ROBERTO J. GONZÁLEZ HUGH GUSTERSON GUSTAAF HOUTMAN EDITORS

MILITARIZATION

A READER

GLOBAL INSECURITIES

A Series Edited by Catherine Besteman and Daniel M. Goldstein

ROBERTO J. GONZÁLEZ HUGH GUSTERSON GUSTAAF HOUTMAN EDITORS

MILITARIZATION

A READER

in collaboration with

Catherine Besteman
Andrew Bickford
Catherine Lutz
Katherine T. McCaffrey
Austin Miller
David H. Price
David Vine

Duke University Press Durham and London 2019

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Designed by Courtney Leigh Baker
Typeset in Din and Garamond Premier Pro
by Westchester Publishing Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: González, Roberto J. (Roberto Jesŭs), [date] editor. |
Gusterson, Hugh, editor. | Houtman, Gustaaf, editor.
Title: Militarization : a reader / Roberto J. González, Hugh
Gusterson, and Gustaaf Houtman, editors ; in collaboration
with Catherine Besteman, Andrew Bickford, Catherine Lutz,
Katherine T. McCaffrey, Austin Miller, David H. Price,
David Vine.
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2019. |
Series: Global insecurities | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019008552 (print)
LCCN 2019016268 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478007135 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478005469 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 9781478006237 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Militarization. | Militarism. | War.
Classification: LCC U21.2 (ebook) | LCC U21.2 .M558 2019 (print) |
DDC 355.02/13—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019008552

COVER ART: Toy Soldier. Courtesy Pablo Eder/Shutterstock.com.

SECTION IV. THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF MILITARISM

SECTION V. RHETORICS OF MILITARISM

SECTION VI. MILITARIZATION, PLACE, AND TERRITORY

SECTION VII. MILITARIZED HUMANITARIANISM

SECTION X. MILITARIZATION AND THE BODY

SECTION XI. MILITARISM AND TECHNOLOGY

This book is the outcome of an initiative by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists, which has worked since 2007 to oppose the militarization of anthropology and society more broadly.

Militarization: A Reader has twelve sections, each highlighting a theme related to militarization or militarism. A general introduction to the volume (immediately following this note) provides an overview of these subjects and how the twelve sections relate to one another.

Each of the twelve sections contains a brief introduction and several exemplary readings, compiled by a section editor who is an anthropologist specializing in the field. Most selections are abridged versions assembled from excerpts of longer pieces. Original source information can be found at the end of each section introduction. We encourage readers to refer to the original articles for more information and analysis.

A master reference list can be found at the end of the book, incorporating bibliographical references from all of the contributions and section introductions.

Many people helped us plan, prepare, and publish this book, which has been nearly a decade in the making. Austin Miller played a critical organizational role by securing reprint permissions, weaving together bibliographical references, and providing sound editorial advice at crucial moments. Founding members of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists who were not directly involved in this project provided encouragement—most notably, Gregory Feldman, Jean E. Jackson, and Kanhong Lin. Much of the conceptual work for this book came out of a workshop at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs in May 2012, organized by Catherine Lutz. At that event, Cynthia Enloe, Neta Crawford, Gregory Feldman, and others provided interdisciplinary perspectives that added depth to the project. We are especially grateful to Neta Crawford for her incisive ideas and intellectual generosity. Thanks, too, to June Sawyers, who created the index.

This book was supported in part by the San José State University (SJSU) College of Social Sciences, which provided grant funding to help defray the costs of reprint permissions and indexing. Walt Jacobs and Shishir Mathur were instrumental in securing that support. The SJSU Department of Anthropology provided financial and logistical support for preparation of the final manuscript. Special thanks to Agnes Borja, Shannon Gallagher, and Kristen Constanza for their assistance. The George Washington University provided funds for indexing.

We express gratitude to all those contributors who generously allowed us to include their work in this reader. In addition, we appreciate the support of the American Anthropological Association's Ed Liebow (executive director) and Janine McKenna and Chelsea Horton of the association's Permissions Department. Thanks, too, to Karin Beesley and Mary Ann Muller of Taylor and Francis; to John Mecklin (editor-in-chief) and Rachel Bronson (president) of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*; and Margie Guerra of New York University Press.

We are especially grateful to our colleagues at Duke University Press. Gisela Fosado provided unwavering editorial support and advice, and Jenny Tan expertly answered literally dozens of queries regarding copyrights, reprint permissions, and final manuscript preparation. Ellen Goldlust helped guide the book through its last stages. Without their patient guidance, we would not have succeeded in completing this volume.

FIG. I.0. In the United States, militarization often begins at home, where children are frequently socialized in ways that normalize armed conflict. Toys, books, television programs, video games, and other media not only reflect but also shape social values. Plastic army men were first popularized in the early 1950s and have been in production ever since. Photograph by Roberto J. González.

INTRODUCTION

Roberto J. González and Hugh Gusterson

In the silence of his basement workshop, Peter Cleary delicately sliced away a few thin slivers of plastic from his latest project. Using a razor-sharp cutting knife, the sixty-year-old Cleary—a retired military man—sculptured the last facial features of a twelve-inch-tall human figurine clad in camouflage combat gear.

For years, Cleary had created miniature historical dioramas, usually related to wartime scenarios: a U.S. Civil War campsite; a Paris nightclub from the World War II period; a model of the famous meeting of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin. Local museums, schools, and churches occasionally displayed Cleary's work.

But his newest project was different.

As he worked late into the night, Cleary's thoughts transported him to another place and time. His head filled with memories of his only child's first birthday, in late November 1985, when he was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia. That day, he gave his baby boy a G.I. Joe action figure. He hoped that Pete Jr. would enjoy playing with G.I. Joe as much as he had nearly twenty years earlier—and he did. Over the years, G.I. Joe served as a link connecting father and son. By the late 1990s, Pete Sr. and Pete Jr. would even compete with each other to acquire rare and often valuable collectible G.I. Joe action figures and accessories.

Another bond the two shared was a commitment to military service. Following in his father's footsteps, Pete Jr. joined the U.S. Army in 2008 and trained as a cavalry scout. Later, his wife, Beth, said, "Pete was really proud of his grandfather and dad being in the service. He loved the war movies, he loved John Wayne, and he loved G.I. Joe."

In January 2011, Army First Lieutenant Peter Cleary Jr. was deployed to Afghanistan's Khost Province, near the Pakistan border. Just a few months later, on April 3, he was killed when a mortar shell struck while he was on patrol. Pete Jr. died within minutes of the blast.

When he learned that he had lost his only child, Peter Cleary Sr. was stunned, speechless. He descended into the basement workshop and knew that, somehow, he needed to memorialize his son.

So he created a twelve-inch image in his likeness by modifying and customizing a G.I. Joe action figure.

Cleary gathered photos of his son in combat gear, and over the next few weeks he scoured the Internet for websites selling miniature pixelated Army uniforms, tiny patches, even a meticulously crafted helmet replete with a "helmet cam." He later said, "It helped me work through the grief. I wanted to make it as much like him as possible. It was very therapeutic for me to sit there and feel like I was doing something to honor him."

Others were also affected. Some of Pete Jr.'s Army buddies visited his parents. One said admiringly, "You captured his image, Mr. Cleary." Another silently cradled Pete Jr.'s miniature body in the crook of his arm for the better part of an afternoon.

Fast forward to November 30, 2014, the day that would have been Pete Jr.'s thirtieth birthday. Beth and her two sons—seven-year-old Adam and five-year-old Pete III—celebrated Daddy's birthday by doing what they had done for the past three years: visiting the beautifully manicured Dallas–Fort Worth National Cemetery. The young family took flowers, cupcakes, toys, and a can of Bud Light to their father's grave. And there they spent the day. Beth said, "The boys feel really comfortable here, so they just run and play. It's a safe place for us to come as a family." Later, she added, "They both know how much Dad loved G.I. Joe."[1]

Merchandising War

The story of the Cleary family resonates deeply—a triumphant and unusual case in which bonds of love and affection between father and son, between parent and child, are publicly recognized and celebrated.

But from a different perspective, this account illustrates the subtle means by which militaristic values can be designed, manufactured, packaged, and marketed. It also reveals how human connections—including intimate family relationships—can be influenced by the "military-industrial complex," a concept first developed by President (and former World War II commander) Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower used the term to warn Americans about the growing political influence of the defense industry and the threat it posed to democracy in the United States.

One can only wonder how many thousands of times similar dramas have played out over the years. For more than half a century, the Hasbro toy company has sold G.I. Joe, its plastic doll—or "action figure," to use Hasbro's

term—to millions of Americans. (G.I. Joe was introduced in 1964; its creators were motivated to compete with Mattel's wildly popular and lucrative Barbie doll by marketing a new toy to boys.) Its commercial success was due in large part to hundreds of additional accessories, such as uniforms, weapons, vehicles, and battle stations that Hasbro sold to enthusiasts. Today there are dozens of official and unofficial G.I. Joe fan clubs and collectors' clubs, and original action figures and accessories sometimes sell for hundreds of dollars at antique shops and on eBay.

But Hasbro went a step further. In 2003, it franchised G.I. Joe to Paramount Pictures, which then created the blockbuster *G.I. Joe: Rise of the Cobra* (2009). The film was panned by critics, but it was a commercial success, due in part to extensive "tie-ins" with fast-food chains, technology companies, and other corporate sponsors. In 2014, Paramount released a sequel, *G.I. Joe: Retaliation*, which was also a box-office success.

Paramount Pictures was strongly supported by its partnership with the U.S. Department of Defense. As in the case of many Hollywood films (from *Top Gun* to *Iron Man*), the Pentagon lent a great deal of equipment and personnel for the making of the *G.I. Joe* films, including Apache helicopters, Humvees, and even members of the Army's 21st Cavalry Brigade.[2]

According to a report published by the Bloomberg news service, "Pentagon officials and weapon makers say they've found a savvy way to make US military service seem attractive to teenage boys" and more recently girls: by placing the weapons of war on the big screen (Lococo 2007). The synergy of the Paramount-Pentagon partnership was simple but powerful: free high-tech stage props in exchange for a two-hour recruitment advertisement for the military. Weapons manufacturers enjoyed the added benefit of product promotion. Scott Lusk, a spokesman for Lockheed Martin, provided a candid assessment of including F-22 fighter planes in Paramount films: such appearances "help promote the state-of-the-art, high-tech products that are designed, developed and manufactured" by Lockheed Martin for the US military (quoted in Lococo 2007).

Even before its partnership with Paramount, the Pentagon was involved in a symbiotic relationship with toy companies. In an eye-opening report that followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the journalist William Hamilton revealed how Mattel, Hasbro, and other companies inspired state-of-the-art weaponry:

> "The M-16 rifle is based on something Mattel did," says Glenn Flood, a spokesman for the Pentagon, which is looking to toys and electronic

> games for parts, prototypes and ideas that can be developed effectively and inexpensively as battlefield tools. Inspiration has come from model planes (reconnaissance drones), "supersoaker" water guns (quick-loading assault weapons), cheap cellular phones for teenagers (video-capable walkie-talkies) and gaming control panels (for unmanned robotic vehicles). . . . Today's troops effectively received basic training as children. (Hamilton 2003)

Given these connections, the G.I. Joe franchise might be described as a massive joint venture of Paramount Pictures, Hasbro, the Pentagon and its contract firms (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and AM General), fast-food companies, and other firms that benefit from box-office sales, action figure sales, weapon systems sales, junk food sales, and the like.

But such endeavors can be measured in more than dollars and cents. The social and psychological consequences are also important considerations, for people and families sometimes get caught in the crosshairs. Hollywood churns out films that glamorize soldiers, projecting them as archetypical American men whose struggles define the quest to come of age and find meaning in life. Filmmakers routinely submit their scripts to the Pentagon and rewrite them in exchange for access to military hardware and military locations (Fleischer 2004; Koppes and Black 1990).

Militarized cultures also tend to idealize men, masculinity, and patriarchy. In the context of the contemporary United States, it is striking that so many accounts of military families are framed as intergenerational links in which grandfathers, fathers, and sons share common experiences and identities centered on military service—as in the case of the Cleary family highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. Frequently, women are left entirely out of the picture or are portrayed as passive bystanders. As noted in the section of this reader entitled "Gender and Militarism," this gender imbalance does not provide an accurate representation of reality.

Even when women are drawn into militarist narratives, as in the case of the Hollywood film *G.I. Jane* (1997), they are typically portrayed as people who can be just as aggressive and "tough" as their male counterparts. (This has become an important gendered dimension of contemporary militarism in many nation-states, including the United States, extending militarism by promoting active participation in the armed services, including combat roles.) The intersections of militarism, war, and gender are being analyzed by a growing number of social scientists, including anthropologists (Altinay 2004; Davis et al. 2014; Enloe 1983, 2007; Peteet 1992).

Like any cultural product, G.I. Joe reveals much about American society, including the powerful role played by the complex that links the Pentagon, Hollywood, weapons manufacturers, toy companies, and other industries; the mechanisms by which such institutions succeed in diffusing militaristic ideologies widely and effectively; and the disproportionately large effects of these projects on youth. Nick Turse (2008) has gone as far as to call this interconnected system "America's military-industrial-technological-entertainment-academic-media-corporate" complex, expanding on Eisenhower's notion of the military-industrial complex.[3] Apart from the web of corporations and government agencies connected by symbiotic business relationships, and apart from the economics of profitmaking, there is the question of attitudes and values. What are the consequences of a culture industry that produces war films, toys, clothing, video games, and comic books year after year, in lockstep with the Pentagon's military adventures abroad? How can we better understand the long-term effects of what the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (2009b: 23) has called the "military normal"—a condition in which science, entertainment, business, and even high fashion deeply reflect militaristic values?[4] In short, what are the consequences of militarizing culture?

The story of the Cleary family might be viewed as a bittersweet human-interest story with a heartwarming ending. It might even make Americans feel better about fighting wars that create hometown heroes.

But from a more critical perspective, it illustrates how today's U.S. military-industrial complex is powerful and sophisticated enough to infiltrate and mediate intimate social relationships—between parent and child, family and community, civilian and soldier—colonizing the imagination of those who can help it further its own ends.

What makes such situations troubling—even tragic—is that they reveal how in American society heroism, valor, and love are often expressed in the idiom of a military-industrial-entertainment complex whose architects have altogether different motives. We begin with the story of the Cleary family and G.I. Joe because it is in many ways the story of us all.

Defining Militarization

This book is a collection of readings selected to give readers a clearer understanding of militarization—as both a cultural product and a process—across a range of societies. The contributions to this collection were chosen to provide broad anthropological perspectives on the topic. *Militarization: A Reader* is intended to serve two purposes: first, to encourage other anthropologists to

begin their own explorations, particularly those who might not otherwise be inclined to do so; and second, to serve as a handbook for researchers and instructors who are already interested in militarization and who are interested in how a distinctly anthropological approach might inform the topic.

This volume was designed as a cross-cultural reader that explores militarization in different cultural contexts, but readers will discover a disproportionate amount of material dedicated to the analysis of militarization in the United States. This was done intentionally for two reasons. First, the United States today accounts for nearly 40 percent of the world's military expenditures every year; and second, the United States is the most studied and leading model of what might be called a militarized society.

Militarization—and militarism—are integral to global society today. These processes can be seen around the world in the growth of standing armies, paramilitaries, and military contractors; the stockpiling of weaponry; burgeoning state surveillance programs; the colonization of research by the national security state; the circulation of militarized imagery in popular culture; and "the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state."[5] In militarized societies we are always memorializing past wars, planning for future wars, or debating the nature of war, even when we are technically at peace. No one in the world today is untouched by militarization. However, given the enormous range of local experiences of the phenomenon, from the immiserated war refugee from Syria to the suburban American happily watching *Saving Private Ryan* on its flat-panel living room television set, it may be as appropriate to speak of militarisms as of militarism.

Before going any further, we should ask: What exactly is militarism? What is militarization? How are they connected?

The historian Richard H. Kohn defines militarization as a wide-ranging process that codes "the degree to which a society's institutions, policies, behaviors, thought, and values are devoted to military power and shaped by war." He argues that for nearly seventy years, the United States has "experienced a degree of militarization heretofore unknown in American history." What particularly concerns Kohn is the possibility that American militarization will blur into *militarism*, which he defines as "the domination of war values and frameworks in American thinking, public policy, institutions, and society to the point of dominating rather than influencing or simply shaping American foreign relations and domestic life." For Kohn—who served for ten years as the U.S. Air Force's chief historian and has held various academic positions at the U.S. Army War College—militarism is the more acute condition. Kohn's analysis of the post-9/11 era and the subsequent open-ended "war on terror" raises the

question of "whether the very character of the American people changes [as a result], with the emphasis on freedom and individualism displaced by obedience, discipline, hierarchy, collectivism, authoritarianism, pessimism, and cynicism" (see Kohn 2009).[6]

It is striking that a scholar with career-long connections to military institutions would issue such a warning, but others who have served the national security state have echoed Kohn's concerns. Andrew Bacevich, a professor of international relations and a Vietnam War veteran who graduated from West Point, argues that "today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with military power." He warns that "America will surely share the fate of all those who in ages past have looked to war and military power to fulfill their destiny. We will rob future generations of their rightful inheritance. We will wreak havoc abroad. We will endanger our security at home. We will risk the forfeiture of all that we prize" (Bacevich 2005: 1, 255). By observing increases in defense spending (the U.S. military budget rose from $266 billion in 1996 to more than $700 billion in 2017), the constant growth of the U.S. military arsenal, the worldwide expansion of American military bases, a greater propensity for our leaders to use force as a foreign policy tool, and a "new aesthetic of war" manifested through a sanitized "public enthusiasm for the whiz-bang technology of the U.S. military," Bacevich convincingly argues that the rise of American militarism represents a threat to the country's long-term viability.

More recently, Catherine Lutz (2009b: 23) has noted that "the ascendance of the military came about only relatively recently in US history," since America's founders were suspicious of standing armies and used the Constitution as a means of ensuring civilian control over the military. Until World War II, most Americans generally "saw the military as a burden in peacetime and at best very occasionally necessary. . . . [M]iddle class families were reluctant to send their children into a military they saw as a virtual cesspool of vices." Like Kohn and Bacevich, Lutz describes America's most recent phase of militarization as a process that began taking shape seven decades ago as the United States mobilized for World War II and then the Cold War, with its protracted blurring of the boundaries between peace and wartime mobilization. She reminds us that militarization mobilizes a coalition that includes "all of the institutions and groups who benefitted from a large military budget":

> Not only weapons manufacturers but companies like Proctor & Gamble and the Disney Corporation came to enjoy and rely on immense military contracts. US universities were drawn up in a concerted government campaign to put much of the nation's scientific talent and university

> training at the disposal of the military, to the point where 45 percent of all computer science graduate students with federal support get it from the Pentagon, and 25 percent of all scientists and engineers work on military projects. The military-industrial-Congressional-media-entertainment-university complex is a massively entangled system. (Lutz 2009b: 28–29)

In her book *Homefront*—an ethnography of Fayetteville, North Carolina, a town located near one of the largest U.S. military bases in the world—Lutz observes that "there are many places like Fayetteville in America, from its nearly nine hundred other domestic military bases in such towns as Norfolk, Virginia, New London, Connecticut, and Killeen, Texas, to the thousands of places from Seattle, Washington, to Binghamton, New York, where weapons and equipment are made." Whether they are military bases or production facilities, they produce ingrained patterns of local economic dependence. The economy, geography, customs, fashions, forms of entertainment, and even values of the United States have been shaped by military institutions. Lutz notes: "In an important sense, we all inhabit an army camp, mobilized to lend support to the permanent state of war readiness that has been with us since World War II." Militarization truly affects us all, and it may well be the case that U.S. society has become "addicted to war" (Lutz 2001: 3).

Lutz's analysis provides us with a glimpse of what the anthropology of militarization means and how it might differ from other disciplinary analyses. Anthropology, which integrates several subfields, including cultural anthropology, archaeology, and physical anthropology, can offer important insights into processes of militarism and militarization. The discipline combines empirical methods with culturally informed perspectives and can offer a long-term historical perspective stretching back thousands of years. It can provide valuable information about the biological consequences of militarism, both on human bodies and on ecosystems. Finally, its methods include both cross-cultural comparison and ethnographic approaches based on long-term fieldwork and participant observation, which can provide a ground-level view of how militarism is experienced by those who are most affected by it. The combination of these elements can bring a powerful multidimensional approach not found in other disciplines.

A comprehensive review of the anthropology of militarization would include topics beyond the scope of this book, including the anthropology of social conflict, the anthropology of war, and the anthropology of peace and conflict.[7]

Ancient Militarized Cultures: Spartan, Mongolian, Aztec

Of course, the United States is not the first society to follow a military imperative. Others have also placed a high value on military prowess and war fighting, but at a cost. It will put our analysis of contemporary militarism in broader perspective if we put it in the context of other societies from the historical record who organized themselves around military conquest and martial virtues. Archaeologists and cultural anthropologists have researched the rise and fall of such cultures in various regions of the world. Although there are many differences among them, they hold in common several salient characteristics.

The ancient Greek city-state of Sparta is among the most famous. It was the dominant military power in Greece for nearly three centuries, beginning in approximately 650 B.C. A male citizen's primary obligation was to be a good soldier, and Sparta rose to prominence on the strength of its infantry.

According to Plutarch, Spartan mothers bathed their newborn sons in wine rather than water to test their resilience. Even more remarkable was the extraordinary dominance of the Spartan state and its institutions. Unlike its rival Athens (and many other Greek city-states), Sparta was a society in which children, particularly boys, were separated from their parents at an early age. All boys were required to undergo a lengthy, physically challenging collective upbringing called the *agoge*, supervised by the city-state's most prestigious officers.

By the time they were seven years old, Spartan boys spent part of the day with peers in physical training. Boys were subjected to harsh conditioning: they lived barefoot, were forced to steal crops to supplement their inadequate rations, and improvised their sleeping quarters. Their overseers brutally punished them with beatings if they were recalcitrant or fell short of expectations (Golden 2003: 20).

The Spartans placed little importance on literature, the arts, or commerce. Instead, education focused on strength, discipline, and austerity. The *agoge* made ever greater demands on young Spartans by age twelve, when most Greek boys had completed their schooling.

Boys lived in barracks under constant surveillance from their elders and military officials. They were also faced with frequent ordeals, including massed brawls. According to the historian Mark Golden, "Only those who proved their fitness could eventually earn election to one of the common messes where Spartan males lived from the ages of twenty to thirty and ate their main meal for thirty years more. The *agoge* aimed to instill soldierly virtues: strength, endurance, solidarity" (Golden 2003: 20).

Perhaps it is for this reason that the great Athenian statesman Pericles once noted that Spartan youth had no childhood at all.

A striking effect of this prolonged training was a severed bond between parents and their sons; indeed, Spartan mothers and fathers had no significant role in raising their children: "The boy belonged, effectively, not to his own family but to the state, and the goal was to produce a strong and efficient military machine whose men were loyal only to each other and to Sparta" (Shapiro 2003: 107).

The nomadic peoples of Mongolia were another society that placed great importance on war fighting and military expansion. Prior to the thirteenth century AD, localized raids among different nomadic groups in that region were not unusual, but Genghis Khan managed to either unite or subdue the various groups by 1206. Then he and his descendants led the Mongol confederation on a series of conquests that would lead to the creation of the largest empire the world had ever seen.

The Mongol army was organized in a strict hierarchy, and its fighters were ruthless. As it expanded across Asia (and eventually into Europe), the army laid siege to towns and cities. Those who refused to surrender were often massacred, and surviving soldiers were incorporated into the Mongol military. Genghis Khan earned the loyalty of his growing army by distributing the spoils among his soldiers and by promoting officers based on merit rather than kinship. He demanded absolute allegiance.

These tactical and political strategies were grafted onto the nomadic pastoral culture of the Mongols. According to the historian Stephen Turnbull (2003: 26), "To be a Mongol man was to be a Mongol warrior. There is no word in the Mongol language for 'soldier.' . . . [T]he whole of a Mongol warrior's daily life was a preparation for war. The same techniques that were learnt for survival, for herding or for hunting had direct application in the Mongol campaigns. . . . Mongol society [was] arranged on a war footing."

An essential part of childhood, particularly for boys, included herding and hunting with bow and arrow. These things were commonly done on horseback; consequently, Mongolian men were experts in horsemanship by the time they were conscripted into the army at age fifteen. The Mongol army relied heavily on its cavalry, which allowed it to move, strike, and, if necessary, withdraw from battle quickly.

But perhaps what is most remarkable about thirteenth-century Mongol warfare is the fact that the entire family—and the entire society—was mobilized in support of the Khan's wars of conquest. In the words of the historian John Masson Smith Jr., "The Mongol armies were the Mongol people in arms:

all adult males were soldiers, and all women, children of age to do [*sic*] herding, and animals served as the logistical 'tail' of an army," resulting in a constantly moving "citizens' army" (quoted in Turnbull 2003: 26).

As the Mongol Empire was disintegrating into smaller entities in the 1400s, Aztec society was beginning to take shape on the other side of the world. It offers yet another example of a culture in which warfare was a central part of the identity of a people.

The Aztecs settled on an island in the lagoon of Texcoco, situated in central plateau of Mexico, in the 1340s. Here they established the famed Tenochtitlán, a sophisticated city connected to the mainland by a series of causeways. Some have suggested that the Aztecs served as mercenaries for other indigenous groups in the region before their ascent to imperial power in the late 1400s (Aguilar-Moreno 2007: 100).

Warfare was a defining feature of Aztec life. It was the means by which they established political and economic hegemony over their empire. Warfare also had religious significance, for most of the victims that the Aztecs sacrificed to their gods were captured in battle.

Military service was mandatory for all Aztec men. Commoner families, who made up the majority of the population, prepared their sons for the military by having them do hard physical work and by strictly rationing their food. Such hardships were designed to instill discipline. By the time they were fifteen, boys were required to undergo rigorous military training at an institution called the *telpochcalli*. There the lessons of home were reinforced and expanded: teams of youth were expected to complete public works projects such as the cleaning and repairing of causeways and aqueducts and to carry firewood over long distances. Veteran soldiers trained youth in a series of exercises that eventually culminated in battlefield experience. Experienced soldiers taught novices to shoot arrows, master the use of the *atlatl* (spear thrower), and deftly swing a *maquahuitl* (a sawtoothed sword studded with sharp obsidian blades). According to Eric Wolf (1957: 145–47), "Youths were taken as apprentices to carry supplies and arms for the instructing warrior when he went to war. . . . Eventually, they would be allowed to participate fully in battle and to attempt to capture enemy prisoners for sacrifice."

Mock battles between groups of boys were valued highly in Aztec society. Youth who deviated from telpochcalli training were publicly humiliated. Those who excelled might one day join the ranks of the elite soldiers: the military orders known as the eagles (*cuacuauhtin*) and jaguars (*ocelomeh*). Aztec emperors granted special rights and privileges to the members of the orders: "the right to wear otherwise proscribed jewelry and daily military attire, to dress

in cotton and wear sandals in the royal palace, to eat human flesh and drink *octli* (pulque) in public, to keep concubines, and to dine in the royal palaces" (Aguilar-Moreno 2007: 105).

Aztec women were profoundly affected by warfare. Although they were not allowed to become soldiers, women defended their families from external attacks, even if that meant jeopardizing their own lives. But as in any society undergoing constant warfare, women were most directly affected by the reality and the effects of death. Aztec women frequently lost their husbands, brothers, and children in battle, and the burdens of everyday life were heavier as a result.

A range of experiences differentiates Spartan, Mongol, and Aztec societies. At the same time, certain commonalities appear: the dominance of state or empire over personal relationships; child-rearing and educational practices characterized by hard physical training, harsh discipline, and separation from parents; the extraordinary role of military symbols in songs, rituals, and art; a cult of masculinity; and subordination of the family unit to the warfare state.

Militarism has shaped American society, too, though in different ways. In the twenty-first century, militaristic societies generally do not require boys to be physically separated from their families to be transformed into soldiers. Instead, it is more common for the contemporary national security state to reach into all aspects of life. In the contemporary United States, spending on war and defense is generally unquestioned; economic life is tightly tied to the imperatives of war-making, war preparedness, and national "security"; and popular culture is saturated with entertainment—video games, TV programs, films—that glorify and normalize militarism.

War and Human Nature

So many societies have engaged in warfare that it is tempting to ask: Is war a part of human nature? Are militarism and warfare inevitable?

Sociobiologists such as Napoleon Chagnon argue that humans have been hardwired by evolution to wage war, and a poll conducted by Zogby International in 2009 revealed that nearly three out of five Americans agreed that "waging war is a part of human nature" (Chagnon [1968] 1977, 1988; Zogby 2009). However, a great deal of anthropological evidence refutes this assumption.

In 1940, in an article that has stood the test of time, Margaret Mead made a distinction between violence (aggression at the interpersonal level) and warfare (a social institution with norms and rules). Violence is found in all societies; warfare is not. As Mead pointed out, organized armed conflict among rival groups—that is, the institution of warfare—was unknown in some

societies, which did not even have a word for it. Mead noted that some contemporary hunting and gathering groups, such as the Inuit of the Arctic region and the Lepchas of the Himalayas, did not engage in war but instead resolved conflicts through other means (Mead 1940). The ethnographic record reveals that humans have been creative when it comes to ending conflicts: mediation, duels, ordeals, games and contests, court systems, and other means have all functioned as alternatives to war.

More recently, others have expanded on Mead's observations. In his book *Beyond War*, the anthropologist Douglas Fry identifies seventy-four "nonwarring" societies, mostly hunter-gatherers such as the Mbuti of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Semai of the Malay Peninsula. (Many of these societies are not completely free from violence but have used means other than organized armed conflict to settle disputes.) The evidence is clear: warfare is not intrinsic to human nature. Fry (2007: 2) argues that *Homo sapiens* has "a substantial capacity for dealing with conflicts non-violently," suggesting that this might help humanity pave the way toward a future in which warring is less common.

From an evolutionary perspective, war as we know it is a product of a particular form of social organization—stratified state societies—and only emerged with the first states, approximately six thousand years ago. Occupational specialization was a hallmark of these societies, including occupational specialization of full-time military specialists—namely, soldiers. Consequently, prehistoric warfare (small-scale, limited, and episodic) probably emerged after the Neolithic Revolution (about twelve thousand years ago). *Homo sapiens* emerged as a species approximately 200,000 years ago; therefore, humans have waged war for less than 5 percent of their existence as a species. This long-term perspective makes it clear that war is a relatively recent phenomenon. Peace and social cooperation are much more "normal" (in the statistical sense) than war.

Another anthropologist, R. Brian Ferguson (2008: 33–34), has reached similar conclusions. He summarizes his findings in an essay entitled "Ten Points on War" and notes that "Our Species Is Not Biologically Destined for War" and "War Is Not an Inescapable Part of Social Existence." After presenting a devastating critique of those who argue that humans have an innate predisposition to violence, including Napoleon Chagnon, Ferguson systematically outlines the preconditions that make war more likely to occur—namely, sedentary agriculture (which creates settled territory to attack and defend), increased population density, pronounced social hierarchies and occupational specialization, trade (particularly in prestige goods), and rapid ecological transformations.

In other words, Ferguson argues that war is a relatively recent human invention that has spread as humanity has become more agricultural, more organized into hierarchical state societies and expanding empires, and more involved in cross-cultural conquest and trade.

Here Ferguson's arguments converge with those of the distinguished political theorist Charles Tilly, who argues that, over centuries of increasing state centralization, "war made the state, and the state made war" (Tilly 1992: 42). And, as Andrew Bard Schmookler (1994) points out, in an environment where some states devote great resources to war and the preparation for war, there will be pressure on neighboring societies to emulate them to protect themselves. It is worth noting that the general anthropological consensus goes beyond these points: anthropologists tend to agree that war played a crucial role in the evolution of the state and that states evolved as the most efficient and powerful war-making institutions in human history (Cohen 1984; Cohen and Service 1978; Fried 1969; Fried et al. 1968).

Ferguson concludes with a disturbing point: "People have the *capacity* to learn, even to enjoy, war and build it into their social lives and institutions." Furthermore, he argues, "Once a given society is internally adapted for war, making war becomes much easier—a necessity, even, for the reproduction of existing social relations. Commentators have often compared war to a disease, but a more apt analogy is an addiction" (Ferguson 2008: 34, 40).

Now that we have briefly discussed war and militarism in historical cross-cultural perspective, let us consider the complex and evolving relationship between anthropology and militarism.

How War and Militarism Shaped Early Modern Anthropology

Anthropology has been subtly molded by the priorities of the national security state and the exigencies of other peoples' wars, but until recently anthropologists have written little about militarism or international conflict. They have written still less about their own relations with the national security state.

This is ironic given that modern anthropology crystallized in the context of war. In the United States, anthropology emerged as the state sought to understand and administer native populations in the Indian wars (Borneman 1995). In England, Bronisław Malinowski—a Pole and therefore an enemy alien during World War I—devised anthropology's signature methodology of extended participant observation when he was advised, for his own good, to extend his sojourn in the Trobriand Islands for the duration of the war. In 1918, Franz Boas—often called the "father" of American anthropology—was censured

from the American Anthropological Association after he publicly decried the secret involvement of anthropologists in espionage in Central America during World War I. The involvement of anthropologists in the war effort during World War II was even more profound (Price 2008).

Anthropologists' choices of field sites and research projects were also often shaped by war. Anthropologists have generally sought to avoid field sites engulfed by war, and in the Cold War anthropologists in Europe and the United States found the territory of the Soviet bloc largely off-limits even as they had easy access to countries controlled by the Western powers.[8] Meanwhile, from World War II through the first decades of the Cold War many U.S. anthropologists were sponsored by the national security state to carry out research on places of interest to the national security state, whereas others learned during the McCarthy years not to ask the wrong kinds of questions about the Cold War order (Lutz 1999; Nader 1997). During World War II, a small number of anthropologists in the United States were also, in one of the more shameful episodes in the discipline's history, involved in the administration of internment camps for Japanese Americans (Starn 1986). Ruth Benedict's classic *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* ([1946] 1989), a World War II study of Japanese national character, exemplifies ethnographic work commissioned by the national security state. It was followed during the Cold War in the United States by more anthropological studies of national character, by the rise of area studies, and by the emergence of a positivistic approach to cultural description that was favored by government agencies. At the same time, many European anthropologists were employed by colonial governments in Africa and the Middle East to study the cultural practices and structures of social organizations of societies under colonial rule to enhance the ability of the colonial governments to control them.

The World War II generation of anthropologists, their attitudes shaped by the "good war" against fascism, often saw their work for military and intelligence agencies as relatively unproblematic. By the 1960s, a new generation of anthropologists—trained, ironically, thanks to the educational largesse generated by the GI Bill and Cold War boom years—began to question anthropology's private bargains with these government entities. This generation questioned (and, according to their opponents, exaggerated) anthropologists' covert work in the service of counterinsurgency in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the 1960s (Berreman 1968; Jorgensen and Wolf 1970). A few anthropologists who had studied the relationship between war and the evolution of the state in the late 1960s began directing some of their attention to modern warfare.

Anthropology after the 1960s embodied a strong sentiment against war and militarism, and the American Anthropological Association's "Principles of Professional Responsibility" (1971) took a clear stand against the kind of covert anthropological work the national security state had sponsored in the past.

Given the geopolitical context in which anthropology grew to maturity, some striking gaps exist in the targets of the ethnographic gaze during the mid-twentieth century. Anthropologists hardly wrote about nuclear weapons; about the U.S. military bases or colonial aggression in the countries where they did their fieldwork or where they lived; or about colonialism, imperialism, or the Cold War as a cultural system—with a few notable exceptions (Gough 1968). And although the Vietnam War fractured the American Anthropological Association in the late 1960s, anthropologists wrote surprisingly little about Vietnamese culture or about the Vietnam War until the 1990s. Instead, during the mid-twentieth century, most anthropologists struck an informal bargain with political scientists, ceding to them the international state system while taking for themselves the "tribal zone."

Anthropological Work on Militarism after the Cold War

One could make a compelling argument that for much of the Cold War, anthropologists suffered from a kind of myopia. Many were too narrowly focused on traditional cultural forms until militarism, terror, and violence finally began to come into anthropological focus in the 1980s. This change came about partly because communal violence and terror in ethnographic sites such as Sri Lanka and Latin America were becoming impossible to overlook, and partly because theoretical shifts in anthropology in the 1980s authorized the investigation of new subjects, often by a generation of anthropologists who had come of age during or after the Vietnam War. The end of the Cold War also produced new structures of international conflict, stimulating new theoretical and empirical work in response. Numerous anthropologists began documenting and theorizing terror and communal violence in many regions, including Latin America, South Asia, Northern Ireland, and Africa (see, e.g., Feldman 1991; Kapferer 1988; Manz 1988; Sluka 1989; Tambiah 1986; Taussig 1986). These years also saw the publication of compendia on war, violence, and torture (Nordstrom and Martin 1992; Nordstrom and Robben 1995).

During the post–Cold War era, initiated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a boom in anthropological studies of militarization, war, and violence that

represented a major ethnographic and theoretical advance. This body of work focused on ethnic violence and genocide; research on war and memory; the phenomenology of violence; nuclear weapons; the impact of U.S. military bases; and last, but not least, American militarism.

Anthropological research on ethnonational violence and genocide emerged as globalization processes eroded the state's old monopoly of legitimate violence from above—through the "transnationalization of military forces" (e.g., via an expanded and more active North Atlantic Treaty Organization)—and from below, as force was increasingly privatized and subcontracted. The old legitimating ideologies of the Cold War were replaced by reinvented ethnonationalisms, and wars took shape in which the stake was identity. Partly because most of these were internal wars that sought to settle the identities of entire populations that contested their place in countries established through conquest and imperialism, 80–90 percent of the casualties were civilian—the exact inverse of the military-civilian casualty ratio at the start of the twentieth century, when most wars were between states rather than within them. Such wars have taken place in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and now, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria (Besteman 1996; Bringa 1996; Hayden 1996; Malkki 1995; Mamdani 2002; Tishkov 2004).

The body of work addressing such conflicts is subtle and historically sensitive in its deconstruction of popular deterministic assumptions about ancient hatreds. It is striking that identities that, according to this literature, are manufactured and contingent are nevertheless so powerful in mobilizing populations for mass murder and that when nations fractured in the 1990s and 2000s, they often did so along ethnic lines. It is understandable why this would be the case. Many contemporary nation-states were created in the aftermath of a global history of imperialism during which thousands of more-or-less independent societies were forcibly incorporated into expanding empires, where they were redefined as "ethnic groups" rather than autonomous peoples. Because they did not give their consent, did not disappear or assimilate, and frequently have been exploited and oppressed, it is not surprising that the vast majority of wars around the world today are internal wars between ethnonational groups and central governments rather than wars between nation-states.

In addition to researching ethnonational violence and genocide, anthropologists have conducted studies of war and memory, often bearing witness to suffering endured by communities they study. Especially in Latin America, after two decades marked by widespread torture, death squad activity, and guerrilla insurgency, some anthropologists have sought (often at risk to themselves) to ensure that their writing speaks for the dead and bereaved and does not contribute

to the culture of silence that often enabled the killing in the 1980s and 1990s (Binford 1996; Falla 1999; Green 1999; Manz 2004; Nelson 2015; Sanford 2003; Sluka 2000).[9]

Another rich body of anthropological work focuses on the phenomenology of war and violence: how violence works as a set of cultural practices and what it does to people to live in a society wracked by civil war or state-sponsored terror. In societies where fear is "a way of life" (Green 1999), one often finds a range of interrelated phenomena: a disabling uncertainty as to what might get one killed and which neighbors and friends might turn into enemies; a sense that the future has been forever lost; the use of pain and terror to socially disconnect victims; a public culture of silence and denial about atrocities; a pervasive militarization of daily life often lived under surveillance; waves of violence that, taking people out of everyday mundane reality, create a perverse sense of communitas among perpetrators; the sundering of families by death, forced conscription, or eviction; dead, mutilated, and tortured bodies intended by the perpetrators as semiotic messages in a context where victims experience terror and bodily suffering at the very boundaries of representability; and exaggerated ideologies of masculinity among perpetrators and the feminization of male victims, often achieved in part by the rape of "their" women.

In situations of prolonged military occupation and resistance (e.g., in Northern Ireland, the West Bank, and Gaza) such conditions become internalized in processes of cultural reproduction. Prison detention and torture at the hands of security forces can become rites of passage into adulthood among subordinate populations, often effecting shifts in the balance of power between the sexes and the generations in the process (Arextaga 1997; Peteet 1992). In the Occupied Territories, for example, the young men of the Intifada have parlayed beatings and detentions into enhanced authority within communities that formerly accorded greater respect to an older generation. Meanwhile, weapons training and combat are increasingly common teenage and even preteen experiences, especially in parts of Africa (Singer 2005).

A decade that has seen increasing anthropological interest in globalization has also produced more studies exploring the transnational linkages of cultures of violence and terror. For example, at the School of the Americas (now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation), American military trainers shared techniques with Latin American military officers, many of whom were involved in human rights violations (Gill 2004). If such violations were once legitimated by the U.S. struggle against communism, the organizing frame shifted to the "war on drugs" in the 1990s and the "war on terror" after September 11, 2001. In reference to such conflicts, Carolyn Nordstrom argues

that "the whole concept of local wars is largely a fiction," since local wars are enabled by a globalized shadow economy of arms traffickers, diamond smugglers, and even nongovernmental organization workers (Nordstrom 1997: 5). Other anthropologists are probing the connection between wars in the Third World and the recent growth of the new mercenaries or "private military contractors" in the burgeoning military services industry—an industry whose rise is undermining the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence that Max Weber saw as essential to the modern state (Higate 2012; Li 2015b; Singer 2004).

Yet another fruitful area of anthropological research on militarism has focused on U.S. nuclear weapons testing and production. Pacific Islanders and residents of the American Southwest have experienced exceptional suffering, including environmental contamination and high rates of cancer and birth defects (Barker 2003; Johnston 2007; Johnston and Barker 2008; Kuletz 1998; Masco 2006). Nuclear testing has been challenged by antimilitary activists, and several anthropologists have chronicled their efforts (Krasniewicz 1992; Masco 2006). American nuclear weapons laboratories have been the subject of various ethnographic studies focusing on the web of local relationships within which weapons laboratories are embedded and on the dynamics of simulations in nuclear weapons scientists' scientific practices. This ethnographic work has also scrutinized the public discourses that legitimate nuclear weapons (Gusterson 1999b; Masco 2006; McNamara 2001).

The Anthropology of Militarism in the Twenty-First Century

U.S. militarism was almost invisible in anthropology until recent years, despite the fact that the United States accounts for nearly 40 percent of all global military spending and arms sales in the world while stationing half a million troops, contractors, intelligence agents, and their dependents on nearly eight hundred overseas bases in more than seventy countries. Militarism provides a powerful set of processes for structuring the U.S. economy and society, organizing U.S. relationships with allies and adversaries, shaping the flow of information in the public sphere, and molding popular culture.

A growing body of ethnographic work has focused on military bases, both abroad and at home. By now, it is clear that U.S. military bases abroad contaminate the environment and exacerbate inequality and human rights abuses while military bases at home deplete local resource bases, inflect asymmetrical race and gender relations, and create a privileged category of militarized "super-citizens." At the same time, military contracts often have public support because they provide a significant boost to state and local economies, even as

they shift resources away from social services (Lutz 2001, 2009b; McCaffrey 2002; McLeish 2015; Vine 2011, 2015).

Less tangible but equally damaging is the way militarist apologetics have distorted U.S. media coverage of international affairs and helped shape a degraded popular culture saturated with racial and nationalist stereotypes, aestheticized destruction, and images of violent hypermasculinity (Bishara 2012; Gibson 1994; Gusterson 1999b; Hammond 2007; Hannerz and Carter 2004; Jeffords 1989; Pedelty 1995; Weber 2006). In this cultural milieu, the toxic combination of a smoldering backlash against national humiliation in Vietnam and the hubris of being the world's only superpower, aggravated by the injuries of 9/11, has produced a virulent militaristic nationalism that threatens both the American way of life and the stability of the international security system (Bacevich 2005; Johnson 2004; Turner 1996). Donald Trump's electoral triumph is connected to his "America first" brand of militant nationalism—he has called for "the greatest military buildup in American history," describes the U.S. military as "the best fighting force in the history of this planet," and has appointed more generals to positions of power than any president in recent history.

In the years following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the American military began turning to social scientists for help. A few responded by enthusiastically joining the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System (HTS) program, an initiative that embedded researchers with combat brigades beginning in 2007. Most anthropologists responded with deep skepticism, and as counterinsurgency theories and methods regained popularity in U.S. military circles, a number of anthropologists responded with critical analyses (González 2009; Joseph 2011; Kelly et al. 2010; Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2009; Price 2011). By 2008, both the American Anthropological Association and the Society for Applied Anthropology expressed concerns over the ethical problems inherent in such an effort. In 2007, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association issued a statement strongly condemning the HTS, noting that the "Board views the HTS project as an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise" (American Anthropological Association 2007).

Unlike during the Vietnam War era, anthropologists conducted a range of studies directly related to the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (and, more broadly, the so-called war on terror) during the first decade of the twenty-first century: ethnographic interviews with Iraq War veterans who came to oppose the war as well as studies of the challenges facing U.S. combat veterans seeking to reintegrate themselves into civilian life (Gutmann and Lutz 2010; Hautzinger and Scanlan 2013; Wool 2015); accounts of lives under occupation in Iraq,

Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere (Al-Ali 2007; Aziz 2007; Bhan 2013; Daulitzai 2006; Duschinski 2009; Enloe 2010; Robben 2010; Visweswaran 2013); the development of new technologies of warfare such as drones, virtual wars, and war gaming (Der Derian 2009; Finnström and Whitehead 2013; Gusterson 2016; Sluka 2011; Stroeken 2012); social and psychological studies of the motivations of terrorist groups, as well as the impact on Muslim communities of the "terrorist" label (Atran 2010); studies of the application of law in the "war on terror" (Li 2015a, 2010); an analysis of the transformation of the "war on terror" into a new kind of conflict pitting the United States and its client governments in Central Asia and the Middle East against "tribal" societies (Nordstrom 2004; Richards 2004); research on how the inhabitants of war zones adapt to living under difficult conditions (Finnström 2008; Lubkemann 2008; Măcek 2011; Nordstrom 1997; Tishkov 2004); and studies of situations in which wars have formally ended but political violence or armed conflict continues (Ahmed 2013). It is a telling sign that the U.S. national security state itself has become a subject of anthropological inquiry (Masco 2014; McNamara and Rubenstein 2011). At the same time, military agencies in the United States and beyond (and private military contractors) are increasingly interested in coopting a simplified version of "culture" that can be incorporated into heuristic techniques, computerized algorithms, and predictive modeling software.

Looking further afield, other recent anthropological work on militarism and war focuses on a relatively new phenomenon: the rise of nonstate paramilitary organizations, including gangs and religious extremists, in postwar settings (Burrell 2014; Campbell 2009; Hoffman 2008, 2011b; Moodie 2012; Muehlmann 2014; Zilberg 2011). The groups tend to be transnational, and in many ways neoliberal economic processes (e.g., deregulation of capital controls, increasing international trade) and other globalizing trends (e.g., the Internet and social media) have enabled these organizations—and their ideologies—to thrive.

Anthropologists have recently become interested in analyzing state-sanctioned memorializations of war and violence, as well as the use of new biotechnologies and forensics to identify the dead (Ferrándiz 2013; Wagner 2008). Finally, anthropologists have been tracking new attempts to link humanitarianism, disaster relief, and militarization (de Waal 1998; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010; Forte 2014; Tate 2015).

The anthropology of militarism and war has broadened in scope, but there are numerous topical and geographical areas in need of investigation. For example, there is great potential for future anthropological research into the ways in which "formal" wars often lead to cycles of ever more intractable problems

of violence and instability. And there is broad agreement today among regional scholars that many aspects of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq—"de-Baathification" policies that put thousands of armed military men out of work; wanton incarceration of thousands of Iraqis (many, if not most, of whom were innocent); inadequate training of Iraqi security forces; U.S. support for a corrupt Shia-led government; importation of massive quantities of weaponry, military vehicles, armaments, and so on—created the conditions by which the self-styled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was able to rise to power.

Much work also remains to be done on other militarized societies—for example, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, France, Indonesia, Myanmar, Egypt, Nigeria, India, Sudan, Pakistan, Venezuela, and the United Kingdom. A better comparative understanding of militarism will surely lead to more sophisticated theoretical frameworks.

Militarism, like capitalism, is a lifeworld with its own escalatory logic that takes different local forms while displaying fundamental underlying unities. Despite these underlying unities, local processes of militarization are invariably rationalized and legitimated as defensive reactions to someone else's militarism from which they therefore differ in moral character. One task for anthropological analysis is to unmask such ideological processes of legitimation. Despite many advances, anthropology still has much theoretical and empirical work to do to illuminate militarism, the source of so much suffering in the world today.

About This Book

We have edited this collection as a primer on militarism, viewed from a broadly anthropological perspective. In other words, we have attempted to approach militarism holistically, historically, and cross-culturally. As we chose the selected readings, we were determined to include work that analyzed militarism in its full social, economic, political, cultural, environmental, and symbolic contexts. Readers should note that nearly all of the selections are edited or excerpted, in some cases very extensively. We encourage interested readers to seek out the original material for more depth and detail. Collectively, we thought carefully about who to ask to edit each of the constituent sections and tried to approach those who have special expertise in that subject area.

Our reader begins with section I, "Militarization and Political Economy." The selections analyze how war and militarism have transformed national economies, and how the global movement of weapons, soldiers, and defense contractors have played a role in redistributing wealth and power.

Section II, "Military Labor," broadly explores the work of warfare—from mercenary labor in West Africa and U.S. soldiers being displaced by robots to sex workers stationed near military bases. A key theme of this section is that military labor is more than just "soldiering." It encompasses a wide range of auxiliary activities.

Section III, "Gender and Militarism," delves deeply into the ways in which concepts of masculinity and femininity are used for wartime mobilization and to justify killing. The selections also call into question cherished assumptions about men's aggression and women's passivity.

Section IV, "The Emotional Life of Militarism," addresses the question of how people in militarized societies grapple emotionally with daily life. What are the structures of feeling, or the political aesthetics that characterize their interactions with others? To what extent does fear (e.g., about a terrorist attack or nuclear war) influence the everyday decisions of a person living in militarized state?

Section V, "Rhetorics of Militarism," analyzes the ways in which words and images are manipulated to make war seem natural and even beneficial, to encourage military action, and to dehumanize enemies. This section also focuses on the ways in which soldiers are transformed into heroes worthy of veneration. In short, it dissects the controlling processes by which symbols can be deployed to stimulate war fever.

Militaristic policies have profoundly altered physical and cultural landscapes. This is the subject of section VI, "Militarization, Place, and Territory." A wide range of activities—nuclear testing, military occupation, the creation of checkpoints and barriers, the construction of military bases, the development of "strategic hamlets" and United Nations refugee camps—have geographically reshaped space and place.

In section VII, "Militarized Humanitarianism," special attention is given to the growing role of the United Nations, nongovernmental agencies, and relief agencies over the past twenty-five years. As this process has unfolded, it has become clear that humanitarian aid has become tightly intertwined with military intervention in many different regions. The selections in this section view these changes through a critical lens.

Section VIII, "Militarism and the Media," explores the complicity of journalists with U.S. military operations while noting that journalists have also made important critical revelations about the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This section also explores the valorization of warfare by Hollywood and the emergence of the paramilitary hero in popular culture.

Section IX, "Militarizing Knowledge," explores the long-standing relationship between American universities and U.S. military and intelligence agencies. Although popular stereotypes often cast academics as detached, apolitical scientists who inhabit ivory towers, the reality is much different. Over the past century, many university researchers from both the "hard" and the "soft" sciences have conducted their work in close collaboration with the military, particularly during the Cold War.

Section X, "Militarization and the Body," focuses on the many ways in which war and militarism have physically and physiologically transformed humans. More specifically, the selections address the question of how human bodies have been inscribed, altered, damaged, and destroyed by living in a constant state of war readiness. Disciplinary practices, pharmacological innovations, prolonged exposure to traumatic stress—all of these elements and many more have left indelible marks on human bodies and psyches.

Section XI, "Militarism and Technology," explores the aestheticization of military technology and the ideological power of discourses of technical rationality that promises (often mistakenly) victory in war. It is often said of military technology, particularly of nuclear weapons, that "you can't put the genie back in the bottle," but this section gives the striking historical example of Japan's decision to eliminate guns after they were introduced by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.

The final section, "Alternatives to Militarization," provides a range of ideas for lessening the harmful impact of militarism in the world. The goal is to inspire readers to think creatively about ways to build alternatives to war and militarism. To paraphrase Margaret Mead, if war and militarism are human inventions, then perhaps it is time for us to recognize that they are obsolete.

We hope that this reader will play a role in moving us a step closer to that moment of recognition.

NOTES

The authors wish to thank Catherine Besteman and Katherine McCaffrey for their assistance and advice in preparing this introduction and Gustaaf Houtman for his careful coordination and editorial work. Portions of the introduction are drawn from two of the authors' previous publications: Roberto J. González, *Militarizing Culture: Essays on the Warfare State* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast, 2010), and Hugh Gusterson, "Anthropology and Militarism," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 36 (2007), 155–75.

1. This account is based on actual events: see Marc Ramirez, "Salute to a Son," *Dallas Morning News*, December 18, 2014, accessed January 10, 2016, http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/gijoe-dad/.

2. Accounts of the U.S. Army's involvement in the *G.I. Joe* movie are in Holman 2009; Sheftick and Pritchartt 2009.

3. Anthropologists employ similar ideas in the edited book *War, Technology, Anthropology* (Stroeken 2012), which includes work on military video games (some of them designed with the cooperation of the U.S. Army) and the aesthetics of war music videos. See also Grossman and DeGaetano 1998.

4. For a typical example of haute couture military chic, see "Military Issue," a photo spread by Mario Testino, in *Vogue*, March 2010, 446–58. Twelve full-page photos feature svelte models wearing khaki and olive drab blouses, coats, hats, shoes, and accessories by Louis Vuitton, Max Mara, Ralph Lauren, and Chloé, among many others. For a discussion of "military chic" in the fashion world, see Enloe 2007.

5. *Oxford English Dictionary*, quoted in Bacevich 2005: 1, 255.

6. Kohn's qualitative analysis focuses on the ways in which political institutions, the U.S. legal system, and shifts in cultural mores have changed in the post–World War II period and the post-9/11 period, in particular. For broadly similar arguments about the progressive militarization of the United States during and after the Cold War, see Masco 2014; Wills 2010.

7. For example, readers interested in the anthropology of war are encouraged to explore Haas 1990; Otterbein 2009; Waterston 2009.

8. A notable exception is Katherine Verdery (1991), who studied nationalism and ethnic identity in Cold War Romania. Andrew Bickford (2011), doing fieldwork at the end of the Cold War, has written about East German soldiers and their shoddy treatment at the hands of the newly unified German state.

9. Such work often builds on and revoices in a more theoretical register an indigenous tradition of *testimonio*—vivid, first-person eyewitness accounts of terror and violence exemplified by Rigoberta Menchú's autobiography.