AYALA LEVIN

ARCHITECTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

Israeli Construction in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Settler Colonial Imagination, 1958–1973



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introduction

Settler Colonial Expertise in the Theater of Development


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FIGURE I.1 Queen Elizabeth II, accompanied by Prince Philip, discussing the Sierra Leone parliament building model with architect Zvi Meltzer, November 1961. The wig of an unknown member of Sierra Leone's new parliament is visible to Meltzer's right. Courtesy of Zvi Meltzer.

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IN A PHOTOGRAPH depicting the Israeli architect Zvi Meltzer presenting a model of the Sierra Leone parliament building to the queen of England, another figure standing between the two is barely visible and recognizable only by his British-style wig: a member of Sierra Leone's newly founded parliament (fig. I.1). What can we make of this strange triangular constellation that comprised the queen of England, the Israeli architect, and the anonymous Sierra Leonean parliament member? On the face of it, this triangulation might seem to represent the smooth transition from colonial to neocolonial forces in Africa, with new actors like Israel gaining a foothold in the postcolonial development market via technical aid.[1] But such an analysis only further obscures the Sierra Leonean member of parliament and what he represents—the key role that African elites played in the development of their countries after independence, as initiators of projects such as the Sierra Leone parliament building. These African elites often chose to commission, when they could, not English or French construction companies but instead companies from Israel and other countries that presented an alternative to the colonial powers in the region.

While both the Israeli architect and Sierra Leone's member of parliament still sought the warmth of the queen's approving gaze, their partnership in fact transgressed old colonial hierarchies. Sometimes over British objections, Israeli officials established relations with Britain's West African colonies even prior to independence by offering them the services of the Israeli construction company Solel Boneh, as well as those of other governmental companies. Solel Boneh, whose name means "Paves-Builds," was owned by the Histadrut, the General Federation of Laborers, a cooperative organization established in 1920 that laid the foundations for the Israeli state's institutional infrastructure and political leadership in its first decades of statehood.[2] Solel Boneh established local partnerships with African governments and executed these governments' most prestigious projects, often commissioning Israel's best-known architects for them. In Sierra Leone, the Israeli company had won its bid for the parliament project over the much better financed and locally experienced general contractor, the British firm Taylor Woodrow. Behind the smiles posed for the camera was a queen who had to step over the rubble that the Israeli managers had left on the site, perhaps slowly reckoning with her diminishing authority in a postimperial age.

Challenging the prevailing understanding of development discourse as homogenous and of the development expert as disembodied technocrat, this book calls attention to what has been long overlooked in development scholarship, just as it is obscured in the photo.[3] That is, in the competition over development aid in Africa, incited by decolonization and shaped largely by the politics of the global Cold War, new centers of knowledge production emerged and, with them, the opportunity for African governments to negotiate with various aid donors and choose the forms of aid—and by extension the forms of modernity—that they desired. Though these choices were shaped by Cold War politics, they were not completely determined by them, as the competition over aid allowed room for sophisticated maneuvering even between countries associated with the same bloc.[4]

The "golden age" of Israeli-African relationships from 1958 to 1973, whereby Israel sought to gain support at the United Nations against the Arab League's pressures, coincided with optimistic development plans that African governments carried out with the support of foreign aid.[5] "The Development Decade," as the Kennedy administration named the 1960s, marked the transition of British, French, and Belgian colonies in Africa to independence, and abundant faith—domestic and international—in the new nations' economic and social development, perceived as the interdependent and inevitable product of modernization. During that short but intense period, many international players, old and new, competed over this newly opened development market that had previously been monopolized by colonial powers. Whether acting as proxies for the new superpowers or assuming an independent position such as that offered by the Non-Aligned Movement, these new players included, besides Israel, West Germany and the German Democratic Republic, North and South Korea, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, Cuba, and China.[6] This multiplicity of exchanges presses us to consider aid relationship beyond an assumed binary by which donor countries represent the Western "developed world," and recipients the non-Western "developing world." By focusing on exchanges between African states and Israel—which was itself a "developing country" during this period—this book introduces a third category between the global North and the global South that complicates existing narratives of development and directs attention to the diverse social and political stakes that undergirded north-south exchanges.[7]

Architecture offers a unique lens for examining this complex history. While it was by no means the only field in which Israel offered development aid, its hypervisibility and its confluence of aesthetics and governing politics provides a rich archive for deciphering the material and discursive practices that informed the Israeli-African exchange. This book presents an in-depth analysis of prestigious governmental projects in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, demonstrating how architectural aid operated at interlocking scales, mediating both between international institutions and governing elites and between governing elites and domestic stakeholders, and how it connected individual buildings to broader transformations of cities and regions. By focusing on Sierra Leone's parliament building and national urbanization plan, the University of Ife (today Obafemi Awolowo University) in Nigeria, and the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Filwoha Baths in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, this book offers both an architectural history of development aid and a development aid history of architecture.

This introduction lays the groundwork for the book's analysis by examining how Israel self-fashioned its geopolitical position with respect to African governments and how the state structured its aid as "cooperation." This analysis pertains mainly to the early years in the formation of these relations up to the mid-1960s, the period in which most of the projects discussed in this book were completed. Since my focus is on how Israel staged itself as a new center of knowledge production that could circumvent international professional hierarchies, I then proceed to how it turned its settler colonial experience into development expertise that could be exported to other developing countries. I situate this turn in the crisis of "pioneering" that Israeli society faced during its transition from voluntary society to statehood. Before concluding with an overview of the chapters that describes how Israeli architects performed this expertise in the context of the conditions they encountered in African countries, I develop the conceptual framework of "development theater" to account for the complex dramaturgy of aid among donors and recipients, and the role architectural modernism assumed in it.

Israel and Africa: "Cooperation," Not Aid

After a visit to Israel in 1957, John Tettegah, the secretary general of Ghana's trade union movement, declared, "Israel has given me more in eight days than I could obtain from two years in a British university." Similarly, Tom Mboya, the Kenyan trade unionist, commented, "Any African who tours Israel cannot fail to be impressed by the achievements made in such a short time from poor soil and with so few natural resources. We all tended to come away most excited and eager to return to our countries and repeat all those experiments."[8] As these two quotes demonstrate, Israel's appeal to African leaders was rooted in speed—both how quickly Israel had developed and how quickly African countries could do so following its model. Tettegah's and Mboya's emphasis on the temporality of development attests to a fundamental turn in postcolonial development thinking. Encompassing industry, agriculture, infrastructure, health, and education, African postcolonial development plans often continued late colonial development plans. Yet in their unprecedented comprehensiveness, scale, and funding, they marked a decisive shift from the "not yet" approach that characterized colonial rule. Measuring the colonies with a universal yardstick of development, this approach served to justify colonial presence even during later stages of decolonization.[9] With the emergence of "development" as an object of modernization theory following World War II, inherent causes, whether environmental or racial, could no longer explain "backwardness" and legitimize the perpetuation of external rule. The new developmental narrative postulated latecomers' ability "to catch up," and thereby align themselves with "universal history" as recorded and narrated by the West, via the omnipotence of science and technology, rational economic planning, and social engineering.[10] As Michael Adas explains, this narrative involved compressing the time required for development from centuries to decades, and transferring agency from the Western powers whose civilizing, paternalistic approaches had characterized colonial rule to Africans and Asians themselves.[11] While the United States was the main exponent of this modernization theory, which was based on its historical experience in the late nineteenth century, Israel presented African states with a more tangible example of such a "leap"—a contemporaneous test case that proved the theory. To be sure, Israel's model of development, as well as that of most of the African countries it aided, adhered to the same universal history yardstick and enjoyed Western patronage. But while European and American histories rested on centuries or decades of such historical progress, Israel's emergence on the world stage in 1948 presented a moving picture of development in the making—an acceleration of history that could be emulated and repeated elsewhere.

For African leaders, aid did not mean showering gifts on passive recipients. Nor, as Frederick Cooper has argued, did independence turn late colonial political and economic entitlement into supplication.[12] In 1964, G. Odartey Lamptey, Ghana's representative in Washington, explained that in order to maintain its independence Ghana preferred to accept loans rather than gifts:

> Loans with interest payable, and technicians loaned to a developing country with the receiving country paying much of their upkeep are not aid in the restrictive sense. As far as the Government of Ghana is concerned only a very insignificant amount of the cooperative assistance it had received from other countries could be considered outright gifts with no chance of gain of the giving country . . . we are appreciative of the technical skills that we have acquired with the cooperation of other peoples but most of these things are joint projects and the gain goes both ways.[13]

As Lamptey made clear, Ghana wished to be perceived as a partner worth investing in, not a charity case. African recipients did not expect or desire development aid prompted by disinterested philanthropy, but rather wanted aid to derive from business and diplomatic interests that would prove mutually beneficial. From these relationships, Israel hoped to gain not only support at the UN, where the anticipated decolonization of African states presented a lucrative field of diplomatic opportunity, but also access to raw materials, a large market for its trade in arms and other goods, and the chance to gather intelligence on the Arab League via its African activities.[14] Moreover, Israel used its influence in Africa to assert its own significance to Western countries, particularly the United States, while the African countries hoped to have influence in Washington via Israeli channels.[15] If anything, these relations were based on mutually agreed upon "contractual dependency."[16] This contractual dependency, in the case of the joint companies Solel Boneh established with African governments, was limited to specified periods of management and skill transfer, which relieved African governments of the fear of prolonged interventions. Attentive to these anxieties, Golda Meir, then the Israeli foreign minister, explained, "We'll look for the most professional people available, but development of Ghana can be carried out only by the Ghanaians themselves."[17] Similarly, the foreign ministry's Department of International Aid and Cooperation, which grew out of the Section for Technical Cooperation that Meir had established in 1958, was renamed the Department of International Cooperation (Mashav) in 1961 to avoid the patronizing connotations of the word "aid" itself.[18] This strategy proved successful. By the end of 1962, Israel had twenty-two embassies in Africa, and by 1973, over three thousand Israeli experts had worked in the continent.[19]

While Israel's extensive efforts to establish relations with African countries are often attributed to Meir's term as foreign minister from 1956 to 1966, it was David Hacohen's experience in Burma in 1953–54 under Moshe Sharett, Meir's predecessor, that consolidated Israel's unique approach to aid in practice. A leading figure in the Jewish settlement in Palestine, Hacohen was nominated to serve as Israel's first envoy in a Third World country—"a guinea pig in the Jungle," as he put it—where he devised the basic principles of Israeli aid.[20] Recognizing that the development market, once freed from colonial monopolies, would have significant economic and diplomatic potential, Hacohen emphasized the urgency of entering it before other major players did. He also stressed the need to involve Israeli public or semipublic companies, specifically Solel Boneh and the Israel Military Industries (Ta'asia Tzvait), rather than private firms. Hacohen's final principle, designed for speed, was that local workers from the country in question should be brought to Israel for training, while Israeli personnel set up the companies that would employ those workers in the recipient country.[21]

Before becoming a parliament member and diplomatic envoy in Burma, Hacohen laid the foundations for Israel's architectural role in Africa as managing director of Solel Boneh. Established in 1924 as a subsidiary of the Histadrut, Solel Boneh played an instrumental role in demarcating the territory of the Jewish settlement and facilitating the New Jew's occupational shift from commerce to manual labor.[22] In addition to projects initiated by Zionist organizations, Solel Boneh carried out public works for the British mandate government. In this dual capacity, it collaborated with the British Empire in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, and Cyprus, even while defying the British in clandestine operations toward Zionist ends, as in the case of the Tower and Stockade operation (1936–39).[23] As such, Solel Boneh exemplifies the complex positionality of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, which benefited from and collaborated with the British Empire but also undermined its authority when Britain acted against Zionist interests. A cartoon about Solel Boneh's work under the British in Abadan, Iran, portraying a Jewish worker crouching as an army of British officers looms over him, demonstrates the Jewish settlers' understanding of themselves as anticolonial (fig. I.2). With the establishment of Israel, Solel Boneh's power multiplied, as it reasserted its national role in industrialization by creating jobs, training thousands of immigrants, building New Towns for a growing population, and offering services such as financing, credit, marketing, and transportation. Within a decade, however, it became clear to the Histadrut—backed by the Labor government, which sought to encourage private investment—that they needed to contain the company's expansionist but often economically risky logic.[24] In 1958, Solel Boneh was subdivided into three functional units: Building and Public Works, Koor Industries and Crafts, and Overseas and Harbour Works.[25] This move, I propose, was meant to contain Solel Boneh domestically while relegating its expansionist logic to Third World countries, where its ability to mobilize manpower and execute complex tasks under strenuous conditions could be put in service of Israeli diplomacy.

To gain a competitive edge over other donor countries, most of which could afford to provide considerably more financial assistance and well-established know-how, Israel positioned itself as a fellow postcolonial developing country—a feat perhaps made more difficult by its association with former colonial powers through its role in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Israel's foreign ministry capitalized on the narrative of racial oppression,

FIGURE I.2 A Solel Boneh cartoon of the work it did for the British Army in Abadan in 1943–45, depicting British supervision as an army of taskmasters dwarfing the Hebrew laborer. Courtesy of the Labour Movement Archives, Lavon Institute for Labour Research, Tel Aviv, IV 320-6.


SUPERVISION...

Diaspora, and national-cultural rejuvenation that Pan-African intellectuals such as Edward Blyden and Marcus Garvey shared with Zionist thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like the latter, they conceived of repatriation as a condition for African racial, political, and spiritual regeneration.[26] This intellectual connection not only ensured that the educated African elite accepted the Israeli foreign ministry's rhetoric but also attracted the advocacy and concrete help of contemporary intellectuals such as George Padmore, a leftist journalist and Ghanaian prime minister Kwame Nkrumah's advisor, who assisted Golda Meir in her initial diplomatic steps in Africa.[27] This intellectual connection may also explain why the first country to host an Israeli military-diplomatic display on the continent was Liberia, itself a repatriate settler colonial state. On April 18, 1955, the exact date that the first Afro-Asian conference opened in Bandung, Indonesia, the Liberian honorary guard welcomed an Israeli warship to Monrovia's shores.[28] This was a highly symbolic gesture for both parties: Israel's attempts to participate in the first Afro-Asian conference had been thwarted, and while Momolu Dukuly, the Liberian foreign minister, attended the Bandung conference, his country affirmed relations with Israel despite its exclusion. Moreover, in the wake of the Holocaust, Israel's narrative of how the Jewish people's racial oppression led to national sovereignty differentiated it from most European countries and the United States, whose own contemporaneous social and political struggles over race were being exploited by the Soviet Union to frustrate American diplomatic efforts in Africa. To secure its own independent postcolonial image, Israel distanced its aid from American institutions such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.[29] While it is suspected that Israel's aid was at times secretly funded by the United States and at least once by Germany, and while Israel was willing to coordinate its aid with the British Commonwealth or France, it did not abide their dictates when they were against Israeli interests.[30] In practice, Israeli architects, planners, and companies sometimes collaborated with consultants from the US Agency of International Development (USAID), as in the planning of the University of Ife in West Nigeria, or established partnerships with American private investors, as did Solel Boneh's Reynolds company, which worked extensively in Ethiopia.

While associated with the Western bloc, Israel's official stance in relation to the Cold War was neutral. Israel's neutrality and the labor movement's hegemony in the country offered African leaders a "third way" between communism and capitalism, without the strings that the superpowers attached to their aid. In addition, Labor Zionism's "constructive socialism," which married class interests with national causes, appealed to African governments, many of which had grown from the ranks of trade unions, as the Israeli ruling party Mapai had in the years before Israel's statehood. Labor Zionism's subsumption of trade union loyalty to state-building tasks presented a seemingly viable model for countering Africans' entrenched distrust of governmental authority due to generations of colonial rule.[31] In addition to the social cause of labor solidarity that was sometimes compared to African communitarianism, Israel's experience in forging a coherent—albeit exclusively Jewish—national identity despite the varied origins of its immigrants, and in relation to the broad Jewish Diaspora, also resonated with African governments facing similar challenges.[32]

Certainly, these concerns were not shared equally among the leadership of all African countries. The three African countries discussed in this book—Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ethiopia—presented various governance challenges rooted in their divergent histories. Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain in 1961, and its newly elected government used Israeli architectural aid to help unite a country divided culturally and economically by its history of African settler colonialism and the consequent British colonial divide between direct and indirect rule. In the nineteenth century, Sierra Leone played an important role in West Africa: it was home to liberated African slaves and boasted the first university in the region. By the mid-twentieth century, however, its glory as the "Athens of Africa" had completely waned, as its inland population gained political dominance over the Krio descendants of liberated slaves, thus reversing the former settler colonial power balance. Israeli architectural aid attempted to provide both the symbols to support this new cultural hegemony, as well as the means to achieve it through labor mobilization and the territorial distribution of the population.

Much larger in size and diplomatic importance, Nigeria consisted of three self-governing regions that corresponded to its major ethnic groups when it gained independence from Britain in 1960. Nigeria's regions used Israeli aid in their competition over the allocation of resources in the country's federal system. The Muslim-dominated north refused direct Israeli aid. The eastern region—whose secession in 1967 led to the Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War—evoked the Holocaust in its pleas for military and humanitarian aid, pressing Israel to act on its stated ideology at an inconvenient time, as Israel had diplomatic relations with Nigeria's federal government.[33] The western region, which is the focus of this book, used Israeli architectural aid to advance higher education in direct defiance of the federal government's recommendations.

Unlike the two West African countries, Ethiopia was occupied only briefly by Italy in the mid-1930s, followed by British occupation during World War II. With the wave of decolonization in the continent, imperial Ethiopia capitalized on its long history as a Christian monarchy to become a symbol of African independence, in a regional competition with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had growing influence in the continent. In Ethiopia, as in other East African states, Israel's explicit strategic goal was to secure regional alliances with non-Arab states, such as Turkey and prerevolutionary Iran, which resulted in a periphery pact all countries signed in 1958. Ethiopia used extensive Israeli military and intelligence aid, as well as aid in civilian fields, to bolster its own territorial ambitions in neighboring Muslim countries Eritrea and Somalia, as well as to curb civilian unrest within its growing educated class. As these snapshots show, in these three cases neither were the goals of development aid unified nor were its political ideologies consistent. To explain how Israeli experts could promote African imperialism in Ethiopia on the one hand, while defending a nativist hegemony in Sierra Leone on the other, we now turn to the settler colonial roots of Israel's development aid expertise.

Settler Colonialism as Development Expertise

Israeli development aid emerged in conjunction with the crisis of "pioneering" in Labor Zionism, as Israel transitioned from voluntary society to statehood. With the era of voluntary settlement coming to an end, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, attempted to institutionalize "pioneering" as part of his new doctrine of *mamlakhtiut*.[34] Among its various characteristics, mamlakhtiut sought to preserve the pioneering zeal that had characterized the heretofore voluntary society by transforming it into a mobilizing force that would unite veteran and new immigrants around a national sense of purpose. Perhaps surprisingly, international development aid was one of these national causes. In 1959, Ben-Gurion announced that the peoples of Asia and Africa "desire rapprochement not because we are rich in possessions that enable us to influence them, but because they view the spiritual values enshrined in Israeli *halutziut* [pioneering] as worth learning."[35] Coupling aid with pioneering, Ben-Gurion and others in the labor movement constructed Israeli aid in the Third World as a continuation of Zionist prestate pioneering tasks. Imbuing aid with such spiritual and moral values can be interpreted as a means of alleviating the fear that once Zionism had achieved its teleological aim—that is, national sovereignty—Israel would become "a nation like all nations" and Zionism would be divested of its moral purpose.

As a settler colonial project that aimed to extinguish its colonial character, Zionism successfully naturalized itself as a sovereign nation.[36] Yet it was precisely the success of the Zionist colonial project in establishing Israel's boundaries as a sovereign nation that was at the heart of the country's postindependence crisis. As Adriana Kemp has shown, until 1967 Israeli borders operated both as an icon that unified the nation within and as a porous frontier for military border crossing.[37] If Jews who had recently emigrated from North Africa were forced to serve the settler project as a civilian shield in the country's periphery, then military operations served as an outlet for a desire to transgress the border, which was construed not as a fixed entity but as one that needed to be perpetually sealed against Palestinian return. Since these borders seemed temporary and ambiguous, citizenship could not be defined only by rights, but had to be undergirded by a sacrificial settler voluntarism. If border crossing served to hone the military and intelligence expertise that Israel also deployed in its military aid in some African countries, then nonmilitary aid presented a civilian form of border crossing. The restructuring of Solel Boneh and relegation of its prestate colonial expertise to postcolonial governments can be considered one manifestation of this crisis, as it served to contain the company's unruly behavior within Israel while unleashing its expansionist drive overseas. This civilian border crossing allowed Israeli professionals to continue refining their settler colonial expertise in development, while providing an outlet for the country's surplus of "development experts."[38]

The idea that Jewish settlement in Palestine might be beneficial to Africans stretches back to a seminal text in the birth of Zionism, Theodor Herzl's 1902 utopian novel *Altneuland*. While others have pointed to this work in connection with Israeli diplomacy in Africa, they have not attended to the assumptions embedded in the novel's imagined forms of knowledge production or examined how it envisions the forms of knowledge produced by Jewish colonization as benefitting Africans.[39] In the key passage on the subject, one of the protagonists, a bacteriologist named Professor Steineck, declares that once the Jewish problem is resolved, it will be time to attend to the "Negro problem."[40] Steineck, who set up a research institute in Palestine modeled after the Pasteur Institute in Paris, hoped to find a cure for malaria to allow for mass repatriation of diasporic Africans, while also promoting this as a measure to relieve unemployment in Europe by facilitating white settler colonialism in Africa.[41] In this succinct example, Herzl, the visionary of Political Zionism, shifted the center of colonial knowledge production from European metropoles to the Jewish settlement in Palestine, where the experimental medicine was to be tested locally before being exported elsewhere in the Southern Hemisphere.

Unlike the form of imperial science Herzl advocated, however, Labor Zionism privileged the laborer-pioneer over the scientist, and concrete action in the harsh conditions of the field over experimentation in a sterile lab.[42] Although the two were in fact complementary, as the history of malaria eradication demonstrates—the scientists needed the pioneers just as the pioneers needed the scientists[43]—this ideological position helped Labor Zionist settlers disavow the colonial character of their project. Fields that require an unmediated familiarity with conditions on the ground, such as construction, made this disavowal possible. Contemporaneous publications on knowledge transfer from Israel often emphasized Israeli experts' personal and social qualities—such as unpretentiousness and a "hands-on" approach, the ideal characteristics of the Zionist settler-pioneer—as much as their technical knowledge.[44] Such qualities did not simply complement technical expertise, but rather conditioned it, since experts produced knowledge by facing unprecedented challenges, such as a difficult climate, lack of natural resources, and the conditions of warfare. At the same time, these qualities conveyed the informal, down-to-earth, and nonhierarchical character of Israeli experts in the social sphere of labor relations with African workers.[45] Inflected by a minority consciousness and a sense of a corrective historical mission, Labor Zionist settlers rationalized practices that reimagined the diaspora Jew as a new man, while dispossessing the Palestinians of their lands.[46] Development aid was one of the conduits through which the Israeli Labor government sought to sustain this disavowal, despite the fact that it had turned about 800,000 Palestinians into refugees following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and had subjected many of the 160,000 who remained within Israeli borders to military rule, which lasted until late 1966, just a few months before the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip began.[47]

In conceptualizing settler colonialism as a repressed imaginary that informed practices of foreign aid, this book draws from Megan Black, who argues that the US Department of the Interior's "institutional memory rooted in conquest" undergirded not only its technocracy for managing Indigenous Americans and domestic natural resources but also its involvement in the Point Four aid program.[48] International relations historian Odd Arne Westad similarly argues that the Cold War superpowers extended the "deep structures" of their ideologies to the global arena as an extraterritorial continuation of their civil wars.[49] Like Black and Westad, I argue that Labor Zionist settler-pioneer ideology was the deep structure undergirding Israel's foreign policy. However, rather than interpreting this continuity as ideologically consistent, as both Black's and Westad's arguments might imply, I interpret it as an anachronistic attempt, in the face of domestic and international crises, to restore Israel's imagined prestate past as a pioneering and just society, however selective this vision of "justice" was. As we shall see in various examples throughout this book, the labor invested in holding on to prestate practices and values reveals the contradictions embedded in this anachronism.

Considering Israeli development thinking in African countries in terms of settler colonial expertise sets this book apart from the growing critical literature on Israeli-African aid relationships, as well as from scholarship on Israel's contemporaneous export of architecture and urban planning models to the Middle East.[50] While scholars such as Haim Yacobi, Eitan Bar-Yosef, and Rivi Gillis have identified "pioneering" as a central trope in Israeli aid to Africa, and Bar-Yosef has tied the latter to the Israeli crisis in pioneering, they have not considered "pioneering" a settler colonial mode of professional expertise.[51] The most extensive study of the spatial imaginary of Israel's relations with Africa to date, of which two chapters are dedicated to the export of Israeli architectural and planning expertise to Africa, is Haim Yacobi's *Israel and Africa: A Genealogy of Moral Geography* (2016). Focusing on the state period, this study does not take into account the decades of prestate settler colonialism that provided the state with its institutional and physical infrastructure. Beginning with the state as point zero runs the risk of reifying the very myth of exceptionalism Israel tried to promote—that of becoming a "development miracle" in just a decade. *Architecture and Development* demonstrates that Israeli architecture, as a profession, cannot be separated from the settler colonial experience that shaped it into a crucial instrument in the projects of "the conquest of labor" (*kibush ha'avoda*) and "the conquest of wasteland" (*kibush hashmama*), the founding myths of Zionist settler colonialism.[52] This historical consideration of the architectural profession in Israel helps refine our understanding of architects' perceptions of the conditions they encountered in Africa beyond the generalized colonial imaginary of terra nullius that Yacobi invokes.[53] Moreover, while Yacobi acknowledges Israel's

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unique geopolitical positioning, his analysis predetermines Israeli-African relations by arguing that by joining the Western "donor club," Israel could perpetuate its self-image as "a Western, modern, white state."[54] This explanation might be overdetermined by Israel's current unequivocal association with the United States—an alliance that was fully consolidated only in 1967. Even if plausible, this account does not explain how Israeli architects differentiated their expertise from that of former colonial powers, and does not attend to the multiplicity of actors who made up this so-called donors' club in the context of a new geopolitics in which modernity was no longer exclusively the purview of the West. Lastly, as the title of Yacobi's book in Hebrew, *Kan lo Africa* (It Is Not Africa Here), suggests, it is primarily concerned with the effects of these relations on the Israeli imaginary. In contrast, my work aims to situate these relations in the concrete conditions Israeli architects encountered in the African countries where they worked.

While Israeli architects did export Zionist settler colonial practices to African countries, their interventions did not assume the extension of Israeli settler colonialism to African territories, nor did they prefigure post-1967 colonial relations. By asking what African elites were interested in emulating, how Israeli architects translated their experience to conditions in Africa and responded to other aid donors' complementary or competing models, and how the architectural results differed from both their Israeli precedents and African elites' expectations, this work complicates scholarly understanding of Israel's export of its settler colonial model, which can explain only part of the multifaceted exchange. The "theater of development," the concept I introduce next, helps us analyze the role of architecture and architectural expertise in this exchange in the specific context of the Cold War development race, and against the backdrop or active influence of competing actors and stakeholders.

Theater of Development and Architectural Modernism

Within the complex geopolitical dramaturgy of the competition over aid, Israeli actors' portrayal of themselves as anticolonial was a performative stance that had real effects regardless of their sincerity.[55] This applies as much to actors from other competing donor countries as to those from recipient African countries who solicited their aid. Just as the authenticity of Israel's position is beside the point, so it is reasonable to assume that African leaders' warm statements about Israel were equally performative. As Jean-François Bayart has argued poignantly, Africans "have been active agents in the *mise en dépendance* of their societies."[56] Rejecting a dichotomy between collaboration with or resistance to international forces, Bayart explains that African dependency is a strategy of extraversion "astutely fabricated as much as predetermined," designed to exploit the resources of (in)dependence.[57] The issue at stake is not the extent of these states' autonomy in relation to international forces, but rather how they took hold of and mobilized resources to accommodate local interests.[58]

I use the term "development theater," on the one hand, to underscore the geopolitical stakes of aid exchanges through an intentional echo of the military expression "theater of war," and, on the other, to highlight the complex mise-en-scène produced by the performances of human and inanimate actors. While development was performed by an international network of governments, institutions, and professionals both within and beyond its African locales, I use the theater metaphor, with its suggestion of a bound space, in order to examine these architectural objects in relation to their local effects and the forms of modernity that they aimed to produce. The theater metaphor also describes the nexus of human and inanimate actors more accurately than the term "development industry" coined by James Ferguson, since it acknowledges the active engagement of both producers and consumers of architecture as signs of modernity as well as the performative capacities of the objects produced.[59] Furthermore, the self-conscious positionality of the participants in this performance of development, whether as donors or recipients, distinguishes it from "spectacle," a term others have used to characterize African postcolonial modernization.[60] Calling development a "spectacle" risks reducing African desire for modernity to mere commodity fetishism—a manifestation of false consciousness inflected by the "colonization of the mind." This book instead emphasizes the capacity of subjects to set into motion architectural projects, showing how the role of African commissioners extended beyond passive consumption. Likewise, as "plot motivators," the objects themselves played an active role far beyond that of evoking fetishistic desire. As harbingers of long processes to come, they addressed both domestic and international audiences. Internationally, they represented the donor country's aid relationships—which one Israeli diplomat called "a dam against diplomatic crises"[61]—and acted as a catalyst for further foreign investment. Domestically, they represented an independent state's institutions to its own citizens as evidence of the government's ability to fulfill its promises, giving concrete form to the abstract economic and social processes described in dry technical terms in national development plans.

Because of their scale and aesthetic qualities, architectural objects played a significant role in making aid visible. In terms of form, these projects were conceived in relation to an existing repertoire of images of modernist architecture and planning that circulated in the media, and that members of the African elite also saw in person during their education abroad or on professional and political tours. These projects aimed to connect African locales—usually, but not always, capitals—to the international system through an aesthetic language that, for the most part, was based on similarity and virtuosic repetition, not iconic difference.[62] For this reason, there was no contradiction between national aspirations and an international modernist outlook, and no particular insistence on the employment of local architects—in countries where they were available, such as Nigeria—for prestigious governmental projects.[63]

Even if the buildings and development projects were produced not by creative African individuals but by a group of foreign and local stakeholders, they constituted an "ontology of not-yet-being" in the societies in which they were staged. According to Ernst Bloch, the Frankfurt school theorist who coined this term, cultural products such as architecture can carry a utopian imaginary. Even the false promises and false needs produced by advertisements, he argued, can express wishes that subvert the logic of capitalism.[64] Or, as Arjun Appadurai put it, "Where there is consumption there is pleasure, and where there is pleasure there is agency."[65] The temporal disjuncture expressed in Bloch's politics of hope, by which he means the germination of the future in the present, is useful for conceptualizing the tantalizing gap between modernity and modernization in postcolonial societies.[66] From this perspective, even if these architectural objects did not directly express African wishes and desires because they were produced by an international Western-dominated market, they could still function as objects of desire that articulate "a complex configuration of unmet needs" that transgressed material consumption.[67]

To understand how architectural objects translated development into practice, we need to complement and substantiate the analysis of forms with reflection on architectural objects as agents and instruments in the mobilization of resources. Like props in a play—think of Chekhov's gun that must fire in one of the following acts if it appears in the first—architectural objects not only served as a backdrop for the main action of development but also prompted it through the mobilization of workers, international funds, lands, infrastructure, and policy making. While Bayart interprets the African "politics of the belly" as primarily oriented toward access to resources, the architectural objects produced in the first decade of independence served as active agents not only in securing resources but also in mobilizing and distributing them.[68] Rather than focusing solely on form, this study asks how these architectural objects were envisioned to mobilize resources and how these attempts are reflected in their design.

Understanding form in relation to resource mobilization is crucial for articulating the work that the architecture of independence did beyond representation. This is especially significant given the crisis of representation that independence entailed in African countries. According to Mamadou Diouf, if the emblems of colonialism were roads, commerce, and sanitation, then the emblems of independence were schools, community clinics, and electricity.[69] Social welfare and mobility were to be improved by intensifying the focus on infrastructure and government services that had begun during the colonial era, not by discontinuing it. Okwui Enwezor reflected on the elusive character of this transformation: "The distance between colonial modernity and postcolonial modernity is one of degrees, for each incorporates and contradicts the other. Each is a mirror of the other."[70] The modern emblems of African independence thus call for a more subtle reading, one that locates the crisis of representation in the historical impossibility of a radical break from the colonial past.

Even if postindependence projects did not differ in style from the modernism of late colonial ones—and even if the International Style, the lingua franca of architectural modernism, traversed alliances beyond the divide between capitalism and communism—differences among architectural modernism's various enunciations can be found in practice, especially in the choice of materials, labor relations, and the structure of know-how transfer. As Cole Roskam has demonstrated, in the 1960s, Guinea and Ghana employed Chinese construction companies that emphasized process over the finished object and the reuse of materials, conveying these values aesthetically through the material and structural thrift of the buildings.[71] Similarly, Łukasz Stanek has shown how the Ghanaian National Construction Company, which was originally established by Solel Boneh, hired Eastern European architects who provided expertise comparable to that of their Western colleagues but offered a crucial difference at the level of work relations by having them work under Ghanaian administration.[72] Importantly, this focus on practice directs attention to the previously unacknowledged role of construction companies in the mediation between diplomacy and architecture, ideology and development. It also emphasizes how expertise was performed, the final subject to which we turn here.

Performing Expertise

One of the main questions this book asks is how Israeli architects performed and staged their development expertise as adaptable from one context to another, and how this act of translation made Israel's experience particularly relevant to that of other countries. This focus on expertise was perhaps more common when the donor country emphasized the export of personnel over monetary aid, as in the case of Israel. Unlike "professional knowledge," which is codified by technical language and international standards, "expertise," which etymologically derives from experience, can explain how personal biographies affected professional ones and highlight the effects of sociocorporeal experiences on the construction of professional knowledge. Examining professional knowledge and practices in this framework sheds light on aspects of embodied expertise that otherwise cannot be accounted for in purely professional terms.

To attend to how a localized expertise in architectural modernism was made adaptable and relevant to other locations, it is not enough to postulate that architectural modernism has always been cosmopolitan and situated, as Vikramaditya Prakash has compellingly argued; one needs to account for modernism's routes and the various subject positions that architects could assume in its travel.[73] The case of Israeli aid in Africa demonstrates how interstitial colonial positions were used to make claims on expertise in the postcolonial world. Just as in the diplomatic realm, where alternative forms of aid were nuanced versions rather than outright rejections of dominant models, this professional competition did not upset hegemonic frames of reference. The fact that Israeli architects belonged to the first wave of modernism via their education in Central and Western Europe, including in prestigious institutions such as the Bauhaus, gave them a privileged position with regard to firsthand access to knowledge, connections, and early experiences of adaptation.[74] In the postwar period, it also gave them a privileged position in the expanding but racialized and uneven global market for architectural production. Having made one translation from Europe to the Middle East, where they put modern architecture in service of Zionist settler colonialism, Israeli architects were exporting to Africa not an "Israeli architecture" but rather their experience adapting modernism to non-Western locales. The fact that their locally derived expertise could be translated from one location to another demonstrates that situated knowledge not only *can* travel but also,[75] by virtue of its inherent adaptability, can be remade and *re*situated through that travel.

The chapters that follow trace the adaptation of architectural practices from Israel to Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, and situate these adaptations against lingering British colonial models or complementary ones from other donor states. Chapter 1 examines the design of the Sierra Leone parliament (1960–61) by acclaimed Israeli architects Dov Karmi (1905–62) and Ram Karmi (1931–2013), a father-and-son team who were concurrently revising the contested design for the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. At the heart of Israel's public debate about the aesthetics of the Knesset was a conflict over how to express Jewish national belonging in the territory, whether through a timeless classicism drawn from British colonialism, or through a dynamic modernism that expressed the Labor Zionist movement. The result was a compromise between the two. This chapter analyzes how the architects translated their Knesset design to the Sierra Leone context by using on-site prefabrication techniques to convey rapid technical development on the one hand, and deep-rooted historical belonging on the other. The chapter then analyzes how local Sierra Leonean media documented the parliament's rapid construction and staged it as a national event that subjugated class interests and ethnic divisions to national causes. As I argue in this chapter, this emphasis on the visibility and performance of labor—something that opening the parliament building before its completion also underscored—articulates a conceptual shift from the colonial sublime, which focused on the completed object as a technological feat and a tantalizing promise for participation in modernity, to a new emphasis on process and the agency of the citizenry in achieving that goal.

Chapter 2 analyzes the national urbanization plan that Israeli urban planner Aryeh Doudai (1911–1982) devised for Sierra Leone in 1965. Unlike the Karmis and Arieh Sharon (1900–1984), the protagonists of chapters 3 and 4, who are famous for designing Israel's foremost governmental, cultural, and educational institutions, Doudai is much less known in Israeli architectural history.[76] Yet he was influential as the chief planner of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency in the 1950s and as head of the governmental Institute for Planning and Development, in which capacity he worked in Sierra Leone. Originally conceived as a survey in an attempt to solicit funds from the UN, Doudai's national urbanization plan redefined the entire territory of the country by identifying potential future urban centers in its interior. This plan followed recent planning trends in Israel that directed its legions of immigrants from the urban coasts to newly built towns and villages distributed inland to secure Jewish control over the contested territories following the 1948 war. This chapter shows how Doudai fashioned the plan as decisively postcolonial, despite drawing from British New Towns and German and Italian internal colonization models, which had been adapted in Israel. Unlike its Israeli precedent, however, the Sierra Leone plan did not entail the creation of new settlements in a fixed master plan. Instead, it emphasized open-ended and reciprocal relations between town and country, using the plan as a tool to enhance the Sierra Leone government's administrative power by reinforcing the customary rule of paramount chiefs, who were its main powerbrokers. This chapter shows that the central objectives of the plan, despite its title, were to contain rural-urban migration and secure a rural workforce in the chiefdoms.

Chapter 3 turns to Arieh Sharon's campus plan for the West Nigerian University of Ife (1962–76) as part of a regional competition over the allocation of higher education in the federal state. In an attempt to address the growing needs of the region, the university was to present a semirural democratic alternative to the neighboring federal University College Ibadan, which was established under the British rule in 1948 and followed the Oxbridge model. Devised in conjunction with the production of a postcolonial university curriculum, and in cooperation with USAID consultants, the resulting plan combined the American Land Grant University campus with the planning principles of *kibbutzim* (Zionist agricultural collectives), which Sharon knew well, first as a kibbutz founder and later as a prominent kibbutz planner. As I demonstrate in this chapter, the coupling of kibbutz planning with American rural-suburban landscaping presented a new rural-suburban typology that refashioned the countryside as a modern alternative to the lure of the city, so that it could draw faculty to the semirural area as well as keep students from relocating to major urban centers upon graduation.

Chapter 4 focuses on how Arieh Sharon's team designed the monumental core of the University of Ife campus. While the campus design has received much attention, due in part to Sharon's education in the famed Bauhaus school, the scholarship has mainly focused on the formal aspects of campus buildings.[77] Understanding Sharon's work in relation to his experience as a Zionist settler colonial pioneer allows me to redirect the conversation to the racial thinking that undergirds discourse on climate in the tropics via a comparison with British colonial architecture. As this chapter demonstrates, Sharon emphatically rejected the then-prevailing British colonial tropical architecture approach, epitomized in prominent

British architects E. Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew's design for the University College Ibadan, which focused on the building's envelope as a climatic barrier. To counter this approach, which was originally developed to protect the British military and administration from the tropical climate, Sharon instead proposed a volumetric solution in the form of an inverted pyramid. I argue that this inverted pyramid embodied his Zionist ideal of unmediated relationship with the environment as a condition of the settler becoming a productive New Man, in contrast with the image of the effeminate, degenerate Jew of the diaspora. By linking Zionist discourse on national regeneration to architectural discourse on degeneration in fin de siècle Vienna, this chapter shows how Sharon employed modernist architectural principles to cast the British approach as inhibiting Nigeria's national development.

The first four chapters represent the hegemony of Labor Zionism and its institutions, with which the Karmis, Sharon, and Doudai were associated. Chapter 5, in contrast, considers the entanglement of private interests with those of the state, turning to the prolific design and educational work of Zalman Enav (b. 1928) and his Ethiopian partner, Michael Tedros (1921–2012), in Addis Ababa (1959–66). A generation younger than Dov Karmi, Sharon, and Doudai, Enav established his professional career in Addis Ababa, where he lived for a number of years, in contrast with most of the Israeli architects working in sub-Saharan Africa at that time. Enav designed multiple buildings in addition to teaching in Ethiopia's first architecture department. Unlike the projects described in earlier chapters, which were mediated via state institutions, Enav's practice in Addis Ababa was a private initiative and consequently differed in scope and variety in terms of his effect on the local architectural scene and the development of the city. This chapter narrates how Enav gained access to Addis Ababa's building market via his connections with a Jewish trader's family from Aden in Yemen as well as with the royal family, the Ethiopian government, and Israeli aid personnel.

This chapter demonstrates that although Enav was free from institutional ties to the Israeli government, he took advantage of and promoted strong Israeli trade, military, and diplomatic connections in Ethiopia. Unlike in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, where Solel Boneh established local partnerships with governments and subcontracted prominent Israeli architects for its prestigious jobs, in Ethiopia, where it failed to establish a local partnership, Enav was instrumental in recommending Solel Boneh for jobs he was commissioned for. This chapter considers Enav and Tedros's designs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Filwoha Baths in the context of Haile Selassie's attempts to curb social reform while advancing modernization. I discuss this design activity in relation to the department of architecture in the Israeli-run College of Engineering at Haile Selassie I University, where Enav taught, and which played a role in the competition over higher education aid among Israel, West Germany, and Sweden. The entanglement of private and state interests is further examined in the book's postscript. The liberalization of the Israeli economy in the 1960s shaped the Mayer brothers' entrepreneurial touristic projects in Monrovia, Liberia, and Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, as well as practices of architecture and construction post-1973, in which Labor Zionist modernist aesthetics still continue to reverberate despite their neoliberal context.

As this book emphatically demonstrates, these architectural projects belong to histories of African modernity, even though they were primarily the vision of a Western-educated elite and were designed and implemented by Israeli professionals. Thus *Architecture and Development* challenges the common perception of such objects as foreign intrusions in the African urban landscape. Though materializing an African modernism refracted through a Zionist settler colonial imaginary, the projects discussed in the following chapters articulate a qualified departure from preceding local colonial experiences. Because they operated within a Western epistemology and the international economic system, these projects could not manifest a truly decolonial alternative. And still, as we shall see next, these are not primarily stories of failure but of the hopes and challenges African governments faced in their precarious transition to independence.

notes

INTRODUCTION

1. For a survey of Israeli construction in the continent, see Efrat, *Israeli Project*, 607–30.

2. The Histadrut consolidated Labor Zionism's hegemony by providing an infrastructure and services for the Jewish population, acting as a de facto state-within-a-state under the British Mandate and as the breeding ground for the future state's political leadership. In the state period, due to its intimate relationship with the ruling party, with which many of its actors overlapped (e.g., David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, served as its first elected secretary), the Histadrut helped the foreign ministry establish initial contacts with Third World leaders, sometimes even before their countries' independence. See Gorni, Bareli, and Greenberg, *Workers' Society to Trade Union*.

3. This view, for example, is expressed in James Ferguson's seminal book *The Anti-Politics Machine*, 8. International historians have started to broaden the categories of "development" and "modernization" by tracing the multiple north-south alliances that gave rise to various regional modernities. See Engerman and Unger, "Introduction."

4. As Frederick Cooper has noted, even among Western countries, "the world of development has offered a variety of approaches and a variety of linkages to scholars and practitioners in ex-colonial polities; development orthodoxies have been far less orthodox than images suggest." Cooper, "Writing," 16.

5. There is ample international relations literature on the subject. The most recent and comprehensive study is Levey, *Israel in Africa, 1956–76*. The UN recommended the "Five Year Development Plan" model in 1951, and subsequently it was widely adopted among decolonizing African countries regardless of their Cold War ideological affinity. See McVety, *Enlightened Aid*, 119.

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6. Other players might include Brazil and the Gulf states, especially after 1973. This list is informed by nascent scholarship on architectural development aid in Africa and is in no way conclusive. See Łukasz Stanek, ed., "Cold War Transfer: Architecture and Planning from Socialist Countries in the 'Third World'" special issue, *Journal of Architecture* 17, no. 3 (2012); Stanek, *Architecture in Global Socialism*; Roskam, "Non-Aligned Architecture." On the role Egypt assumed in the production of knowledge on Third World housing, see Elshahed, "Revolutionary Modernism?," 401–5. Other sources include exhibitions such as the Nordic pavilion, "Forms of Freedom: African Independence and Nordic Models," at the Venice Architecture Biennale in 2014, and art projects such as Che Onejoon's video documentation of North Korean architecture and art, *Mansudae Master Class* (South Korea, 2013–15), DVD, which was exhibited at the New Museum Triennial: *Surround Audience* (February 25 to May 24, 2015).

7. Arturo Escobar's influential analysis of development discourse, to take one notable example, ignores issues of social, cultural, and geopolitical positionality in the performance of development expertise. See Escobar, *Encountering Development*. As historian Nick Cullather has observed, "The real stakes were measured in prestige, state power, and international alignments" rather than in purely economic terms. See Cullather, "Third Race," 508. The third category that Israel occupied between north and south is akin to that of "semi-periphery countries" in world-systems theory.

8. John Tettegah and Tom Mboya quoted in Peters, *Israel and Africa*, 3.

9. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7–9. I refer here and throughout the text to decolonization in historical rather than epistemological terms, indicating the final years of colonial rule leading to independence.

10. Watts, "New Deal in Emotions," 49–50.

11. Adas, "Modernization Theory," 35–36.

12. Cooper, "Writing," 15.

13. Lamptey, "Ghana Experience," 12–13.

14. Although trade was an important part of these relations, its sum was negligible compared to the resources Israel invested in its aid. Israel's goal was diplomatic; trade was perceived as a way to establish these relationships rather than their end result. Similarly, aid was not tied to how African countries voted at the UN; they did not consistently favor Israeli objectives. For Israel's security interests, see Bergman, "Israel and Africa."

15. Bergman, "Israel and Africa," 283.

16. For the term "contractual dependency," see Mafeje, "Neo-Colonialism," 412.

17. Golda Meir quoted in Levey, *Israel in Africa*, 31.

18. Oded, *Africa and Israel*, 30.

19. Levey, “Israel’s Entry to Africa,” 104. Peters, *Israel and Africa,* 4. Only Mauritania and Somalia refused to establish relations with Israel.

20. N. Pundak, “I Was a Guinea Pig for the Jungle,” *Davar,* July 26, 1963, 3. On the pejorative use of the term “jungle” in Israeli political and cultural discourse, see Bar-Yosef, *Villa in the Jungle*, 10. Here and throughout the text, I use the term “Third World” in its historical sense as a political position and not as a category of economic standing.

21. ISA, MFA 226/5 (93). See also Avimor, *Relations*, 138.

22. For Solel Boneh’s history, see Biletzky, *Solel Boneh*; Dan, *On the Unpaved Road*.

23. Biletzky, *Solel Boneh,* 403–6; Dan, *On the Unpaved Road,* 170–80. Solel Boneh often used these jobs as cover for clandestine intelligence gathering for the Jewish settlement and Zionist recruiting in the Middle East. See Dan, *On the Unpaved Road,* 170–80; Svorai, “Solel Bone,” 129–30.

24. Biletzky, *Solel Boneh,* 249–51, 286–94, 319–42. Greenberg, “Labor’s Expanding Economy.”

25. In 1963, due to financial losses, Overseas and Harbour Works was merged with Building and Public Works.

26. See Neuberger, “Early African Nationalism”; Echeruo, “Jewish Question”; Hill, “Black Zionism: Marcus Garvey and the Jewish Question.” For a critique of the comparison, see Williams, “Pan-Africanism and Zionism: The Delusion of Comparability.”

27. Meir, *My Life*, 325.

28. “Head of Ceremony to the President’s office,” April 20, 1955, ISA, Pres 53/19.

29. Oded, *Africa and Israel*, 30. Likewise, while the Histadrut Afro-Asian Training Center in Tel Aviv enjoyed funding from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, it denied any interference in its operations. Gillis, “Developing Identity,” 96.

30. Bergman, “Israel and Africa,” 279–83, 288–92, 306–7.

31. Ajayi, “Expectations of Independence,” 4.

32. Zeleza, “Historic and Humanistic Agendas,” 40, 47.

33. Givoni, “Who Cares?”

34. Developed into a doctrine in the 1950s and 1960s, *mamlakhtiut* has no adequate translation in English, and has usually been referred to as “statism” or “republicanism.” See Bareli and Kedar, *Israeli Republicanism*.

35. David Ben-Gurion, *Knesset Minutes* 22 (March 16–31, 1959). Quoted in Levey, *Israel in Africa*, 33.

36. Veracini, “Other Shift,” 28. Veracini distinguishes between pre- and post-1967 Zionist settler colonialism, since the latter, according to him, has not succeeded in superseding itself. For a review of studies of Israel in a settler colonial studies framework from a Palestinian perspective, see Sabbagh-Khoury, “Settler Colonialism.”

37. Kemp, "Borders, Space, and Collective Identity."

38. Mooreville, "Eyeing Africa," 46. During the sixties, Israel had more experts working abroad in proportion to its population than many advanced industrialized countries. Nearly two-thirds of those sent to the Third World worked in Africa. According to Joel Peters, "In 1964 the Israeli ratio of experts to total population (0.028 per cent) was almost twice that of all the OECD countries combined (0.015 per cent)." Peters, *Israel and Africa,* 4.

39. Bar-Yosef, *Villa in the Jungle*, 33–34; Yacobi, *Israel and Africa*, 25–26.

40. Theodor Herzl, *Old New Land*, trans. Lotta Levensohn (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wierner Publishers, 2000 [1941]), 169–70.

Netanel Lorch, the head of the Africa desk in the foreign ministry, ordered Israeli embassies around the world to quote this paragraph in conversations and publications. See Yacobi, *Israel and Africa*, 26. Subsequently, this quote opened a traveling exhibition that toured British and French West Africa. Dan Avni to Israeli Representatives in Africa, August 28, 1964, LA IV-277-189; "Israeli Exhibition Due in Freetown Soon," *Daily Mail*, February 17, 1962, 12. As part of Israeli book donations, *Altneuland* was distributed to Nigerian universities and categorized with the history books, thus effacing its utopian and fictive character. See M. Artsieli to David Ben Dov, January 19, 1965, ISA, MFA 1932/6.

41. It is assumed that this character was based on Alexander Marmorek (1865–1923), an Austrian-Jewish physician and assistant at the Pasteur Institute. See "Alexander Marmorek," *Herzl Museum*, accessed December 30, 2014, http://www.herzl.org/english/Article.aspx?Item=532. Botanist Otto Warburg, who advised Herzl in writing the book, may be another possible influence. Warburg gained his expertise through his service in the German colonization of Cameroon and Togoland, and across the Ottoman Empire. See Troen, "Higher Education," 47–48; Otto Warburg: A Biographical Note, *The Otto Warburg Minerva Center for Agricultural Biotechnology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*, accessed December 30, 2014, http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/biotech/otto3.htm.

42. Kahane, "Dominant Ideology's Stances"; Penslar, *Israel in History*, 150–66.

43. Sufian, *Healing*, 34–38.

44. These "ideal" characteristics implied a distinct racial hierarchy. In the selection criteria for Israeli aid experts, there was a clear preference for men of European descent who were kibbutz or moshav members or Israel Defense Forces veterans, although Mizrahi Jews were also included once their knowledge of French was recognized as beneficial, especially in former French colonies. See Bar-Yosef, *Villa in the Jungle*, 167–73.

45. See Kreinin, *Israel and Africa*; Goldberg, *Israel, Africa, and Asia:*

Partners in Progress; Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries*; Amir, *Israel's Development Cooperation*; Curtis and Gitelson, *Israel in the Third World*.

46. Hever and Gensler, "Minority Discourse"; Massad, "'Post-Colonial' Colony."

47. These numbers are approximate.

48. Black, "Interior's Exterior," 86.

49. Westad, *Global Cold War*, 5–6.

50. On the work of Israeli architects in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, see, for example, Feniger and Kallus, "Expertise"; Kallus, "Crete Development Plan." A notable exception is Feniger's study of landscape design in rural Iran, which traces the roots of Israeli design to prestate colonization practices. See Feniger, "From Nahalal to Danesfahan."

51. Yacobi, *Israel and Africa*, 31; Gillis, "Developing Identity," 74–76; Bar-Yosef, *Villa in the Jungle*, 123–84.

52. Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914*.

53. Yacobi, *Israel and Africa,* 21.

54. Yacobi, *Israel and Africa,* 3, 5.

55. Framed this way, any attempt to evaluate the altruism of individual actors and the authenticity of their intentions is limited at best. For examples of such efforts, see De Raedt, "Between 'True Believers'"; Beeckmans, "Adventures." For a critique of limiting analysis to the "interests" and "intentions" of actors, whether they be states, international institutions, or individual experts, see Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*, 16–21.

56. Bayart, *State in Africa*, 24.

57. Bayart, *State in Africa*, 6.

58. Bayart, *State in Africa*, 27.

59. The term should not be confused with the theater practice known as "theater of development" or "theater for development" that took shape in Africa in the early 1960s. My usage of the term shares with this more literal application the disruption of a colonial binary between creator and consumer that it assumed, as theorized by French Martinique poet and politician Aimé Césaire. Curto, *Inter-tech(s)*, 28–30.

60. Miescher, Bloom, and Manuh, *Modernization as Spectacle in Africa*.

61. Quoted in Levey, *Israel in Africa*, 37.

62. As Ferguson explains, arguments that see African modernity as an inauthentic shadow or copy of Western modernity ignore "the fact that a shadow is not only a dim and empty likeness. . . . Likeness here implies not only resemblance but also a connection, a proximity, an equivalence, even an identity. A shadow, in this sense, is not simply a negative space, a space of absence; it is a likeness, an inseparable other-who-is-also-oneself to whom one is bound." Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, 16–17. Nkrumah's Ghana comes closest

to formulating an iconic language that bends the international style to the task of forging and representing an "African personality." See Hess, *Art and Architecture*, 70–90.

63. Very often, the conditions of aid specified the use of architects and construction materials from the donor country.

64. Kellner, "Ernst Bloch," 91.

65. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 7

66. For Bloch, this hope derives its power from basic human needs, such as physical or metaphorical hunger. Kellner, "Ernst Bloch," 87–88. This discourse of needs presents an alternative to Achille Mbembe's bleak portrayal of the "vulgar aesthetics" of African politics, in a study that draws mainly from the 1990s. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 102–41.

67. Daniel, "Reclaiming the 'Terrain of Fantasy,'" 55. Bloch's sensitive understanding of the significance of consumer desires also presents an alternative to the prevailing critique of development as the creation of false needs. See, for example, Watts, "New Deal in Emotions," 50. The best source to counter the development critics' cynicism regarding Africans' desire for development is Ferguson's account of modernity as a broken promise for equal status in the world and equal standards of living. See Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, especially 186–87.

68. Bayart, *State in Africa*, especially 70–83.

69. Diouf, "Modernity," 1478.

70. Enwezor, "Modernity and Postcolonial Ambivalence," n.p.

71. Roskam, "Non-Aligned Architecture," 267.

72. Stanek, "Architects from Socialist Countries."

73. Prakash, "Epilogue."

74. It is rarely acknowledged that Jewish architects' studies in major centers of knowledge production, such as the Bauhaus, often followed their immigration to Palestine and were therefore colored by this experience. I suggest that their professional and personal objectives in Palestine should be taken into consideration when examining their studies and the professional knowledge they brought back with them.

75. Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*, 10.

76. For the spelling of their names in English, I follow their publications.

77. For the most authoritative study of the campus to date, see Ben-Asher Gitler, "Campus Architecture as Nation Building."

ONE. FAST-TRACKING THE NATION-STATE

1. "Buildings and Projects."

2. Massad, "'Post-Colonial' Colony," 311–46.

3. The key text that expresses the search for new monumentality is Sieg-