

# KNOWING



# AS MOVING

PERCEPTION, MEMORY, AND PLACE

Susan Leigh Foster

# **KNOWING AS MOVING**

**BUY**

# KNOWING AS MOVING

PERCEPTION,  
MEMORY,  
AND PLACE

SUSAN LEIGH FOSTER

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Duke University Press Durham and London 2025

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞

Project Editor: Lisa Lawley

Typeset in Whitman Text and Trade Gothic LT Std

by Copperline Book Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Foster, Susan Leigh, author

Title: Knowing as moving : perception, memory, and place /  
Susan Leigh Foster.

Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2025. |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2024050925 (print)

LCCN 2024050926 (ebook)

ISBN 9781478032144 (paperback)

ISBN 9781478028901 (hardcover)

ISBN 9781478061106 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Dance—Psychological aspects. | Movement, Psychology of. | Body language. | Mind and body. | Human beings—Attitude and movement. | Self-consciousness (Awareness)

Classification: LCC GV1588.5 .F678 2025 (print) | LCC GV1588.5 (ebook) | DDC 306.4/846—dc23/eng/20250210

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2024050925>

LC ebook record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2024050926>

ISBN 9781478094500 (ebook/other)

Cover art: Photograph by Gilbert B. Weingourt

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To my dear friends

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## SETTING OUT BY LOOKING BACK

This book began on a walk I was taking in which I looked across at a path I no longer walked and suddenly remembered with startling clarity an encounter with an elderly couple I often saw there. The woman gestured proudly toward a young but very sturdy live oak tree next to us and told me that she had planted it there forty years earlier. Why, I thought, did I suddenly remember this conversation from years earlier? Why, I asked myself, standing here, did I remember something I hadn't thought of for years?

I started reading and continued walking.

Long a fan of James J. Gibson's work on kinesthesia, I wondered whether my physical location and actions might have prompted the memory. I was very surprised to discover how his work has been taken up by a new generation of cognitive scientists approaching the study of a mind in a radically new way. I read unsystematically and unguided through their studies, all the while sustaining my interest in Native philosophy and Native fiction. Native novelists created overlapping worlds that facilitated my understanding of Native philosophy, and the philosophers, in turn, deepened my appreciation of the marvelous ways that the fiction writers crafted similar concepts and ideas. With the neuroscience, I studied footnotes, trying to ascertain who was arguing what. One author led to another, but it was messy.

Friends and colleagues made recommendations. Folders of notes with various titles such as "Intercorporeality," "Relationality," "Memory," "Tongva history," "Cognitive Science," "Conquest," "Disability," and "Indigeneity," emerged. I was very fortunate to have the assistance of highly capable graduate student researchers during this time who dumped massive amounts of reading into these folders. L. Archer Porter, Jackie Davis, Zena Bibler, Laura Smith, and Cora Miller Laszlo, all outstanding scholars in their own right, I thank you from the bottom of my heart.

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Unlike my last book, *Valuing Dance*, where I built a machine and systematically processed dance through it, the meandering I was doing for this project seemed to hold very little coherence. Eventually, islands with very fuzzy shores started to appear. Fine, I thought, let it be a collection of essays.

Then I started talking about it with my dear friend and butt-buster walking partner, Alex Purves. Her questions and comments helped a lot. Then I sent it out to Anurima Banerji, Clare Croft, Jacqueline Shea Murphy, and Tria Blu Wakpa, none of whom said not to do it and all of whom gave me great advice. Jacqueline, in particular, pushed back on some of my assumptions, and I'm very grateful to her for it. Lionel Popkin subsequently reviewed rewritten portions of the manuscript, and his comments were also deeply insightful. Thank you all.

Five rewrites in, I send the manuscript to Diana Taylor, who forwards it to Ken Wissoker. Thank you, Diana. Ken, who has been spot-on throughout this whole process, advises me to rewrite it before he sends it out to readers, which I do. Thank you, Ken. And now, I've rewritten it again, thanks to the extraordinarily supportive yet critical and deeply insightful feedback from two anonymous readers. I am profoundly grateful to you both. You couldn't have given me a more generous gift. Finally, I thank the project editor, Lisa Lawley, and copyeditor, Valerie Paquin.

So, the process of bringing this book into the world has been a long one, and I worry that many of my references are dated. Still, the rewrites gave me opportunities to mull over what I and the others I'm engaging with are saying. I have sat with it, walked with it, danced with it.

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x · *Knowing as Moving*  
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# KNOWING AS MOVING

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## ESSAYING

Why do accounts of dancing endlessly assert that “the body is an instrument of or vehicle for expression” and that it “must be subjected to rigorous discipline,” or that “intensive practice leads to freedom”? Why do they explain dancing as “executing an idea” or “responding to an inner necessity”? Why do dancers talk about something called “muscle memory,” “bodily wisdom,” “blood memory,” or “the body’s knowledge as different from the mind”? Why do their teachers issue instructions like “Your arm should be here,” “Push harder and lift higher,” “Keep your foot perpendicular to the floor”? Why do my students point to their head when they mention thinking while envisioning the rest of their body responding to that thinking?

The acts of dancing and learning to dance lay bare epistemological assumptions underlying partitions constructed between mind and body. Particularly in Euro-American concert dance and in university and private studio classes, the practice of dancing continually relies on descriptions of who is doing what to whom, and the vast preponderance of these center on the presumption that something “mental” tells the “physical” what to do, or, alternatively, that the physical takes over and spontaneously and uncontrollably does what it wants. Corollary to this mind-body division of labor is the understanding that perception is a passive intake of “stimuli,” and response is an active and often physical reaction. Thus, in all the phrases quoted in this essay’s first paragraph, the body as instrument comes into being as a result of the assumption that an idea needs to be expressed and that to express this “idea,” the body must be continually and methodically drilled to attain virtuoso capabilities. Yet in the development of those technical capacities, dancers begin to experience a reservoir of knowing they label “bodily knowledge,” while at the same time being unable to imagine

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that all knowledge might be physical and that all “ideas” might involve proprioceptive sensations.

In an effort to expose and contest the underlying assumptions reflected in the questions listed in the opening of this essay, and from a somatically based interface with my surroundings, I am reaching out into foreign lands: moving into them while endeavoring to be a respectful guest.<sup>1</sup> As a dancer and dance scholar, I enter spaces and territories formed by other disciplines’ scholarship, and as part of my practice of attempting to read nonextractively, I spend time trying to live with an argument or idea, physicalizing it and reflecting on how it moves me. I also ask myself, “How is the author’s body moving?” or “How does the writing move toward me?” Sometimes, an idea seems to take hold; other times, I am sure I have grasped it, but I have not. Throughout this process the only constant is the mindful body’s continual change.

...

The essays bound together in this volume examine how bodies engage in the actualizing of connectedness.<sup>2</sup> Unified by the assertion that knowing takes place through bodily movement, they variously consider the act of moving in and through the world in its potentiality to unite, commune, remember, and make place. Identifying strong resonances among certain scholars in Indigenous and Native studies,<sup>3</sup> ecological cognitive science, disability studies, phenomenology, and new materialism, these essays explore how knowledge is neither static nor storables.<sup>4</sup> These scholars also undertake, in different ways, a critique of mind-body duality. By focusing on the centrality of bodily movement in their arguments, I intend to contribute to decolonial studies a critique of Cartesian dualism and the colonizing politics it enacts.<sup>5</sup>

Colonization, settler colonialism, and neo-imperialism have been extensively analyzed in terms of the ways they claim and control both land and all the living beings that inhabit it.<sup>6</sup> Although different interpretations of the term are widespread, with many arguing that land repatriation is its central goal, a substantial number of scholars are using *decolonization* to reference many diverse processes that address epistemic justice, albeit with less tangible consequences for land redistribution.<sup>7</sup> In alignment with this use of the term and drawing primarily on the work of Enrique Dussel (Argentine-Mexican), Ramón Grosfoguel (Puerto Rican), and Sylvia Wynter (Jamaican),<sup>8</sup> this book examines the mind’s colonial status over

the body, proposing that mind-body duality is saturated with many of the same relationships—procedures of dominance and control, claims of hierarchically based superiority, and the unruliness and rebelliousness of the subjugated. Each of these essays, by engaging with multiple different bodies of scholarship, explores the structurings of power that define mind-body dualism and undertakes to suggest alternative conceptions of what thinking is by asserting theorizations of connectedness.

What does connectedness feel like? The answer proposed by the neuroscientists and phenomenologists considered in this volume is that it is so intrinsic that it is often barely sensed, and yet it is continual and constant. Connectedness is the product of moving while registering both the proprioceptive and sensory information that movement produces. The fact that this simple process occurs at the interface between body and surroundings sutures them together, or as some would argue, establishes their fundamental unity. Is it because of my experience as a dancer that I feel more easily able to access what these texts are describing as the way that moving produces perception? Dancing, like many other movement-focused activities, can bring awareness of connectedness with the world into consciousness because it directs attention to the proprioceptive information that movement produces, whether through the acts of receiving instruction about what to attend to or copying another's movement. Although for many periods of the day I lose that awareness, what these scientists are claiming about how movement creates connectedness offers me insight that I feel bone deep.

Connectedness, however, is not merely an individual experience. As many Native scholars argue, it extends across the entire human and other-than-human world. In his book *Research Is Ceremony*, Shawn Wilson (Opaskwayak Cree) outlines Indigenous approaches to research among Native peoples in Canada and Australia, arguing that relationships do not shape but rather constitute reality.<sup>9</sup> Lauren Tynan (Pairrebenne Trawlwoolway) expands on what this might mean, by offering the example of two possible answers to the question “How is the river related to the mountain?”<sup>10</sup> One answer sees both the mountain and the river as part of nature. The other observes that the river flows down the mountain. The first answer, she argues, conducts a standard classificatory procedure by looking for the likeness between the two in terms of how they are the same, whereas the second answer considers the relationship they have to one another—that is, their kinship. It is this second approach, for which she advocates in con-

ducting research that is reciprocal, respectful, and willing to consider all beings and entities as variously in relation and connected.

Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (*Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg*) argues that connectedness both reveals itself and is built through patient observation and quiet attentiveness. It is then reaffirmed in choices made throughout one's daily life as well as in ceremonial contexts.<sup>11</sup> In addition to observation and patience, according to Simpson, an Indigenous approach to building connection requires creativity in devising contact with what one is observing so that a bond that is "based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and caring" can be forged.<sup>12</sup> This connection must sustain and promote all life, rather than privileging some life over other life.<sup>13</sup> As Simpson details, an Indigenous approach to world-making focuses on alignment with rather than domination over, and it promotes a willingness to decenter human superiority.<sup>14</sup> It also encourages a constant repositioning of oneself as a learner. Further, it validates bodily experience as a potential reservoir of knowledge.

In her essay "Land as Pedagogy," Simpson elaborates further on how connectedness as kinship is developed by detailing the process through which a young Native girl, whose curiosity is supported by the community, pays close attention to her surroundings. As a result of that attentiveness, she discovers the deliciousness of maple sap. This process, as Simpson explains, entails first watching a squirrel eat the sap, tasting it herself, and then telling others who trust and support her exploration. Reading Simpson's description, I try to imagine the girl's attentiveness—her quiet alertness, intense focus, slight shifts of head and body, and a continual energizing of her stance that stretches in the direction of the squirrel. The squirrel the young girl is watching senses the texture of the bark, the pull of gravity, and the smell of sap through its movements, just as the sap itself knows the vigor of the tree and the warming temperature as it begins to travel. The girl's subtle changes in posture reaffirm her relation to the squirrel as she remains both strongly directed yet calm, so that the squirrel senses that she is not a threat. She also takes in the temperature and air currents, sounds of other creatures in the forest, and the changing light. Her physical energy, motion, and restraint undergird her understanding of all that is in relation in those moments.

These essays are similarly the result of watching and copying, observing, and translating movements into words. They are also the product of reading, pausing, assimilating, and digesting, and then seeking interaction with others to determine the validity of my interpretation. What if reading

is not that different from observing a squirrel and tasting the maple sap it has nibbled? What if an idea is apprehended by taking it in and trying it out, assimilating it into one's body and putting it into action? And what if the taking in of an idea and the trying it out both consist of bodily action? These are some of the questions this set of essays addresses in an effort to explore how moving produces knowing.

Not only does movement yield knowledge, it forms the basis of what is known at any given moment in time. Yes, knowledge resides in dances, ceremonies, and other rituals, but it is only known during the enacting of these rituals. Similarly, the knowledge lodged in archives and museums is only transformed into knowing through the actions of people as they seek it out. As I will argue throughout this volume, thinking is a physical action, the product of an entire neuromuscular system with its mobile postural and gestural configurations, perceptual systems, and brain activity. Reading, exploring, examining, talking, and remembering are all forms of moving, and any processes of thinking and knowing include some kind of physical action to establish both one's identity and one's relationality. Rather than Descartes's "I think, and therefore I am," the scholars discussed here might argue, "I move, and therefore I know."

Simpson additionally reminds readers that the girl's learning takes place within an environment that is supportive of her inquiries. She emphasizes that when curiosity and investigation occur in an environment that is authoritarian, dismissive, rigid, and judgmental, they will not yield any learning. Contrasting Native conceptions of discovering and learning with settler-colonial attitudes toward knowledge extraction, she highlights the communal nature of coming to know as well as the processual quality of learning as a series of interactions. Her entire community supports the young girl's explorations as part of their shared understanding of the world. Simpson's story thus offers both an indictment and rejection of settler-colonial values and a validation of Native ways of knowing.

Contemplating Simpson's story, I reflect on my own community and learning contexts. On the one hand, I have enjoyed a highly supportive environment, encouraged by a middle-class family who valued the arts, a university that considers dance a form of research, a field of study where women far outnumber men, white skin, and a thin body in good health.<sup>15</sup> On the other, settler-colonial and Cartesian values that equate dance with the body and not the mind and that deem dance superficial, ornamental, or trivial also permeated my learning. As a consequence, I felt daily like a

“dumb dancer” until I was in my fifties. I spent many years trying to prove to the dean of the college I attended that dance was not a “noncognitive activity that had no place in the college curriculum,” as he referred to it, not to mention the librarian at the university where I first taught who asked me upon learning I was an assistant professor of dance for some exercises to help with slimming her thighs. The memory of that imposing building—an assertion of knowledge as a possession accessible to those who can afford it—and its librarian so plagued by normative standards of feminine beauty haunt me to this day.

I am endeavoring to use the advantages in wealth and privilege I have inherited to guide me toward being an attentive and respectful student.<sup>16</sup> Informed by my dumb dancer self, I also intend in these essays to analyze the ways that dance sits uncomfortably within the university—sometimes conceptualized as a way merely to relax or express feelings as an antidote to “more rigorous” academic study, and other times as a unique form of investigation and problem-solving. Additionally, I will argue for an interrogation of assumptions underlying what knowledge is. What, exactly, is it to know something and what does the assertion of knowing something imply? With Native theorizations of knowing leading the way, I hope to join in the efforts to construct more inclusive approaches to research that acknowledge the shared responsibilities of all participants engaged in understanding the world.

While I am trying to assess the kinds of access my privilege gives me, I am aware of the enormous disparities in support and prestige that the disciplines I am studying enjoy. Denigrated, decimated, or forced into assimilation, Native voices have long been ignored within the Academy or else regarded merely as subjects to be studied. The perspectives of Native scholars have only recently been accorded the degree of respect and credibility they deserve, and many universities still have not granted Native studies departmental status.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, the physical sciences have long held a superior position in terms of respect and funding support for research. One reading of this book could see scientific experimentation as validating Native perspectives or otherwise confirming the plausibility of their arguments. My intention, to the contrary, is to consider the different ways of describing connectedness that each offers as articulating perspectives using different descriptive systems that could inform each other. While they sometimes strongly resonate with one another, they also extend one another, posing new questions within each discipline.

Vanessa Watts (Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee) offers a salient critique of those who are bringing aspects of Native thought into their own work but in a way that tokenizes it and fails to reckon with Native commitment to accord spirit to all beings and entities in the world. Spirit is evident in the agency that each being expresses. As she explains: “Non-human beings choose how they reside, interact and develop relationships with other non-humans. So, all elements of nature possess agency, and this agency is not limited to innate action or causal relationships.”<sup>18</sup> Rather than refer to systems of interaction as ecosystems, she proposes that they be seen as societies, “meaning that they have ethical structures, inter-species treaties and agreements, and further their ability to interpret, understand and implement. Non-human beings are active members of society. Not only are they active, they also directly influence how humans organize themselves into that society.”<sup>19</sup> Failure to acknowledge the full implications of this orientation toward life, as when Donna Haraway (California-based settler-scholar) refers to feminism as a form of coyote discourse without further explanation, abstracts one aspect of Native philosophy and treats it as a tool.<sup>20</sup> Watts similarly critiques Stacy Alaimo (Oregon-based settler-scholar) who argues that dirt may not be elevated to the status of “family member,” but at least elevated to “something worthy of proper care and feeding.”<sup>21</sup> Such a claim about dirt constructs and solidifies borders between entities that, in this case, would infer that humans’ responsibility to land is analogous to an owner’s duty to a pet, but land is not something that can or should be owned.

Continually contemplating Watts’s critique over the course of this research, I nonetheless acknowledge that the question of whether these essays practice a form of extractivist research, in which I am cherry-picking easily available examples of Native thought without sufficiently living with their consequences, is an open one. I am profoundly grateful for the generosity of Native scholars, “word warriors” who have entered academic publishing and shared their insights and ways of conceptualizing the world.<sup>22</sup> Their ability and willingness to translate, while knowing that academic writing can never fully document Native knowledge, suggest a courage and commitment to sharing that I can only attempt to imagine.<sup>23</sup>

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These are essays in the double sense of being both a scholarly genre and an effort or attempt. They are testing, endeavoring, or trying out; they are

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essaying. They were conceived as an archipelago and written specifically for this volume. Archipelagos emerge through erosion or, more commonly, through volcanic eruption, most often caused by tectonic plate movements. Although the islands may be very differently composed, with their land masses distributed uniquely and made of diverse amounts and kinds of earth, weathering and facing wind, rain, and tides distinctively, they remain connected under water. When formed through erosion, a once single mass slowly wears away, leaving islands whose underwater connections endure, and when volcanically formed, the islands likewise share a common or adjacent source, one that lies even further beneath the earth's crust.

Like diasporic scholar Édouard Glissant's (Martinican) vision of archipelagic thinking, this volume brings together entirely disparate fields of inquiry, and it emphasizes the process of traveling among them over any enduring product of that voyage.<sup>24</sup> Because its "islands" are so different from one another, it certainly aligns with Glissant's rejection of the continent as a place where one is grounded in the sense of the world as one unified large mass. It also shares with Glissant's archipelagic thought an emphasis on the rhizomatic rather than the rooted.<sup>25</sup> Yet where Glissant celebrates fragmentation and delves into the complexities of creolization, this volume constructs a clustered form of argumentation, with each essay connecting to the others as mutually dependent and reinforcing.

Writing about the archipelagos that comprise Oceania, Epeli Hau'ofa (Tongan and Fijian) emphasizes the process of traveling among the islands.<sup>26</sup> Where the colonization of the "Pacific Islands" partitioned them one from another and reduced their value to the land masses themselves, the decolonial title Oceania emphasizes the routes taken by islanders to connect to each other over millennia, transforming the region into a vast expanse traveled by inhabitants who navigate the waters to establish and renew relations.<sup>27</sup> Hau'ofa also asserts that a connection to the sea travels with islanders wherever they go, enabling them to make new homes in new places yet remain connected to their Oceanic identity. In a similar fashion I have made an effort to tie together the essays collected here, even as they explore different ways of describing and narrating, by centering bodily movement and its essential role in perceiving and knowing. They are fastened to one another both on the surface and underground by that movement, with the book's index serving to document ways that they overlap and draw on shared sources.

The first essay in this volume, “Walking as Place-Making,” examines interconnections of memory, place, and physicality, grounding the analysis in an autoethnographic account of my own daily practice of walking in the hills and mountains of the Tongva, Chumash, and Paiute peoples, also known as the Hollywood Hills, Ojai, and the Eastern Sierra. In the last twenty years, my early-morning hill walks have taken on increasing importance as a kind of protocol through which I simultaneously immerse and locate myself in the Land.<sup>28</sup> As I move, I try to greet and pay respect to what is around me. This essay documents, in part, that process.

A vast literature on walking exists, developed within fields as diverse as anthropology, phenomenology, urban studies, geography, and sociology. What this essay adds to these discussions is a thesis about walking that integrates neurophysiological and cognitive perspectives with psychological and social experiences of walking. The essay also develops the distinction, initially observed by Michel de Certeau (unmarked), between space and place, expanding it through Charles Sepulveda’s (Tongva and Acjachemen) arguments around enclosure, and connecting these to theories of colonization. Additionally, it integrates recent research on the neurophysiology of memory, arguing that memory, which is distributed throughout the body, is sometimes activated as part of apprehending the connectedness of body to place.

The second essay incorporates perspectives on processes of being, knowing, and acting ethically that have been put forth by select scholars in Native and Indigenous studies, ecological cognitive science, new materialism, and phenomenology. While these topics have been extensively studied within the disciplines of philosophy, theology, and psychology, they have rarely been examined in relation to bodily movement. In attending to the potential commonality in orientation that scholars in these fields share toward the centrality of physicality, I hope to elucidate the resonances among their articulations of what connectedness is as well as the ways their arguments constitute a rejection of Cartesian dualism.

“Embodying the Decolonial” points to the recent and enormous upsurge in the use of the adjective *embodied*, deployed in terms such as *embodied memory*, *embodied research methods*, and *embodied gender roles*. Written in sympathy with the authors’ desires to emphasize the body’s role in all endeavors, it nonetheless points to the way that this adjective implies its opposite—disembodied knowledge, teaching, or consciousness. Crafted to

provoke reflection on the ludicrousness of disembodied activities, it offers analyses of three terms to which the adjective has frequently been applied: *practice*, *performance*, and *scholarship*. In so doing, I would like to encourage analyses that focus more closely on what bodies actually do when they practice, perform, or conduct scholarly inquiry.

The fourth and fifth essays engage more directly with dancing, illuminated through recent developments in cognitive science and Native studies. “Remembering Dancing” looks specifically at what might be involved cognitively in recalling a dance. It considers recent neuroscientific experimentation on bodily participation in remembering that suggests that cognitive function is distributed across the entire body. It further argues that remembering is a re-creative process. At the same time, it draws on Native conceptions of the past and of memory as both social and individual. Additionally, it reflects on how this emerging theory of what memory is might prompt a reconsideration of what an archive is and how it functions.

“Dancing’s Affordances” applies James J. Gibson’s (unmarked) notion of affordances to the act of dancing. Gibson proposes that what organisms experience about the world is based in their assessment of their capacity to interact and engage with it. Humans do not perceive distance, weight, or grade, but rather, what is walkable, throwable, eatable, graspable, climbable, and so forth. Perceiving is not the passive registering of stimuli, but instead the active process of seeking out information, deduced through the integration of the proprioceptive sense of the body’s whereabouts with the visual, aural, olfactory, and haptic sensations available. Based on this idea, the essay explores what it is that the act of dancing makes manifest and foregrounds in one’s consciousness, individually and collectively. Affordances hold special pertinence for disability studies because of their potential to redefine disability as different ability, and this potential is also considered.

Because affordances have been so influential and cited as foundational for the ecological cognitive science discussed throughout this volume, this essay focuses intensively on them, asking what this theory of perception might elucidate about dancing. And because it focuses on the physical experiences of kinesthesia and proprioception as part of what perceiving is, I have also found that this way of theorizing perception has helped me imagine what many Native scholars have called “connectedness” or “relationality.” Connectedness, within ecological cognitive science and, differently, for

so many Native scholars, is built into and defines each moment of being in and perceiving the world.

Still, ecological cognitive scientists, even as they contest Cartesian dualism, do not align their work with a decolonial project. Native theorizations of coloniality and decoloniality therefore expand cognitive scientists' understanding of the politics embedded in their research: Neuroscience is pursuing a decolonial stance toward mind and brain insofar as it is challenging the equation between the two. These scientists need, however, to reckon with the fact that their work is also focusing on the human being in seeming isolation from all other beings and entities. How might the act of perceiving be examined as a multispecies and more-than-human process?

One of the challenges of writing these essays has been to secure connections among them while also limiting redundancies. I have tried to interlock them; however, they do not form a circle but instead resemble an arc—open ended and incomplete. The content of their form reaffirms the partiality and situatedness of knowing, but also the instability of what that even means.<sup>29</sup> It was particularly important for me to construct this book as an archipelago because of the many potential missteps it may be taking, chief among them insufficiently acknowledging and being respectful of Native and disability studies scholars, failing to recognize my use of white privilege, and superficially engaging with any of the disciplines discussed.

Written during a time of enormous upheavals and crises worldwide—catastrophic climate change resulting in mass extinctions and unprecedented migrations, a monumental augmentation of disparities in wealth and resources, and rising militia and gang violence, coupled with the popularity of authoritarian governments and plutocracies, these essays are intended to direct attention toward possible coalitional politics that could forge an epistemology of futurity.<sup>30</sup>

While the organization of these essays emphasizes the particularity of knowing, I envision that it might also suggest the potential for collective action as bodies moving, not necessarily together but rather alongside one another. Sometimes lagging behind or pushing each other out of the way, sometimes sprinting forward or in circles or curling up for a nap, I hope the essays can assist in moving us toward the portal that Arundhati Roy (South Asian) suggests opened when COVID-19 went global.<sup>31</sup> In that essay she argues for using the lockdown that COVID produced as an opportunity

to reflect on the capitalist consumption and racial and social injustice that caused the disease. Instead of hauling massive amounts of possessions with us through the portal, she suggests we walk with only a backpack, orienting ourselves by implementing new technologies of what Simpson identifies as connection.

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## NOTES

### Essaying

1. Here, I am referencing Charles Sepulveda's (Tongva and Acjachemen) theorizing of the Tongva notion of *kuuyam*, or a person practicing respect for the land and all its inhabitants. Sepulveda, "Our Sacred Waters."

2. I am focusing on the term *connectedness* to align with Vine Deloria's (Standing Rock Sioux) and Leanne Betasamosake Simpson's (Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg) emphasis on connection, while also distinguishing it from the term *relationality*, used frequently and with a wide variety of applications throughout Native and Indigenous studies scholarship. See Deloria, *Spirit and Reason*, and Simpson, "Land as Pedagogy." For me the action of connecting implies more movement than that of relating or the "intra-activity" used by scholars such as Karen Barad (California-based settler-scholar) in "Posthumanist Performativity." Related metaphors, such as "braiding," used by Dwayne Donald (Beaver Hills Cree) and Robin Wall Kimmerer (Potawatomi), are also similar and identify the action. See Donald, "Forts, Curriculum, and Indigenous Métissage," and Kimmerer, *Braiding Sweetgrass*. For a lucid summary of Native and Indigenous scholars using *relationality*, see Shea Murphy (California-based settler-scholar), *Dancing Indigenous Worlds*, 1–3.

3. For a highly instructive discussion of the terminology Native and *Indigenous*, see Shea Murphy, *Dancing Indigenous Worlds*, 32–38.

4. Championing the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (unmarked) as more radical than enactivist cognitive science, Michele Merritt (unmarked) argues that dance is a form of thinking in "Thinking-Is-Moving." My approach differs from hers in that I am trying to examine potential resonances among multiple disciplines, and I am arguing that moving in any amount or form is thought filled.

5. Paul Anthony Chambers (Colombia-based settler-scholar), in his critique of decolonial scholars' use of Descartes, has usefully contextualized Descartes's writings, arguing that his work actually served to support the feminist and antiracist progressive thinking of his time. Chambers, "Epistemology and Domination." Because of this I prefer using Cartesian epistemology as a way to refer to a broad set of assumptions about

mind and body as separate and charged with the distinct functions of cognition and action.

6. Foundational texts in this inquiry include Said (Palestinian American), *Orientalism*; Santos (Portuguese), *Epistemologies of the South*; and Tuck (Unangax̂) and Yang (diaspora settler of color), “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” 1–40.

7. For example, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” argue strongly that decolonization pertains exclusively to the repatriation of Native Lands. In contrast, as Max Liboiron (Red River Métis/Michif and settler) asserts, anti-colonial arguments and practices address ways of confronting colonization and attempting to establish more equitable relations. See Liboiron, *Pollution Is Colonialism*, 129–34.

8. In identifying tribal, ethnic, and other regional and national affiliations, I am following Liboiron’s argument for documenting those who self-identify with a given group and those (unmarked) who feel no need or desire to do so. See Liboiron, *Pollution Is Colonialism*, 3–4. I am also using *settler-scholar* to identify non-Native authors who acknowledge their status as settlers. I am not using any of these affiliations as a way to certify authenticity. Burkhardt (Cherokee), for example, discusses the settler-colonial tendency to require an authentic voice from Native speakers in contrast to Western philosophers who are not required to manifest such assurances in order to be interpreted as speaking the truth. See Burkhardt, *Indigenizing Philosophy*, xxi, 73–79. Rather, my aim, in line with Liboiron, is to continually mark the privilege assumed by those who feel no such need. My sincerest apologies to anyone for whom I have provided an incorrect affiliation.

9. Wilson (Opaskwayak Cree), *Research Is Ceremony*, 7.

10. Tynan (Pairrebenne Trawlwoolway), “What Is Relationality?,” 599–601.

11. Simpson identifies the following aspects of developing connection: (1) observation; (2) patience in apprehending what one is observing and all its surrounding context; (3) creativity in devising a connection to what one is observing; a connection that is “based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and caring,” a connection that sustains and promotes all life, rather than privileging some life or other life; (4) sharing this connection with trusted others; (5) building on that connection in ways that mutually benefit everyone; and (6) using “ceremony, ritual, and the embodiment of teachings one already carries” to strengthen new connections and the relations they make possible. Simpson, “Land as Pedagogy,” 10.

12. Simpson, “Land as Pedagogy,” 12.

13. See also Tinker (Osage), “Stones Shall Cry Out,” 119.

14. This process can be seen as the very act of theorizing. See Absolon (Anishinaabekwe), *Kaandossiwin*, for one compelling discussion of this.

15. In positioning myself and especially in asserting my white privilege, I am very mindful of the ways that reflexive methodologies can serve either to reclaim and reassert privilege or, alternatively, to absolve the author of blame. See Gani (South Asian–British) and Khan (South Asian–British), “Positionality Statements.”

16. For more on developing relations and being a good student within Native contexts, see Shea Murphy, *Dancing Indigenous Worlds*, 272–80.

17. Shea Murphy provides a comprehensive discussion of similarities between Native studies and dance studies as scholars in both fields work to navigate and contest the colonial assumptions within the Academy. She also identifies clear differences between the two disciplines that, because of their distinctive blind spots, could make them strong and productive allies. See Shea Murphy, *Dancing Indigenous Worlds*, 27–64.

18. Watts (Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee), “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency,” 23.

19. Watts, “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency,” 23.

20. Watts, “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency,” 28.

21. Stacy Alaimo (Oregon-based settler-scholar), quoted in Watts, “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency,” 29.

22. Burkhart uses the term *word warriors* in *Indigenizing Philosophy*, 147–50.

23. See Liboiron, *Pollution Is Colonialism*, 22.

24. Noudelmann (unmarked), “Literature,” 203–16.

25. Wiedorn (unmarked), “Édouard Glissant’s Archipelagic Thought,” 3.

26. Hau’ofa (Tongan and Fijian), “Our Sea of Islands,” 148–61.

27. Scholars such as Christina Sharpe (Black American) and Tiffany Lethabo King (Black American) have also contributed highly significant theorizations of the sea and the events taking place on and in it. Focusing on the Middle Passage, Sharpe identifies the ship, the hold, the wake, and the weather as metaphors that elucidate the enduring operations of anti-Black racism that are so pervasive throughout US culture today. King considers shoals, the shifting formations of sand and rock lying just beneath the water’s surface, as inhibiting the free passage of ships, slowing them down and compounding the dangers of the sea, making movement as usual impossible. Both scholars invoke these aspects of the sea and travel across it to reflect on the persistent racism animating contemporary society and to assess possibilities for livability within it. Sharpe, *In the Wake*, and King, *Black Shoals*.

28. In my references to *Land*, I am following Styres (Mohawk, English, and French), Haig-Brown (Euro-Canadian settler-scholar), and Blimkie (Canadian settler-scholar), who argue that *land* (the more general term) refers to landscapes as affixed geographical and physical spaces that include earth, rocks, and waterways, whereas *Land* (the proper name) extends beyond a material fixed space. Land is a spiritually infused place grounded in interconnected and interdependent relationships and cultural positioning, and is highly contextualized. Styres et al., “Toward a Pedagogy of Land,” 300–301. Liboiron makes a similar distinction in *Pollution Is Colonialism*, 7.

29. For an insightful discussion of how situatedness could be claimed while still dwelling in an episteme of coloniality, see Burkhart *Indigenizing Philosophy*, 64–67.

30. Harjo (Mvskoke), *Spiral to the Stars*; Recollet (Cree), “Gesturing Indigenous Futurities”; and Blu Wakpa (Filipina, white, and unenrolled tribal member), “Buffalo Dance,” among many others. See also Shea Murphy, *Dancing Indigenous Worlds*, 221–25, for a discussion of Indigenous notions of futurity in relation to Afrofuturism. Shea Murphy also makes the point that the kinds of precarity facing the world today are

not new to Native peoples, whose entire world was destroyed during colonization. See *Dancing Indigenous Worlds*, 217–21.

31. Roy (South Asian), “Pandemic Is a Portal.”

### Walking as Place-Making

1. This is Edward Casey’s (unmarked) term for our relationship to place, used throughout *Getting Back into Place*.

2. A major figure in this literature and source of inspiration for this work is Timothy Ingold (Britain-based settler-scholar). His various essays on walking (see Ingold, “Culture on the Ground,” and Ingold, “Footprints Through the Weather-World”) and his anthology, *Ways of Walking*, edited with Jo Lee Vergunst (Scotland-based settler-scholar), have been pathbreaking and deeply insightful. Additional approaches with which this work moves in tandem include Wylie (Britain-based settler-scholar), “Single Day’s Walking”; Middleton (Britain-based settler-scholar), “Sense and the City”; Wunderlich (Britain-based settler-scholar), “Walking and Rhythmicity”; and Seamon (United States-based settler-scholar), *Geography of the Lifeworld*.

3. Simpson, “Land as Pedagogy”; Harjo, *Spiral to the Stars*; Burkhardt, *Indigenizing Philosophy*; Haraway (California-based settler-scholar), “Situated Knowledges”; and Harding (California-based settler-scholar), *Science Question in Feminism*.

4. Almost all the descriptions of my surroundings refer to walks taken on the Tongva Land now known as the Hollywood Hills in what the Spanish conquistadors named Los Angeles. A few of the descriptions reference Chumash territory in what is now called Ojai, California, and the Inconsolables is a mountain range in Paiute territory in the Eastern Sierra.

5. Kirkman (unmarked), *Pictorial and Historical Map*.

6. Sepulveda, “Our Sacred Waters,” 46.

7. Doti (California-based settler-scholar), “Spanish California Missions.” See also Hyslop (settler-scholar), *Contest for California*, and Lightfoot, *Indians, Missionaries, and Merchants*.

8. UCLA, Mapping Indigenous LA, “Visit Our Story Maps.”

9. Mason (United States-based settler-scholar) argues that “Fages’ Code of Conduct” from 1787, authored by the commanding officer of the region, Pedro Fages, reflects a restraint in approaching Native people based on his extensive battles with Apaches and Navajos. Fages advised settlers not to allow any Native peoples into their houses and to avoid their dances since they amassed large numbers of participants who could be turned against the soldiers. Mason, “Fages’ Code of Conduct.”

10. UCLA, Mapping Indigenous LA, “Visit Our Story Maps.”

11. UCLA, Mapping Indigenous LA, “Visit Our Story Maps.”

12. Weighill (Chumash), “2-Step Tales of Hahashka,” 150–57.

13. Duane (California-based settler-scholar), “People’s History.”

14. Tuck and Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” 14–17.

15. Tuck et al., “Introduction,” 16.