010).

Our comparative analysis demonstrates that the countries of the Pink Tide made a significant difference in the lives of women and LGBT people in the region. Crosscutting results show that most governments improved the basic conditions of poor women and their families. In many cases, they advanced women's representation in national legislatures to high global ranks. Some countries legalized same-sex relationships and enabled their citizens to claim their own gender identity. They also opened up opportunities for feminist and queer[3] movements to articulate and press forward their demands. But at the same time, these governments largely relied on heteropatriarchal relations of power—ones that privilege heterosexual men—ignoring or rejecting the more challenging elements of a social agenda and engaging in strategic trade-offs among gender and sexual rights. Moreover, the comparative examination of such rights arenas reveals that the Left's more general political and economic projects have been profoundly, if at times unintentionally, informed by traditional understandings of gender and sexuality.

This last point highlights the combination of policy change and continuity that this volume uncovers. There is no linear story of progress across these chapters, which as often contest as uphold the transformations promised by left governance. Instead, the possibilities for change seem to depend on insti-

tutional contexts as well as the organization and actions of collective actors seeking rights from the Left. On the one hand, the collection highlights that the degree of state institutionalization, particularly the effectiveness of checks on executive power, is critical in determining the ultimate impact of the Left in power. Moreover, the largely underanalyzed alliances between progressive political forces and conservative religious ones play a central role in determining the fate of policy issues that deeply contest traditional or cultural norms in Latin America, such as abortion, same-sex marriage, gender identity recognition, or even gender-based violence. However, these dangerous liaisons have not been an obstacle to achievements in policy arenas that do not challenge deeply rooted norms, such as the advancement of social rights or the political representation of women.

On the other hand, this collection also offers multiple examples of how advocates and movements have fought for gender and sexual justice, and provides insights into their successful strategies. The experiences recounted in this volume underline the relevance of building state-society coalitions that can cut across policy sectors and state institutions, as well as the need for strategically framing demands. These two aspects of state-society relations help us explain the variable outcomes of the Left's governance in Latin America. They also help us explain why looking through the lenses of gender and sexuality erodes any unified notion of the Pink Tide as a common political experience.

To explain its wide spectrum of results, this collection sheds light on the complex, and sometimes contradictory, relationships among governments, left-leaning parties, femocrats,[4] feminist and women's movements, LGBT movements, and opponents as well as proponents of gender and sexual rights. By engendering and queering the study of the Latin American Left, the analyses focus on new social actors, processes, and institutions. Sidelined movements become protagonists: grassroots, Afro-Brazilian, and indigenous movements, feminist and LGBT movements, and their alliances cut across the collection. Chapters bring largely overlooked state bureaucracies, most notably national women's agencies and antidiscrimination institutions, to the forefront, along with the Catholic and Protestant forces that have often sought to impede policy change. The volume covers scenarios of overt conflict between the Left and a feminist agenda, such as those found in Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua and Rafael Correa's Ecuador, with their direct attacks on women's rights and their proponents. It also includes more collaborative scenarios, such as those witnessed during the Frente Amplio administration in Uruguay, when mobilization and alliances between feminist and LGBT movements promoted "em-

blematic achievements such as same-sex marriage and the decriminalization of abortion, and innovative affirmative action measures for the trans population" (chapter 1). Our analytic comparison enables a display, in productive tension, of national specificities, as well as the regional and subregional trends in policy and politics that are the focus of this introduction.

This volume's objective was to enable comparison while giving authors enough room to tailor their chapters around the distinct experiences and central political struggles of each country. While some authors offer more comprehensive explorations (as in the chapters on Uruguay, Chile, and Venezuela), others have foregrounded a particular conundrum: Why did Argentina succeed in advancing same-sex marriage and gender identity recognition while calls for the right to abortion went largely unheeded? What does a wide-ranging gender and sexuality policy inventory reveal about left versus centrist governance in Brazil? These explorations reflect the distinct political, geographical, analytic, and disciplinary perspectives of their authors.

Taking such variety into account, the remainder of this introduction is organized into two main sections: the first explains the book's common framework, and the second presents the main comparative findings. Taken together, these findings establish how the countries under examination dealt with the issues of social welfare, political representation, violence against women, and the trade-offs between women's bodily autonomy and LGBT identity recognition, as well as offer insights on successful strategies for achieving changes for women and LGBT communities.

Conceptual and Methodological Framework

This section starts by addressing three key analytic choices undergirding this project. The first, and most fundamental, is why we should expect Pink Tide governments to focus on gender and sexual justice. The second considers why these countries should be grouped together at all. What do Pink Tide governments share that allow us to consider them as an expression of a similar political phenomenon? And what are their basic differences? The third moves to methodological concerns, and invites us to explain why we chose to analyze gender and sexuality, two issues that are diverse (and, in some cases, divergent) in their traditions and objects of study, within one analytic frame. Are there similarities in how gender and sexuality are embedded in Latin American states, and in how advocates seek change on these issues? After spelling out these analytic choices, we set out the framework that organizes our comparative findings.

Should We Expect Pink Tide Governments to Fare Better on Gender and Sexual Justice?

One of the conceptual aims of this collection is to unpack the putative association between gender and sexual rights and left governance. Global analysis suggests that while left-wing organizations can play critical roles in advancing the social rights of women and LGBT populations, they are less significant in advancing other dimensions of gender and sexual justice (Htun and Weldon 2010). Moreover, counterintuitive findings from Latin America show that some progressive policies have been promoted by neoliberal, right-wing, or even undemocratic governments (Htun 2003), such as recent efforts by neoliberal Mexican and Chilean presidents to support same-sex marriage. The latest research on the relationship between the Left and gender equality policy in particular finds the Left to be "reactive" rather than proactive on these issues (Blofeld, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017). While taking stock of the uncertain relationship between the Left and gender and sexual justice, this project started from the assumption that the Pink Tide was a period of political opportunity for feminism and queer politics. This hypothesis was based on Latin American presidential commitments, political party platforms, and historical legacies of left-wing politics, as well as previous research on gender, sexuality, and politics.

Pink Tide governments distinguished themselves from previous administrations in their explicit promises to tackle historical inequalities by reshaping relationships among state, society, and the market. First, they mobilized state resources to address class inequality by reversing many of the neoliberal reforms of their predecessors, with increases in public spending, the renationalization of public services and natural resources, a stronger portfolio of social policies, and the expansion of social protection. Second, they focused on the political incorporation of historically excluded or marginalized social groups, such as the urban poor, indigenous populations, LGBT groups, and women.[5]

Third, they sought to alter state-society relations and address historic social inequalities by incorporating a language of rights and well-being to reshape constitutions, state policies, and/or individual programs.[6] These general commitments to furthering equality in economic, social, and political life allow us to assess whether such statements translated into more opportunities for advancing feminist and queer movement demands, and more inclusion of their protagonists. Thus, this collection sheds light on the relationships between these discursive commitments and the lived experiences of women and LGBT people.

In addition to general pledges for redistribution and recognition, leaders and presidents of these administrations called upon the rhetorical link between socialism and women's emancipation (Molyneux 2001). For example, the long-serving presidents Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007–17) and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1999–2013) claimed that their revolutionary projects had "a woman's face." In these cases, women's rights were highlighted as a fundamental dimension of the social transformation sought by the Pink Tide, while women as a constituency were mobilized for revolutionary change.

In terms of the Left's relationship with LGBT populations, Pink Tide governments have ameliorated previous tensions (Corrales and Pecheny 2010, 23). Historically, prejudice and/or fear of losing popular support prevented much of the Left from allying with gay advocates (Brown 2010, 90). Male leaders used macho imagery in the service of nation building, consciousness raising, and guerrilla warfare. This political rhetoric reified heteronormativity and homophobia on the Left, and led scholars to argue that "in relation to sexuality, members of the Left have sometimes been as reactionary as their right-wing counterparts" (Corrales and Pecheny 2010, 24). Yet, some contemporary Left parties offer a newfound support for gay rights (Encarnación 2016, 70–71; Schulenberg 2013).[7] This explicit hailing of women and the opening to LGBT rights issues also set the stage for an evaluation of their gender and sexual politics.

At least rhetorically, the Pink Tide has leaned toward gender and sexual justice. What does the more general literature on gender and the Left lead us to expect about their relationship? Global studies find that left political actors will be more relevant on class-based gender and (by extension) sexuality issues, such as the gendered division of labor and social and economic rights (Htun and Weldon 2010). For instance, left parties and unions drove the expansion of European welfare states (Esping-Anderson 1990), and cross-national analyses highlight their role in the extension of parental leave and day care in Western and Northern Europe (Huber and Stephens 2001; Grey 2002; Weldon 2011). Other research concludes that left parties have helped to advance women's rights and representation, as well as with the creation and consolidation of effective national women's agencies (Stetson and Mazur 1995). In Latin America, left parties have been more central in LGBT rights achievement than those on the right (Schulenberg 2013).

Yet, other scholars assert a weaker association between left-leaning parties and gender redistributive issues. For instance, women's presence in legislatures trumps party ideology in achieving maternity leave in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development democracies and Latin America

(Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). In Latin America, left governments have extended welfare rights and social income to those working informally as well as the income poor with a particular focus on women. These governments made some progress on reducing gender and class inequalities separately, yet did not address their interactions (Filgueira and Franzioni 2017). And researchers underline the long-standing tensions between women's movements and left parties (della Porta 2003; Mueller and McCarthy 2003).[8] Thus, left parties' role in class-based issues of women and LGBT people might be better characterized as ambiguous and dependent on both context and the issue type addressed.

Globally, left political actors have been less relevant in addressing issues, such as family law and abortion, that focus on women's status as a subordinate group. These demands are more likely to be achieved by autonomous women's organizations whose main agenda is gender equality. For instance, cross-national studies find women's movements to be the central actors in achieving progressive policies on violence against women (VAW) (Htun and Weldon 2012). In Latin America, abortion policy reform exhibits considerable variation under Left governments (Blofeld and Ewig 2017). Left parties' support for LGBT rights is mediated by public opinion, and progress has often come as part of larger political phenomena such as constitutional or criminal code reform (Schulenberg 2013). As with VAW policy dynamics, the protagonistic role of LGBT advocates in achieving same-sex marriage has proved more important than the ideology of the party in power (Corrales 2015). Thus, although the Pink Tide seemed to promise transformation and/or inclusion with respect to gender and sexuality, the larger context of left governance predicts a more contested reality.

How Red Are the Pink Tide's Many Lefts?

Although Pink Tide governments have sought to ameliorate long-standing inequalities, they have offered distinct political projects, and achieved different results. To indicate their commitments to left transformation they have appealed to left-leaning political legacies, rhetorics, parties, or movements to quite dissimilar degrees.[9] For example, while some governments built on long-standing institutionalized or experienced political forces, such as the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party) in Brazil, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front) in Uruguay, the Concertación in Chile, or the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party, known as the Peronist Party) in Argentina, others have relied on political outsiders and newer parties, such as Hugo Chávez's Partido

Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), and Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism) in Bolivia. Thus, this section justifies their comparison while bearing in mind their different points of departure, development, and outcomes.

Despite distinctive historical legacies and contemporary political systems, it is analytically meaningful to consider these governments part of a regional political experience. At a time when regional institutions and exchanges intensified, these executives recognized one another as part of a shared process of transformation. In addition, during this period, state policymakers departed from similar definitions of social problems to be targeted, as well as their common advocacy for a stronger role of the state in the market and society more generally. The Pink Tide ushered in a long-awaited period of state attention to social, economic, and political inequality. Given Latin America's notoriety in this regard—it is the world region with the worst income inequality[10]—the shift seemed to herald a much-needed political change through democratic decision making.

As the central point of commonality, the rise of the Pink Tide is considered to be a political response to the negative outcomes of neoliberal policies. During the 1990s, right-wing and centrist incumbents were tarnished by their open support of crisis-prone economic transitions with devastating social consequences for vast sectors of the population. After decades out of power, left-leaning parties responded to the demands of movements challenging inequality through both recognition of their distinct identities—such as indigenous, LGBT, and Afro-Latinx—and social redistribution of the economic resources held tightly in the fists of powerful capitalists and elite classes. Once in power, many of the left and center-left administrations drew on the resources of a sustained commodities boom to fund poverty alleviation and social service expansion, even as they did not follow through on promises for structural economic change (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Queirolo 2013). This state attention to inequality and exclusion are grounds for comparing the national case studies presented in this book, even as we acknowledge differences among and within countries.

In distinguishing among Pink Tide cases, analysts have focused on two main axes: what governments claim to achieve (their political platforms) and how they do it (their exercise of power). Their distinct political projects have frequently been placed across a spectrum from reformist to revolutionary. The second axis orders these administrations in terms of their institutional-

ist, charismatic, or individualist modes of doing politics, as well as their degree of authoritarianism and durability in power. Mainstream, institutionally focused analysts offer a normative assessment of the Pink Tide's many lefts, which tends to applaud the projects that come closer to the idealized model of representative liberal democracy and (somewhat) free-market capitalism, as in Chile, dismissing the other experiences as hewing to an outdated populism led by charismatic caudillos seeking to centralize power (Castañeda 2006). They look askance at the constitutional (and extraconstitutional) transformations in those countries at the far end of the spectrum, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, watching warily at increasing concentrations of power in the executive branch (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010).

They are not alone: echoing the main criticism of previous forms of state socialism, critical left-wing Latin American intellectuals also question the authoritarian traits and moves to perpetuate personal power of some Pink Tide executives, highlighting their mix of democracy, neopopulism, and extractivism (Svampa 2015). Sociological analyses acknowledge the criticism of the authoritarian features of these governments, while also taking into account their inclusive and democratizing aspects and highly polarized political contexts (de la Torre 2013, 2017). They find them to be characterized by the mobilization of popular sectors[11] against elites as well as the fight against poverty, an increase in social spending, and redistribution of the surplus of natural resource extraction upon which they remain deeply dependent.

More sympathetic approaches see incomplete, yet inspirational, transitions to twenty-first-century socialism under way, with committed leadership turning the "constituted power" of the state to the service of the "constituent power" of the masses (Ciccariello-Maher 2014). They seek to illustrate how more radical experiments encouraged and/or responded to the will of those groups previously marginalized on the basis of class, race/ethnicity, and even gender (Ellner 2014). Last, a smaller set of analysts has complicated these dichotomous assessments by exploring similarities across the spectrum or focusing on each country's complex contextual realities (Cameron and Hershberg 2010).

Without hewing to a single perspective, the authors in this volume are careful to contextualize what "left" means in each national context. For example, Constanza Tabbush, María Constanza Díaz, Catalina Trebisacce, and Victoria Keller argue that the political phenomenon of Peronism in Argentina has

included not only an (ever-transforming) party, but also worker and grassroots movements. Given its pre-dominant political influence across other ideologies, the "classical divide between left and right" and "between civil society and representative politics" do not hold there. In Nicaragua, Edurne Larracoechea finds a misalignment between the claims of revolutionary transformation and the reality of the "cynical, pragmatic, and clientelistic way of doing politics" through which former Marxist guerrilla Daniel Ortega and his party, the FSLN, govern.

Finally, a gender and sexuality perspective reminds us to consider the importance of the relationships between the Left and religious institutions or forces. This dimension of analysis has been ignored or downplayed by both mainstream analysis and left intellectual accounts, which seem to assume that left politics by definition challenge conservative religious belief and hierarchies. But by highlighting the relationship between left-leaning governments and traditional religious groups, this book underlines that certain religious institutions could be strategic allies in advancing projects of social equity even as some, such as, prominently, the Catholic Church, are the strongest actors opposing reproductive autonomy and LGBT rights. This is seen most clearly in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Brazil, where executive alliances with religious forces, or their inability to challenge them legislatively, have become a serious obstacle for these rights-based agendas. For example, Marlise Matos shows that in Brazil a parliamentary *bancada evangélica* (evangelical bloc) has developed that systematically opposes women's and LGBT rights. However, many of this volume's authors highlight the shifting relationship between and among administrations and conservative forces in the same country. The confrontation or alliance between executives and representatives of the Catholic Church around gender and sexual rights laws lead Tabbush, Díaz, Trebisacce, and Keller to distinguish among the three successive administrations of Kirchnerism. In Chile, argues Gwynn Thomas, changing relationships among the Left, religious parties, and the Church have acted as a window of opportunity to question the heteropatriarchal family model during Michelle Bachelet's second term in office. The possibilities for change depend on the strength of religious parties or coalitions and the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between the leadership of the executive branch and conservative or religious actors. A focus on gender and sexuality unearths these understudied dimensions of the Pink Tide that partly explain its heterogeneous performance.

Why Consider Gender and Sexuality Together?

This collection presents an original, and unusual, thematic comparison by bringing together a focus on gender and sexuality. It does so because previous research has established that gender and sexuality have been linked at the foundations and throughout the development of Latin American nation-states. Moreover, political analysis attests that those who challenge heteropatriarchal policy, such as feminist and LGBT movements, build coalitions to address linked demands. This section explains these two central reasons to analyze gender and sexuality together.

Historically, states have promoted both traditional gender roles and heterosexuality. In her review of Latin American state-gender relations, Maxine Molyneux (2000a, 39) argues that states "have largely served to perpetuate and enforce" unequal gender relations, whether deliberately or "through . . . indifference and inaction." They have done so in three ways. First, they have institutionalized men's social, political, and economic power over women. Second, they have established heterosexual relationships, and the families based upon them, as the focus of social policy. Finally, these relationships have been seen as fundamental to nation building. Such normative ideals acquire force because, across the political spectrum, national ideologies have built upon metaphors of nuclear families—generally lighter- rather than darker-skinned—and heterosexual relationships (McClintock 1995; Bernstein 2008). And these ideals continue to have influence, despite their clear contrast with contemporary family arrangements in Latin America[12] and the reality of the racial and ethnic makeup of the region.

This gendering and sexing of the Latin American state, harking back to the colonial era and developing in the nineteenth century,[13] was reinforced throughout the twentieth century. States continued to deploy gender and sexuality as integral aspects of development, although in ways that were "variable and contingent," as political elites grappled with development pressures and an increasingly organized society (Molyneux 2000a, 40, 38). Even as women entered into education and employment as part of national development projects, they largely remained legally subordinated to their husbands and fathers.[14] The heterosexual family remained the ideal, with some state policy openly castigating homosexuality even as women's rights developed (Bejel 2010). Beginning in the late 1960s, the wave of authoritarian regimes that fiercely opposed struggles for political and social inclusion elevated the traditional family as fundamental

to their draconian policies of political order. Although the succeeding democratic states, which preceded the Pink Tide, provided more opportunities to transform state policy around gender and sexuality, they also demonstrated an often-unrecognized dependence on women's subordination. The stripped-down neoliberal state of the late twentieth century relied heavily on unpaid women's labor and community activities, such as the communal kitchens poor women established to ensure their families could eat.[15] To claim modern values in the face of real economic hardship, some states offered a trade-off of state recognition of certain gender- and sexuality-based demands for economic benefits.[16] History contests narratives of progress around gender and sexuality that map over political and economic transformations.

Given this reality, demands that contest men's control over women's bodies, such as reproductive autonomy, or reject the heterosexual basis of the family, such as equal marriage rights for gays and lesbians, profoundly challenge political leaders and institutions. Advocates are contesting not only an ideology at the foundation of Latin American state formation but one that continues to be highly relevant. While women's, feminist, and LGBT movements have evinced this contestation in myriad ways, they also have built from intertwined histories of mobilization to strengthen their common causes.

Movements focused on both gender and sexuality have sought to disrupt state institutionalization of patriarchy and heterosexuality through their demands for "sexual citizenship" or "the transformation of public life into a domain that is no longer dominated by male heterosexuals" (Hekma 2004, 4). This deepening of citizenship recognizes that "individual autonomy, partly determined by the control of one's body, is a necessary condition for true citizenship, with all its rights and responsibilities" (Pecheny 2010, 113). It includes free sexual expression, bodily autonomy, institutional inclusion, and even access to public spaces (Hekma 2004). Feminist and queer communities, with their overlapping memberships (such as lesbian and transgender feminists), have built coalitions to make their demands known and improve their strategic capacities.

Feminist and queer movements have common roots in opposition to authoritarian rule and engagement in democratic politics. Both were inspired by the powerfully antiauthoritarian discourse of human rights of the late twentieth century, resulting in "the formation of sexual subjects and social movements around gender and sexuality throughout the region" (Pecheny 2012/2013; Brown 2010). Under conditions of political democracy, these have converted into claims for full citizenship. Thus, unlike the predominantly identitarian claims of movements in many countries of the Global North, in Latin America

feminist and, especially, queer movements have often framed their claims as part of larger demands for state responsiveness to protect and expand rights.[17]

The contemporary politics of sexual citizenship often relies upon collaborations among those working to shift traditional norms around gender and sexuality in policy, politics, and society.[18] In some places these coincidences reach back to foundational moments in movement history, as with Argentina's Frente de Liberación Homosexual (Homosexual Liberation Front), begun in the early 1970s, within which an "autonomous movement" sought to challenge Argentina's "discriminatory male hierarchy," according to Omar Encarnación (2016, 89), or in Ecuador, where marginal LGBT organizations "decided to join forces with a variety of feminist groups, which had a stronger, more legitimate presence" in politics (Xie and Corrales 2010, 225). Those united in defense of sexual citizenship were also inspired by international dynamics, such as the norms generated through the UN Conference on Population and Development and the Fourth World Conference on Women of the 1990s as well as more recent international efforts (Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker 2008, 174). And their work has a vibrant present: for example, in Brazil "the greatest development in the struggle for sexual rights" are the alliances "to strengthen the commitment of gay militants to the abortion cause, and to bring sex workers and feminists together" (Vianna and Carrara 2010, 131). In a vivid recent illustration, women and queer activists joined together to protest the coup against Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff in 2016, and the misogyny and homophobia upon which its leaders relied (Hertzman 2016).

Building sexual citizenship coalitions has not been an easy process; it can be tension-filled and fragile, given the distinct social positions and demands of different sectors (Moreno 2010).[19] For example, feminist and gay movements in some countries resisted the inclusion of lesbians and trans women and men, and their demands, fearing a dilution of their agenda and/or evincing sexism, lesbo- and trans-phobia. Coalitional efforts depend on the energies and perspectives of particular actors and organizations. Ultimately, despite their struggles for inclusion by both "sides" and consequent demands for political autonomy (Friedman 2007, 794), lesbian feminists have been key actors in bridging their communities (Thayer 2010; de la Dehesa 2010, 150–53); their "vital link . . . has to do with an understanding of obligatory heterosexuality as a social institution" that produces male dominance (Espinosa Miñoso 2010, 403). And transgender organizations in which feminists are active also build bridges to both feminist and gay movements (Vianna and Carrera 2010, 131).

Many coalitions, or the networks that undergird them, follow the pattern in which an earlier generation of feminist activists collaborates with a burgeoning LGBT sector. In Mexico, successful state-directed LGBT activism has been characterized by "an articulation with feminists," particularly through lesbian feminist organizations and elected officials (de la Dehesa 2010, 153). Whether or not they have built extensive coalitions, feminist and LGBT organizations have collaborated around demands for sexual health, predominantly through the fight for just treatment of people with AIDS (Gómez 2010). As they organized around their own health crisis, gay men discovered feminist allies with over a decade of experience, particularly in reproductive health.

As the foregoing suggests, successful coalition building is not limited to nonstate actors but also incorporates party cadre and state decision makers. Here again, the inroads feminists have made in such spaces can be fruitful for LGBT sectors. Feminists in left parties are often key allies for LGBT movements, due to their shared struggle against gender oppression (Marsiaj 2010, 207). As individual activists take on higher-profile work in parties or governing institutions, they bring along their commitments to preexisting networks of colleagues and fellow travelers, becoming key allies in policy-making endeavors.

From national identity to many areas of policy and politics, Latin American states have relied upon and promoted the ideal of a heterosexual family with the father at the helm. This ideal has lasted through many state formations, shifting in the service of state development needs. In reaction, feminist and queer activists have built coalitions to defend and promote sexual citizenship at the intersection of their demands. However, there are other issues of fundamental significance to the gendering of the state that are not usually the focus of such citizenship demands, which address the economic status and social rights of women (or poor queers). Poor and working-class women, among whom indigenous and Afro-Latinx women are overrepresented, have repeatedly mobilized in reaction to economic inequality, and the ways it is crosscut by race and ethnic relations.[20] These movements have grown in strength and numbers, informed by—but always in uneasy relation with—the feminist ideals and organizing principles of largely middle- and upper-class white and mestiza women. Due to such movements' importance, they are also considered in this volume.

As the trends detailed below will show, feminist, women's, and LGBT demands, and the communities from which they emerge, are not monolithic: while forging common agendas, they have walked distinct historical paths

and face different contemporary challenges. This analysis reveals diverse dynamics in internally differentiated communities. While a feminist analysis might focus on how poor women's reproductive labor is mobilized on the basis of their assumed maternal identity, queering that lens will remind us that they are also assumed to have (had) male partners. Gender itself is interpellated differently: for example, feminist analysis has focused more on the ways male and female genders, and masculine and feminine bodies, are constructed through social processes, whereas queer analysis considers the extent to which individuals have the right to state recognition of their gender identity. Although this volume addresses a range of issues using an intertwined analysis, the chapters tend to reach out from feminist starting points to include queer insights, rather than the other direction. This is based on the analytic grounding of the authors as well as the earlier development of both feminist analysis and mobilization.

Our Framework for Analyzing Gender and Sexuality Policy

Because Latin American states have built patriarchal heteronormativity into their historical foundations and contemporary functions, and the real-world politics of sexual citizenship show actors coming together to confront common challenges, the chapters in this volume address issues of both gender and sexuality. As they do so, they depart from the understanding, underlined by previous studies, that countries can become leaders in some areas of gender and sexual equality, and laggards in others (Franceschet 2010). The actors involved, the relevance of left governance, and the priorities, strategies, and effectiveness of defenders and critics of these changes are conditioned by the type of issue being debated (Htun and Weldon 2010). In addressing gender and sexuality policy, a focus on political context is crucial.

In order to determine to what extent left governance has made a difference on issues of gender and sexuality, we offer an analysis that focuses on the key demands of those seeking sexual citizenship rights, alongside the long-time feminist focus on ameliorating the gendered division of labor through state redistribution. We characterize those demands using a typology that builds on Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon's (2010) delineation of policies that aim to shift gendered systems of power. Thus, as the Intro.1 table below displays, one axis of the typology differentiates among gender status policies, which challenge

men's power and privilege; we also break out LGBT status policies, which focus on the institutionalization of heterosexuality and cisgender privilege, as well as policies that confront class and gender inequality with a focus on women's subordination in the gendered division of labor.

However, again with reference to Htun and Weldon's analysis, it is not sufficient to differentiate policies based on whether they focus primarily on gender, LGBT, or class status. As shown on the other axis, some of these policies are "countercultural" demands (Goetz and Jenkins 2016) because they directly challenge "religious doctrine or codified cultural traditions" (Htun and Weldon 2010, 209). As highlighted above, traditional or religious authorities are deeply invested in particular understandings of gender relations, sexuality, or gender identity that uphold their moral and social ideals. Thus, the fate of policies that challenge those understandings depends on the existence of religious political parties or coalitions and the dynamics between the political leadership and religious leaders. However, other policies that promote women's and LGBT equality may not be perceived as acting against such authorities' power or values.

Table Intro.1 illustrates the placement of central examples such as abortion, a policy that affects women's gender status and invokes clear opposition by morally and religiously inspired authorities, and same-sex marriage, which similarly invokes opposition but on LGBT status. However, the gender status policy of gender candidate quotas is not often perceived as challenging the structure of society, and gender identity recognition may be seen as a realignment of an individual into her or his "correct" status, although there is considerable variability in these policy dynamics.

As the foregoing suggests and the authors in this volume make clear, although policies may at first blush seem to fit only in one area, there is no "inherent" placement. Table Intro.1 shows that policies initially proposed as gender equitable may then be adopted in ways that do or do not challenge gender inequality, for example by giving antigender violence legislation a family-unification orientation rather than one that protects women from male aggression. Or the implementation of antidiscrimination policy with respect to sexual orientation, such as civil union registration, may be so weak as to effectively uphold heteronormativity. However, the targets of such policies may themselves shift their meaning through use, as when low-income mothers develop their leadership capabilities by managing poverty alleviation funds.

TABLE INTRO.1 Typology of gender and sexuality policies

	Culturally acceptable (nondoctrinal)	Countercultural (doctrinal issues)
Gender status *Challenge power hierarchies that "privilege men and the masculine"*	Quotas Violence Against Women policy that foregrounds the family	Abortion Violence Against Women policy that foregrounds women's human rights
LGBT status *Contest "institutionalization of normative heterosexuality" and cisgenderism*	Gender identity recognition	Same-sex marriage
Class-based *Ameliorate division of labor that "devalues women and the feminine"*	Conditional Cash Transfer policies that rely on poor women's reproductive labor	Conditional Cash Transfer policies that incorporate poor women as central protagonists

Source: Authors' elaboration of concepts/table from Htun and Weldon 2010, 208–9.

The rest of the introduction uses this framework to critically evaluate the difference Pink Tide governments have made with respect to gender and sexual justice, relying on comparative insights gleaned from the collection's case studies. We organize our explorations by addressing the issues of social welfare, political representation, violence against women, and the trade-offs between women's and LGBT rights. We then turn to an evaluation of the more successful strategies through which advocates have advanced their demands under Pink Tide governments.

Comparative Findings

Welfare, Social Redistribution, and Poverty Alleviation

One of the most important claims of Pink Tide administrations was their explicit promise to fight poverty and, to a lesser extent, inequality in order to redress the neoliberal legacy of historic class divisions and subsequent marginalization of the poor. Initially, and as described by the figures below, these governments offered some remarkable achievements in reducing extreme poverty and deprivation. Yet, in many cases, the socioeconomic gains of the



Figure Intro.1 Percentage of people living in extreme poverty under left-leaning governments, 2000–2012. Source: Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and the World Bank), http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/.

Pink Tide, which could have challenged the gendered division of labor and empowered women economically, were overshadowed by the one-third of the regional female population who still lacked their own income in 2015 (ECLAC 2015). In addition, poor women's unpaid work was the backbone of social programs that reduced extreme poverty, as well as central to the entire political project of the Left in power. Such overall findings were generally upheld in this volume.

When considering social indicators, all countries in this collection attest to the material gains for poor women under left administrations.[21] As figure Intro.1 indicates, extreme poverty declined, sometimes precipitously, in all cases, with half at or below the regional average. Countries with a significant population living in acute deprivation experienced the most positive outcomes. For example, in Ecuador this population declined from 47.5 percent in 2000 to only 13.1 percent in 2012; and Bolivia brought down its extreme poverty rates by more than 25 percent.

Poverty levels in female-headed households experienced a similar decline. Figure Intro.2 shows that when considering these households, the Pink Tide countries of this volume had very different points of departure. Yet,



Figure Intro.2 Percentage of female-headed households living in poverty under left-leaning governments, 2000–2012. Source: Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and the World Bank) http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/.

between 2000 and 2012, they all converged close to or below the regional average. Although clearly other factors besides political ideology (such as rising commodity prices) are at play in achieving these positive results, the figures demonstrate the definitive impact that left-leaning governments had on the situation of poor people and, in particular, poor women who were solely responsible for their children.

While the data on extreme poverty is very positive, the following figures attest to a more troubling picture. First, as presented in figure Intro.3, in the 2000s women were more likely than men to still be living in poverty. The countries with socioegalitarian traditions, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, are the ones with significantly higher ratios of poor women compared to poor men. Many countries are considerably above the regional average and point out the persistence of gender poverty gaps even in the most developed welfare states of the region. This is partially explained by the fact that women in the lowest two quintiles of income distribution are disproportionately unlikely to have their own source of income, emphasizing women's continued dependency (see figure Intro.4). Beyond the implementation of poverty



Figure Intro.3 Femininity index of indigence and poverty under left-leaning governments, 2000–2012. Source: CEPALSTAT Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/web_cepalstat/Portada.asp?idioma=i.

alleviation measures, this signals that women's economic autonomy remained an important challenge to the Pink Tide's narrative of social transformation.

Turning to the welfare policy arena, this collection affirms other studies of gender and left politics (Htun and Weldon 2012). Pink Tide administrations, left-leaning political parties and coalitions of movements, and unions played an important role in advancing a social rights agenda, including state funding for social policies, programs, and transfers. With little participation of feminist movements and national women's agencies, these left-leaning parties promoted state-led social protection policies, which included the expansion of social transfers, such as noncontributory pensions and poverty alleviation in the form of conditional cash transfers given directly to women (Molyneux 2008; Lavinas 2013; Tabbush 2009).

While recognizing this positive development, the chapters reveal an unsettling series of continuities between Pink Tide social programs and previous neoliberal policies. The chapters uphold other critical analyses in identifying similarities in how gendered assumptions undergird policy formulation as well as the models of economic development that financed such policy. Both left-leaning and neoliberal policy regimes have relied on poor women's



Figure Intro.4 Percent of men and women without own income under left-leaning governments, 2013. Source: CEPALSTAT Economic Commission for Latin American and the Carribean, http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/web_cepalstat/Portada.asp?idioma=i.

various forms of work and traditional notions of the family, environmentally unsustainable extractivist industries, and poverty alleviation, rather than addressing the structure of gender and class inequalities.

The country studies focus particularly on the widespread implementation of "Conditional Cash Transfer" (CCT) policies and their links with broader social policies and schemes. As a central policy through which Pink Tide governments have reduced poverty, the chapters analyze CCT policies that provided monetary support to mothers on the condition that they send their children to school and get regular medical checkups. Initiated in Brazil (1995) and Mexico (1997), by 2011, CCTs were adopted by nearly every Latin American country, covering almost 20 percent of the regional population (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011, 11). They have been quite successful in reducing extreme poverty, meeting health and education targets, and overall positive outcomes for poor women and their families (Johannsen et al. 2008; Molyneux and Thompson 2011; Molyneux with Jones and Samuels 2016).

In this sense, the chapters indicate that the policy of giving cash directly to women is an important acknowledgment of feminist scholars' advocacy and development practitioners' awareness that adult males tend to undervalue (and underfund) family budgets and reproductive responsibilities. It also redresses the historic segregation of women, who were considered by

social insurance contributions (such as social security or other retirement benefits) as part of the family wage of formally employed male heads of household. Such programs, promoted by practitioners to support the unpaid labor of poor women, have the potential to challenge the gendered division of labor.

Yet, our comparative findings suggest that, to various degrees, Pink Tide administrations have designed and implemented CCT programs as culturally acceptable policies that target poor mothers and vulnerable families. Moreover, feminist activists and national women's agencies have played mostly a secondary role, when compared to their salience in the other policy arenas analyzed in this introduction.

One of the key findings of this volume is that across the Pink Tide, social policies relied on poor women's unpaid labor in different ways and with various intensities. Between 2000 and 2015, countries implemented a wide spectrum of CCT policies and social programs that largely reproduced, and only under certain circumstances challenged, the gendered distribution of power, labor, and resources available for women from popular sectors. Three groups of national administrations can be identified: those that maximized the use of poor women's unpaid reproductive, community, and political labor; a second group that naturalized women as intermediaries of the human development of their children; and finally a smaller third cluster that attempted to redistribute gendered tasks and responsibilities.

The first group of governments included programs in Argentina implemented just after the economic crisis during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003–7), and the redder administrations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, most notably, Venezuela under President Chávez's administrations. As Annie Wilkinson writes in her chapter on Ecuador, there is an "unquestioned centrality of the heteropatriarchal family" in both policy and the discourse used to justify it. These countries maximized the use of women's unpaid work and attempted to renegotiate the "reproductive bargain" through which the state supports poor women and their families.[22] They combined and intensified the use of various forms of women's labor in the areas of social reproduction and care, community development, and grassroots political activism in popular neighborhoods. Written prior to Venezuela's political and socioeconomic crisis, including widespread shortages of food and medicine, Rachel Elfenbein's critical analysis of the social welfare "missions" of the 2000s provides a paradigmatic example of the combined use of all these forms of work. Her chapter underscores how,

through this intensification, "popular women became the backbone of the revolutionary process."

In these countries, women have continued to manage reproductive and productive tasks, even as they have taken on the lion(ess)'s share of managing various targeted poverty alleviation policies, and become politically mobilized at the local level. As with their neoliberal variants, these policies work because poor women have made them work (Lind 2009). The Pink Tide administrations seeking profound social transformations either by tackling deep economic crisis or by revolutionizing state-society relations did so by supporting social programs that embody conservative ideals of the family. They aimed to secure the support of poor urban households for their political parties through their heavy dependence on women's unpaid work, time, and commitment.

In the middle of the spectrum, a second group of countries follow the guidelines of international organizations that link poverty alleviation with the human development of children. In contrast to the previous group, in these cases the political labor of women to sustain a left-leaning political project of social transformation is reduced. These country experiences support and nuance feminist findings that stress CCTs' focus on poor women as intermediaries of their children's welfare or with other developmental goals in mind, rather than as full citizens in their own right (Molyneux 2007). Argentina after 2009 (with the implementation of the CCT program Asignación Universal por Hijo [Universal Child Allowance]), the implementation of CCT program Bolsa Família (Family Income) in Brazil, and the lighter pink Chilean Concertación government until 2014 (through the Puente [Bridge] program and Chile Solidario [Solidarity] are all examples that follow the overall regional trend in poverty reduction that targets mothers (Molyneux 2007). These maternalistic—or, as our analytic framework labels them, "culturally acceptable"—policies provide a potent, yet inegalitarian, recipe that largely naturalized the gendered division of labor, accomplishing little gendered and class redistribution of work, power, and resources (Molyneux 2008; Lavinas 2013; Tabbush 2010).

Finally, there is a smaller third set of Pink Tide administrations in which social policies challenged traditional cultural or religious beliefs about the family and women's role in it. These "countercultural" social policies attempted to alter the unequal gendered division of labor within households. At this end of the spectrum, we find most notably the cases of Uruguay and the Chilean administration after 2014. During the José Mujica government in

Uruguay, Niki Johnson, Ana Laura Rodríguez Gustá, and Diego Sempol describe how feminists in midlevel ministerial positions were critical actors in taking on women's movements demands to create a National System of Care for the elderly, children up to the age of five, and the disabled. In Chile, Gwynn Thomas describes how President Michelle Bachelet's vision of social provision as a right provided state-funded child and elderly care for low-income groups. The Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows with You) program oversaw the construction of hundreds of day care centers for children under the age of five, and other supports for low-income working women (Staab 2017).

But to be sure, as Shawnna Mullenax observes in Bolivia, CCTs have different meanings for various factions of women's and feminist movements, pointing toward some of the challenges in building coalitions among popular women's movements, middle-class feminists, and women's indigenous organizations. Overall, popular and grassroots women's movements tend to look favorably on these programs, whereas feminists are more outspoken critics of their heteropatriarchal basis. Feminists battling for social justice across the Pink Tide promote an agenda of universal, unconditional, expanded transfers to women within a framework that links social redistribution with gender justice.[23]

Women's indigenous movements, for their part, often welcome the extra resources, while remaining critical of the cultural disciplining of indigenous mothers (Cookson 2016). In a more trenchant critique of the economic model, their political organizations focus on the fact that the social programs responsible for the precipitous drop in extreme poverty in their countries are, by and large, based on funding that is tied to unsustainable and environmentally degrading extractivist industries. Indigenous and peasant women's mobilizations strongly linked to the defense of their territories and natural resources open a much-needed debate on the Pink Tide's future developmental models and sustainability. For example in Ecuador, Wilkinson finds that "Correa's neoextractivist model puts economic inclusion and gender equality at odds." As decolonial feminists insist, and the chapters on Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador demonstrate, such economic policies run roughshod over indigenous rights to land and livelihoods. These various standpoints on social policies mark the still-sharp class and ethnic divisions between feminists and women's organizations.

In summary, even though the results of this comparison indicate a historical continuity of state policy under the Pink Tide with earlier neoliberal governments, in some countries femocrats have incorporated movement de-



Figure Intro.5 Percent of women in single or lower house of national legislature under left-leaning governments, 2000–2015. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments," http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.

mands in promoting a countercultural agenda of redistribution of care. In this way they have sought to challenge the conservative ideals of the family underpinning policy formulation.

Political Representation: Fighting for Presence and Substance

Turning to a key global measurement of women's empowerment, the percentage of women in national legislatures, the Pink Tide governments covered in this volume are generally, but not universally, leaders in women's descriptive representation. Figure Intro.5 above shows that these governments have high rates of women's inclusion: half of them have national legislatures that are more than one-third female, and a quarter are 40 percent or more female. The redder governments tend to have the highest rates, particularly Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. However, this movement is not uniform. Half of the countries are considerably below the regional average, with socialist Venezuela being close to the bottom—along with lighter pink Brazil. Finally, and notably, during its progressive policy explosion Uruguay has had low levels of women's representation.

The major mechanism for the dramatic developments in descriptive representation is the use of candidate gender quotas.[24] These did not originate with the Pink Tide but were already on the agenda, and, in some cases, were implemented beforehand.[25] With the return to largely democratic politics in the 1980s, demands to improve women's formal representation through gender-based quotas for electoral office diffused across the region. Inspired by the lessons from European advocates from social democratic and socialist parties (Krook 2009, 166–67), women both outside and inside of the state organized to advance the adoption of quotas in individual parties and through national legislation. Quota advocates organized at a propitious moment; in the 1990s, Latin American governments were eager to adopt measures seen as legitimating their nascent democracies. Although some male elites proved resistant, such as Concertación leaders in Chile, others, such as then-president Carlos Menem of Argentina, took it on as another symbol of modern, democratic inclusion. The highly successful demand for quotas eventually made Latin America a global standout, with the highest regional average of women in national legislatures.[26]

The Pink Tide governments that have pulled ahead in descriptive representation have varied in their approach to quota adoption. In regional leader Argentina, quotas were adopted, and, after a difficult battle in which proponents were forced to appeal to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for redress, were implemented, just before the Kirchners came to power. Since that time, left-leaning governments have overseen quota fulfillment, with between 36 and 38 percent of Congress made up of female representatives. In Bolivia, pressure for quotas from organized women during and after the institutional foundation of the plurinational state through the 2009 constitution resulted in Bolivia having the second-highest percentage of female legislators in the world. In this case, quotas took place within a larger context of demands for inclusion, particularly for the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples. Similarly, with Ecuador's "Citizen Revolution" positive action was enshrined in the constitution in a context of widening inclusion. Its parliament is now not only over 40 percent women but boasts a female president and vice presidents. Moreover, the Constitutional Court is also characterized by gender parity. Although not constitutionally mandated in Nicaragua, women's representation has shot up over 40 percent under the leadership of President Daniel Ortega, and the dominance of his party in the National Assembly. Moreover, executive ministries and mayoralties have reportedly reached gender parity.

The international emphasis on office holding as a key measurement of gender equality is undergirded by an assumption that female representatives will devote more attention to women's issues, equating descriptive with substantive representation. As Latin American cases such as Argentina and Bolivia have shown, the demand for female candidates has enabled coalition building across parties and other sources of difference (Htun and Ossa 2013). However, analysts of the impact of descriptive representation find considerable variation. While some observe that having more women in office does lead to a shift in both the discussion and implementation of new policies, others find that barriers remain "to the articulation of women's concerns" (Krook and Zetterberg 2014, 288). Quotas may even "reduce women's collective influence" (Htun 2016, 140). Women who are bound to their leaders' or parties' dictates have less room for maneuver; and all women must contend with male-dominated power networks beyond the floor of the legislature (and on it) that prevent gendered agendas from going forward (Franceschet and Piscopo 2013). Such findings are generally upheld by this volume.

The countries under study here reveal a lack of correlation between high levels of women's descriptive representation and positive outcomes for women's rights. Having more women in office can lead to the introduction of more gender-focused legislation, as the case of Argentina attests. But as the paradigmatic case of Uruguay manifests, progressive achievements on gender and sexuality, including the extraordinarily difficult feat of decriminalizing abortion as well as same-sex marriage and gender identity recognition, have come about with women's representation below 13 percent. In Brazil, with even lower levels of representation, left-leaning administrations made substantially more policy interventions on gender and sexuality. And, as the three chapters that focus on the countries with the highest numbers of women in office make clear, higher descriptive representation can be inversely correlated with substantive representation. Mullenax suggests that in Bolivia, high numbers may be "a strategic move by the government to appear that they were working on women's issues," although she also makes clear that indigenous women's organizations have had demands implemented by their government. In Nicaragua and Ecuador, Larracoechea and Wilkinson find high numbers to be a cynical symbol in the face of the denigration or outright repression of feminist activism, and the weakening of national women's agencies. External validation of such "window dressing" is the focus of these last two leaders, rather than the material situation of women in their countries.

When power is concentrated in the hands of executives, legislative representation may be less than salient in terms of real change. When those executives are wooing supporters from among conservative religious movements or hierarchies, or adopt a discriminatory agenda for other reasons, women's presence in congress is far from the answer to ensuring women's substantive representation. As with other demands from organized women, the implementation of this policy shows how difficult it is to pin down a particular measure as being inherently countercultural. Once the quota has been implemented, under certain circumstances high numbers of women may, paradoxically, be used to mask an antifeminist agenda.

Violence against Women

At first glance, the Latin American region as a whole offers a remarkable diffusion of legislation on violence against women. Between 1993 and 2000, nearly every country passed a law prohibiting domestic violence; several have since reformed and strengthened their laws. But what made the reformist "wave" of legislation necessary was the notable reinscription of gender hierarchies in the first one. Advocates had pressured their governments to comply with the path-breaking Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (known as Belém do Pará after the city where it was adopted in 1994). Belém do Pará takes a feminist perspective in drawing attention to the many ways gender hierarchies undergird violence against women in the home, on the street, and in the state, and—finding it to be a violation of women's human rights—holds the state responsible for its prevention. But the majority of first-wave legislation prohibited "intrafamilial" violence, simultaneously ignoring the particular ways women are victims of gender-based violence within the home, and the kinds of violence they face outside of it. In a final indication of this legislation's protection of the family, rather than women, the legal sanction for intrafamilial violence was usually not criminal; mediation was promoted instead. As a result of these developments, advocates pushed for the second wave of revised laws that followed the spirit of Belém rather than ran counter to it (Friedman 2009). This second wave largely overlapped with Pink Tide governance, but, as the following discussion demonstrates, debates continued over how—or whether—to challenge the gendered power relations inherent in gender-based violence.

These chapters evince a spectrum of approaches to violence against women ranging from feminist to heteropatriarchal. At one end are those countries that have successfully advanced legislation, institutionalization, and, to a cer-

tain extent, implementation of robust policies. In Uruguay, feminist work to transversalize attention to violence against women across multiple ministries has had significant institutional success, particularly in terms of its support through the national women's agency Inmujeres. Chile's parallel agency also had a central role in achieving revisions to their initial legislation, resulting in the criminalization of domestic violence and an increase in state responsibility for preventing gendered violence.

In the middle of the spectrum are countries that have advanced adequate policy but faltered on implementation. The chapters on Venezuela and Bolivia show that, while women's movement pressure has resulted in reforming legislation to focus on preventing violence against women in all its forms, rather than centering on the family, it is largely unenforced. Although Argentina's revised law widened the ambit of violence prevention beyond the family, eliminated reconciliation between spouses as a legal resolution, and offered victims guaranteed services, the weak institutional position of its national women's agency, the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer (National Council on Women), has meant less support for implementation. The obvious impunity for perpetrators inspired a massive outcry across Argentina and elsewhere in the region: in 2015 and 2016, hundreds of thousands of protestors from all walks of life took to the streets mobilized by the slogan #NiUnaMenos (Not One Less) (Goñi 2015; Friedman and Tabbush 2016).

Most disturbing, Ecuadoran and Nicaraguan governments, in close collaboration with the Catholic hierarchy in their countries, have gutted legislative efforts to combat gender-related violence. As Wilkinson explains, the Ecuadorean Penal Code reform of 2013 returned to first-wave approaches: "The paradigm of 'violence against women' that women had fought for was changed to 'intrafamily violence,' placing violence against women once again in the private sphere of the heteropatriarchal family." The change also stripped the victim protections afforded to women. The antifeminist president and first lady of Nicaragua have overseen the evisceration of antiviolence legislation, which now is committed to strengthening the Nicaraguan family through mandates such as having women attend church- and community-led family mediation sessions instead of reporting abuse to women's police stations. Moreover, Larracoechea details, the executive regulation redefined "femicide" in order to halve the number of reported murders of women.

Htun and Weldon (2012) argue in their global analysis of the genesis of anti-VAW policies that left parties are not the major protagonists for change on this issue; the strongest efforts depend on the collaboration between

autonomous women's movements and national women's agencies. This collection confirms and extends these findings. When women have successfully mobilized to demand stronger VAW legislation in many countries, robust state support is essential, as the cases of Chile and Uruguay demonstrate. However, Htun and Weldon characterize antiviolence work as "nondoctrinal," or as we call it here, "culturally acceptable" policy, that is less objectionable to religious forces. But as the first regional wave of legislative reform, alongside the dramatic shifts in Ecuador and Nicaragua, indicate, some elements of the Catholic Church and religiously inspired leadership have perceived feminist VAW as an attack on the family, and have promoted conservative policies in its stead.

Trade-offs between Feminist and LGBT Demands for Bodily Autonomy and Recognition: Variations in "Pinkwashing"

As the chapters on Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela detail, some states have focused their attention on the most challenging issues of sexual citizenship in paradoxical ways that we, following increasingly popular usage, term "pinkwashing." Although the term has migrated to focus on the ways in which states advance LGBT policies to claim progressive or modern status in the face of other areas of repression or neglect, it was originally coined by breast cancer activists in critique of corporations' "pink-ribbon" marketing initiatives supporting women's health despite their contributions to unhealthy lifestyles and environmental contamination (Lind and Keating 2013, 5). As such, "pinkwashing" can also be used to consider how states trade off different gender-based rights, for example offering evidence of women's political leadership to distract from the rejection of women's right to control their own bodies.

Pink Tide governments have made strategic or unintentional trade-offs between and among the policy issues central to feminist and LGBT communities. Some governments have intentionally pinkwashed their failure or rejection of women's substantive rights, such as reproductive autonomy or the implementation of effective antiviolence policies, by promoting their tolerance of the LGBT community, often to an international community eager to see this latest sign of modernity. In our cases, governments also display improvements in particular women's rights to mask other problems. In this sense, what is being "washed" varies in different national contexts.

The intentional pinkwashing trade-off between LGBT and women's rights is most starkly presented in Nicaragua and Ecuador, where presidents have

cemented alliances with religious leaders and distanced themselves from feminist movements and demands. Under the leadership of former revolutionary Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua criminalized therapeutic abortion in the same Penal Code reform that decriminalized homosexuality. The president and first lady have declared war against the feminist movement even as they have attempted to build support among younger LGBT people. In Ecuador, Correa also used cooptation to undermine the more challenging aspects of the sexual citizenship agenda. He elevated the work and profile of a single trans leader, relying on her to publicly denounce criticisms from the broader LGBT movement. At the same time, he undermined proposed gender identity legislation, held the conservative line against same-sex marriage and abortion, and shuttered a successful teenage pregnancy prevention program.

It is worth noting that some countries on the red side of the Pink Tide engage in trade-offs in which, as Rachel Elfenbein signals, LGBT issues were peripheral. The Venezuelan constitutional reform of 1999 met almost all the rights demands of the women's movement, except the right to abortion. And, while the constitutional national assembly presented a political opportunity to "contest and set a framework for restructuring gender power relations, it did not signify an opening to contest heteronormativity and advance LGBTTI interests." Elfenbein's analysis concludes that the marginalization of LGBT and sexual diversity demands in Venezuela was tied to the maternalistic and heteronormative governmental approach to gender issues, and to explicit homophobia within government ranks.

Another variation in the processes of pinkwashing is the audience to whom the clean laundry is displayed. Sometimes domestic audiences are the target, for example, by presidential candidates seeking to build coalition support, as in Argentina and Ecuador. Argentina demonstrates the significance of shifting executive-church relations: moments of tension allowed for presidential support for same-sex marriage, while phases of cooperation consistently held off abortion rights, despite growing public and legislative support for long-delayed decriminalization. But nearly always lurking not so distantly in the background are the global audiences—from philanthropists to Western governments to the United Nations Development Program—upon which some governments are heavily dependent for program funding and international recognition. Larracoechea finds that Ortega strategically positioned his partial acceptance of the "sexual diversity" community "in order to improve [his] international credentials as a modern leftist leader"; these credentials were burnished when the World Economic Forum ranked Nicaragua sixth

in its influential *Global Gender Gap Report* of 2014, "leaving first lady Murillo overjoyed and [the] feminists startled."

As the foregoing suggests, the (in some cases, hyper-) presidentialist systems of Latin America leave a great deal of policy direction in the hands of individual leaders. Sometimes this worked in sexual citizenship advocates' favor, when executives decided to promote issues in the face of legislative recalcitrance, or offer state resources. Marlise Matos shows how much supportive executive action grew under the Partido dos Trabalhadores, and Gwynn Thomas sees some hope in President Bachelet's promotion of quotas, improved state services, and advocacy of therapeutic abortion in her second term. But as this section suggests, executive support is often inconsistent, nonexistent, or instrumentalized. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's support for marriage equality was crucial; she even took two intransigent legislators from her party out of the country during the vote. But she was similarly persuasive to her supporters in the legislature to throw up roadblocks to legal abortion, despite the increase in bill signatories and popular approval. Following their executive's orders, state women's organizations in Venezuela have largely mobilized popular women to support revolutionary transformation, rather than transforming revolutionary regimes to support popular women. Correa and Uruguay's Tabaré Vázquez threatened to resign in the face of abortion decriminalization bills (and the former saw expanding exemptions as "treason"). As Wilkinson argues, "The heteropatriarchal family . . . became as entrenched at the center of the state as Correa did himself." Moreover, reliance on the executive often results in unsustainable policies—such as Matos tracks in Brazil, where the removal of Dilma Rousseff negatively affected rights gains.

The chapters in this volume offer additional insights with regard to executive power. To begin with, not all presidential systems concentrate power and compromise accountability mechanisms to the same degree. Furthermore, the political opportunities for feminist and LGBT movements may shift between different administrations in a given national context. The contrasts marked by Bachelet's two terms, the distinctions between Vázquez's and Mujica's administrations in Uruguay, between Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, and Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, bring out such differences. In an often-neglected dimension of executive analysis, the Nicaragua chapter illuminates the role of the first lady, who has strengthened her husband's conservative Catholicism and is becoming equally powerful. And

finally, Thomas reminds us of the importance of party systems even within presidentialism: she finds that coalition dynamics have moderated the impact of conservative religious forces.

This comparative analysis of trade-offs between women's and LGBT rights under Latin American left governance offers a complex picture with regard to the two demands most often categorized as "countercultural." The chapters suggest significant variations between countries and administration in terms of political opportunities and policy issues. They also suggest that there are various audiences to which these trade-offs are directed.

In terms of advances in sexual rights for women and LGBT constituents, this collection distinguishes three main groups of countries. Crosscutting findings reveal that the Pink Tide administrations with a strong rights platform, such as Uruguay, have pushed for the most progressive demands for legal abortion, same-sex marriage, and provisions for the recognition of gender identity. Whereas a second set of countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, have advanced considerably in aspects of LGBT rights while largely holding the line on abortion decriminalization. The most extreme cases of pinkwashing are in Nicaragua and Ecuador. They suggest that the intensity of pinkwashing depends on the degree of hostility between the executive and the feminist movement; the links between the executive and religious conservative forces; and their desire to be reviewed well internationally.[27] Left administrations seeking religious support have downplayed feminist demands and presented their support for LGBT rights to an international audience as a beacon of modernity.

The foregoing sections summarize the multifaceted challenges to gender and sexual justice under Pink Tide governments. In many cases, a more generous social policy has treated women as the center of their families,' and often countries,' well-being, rather than as individuals deserving of rights beyond their roles in the gender system. Our case studies frontally contest the assumed equivalence between women's descriptive representation and their ability to advance a gender justice agenda in politics. On the issue of violence against women, these chapters echo the global analysis that left parties are not the central protagonists, and that other forces—organized women and femocrats—are more deeply committed to making change. But perhaps most discouraging to their protagonists, concerted efforts for sexual citizenship may be thwarted by governments eager to trade LGBT recognition for a firm rejection of reproductive choice.

Successful Contestation through Strategic Framing and State/Society Collaborations

In addition to the considerable challenges that remain, these chapters also analyze how advocates have successfully articulated, organized, and achieved some of their demands. Their activities transform the arena of social and political activism, as well as the relationships between social movements and Pink Tide administrations. Confirming previous studies, chapter authors find that effective crosscutting movement work has depended on two major factors: savvy narrative framing and strategic coalition building across state/society boundaries.

In terms of the first factor, Uruguay stands out: according to chapter authors, LGBT organizations "reconfigured the master frame of the sexual diversity movement," expanding their agenda to include other potent sources of discrimination based on class, race-ethnicity, and gender. In a vivid illustration of their coalitional perspective, they changed the name of the Gay Pride Parade to the "Diversity March"; its numbers then soared. Firmly embedding demands within previously legitimated human rights frames helped Argentine proponents successfully lobby for the first same-sex marriage legislation in the region and one of the most progressive gender identity recognition laws in the world. Failure to sync frames with dominant sources of legitimacy is clearly a challenge to movements; as the Argentina chapter also recounts, the frame of women's rights to their own bodies has been unsuccessful in promoting abortion decriminalization. In Ecuador and Venezuela, feminist and LGBT activists seized the political opportunity of constitutional conventions to advance a common agenda and repel common opponents. Here again, framing was crucial: in Venezuela, activists reappropriated revolutionary concepts to join in the Bolivarian revolution even as they critiqued it.

To achieve policy successes, movements have worked closely with allies inside the state. In Brazil, for example, Matos claims that women's and LGBT movements advanced their agenda significantly under the Partido dos Trabalhadores by working through institutional engagement and close relations with sympathetic state actors. Similarly in Uruguay, feminist and women's movements have been the motor behind "a multinodal policy network" of feminists throughout the state which "has facilitated the entry of central feminist demands onto the government agenda" and ensured their policy adoption when executives have been less than supportive. As the chapters on Uruguay

and Chile make clear, national women's agencies provide the potential for effective state-society coalition building. In the case of Argentina, successful state collaboration was not central on abortion legislation but was extended to the LGBT community: same-sex marriage proponents received robust support for their demands from the antidiscrimination institute. This finding helps to put into perspective how damaging it is for sexual and gender rights when actors within these state agencies turn their backs on movements, as has happened in Ecuador and Nicaragua, or when the agencies have few resources or capabilities.

However, intersectional alliances are highly dependent on the broader political context. For instance, conflictive contexts such as military dictatorships or economic crises tend to unite movements under broad political objectives, such as democratization or social inclusion. In contrast, in the context of progressive governments, disagreements have arisen over the specific policies to achieve gender or sexual justice; priorities, interpersonal rifts, and competition over resources; politics shaped by deep gender, class, and ethnic or racial inequalities; and relationships to political parties and the state. Wilkinson's analysis of Ecuador indicates that the fracturing of social movements has been exacerbated by a context of extreme polarization, and clientelistic state politics that divide feminist and LGBT movements even as they may co-opt elements of their communities. This fragmentation and divide-and-rule approach to feminist, women's, and LGBT movements is also strong in Nicaragua, and where indigenous women have found more support from Evo Morales's administration than other women in terms of their demands for recognition and redistribution.

Conclusion

By exploring distinct elements of a gender and sexual rights agenda, this volume contests the narrative of the Pink Tide's uniform experience and transformative impact. As with other historical periods, this one manifests continuities in heteropatriarchal structures and practices of state power even as such power has been dramatically or mildly altered in other ways. Reflecting back on table Intro.1, through which we categorized gender- and sexuality-related policy, we see that there is no fixed understanding of the extent to which a given issue challenges deep-seated cultural values and their proponents. Across these arenas, the largely underanalyzed but ever-stronger alliances between putatively progressive political forces and conservative

religious ones play a central role in determining the degree to which these policies promote transformation.

As this volume attests, the impact of the Pink Tide cannot be understood without reference to the politics of and policy on gender and sexuality. At first glance, restoring such references might seem to indicate that the more radical attempts at reorienting social, political, and economic development have been, paradoxically, more dependent on traditional gender ideology and its institutional manifestations. Instead, the countries with a less radical framework for change have been more effective in challenging traditional sexuality norms and male privilege. Indeed, feminists seem to have greater possibilities to exert influence within institutionalized partisan left governments (Blofeld, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017, 362).

But it is precisely by refocusing our view through the lenses of gender and sexuality that we can see that neat bifurcations between "bad" and "good" Lefts lead to erroneous conclusions. It is not Ortega's, Correa's, Chávez's, or, periodically, Fernández de Kirchner's ideological radicality that are at issue here, but their hyperpresidentialism and strategic alliances with conservative actors, particularly the Catholic Church, to maintain their holds on power and develop electoral or ruling coalitions. It is not Chávez's, and now, Maduro's, attempt to mobilize popular sectors to support a socialist project that has exploited popular women's unpaid labor, but their eagerness to perpetuate their support and power in the face of legislative opposition, use of police repression against mass protests, and unexamined reliance on gendered social and economic structures in doing so. And it is not Morales's claim to decolonize the Bolivian state that has alienated many indigenous women—and men—but his administration's continuing dependence on extractivist economic development. At the other end of the spectrum, progress in Uruguay has depended on the shrewd actions of multisectoral coalitions rather than on institutionalized political processes alone. The concentration of power and its continued reliance on gendered and sexual relations of power undermine transformative political projects.

However, revolutionary rhetorical commitments and their embodiment through new constitutions have provided political opportunities by which movements have articulated and demanded the diverse changes they seek. They have built conjunctural coalitions and shared platforms, or at least shared resistance to common foes. They have also connected with allies inside the state; such state-society collaboration proves central to the successes

movements have achieved. And they have advanced distinct ways of staking their claims that resonate with domestic contexts.

As nearly all of the countries profiled in this collection experience the growth of the center-right and the decline of commodity-fueled growth, the reliance on poor women's unpaid labor will doubtless continue as a fundamental, yet invisibilized, element of shifting economic and social relations. It remains to be seen whether the kind of coalitions that have been successful in challenging less material elements of the heteropatriarchal social order, such as demanding action on gender-based violence and relationship and gender identity recognition, can be turned to the work of lightening the burdens placed on those mothers' shoulders.

To make progress in shifting political contexts, movements can build on the lessons learned under Pink Tide governance—since trends such as hyperpresidentialism, alliances with conservative religious forces, and dependence on extractive industries are bound to continue under right-wing rule. Enhanced descriptive representation, as attractive as it may appear to global audiences, does not seem to be the lynchpin to achieving gender and sexuality justice, particularly when such representation is subject to the control of centralizing executives and hamstrung by the pressure of conservative actors. Instead, effective substantive representation has to be achieved through strategically connecting movement actions to legitimized frames of understanding and institutional spaces at many levels, including the judiciary. Movement actors must fight to maintain spaces such as state women's agencies and antidiscrimination institutions and demand that allies fill them. They should also continue to exploit opportunities to "judicialize" their demands, such as those mentioned in the chapters on Argentina and Brazil, especially where independent supreme courts attempt to hold other powers accountable.

We invite readers to consider these findings as they explore the chapters that follow. In order to make the comparisons as clear as possible, we have organized the rest of the volume to reflect countries' relative progressivity on the policies challenging the heteropatriarchal organization of society: women's reproductive autonomy, LGBT recognition, and the empowerment of poor women. Challenging a key global measurement for women's equality, we interrogate but do not organize the chapters according to the vexed question of women's representation, given the contested relationship and lack of correlation between women's descriptive and substantive representation. The complexities of the cases belie a smooth analytic trajectory, but the endpoints

are clear. The more that feminist and queer movements have seized the political opportunities opened by left governance and been able to count on state allies within a framework of institutionalized political interactions, the more successful they have been at seeking rights from the Left. The more control that executives have had, and the more tightly bound they have been to conservative religious hierarchies and ideas, the less a gender and sexual justice agenda has been realized by its proponents.

Notes

We would like to thank the reviewers of this volume for their insightful feedback on earlier drafts, as well as participants at the CLACSO Congress of 2016. We are grateful for the work of Janet Chavez and Maegan Hoover in collecting data and creating figures.

1. This worldview challenges the power hierarchies embedded in Western social, political, and economic frameworks and their appropriateness for formerly colonized peoples.

2. The color pink refers both to the global association of the color red with the Left, and to the spectrum of political projects, from light-pink reformist to deeper-red radical, included in this period. The countries in which left-leaning executives were in power for at least one term between the mid-1990s and the present are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

3. In this introduction we use the adjective "queer" and the acronym "LGBT" as synonyms, following increasingly common usage in the United States, even as we acknowledge that the former is often used as a way to acknowledge the blurred boundaries among nonheteronormative and gender-nonconforming identities, and the latter is often expanded to take into account more specific identities, such as transsexual, intersex, and asexual. Although they have different histories and contemporary valences, both terms reference individuals and communities whose lived experience and identities in some way challenge heterosexual, cisgender, and patriarchal norms. However, because the communities we reference in Latin America use a range of terms to self-identify that are relevant to their own contexts, the authors of the country studies also use a range of different terms.

4. Feminists who work inside state institutions.

5. The modes of incorporation varied from executive cabinet placements to legislative action to shifting the entire constitutional framework toward more mass-based participation.

6. These entailed broad-based legal reforms such as constitutional modifications, revisions of civil and penal codes, and the passing of laws regulating gender and sexuality; writing national plans based on social inclusion and indigenous notions of *buen vivir* (this concept roughly translates to "living well"; in context, it

suggests placing community needs above those of the individual); and creating new "imagined political communit[ies]" (Anderson 1983, 6).

7. This is due to three main reasons: the expansion of the agenda beyond economic issues; a desire to reconnect with an anticlerical history; and the use of social liberalism to restore a sense of radicalism (Encarnación 2016, 70–71).

8. Previous experiences of state socialism in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Latin America show the distance between discursive affirmation of gender equality and the lived experiences of citizens (Molyneux 2001).

9. There is an abundant political science and sociological literature that attempts to characterize these governments. For example, see Castañeda and Morales 2008; Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; de la Torre and Arnson 2013; Queirolo 2013; and Ellner 2014.

10. This is according to income distribution as measured by the World Bank through the Gini index (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017).

11. There is no English translation of the widely used term *sectores populares*. According to the translators of Elizabeth Jelin's 1990 edited collection, *Women and Social Change in Latin America*, "working class" is not an accurate definition since the poor do not often work for a regular salary. Instead, they perform the most precarious informal and temporary work and also experience high unemployment. Although they have political citizenship, they do not have social rights, and are segregated in neighborhoods in remote suburbs or marginal urban areas. Jelin uses the term "popular sectors" as a synonym for the Latin American urban poor to reflect their substantial presence as well as their social and political protagonism (Jelin 1990a, 10–11; 1990b).

12. In practice, the nuclear family is becoming less and less common, as the numbers of female-headed households and people living alone increase (Arriagada 2002).

13. In colonial times, Elizabeth Dore (2000, 12, 11) explains, "officials drew on legal and cultural norms of patriarchal authority to lend legitimacy to the authority of the state"; as a result "men's gender privileges and obligations were regarded as natural law," and women's legal autonomy determined by their relationship to men, as well as their race and class. Catholic teachings reinforced the male-dominated family as the basic building block of society, and, as Jordi Díez (2015, 33) notes, "excluded any sexual expression other than heterosexuality." After independence and the rise of the liberal state, both social and political organization continued to privilege light-skinned, propertied men; secular liberalism reinforced, rather than challenged, heteropatriarchal norms. Moreover, new laws and constitutional frameworks institutionalized the male-dominated family as the basis of citizenship and began to outlaw homosexuality (Díez 2015, 34). Even after it was decriminalized with the adoption of Napoleonic codes, homosexuality moved from sin to a sickness, pathologized by its medicalization (Bejel 2010, 48).

14. Maxine Molyneux (2000a) explains that corporatist governments, while more inclusive of the working class, privileged men through party-union relations. Their openness to women's political participation, if not mobilization, was largely

to support state projects; the expansion of women's social rights were awarded through their roles as daughters, wives, and mothers.

15. Although this reliance is not new, it became especially marked where the state shed responsibility for social programs and services.

16. As Mario Pecheny argues (2012/2013), "advances in gender and sexual rights facilitate a regional self-image of modern societies, modern politicians, and modern political systems. The enlightened middle classes that support individual values of sexual freedom find in these measures (divorce, sex education, and even equal marriage) a sort of compensation for the unjust economic policies and attacks on social rights that have occurred simultaneously."

17. Such frames are also adapted to distinct contexts. In Mexico City, framing of both abortion and marriage equality as part of a secular society, harkening back to the revolutionary promise of a separation of church and state, helped to broaden the coalition supporting these demands and win legislative victories. Moreover, claims for "sexual diversity" connected queer theory to the idea of cultural diversity, a particularly relevant idea given Mexican indigenous demands for well-being and recognition of their cultural heritage (Díez 2015, 97).

18. This is not to imply that such movements operate in a mobilizational vacuum; other social change movements, such as those focused on race, ethnicity, and territory, interpenetrate these efforts, resulting in other forms of collaboration.

19. For a careful critique of the tensions implicit in the use of a liberal notion of rights to demand inclusion on the basis of sexuality in national and international institutions, see Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker (2008, part 3).

20. For instance, the period of economic decline and political repression that characterized the region from the late 1960s through the 1980s was a particularly fertile time for such organizing, as popular women formed soup kitchens and neighborhood organizations (Jelin 1990b; Schild 1994).

21. Although this section offers what are often considered objective measurements of socioeconomic progress based on gender, manipulation of official statistics is not unknown. For governments whose legitimacy depends on improving social indicators, the temptation is strong to produce indicators that demonstrate an even more improved situation than what is actually happening. (See, for example, the Nicaraguan government's approach to femicide in chapter 7.) This could have a straightforward impact on women's status, such as reporting higher-than-actual educational enrollment. Or it could have a more indirect effect. Consider inflation statistics: if they are underreported, governments can claim that the prices of necessities upon which poverty rates are based are low enough that those rates are correspondingly low. But if the reality of inflation is much higher, those necessities are also more expensive—and the economic and social status of the women often responsible for purchasing them is then worse than reported.

22. The "reproductive bargain" focuses on the state-society relations that ensure the continuity of goods and services for social reproduction in its widest sense, as

well as expectations of how such reproductive responsibilities are distributed and a moral economy of welfare is legitimated (Pearson 1997, 680).

23. In the Pink Tide, CCT coverage is quite variable, ranging from countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, where coverage reaches all those living in extreme poverty, to Bolivia and Peru, where it is significantly lower (50 and 60 percent) (Gender Equality Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean 2012, 56). There is also a sharp variability in the amount of cash provided to women between programs and countries (Gender Equality Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean 2012).

24. Some countries have replaced earlier minimum quotas with parity (50 percent) requirements for party lists.

25. Recent work argues that ideology, in fact, is not as important an explanatory factor as parties' "decision environments" in explaining female candidacy. Parties nominate more women when facing public distrust, and more men in times of economic weakening or higher partisan competition (Funk, Hinojosa, and Piscopo 2017).

26. This holds true if Europe is taken as a single region (of OSCE member countries). If Nordic countries are broken out into their own region, the Americas form the region with the second highest average (IPU 2017).

27. With respect to LGBT rights, Javier Corrales (2015, 28) also points to the legislative branch: "The veto power of religion is most strongly felt where Protestants and Evangelicals are dominant, growing, or have a strong presence in Congress. By contrast, in predominantly Catholic countries, religion tends to be decisive where church attendance is high or where strong historical ties exist between the clergy and at least one dominant political party."

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