
FUELING DEVELOPMENT



HOW BLACK RADICAL TRADE UNIONISM
TRANSFORMED TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Zophia Edwards

Fueling Development



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*How Black Radical Trade Unionism
Transformed Trinidad and Tobago*

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For Mummy, John, and Adira

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Abbreviations

| | |
|----------|---|
| ALCOA | Aluminum Company of America |
| ATSEFWTU | All Trinidad Sugar Estates and Factory Workers' Trade Union |
| ASCRIA | African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa |
| BEW&CHRP | British Empire Workers and Citizens Home Rule Party |
| BGLU | British Guiana Labour Union |
| BP | British Petroleum |
| CLC | Caribbean Labour Congress |
| CPTU | Council of Progressive Trade Unions |
| DLP | Democratic Labour Party |
| EIDL | East Indian Destitute League |
| EINA | East Indian National Association |
| EINC | East Indian National Congress |
| FWTU | Federated Workers' Trade Union |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ISA | Industrial Stabilization Act |
| JLP | Jamaica Labour Party |
| MPCA | ManPower Citizens' Association |

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| | |
|---------|---|
| NJAC | National Joint Action Committee |
| NTUC | National Trades Union Congress |
| NUFHBAW | National Union of Foods, Hotels, Beverages, and Allied Workers |
| NWCSA | Negro Welfare Cultural and Social Association |
| OWTU | Oilfield Workers' Trade Union |
| PAC | Political Affairs Committee |
| PDP | People's Democratic Party |
| PNC | People's National Congress |
| PNM | People's National Movement |
| PNP | People's National Party |
| PPP | People's Progressive Party |
| SOE | state-owned enterprise |
| TCL | Trinidad Citizens League |
| TIWU | Transport and Industrial Workers' Union |
| TLP | Trinidad Labour Party |
| TTTUC | Trinidad and Tobago Trades Union Congress |
| TWA | Trinidad Workingmen's Association |
| UNIA | Universal Negro Improvement Association |
| WFP | Workers and Farmers Party |
| WFTU | World Federation of Trade Unions |
| WMA | Workingmen's Association |

ARCHIVAL ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|------|-----------------------------------|
| GOTT | Government of Trinidad and Tobago |
| LL | Labour Leader |

| | |
|------|--|
| NATT | National Archives of Trinidad and Tobago |
| POSG | Port of Spain Gazette |
| TG | Trinidad Guardian |
| TNA | The National Archives (UK) |
| TP | The People |

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Introduction

I have been working here since 1919. We, women, have been working here for the government all this time. . . . We have been breaking stone blasted from the drilling and making it into metal. The government started to pay us 38 cents per cubic yard. It was brought down to 30 cents, and now . . . 28 cents. . . . The Harbor scheme people came and took over. . . . This week, they came and told us they want no breakers . . . [they] told us we must quit by tomorrow. We feel it is hurtful. We have nowhere else to work and nobody to depend on.
—A laboring woman in the then British Caribbean colony of Trinidad and Tobago, 1935

This woman's statements reflect the general sense of vulnerability, exploitation, and frustration felt by the predominantly African and Indian working people in the British colony of Trinidad and Tobago in the first decades of the twentieth century.¹ Economic and social conditions in the colony were dreadful. While workers generated significant wealth for their employers from the agricultural plantations and oil extraction and did backbreaking public works for

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the colonial government, they themselves struggled to live. Wages were so low that many could not afford adequate food and basic necessities.² Sanitation, access to health and social services, schools, and public utilities like domestic water supplies were scant. Malnutrition and deficiency diseases were widespread among the general population, and many suffered and died from preventable illnesses such as hookworms.³ State violence, racist laws, and other government policies kept the laboring masses in a position of subjugation. Like in so many other European colonies across the world, the general conditions of life for the masses in Trinidad and Tobago were deplorable.

However, by the early 1980s, Trinidad and Tobago had quietly emerged as one of the most remarkable, and improbable, cases of relatively high redistributive and democratic development in the formerly colonized world. Life expectancy, access to education, and the standard of living had dramatically increased. Trinidad and Tobago now stands among the countries in the world with the highest levels of human development.⁴ The adult literacy rate reached approximately 98 percent in 2000, including a 97 percent rate for women, and maternal and infant mortality rates are among the lowest in the Global South, indicating that education and social services are available to a wide proportion of the population.⁵ There is a low prevalence of malnourishment and diseases that are preventable by inoculation and public health services.⁶ Relatively high average per capita incomes also indicate a decent standard of living, and the country now ranks among the high-income economies of the world, according to the World Bank.⁷ Furthermore, the multiracial population of Indigenous First Peoples, Africans, and Indians and the descendants of those who came from Europe, South America, the Middle East, and China enjoy relatively high political and civil liberties and a stable parliamentary democracy.⁸ Indeed, by the early 1980s, Trinidad and Tobago, which won its independence from British colonial rule in 1962, had come a long way from the economic, social, and political conditions of the colonial era.

This book explores how, over the course of the twentieth century, Trinidad and Tobago was able to achieve such significant gains in economic and social development. Understanding Trinidad and Tobago's impressive performance is crucial for tackling long-standing questions in development theory and has paramount practical implications for contemporary societies—what forces drive improvements in human living conditions and well-being, and how? According to contemporary theories on the determinants of development, Trinidad and Tobago did not have the ingredients necessary for such broad-based enhancements in average incomes and social welfare. In fact, it had all the makings for long-term economic and social malaise. Its colonial history of plantation slavery and other forms of labor exploitation and weak institution building, its “petro-

statehood” or economic dependence on oil and gas extraction, and its racial diversity should have produced a corrupt, clientelistic state that was incapable of directing and implementing development policies, managing the resource wealth, promoting the equitable distribution of public goods, and maintaining political stability.⁹ Yet, despite these theoretically unfavorable conditions, Trinidad and Tobago exhibits noteworthy developmental achievements.

I argue that the key to explaining this outcome in Trinidad and Tobago is the presence of a militant mass labor movement, which I call *liberation unionism*. This form of working-class unionism was rooted in Black radical struggles for liberation from racialized and gendered superexploitation, imperialism, colonial domination, and white supremacy. With its Pan-African and diasporic orientation, liberation unionism challenged these interconnected oppressive systems. This Black worker-led movement was multiracial and inclusive of women. The resulting unity strengthened the movement in terms of its numbers and encouraged welfare gains to be distributed across the entire population.

Liberation unionism emerged in the colonial period in Trinidad and Tobago and, having taken advantage of a geopolitical context that favored worker demands, forced the colonial state to enact institutional reforms that increased the state’s capacity to redistribute the oil wealth, improve the welfare of the masses, and enhance democratic rights and civil liberties. This agency from below persisted into the early postindependence period and pushed the newly independent state to further increase its capacity to manage the oil wealth and improve the quality of life for the masses, leading to long-term robust redistributive and democratic development.

This book argues that liberation unionism was the critical force for enhancing equitable development in Trinidad and Tobago, in the way it moved the state apparatus to better meet the needs of the masses. From W. E. B. Du Bois and Karl Marx to a range of contemporary scholars across the social sciences, the potential of workers’ collective action to make a decisive difference in the course of history has long preoccupied our thinking about the relationship between capitalism and human well-being. This focus on the agency of ordinary people constitutes the foundation on which this book builds.

A Case for Trinidad and Tobago in Contemporary Development Theories

Trinidad and Tobago might not appear as a case of interest in academic literature on development or in the discourse of international development agencies, but its development performance is far from trivial. Table I.1 shows how

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measures of economic and social development in Trinidad and Tobago, such as life expectancy, literacy, and maternal mortality rates, have improved over time. In addition, Trinidad and Tobago performs quite well compared to other widely praised cases of equity-enhancing development, such as Kerala, India, and other commonly studied cases in development literature (see table A.1 in appendix).

How Trinidad and Tobago came to achieve these levels of equitable development is a puzzle for those well versed in the dominant theories of development. It is well established in the development literature that, within capitalism, it is not the invisible hand of the unfettered market that improves human well-being but, rather, those states with the *capacity* for planning and coordinating the massive tasks involved in increasing national income and a redistributive agenda, which includes welfare provision, social insurance, land reforms, and other policies to enhance equity and economic security.¹⁰ In the state-centered, Weberian-inspired scholarship on rationalization and bureaucracies, state capacity that is conducive to this kind of development encompasses three main dimensions. The first is that the state must have relative autonomy from the capitalist class, which allows it to formulate and implement collective national development goals that do not maximize profit for either economic elites or political officeholders. Second, there must be a state bureaucracy characterized by an efficient organizational structure and staffed by qualified, experienced personnel, transforming individual rational-instrumental orientations into shared aims and commitments. Such a bureaucratic machinery also enables the state to coordinate a multitude of actors and complex tasks on a large scale, such as providing collective social goods like education, transportation, roads, health services, and sanitation throughout its territory. Third, dense ties between the state and the vast array of communities in the society are required for development, as these enable the state to access information about people's needs and to harness the skills and expertise of the populace in the creation and execution of development programs and policies. By contrast, states with a weaker capacity for development are characterized by patrimonial ties, self-interested personnel, a lack of coordination between government agencies, and apparatuses that repress the masses. These states tend to be ineffective in formulating people-centered policies and often exacerbate inequality and underdevelopment.

The perplexing thing about Trinidad and Tobago is that, according to the conventional development theories, the country had the key conditions that should have produced a weak state capacity and, therefore, low levels of development: European colonizers, oil dependence, and racial diversity. The


TABLE 1.1. Economic and Social Indicators over Time, Trinidad and Tobago

| Year | 1962 | 1983 | 2019 |
|---|----------|--------------|-----------|
| GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$) | 4,835 | 8,105 | 17,401 |
| Human Development Index | – | 0.656 (1990) | 0.813 |
| Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) | – | 95 (1980) | 98 (2000) |
| Life expectancy at birth, total (years) | 63 | 68 | 74 |
| Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) | 53 | 31 | 15 |
| Mortality rate, under 5 (per 1,000 live births) | 64 | 36 | 17 |
| Maternal mortality (deaths per 100,000 live births) | – | 74 (2000) | 26 |
| Political rights | 2 (1972) | 1 | 2 |
| Civil liberties | 3 (1972) | 2 | 2 |
| Population (millions) | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 |

Sources: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2024* (indices of political rights and civil liberties are on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 [least democratic] to 7 [most democratic]); United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT: Statistical Databases and Publications, 2024; UNDP, Human Development Index dataset, 2024; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2024.

historical-institutional scholarship on the developmental legacies of European colonizers argues that in territories with low European settlement and/or where colonizers ruled through collaboration with Indigenous elites such as kings and chiefs, there was an ineffective transfer of Western economic, political, and cultural institutions. Here, despotic states that lacked the bureaucratic and legal-administrative structures based on formal rules derived from European law emerged, that is, states that lacked the capacity for achieving long-run post-colonial development.¹¹

The resource-curse perspective, in turn, posits that resource dependence, especially on oil, tends to inhibit rather than enhance economic and social development and to weaken democracy and political stability.¹² The “rents,” or external income from taxes and royalties on natural resource production, free these states from having to tax the local population to generate income and, therefore, from accountability to their citizenry. Consequently, these revenues tend to weaken state capacity for development in these “rentier states,” or “petro-states” in the case of oil, by fostering corruption, clientelism, excessive distribution, economic mismanagement, and the building up of authoritarian and repressive capacities.¹³ Except for the few that “escaped” the resource curse, owing, supposedly, to private ownership in the resource sector, oil dependence tends to hamper development.¹⁴



Finally, according to the diversity-development thesis, described as “one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy,” countries with greater racial and/or ethnic heterogeneity tend to have slower economic growth, more political instability, and less public goods provision than ethnically “homogeneous” countries.¹⁵ Some trace this outcome to competition between ethnic groups for state power and the distribution of resources along racial and/or ethnic lines, often leading to ethnic violence and civil war.¹⁶

According to all these accounts, the odds were stacked against Trinidad and Tobago. The resident European population was small, and white capital and colonial administrators established extractive institutions of plantation slavery (for sugar, coffee, cacao) based on African labor, Indian indentureship, and natural resource exploitation.¹⁷ The colonial state was authoritarian, nepotistic, understaffed, and underresourced.¹⁸ With respect to oil dependence, Trinidad and Tobago’s economy and state are heavily reliant on oil and gas revenues and have not been immune to the “Dutch disease” and the vagaries of international oil prices.¹⁹ Still, Trinidad and Tobago has a Human Development Index comparable to and in some cases surpassing those of other countries that are widely acclaimed to have escaped the resource curse; moreover, it has maintained democratic governance since its independence from colonial rule.²⁰ Finally, Trinidad and Tobago has a multiracial population, but the country is not stuck in perpetual poverty, calamity, and interracial violence or war. Trinidad and Tobago challenges existing predictions about its development path and complicates dominant accounts about the factors and processes that stimulate or inhibit development.

Trinidad and Tobago’s experience illustrates that there is more to the story than only European colonizers *or* natural resource economic dependence *or* ethnic heterogeneity. We are missing possible alternative actors and causal pathways to institutional development. This book shows that at the intersection of colonialism, oil production, and racial and/or ethnic projects, there are the masses of ordinary people, whose agency should never be underestimated. *Fueling Development* provides an account of Trinidad and Tobago’s development that exposes the critical but heretofore underemphasized role of racialized colonized working people.

Labor, Race, States, and Development: A Black Radical and Institutional Approach

Labor studies provide a useful entry point into understanding how workers influence development. A core finding in labor studies is that worker agency shapes state policy, state institutions, and the state’s orientation toward capital-

ist development. Consistent with this scholarship, this book argues that working people were the decisive force spurring institutional changes within the Trinidad and Tobago state that resulted in its impressive development outcomes.

Labor studies tend to focus on class, which, defined in Marx's terms, refers to relations of exploitation where the capitalist class (owners of capital) extract surplus value from the laboring class (those who must sell their ability to work). Through analyses of class structure and class struggles, these works show the key role organized labor played in bringing about universal suffrage, decolonization, and democracy; the emergence and expansion of the welfare state and welfare benefits; and stronger institutions of governance, including transparency and effective bureaucracy.²¹ The character of working-class movements matters for the different models of capitalist development.²² For example, the unified mobilization of workers and peasants can produce social-democratic states and robust equitable development, as was the case in Kerala, India.²³ Conversely, labor mobilization that is beset by divisions along racial, gender, and ideological lines, as Ray Kiely sees in Trinidad and Tobago, can result in uneven development, which he defines in terms of levels of industrialization.²⁴ Also, in the absence of militant trade unions and class-based organizing, rapid industrialization and economic growth may occur, as was the case with the East Asian "miracles."²⁵ However, such transformations were predicated on authoritarian rule and extreme forms of labor repression, which negatively impact human well-being.²⁶ Like this labor-centered scholarship, this book also recognizes social class to be an important driver of conflict and a collective identity around which people mobilize, producing a more equitable distribution of power and resources.

Class is not, however, the only source of grievance and basis for mobilization.²⁷ Labor studies may acknowledge other forms of hierarchy and antagonism, such as race and gender, but nevertheless it tends to stress class as the primary axis of inequality and conflict in capitalism. For a "class in itself" to become a "class for itself," in Marx's terms, and "realize its historic role" as collective actors shaping the course of history, this research tends to search for and even prescribe the elevation of class consciousness over and above other concerns. However, for people living at the intersection of different oppressive hierarchical systems, including class, race, and gender, their experiences, subjectivities, and manifest struggles can and do span several dimensions simultaneously.²⁸ The analytic challenge is to examine how these different cleavages intertwine as sources of conflict, mobilizing identity, and collective action. The form and motive of working people's agency in Trinidad and Tobago cannot be understood through class interest and mobilization alone, as it also involved

collective action based on racial interests, as well as the simultaneous weight and political opportunities of imperialism and colonial domination. This book develops an overarching framework with which to holistically and systematically make sense of how different axes of inequality and subjectivity, such as race and class, are related and imbricated with imperialism and colonialism; how they shape movements; and, in turn, how they impact development.

To meet this challenge, this book draws on the literature on race and capitalism from the Black radical tradition to ground its analysis of development in Trinidad and Tobago. The Black radical tradition is broadly defined as the distinct political and intellectual struggles of global Africans against the global history of chattel slavery and racism, imperialism, and capitalism. It is vast and comprises many different ideas, practices, discourses, and strands of political thought, including various forms of Black nationalisms, socialisms, Pan-Africanisms, Marxist feminisms, and more.²⁹ Within these traditions of Black radicalism, I draw primarily on those who had varying levels of engagement with and critical appreciation for Marxism. Some were Pan-African Marxist intellectuals, such as C. L. R. James, Kwame Nkrumah, and Walter Rodney, who theorized the political economy of race and racism, colonialism, and capitalism through a dialectical and materialist approach to history. Pan-African Marxist feminists, such as Claudia Jones, urged attention to the compounded effects of gendered oppression and the indispensability of Black working women to liberation struggles. I also draw on others, like W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, who over the course of their lifetimes increasingly engaged with Marxism, and those who shifted away, such as George Padmore. And still others, such as Oliver Cromwell Cox, who rejected the Marxist label and distanced himself from Pan-Africanism, yet nevertheless laid the intellectual foundations for academic research on the racial order of capital accumulation. Together, these thinkers constitute a Black radical approach to the study of political economy—one that has been historically marginalized across multiple academic disciplines.³⁰ At its core, this Black radical literature on race and capitalism advances an integrated account of how capitalist imperialism subjugates the racialized masses and also sets the conditions for their self-directed liberation. The research and debates among these thinkers have generated powerful analytic tools for understanding the development experience of Trinidad and Tobago.

Analyzing development using a Black radical analytic approach challenges us to attend to the racial and colonial architecture of global capitalism, not as a side issue or marginal concern, but rather as a central feature of the world-scale organization of wealth accumulation and the production of poverty. For these thinkers, capitalist classes and imperial states seek to maximize profits not by

homogenizing labor, as Marx and Friedrich Engels had theorized, but rather by producing social difference, particularly the modern idea of race. As capitalism developed, Europeans invented white supremacist ideology and race to justify the incorporation of labor and lands into a global regime of accumulation by genocide, expropriation, dispossession, racial slavery and various forms of labor superexploitation, and colonial domination.³¹ As Oliver Cox explained, “It would be next to impossible for, say, the British in East Africa to conceive of the masses as normal human beings and yet maintain their exploitative designs toward them.”³² This social construction of race alongside hierarchical center-periphery extractive relations has real developmental consequences. The capitalist imperial countries amass wealth, which becomes the basis of world power, industry, technological expansion, and so on by creating impoverishment, human suffering, and dependency in peripheralized regions. Thus, a deep historical analysis of how the people, land, and resources in Trinidad and Tobago were incorporated into the global economic system, and how people were racialized in the mode of production, is crucial for understanding its developmental constraints and possibilities.

What later came to be called dependency theory and world-systems analysis reiterates that the development of individual countries is conditioned by their structural position in the international division of labor in the world capitalist system.³³ The “Caribbean dependency thought” of the New World Group, a radical intellectual movement in the anglophone Caribbean in the 1960s, maintained that the plantation economy based on slavery structured capitalist (under)development of the region well beyond emancipation through the persistent dependence on foreign multinationals, cheap raw material exports, and foreign loans, which reduced economic autonomy and produced economic instability.³⁴ These literatures have tended to emphasize economic structural dependence, leading many within them to call for more attention to race in an analytic manner.³⁵ In *Fueling Development*, I analyze race as part of many dynamic forces shaping Trinidad and Tobago’s development experience.

Many terms have emerged to capture the racial, colonial, and imperial underpinnings of capital accumulation and underdevelopment. They include *racial capitalism*, *racial and colonial capitalism*, *racist capitalism*, *racialized capitalism*, and *race and capitalism*.³⁶ Du Bois speaks of a world divided by a “global color line.” Others, like C. L. R. James, bring race and colonialism into the class analysis without adding a descriptor to the term *capitalism*. These labels are not entirely interchangeable, as there are notable differences in how scholars theorize the timing of the emergence of race and racism, their precise roles in capitalism, and their necessity or contingency to capitalism.³⁷ This book uses Wal-

ter Rodney's terminology—the “white capitalist system.”³⁸ Although Rodney never explicitly defined the term, he used it in a way that is a useful anchor for this text. Located in the Pan-African Marxist tradition, Rodney views the invention of race and white supremacist ideology as specifically tied to the emergence of capitalism. The adjective *white* forces analytic attention to a global system dominated economically, politically, militarily, and culturally by white capital and capitalist imperialism, and to white supremacy as an ideological basis for racialized labor exploitation.³⁹ This term encapsulates those conditions that oppress the masses and stunt the development of peripheralized regions.

Once we accept the postulate that racialization, labor exploitation, and colonial domination are conjoined dynamics shaping capitalist development, we must then “stretch” the Marxist analysis, according to Fanon, to include in our theoretical frameworks how race, class, and colonialism shape social and economic divisions, the state, and the politics of development within countries.⁴⁰ The distribution of power, economic resources, rights, and privileges runs not just along racial or class lines but along complex hierarchies of race-class intersections that vary among countries and over time. Comparative racial and ethnic studies have documented cross-national variations in racial classifications and social mobility of racialized groups.⁴¹ At the same time, class position also reciprocally reinforces racialization and racialized identity. Fanon captured this complexity in the famous quote: “You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.”⁴² Thus, the various cleavages, identities, and interests that stem from different configurations of race *and* class in the social hierarchy shape the content of the struggle over material resources and political power and the balance of power between groups.

Thus, *Fueling Development* attends to how economic and political conflicts and their outcomes are shaped by both racial fissures within a class and class chasms within a racialized group. Black radical thinkers have long established that shared class conditions, among workers, for example, may not inevitably generate class action because of investments in socially constructed racial identities, racism, and colorism, thereby constraining the collective power of workers to obtain greater socioeconomic gains, democratize the state, and transform society.⁴³ Within the middle class as well, color and/or ethnic-based rivalries can cause and/or exacerbate conflicts, which weaken their class coherence and shape cross-class alliances.⁴⁴ Likewise, intraracial class antagonisms, such as between the Black working class and the Black middle class, also shape politics, state building, and development. Black political and economic elites were created and cultivated by capitalist imperialism and colonial states to serve imperial interests and became dependent on the state apparatus for

their own reproduction. Additionally, having internalized white supremacist colonial education, they tended to be preoccupied with mimicking and attaining equal status with white elites. Consequently, rather than struggling together with Black workers and peasants for socialism and self-determination of post-colonial states, the Black middle class, Black radical thinkers observe, has historically co-opted radical movements, facilitated neocolonial exploitation, politicized race to serve their own interests, prevented democracy, and conserved the capitalist social order, all of which have prevented improvements in conditions of life for the masses.⁴⁵ Thus, neither the shared experience of racial domination nor a common class condition necessarily produces shared economic and/or political outlooks. This is why race cannot be reduced to class and vice versa. Both must be analyzed in their concrete historical situation to understand political struggles, states, and development.

Thus far, we have discussed how *Fueling Development* draws on Black radical theories to understand the various oppressions that constitute the white capitalist system and prevent human development. The dialectical thinking in this tradition also pushes us to expose how those very conditions of subjugation simultaneously invigorate agency from below and spur social change. “Below,” for these intellectuals, is not the white industrial working class in the imperial core. This group tends to be more reformist than revolutionary. It cherishes the economic and democratic concessions obtained from capital and bourgeois nation-states, who in turn obtained that wealth through imperial exploits, as well as what Du Bois called the “public and psychological wage” of whiteness, that is, the status, privileges, and social deference they receive simply from being racialized as white.⁴⁶ Below this white working class in the core are the “inferior darker folk” who, in accordance with the racial doctrines of modernity, are denied equality with whites.⁴⁷ These are the “real exploited and exploitable proletariat of the system,” as they are precluded from similar wages, welfare, or protections for white workers.⁴⁸ These conditions of racialized exploitation and colonial oppression contain within them the potential for the racialized colonized working people—the real agents of history—in certain conducive historical situations to develop a critical consciousness and spring into radical collective action.

As C. L. R. James asserts, “Economic development on the grand scale is first of all people,” and the “only way of changing the structure of the economy and setting it on to new paths is by mobilizing the mass against all who will stand in the way.”⁴⁹ From Haiti to Kenya, South Africa, the United States, and beyond, such mobilization has profoundly impacted the global economy and the trajectories of individual countries therein, including ending slavery, expanding democracy or intensifying authoritarianism, and triggering global shifts in

the movement of white capital and the organization/regimes of capital accumulation.⁵⁰ The complexities of race and class do not affect only the unity of the movement. The subjectivities and lived experiences that develop out of the destructive dialectic of the white capitalist system embody not only material concerns but also racial ones. As Rodney put it, to understand the masses in action, “the question of the inter-relation between race and class consciousness is of the utmost importance.”⁵¹ The triple oppressive forces of race, class, and gender, and the role of Black working women in liberation movements, also cannot be ignored.⁵² Because of their location at the nexus of these compounding structures, Black working women have historically advanced an agenda that addresses not only formal productive activities but also the devalued reproductive labor of caring, sexual violence, and family and social reproduction generally. As such, following the Black radical political economic tradition, I analyze Black struggles against the white capitalist system. In *Fueling Development*, I center the visions, strategies, and actions of racialized subordinate classes in their quest for liberation and investigate the outcomes of mass action.

In explaining Trinidad and Tobago’s economic and social development, I corroborate the Black radicals’ view on how racial and colonial domination impedes development, but I also more explicitly develop the other side of the dialectic that these thinkers advanced but theorized less, which is *how* the agency of working people can improve their economic and social conditions. These thinkers maintained that better conditions for the masses could only be realized through the agency of Black working people, but they were not conceptualizing that “development” as the pursuit of Western economic, political, and cultural formations. They rejected this liberal and normative framing of development. These “advancements,” after all, are derived from intensive and widespread racist and gender-motivated violence, exploitation, degradation, inequality, and political repression, all of which are occluded in the hegemonic European conceptualization of development and progress.⁵³ The only true development for working people is a global, anticapitalist, antiracist, feminist, anti-imperial, and anticolonial socialist order.⁵⁴ For most of these thinkers, only worker- and peasant-controlled property, production, and socialist state apparatus grounded in the principle of egalitarian distribution will satisfy the wants and needs of all members of the society—housing, health, public schools, and general welfare—and uphold all human freedom and dignity. Du Bois for example, asserted that the success of a multiracial social democracy required a military-backed “dictatorship of the proletariat.”⁵⁵ C. L. R. James rejected representative government and advocated for direct democracy comprising popular councils and worker self-management.⁵⁶ Anything short of this

is reformist, not revolutionary, and reforms are insufficient, or, more aptly, an obstacle to true mass liberation.

The Trinidad and Tobago state is not a socialist one, and the workers do not own or control the means of production. The country may now register as a high-income economy, but with its reliance on exports, access to foreign markets, and foreign capital, it has not broken the chains of structural dependency. It has not leapfrogged out of the economic position and resource-exporter role into which it was placed during British colonial domination. In this sense, Black radical thinkers would not call Trinidad and Tobago a developmental success. Similarly, the New World Group might have interpreted the shifts in the standard of living for Trinidad and Tobago's working people as "continuity with change" or "adjustment without transformation."⁵⁷

This book does not dispute the persistence of Trinidad and Tobago's structural dependency in the global white capitalist system. However, the unintended by-product of emphasizing structural stasis is the constriction of the intellectual space for understanding the agents and activities responsible for the instances, whether fleeting or lasting, of positive change. In the late 1960s, development scholars began to recognize that development was more dynamic, and outcomes, whether defined as industrialization, average income, social well-being, or all of the above, varied considerably among states outside of the core.⁵⁸ Others noted the many contradictions of developmental "success," where states like Trinidad and Tobago might remain in the same relative position in the global hierarchy of wealth and power but nevertheless undergo major social and economic transformations.⁵⁹ Material conditions and human welfare *have* improved remarkably in Trinidad and Tobago, so how do we account for this shift? This book argues that the mobilization of working people within the constraints of the white capitalist system, while falling short of socialist revolution, still had important enduring successes, through the way it forced changes in the state apparatus.

Also following this group of Black radical intellectuals, this book draws on a range of archival sources, government documents, and databases, and employs a historical and dialectical materialist analysis that aims to trace how the past informs the present. Using their narrative strategy, which is also common in North American comparative-historical research methods, I attend to the temporal order, event sequences, conjunctures, and contingencies.⁶⁰ Also consistent with Black radical thinkers' analytic approaches, I aim to overcome what recent scholars have called *methodological nationalism* and attend to the interrelations among actors, events, and processes across time and space that shape outcomes in Trinidad and Tobago.⁶¹ My methodology is described in

detail in the appendix. The next section lays out the details of the book's argument regarding Trinidad and Tobago's worker movements, state structure, and development.

The Argument: Liberation Unionism, State Capacity, and Development

I trace Trinidad and Tobago's development over the course of the twentieth century to the mobilization of a specific form of working-class unionism, which I call *liberation unionism*. Liberation unionism in Trinidad and Tobago had three main defining features: (1) it was internationalist, meaning imbued with the Pan-African anticolonial, anti-imperial, diasporic connections primarily of Garveyism and later Black Power; (2) it united workers across racial and sectoral lines and was also inclusive of women; and (3) it advocated for economic, political, and social transformations. Liberation unionism emerged during the interwar years, erupting in 1919 and 1937, under crucial contextual factors that workers took advantage of, namely, a wider geopolitical context where the British Empire viewed the colony of Trinidad and Tobago as its only secure source of oil. While not eliminating the underlying exploitative racial and economic structures, these movements forced the colonial state to enact institutional reforms that increased state capacity for development. Liberation unionism triggered the construction of a welfare-enhancing state apparatus, which enabled the Trinidad and Tobago state to achieve remarkable gains in such gargantuan tasks as lowering infant mortality, increasing life expectancy, expanding access to education, and generally raising living standards and well-being.

This form of unionism differed from the far more insular "business unionism," in which unions struggle to improve the working conditions of their members, narrowly defined.⁶² Other forms of unionism, such as political unionism, social justice unionism, and social movement unionism, adopt a broader scope, where workers not only fight for better wages and working conditions but also make political claims for human rights, democratization, and/or the needs of the larger community.⁶³ Liberation unionism, as defined in this book, encompasses all these demands but has its basis in a phenomenology of racialized and colonized subjectivity. It is a distinctive form of worker organizing that is deeply rooted in independent Black struggles for freedom and self-determination. The designation *liberation* is not meant to imply that other traditions and forms of unionism do not also seek some kind of liberation from exploitation and oppression. The Communist Party-affiliated social movement unionism in India, South Africa, Hawai'i, the United States, and

across Latin America and the *sindicalismo de liberación* in late 1960s Argentina, as it was called by labor organizer Raimondo Ongaro, all at one point or another contained or embodied expressions of anti-imperial working-class socialism.⁶⁴ The term *liberation* is also not meant to suggest that totally breaking free from the white capitalist system was achieved. The conflict-compromise relationship between capital and labor constrains what labor unions and movements can accomplish.⁶⁵ The *liberation* in *liberation unionism* denotes the distinctive Black radical political philosophies, strategies, and expressions of *Black liberation* that orient and give meaning to the workers' self-directed collective action.

The next chapter (chapter 1) lays out the conditions favoring the emergence of liberation unionism in Trinidad and Tobago. I explore the social structure, the lived experiences and interests of the three main actors involved in institutional development—workers, colonial state officials, and private capital—and the history of resource and labor extraction in colonial Trinidad and Tobago prior to the first colony-wide worker mobilization in 1919. I also highlight the lack of institutions for addressing these conflicts and promoting equitable human development. Chapters 2 and 3 chronicle the events and institutional changes following the 1919 and 1937 worker mobilizations, respectively.

Despite being the most cohesive and prominent political force during the colonial period, the working people did not win control of the state apparatus during formal decolonization. Chapter 4 presents how liberation unionism was severely weakened, although not eliminated, during this period. I argue that labor's failure to win state control was consequential for development in the long run. It enabled militant unions to remain organizationally independent of political parties and the state and to retain their radicalism, whereas foreign intervention and party and political incorporation of labor in so many other former colonies resulted in longer-lasting depoliticization of worker movements. This relative autonomy of labor led to open confrontation just after independence between labor, on one side, and the state and private capital, on the other, over the unfulfilled dreams for economic and social justice and transformation.

Liberation unionism survived and resurged in the postindependence period, crucially between independence in 1962 and the first oil boom of 1973. It paralleled and innovated on the Black radical activity of the colonial era, and the timing was crucial for shaping how the state invested the massive oil windfalls. As shown in chapter 5, this postindependence liberation unionism reinforced the path-dependent process of institution building and forced the newly independent state to further increase its capacity, leading to long-term robust development.

Across chapters 2 to 5, I demonstrate how liberation unionism shaped long-term development by pushing the despotic state to institutionalize greater legal-administrative capacity to devise and implement development policies and provide public goods. I show how the movement forced the colonial and post-colonial states to loosen entanglements with white foreign and local economic elites, thereby carving out some autonomous space for state action that was more oriented toward the masses. Through liberation unionism, working people also enhanced the coherence and meritocracy of the state as they compelled the state to provide developmental goods to the African and Indian masses across the country. Finally, I show how worker mobilization in the colonial and independence period propelled the Trinidad and Tobago state toward democracy and the expansion of political rights and civil liberties, and encouraged greater transparency and accountability of the state to the public. The institutional features of increased autonomy from the dominant class, enhanced bureaucratization, and greater embeddedness with the masses helped promote economic and social development in Trinidad and Tobago.

Chapter 6 compares the findings from the in-depth case study of Trinidad and Tobago with an abbreviated study of Guyana over the same time period to sharpen the concept of liberation unionism and demonstrate how it might be used to understand development in other contexts. Guyana is another former British colony in the Caribbean region where workers had significant structural power on account of the geostrategic importance of their natural resources—bauxite—to British imperial efforts. Guyana's history of plantation slavery with a multiracial African and Indian worker base closely resembles Trinidad and Tobago's, and liberation unionism did emerge there during the interwar years. However, Guyana ended up with comparably less equitable development outcomes.

The Guyana case reinforces the argument that geopolitical contexts shape the extent to which liberation unionism stimulates reformist welfare-enhancing state building. Unlike Trinidad and Tobago's workers, who were unsuccessful at the polls during decolonization, in Guyana a radical Marxist political party representing working people won state power and began constructing a socialist state. But to the British and United States, such a state threatened their interests and the existing global order. These imperial powers repressed liberation unionism and the socialist party, reversed democracy, and ensured that the Guyanese state, upon constitutional independence, was in the hands of leaders who professed alignment with imperial interests. As such, state building after constitutional independence proceeded in ways that impeded democratic and redistributive development. This comparison shows that liberation unionism

is not unique to Trinidad and Tobago per se, but that its exclusion from state power spared the state and masses from imperial interventions and generated concessions that positively affected development.

In arguing that liberation unionism had developmental impacts, I am not saying that this process was smooth and uncontested or resulted in a steady march toward mass upliftment. I am also not asserting that working people should eschew revolution and aspire only to concessions, thereby leaving the overall white capitalist system intact. My argument is simply that the agency of working people matters, and I show empirically how their self-directed struggles led to changes that improved their everyday lives. State-building processes are path dependent.⁶⁶ Once the colonizers invaded and constructed institutions in a particular way, these institutions became very difficult, if not nearly impossible, to change as entrenched interests favored and defended the status quo. Worker mobilization threatened the legitimacy and dominance of the white elites and the colonial and independent regimes. Gains were uneven and at times were rolled back as the white ruling elites retaliated with the repressive capacity of the state and novel methods of labor exploitation, resource extraction, and accumulation.

Still, I show how after the first set of institutional changes stimulated by liberation unionism in 1919–20, subsequent mobilizations tended to reinforce those previously established patterns of relations between the state and the working people. During formal decolonization, state reforms did not involve dismantling the existing structure and creating something different. Instead, movement-driven reforms increased the size of the state and its capacity, and further enhanced public participation, resulting in the consolidation of an institutionally robust democratic and redistributive development.

My analysis of Trinidad and Tobago covers the full sweep of the twentieth century, with a specific focus on the period from 1919, when the first instantiation of liberation unionism erupted, to 1983, when the global neoliberal current of the 1980s pulled in the Trinidad and Tobago state. In the concluding chapter, I review the argument about Trinidad and Tobago's development story, which I trace to worker struggle and its long-lasting institutional impacts. My framework helps make sense of trends in the mid-1980s and thereafter, which are more dispiriting as global economic restructuring has increased labor precarity, the state has embraced certain elements of neoliberalism, unions have been severely weakened, and the indicators of social dislocation, most notably crime, have skyrocketed. In *Fueling Development*, one theme is clear: when labor strikes, capital strikes back. The conclusion situates these contemporary conditions in the *longue durée* of state-capital and state-society relations and

in the global context of the ever-evolving white capitalist system. Liberation unionism suffered challenges after World War II, but it reemerged in the 1960s. Thus, the neoliberal turn is a downside for worker organizing, but this is one part of a longer struggle, and the fate of worker movements is not given. *Fueling Development* is a story of hope, tragedy, and ongoing struggle with liberation unionism at the heart of it. I end by discussing the implications of this book's findings for other countries and for the future of human development.

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Notes

INTRODUCTION

Epigraph: *The People*, May 18, 1935, 7.

1. I use Walter Rodney's term *working people* and *working class* interchangeably to refer to urban and rural wage workers and peasants, and the not-so-stark distinction between worker and peasant in the Caribbean colonies. See Rodney, *History*; Rodney, "Class Contradictions in Tanzania." For a more recent theorization, see Shivji, "Concept of 'Working People.'"

2. *Wages Committee, 1919–1920 Report*, November 5, 1920, The National Archives (TNA), Colonial Office (CO) 295/531; *Trinidad and Tobago Disturbances 1937 Report of Commission* (Forster Report), TNA, CO 295/601/2.

3. Harding and Gent, *Dominions Office and Colonial Office List for 1937*; Harding and Gent, *Dominions Office and Colonial Office List for 1940*; Mercer and Collins, *Colonial Office List for 1919*; Mercer, Harding, and Gent, *Dominions Office and Colonial Office List for 1930*; Forster Report, 30–41.

4. UNDP, Human Development Index (HDI) dataset, accessed December 3, 2024. <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>.

5. World Bank, "World Development Indicators" databank, accessed December 5, 2024, <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=TTO>.

6. Pan American Health Organization, "Trinidad and Tobago."

7. World Bank, "World Bank Country and Lending Groups," accessed June 15, 2024, <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.

8. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2024*, Country and Territory Ratings and Statutes, 1973–2024, accessed December 5, 2024, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>.

9. These literatures are vast. For just a few examples concerning the developmental legacies of colonialism, see Acemoglu et al., "Colonial Origins"; Kohli, *State-Directed Development*; Lange, *Lineages of Despotism*; Mahoney, *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development*. On the problems of dependence on oil, see Karl, *Paradox of Plenty*;

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Mahdavy, "Patterns and Problems"; Ross, *Oil Curse*. On challenges related to racial or ethnic diversity, see Alesina et al., "Fractionalization"; Churchill and Smyth, "Ethnic Diversity and Poverty"; Easterly and Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy."

10. Evans, "Constructing the 21st-Century Developmental State"; Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*; Evans and Heller, "Human Development"; Heller, *Labor of Development*; Lange, *Lineages of Despotism*; Mann, *Sources of Social Power*; Mkandawire, "Thinking About Developmental States"; Sandbrook et al., *Social Democracy*; Weir and Skocpol, "State Structures."

11. Acemoglu et al., "Colonial Origins"; Boone, "States and Ruling Classes"; Gerring et al., "Direct and Indirect Rule"; Lange, *Lineages of Despotism*; Mahoney, *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development*; Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*; Patterson, *Confounding Island*. For related arguments about institutions created by colonizers, see also Kohli, *State-Directed Development*; Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Miles, *Hausaland Divided*; and Owolabi, *Ruling Emancipated Slaves*; Woodberry, "Missionary Roots"; Young, *African Colonial State*. Following Julian Go in *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory*, the term *post-colonial* (with the hyphen) connotes a period following the end of formal colonial domination or after a colony attained constitutional independence, whereas *postcolonial* (without the hyphen) refers to a body of writings and thought that seeks to challenge and transcend imperial epistemes.

12. Auty, *Sustaining Development*; Humphreys et al., *Escaping the Resource Curse*; Isham et al., "Varieties of Resource Experience"; Ross, *Oil Curse*; Sachs and Warner, "Natural Resource Abundance"; Lederman and Maloney, *Natural Resources*; Vicente, "Does Oil Corrupt?"

13. Auty and Gelb, "Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States"; Beblawi and Luciani, *Rentier State*; Bellin, "Robustness of Authoritarianism"; Chaudhry, "Economic Liberalization"; Jensen and Wantchekon, "Resource Wealth"; Karl, *Paradox of Plenty*; Mahdavy, "Patterns and Problems"; Ross, *Oil Curse*; Sachs and Warner, "Natural Resource Abundance."

14. Scholars argue that Botswana, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan escaped the resource curse. See Acemoglu et al., "African Success Story"; Jones Luong and Weinthal, *Oil Is Not a Curse*; Rosser, "Escaping the Resource Curse."

15. Banerjee et al., "History, Social Divisions," 639. See also Alesina et al., "Fractionalization"; Easterly and Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy"; La Porta et al., "Quality of Government"; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Diversity"; Pribble, "Worlds Apart."

16. Baldwin and Huber, "Economic Versus Cultural Differences"; Cederman et al., "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?"; Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*; Franck and Rainer, "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter?"; E. Lieberman and McClendon, "Ethnicity-Policy Preference Link"; Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics*.

17. The white population was 1.9 percent in 1960. Abraham, *Labour and the Multiracial Project*, 19; Brereton, *History of Modern Trinidad*; M. John, *Plantation Slaves of Trinidad*, 6; MacDonald, *Trinidad and Tobago*, 146; A. Robinson, *Mechanics of Independence*; Williams, *History of the People*; Wood, *Trinidad in Transition*.

18. Titus, *Amelioration and Abolition*; Trotman, *Crime in Trinidad*.

19. The minimum threshold for resource dependence, according to Terry Karl, is where oil and gas account for more than 40 percent of exports and 10 percent of resource rents. See Karl, *Paradox of Plenty*.

20. Based on a comparison of HDI indices for 2019 (before the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic). UNDP, Human Development Index dataset, accessed December 3, 2024, <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>. For a detailed comparison of the development indicators of Trinidad and Tobago and Botswana, see table A.1 in the appendix.

21. On the role of labor in universal suffrage, decolonization, and democracy, see Bonilla, *Non-Sovereign Futures*; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*; Hart, *From Occupation to Independence*; Kiely, *Politics of Labour and Development*; Ledgister, *Class Alliances*; Plys, *Brewing Resistance*; Post, *Arise Ye Starvelings*; Ramdin, *From Chattel Slave*; Reddock, *Women, Labour and Politics*; Rennie, *History of the Working-Class*; Rueschemeyer et al., *Capitalist Development and Democracy*; Samaroo, *Adrian Cola Rienzi*; Samaroo and Girvan, "Trinidad Workingmen's Association"; Seidman, *Manufacturing Militance*; Teelucksingh, *Labour*; Zeilig, *Class Struggle*. On the role of labor in creating and expanding welfare states, see Agarwala, *Informal Labor*; Esping-Andersen, "Power and Distributional Regimes"; Huber and Stephens, *Development and Crisis*; Korpi, *Democratic Class Struggle*; Selwyn, *Struggle for Development*. And on the role of labor in better institutions of governance, see Lee, "Labor Unions"; see also Quadagno, "Social Movements." The literature on social movements and development also argues that collective mass agitation shapes state structures and industrial policies, depending on the elite responses to those movements. See Doner, *Politics of Uneven Development*; Kuhonta, *Institutional Imperative*; Slater, *Ordering Power*; Vu, *Paths to Development*.

22. Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*; Gray, *Labour and Development*; S. Kale and Mazaheri, "Natural Resources."

23. Heller, *Labor of Development*.

24. Kiely, *Politics of Labour and Development*.

25. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant*; Chibber, *Locked in Place*; Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*; Chalmers Johnson, *MITI*; Kuhonta, *Institutional Imperative*; Rueschemeyer and Evans, "State and Economic Transformation"; Wade, *Governing the Market*.

26. Chang, "Labour and 'Developmental State'"; Deyo, *Beneath the Miracle*; Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*; Fishwick, "Labour Control"; Sen, *Development as Freedom*; Vu, *Paths to Development*. Richard Doner and colleagues argue that alongside violent repression might be significant "wealth-sharing" to pacify "restive popular sectors." Doner et al., "Systemic Vulnerability."

27. Amenta et al., "All the Movements Fit to Print"; Calhoun, "New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century"; Clemens, *People's Lobby*; Doner et al., "Systemic Vulnerability"; Gamson, *Strategy of Social Protest*; McAdam et al., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*; Morris, *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*.

28. Matlon, *Man Among Other Men*; Paschel, *Becoming Black Political Subjects*; Perry, *Black Women*.

29. Bogues, *Black Heretics, Black Prophets*; Carole Davies, "Sisters Outside"; Henry, *Caliban's Reason*; Kelley, *Freedom Dreams*; Rabaka, *Africana Critical Theory*; Rabaka, "Revolutionary Fanonism"; Reddock, "Radical Caribbean Social Thought"; C. Robinson, *Black Marxism*; D. Scott, "On the Very Idea."

30. Hunter and Abraham, *Race, Class*, xvii–xlv; Reddock, "Radical Caribbean Social Thought," 499. On Black radical political economy, see Burden-Stelly, "Absence of

Political Economy”; Edwards, “Applying the Black Radical Tradition”; Rice, “Political Economy.”

31. Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race*; Cox, *Capitalism as a System*; Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America*; Du Bois, *World and Africa*; James, *Black Jacobins*; Fields, “Slavery, Race and Ideology”; C. Robinson, *Black Marxism*; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*. See also Wynter, “1492.” Contrary to these scholars, Cedric Robinson argues that race is an enduring relic of European feudalism.

32. Cox, *Capitalism as a System*, 158.

33. Amin et al., *Dynamics of Global Crisis*; Amin, *Imperialism*; Baran, *Political Economy of Growth*; Bornschieer and Chase-Dunn, *Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment*; Bunker and Ciccantell, *Globalization*; Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*; Dos Santos, “Structure of Dependence”; Frank, *Dependent Accumulation*; Marini, *Dialectics of Dependency*; Wallerstein, *Modern World-System*.

34. Best, “Outlines of a Model”; Best and Levitt, *Essays*; Girvan, “Development of Dependency Economics”; C. Thomas, *Dependence and Transformation*; Meeks and Girvan, *Thought of New World*.

35. Antunes de Oliveira, “Who Are the Super-Exploited?”; Arrighi et al., *Anti-Systemic Movements*; Beckford, “Plantation System”; Girvan, *Aspects of the Political Economy*. Variations of the New World Group and dependency arguments concerning contemporary inequalities produced from structural hierarchy of the world system appear in other works that are not squarely part of these traditions but draw on them, while at the same time centering race. See, for example, Ramsaran, “Myth’ of Development.”

36. “Racial capitalism” is used by Legassick and Hemson, *Foreign Investment*; and C. Robinson, *Black Marxism*. “Racial and colonial capitalism” is from Itzigsohn and Brown, *Sociology of W. E. B. Du Bois*. “Racist capitalism” is from Rabaka, *Africana Critical Theory*. “Racialized capitalism” is used by N. Fraser, “Expropriation and Exploitation”; and Virdee, “Racialized Capitalism.” “Race and capitalism” is from Dawson, “Hidden in Plain Sight.”

37. See, for example, Go, “Three Tensions.”

38. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 303; Rodney, *Groundings with My Brothers*, 63.

39. Rodney, *Groundings with My Brothers*, 9–13.

40. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 5.

41. Loveman, *National Colors*; Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship*; Telles, *Pigmentocracies*; Telles, *Race in Another America*.

42. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 5.

43. Du Bois, “Marxism and the Negro Problem”; Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*; Du Bois, *Color and Democracy*; James, *Black Jacobins*; Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*? Marx did not theorize race, but there is evidence that he recognized how racial slavery operated to inhibit solidarity between workers and maintain the power of the capitalist class. In *Capital*, he wrote, “Labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin” (414).

44. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 107–10; James, “Case for West Indian Self-Government,” in *Life of Captain Cipriani*, 171–72.

45. Cabral, “The Weapon of Theory”; Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 97–144; Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism*; James, “West Indian Middle Classes”; Rodney, “Contemporary

Political Trends”; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; see also Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America*.

46. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 700; see also Du Bois, “Class Struggle,” and Padmore, *Life and Struggles*.

47. Du Bois, *World and Africa*, 27.

48. Cox, *Capitalism as a System*, 195. See also Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 176–77.

49. James, “West Indian Middle Classes,” 256.

50. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*; James, *Black Jacobins*; James, *History of Pan-African Revolt*; Fick, *Making of Haiti*.

51. Rodney, *Decolonial Marxism*, 30.

52. Combahee River Collective, “Black Feminist Statement”; A. Davis, “Reflections”; Jones, *End to the Neglect*; Thompson, “Toward a Brighter Dawn.” Intersectionality (Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” and “Mapping the Margins”; Hill-Collins, *Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory*) is currently the dominant framework through which to study race-class-gender oppression and mobilization in the social sciences, but it is not the only one. In this book, I draw on the political economy approach to the integrated study of race, class, and gender as developed by Louise Thompson Patterson, Claudia Jones, Angela Davis, Andaiye, and other Black radical feminists. There are important shared ambitions and affinities between the two traditions—namely, a critique of racism and patriarchy. The political economy tradition, however, includes a critique of capitalist imperialism and centers the racialized and gendered superexploitative relations of production and reproduction that enable accumulation via the labors and bodies of people categorized as Black women. For more detailed discussions of the two approaches, see Edwards, “Beyond Intersectionality”; Burden-Stelly and Dean, *Organize, Fight, WIN*; Carole Davies, *Left of Karl Marx*; and C. Davies and Burden-Stelly, “Claudia Jones Research and Collections.”

53. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 238; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 17; see also Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 155.

54. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 238–39.

55. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 345.

56. James, *Every Cook Can Govern*. James also seemed to envision direct democracy coexisting with state power. See Quest, “Every Cook Can Govern.”

57. Meeks and Girvan, *Thought of New World*, 7.

58. Evans, *Dependent Development*.

59. Arrighi, “Development Illusion”; Bissessar and Hosein, “Role of the State”; Silver, “Contradictions of Semiperipheral Success.”

60. Adams et al., *Remaking Modernity*; Aminzade, “Historical Sociology and Time”; Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods*; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis*.

61. Bhabra, *Connected Sociologies*; Boatacă, *Global Inequalities Beyond Occidentalism*; Go, *Postcolonial Thought*; Go and Lawson, *Global Historical Sociology*; Hammer and White, “Sociology of Colonial Subjectivity”; Itzigsohn and Brown, *Sociology of W. E. B.*

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Du Bois; Magubane, "Overlapping Territories and Intertwined Histories"; Meghji, *Decolonizing Sociology*; Silver, *Forces of Labor*.

62. Goldfield, *Decline of Organized Labor*; Hattam, *Labor Visions*.

63. Caswell Johnson, "Emergence of Political Unionism"; Lambert, "Political Unionism"; Scipes, "Social Movement Unionism"; Seidman, *Manufacturing Militance*; Webster, "Rise of Social-Movement Unionism."

64. Basualdo, "Labor and Structural Change"; Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*; Heller, *Labor of Development*; Jung, *Reworking Race*; Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe*; Seidman, *Manufacturing Militance*; Goldfield, *Southern Key*; Zeitlin and Weyher, "Black and White."

65. Goldfield, *Decline of Organized Labor*.

66. Mahoney, "Comparative-Historical Analysis."

CHAPTER 1. PROLETARIANIZATION, RACE MAKING, AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, 1498–1914

1. Boomert, *Indigenous Peoples*, 88–103, 115.

2. F. Knight, *General History*; Mintz, *Three Ancient Colonies*.

3. By now it is widely acknowledged that attending to these dynamics corrects the methodological deficiencies common in so-called classic studies of working-class formation, such as E. P. Thompson's *Making of the English Working Class* and Eric Hobsbawm's *Labouring Men*. For just one example of this critique and a corrective, see Virdee, *Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider*.

4. Loveman, "Is 'Race' Essential?"; Wimmer, "Race-Centrism"; Bonilla-Silva, "Essential Social Fact of Race"; Winant, "Race, Ethnicity."

5. Bashi, *Ethnic Project*, 10.

6. Braithwaite, "Social Stratification in Trinidad," 75; K. Singh, *Race and Class Struggles*, xx–xxi; Segal, "'Race' and 'Colour'"; Reddock, "Competing Victimhoods."

7. I refrain from using quotation marks around the various terms for racial groups so as not to interrupt the flow of the argument, but I do maintain that these and other races are socially constructed, not natural, categories.

8. There have been turns within contemporary African American racial politics and among Indian diaspora intellectuals to reclaim and redefine these respective terms. See, for example, Carter and Torabully, *Coolitude*; and Kennedy, "Who Can Say 'Nigger'?" However, both in the time period under analysis in this book and in contemporary Trinidad and Tobago, these terms are harmful racial epithets, and no such politically salient counterdiscursive movements have emerged at the grassroots level.

9. Brereton, *History of Modern Trinidad*, 96–115; Ryan, *Race and Nationalism*, 18–27.

10. On the effect of changes in the organization of production, see Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*; Heller, *Labor of Development*; Hung, "Labor Politics"; Seidman, *Manufacturing Militance*; and Rueschemeyer et al., *Capitalist Development and Democracy*; see also Tilly and Tilly, *Class Conflict*. On the effects of state repression, see Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*; Deyo, *Beneath the Miracle*; and Jenkins and Perrow, "Insurgency of the Powerless"; see also Davenport, "State Repression"; Tarrow, *Power*

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