

The Loss of Empire and Hikikomori Nationalism

THE END OF PAX AMERICANA

NAOKI SAKAI

THE END OF PAX AMERICANA

ASIA-PACIFIC: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY

Editors: Rey Chow, Michael Dutton,
H. D. Harootunian, and Rosalind C. Morris

Duke University Press *Durham and London* 2022

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Project editor: Lisa Lawley
Typeset in Garamond Premier Pro and Din by Typesetter, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Sakai, Naoki, 1946- author.
Title: The end of Pax Americana : The loss of empire and
Hikikomori nationalism/ Naoki Sakai.
Other titles: Asia-Pacific.
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2022. | Series: Asia-pacific:
culture, politics, and society | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021016456 (print)
LCCN 20210164457 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478013976 (hardcover)
ISBN 9781478014911 (paperback)
ISBN 9781478022213 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Postcolonialism—Social aspects—East Asia—History—
20th century. | Postcolonialism—Social aspects—Japan—History—
20th century. | Hikikomori. | Social isolation—Japan. | East Asia—Foreign
relations—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—East Asia. |
Japan—Foreign relations—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—
Japan. | BISAC: HISTORY / Asia / General | HISTORY / Asia / Japan
Classification: LCC DS518.8 .S253 2022 (print) | LCC DS518.8 (ebook) |
DDC 320.540952—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021016456
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021016457

Cover art: Workers at the Kidoura shipyard in Kesennuma, Japan, 2012.
Courtesy Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images.

Dedicated to
Harry D. Harootunian
in friendship, admiration,
and gratitude

Contents

Acknowledgments

This volume consists of articles and manuscripts for speeches that I have written and delivered in the last two decades in a variety of locations in Asia, Europe, and North America. Although each is modified and edited for inclusion here, without too much difficulty a reader might detect inconsistencies, revisions, and minor contradictions that I have failed to resolve. Some of the problematics I repeatedly tackled, such as racism and translation, were inversely formulated, articulated to different topics, and contrarily conceptualized. As a matter of fact, in the editing process for their inclusion I encountered a certain difficulty in reducing incongruities and, on rare occasions, outright contradictions in my original versions. Apparently, time is one reason for this challenge. As the situation changes and as my thinking advances, many times I discover how inadequate and insufficient my previous grasp was. As recently as 2016, for instance, I was forced to acknowledge that the end of Pax Americana would come in a much more drastic and catastrophic fashion than I had previously anticipated. Until then I thought of Donald Trump as nothing more than a bad joke. Another reason is not unrelated to the time factor; it is input from my fellow scholars from whom I have learned so much that often forced me to reconsider the ways I posed problems and programmed perspectives.

I want to acknowledge my exceptional gratitude to Harry D. Harootunian, who helped to create many opportunities for me to pursue an academic career, introduced me to rigorous inquiry, and taught me how not to ignore the sense of justice in intellectual life. Therefore I dedicate this book to him.

In the 1980s, at the University of Chicago, I became increasingly suspicious of the disciplinary formation of area studies with regard to power and governmentality, but it was William Haver, a fellow graduate student, who

taught me that, as long as one works in a certain field of specialization, one cannot evade the responsibility for critically examining how knowledge is produced within and under what conditions one's expertise is sanctioned. In the last three decades, I have tried to be responsible for the demands of critical scholarship, although I am not certain that I have succeeded in this mission at all. My acknowledgment also goes to Jon Solomon, with whom I have been in constant dialogue about the disciplinary knowledge of area studies and the politics of the will to know. I acknowledge his great assistance in providing me with many opportunities to reflect on my own argument and to broaden the theoretical scope I had assumed. In this volume he kindly allowed me to include the introduction to the fourth volume of *Traces: A Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory and Translation*, which we coedited. Of course, I want to express my gratitude to Takashi Fujitani for his exceptional generosity. When he discovered Edwin O. Reischauer's "Memorandum on Policy towards Japan" at the National Archive at College Park, he contacted me and allowed me access to this amazing document. It was the discovery of this historical source that finally confirmed my speculation, for which I did not have any documentary evidence until 2000. I had conducted my research on U.S.–Japan complicity after the Asia-Pacific War, on the one hand, and the structural homologies between prewar Japanese imperial nationalism and American imperial nationalism, on the other. Reischauer's memorandum finally confirmed my hunches and predictions. I have been exceptionally fortunate in their friendship.

In addition to these three friends, in myriad ways I have received tremendous inspiration from Sandro Mezzadra, Lisa Yoneyama, Brett Neilson, Rey Chow, Brett de Bary, Gavin Walker, Lim Jie-Hyun, the late Tetsuo Najita, J. Victor Koschmann, and the late Masao Miyoshi.

I cannot express adequately how much I have benefited from my dialogues with Richard Calichmann, Isomae Jun'ichi, John Kim, Joyce C. H. Liu, Wang Hui, Iyotani Toshio, the late Hirota Masaki, Mayumo Inoue, Nojiri Ei'ichi, Guarne Blai, Katsuya Hirano, Itagaki Ryûta, Thomas LaMarre, Nich Vaughan-Williams, Hyon-Joo Yoo, Toba Koji, Andrea Bachner, Wu Peichen, Étienne Balibar, the late Watanabe Kôzô, Boris Buden, Uno Kuni'ichi, Charles Prado-Fonts, Uemura Tadao, Atsuko Ueda, Goh Byeung-Gwon, Iwasaki Minoru, the late Etsuko Terasaki, Myriam Suchet, Kang Naehui, Stefan Tanaka, Darko Suvin, Kim Chul, Tomiyama Ichiro, Kim Heisook, Toshiaki Kobayashi, Lee Hyoduk, Tsuboi Hideto, the late Kyoko Selden, Narita Rui'ichi, Nakano Toshio, the late Michael Marr, Tim Murray, Nishitani Osamu, Nayoung Aimee Kwon, Steffi Richter, Lydia Liu, Sun Ge, Komagome Takeshi, Boreth Ly,

Morinaka Takaaki, Yann Moulier Boutang, Sun Ge, Yan Haiping, and Muto Ichiyo, as well as many others.

In the preparation of this volume, I combined some separate publications into chapters, so each one does not necessarily correspond to a single article or lecture. Chapter 1, "History and Responsibility: Debates over *The Showa History*" was originally prepared for a public lecture at Hanyang University in Seoul and later included as "History and Responsibility: On the Debates on the *Shōwa History*," in *Mass Dictatorship and Memory as Ever Present Past* (ed. Lim Jie-Hyun, Barbara Walker, and Peter Lambert, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 120–138). Chapter 2, "From Relational Identity to Specific Identity," was originally delivered at the University of British Columbia in August 2013 and later published as "From Relational Identity to Specific Identity: On Equality and Nationality" in *Values, Identity and Equality in 18th and 19th-Century Japan* (ed. Peter Nosco et al., Boston: Brill, 2015, 290–320). It was later translated into Japanese and published as「関係的同一性から種的同一性へ—平等と国体(ナショナリティ)について」("From relational identity to specific identity: On equality and nationality," trans. Noberto Ono, in『江戸の中の日本、日本の中の江戸』, ed. Peter Nosco et al. (Tokyo: Kashiwa-shobo, 2016, 246–291). Chapter 3, "Asian Theory and European Humanity," was first prepared for *Postcolonial Studies*. It was published as "Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of *Humanitas* and *Anthropos*" (*Postcolonial Studies* 13, no. 4 [2010]: 441–464). Chapter 4, "'You Asians': On the Historical Role of the Binary of the West and Asia," was first delivered at the Millennium Regional Conference "'WeAsians' between Past and Future" held in Singapore in February 2000 and was included in the conference publication of the same title (ed. Kowk Kian-Woon, Indira Arumugam, Karen Chia, and Lee Chee Kenge, Singapore: Singapore Heritage Society/National Archive of Singapore, 2000, 212–247). It was later reprinted in *South Atlantic Quarterly* as "Millennial Japan: Rethinking the Nation in the Age of Recession" (ed. Harry Harootunian and Tomiko Yoda, 99, no. 4 [2000]: 789–817). Chapter 5, "Addressing the Multitude of Foreigners, Echoing Foucault," was prepared by Jon Solomon and me as the introduction to the special issue "Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference" of *Traces: A Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory and Translation* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006). And Chapter 6, "The Loss of Empire and Inward-Looking Society," came from two separate manuscripts: "Trans-Pacific Studies and U.S.- Japan Complicity" and "The End of *Pax Americana* and the Nationalism of *Hikikomori*." The former was prepared as a chapter in *The Trans-Pacific Imagination: Rethinking*

Boundary, Culture and Society (ed. Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joo Yoo, Singapore: World Scientific, 2012). The latter was delivered as a public lecture at the University of Hong Kong in October 2014—and also at Kobe University a month after—and later published as "On Nishikawa Nagao's *Neo-Colonialism*: The End of *Pax Americana* and the Nationalism of *Hikikomori*," *Shisô*, no. 1095, July 2015. The publication of this article prompted the Japanese anthology『ひきこもりの国民主義』(The nationalism of hikikomori [reclusive withdrawal], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2017), in which the latter was included.

While I was writing this book, Gail Sakai read every part of the manuscript and gave me a large number of valuable suggestions and supportive criticism, without which I would never have completed this task. Once again I want to express my gratitude to her. Finally, I would like to privately dedicate this book to the memory of my father, Haruyoshi Sakai, and to my mother, Katsuko Sakai, who passed away late in 2018 while I was working on the manuscript for this volume.

INTRODUCTION

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, countries in Northeast Asia underwent unprecedented social transformations, some of which were undoubtedly traumatic, while some others were welcomed by local residents almost with a sense of euphoria. No matter how one narrates, interprets, and evaluates these transformations, they are so drastic that, at this point in time, all of the conventional historical narratives feel inadequate to take account of what has been happening in this increasingly wealthy part of the globe. Many of us, including the majority of intellectuals and scholars resident in or coming from this geopolitical area of the world, are not yet intellectually or even emotionally ready for this new reality. How can we come to terms with the historical prospect that, in a decade or two, East Asia may well be the center of gravity in the global economy? Or, to put it a slightly different way, how should we prepare ourselves for the end of Pax Americana, for the end of the geopolitical order that has been accepted in the last several decades?

By now, after four years of Donald Trump's presidency, the prospect that Pax Americana can soon end will not be especially surprising to many, including U.S. citizens. In so many tangible ways, the hegemonic dominance of the United States of America has deteriorated, and in a visible way the features that used to persuade many peoples on the earth to respect, adore, and fear the United States as a global hegemon have been chipped away. Perhaps America's extraordinary military capacity is still sustained through its global network of military bases and international collective security agreements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, that have been built step by step since the end of World War II; yet American military superiority is not easy to maintain today. It is

important to emphasize at the beginning of this book, however, that I am not concerned with counterproductive international policies, incoherent or simply irrational assessments, unrealistic propaganda, and almost self-destructive resolutions in the spheres of international politics as adopted by the U.S. government in these last four years; these have helped to render the prospect of the end of U.S. global hegemony not only visible but also plausible. I have been pursuing issues concerning Pax Americana for more than two decades, and, as a matter of fact, every one of the original essays that have been modified and reorganized as chapters for inclusion in this volume was written and published in periodicals and anthologies before the inauguration of the Donald Trump administration in January 2017. For some people, it may be very hard to dissociate the end of Pax Americana from the name Donald Trump, but I purposely did not include any assessment or evaluation of the Trump presidency itself in this volume. Instead, for the last three decades, I have been observing many developments and changes that have occurred in East Asia and Europe, and I have been wondering if I could find some common problematics among these incidents and transformations that may appear unrelated to one another at first glance. What I have undertaken is to seek some common themes and to understand these vicissitudes from the perspective of Pax Americana and its future. In this respect, I would like to stress that I do not want readers of this book to look for some rosy picture of the future, particularly in East Asia. My focus is on the loss of empire rather than the end of colonial subjugation.

Before offering congratulations on the century of East Asian prosperity to come, therefore, we must remember that we cannot afford to overlook the era of Pax Americana during which the historical conditions for the present were prepared and came into existence. This peace associated with the global reign of the United States of America continued to be exceptionally bloody even after World War II and succeeded in prolonging the basic colonial-imperial order of the modern international world, which Carl Schmitt called "the spatial structure of international law" (2006, 140–212), despite the orchestrated rhetorical disavowal of the essentially colonial character of America's peace in the postwar world. By no means, however, do I mean to suggest the internal collapse of the United States national economy or a decline in American domestic polity with the end of Pax Americana. The prospect of the United States of America as a national society is a matter that requires a different set of inquiries.

I do not predict that the end of Pax Americana will be somewhat comparable to the end of Pax Britannica. Therefore, I do not anticipate Pax Americana will be followed by some other structure of global hegemony such as Pax Sinica.

What I want to indicate by "the end of Pax Americana" is, first of all, this sense of growing historical irrelevance, the sense that, in some way, our conventional categories for historical narrative are rendered increasingly extraneous; we are in one way or another facing the proliferating sense of worthlessness of such categories as the West, the Rest of the World, and so forth, whose cogency we used to take for granted. These basic categories by which we used to envision the world, comprehend global events, and imagine our futures now seem unhinged, dislocated, or ineffective as far as the historical perspective from East Asia is concerned. Of course, this geopolitical designation "East Asia" itself is not beyond question.

The history of East Asia since Japan's defeat in 1945 will remain incongruous in some fundamental sense unless we take full account of its hegemonic domination by the United States of America. What makes Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers so significant in retrospect is the subsequent history of the American reign in Northeast Asia as well as in the international world at large. If the reality of Pax Americana were discounted, it would be utterly unlikely to find coherent historical interpretations, evaluations, and judgments about the area's major events, social transformations, cultural trends, and collective anxieties in the post–World War II era; this is true not only of military, economic, and diplomatic interstate maneuvers but also of everyday life, communal sentiments and emotions, mass media, and domestic politics. By no means has the presence of America's military forces and its economic intervention, ways of life, political values, and, most importantly, its introduction of consumer capitalism remained accidental or trivial to the ways in which Asian people have constructed their own national, ethnic, or racial identities, invented the types of their daily life, and shaped their desires and anxieties in the midst of consumerist interpellations. As soon as American global strategy was outlined in the Truman Doctrine after the Second World War, Northeast Asia was one of the target regions of the world where the United States attempted to establish its hegemonic domination over local political forces by means of the incentives of "development"; this was a symbolic word that could mean all sorts of things and that served significantly to justify American efforts to "modernize" an underdeveloped Asia against the tides of anticolonial nationalism and Maoist socialism.[1] The idea of "modernization" was newly marketed by the promoters of modernization theory, and countries in North East Asia were often regarded as experimental fields for American modernization theory.[2] American domination has been absolutely overwhelming to virtually every person born, raised, working, and dying in this northeastern part of what has been labeled Asia.

Of course, we cannot afford to forget that the word "Asia" itself marks a specific historical reality generally referred to as "modernity" since the ascendance of Europe to the throne of the world more than two centuries ago. Prior to American domination, Asian people had been subject to the colonial governance of European and Japanese states. It was under Pax Americana that many constituted themselves as peoples and acquired their state sovereignties. The United States' hegemony was an indisputable reality for peoples in the Philippines, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and even China, where their lives were fashioned largely in accordance with and in reaction to its overwhelming presence and "the American way of life."

In the famous Policy Planning Staff Memo of 1948, George Kennan estimated that more than 50 percent of global wealth was produced by the population of the United States of America alone, which then constituted no more than 6.3 percent of the planet's population. At stake in his shrewd design of the containment strategy were two concerns: how long the United States could possibly maintain this unprecedented global domination, and what policy arrangements would facilitate global peace under American leadership lasting for as many decades as possible. My guess is that Kennan was not optimistic enough to believe that Pax Americana would last more than half a century. Seven decades later, the United States still occupies the position of global hegemon, but it no longer enjoys such a one-sided preeminence as Kennan witnessed in 1948. Particularly in the last two decades (including the last three years of the Trumpian tragicomedy in which all the destructive and fatuous instincts of American reactionaries have been on display), a self-inflicted collapse of American global leadership has been observed virtually everywhere in the world, but it should not be forgotten that the gradual decomposition of Pax Americana has been under way for a much longer time. And wide differentials in the standard of living and the per capita average income that used to exist between North America and countries in Northeast Asia can no longer be taken for granted. In the late twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, a large-scale historical transition occurred, and consequently some fundamental changes in the structure of the international world ought to be recognized, not only in Northeast Asia but also globally, in spite of the continuing existence of elements that facilitated Pax Americana in the first place.

The fatigue or exhaustion of Pax Americana can be observed today, but the phenomenon has been a rather long and gradual one. Over time I noticed certain symptoms indicating the recession of the U.S. global hegemony in East Asia, but it never struck me as a one-time blow or surprise, unlike the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the last two decades, I have attempted many times to understand how

the dominant position of the United States of America in international politics has altered and been redefined. The essays collected in this volume were all written, delivered as public lectures, and published in academic journals and anthologies during the last twenty years, with the exception of Edwin O. Reischauer's "Memorandum on Policy towards Japan" and "Statement on Racism," prepared by William Haver and me, which are included as appendixes at the end of the volume. Since I wrote these essays in response to ongoing historical changes, I could not preliminarily delimit their themes to focus on or organize their systematic analysis. Compiling them together in this volume, I tried to streamline my arguments so that readers can follow these chapters as an assembly of interconnected treatises on a set of well-defined problems; unfortunately, they cannot be read as a series of coherent and continual narratives. Rather, they should be read as chapters, each of which serves as a historical witness to ongoing events.

Despite the accidental and disparate situations in response to which the chapters of this volume were initially produced, they are backed by one overarching inquiry. In recent decades, I have been concerned with the general problematic of "the dislocation of the West." By this, I want to offer a diagnosis of a historically long duration in which the modern international world is being transformed. Definitely it is not "the decline of the West" or "the disintegration of Western civilization." In this respect, the chapters of this volume have been prepared as historical case studies on the basis of which the systematic and theoretical monograph titled *The Dislocation of the West* will be written.

Why should I evade idioms such as "the decline of the West" by any means? Above all else, the West or any other civilizational identity—Asia, Christendom, Islam, or Africa—must not be regarded as something substantial or as an enduring body that germinates, grows, wanes, or declines. My aversion to organicist **tropisms** that depict communities, nations, cultures, civilizations, and societies derives from my concern for what is generally described in terms of racism. Of course, my stance in all the chapters in this volume can be summarized as "antiracist," and I do not hesitate to criticize racism and denounce a variety of forms of racist practice, but my concern for racism goes beyond opposition or denunciation of it. Hostility toward racism, I believe, must be informed by how it is possible to envision the world without relying on racial identities. As soon as I commit myself to antiracism, however, I am obliged to acknowledge that my task to comprehend what I oppose and denounce as racism is not an easy one at all. More broadly speaking, my inquiry into racism must begin with an acknowledgment that it is extremely hard or virtually impossible to apprehend the conception or conceptions of race. Whereas we face the reality of racism and racial discrimination persistently everywhere in

the world, the very relationship between the concept of race and the reality of racism has never ceased to be an enigma.

For us to be effectively oppositional to racists, our apprehension of racism must include how certain social formations are facilitated by the constitution of essentialized categories called race, ethnicity, or nationality. In other words, we must not take the very concept of race for granted, and our apprehension of racism needs to be accompanied by a critical assessment of the categories of race themselves: how they are constituted socially and relationally; under what historical conditions they came into existence. Since I determinedly commit myself to the denunciation of racist practices for the first time (my stance is outlined in "Statement on Racism"; see appendix 2), the problematic of racism has continued to proliferate. My hostility toward racism, which cannot be divorced from an endeavor to know how race is constituted, how racism is practiced, or how racial identity is performatively installed, has never given me uncomplicated answers; my denunciation of it scarcely offered me any help in objectifying what can be subsumed under racism, consolidating the target of my criticism, recognizing who my enemies—tentatively called racists—are, or positioning myself on the positive outside of racist discourse. The more I have wanted to understand racism, the greater difficulty I have encountered in systematizing critical knowledge on race and racism. In short, I have never been assured that I could ever speak from the outside of racism despite my persistent commitment to antiracism.

It goes without saying that there are many sites outside academia where racism is routinely practiced. But the most crucial issue I have to tackle is the insidious relationship between knowledge production and racism. It is in this respect that the very topic of race and racism did not allow me to remain indifferent or nonchalant about my own profession. For the last four decades, I have been engaged in academic disciplines of area studies—even though I have never been fully comfortable there—and all my writings, not only those included in this volume but also the majority of my previous publications, are academically and professionally classified in the fields of area studies. It is undeniable that since the late 1970s I have worked as a member of area studies departments at universities, have been recognized in its fields, have registered in its academic associations, and, on occasion, have been invited to participate in conferences concerning area studies scholarship. Ever since its inauguration in the late 1940s, the disciplinary genre of area studies has been an ensemble of institutional sites of academic and professional activities, just like those of cultural and social anthropology, where racism has frequently been refuted and disavowed but at the same time institutionalized and practiced. One might

trace it back to the scholarly intelligence activities associated with the colonial administrations of European and Japanese imperial powers during the interwar period or earlier. These disciplines are epistemologically, socially, and politically associated with the topoi in which racial recognition plays an essential role. The term "race" may be displaced by other terms such as "ethnicity" and "nationality," but regardless of which specific discussions are under way, area studies as a disciplinary genre cannot sever its fatal bonds with colonialism and colonial administration.

It is not for the sake of giving a kind of summary of the many articles included in this volume that I decided to reproduce the text of "Statement on Racism," which William Haver and I composed in the 1980s. On the contrary, it indicates the beginning of a confusion and uncontrollable proliferation of problems of and about racism as a result of which I had to wrestle with a number of issues—the discourse of "the West and the Rest," the loss of empire, the nationalism of *hikikomori* (reclusive withdrawal), the putative unity of the West, the modern international world, anthropological difference, specific identity, and so on. Even if these issues may appear fragmented and mutually disconnected, I would like readers to apprehend that they had to be raised in my pursuit of the problematics of racism. Moreover, I believe that the end of Pax Americana must be grasped from this generalized perspective of racism problematics and the modern international world. As a matter of fact, all the chapters of this volume are explicitly or implicitly underlined by my conviction that area studies as an institutional formation of knowledge production cannot be appreciated in its historical significance outside the context of Pax Americana.

The End of Pax Americana and *Hikikomori*

The end of Pax Americana has been anticipated with a variety of premonitions. For the first time in the 1990s, I was compelled to speculate on what the end of Pax Americana would possibly engender as well as what we should expect with this emerging reality of global geopolitics. What prompted me to seriously consider the end of American global hegemony, however, was not directly related to a policy adopted by the U.S. government or an incident in North America. Instead I was urged to critically consider the prospect of the end of Pax Americana, first because I witnessed the advent of a social phenomenon generally called "hikikomori" (reclusive withdrawal) in Japan. With this term, some social workers, sociologists, and mental health experts there referred to a group of young people (mostly men, but some women too) who refused to emerge from their bedrooms or their parents' homes and thereby alienated

themselves from social life in general. Besides the people suffering this reclusive withdrawal from social life, the Japanese word "hikikomori" also signifies the phenomenon of this type of extreme social alienation. The social phenomenon of hikikomori was first reported in mass media in the late 1980s, but I only became aware of its gravity in the 1990s. It was in the middle of a long recession, when Japanese public opinion drastically shifted in a reactionary direction, that I faced the questions concerning hikikomori and its implications.

Although hesitant, I began to use the idiom "nationalism of hikikomori" to roughly group an assembly of sociopolitical issues related in one way or another to emerging reactionary, discriminatory, and exclusionary political trends observable in Japan during what is widely termed the Two Decades of Loss (失われた二十年), from the 1990s through 2010. It is, however, necessary to clarify my use of "hikikomori" in the idiom "nationalism of hikikomori" as part of the umbrella title of this volume, for fear that it could easily be misapprehended; here, in fact, this idiom does not directly refer to the hikikomori people who suffer from reclusive withdrawal at all; instead, it designates a parallel sociopolitical tendency witnessed in many postindustrial societies, sometimes discussed nowadays with the phrase "inward-looking society." By "nationalism of hikikomori," therefore, I designate a social and political constellation based upon the fantasy built around the image of a nation as an enclosed space of security and comfort, almost a fantastic equivalent to the enclosed space of a bedroom for hikikomori people. The adherents of this type of nationalism fear that their national space is vulnerable to the intrusion of aliens from outside the nation. As a matter of fact, in their political orientation and conduct, hikikomori people have little in common with those who speak loudly for the nationalism of hikikomori or have behaviors largely inspired by this type of jingoism.

I had to face the question of Pax Americana and its future when I examined sweeping changes occurring in societies on the western shores of the Pacific. When I was invited to deliver a lecture at the University of Hong Kong in the midst of the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, I discussed the topic of the end of Pax Americana. Later, while selecting essays in preparation for this volume, I decided to include "hikikomori" in the title of the whole book.

In the last two decades, I have dealt with a number of topics, discussions of which have culminated in my analysis in chapter 6 of this volume, "The Loss of Empire and Inward-Looking Society." However, as a preliminary caution for readers, it must be noted that its central focus is neither state policies of the countries on both shores of the Pacific nor the international and military maneuvers adopted by transpacific alliances. Although I do not completely

overlook the United States' global prerogatives, international treaty negotiations, transpacific economic collaborations, or military maneuvers based on Cold War collective security arrangements, my primary thrust is rather with what Michel Foucault once called the microphysics of power.

Accordingly, my discussion of the end of Pax Americana and the nationalism of hikikomori must be located in the constellation of several problematics, each of which may appear, when apprehended in isolation, to be unrelated to others. Let me go back to these problematics that have motivated my research in the last twenty years.

The Modern International World and Europe

I was first introduced to the problem of internationality when with Jon Solomon I prepared the introduction (reproduced in this volume as chapter 5, "Addressing the Multitude of Foreigners, Echoing Foucault") for the fourth issue of a multilingual series called *Traces*, published in Chinese, Korean, Japanese, English, and Spanish.[3] In seeking the broadest scope from which to discuss modernity, we must take into account the long-term geopolitical arrangement that has characterized the modernity of the modern world in the last several centuries. There are many ways to define modernity, of course, one of which is to refer to a new phase in global history in which the Eurocentric spatial order of international law became dominant. This historical phase is said to have begun in the late fifteenth century and continues to the present. It is a rough span of chronological time in which a new geopolitical area called Europe came into existence and a new type of sovereignty—territorial state sovereignty—was first accepted as the legitimate form of government. A new regime, internationality, became the rule of interstate diplomacy among these states in the area called Europe, each of which fashioned itself as a legitimate territorial state sovereignty; consequently a distinction between the international world and the rest of the world was accepted as basic doxa underlying the operation of international diplomacy. This paved the way for a new polity of the nation-state on the one hand and modern colonialism on the other. The nation-state could not be found before the eighteenth century, while modern colonialism can be traced back to the conquest of the Americas in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century. By the modern international world, therefore, I do not mean an enduring and homologous structure that has existed ever since the discovery of the Americas. In order to investigate the structure of the modern international world, however, we might as well presuppose a new regime of diplomatic equilibrium, which I tentatively call internationality, a

system of interstate relationships according to which the new styles of government were gradually endorsed. Colonialism had existed since antiquity in a variety of forms, but modern colonialism is unique and must be distinguished from its older versions since it has been promoted, authorized, and legitimated within the scope of this interstate balance of internationality.

In discussing the formation of Europe, Michel Foucault raised two distinct principles with respect to government: the first is called the *raison d'état* prior to the eighteenth century; the second, the liberal art of government after the eighteenth century (2004a, 2008). We know that, in transition from the raison d'état to the liberal art of government, new historical positivities, such as "life" and "labor," were also introduced. One may add new objects of governmentality such as "peoplehood" and "population," and a field of knowledge summarily called the "social sciences" to the list of eighteenth-century inventions. While the former agenda was closely tied to mercantilist incentives, the latter assumes the liberal dynamics of competition and progress. Yet what Foucault stresses both in the raison d'état and the liberal art of government is that imperial domination by one state over others was deliberately evaded in the international world or Europe then. It prevented sovereigns and governing authorities from seeking to occupy an imperial position over other states. Raison d'état postulated that every state had its interests and had to defend them and that the state objective could not be to assume the unifying position of a total and global empire.[4]

Of course, his analysis is deployed within an assumed domain of historical occurrences, a privileged area that he elsewhere calls "our society" or "the West." To my knowledge, he never explicitly queried how our society or the West was constituted, how he was justified in relying upon the framework of the history of Western civilization that has supposedly continued to exist since Greek antiquity, in which a wide variety of documents of Greco-Roman antiquity are assumed to be relevant to us, the Europeans of the late twentieth century. As Foucault did not explicitly refer to non-European cases, his historical assessment implicitly highlights a striking contrast between developments in Western Europe and in other areas, such as Northeast Asia, and illustrates that the interstate regime of internationality was a prerogative unique to Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a prerogative that would be exploited in the history of the modern international world.

While we are no doubt heavily indebted to Foucault's insights and analyses, we must never lose sight of his Occidentalist blindness. Nevertheless, it is important to note that he did not forget to remark the very historicity of Europe; he called this historically unprecedented geopolitical formation "Europe" that

was independent of imperial subordination. Europe is not some transhistorical substance for him. Europe became "Europe" precisely because it was characterized by this regime of international equilibrium; it is in this respect that internationality was something unique to Europe. This internationality was nothing but a prerogative resulting from this principle of equilibrium that was absent in Northeast Asia, at least until the late nineteenth century.

Before the nineteenth century in Northeast Asia, interstate diplomacy had never been apprehended in terms of internationality; it was never exercised on the basis of mutual recognition among equal states. It had never accepted the protocol of formal equality, thanks to which, no matter how small, poor, or militarily weak a state may be, it was allowed to behave as an equal in the game of interstate recognition. Hence the idea of a treaty was a challenge to Northeast Asian actors in interstate diplomacy in the nineteenth century. In this respect, Europe was born as an area where the prerogative of internationality prevailed. What distinguished it from the rest of the world was the conviction on the part of Europeans that Europe was an international world, while the rest of the world was not.

The Nation and the Modalities of Individual Identification

In chapter 2, "From Relational Identity to Specific Identity," I outline the drastic change that occurred in the modality of individual identification in modernization in Northeast Asia and that inaugurated the possibility of the new community called "nation." I have tried to give a more detailed explanation to this pair of concepts, relational identity on the one hand and specific identity on the other, in the sphere of the interpersonal relationship, which I coined in my study of the stillbirth of Japanese as an ethnos and as a language in the eighteenth century (Sakai [1997c] 2015).

Initially, I introduced this pair so as to describe the drastic change that occurred in ethics or, more specifically, in the structure of imperative statement. It was a part of my attempt to correct an error I had committed in my early study of the invention in fantasy of ethnic/national language in the eighteenth-century discourse, *Voices of the Past: The Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse* (Sakai 1991). In analyzing Confucian ethics, I presumed, even though I acknowledged that the concept of judgment in the propositional form could not be found in Confucian or pre-nineteenth-century discourses in Northeast Asia, that the basic pattern of the ethical imperative could be construed in the propositional form of an imperative statement, just as it is, for example, in Kant's moral philosophy: "One must do this" or "One must not

do that."[5] In fact, none of the ethical imperatives takes either an individual or anonymous general subject as "one," as an agent of ethical conduct. In Confucian discourses, an agent of moral action is never divorced from the specific position of enunciation, as determined in the network of kinship, in clan or some rank-related positions. Accordingly, a basic imperative should never be construed in such a way as "One must respect one's elder brother" or "One must take care of one's children." Instead, a Confucian virtue is expressed in a statement such as this: "A son is expected to respect his father," or "A husband is obligated to take care of his wives." As far as a person's ethical conduct is concerned, the acting agent is always and already determined in his or her relationality to others, primarily in the network of kinship. It follows that all the major ethical values carry the sense of familial obligations in Confucian or premodern discourses in Northeast Asia, and that the abstract notion of the individual human being, of a human agent stripped of all familial relations, could not exist there.[6] Therefore, when the project of modernization was thematically taken up in Northeast Asian societies for the first time in the late nineteenth century, so-called Enlightenment intellectuals could not avoid a question of how to eliminate the modus operandi of Confucian ethics. As I discuss in chapter 2, as far as the modernization of subjectivity was summarized by the invention of individualism, Enlightenment intellectuals could not evade the question of how to liberate the personhood totally incarcerated in the network of kinship into an individuality independent of all these kinship constraints.

Accordingly, I argue that one of the tenets of modernization in some countries in Northeast Asia, where Confucianism dominated many aspects of everyday life and government, must have been to introduce a new modality of individual identification, to manufacture subjects who identify with a large collectivity without the mediation of kinship, clan, and rank-related hierarchy. I call this new modality of identification "specific identity" in contrast to "relational identity," the old modality of identification. I believe that this explains why, for progressive intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Northeast Asia, it was so important to get rid of the legacies of Confucianism and open up the social possibility of the individual human being who is directly identified with the new imagined community of the nation.

Modernization implies a host of social changes, from the sphere of the money economy, to the registration of population, to the institutions of legislative procedures, to the reorganization of the heterosexual relationship in terms of the idea of romantic love, to the rearrangement of familial networks (the invention of the modern family), to the introduction of scientific and technological

rationality in everyday life, to the creation of individualized subjects effectively capable of responding to the new tactics of government as members of the new community called the nation, and so on. But for the massive transition from relational identity to specific identity, the nationalization of population would not have been possible. Neither could the individuation of subjectivity have been accomplished in countries in Northeast Asia. What I overlooked in my initial study was this radical biopolitical transformation that occurred in the sphere of everyday life for individuals in the late nineteenth century.

Even in the sphere of diplomacy, the comprehension of the interstate relationship could not be emancipated from the old form of relational identity. Hence, a tributary worked between two semiautonomous sovereigns as if they shared some kinship relation, which obliged the sovereign to follow some moral dictates in relation to his vassals. Without fail, tributary diplomacy reintroduces some pseudo-paternalistic relationship of subordination between a father and his legitimate offspring. Thus the interstate relationship also had to be fashioned as if it were a kinship relation that was quite often reinforced by some marital arrangements. Just as there was no explicit conception of formal equality in a familial network according to Confucian ethics, likewise there was no place for the protocols of formal equality in diplomacy as long as it was dictated by the tributary system.

Internationality thus meant much more than the sheer juxtaposition of states: it may appear to help build a new type of international diplomacy; yet we must not overlook the other aspect of the modern international world. Foucault's discussion of Europe is indispensable precisely because, perhaps unwittingly, it casts light upon this difference, which I have called "civilizational difference" or "anthropological difference," and which Stuart Hall, among others, called "the West and the Rest" (Hall 1996, 184–227). It is a difference that may appear pertinent to geographical order, of the region designated initially as Europe and later as the West, in contrast to the rest of the world. But, as Jon Solomon and I explore in chapter 5 in this volume, it is a sort of ethical imperative masquerading as an epistemic judgment that serves to differentiate two types of humanity: *humanitas* and *anthropos*.

Anthropological Difference and "the West and the Rest"

A plurality of people inhabits the world, and frequently the world is imagined as a common space where differences among people are encountered. In order to distinguish the plurality of peoples from the plurality of human individuals, we often rely upon categories for collective identities, such as family, kin, race,

nation, ethnos, religion, and culture. The most commanding category for collective unity in the modern international world is presented in language; a language is represented as expressing the primordial union of a people. The individuality or indivisibility of one's soul or ego is most often associated with the imaginary unity of one's body, a body supposedly proper to a human individual. If one's proper body is somewhat a marker of human individuality, the image—or figure, trope, or schema—of a language gives the sense of an individual or indivisible collectivity. While it is possible to experience an encounter of an individual and another or one set of individuals with another set, an encounter of a collectivity with another—or among plural collectivities—cannot be experienced unless it is symbolically construed in such an expression as "Britain meets China." One individual encounters another individual, but it is only through a symbolic representation that one collectivity—such as nation and race—encounters another. We understand that an encounter of collectivities occurs when individuals involved in it are recognized as representatives of different collectivities. Since there are always multiple categories for collectivities, a single encounter among individuals is always open to different categorizations. Hence, an encounter of collectivities always implies that individuals involved in such an encounter identify themselves with their respective collectivities. This is a mundane truism, of course. No matter how rudimentary it may sound, however, let us not undervalue this logical cliché.

How does the symbolic representation of collectivity work in the interstate balance of internationality? How does internationality modify and transform the manner in which collectivities are represented? What modification and transformation in the symbolic representation of collectivities allow for the emergence of a new collectivity called "nation" in the modern international world?

Collectivities can be said to encounter each other only when individuals identifying with them come across one another. For example, China and Britain never meet; it is only a person regarded as a representative of China and another regarded as a representative of Britain that can in fact meet. It is always the encounter of individuals identifying with two different collectivities that allows us to say collectivities encounter one another. It follows that, for instance, the West and the East never meet because this context is only an individual identifying with the West meeting another identifying with the East, leaving aside the question of how to specify identification in this instance.[7] When we say that collective identities meet, it is assumed that individuals encounter each other and that each of these individual participants identifies with one or other collectivity.

This encounter gives rise to a series of choices: what collectivities these participants select for their identification; through what procedures they identify with the collectivities of choices; to what positionalities they ascribe their own choices in relation to the other participants' choices; and so on. The encounter thus marks a locale of identification when collectivities are constituted. In other words, this encounter is the very site where what Michel Foucault termed "microphysics of power" is carried out.

The West is one such category, and it is often used as if it were a trope for a unified collectivity, like a language whose visual representation is often ascribed to an area on the cartographic plane. Habitually, it is believed that the West is one of these collective identities and furthermore is cartographically determinable since the phrase itself comes etymologically from the directional adverb "west." Yet, on what grounds is it possible to claim that the West can be configured cartographically? What sort of microphysics of power serves to articulate the West to a geographic location?

It is generally believed that the West and the Rest is one of the most significant ways of ordering differences among peoples by geographic location.[8] Here I have adopted the notation the "West and the Rest," following Stuart Hall. The West and the Rest is not a juxtaposition of two separate and preconstituted entities, namely, the West and the Rest, but rather it is a discourse that institutes the very differentiation of the West from the Rest. When the Rest cannot be postulated, neither can the West be identified. It follows that the Rest cannot exist when the West cannot be postulated. Both the West and the Rest are effects of some differentiation, without which neither can be sustained. In other words, the West and the Rest symbolize positionalities whose stability is sustained only as long as they are incorporated into the quest for anthropological difference.

I propose to understand the world in which the West is distinguished from the Rest as a schema. This schema world enables us to make different social relations comprehensible, as though these relations were synthesized and accommodated in a coherent configuration. But the presumed coherence of this configuration is never more than a presumption that cannot be factually verified. In this sense, too, the world is a schema. As far as the world projected as a schema is concerned, let us call this performance through the schema of the world "worlding."[9] The schematism of the world, or "worlding," which gives sense to our experiences with the things and people we encounter, allows us to imagine heterogeneous social relations—races, social classes, genders, nationalities—as forming a coherence, along with a certain cartographic representation of the world, as well as the narratives of world history. One may argue that worlding

or the schematism of the world serves as a passive doxa or prejudicial ground that provides us with a fantasized coherence among things and people we encounter in this lifeworld. In other words, it gives us the facticity of our being in the world in a typically anthropocentric and Eurocentric manner. This modern schema of the world allows us to comprehend a wide variety of power relations in an imaginary configuration of hierarchies in which the West is considered the center. Therefore, the modern world is structured, spatially as well as temporally, by the opposition of the West and the Rest. The West is a figure rendered sensible through the worlding of modernity, and it is always a putative unity. It is putative, first, in the sense that the world is imagined as a putative coherence, and, as long as it is only determinable within the world, the West can only be identified as such in the last instance. But this last instance never comes; the West is always in suspension, so to speak. Second, it is in the sense of a project toward an actualization in the future. The West is a teleological order that is not only spatial but also temporal.

However, this teleological intensity of the West has been perceptibly eclipsed in the last several decades so that it is increasingly dislocated, not only in the cartographic representation of the world but also in the chronological order of world history. It is less and less plausible that the West is more developed than the Rest in the chronological order of the world; it is increasingly dubious that the West can designate an assemblage of advanced or progressive collectivities, in contrast to less advanced or, more straightforwardly and condescendingly, primitive societies. Not only among the local tribes in New Guinea and the Congo basin but also among indigenous whites of Alabama in the United States and Northamptonshire in the United Kingdom, what was once characterized as "feudal remnants" can be found nowadays among those indigenous people.

The West is a relatively recent designation in the development of the schematism of the modern international world.[10] Until the late nineteenth century, the term "West" was not in common circulation even in Western Europe, although *xiyang* (西洋 or *seiyô* in Japanese), which signifies the West today, was widely used in Northeast Asia before the mid-nineteenth century; this was mainly because it used to designate the Far Western periphery of the earth in the old Sinocentric world. This compound of Chinese characters—*xi* + *yang*—remained unaltered, but its connotation was completely altered in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This change implied the collapse of the Sinocentric worlding; xiyang no longer indexed a periphery with the Middle Kingdom in the center of the world. The Middle Kingdom was now located in the Far Eastern periphery of the world.

The use of the West was preceded by that of Europe, and, as mentioned above, Europe was already the space of international interstate competition in the seventeenth century, whereas the surface of the earth outside Europe was recognized as virgin land with the potential for colonial conquest. Yet European forces had to wait to be endowed with superior military, economic, and epistemic capabilities in order to overwhelm, conquer, and subdue—or annihilate—local inhabitants in other parts of the rest of the world. In this respect, we must keep in mind that European superiority was first established after the discovery of the Americas. Even two hundred years after this initial conquest of the Americas, European states could in no way challenge the governmental authority of the imperial reign, for instance, in China. Consequently, what Stuart Hall (1996) called "the discourse of the West and the Rest" first became the regulatory dynamics of international politics in the Atlantic theater. Having begun in the Americas, this bifurcation of the world reached Northeast Asia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the development of industrial capitalism and modern technologies in Western Europe.

As a consequence of the imposition of this new bifurcation of the West and the Rest on peoples inhabiting regions to be subsumed under the name of Asia, no people in Northeast Asia could possibly escape this wave of modernization. No matter whether local intellectuals could knowingly reflect upon it or not, modernization in Northeast Asia was, if not explicitly, accompanied by the schematism of the West and the Rest. Consequently, modernization was never felt as an internal progress among the inhabitants of the Rest; it was perceived as an imposition on peoples in Asia by some external forces. As a result, it was comprehended that most Northeast Asian societies were conquered and colonized through modernization by European powers (and later by the United States and Japan), and they had to drastically change their ways of life in the spheres of government, economy, and cognitive and cultural activities as well as social interaction. In this process, the dichotomy of the West and the Rest, which still serves to sustain Pax Americana today, became globally recognized. It was in this bifurcated design of the worlding of modernity that modernization was pursued by the political, industrial, and intellectual elites of local societies in Northeast Asia.

Modernization brought about new forms of legitimacy and community. Under the reign of international law, each state sovereignty had to be legitimated through mutual interstate recognition, while the new community of "nation" that had begun to anchor the legitimacy of the sovereign state since the eighteenth century had to consolidate its authenticity through a number of cultural and aesthetic institutions, including that of the national language. But only

by means of the modern regime of translation could the national language be represented as the unity of a linguistic medium native to a certain population.[11] As I argued in *Voices of the Past: The Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse* (1991), the national language is recognized as an individuated and unified medium supposedly inherent in the national population only when it is represented in contrast to other languages. In other words, the new practice of translation in terms of the modern regime of translation is part and parcel of the biopolitical technology of internationality whereby the identification and individuation of a national community is accomplished together with a subjectivation of an individual as a native speaker of a language.

What happened in Northeast Asia—Vietnam, China, Korea, and Japan—in the process of modernization was the collapse of the authority of the Classical Chinese language, whose presence in societies of Northeast Asia had paralleled the role of Latin in Western Europe as a universal language in some respects (although in other respects the significance of Latin can in no way be compared to that of Classical Chinese). From the ruins of Classical Chinese emerged new national languages—modern Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, and so on; these serve to define the cultural identity of each of these nations today. The aesthetics of national communality was elaborated upon in modernity, and the formation of the national community was accompanied by a revolutionary change, which I have already referred to as the transition from relational identity to specific identity in the mode of individual identification. But for this revolutionary change, the aesthetics of nationality, thanks to which an individual feels that he or she belongs to a nation, would never have been institutionalized. What must be emphasized is the aesthetics of nation building in the modernization of these societies; the emotional-sentimental dynamics of national belonging is closely affiliated with the invention of national language as well as with the subjective technology of nationality whereby subjects of the nation are made to feel together in imagination.

Humanitas and *Anthropos*

One of the most profound transformations that the modern international world gave rise to can be found in the disciplines of knowledge production. From the late eighteenth century when universities began to be modernized in Europe, the discourse of the West and the Rest helped to establish what is referred to as "anthropological difference."[12] By this, two types of knowledge production were differentiated from one another in the fields of the humanities and social sciences. While one is about a type of humanity, "humanitas," the other is about a

different type of humanity, "anthropos." The first, under which disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, and sociology are subsumed, was supposedly about "us" or European humanity—let us not forget Foucault's use of "us"—while the second, in which disciplines such as Indian philosophy and cultural/social anthropology are included, was about "them," or exotic people somewhat distinct from "us." Nowadays it is indeed really arduous to see on which empirical ground this anthropological difference can be ascertained, but regardless of whether there can ever be an empirical ground for this difference, anthropological difference has served as an epistemic judgment as well as a practical imperative in the organization of humanistic and social scientific knowledge at the modern university. What is significant in this assertion of anthropological difference is that it pretends to be based upon empirically verifiable facts: what is put forth is, as a matter of fact, a rule of conduct in the guise of empirical verifiability in the fields of academic knowledge production. Thus, the logical status of anthropological difference is, to say the least, ambivalent.

As I explore in chapter 3, "Asian Theory and European Humanity: On the Question of Anthropological Difference," this difference has been very closely associated for a long time with the mission of European humanity, and it regulates how one must conduct oneself in order to fashion oneself as European when engaged in knowledge production; this is most explicitly expressed in Edmund Husserl's last public lectures and posthumous publications. In short, even though it might appear to justify itself on some constative and empirical grounds, anthropological difference is, in the final analysis, concerned with how one fashions oneself in the practice of knowledge production. In this respect, it is a reactive response to the putative identity of the West; it is nothing but a quest and investment.

It was once argued that those who fashion themselves as European—or as Westerners nowadays—ought not to accept the definition of their status being exclusively as an object of study. Thus, the Westerner is not of an empirical determination of human type even though the claim of Western identity is made on epistemic grounds. Before being known, described, and recognized, they are expected to take an active attitude in knowing, describing, and recognizing. Instead of being passively inspected, classified, compared, and analyzed, Westerners are supposed to apply their own means of inspection, classification, comparison, and analysis to some object, which might well be themselves. The dual characteristics of this subject/object structure—Foucault succinctly calls it an "empirico-transcendental doublet" (1966b, 323–339; 1973, 312–328)—is attributed to the Westerner, who, at the same time, is an object of empirical inquiry and a subject reflecting on the very procedure of that inquiry. Supposedly only Westerners

actively engage in transcendental reflections on, improvements in, and inventions of the means of knowing. When a group of people is characterized exclusively by their communal mores and local histories, they are determined in terms of their objective characteristics. They are thereby overlooked for their subjective faculties. In other words, in this epistemic and/or practical operation, the West insists on being determined, not in terms of its characteristics as an object of knowledge, but rather for its subjective faculties and productivity. This is why the idea of theory, a faculty of reason, to critically examine, incessantly improve upon, and newly innovate the very means of knowing has been singled out as the exclusive endowment of European humanity. Until the twentieth century, as Edmund Husserl insisted, philosophy, the science of theory par excellence, ought to be understood as the spiritual shape of this type of humanity, distinguished from "anthropological types," such as Chinese, Indians, Eskimos, and Gypsies.[13]

It is now essential to apprehend what sort of logical and conceptual maneuver this anthropological difference entails. What sort of difference is it? Where does its inherent ambivalence derive from?

It is often assumed that anthropological difference is something empirically observable, and thus it is possible to construe this constative difference in terms of two species, two already substantialized beings. Just as a group of white horses can be distinguished from a separate group of black horses in the generality of horses, anthropological difference is reduced to the difference between one group of humanity called Europeans and another group of humanity called non-Europeans. What is operating here is an attribution of anthropological difference to discrimination between two distinct species, to a species difference (*diaphora*) in classical logic in this case.[14]

In the discourse of the West and the Rest, it is postulated that there is a fundamental difference in life attitude toward knowledge production between Westerners and non-Westerners. As if reflecting the mythological vision of global migration in the early modern period, Westerners travel around the world and observe, inspect, and gaze at exotic people and their peculiar behaviors encountered on their migratory movements, while non-Westerners are described, analyzed, and compared in a passive way by distant observers or travelers. It is assumed that non-Westerners are destined to be stationary, reactive, and traditional, whereas Westerners are dynamic, active, and restless by nature. Hence, the adjective "indigenous" is rarely attributed to Westerners in this perspective of gaze, where an inspecting look is cast at the stationary indigenous or native inhabitants by mobile migrants even though the vast majority of the European or Western population, in fact, do not participate in global migratory movement.

Flows of Knowledge and Flows of Migrants

One of the signs intimating the end of Pax Americana in the last few decades is a radical change in the perception of migratory flows in the world. Of course, it is misleading to claim that the fantasized vision of global migration has not shifted before. In the 1920s and '30s, an anti-immigrant rhetoric of "Europe for Europeans" flourished, and it propagated an entirely false vision that intruders from outside Europe had invaded Europe and caused European civilization to decline. The political rhetoric of "America First" evokes a similar narrative of anti-immigrant racism on the acute sense of the loss of empire. Operating in the nativist exclusion of immigrants is the perception of the fantastic vision of global migration in reverse. The West is no longer the center from which values and commodities symbolizing modernity emanate. On the contrary, Europeans who used to travel far, move freely, and settle in their colonized places in the peripheries of the world are no longer capable of migrating. It is now fantasized that the assumed division of migratory labor that used to characterize the modern international world has been reversed: such adjectives as "indigenous," "native," and "stationary" must now be attributed to the inhabitants of Western Europe and North America. We must seriously consider how we can study the indigenous population of North America—it goes without saying that I am not talking about Native Americans—independently of the discourse of the West and the Rest. But, before going into this redefinition of indigenous or native people, one simply cannot overlook the disciplinary formation in the humanities and social sciences at American universities, a disciplinary arrangement that contributed greatly to the transformation of American universities and developed in the age of Pax Americana: area studies.

In selectively inheriting the legacies of the colonial studies of prewar empires, the disciplines of area studies were established at universities and institutions of higher education in the United States after World War II. With the remarkable expansion of these programs, the humanities and social sciences were transformed and reorganized on the basis of new interdisciplinary configurations. Initially, in the late 1940s, the Social Science Research Council's task force intended to create area studies programs that were to cover Western Europe as well, but in subsequent decades area studies were confined to those areas supposedly outside the West, namely, geographic regions regarded as the Rest in the discourse of the West and the Rest. Consequently, until the end of the twentieth century, area studies were assigned exclusively to geographic areas outside the North Atlantic. In other words, in higher education in the post–World War II world under the Pax Americana, the idea of area studies

reproduced the centuries-old bifurcation of the world between humanitas and anthropos.

In due course, it has been expected that area studies experts inevitably embody the posture of humanity endowed with the capacity for humanitas, observing particular instances of humanity for the production of knowledge on anthropos. Before the 1990s, when the effects of globalization began to manifest on American university campuses, the imagined positionality of area experts was incarcerated in the fantastic vision of a migratory division of epistemic labor, the dichotomous staging of traveling Europeans who observe, inspect the natives, and collect data on them on the one hand, and on the other of the indigenous residents who are observed, inspected, and recorded by area experts. As a matter of fact, many area experts fashioned themselves as the most typical Westerners. But as the number of international students from the Rest increased in campus classrooms, it became increasingly difficult to project onto a vast plurality of people the simplistic dichotomy of two kinds of humanity differentiated in terms of anthropological difference: European or Western humanity endowed with a theoretical capacity, vis-à-vis the natives of the Rest whose knowledge lacked in self-critical reflection or innovative self-transcendence.

It used to be almost indisputably accepted that those from outside the West specializing in area studies were routinely regarded as "native informants"; they had a lot of native knowledge about an area but were supposedly incapable of either critically reflecting upon such native knowledge or of evaluating the procedure of knowledge production, innovating new operations of describing, classifying, or judging. In short, these indigenous scholars were supposed to be incapable of theory. To the extent that the focus of anthropological difference is displaced from the domain of epistemology to the classification of humanity, those affiliated with the West are presumably theoretical, whereas the native informants are in due course nontheoretical or antitheoretical. Let us remember that this fantastic vision of the global division of intellectual labor is not confined at all to the West or to the so-called white population. Ironic though it may sound, this vision is endorsed rather enthusiastically by a large number of indigenous scholars resident in the Rest. This is why the idiom "Western theory" is still endorsed uncritically and circulated widely in academia in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Yet what has been increasingly noticeable in the last few decades is that this Eurocentric division of intellectual labor is becoming irrelevant, and that area studies experts cannot be neatly accommodated in the bifurcated vision of theoretically oriented Europeans versus nontheoretical natives of the Rest. Can one

seriously argue that Euro-American area scholars are theoretically oriented while Asian or Asian American specialists in area studies programs are alienated from so-called theories? Does an inherent property of a person, such as one's birthplace, ethnicity, nationality, or native language—of course, a human being is never born with his or her langue; a language is always a later acquisition, so the term "native language" in the sense of inborn language is no doubt an oxymoron—determine whether or not one is endowed with capacity for self-critical reflectivity or theoretical reasoning? Is the fantastic vision of migratory flows in this respect any different from the prejudicial assumption of the gendered division of labor, namely that women are less theoretical by nature while men are born to be better at abstract thinking like mathematics? Are you not familiar with many men who are hopeless in mathematics?

Today we live in a globalized academic world where we constantly interact with intellectuals of different ethnicity, from different continents, and of different genders. These fantastic visions of migratory flows and of the global, ethnic, and gender divisions of intellectual labor are much easier to dispute than before the 1990s. What is at stake nowadays is not how to contest these fantastic visions of divisions of labor. As a task, that is all too easy. What we must concern ourselves with is knowing how the enterprise of area studies, whose original design was thoroughly enmeshed with these fantasies of division of labor in the discourse of the West and the Rest, is still sustainable even in the twenty-first century. It seems that the disciplines of area studies are still captured in the worlding of modernity. Our task nowadays is to seek to discover how to transform the discipline of area studies in such a way that it could survive as an intellectual project even when Pax Americana is gone.

Allow me to examine, once again, how appropriate the topic of Pax Americana is to the problematics mentioned so far. First of all, it is undeniable that the United States' global policies were designed to reconstruct the system of international law that had been destroyed twice over, by two world wars in the twentieth century. It was claimed that Pax Americana asserted itself on the grounds of the universal validity of the system of international law within the scope shaped by the structure of the modern international world. The United Nations headquarters was not located in Europe but was symbolically shifted to New York City instead. Second, the U.S. government publicly denounced the ideologies of colonialism and old colonial governance and, at least nominally, supported anticolonial nationalism, not only in Europe but also in countries later designated as part of the Second and Third Worlds. In this respect, Pax Americana was constructed to resurrect the old vision of internationality beyond Europe, recognizing each nation-state's autonomy in terms of the idea of territorial

state sovereignty; it was legitimated as an extension of the modern international world. Thereupon, the Allied Powers initiated a drastic move by which the equation of "Europe = the realm of interstate governmentality dictated by international law" was canceled and the international world was expanded to cover the entirety of the earth's surface. It is no accident that, in East Asia, the former colonies of Vietnam, North and South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Burma gained independence within approximately one decade after Japan's defeat.[15]

Of course, this is not to say that all the old colonial power relations ceased to exist. On the contrary, the United States gradually built a hegemonic order that controlled the western shores of the Pacific through a number of measures, including a network of American military bases where colonial extraterritoriality was guaranteed by status of forces agreements. It is in the relationship of American military personnel stationed in satellite countries of the United States with the local citizens that the remnants of old colonialism are starkly visible.

At the same time, some features of the modern international world and the discourse of the West and the Rest have continued to prevail in the realms of academic knowledge, the humanities, and the social sciences in particular.

Transpacific Complicity and Pax Americana

In many respects, the transpacific alliance between the United States and Japan after Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers represents a newly revised colonial government on the western shore of the Pacific. In the 1950s and '60s, the Japanese state and conservative forces benefited greatly from Pax Americana, which was progressively consolidated from the late 1940s through the 1950s. As I discuss in chapter 6, the decision to pardon Emperor Hirohito for war crimes so as to use him as an American puppet under the Allied Occupation of Japan proved to be exceptionally successful in turning Japanese nationalism into an instrument of American control over Japan's domestic politics. It can be argued that the United States of America imitated the strategy of colonization devised by the Japanese military in the prewar Manchu-kuo in order to fabricate a satellite state, which appeared independent. In this sense, the Japanese state forged after World War II was America's Manchu-kuo. With Hirohito as a prime example, Japanese political actors, many of whom were war criminals released by the United States Occupation Administration who could have been blackmailed anytime if necessary by American agencies, were favored and supported by the U.S. government. Around the U.S. "Confinement Strategy," the American supreme commander while Japan was under the Allied

Occupation, and then the Central Intelligence Agency after Japan's independence in 1952, constructed an alliance between Japan's war criminals, such as Kishi Nobusuke and Shôriki Matsutarô, and an American anticommunist campaign in East Asia. In this respect, Japanese national politics dominated by conservative forces—mainly by the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955 with only brief interruptions—can be characterized as a semicolonial regime of war-criminal conservatives, including the recent administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzô (安倍 晋三).

As explained chiefly in chapter 6, the United States of America inherited the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere from the Japanese Empire. But American policy makers did not have knowledge of these areas for colonial governance, so they had to rely upon Japanese expertise on colonial administration that was acquired by Japanese bureaucrats and colonial officials, mainly during the interwar period, even though Japan was defeated in the Asia-Pacific War; they deliberately assigned the role of "empire under subcontract" to the postwar state of Japan, which was led mainly by former war criminals and anticommunist ideologues. As a result, with a massive infusion of capital investment in its industry, the Japanese economy rebounded rapidly in the 1950s and could sustain high economic growth for more than three decades, well into the 1980s.

Since the United States inherited the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (except, of course, mainland China and North Korea), the Japanese public was allowed to resume the status of colonizers in relation to their Asian neighbors under the pretense of empire under subcontract. Predictably enough, whereas the Japanese public experienced Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers and the loss of empire and its colonies in their relationship to the United States, they never underwent the sort of humiliation expected of them vis-à-vis peoples of Asia. They did not realize that they were also defeated by those whom they used to look down upon as their colonial servants. The majority of Japanese failed to expose themselves to the gaze of Asian peoples and undergo the experience of shame necessary for them to decolonize themselves. The loss of sovereignty over old colonies is not sufficient; one must undergo radical transformation in the manner of self-fashioning in order to decolonize. In this manner, the Japanese nation missed the chance for decolonization through the important process of the loss of empire.

Indeed, here I use "the loss of empire" as something positive, as a sort of affirmative action. In this regard, I learned much from the scholars of British cultural studies who studied the problem of loss of empire in Great Britain.

In the 1980s, scholars like Paul Gilroy confronted social phenomena generally discussed in reference to this expression, "loss of empire."[16] In the late 1940s

and the 1950s, the British Empire lost many of its colonies, and the British public could no longer take for granted the colonial prestige and the sense of superiority toward the inhabitants of their former colonies. Yet, immediately after the collapse of the British Empire as former colonial masters, they were not infected with the disillusionment and anxiety often associated with decolonization; the moment of disillusionment came about thirty years later, for a variety of reasons. In the interim, as the most important satellite state of the United States, Britain could continue to maintain an exceptional status in international politics and, as a core country of the Allied Powers, Britons were allowed to behave as victors under Pax Americana, although, in relation to their former colonial subjects, they were clearly losers. Yet, in the 1970s and '80s, even ordinary British people could not overlook the fact that Britain was no longer an empire, and thus some began to appeal to the nostalgic image of old England. Yet others harbored a strong sentiment of resentment over the reality of this loss of empire. The first visible sign of the loss of empire was widespread anti-immigrant racism. Reactionary political figures such as Enoch Powell attracted many followers, and since that time England has never escaped a persistent substantive anti-immigrant racism. Many in Britain were and still are vulnerable to this sentiment of resentment, which is easily triggered when certain sociopolitical and emotional conditions are in place. Brexit of 2016 cannot be comprehended without regard to this British loss of empire and a deliberate manipulation of mass media. In chapter 6, therefore, I exemplify this with Kazuo Ishiguro's *The Remains of the Day* (1989), a novel that skillfully captures the anxiety and resentment evoked by the loss of empire.

The British example of the loss of empire was very important in my apprehension of what the end of Pax Americana implied for many Japanese. Please allow me to reiterate. In the 1990s, I discovered the social phenomenon of hikikomori in Japan; I learned that a large number of young Japanese, somewhere between one and two million, had withdrawn from public life, and that an increasing portion of the Japanese population exhibited an inward-looking attitude in everyday life. Mass media's coverage of hikikomori coincided with the emergence of the reactionary political movement of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書をつくる会); this society successfully mobilized a large number of Japanese citizens and attempted to erase from middle and high school history textbooks any description of the colonial and wartime atrocities caused by the Japanese state and military. Instead of dealing with historical facts about Japanese colonialism and war crimes, they simply wanted to deny and reject what Japanese soldiers and citizens did before and during the war, including the notorious wartime sex slavery generally

referred to as "the Comfort Women problem." They simply refused to dialogue with non-Japanese or those Japanese concerned about Japanese responsibility for the country's colonial and wartime ventures; they withdrew from any possible occasions where they would be forced into responsibility for or responsiveness to charges of accountability. The significant fact of their disavowal is that they tried to hide in a safe place in order to evade the possibility or potentiality of an encounter with non-Japanese or Japanese critics who were likely to hold them accountable; their evasion of colonial or wartime responsibility was played out entirely in fantasy.

The underlying premise of their movement was to confine themselves to a closure by which to avoid encounter with foreigners or "masochistic" (self-critical) Japanese. Ten years later in 2006, these reactionary movements were followed by street demonstrations organized by the Association of Citizens Who Denounce the Privileges Accorded to Resident Koreans and Chinese (在日特権を許さない市民の会, often abbreviated as Zaitokukai 在特会). These demonstrations publicized many openly racist statements. Although there have been innumerable incidents of racial discrimination and violence in modern Japan, since the end of World War II there have scarcely been any street demonstrations that have openly advocated for discrimination against certain ethnic or racial groups. Perhaps the Association of Citizens Who Denounce the Privileges Accorded to Resident Koreans and Chinese is the first such movement in which resident Koreans and Chinese, the majority of whom were actually born and raised in Japan, were accused of enjoying not excessive privilege but simply an equality under the law. In addition, what is immediately obvious is that the overwhelming majority of the association's members are embarrassingly ignorant of the ethnic groups they choose to attack, of their histories, and of their social conditions. It is apparent that, even though they hate the resident aliens of Korean and Chinese ancestry, this hatred does not stem from any actual encounters with them. It seems plausible that they hate these resident aliens based entirely on their fantastic projection. With this in mind, I want to pose the crucial question: to what extent is the nationalism of hikikomori one of the consequences of their fantastic wish to evade a collective shame, of their disavowal of the loss of empire?

This nationalism of hikikomori is a unique historical occurrence in its own right; it cannot be analyzed without regard to the history of postwar Japan, the rapid media revolution—digitalization in communication technology, the development of social media, the collapse of neighborhood communities, and general atomization—taking place in Northeast Asia or the postcolonial conditions in Asia at large. Yet it is also true that it shares many features of

the inward-looking society observed in many postindustrial countries. As outlined above, I attempt to situate the nationalism of hikikomori in the history of post–World War II Northeast Asia under Pax Americana. Moreover, I also approach it from the viewpoint of the modern international world, one from which I have conducted an extensive historical analysis of the formation of the national community as well as a particular subjective technology whereby subjects have been manufactured for the nation-states.

When I examined the drastic changes undergone by societies on the western shores of the Pacific, I could not escape the question of the myth of Japan's successful modernization that used to give its people a sense of colonial self-esteem. Perhaps we should apprehend the emotive-sentimental impact of the loss of empire against the backdrop of an overly optimistic vision of Japanese modernization.

By the end of the 1960s, having somehow recovered from the trauma of wartime miseries, the devastating effects of American aerial bombing and overseas atrocities, the vast majority of Japanese people conceded that Japan's subsequent modernization was something positive and that they were proud of themselves for this extraordinary accomplishment, despite the fact that Japan's postwar success was possible only under Pax Americana. Underlying this affirmative attitude toward Japan's past—despite its colonialism and defeat in the Asia-Pacific War—there was a sense of collective superiority as a nation. The Japanese public was convinced at that time that, in East Asia, only Japan had succeeded in creating a modern political system and a modern governing bureaucracy, in appropriating the spirit of modern scientific and technological rationality, in competing with Euro-American nations in industrial capitalism, and in establishing an exceptionally high standard of living and education in Asia. South Korea and Taiwan were still very poor countries with a per capita income less than a tenth of Japan's. Even though Japan was defeated in World War II—the Asian-Pacific War—and lost sovereignty over Korea and Taiwan, it could still enjoy the status of empire between Japan and its former colonies, at least in terms of economic measure and as an "empire under subcontract." As is typical of the legacy of colonial domination, the gap between the suzerain nation and its former colonies was still tangible in terms of the standard of living and the degree of modernization.

During the 1980s and '90s, however, a number of significant political reforms were implemented in Taiwan and South Korea, thanks to which parliamentary democracy seemed to take root in these former Japanese colonies. In some respects, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) appear more politically modern than Japan does. Furthermore, one must

TABLE 1.1 Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in Five Countries (1982–2012)

Year	U.S.A.	China	Japan	South Korea	Taiwan
1982	14,410	327	10,615	3,040	4,466
1992	25,467	1,028	21,057	9,443	11,901
2002	38,123	2,884	26,749	18,878	21,613
2012	51,704	9,055	35,856	36,950	38,357

Figures are IMF estimates in current U.S. dollars.

not overlook the fact that these political changes were accomplished against the backdrop of rapid economic growth.

The statistics presented in table 1.1 amply show trends in the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in five countries, the United States of America, China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in the last four decades (figures are in per capita GDP purchasing power parity values).[17]

In the early 1980s, the per capita GDPs in Taiwan and South Korea were about 45 percent and 30 percent that of Japan, respectively; ten years later, in the early 1990s, they were 56 percent and 44 percent; and in the early 2000s, they were 81 percent and 71 percent. In the same period, from 1982 through 2012, China's per capita GDP increased from 3 percent (1982) to 5 percent (1992), 11 percent (2002), and then 25 percent (2012), while Japan's remained almost the same in relation to that of the United States (74 percent in 1982, 83 percent in 1992, 70 percent in 2002, and 69 percent in 2012). What is noteworthy here is that, during the decade of 2002–2012, finally Taiwan's per capita GDP exceeded that of Japan (at 107 percent). Incidentally, in 2017, Taiwan's per capita GDP (purchasing power parity values) exceeded those of both the United Kingdom and France.

Of course, per capita GDP is one of many indicators and cannot be emphasized in isolation. However, referring to the trends observable among these countries helps us to appreciate how drastic the social changes have been in the last four decades on the western shores of the Pacific. It also means that Japan's position relative to other countries in East Asia was being redefined in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, just as Western Europe's or the United States' position was being reassessed in the international world. As I elucidate the notion of empire under subcontract in chapter 6, Japan used to enjoy prestigious status under the American confinement policy, and it benefited greatly from the special treatment it received from the United States. Under the political climate of the Cold War and thanks to the global conditions set in Pax Americana, Japanese people were allowed to behave as if they continued to be

part of a nation of colonial suzerainty, even though Japan had lost its overseas colonies (except for Hokkaido, Okinawa, and other small islands). As a result, many in the Japanese nation have failed to kick their old colonial habit of looking down on their Asian neighbors as less developed and less modernized.

But with the global hegemony of the United States of America having crumbled gradually since the 1970s, a new configuration of interstate politics has finally emerged in Northeast Asia. In not being able to liberate itself from its reliance on Pax Americana, the Japanese public finds it increasingly difficult to view the position of Japan with its Asian neighbors through an optimistic view of modernization theory, according to which Japan was the only genuinely modern society in all of Asia. As a telling indicator of the Japanese attitude toward the outside world, let me mention other signs of their loss of empire.

The Inward-Looking Society

I want to draw attention to another statistic, namely that the number of Japanese college applicants to American universities has steadily declined in the past three decades. In the 1980s, many Japanese students were visible on many university campuses in the United States. Their presence at American universities was then apprehended as a manifestation of the trend toward globalization at large, at a time when compact Japanese automobiles began to dominate the American market. As time passed, Japanese students were outnumbered by South Koreans, and the globalization of higher education in the United States became all the more indisputable. In the last two decades, a larger number of students have also begun to arrive at American universities from India and China.

Since the 1990s, the composition of the American university student body has undergone a drastic change. In 2016 the total number of international students (both undergraduates and graduates) studying at American universities exceeded one million, out of which 363,000 were from China, 196,000 from India, and 55,000 from South Korea.[18] In spite of this general increase in the number of international students from Asian countries studying on American campuses, however, the number of Japanese students in the United States has reflected an entirely different trend. In 2017, it was 18,753. As of 2017, the total number of students from Japan at American universities was far less than that from Taiwan (22,454), while the total population of Taiwan is less than one-fifth of Japan's.

It is not merely the number of Japanese students at American universities that has declined; the level of young Japanese people's intellectual curiosity about the outside world has also shrunk drastically.

Recently a scholar friend of mine who works in political science in Japan drew my attention to a thought-provoking datum: only 5 percent of Japanese people in their twenties have ever applied for passports. In the last five years, the percentage of Japanese in their twenties who have applied for passports has fluctuated between 5 and 6 percent. Fifteen years ago the figure was about 9 percent, which was already shockingly low, so it is now obvious that fewer and fewer young Japanese are interested in going abroad. Regrettably, I have found no access to passport application statistics for the years of the twentieth century, so I cannot discuss a longer trend in passport application figures among the Japanese population in this twenty-to-twenty-nine-year age range. Since about 24 percent of the total population of Japan own passports, this is an astonishingly low figure.[19] Of course, one must not overlook the economic adversity in which an increasing number of young Japanese have found themselves in the last few decades. Perhaps a factor here is that the younger generation of Japanese are much less well paid in comparison to those of other industrialized countries.

According to a 2015 survey of Japanese corporations, 63.7 percent of new employees responded negatively to the question, "Are you willing to work abroad?," while 36.3 percent responded affirmatively (9.1 percent would work in any country; 27.2 percent would not work in certain countries).[20] In 2001, only 29.2 percent answered negatively to the same question, while 70.7 percent answered affirmatively (17.3 percent would work in any country; 53.1 percent would not work in certain countries). Evidently a drastic change has occurred in the attitudes of new employees toward potential work overseas.

These statistical data seem to confirm the tendencies that I have observed about Japanese society in the last three decades. I am now convinced that it is valid to portray today's Japan as an inward-looking society.

In his brilliant study of the imaginary formation of nationhood in what is called Thailand today, Thongchai Winichakul (1994) coined the idiom "the geo-body of a nation"; he explored how modern cartography contributed to the process in which the kingdom of Siam was transformed into the modern vision of the Thai nation, how the technology of modern cartography gave rise to a collective imagining that allowed residents in Siam to imagine themselves as members of a new collectivity called a nation. A nation is a particular form of modern community whose imaginary constitution is closely tied with a geographic enclosure; it is embodied in a national territory, a geographic space bound by national borders. Therefore, a nation is not only a collectivity of people connected to one another through what John Stuart Mill (1972, 187–428) called "sympathy"; sympathy that binds a nation together is invoked

by the image of a geo-body; a nation also signifies a collectivity of people who are geographically bound, who are distinguished from the rest of humanity by the fact of their residency within a determinate territory insulated from the outside world. It follows that their membership in this community—exclusive membership which is indeed called "nationality"—is marked by a national border and that all the individuals living outside this border must be regarded as aliens, excluded from the nationality or from the sympathy that is supposed to be extended to every member of a nation. In other words, for a nation to exist, it is essential that fraternity, the bonds of national comraderies, must never be shared with foreigners. By virtue of the fact that it encircles an enclosed space on a modern map, the figure of a geo-body symbolically represents the very exclusiveness of a national community in ways similar to a border wall that symbolically represents a barrier or obstacle to supposedly prevent foreigners from intruding into the interior of the nation.

By now it is evident why I have adopted the term "hikikomori" (reclusive withdrawal) to describe a certain nationalism that has characterized Japanese society in recent decades while dissociating the term from the hikikomori people who actually suffer from social alienation. Confinement to one's bedroom is one thing, while imaginary confinement to the geo-body of a nation is quite another. Hikikomori people are afraid of the social space outside their bedrooms or their parents' homes, but they are not necessarily afraid of a possible intrusion from the world outside their nation. On the other hand, the nationalism of hikikomori suffers from a phantasmatic fear of intrusion from outside the national territory, and shares little with hikikomori people's physical confinement. This is why the nationalism of hikikomori is insistent upon the building of a wall, in fantasy or actuality, at the national border to supposedly prevent alien intruders from entering the national interior.[21] Therefore, it is important to note that the nationalism of hikikomori is not unique to Japan, while hikikomori as a sociological phenomenon may, at least statistically, appear particular to it; it is universal in the sense that the nation-state cannot be built without this fantastic mechanism of exclusion based upon the geo-body of a nation. Every formation of a modern community called nation potentially includes the nationalism of hikikomori.

Strategic Directives: How to Get out of National History

Before closing this introduction, I would like to remind readers about the strategy or methodology I try to adhere to in selecting, compiling, and modifying the chapters in this volume. The word "strategy" is perhaps more appropriate than

"methodology" in this instance since I do not believe in the sort of epistemic metaphysics usually implied in the concept of methodology, according to which knowledge is produced within the dichotomous configuration of the object of knowing, passively given as empirical data on the one hand, and the subject of knowing, who actively selects and synthesizes such data to form knowledge or experience, on the other. I do not deny that I owe much to the tradition of transcendental criticism and am largely a product of such a legacy of Enlightenment, but I am hesitant to uncritically endorse the classical premises of modern subjectivity.

In writing, selecting, and modifying the chapters for this volume, I have been concerned with two problematics that for more than three decades have guided me with regard to how I conduct my research, make judgments, and construct narrative accounts: (1) how to write history against the narrative premises of national history, and (2) how not to overlook possible or potential links of knowledge production, particularly in the humanities, with such aspects of social reality as racism and colonialism. Of course, it is not easy to determine what is connoted by racism or colonialism. The definition of such terms alone could easily be beyond my ability. Yet I have never wittingly neglected these problematics in my scholarly endeavors.

Obviously some chapters included in this volume address social and political incidents and phenomena normally attributed to Japanese history. Many of the topics I deal with, such as hikikomori (reclusive withdrawal) and the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, are usually discussed by experts working in the disciplinary fields of Japanese history, Japanese literature, or area studies on Japan. Yet, since my earlier publications, I have never abandoned attempts to discuss these topics against the discourse of Japanese history or area studies on Japan (Sakai 1991; 1997b, 1–12). In addition to deliberate efforts to critically scrutinize the idea of national history and its workings, I invert the relationship between the nation and national history, so to speak. Instead of assuming that some incident legitimately belongs to a national history because it happens to a particular nation, I always ask how an incident is made to appear to belong to a national history, and what the conditions and the rules of discourse are by which the incident is ascribed to that history. In other words, a nation is never a given, an entity existent prior to its representation, or a substance that is always and already there before being mentioned or narrated. Thus, the national history must be subsumed under a discourse or a set of discourses in which the nation is constituted. What must be investigated is how some thought or idea is ascribed to the nation, how it is modified by an adjective "Japanese" to constitute "Japanese thought." Instead of writing historical accounts within

the framework of a national history, I always attempt to write a history that historicizes national history; I resort to a kind of historiography whereby the nation is constituted through imagination and narration. This is also one reason why, in discussing the inward-looking society, I always foreground the discussions of certain sociopolitical phenomena with an analysis of the nation form. By critically examining the operation of the nation form, I have always displaced a national history with one that is otherwise. I have never ceased to get out of national history. Yet I also don't accept that I can get out of national history by entering world history or that, in the present, the outside of national history exists positively. For world history, for instance, is not outside of national history or national histories but rather no more than a horizon within which national histories are juxtaposed, a horizon I call "internationality." In this respect, an outside of national history is yet to come, even though I would never give up this prospect.

This is to say that, in order to comprehend racism in its historical nature, one must consider the emergence of the modern social formation, the emergence of a new type of community that we customarily call the nation. In every chapter of this volume the question of racism is, if not thematically discussed, ever present as a basso continuo.

Thereupon let me proceed to the second strategic directive. As you will discover in reading the chapters included in this volume, I have never neglected the problematic of racism. I simply could not forget about it. In view of my preoccupation with this problematic, I have decided to reproduce "Statement on Racism," which William Haver and I composed together in 1987, as one of the appendixes to this volume. When we were working on the question of racism in area studies at that time, I simply could not imagine what an important role it would play in the next three decades of my scholarly career.

Of course, racism is extremely difficult to pin down. Yet it must not be reduced to social discrimination in general. Racism is a specific way to discriminate against a person or group of people since the phrase "racial discrimination" loses its connotation unless it is contrasted with equality. The question of racism is necessarily associated with the social formation in which the idea of equality is somewhat assumed. In this world, however, no society exists in which the idea of equality is fully actualized. In other words, the idea of equality is intelligible only as long as it is only partially realizable. It is precisely in this respect that equality is something particular to modernity, and equality as a socially institutionalized imperative can only be found in modern societies where discrimination in terms of rank, caste, clan affiliation, and heritage is delegitimated. Paradoxically, racism is viable only in such social formations

in which the idea of equality is taken for granted. In this respect, equality is a necessary condition for racism, but it is not a sufficient condition.

THESE ARE SOME OF the problematics that have compelled me to write various essays over the past twenty years. This volume's chapters testify to my struggles and wagers; by no means can I claim that my inquiry has been complete or has arrived at some conclusive insight. They touch upon a group of problematics or concerns that may appear exceedingly diverse; when placed in one volume, they may seem indifferent to and disconnected from one another under one totalizing system. Yet I believe these problematics are intimately interwoven. As a matter of fact, these diverse concerns of mine form a constellation around the central problem: What is the West and, by implication, what is the non-West? The sign "the West" may connote a geopolitical referent, a civilization, a tradition, a political order, an ethnicity, a race, a culture, or a type of humanity. Regardless of whether it is or is not any one of these, or all or some combination of them, one thing is certain: as a concept, it is overdetermined. In short, as a concept, it cannot be coherent. First of all, that the West is overdetermined means that it may be possible to conjure up partial determinations of it in some specific conjunctures, but it also means that it is impossible to do so with an overall coherence in the final determination. In other words, no one is completely determined with regard to positionality in the difference of the West and Asia, the West and Africa, or the West and the Rest. In chapter 4, "You Asians," which is the oldest publication among the chapters included in this volume, therefore, I want to demonstrate the political possibility that anybody can occupy the positionality of Asia (Africa, Latin America, or the Rest); anybody can be Asian because nobody is finally determined as either Western or Asian; anybody who fashions himself or herself as a Westerner can be so only putatively; I wanted to highlight the overdetermined nature of such a civilizational or racial identity. Yet this does not mean that I must surrender any attempt to produce a coherent narrative to deal with the contradictions and dissonances among partial determinations of the West. On the contrary, this is where my optimism of will is located. The question is how to discover the possibilities of practice from the overdetermined nature of the West.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 For instance, Truman's inaugural address of January 20, 1949, stated some of the objectives of his foreign policies.

2 What is usually referred to as "modernization theory" in area studies was produced during the 1950s and 1960s and applied to a number of areas in East Asia. Among the well-known projects of modernization is Walter W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*.

3 *Traces: A Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory and Translation* was published in English, Korean, Chinese, and Japanese for the first, second, and third issues; in English, Korean, and Chinese for the fourth; and English, Chinese, Korean, and Spanish for the fifth issue.

4 In contrast to the delimitation of the state's objectives by raison d'état, a new form of government, the police or police state, with unlimited objectives, was introduced. "When it is a question of an independent power facing other powers, the government according to raison d'état has limited objectives. But there is no limit to the objectives of government when it is a question of managing a public power that has to regulate the behavior of subjects. Competition between states is precisely the hinge connecting these limited and unlimited objectives, because it is precisely so as to be able to enter into competition with other states, that is to say, maintain an always uneven, competitive equilibrium with other states, that government [has to regulate the life of] its subjects, to regulate their economic activity, their production, the price [at which] they sell goods and the price at which they buy them, and so on" (Foucault, 2004a; 2008, 7).

5 Of course, this observation was related to the analysis of subject in the sense of grammatical subject, or *shugo* (主語). The idea of the grammatical subject, which was discovered in the process of translation between modern European and Northeast Asian languages, was a modern invention. For more details, see Sakai (1991).

6 I can make this generalized statement only on the condition that Confucian discourses can be conflated with other kinds of discourses on ethical conduct.

I relied upon Yasumaru Yasuo's (安丸 良夫) historical study of subjectivation in the peasant rebellions during the Tokugawa period. He argued that, toward the end of the Tokugawa period, rich peasantry had appropriated Confucian ethics into the contexts of their everyday life to invent what Yasumaru called 通俗道徳 (popular ethics), in which he identified the preliminary form of modern subjectivity (Yasumaru 1974).

7 There are many different modes by which an individual human can identify a collectivity. An interpersonal dynamics is one mode. In relation to my son, I can be identified as a mother. Or in contrast to a buyer, I can be a seller. But, convinced that I belong to the totality of a nation such as Britain or Vietnam, I can be identified as British or Vietnamese. I can identify myself with the nation. The question of identification is open to the vast field of inquiry concerning collectivity and the speciation of humanity (the classification of humanity into species). Chapter 2 of this volume explores historical transformations in the mode of identification.

8 Of course, it is absolutely necessary to discuss anthropological difference in order to comprehend the structure of the modern international world. It is also important to note that both the West and the Rest must be capitalized since, as a directional adverb, "west" cannot have a fixed referent. Only when a west is delimited by the rest can it be "the West" that can be located. Only when it is accompanied by the Rest can the West claim itself to be unique and fixated. When not capitalized, a west is dislocated; it cannot have a fixed location; neither can the rest be postulated as the Rest. This is why Stuart Hall (1996) hyphenated the West-and-the-Rest in his discussion of the discourse of the West and the Rest.

9 Martin Heidegger analyzed the mode of projecting ourselves into the world in terms of "Dasein's being-in-the-world" in chapters 1–3 of "Division One: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein" in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1996, 39–106). In the early 1930s, Tanabe Hajime critically appropriated the problems of schema from Heidegger and published a series of articles on the topic of the world as a schema (cf. Tanabe 1963a, 1963b). I learned much from Tanabe's reading of Kant and Heidegger.

With regard to the topic of lifeworld, Edmund Husserl introduced the concept of passive doxa in his posthumous work *Experience and Judgment*, arguing, "before every movement of cognition the object of cognition is already present as a dynamis which is to turn into an entelecheia. . . . an actual world always precedes cognitive activity as its universal ground, and this means first of all a ground of universal passive belief in being which is presupposed by every particular cognitive operation." A passive doxa is "this universal ground of belief in a world which all praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life but also theoretical praxis of cognition" (1973, 30).

10 Historically, two geopolitical or civilizational indexes, the West and Europe, must be differentiated, even though the terms are used almost interchangeably in some contexts. An extensive inquiry is necessary, so in the future I will thematically discuss the overdetermined nature of the West and Europe. In the meantime, I refer to "the West" as if it were almost synonymous with "Europe."

11 For a more detailed discussion of the modern regime of translation, see Sakai (1997b; 2013b, 15–31).

12 I used to use a variety of expressions, "colonial difference," "civilizational difference," and so on, in addition to "anthropological difference." It is mainly thanks to Jon Solomon's intervention that I decided to unify the terminology (cf. Solomon 2014).

13 Husserl argued that theory is exclusively European. See, for instance, "The Vienna Lecture" (Husserl 1970c, 269–299).

14 I follow the economy of genus and species in classical logic and rely upon the definition of species difference (diaphora) given by Aristotle in book 10 of *Metaphysics* (1054–1058).

15 The exceptions are Malaysia, Hong Kong, and a few other colonies. Malaysia became independent twelve years after Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers. The United Kingdom did not return Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China until 1997, fifty-two years after the evacuation of Japanese troops.

16 The representative work on the loss of British empire is Gilroy (1991).

17 Per capita GDP purchasing power parity value is GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates and divided by total population.

18 *Statista Infographic Bulletin*, July 3, 2020, "Number of International Students Studying in the United States in 2019/2020, by Country of Origin."

19 This figure may appear extraordinarily low, but it used to be within the range of 8–9 percent in the 1990s. I relied on information provided by the Tourism Strategy Division (2017).

20 An article based upon the 2015 survey conducted by Sangyô Nôritsu University in Tokyo, reported by *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* on October 25, 2015.

21 Japan is an archipelago, so there is no social movement for the building of a wall at the national border. Due to immigration policies adopted since the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945, the officially registered number of immigrants to Japan has been very small. Yet the last few decades have seen the rise of an anti-immigrant racist movement called Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi (在日特権を許さない市民の会), which openly targets resident Koreans and Chinese.

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY AND RESPONSIBILITY

This chapter was originally prepared for a public lecture at Hanyang University in Seoul and included as "History and Responsibility: On the Debates on the *Shōwa History*" in *Mass Dictatorship and Memory as Ever Present Past*, edited by Lim Jie-Hyun, Barbara Walker, and Peter Lambert (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 120–138.

1 This is exactly what Takata Yasuma (高田 保馬), perhaps the most important sociologist of modern Japan, advocated in his publications in the 1930s and early 1940s. He talked about "the integration in the future" (将来における統合) and an "integral nation" (広民族) and sought to find social scientific knowledge to design a multiethnic nationality and construct the ideological justification for the oppression of anticolonial ethnic nationalisms. Precisely because his sociology harbored antiracist