NICHOLAS DE GENOVA

EDITOR

THE
BORDERS OF
"EUROPE"

AUTONOMY OF MIGRATION,
TACTICS OF BORDERING

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Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering

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Cover art: Refugees next to the fence on the Macedonian side of the border as they wait to go back to Greece near Gevgelija, a town in southern Macedonia, Wednesday, March 2, 2016. AP Photo/Visar Kryeziu

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operate as cruel mechanisms of confinement and subjugation. This exploration of the borders of "Europe" is a testament to the journey we have made together.

—NICHOLAS DE GENOVA
Chicago, January 2017

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The Borders of "Europe" and
the European Question

NICHOLAS DE GENOVA

Today everything is immigration.
—DONALD TUSK, President of the European Council, September 3, 2015

We cannot point to a place, state or continent called Europe which readily reveals its
borders, edges or divisions to an impartial observer. On the contrary . . . debates about
the frontiers of Europe are unavoidably political interventions which interject elements
of fixture into the fluid and ambiguous space that is Europe.
—WILLIAM WALTERS, "Europe's Borders," 487

The representation of Europe's borders is, of course, symbolic. But the signs and symbols
have a history.
—TALAL ASAD, "Muslims and European Identity," 220

European Deathscape

This book has arisen in the midst of what has been ubiquitously and virtually unanimously declared in mass-mediated public discourse and the dominant political debate to be a "crisis" of migration in Europe.

The first intimations of a European crisis arose amid the unsightly accumulation of dead black and brown bodies awash on the halcyon shores of the Mediterranean Sea. When a ship transporting as many as 850 migrants and refugees capsized on April 19, 2015, all but 28 of the vessel's passengers were sent to their deaths in what appears to have been the worst border-crossing shipwreck

MAP INTRO.1. Central and Eastern Mediterranean

in the Mediterranean on record. This single event instantly established the prospect that 2015 would earn the dubious distinction of the most deadly year to date for would-be asylum-seekers striving to reach Europe's borders. Subsequently, unnumbered capsized "migrant boats" and incidents of mass death turned that grim likelihood into gruesome fact. These human catastrophes at sea have indisputably transformed the maritime borders of Europe into a macabre deathscape (cf. Andersson 2012; De Genova 2015c; Heller et al. 2012; IOM 2014; Jansen et al. 2015; Pezzani and Heller 2013; Rygiel 2014; Stierl 2016; see also Heller and Pezzani, this volume).[1] During the ensuing months, the accumulating momentum of a gathering storm of human mobility over both sea and land served to fix in place a newfound dominant common sense about a "migrant crisis." Then, on September 2, 2015, social media (followed by mass news media) briefly became captivated by haunting photographs featuring the corpse of a drowned Syrian boy, soon identified as Aylan Kurdi, washed ashore in Turkey after a failed attempt to reach the Greek island of Kos left at least 12 people dead. Abruptly, the desensitizing and rather cynical rhetoric of a mi-

MAP INTRO.2. The Aegean Sea, featuring Greek islands

grant crisis began to recede in favor of appeals for compassion in the face of tragedy, accompanied by a reinvigorated (if ephemeral) language of "refugee crisis" (New Keywords Collective 2016).

The putative crisis surrounding the influx of migrants and refugees in Europe—and the border spectacle that it generates (De Genova 2002, 2013a)—has long been nowhere more extravagantly put on display than in the Mediterranean Sea. Alongside the proliferation of migrant deaths in transit in border zones across the planet, the Mediterranean has incontestably earned the disgraceful distinction of being the veritable epicenter of such lethal border crossings.[2] Indeed, for several years now, the European Union (EU) has actively converted the Mediterranean into a mass grave (see Heller and Pezzani, this volume). The singularity or momentousness of the April 19, 2015, shipwreck was in fact only apparent, therefore, because it came as merely the most ghastly and most publicized in a long and unrelenting list of comparable episodes that have utterly banalized such human disasters, and which continued during the ensuing months. The toll of migrants and refugees who perished in transit to Europe during 2016 predictably exceeded the number of lives lost in 2015, but with considerably less publicity. Indeed, prior to the record-high death tolls of 2015 and 2016, untold tens of thousands of ordinarily nameless refugees, migrants, and their children had already been consigned to horrific, unnatural, premature

deaths by shipwreck and drowning, often following protracted ordeals of hunger, thirst, exposure, and abandonment on the high seas.[3] Prospective migrant shipwrecks have perhaps been abated intermittently and inconsistently during one or another period of heightened search-and-rescue operations by the various enforcers of the borders of Europe (see Andersson; Garelli and Tazzioli, this volume), but it is likewise probable that countless potential incidents of mass migrant and refugee deaths at sea have been circumvented by the sheer versatility of migratory movements that have sought alternate routes over land in the aftermath of such human tragedies. Hence, following the April shipwreck, although there continued to be a record-high volume of migration across the central Mediterranean for months, there was also increasing evidence of a massive reorientation of migratory movement to land routes through the Balkans.[4]

Of course, the option of illegalized travel by land routes is also treacherous: hunger, thirst, exposure, abandonment, and the related lethal risks are not the exclusive travails of illegalized maritime journeys (Andersson 2014b; Ataç et al. 2015; Lecadet 2013a; Tazzioli 2013; see also Garelli and Tazzioli; Lecadet; Soto Bermant; Stierl, this volume). On August 27, 2015, for instance, Austrian police discovered an abandoned meat truck on the highway at Nickelsdorf near the Hungarian border, in which 71 mainly Syrian and Iraqi migrants and refugees' bodies were decomposing in a sealed refrigeration compartment. Hundreds if not thousands of migrants and refugees have died of asphyxiation after extended periods of overcrowded transit by road or rail in sealed, unventilated shipping containers and other means of clandestine (illegalized) transport over land, while others have merely met their doom after dangling precariously from the bottoms of moving trains and trucks. In addition, migrants must navigate the sometimes deadly violence of European border enforcement authorities, as well as their "non-European" counterparts to whom they frequently outsource the most aggressive sorts of border policing, and also other European police forces routinely engaged in the everyday work of superintending migrant precarity (Andersson 2014a, 2014b; see also Andersson; Soto Bermant; and Stierl, this volume).[5] Indeed, another form of border casualty arises from the lack of access to critical health care during extended periods of migrant transit, or the callous disregard for migrants' and refugees' medical needs during detention or deportation (Flynn and Cannon 2010).[6] Furthermore, any consideration of the diffuse violence of these extended border zones must not neglect to consider the less systematic but no less systemic physical attacks of far-right anti-immigrant racists (Ataç et al. 2015; De Genova 2015d; see also Stierl, this volume).

What presents itself as a "crisis" of territorially defined state powers over transnational, cross-border human mobility—in short, what is fundamentally a moment of governmental impasse on the European scale—has been mobilized and strategically deployed as "crisis" or "emergency" for the reconfiguration of tactics and techniques of border policing and immigration and asylum law enforcement (New Keywords Collective 2016). This has been pronouncedly true in Europe, but these sociopolitical processes and struggles resonate far beyond the borders of Europe. In this regard, it is instructive to briefly reflect upon the conceptual framework that informs this volume. For it is the sheer incorrigibility of migrant and refugee subjectivities and their mobility projects—the autonomy of migration—that has instigated a crisis on the scale of Europe as such.[7]

The mass movements of refugees and migrants in Europe and beyond signify different and disparate problems from the varied and opposed perspectives at play. Sovereign power is manifested through the complex and contradictory formations of diverse European authorities and jurisdictions—notably including not only the supranational state formation of the EU and the various nation-states involved, whether EU members or not (across and beyond "Europe"), as well as an array of nonstate actors, from private capitalist enterprises to "smuggling" networks to humanitarian agencies—arrayed in what we may consider to be a heterogeneous and contradictory border regime (Hess 2010; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010) or assemblage (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). From the standpoints of this plurality of contenders for sovereign power, the "crisis" customarily appears to be a problem defined principally in terms of (border) "control" and (migration and asylum) "management." This putative crisis therefore summons the ever-reinvigorated and convulsive recalibration of strategies for border policing and immigration and asylum law enforcement, and thus always resolves itself into a dispute over the most effective and efficient tactics of bordering. Yet it is not difficult to see that these strategies and tactics, even when they are anticipatory and presumably regulatory—whether they are intended to preempt or, alternately, to facilitate or even proactively channel one or another formation of border crossing—are always themselves embedded within larger reaction formations.

Border patrols and the diverse efforts of state powers aimed at border control have everywhere arisen as reaction formations. They are responses to a prior fact—the mass mobility of human beings on the move, the manifest expression of the freedom of movement of the human species, on a global scale. Consequently,

the heterogeneous tactics of bordering respond to all the unpredictable and intractable dimensions of the elementary subjectivity and autonomy of migration. Thus, these two key figures—the autonomy of migration and the tactics of bordering—are central to and mutually constitutive of the agonistic, if not antagonistic, drama that repeatedly manifests itself as the pervasive crisis of what is finally an effectively global border regime. Even to designate this elementary and elemental fact and primacy of human mobility as "migration," however, is already to risk colluding in the naturalization of the borders that serve to produce the spatial difference between one or another state formation's putative inside and outside, constructing the very profoundly consequential difference between the presumably proper subjects of a state's authority and those mobile human beings variously branded as "aliens," "foreigners," and indeed "migrants." Here, it is important to underscore that such human mobility has come to be pervasively construed as migration only to the extent that it is understood to involve the crossing (or transgression) of one or another sort of state-imposed border. If there were no borders, there would be no migration— only mobility (De Genova 2013b). Nonetheless, such borders themselves have only acquired their contemporary significance and materiality—indeed, their productivity—as the effect of histories of reactive tactics on the part of state powers in response to these human movements and their double-faced, double-voiced politics of mobility and presence (De Genova 2009, 2010d). Yet the movement of people around the world, and hence across these border zones, came first. The multifarious attempts to manage or control this autonomous mobility have always come as a response. Confronting the statist perspective of a global regime of borders, the basic human freedom of movement thus could only ever seem to be perfectly incorrigible (De Genova 2010d). What presents itself as the autonomy of migration, therefore, is finally but a particular manifestation of a more elementary and elemental exercise of the human freedom of movement (De Genova 2010b).

A Question of "Crisis"

Regardless of the specific sites and forms of bordering, migrants' and refugees' lives have been mercilessly sacrificed—usually with callous disregard, occasionally with sanctimonious hypocrisy—in the interests of instituting a "new" Europe encircled by ever-increasingly militarized and securitized borders. Hence, following the reports of the April 19, 2015, shipwreck, as has happened repeatedly, so many times before and since, European authorities were immediately catapulted into a political frenzy to redress this "tragedy of epic proportions."[8] Predictably, how-

ever, despite the obligatory pronouncements of exalted humanitarian ideals, the ensuing discourse was compulsively preoccupied with "illegal" migration[9] and the "criminal" predations of "smugglers" and "traffickers" as pretexts for renewed and expanded tactics of militarized interdiction, including proposals to bomb the coasts of Libya from which many maritime border crossers depart, or even to deploy ground troops (Traynor 2015a; cf. Garelli and Tazzioli 2017). Whereas Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat suggested that history would judge Europe and "the global community" in ways comparable to the outcry following the disregard of past genocides for being blind to these beleaguered migrant and refugee movements "of epic proportions," Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi resorted rather more strategically to a discourse that likened migration across the Mediterranean (now equated with human trafficking) to slavery,[10] denouncing it as "a plague in our continent" (BBC News 2015). In other words, the invocation of tragedy was cynically conscripted to supply the pretext for reinforcing and exacerbating precisely the material and practical conditions of possibility for the escalation in migrant deaths—namely, the fortification of various forms of border policing that inevitably serve to channel illegalized human mobility into ever more perilous pathways and modes of passage. That is to say, if migrant smuggling is to be genuinely likened to slave-trading (and indeed, if it is to be sincerely decried as "a plague"), it is precisely the European authorities who have the power to completely (and more or less immediately) eliminate it—by reversing the very border enforcement that makes it an utter necessity.

Even to the extent that part of the official debate turns on the question of various formulations of a kind of military humanitarianism (Garelli and Tazzioli 2017; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Tazzioli 2014, 2015a; Vaughan-Williams 2015; cf. Agier 2006, 2011; Walters 2011a; Williams 2015; see also Andersson; Garelli and Tazzioli; Heller and Pezzani, this volume), whereby European authorities may be charged with expanded responsibilities for the "rescue" of so-called migrant boats in distress on the high seas, every ostensible rescue comes to be haunted for the illegalized border crossers by the ambiguous prospect of apprehension and indefinite detention, with deportation as a defining horizon. Indeed, the commonplace deployment of the term *asylum-seeker* inherently invokes the specter of the allegedly bogus refugee seeking undue benefits or the presumably undeserving (merely "economic") migrant opportunistically claiming asylum. Indeed, here we may recognize that these people on the move across state borders are not in fact considered to be the genuine bearers of any presumptive (purportedly universal) "human right" to asylum, but rather are always under suspicion of deception and subterfuge, produced as the inherently

dubious claimants to various forms of institutionalized international protection (Griffiths 2012; see also Garelli and Tazzioli; Lecadet; Scheel, this volume). Similarly, the pervasive depiction of refugees as (mere) migrants has been a crucial discursive maneuver in the spectacle of Europe's border crisis. Little surprise, then, that begrudging gestures of belated magnanimity toward those who are ultimately granted the status of bona fide refugees by European authorities have been coupled with promises of expedited expulsion for those who may eventually be deemed to be only "migrants"—unwelcome, presumably "irregular" and hence undesirable, illegalized, and deportable all (Ataç et al. 2015; see also Lecadet; Picozza, this volume).[11]

Mass media news coverage has vacillated remarkably between depictions of a European "refugee crisis" and the implicitly more derisive label "migrant crisis." Ambivalence and equivocation around the very labels by which various forms of human mobility are presumed to be knowable are telling signals of the ambiguities and contradictions that bedevil such terminological categories as governmental contrivances (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a; Tazzioli 2013, 2014; see also Garelli and Tazzioli; Osseiran; Picozza, this volume). It is telling that literally every article related to these topics published by BBC News, to choose one prominent example, is accompanied with a kind of disclaimer: "A note on terminology: The BBC uses the term migrant to refer to all people on the move who have yet to complete the legal process of claiming asylum. This group includes people fleeing war-torn countries such as Syria, who are likely to be granted refugee status, as well as people who are seeking jobs and better lives, who governments are likely to rule are economic migrants." In short, in this example and many others, an epistemic crisis related to migration and refugee movements is deflected and displaced: the vexed question of how to most appropriately characterize people on the move across nation-state borders is deferred to a presumed eventual decision on the part of the proper governmental authorities, the ostensible experts, who purport to manage Europe's border regime by sorting and ranking distinct mobilities—in this case, assessing asylum claims and adjudicating the matter of who may be deemed to qualify as a legitimate and credible refugee (see Garelli and Tazzioli, this volume). Accordingly, until such a day of reckoning, all refugees may be reduced to the presumed status of mere migrants. Again, we are reminded that the very term *asylum-seeker* is always already predicated upon a basic suspicion of all people who petition for asylum within a European asylum system that has routinely and systematically disqualified and rejected the great majority of applicants, and thereby ratifies anew the processes by which their mobilities have been illegalized (De Genova 2013a, 2016a, 2016b; see also Lecadet; Scheel, this volume). Here, indeed, we

may appreciate that borders are not simply spatial technologies but also operate in ways that are fundamentally dedicated to the *temporal* processing of distinct mobilities, ultimately consigning various categories of mobile people to one or another protracted trajectory of indeterminate and contingent subjection to the governmentalities of migration (see Osseiran; Picozza, this volume).

The ongoing crisis of European borders, therefore, corresponds above all to a permanent epistemic instability within the governance of transnational human mobility, which itself relies on the exercise of a power over classifying, naming, and partitioning migrants/refugees, and the more general multiplication of subtle nuances and contradictions among the categories that regiment mobility. Indeed, such a proliferation arises as an inescapable effect of the multifarious reasons and entangled predicaments that motivate or compel people to move across state borders, or alternately find themselves stranded en route, temporarily but indefinitely stuck someplace along the way on their migratory itineraries (Andersson 2014b; Collyer 2007, 2010; Dowd 2008; Lecadet 2013a; Tazzioli 2013; see also Garelli and Tazzioli; Lecadet; Osseiran; Picozza; Stierl, this volume). Simply put, refugees never cease to also have aspirations and, against the dominant tendency to figure them as pure victims (and thus as the passive objects of others' compassion, pity, or protection), they remain *subjects* who make more or less calculated strategic and tactical choices about how to reconfigure their lives and advance their life projects despite the dispossession and dislocation of their refugee condition (see Garelli and Tazzioli; Osseiran; Picozza; Stierl, this volume). And likewise, migrants are often in flight (or fleeing) from various social or political conditions that they have come to deem intolerable, thereby actively escaping or deserting forms of everyday deprivation, persecution, or (structural) violence that may be no less pernicious for their mundanity (Mezzadra 2001, 2004; see also Lecadet, this volume). Hence, the labels migrant and refugee commonly remain suspended in a state of tension and ambiguity, and may only be sorted into neat and clean distinctions or separated by hermetically sealed partitions through more or less heavy-handed governmental interventions.

In the face of the resultant proliferation of alternating and seemingly interchangeable discourses of migrant or refugee crisis, the primary question that must be asked, repeatedly, is: *Whose crisis?* The naming of this crisis as such thus operates precisely as a device for the authorization of exceptional or emergency governmental measures toward the ends of enhanced and expanded border enforcement and immigration policing. The spectacle of Europe's migrant crisis is largely equated, consequently, with a crisis of *control* over the ostensible borders of Europe (New Keywords Collective 2016). One such

MAP INTRO.3. Calais (France)

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European border, configured at the port of Calais in France (near the entrance to the Channel Tunnel connecting Britain to the continent), has long been a site where migrants and refugees have regrouped their energies during more or less protracted periods of deceleration in the makeshift camps notoriously known as "the Jungle" (Millner 2011; Reinisch 2015; Rigby and Schlembach 2013; Rygiel 2011; Tazzioli 2015b; see also Picozza, this volume).[12] Following militant strike action by French port and ferry workers at the end of July 2015, several hundred migrants and refugees (perhaps as many as a few thousand) charged the Eurotunnel barriers in an effort to board trucks and trains heading into Britain, provoking massive traffic delays. French authorities deployed riot police, and the British constructed a new razor-wire fence. Confronting this "Calais crisis," British Prime Minister David Cameron reacted with promises of deportations and alarmist calls for more aggressive border policing to stop

the migrant "swarm," accompanied by the clamor of British tabloid newspapers calling for the authorities to "send in the army" (Elgot and Taylor 2015).

Remarkably, by August, September, and October 2015, literally from week to week and even day to day, the apparent front line of European border struggles was repeatedly dislocated from one country to another, oftentimes further and further removed from any imagined outer periphery or frontier of Europe, in a dramatic dialectic of contestation between diverse migrant and refugee autonomies and a feckless heterogeneity of tactics of bordering. These ostensible frontline dramas of the borders of Europe had moved decidedly inward, from the shores of Italy, Malta, and Greece (or Greece and Bulgaria's land borders with Turkey) to Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary, then further still into Austria and Germany, and then back again to Croatia and Slovenia. Eventually, by November, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden had all begun to reintroduce temporary border controls, and pronouncements became commonplace asserting that the Schengen agreement—widely considered to be one of the paramount achievements of European integration—was effectively dead.[13]

Notably, brutal border spectacles of "exclusion" have often exposed their own obscene dynamics of subordinate (illegalized) migrant "inclusion" (De Genova 2013a; cf. 2002:439, 2008; see also Soto Bermant, this volume). The various deployments of military troops or riot police against migrants and refugees, the construction of razor-wire barricades, and assaults against migrant and refugee families with tear gas, stun grenades, rubber truncheons, and eventually live ammunition[14] have been intermittently alternated with the outright facilitation or the de facto ferrying of these same migrant movements through the provision of bus caravans and trains to expedite transit onward. Hence, state tactics of bordering have been abundantly shown to be convulsive reaction formations, responding always to the primacy of the sheer autonomy of migration. This was perhaps nowhere more dramatically manifest than in the self-mobilization on September 4, 2015, of refugees and migrants who had been encamped in Budapest's Keleti railway station. Hungarian riot police had begun to deny migrants access to trains by which they aspired to travel on to Austria and Germany, and had attempted to forcibly evacuate some of them. Following various skirmishes with the riot police in the makeshift refugee camp in the train station, and then a devious rerouting of trains by the authorities toward "transit" (detention) camps outside the city, at least 1,000 migrants and refugees chanting "Freedom!" indignantly coalesced into an ad-hoc protest march (quickly designated the March of Hope) and, following the determined leadership of a one-legged man, defiantly proceeded onto a six-lane

highway leading out of the country. This action promptly culminated in the Hungarian state authorities' capitulation and compliance, albeit cynical and self-serving, with the urgency of the refugees' determination to freely move forward on their chosen itineraries. The march was provided a police escort and then buses that would transport the unruly refugees and migrants further along on their journeys toward the next border. Likewise, Austria and Germany promptly confirmed that their borders were open (Hartocollis 2015; see also Kasparek and Speer 2015). Just the day before, Hungary's right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had proclaimed that Europe's putative magnanimity toward refugees and migrants was "madness," and argued that his attempts to close the border with Serbia with a razor-wire fence were a matter of defending Europe's "Christian roots" against a Muslim menace (Traynor 2015b). Orbán has repeatedly declared baldly that Hungary does not welcome the prospect of granting residence to refugees, and Muslim refugees in particular. Earlier in the summer, Hungary had already announced its refusal to honor the Dublin Regulation (by which other European signatory states could deport refugees to Hungary if they had originally registered there as asylum claimants). In short, much like Italy, Malta, Greece, and Bulgaria previously, Hungary—now as a frontline defender of the borders of the EU—had come to actively resist the imperative that it do the proverbial dirty work of insulating the wealthiest EU member states from migrants and refugees seeking ultimately to resettle where they would have better prospects (see Osseiran; Picozza, this volume).

Such junior partners in the fragmented and externalized bordering of "Europe"—including EU member states (such as Hungary), non-EU European states (such as several Balkan countries), and "non-European" states subcontracted to preempt migratory movements before they ever reach European territory (from Turkey through North Africa, and even several sub-Saharan African countries)—have been poignantly depicted as "wardens of the European border regime" (Ataç et al. 2015; cf. Andersson 2014a, 2014b; see also Andersson; Lecadet; Soto Bermant, this volume).[15] Indeed, as in the case of Hungary, the more aggressive tactics in Europe's extended border zones have sometimes served to proactively and cynically redirect human mobilities onward toward other borders within other states' jurisdictions (see Andersson; Heller and Pezzani; Lecadet; Soto Bermant, this volume). Yet, during much of what Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer have called Europe's "long summer of migration" (2015), "It was as if the transit countries had made an unspoken pact: move along, there's nothing to see here." Then, in September, Hungary instituted emergency legislation in the border zone that threatened all border crossers with up to three years' imprisonment—in flagrant disregard of any and all peti-

tions for asylum—in an extravagant gesture of renewed commitment to its assigned role in enforcing the borders of Europe. "Paradoxically," as Kasparek and Speer underscore, "Hungary is now being pilloried for its callous attempts at maintaining the rules of the European border and migration regime, while Germany, regardless of its role as architect and driving force of that very regime, wins worldwide acclaim for its humanitarian stance."[16] Indeed, after having initially opened their borders to the mass movement of refugees and migrants, Austria and Germany were later prompted to reinstitute their own border controls in the face of the sheer volume and velocity of human mobility through Hungary, in order to better manage the crisis. Most importantly, despite their more draconian proclivities, Hungarian authorities opted to do nothing in the face of the refugees' defiant march through Budapest except assist them on their way toward the border with Austria. Thus the example of Hungary is merely the most dramatic instance of a recurrent vacillation between vicious violence and begrudging complicity on the part of state actors seeking to reinstitute Europe's borders in the face of the veritable intractability of migrant and refugee movements. The crisis of border control and migration management may therefore be seen to be a crisis of sovereignty that is repeatedly instigated, first and foremost, by diverse manifestations of the autonomous subjectivity of human mobility itself.

The Cross-Contamination of "Crisis"

Precisely when the discourses of migrant/refugee crisis seemed to have reached an unsustainable crescendo, the grisly spectacle of "terrorism" in Paris on November 13, 2015, supplied the catalytic event that could conjure anew the well-worn specter of "Muslim extremism." Ornamented with a (fake) Syrian passport fortuitously deposited in the vicinity of one of the bombings, the horrific bloodbath in the heart of urbane Europe was quickly conscripted to allege that the seemingly uncontrollable refugee influx was somehow providing cover for a nefarious ambush by the putative enemies of "civilization" itself, and therefore that the refugee (or migrant) crisis truly represented a security threat, after all.[17] Notably, within a few hours of the events in Paris—and within days of having been branded a "lawless slum" that presented the risk of an "infiltration" of "guerrilla warfare"—the migrant and refugee camps at Calais were subjected to what appeared to be an arson attack (Campbell 2015). Thereafter, in the ensuing days, amid the predictable (indeed, obligatory) speculations about a hydra-headed phantasm of "foreign fighters" and "homegrown extremists" traveling unhindered between combat zones in Syria and Western European countries,

France—long among the most stalwart advocates of European integration—stridently called for an unprecedented securitization of the external borders of the EU's Schengen zone of free mobility. Within a week of the events, amid police raids against Muslim "suspects" across multiple countries, and various calls for mass internment, deportations, and the electronic monitoring of such alleged suspects, EU interior and justice ministers convened an emergency meeting and vowed to institute significantly tighter external border controls and expanded surveillance over human mobility, citizen and noncitizen alike. The urgent push to create new "hotspot" migrant and refugee reception and processing facilities (i.e., detention camps) at sites of illegalized border crossing (Garelli and Tazzioli 2016a; Sciurba 2016), likewise, came now to be reimagined as a matter of perimeter defense against terrorist infiltration, refigured as vital strategic sites for "culling terrorist wolves from refugee sheep" (Lyman 2015). Despite the fact that all of the alleged culprits identified were in fact (racialized minority) Europeans, therefore, the spectacle of terror nevertheless served quite effectively as a virtually unquestionable pretext for dramatically reinvigorated border enforcement.

With various aspects of the Paris attacks associated in one way or another with the Muslim-identified (predominantly Moroccan and Turkish) migrant neighborhoods in the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek, where some of Belgium's most impoverished racialized "minority" communities live in close proximity to some of its most affluent white ones, *The Guardian* newspaper proclaimed Molenbeek's "unique place in European jihadism," and nominated the borough "Europe's jihadi central." In the days following the Paris attacks, and referring to the prominence of Molenbeek in European counterterrorist policing efforts, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel proclaimed, "Now we'll have to get repressive" (Traynor 2015c). Four months later, a few days after the arrest in Molenbeek of the prime suspect in the Paris attacks, three bombings in Brussels on March 22, 2016, including one in the Molenbeek metro station, reanimated anew the twin spectacles of terror and security. Once again, despite the manifest absence of migrants or refugees in these events, the specter of Europe's homegrown (disaffected, "second-generation," racialized minority) "Muslim extremist" citizens—routinely racialized as being "of migrant background"—has served to reconfirm the pernicious affiliation between migrant and refugee noncitizens with the threat of a corrosive and inimical pathology festering within the bosom of Europe.

Following the violent events in Paris that served to reenergize the securitarian figuration of "the Muslim"—as a condensation of religious fundamental-

ism, fanaticism, radicalization, and terrorism—as Europe's premier Other, the abrupt outbreak in January 2016 of a moral panic over multiple sexual assaults during the New Year's Eve festivities in Köln/Cologne promptly delivered up yet another instantiation of the ostensible Muslim Problem. Allegedly perpetrated by unruly mobs of young men, casually characterized as being "of North African or Middle Eastern appearance," the Cologne events reinvigorated the racialization of "Muslim" identity. In the face of these offenses, the racialization of "Muslims"/"Arabs" (eagerly depicted as including asylum-seekers) could now be represented in terms of unsavory cultural differences that had to be excoriated and criminalized as transparently inimical to "European" norms of civility and moral decency. Revealingly, the eminent philosopher and cultural critic—and avowed ("leftist") Eurocentric—Slavoj Žižek seized upon the refugee crisis as an occasion to unabashedly celebrate Europe, demanding: "Isn't the very fact that millions want to go to Europe proof that people still see something in Europe?" (2016b). Confronting the Cologne events, then, Žižek unsurprisingly adopted the condescending moralistic standpoint of European (white) supremacism: "Immigrant refugees," as he designated them, "are well aware that what they are doing is foreign to our predominant culture, but they are doing it precisely to wound our sensitivities. The task is to change this stance of envy and revengeful aggressiveness. . . . They have to be educated (by others and by themselves) into their freedom" (2016a). Making his commitment to a culturalist Europeanism still more explicit and emphatic, Žižek goes further: "Europe needs to be open to refugees, but we have to be clear they are in our culture. Certain ethical limits . . . are non-negotiable. We should be more assertive toward our values. . . . Europe means something noble—human rights, welfare state, social programs for the poor. All of this is embodied in enlightenment of the European legacy" (2016b). Elsewhere, discussing the wider question of the refugee "crisis," and exuding his characteristic flair for unapologetic authoritarianism, Žižek likewise contends:

> Europe should organize itself and impose clear rules and regulations. State control of the stream of refugees should be enforced through a vast administrative network encompassing all of the European Union. . . . Refugees should be reassured of their safety, but it should also be made clear to them that they have to accept the area of living allocated to them by European authorities, plus they have to respect the laws and social norms of European states. . . . Yes, such a set of rules privileges the Western European way of life, but it is a price for European hospitality. These rules should be clearly stated and enforced, by repressive measures (against

foreign fundamentalists as well as against our own anti-immigrant racists) if necessary. (2015)[18]

Decrying the self-righteous and condescending liberal multiculturalist tendency to engage in the "humanitarian idealization of refugees" (2016c) or to objectify refugees as mere victims, notably, Žižek's insistence upon a recognition of the agency and subjectivity of the migrant/refugee Other thus becomes the occasion for projecting the migrant/refugee's subjectivity as an unsavory and misguided one: "not just escaping from their war-torn homelands; they are also possessed by a certain dream," while nonetheless "offering themselves to become cheap precarious workforce, in many cases at the expense of local workers, who react to this threat by joining anti-immigrant political parties" (2015). Consequently, he suggests, refugees must be held to account for their own "responsibility in the crisis" (2016b).

Deemed to be dangerously deficient in terms of "European values," presumptively newly arrived, culturally alien, unassimilated (and by implication, unassimilable) Muslim/Arab asylum-seekers were now refigured, in the aftermath of the Cologne events, as probable sexual predators and potential rapists, suspected of dangerous and violent types of putatively cultural tendencies toward flagrant misogyny and "uncivilized" forms of deviancy and perversity. Thus, a menace previously fashioned as the rather more rarefied threat of terrorism could now be dramatically expanded to encompass virtually all Muslim men as potential criminals. Predictably, this anti-Muslim moral panic was laced with racial hysteria: images proliferated in the mass media in Germany of white women's bodies stained or otherwise graphically violated by black or brown hands. Even the iconic innocent—Aylan Kurdi, the three-year old Syrian boy found dead on the shores of the Aegean Sea—was now, just a few months later, callously denigrated in a cartoon published by the notoriously anti-Muslim French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Under the titular heading "Migrants," the drawing depicts two lascivious pig-like (or ape-like) men with lolling tongues and outstretched groping hands, chasing two women. An insert at the top the cartoon duplicates the famous image of Kurdi, laying face-down on the beach, drowned. The top of the page poses the purportedly comical riddle: "What would little Aylan have become if he had grown up?" The answer appears at the bottom of the page: "Ass fondler in Germany." Plainly, the cynical and derisive insinuation was that even this helpless and harmless victim, by sheer dint of the barbaric moral deficiencies of his despised Muslim heritage, could only have inevitably become a vicious perpetrator, one more predatory miscreant, like all the rest of the Muslim migrant men alleged to have perpetrated the

sexual assaults in Cologne. Thus, the figure of the refugee—so recently fashioned as an object of European compassion, pity, and protection—was refashioned with astounding speed, first as the potential terrorist who surreptitiously infiltrates the space of Europe, and then as the potential criminal/rapist who corrodes the social and moral fabric of Europe from within.

Most significantly, the controversy around the Cologne events immediately authorized public debates over how recently arrived refugees and migrants could be expeditiously rendered deportable and promptly expelled. The rather selective logic of antiterrorist suspicion that has been mobilized for the purposes of more stringent (external) border enforcement, once confronted within the European interior with the palpable presence of recent arrivals of "Muslim" refugees and migrants, was promptly repurposed as a considerably more expansive problem of internal law enforcement, emphatically conjoined to arguments for new powers to unceremoniously deport allegedly criminal asylum-seekers. Thus, nebulous and spectral affiliations are invoked to encompass refugees, ("illegal") migrants, smugglers, sexual deviants, religious fundamentalists, criminals, homegrown and international terrorists, and "foreign fighters" along an inchoate continuum of suspicion and contempt: the "fake" asylum-seeker therefore reappears now not only as the actual (duplicitous) economic migrant, but also as the (deviant) rapist whose culture or morals are simply inimical to the "European" way of life, or as the (devious) terrorist who conceals himself among the genuine refugees in order to wreak havoc on Europe. Above all, migrant and refugee mobilities and subjectivities have instigated for European authorities an epistemic and governmental dilemma regarding an amorphous mob composed simultaneously of people "in need of protection," shadowed by the specter of predators or enemies against whom Europe itself must be protected. Hence, the "emergency" associated with the uncontrolled arrival of migrants and refugees quickly became not only a matter of border enforcement but also of mundane policing, and signaled an incipient crisis not only of the borders of Europe but also of the entire fabric of the European social order.

A Question of "Europe"

The profound source of the intractable crisis of migration in Europe is the veritable struggle over the borders of Europe—migrants' and refugees' struggles to realize their heterogeneous migratory projects by exercising their elementary freedom of movement, thereby appropriating mobility, transgressing the border regime, and thus making spatial claims, as well as the struggle of European

state powers to subdue and discipline the autonomy of migration (cf. Ataç et al. 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a, 2013b; Kasparek and Speer 2015; Pezzani and Heller 2013; Rigo 2011; Tazzioli 2015b; see also Gambino; Lecadet; Picozza; Scheel; Soto Bermant, this volume). Notably, the European border crisis has been commonly depicted in depoliticizing language as a humanitarian crisis with its root causes always attributed to troubles elsewhere, usually in desperate and chaotic places ostensibly "outside" of Europe. These putative elsewheres, beyond the borders of Europe, are systematically represented as historically sanitized, which is to say, shorn of their deeply European (post)colonial histories as well as disarticulated from the European political and economic interests implicated in producing and sustaining their fractured presents.

The refugees and migrants whose mobilities may be productively understood to appropriate the space of Europe (cf. De Genova 2016a, 2016b; Garelli et al. 2013; Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a; Mezzadra 2006; Tazzioli 2015b) nevertheless most commonly originate from places across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia that were formerly the outright or de facto colonies of European masters. In effect, migrants arriving in Europe today, much as has been true for several decades, originate from places that were effectively mass-scale prison labor camps where their forebears contributed to collectively producing the greater part of the material basis for the prosperity, power, and prestige of Europe, historically. In other words, virtually all migrations and refugee movements that today seek their futures in Europe have been deeply shaped by an indisputably European (colonial) past. Furthermore, particularly for those who flee the devastation of war and military occupation or civil war—from Afghanistan or Iraq to Syria, Libya, Somalia, or Mali (to name but a few)—the expansive human consequences of what Derek Gregory (2004) has incisively called the U.S.-dominated, global "colonial present" (cf. De Genova 2010a) are likewise inextricable from their entrenched and enduring European "post"-colonial entanglements. Consequently, with the imposition, enforcement, and continuous reconfiguration of a European border over the last decades, a brave new Europe has, in effect, been busily redrawing the colonial boundary between a European space largely reserved "for Europeans only" and the postcolonial harvest of centuries of European exploitation and subjugation (De Genova 2010c, 2016a, 2016b; cf. van Houtum 2010; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007; see also Soto Bermant, this volume). Thus, it is a new Europe, fortified by very old and morbid cruelties.

The spatialized partitioning of Europe from its putative outside notably begins within Europe itself, where the borders of Europe and the boundaries of European-ness have repeatedly been reinstituted in the uneasy borderlands that extend eastward (see Dzenovska, this volume). The legacies of the Cold

1	Netherlands
2	Switzerland
3	Czech Rep.
4	Slovakia
5	Hungary
6	Slovenia
7	Croatia
8	Serbia
9	Macedonia

MAP INTRO.4. Europe Provincialized

War have ensured that some regions of "the East" of Europe have been and largely remain a crucial reserve of migrant labor, both within and across the borders of EU citizenship and mobility (Dzenovska 2013a, 2014). This is particularly pertinent with regard to the Balkans, as Europe extends eastward toward Turkey as the perhaps most enduring Orientalized frontier (Mastnak 2003). It is, of course, not incidental that it is precisely the southeastern European countries that previously found themselves within the realm of the Ottoman Empire, where many Europeans themselves are Muslim, that the borders of Europe become riddled with ambiguity, whereby cultural essentialisms can be readily converted into effectively racialized ones. In this manner, European-ness

comes to encompass a variegated and contradictory nexus of racialized formations of whiteness that extend toward a series of "off-white" or "not-quite-white" borderland identities. Hence, the recent prominence of "the Balkan route" for migrant and refugee movements has been haunted by the awkward fact that several European countries which emerged from the genocidal dissolution of Yugoslavia have yet to be (re)admitted into the self-anointed circle of genuine and proper European-ness. Moreover, while there have been intimations that some of these illegalized mobile subjects (particularly Syrians) may ultimately be recognized to be credible and worthy recipients of the status of "refugees,"[19] there are concurrent and insistent assurances that speedy deportation will be the rightful fate of others who may be rejected as mere "migrants." Predictably, the great majority of sub-Saharan Africans are counted among the asylum-seekers preemptively deemed to be immediately eligible for rejection, but notably included among these are also those originating in the Balkan countries themselves. Here, importantly, in addition to the duplicitous insinuation that the devastating effects of the internecine violence of the Yugoslavian civil wars can now be assumed to be simply over and done, and consequently the reductive presumption that human mobilities from the Balkan region are purely economic in motivation, we must also be alert to the systematic deployment of "Balkan" and other "Eastern European" regional or national-origin categorizations for the elision and euphemization of the specificity of Roma (Gypsy) mobilities, in particular (Fox 2012; Fox et al. 2012; Grill 2012a, 2012b). As one of the foundational and constitutive internal racial alterities of Europe, the Roma are now reconstructed anew as a mobile (racialized, criminalized) menace to the stability and integrity of (Western) European "civilization," whose flight from protracted poverty and entrenched marginalization must not even conceivably be apprehensible as the mobility of refugees fleeing institutionalized persecution and structural violence within Europe (Fekete 2014; Hepworth 2012, 2014, 2015; Riedner et al. 2016; Sigona and Trehan 2009; van Baar 2011a, 2011b, 2015; Yildiz and De Genova n.d.).

Consequently, the crisis of European borders is eminently political, in manifold ways. Most importantly, these struggles expose the fact that the borders of Europe are never reducible to anything resembling immutable, integral, internally consistent, or objective boundaries corresponding to any self-evident "natural" fact of physical geography. Nor can these European borders be apprehensible as simply the outward projections of a stable and coherent center, whereby the sociopolitical, cultural, or civilizational identity, and spatial integrity of Europe may be presupposed in contradistinction with a variety of alterities beyond or outside the ostensible limits demarcated by those boundaries. Instead,

Europe's borders, like all borders, are the materializations of sociopolitical relations that mediate the continuous production of the distinction between the putative inside and outside, and likewise mediate the diverse mobilities that are orchestrated and regimented through the production of that spatial divide (De Genova 2013b). Thus, with respect to the abundant inequalities of human mobility, the borders of Europe are simultaneously entangled with a global (postcolonial) politics of race that redraws the proverbial color line and refortifies European-ness as a racial formation of whiteness (De Genova 2016a, 2016b; see also Dzenovska; Soto Bermant; Stierl, this volume), and a comparably global (neoliberal) politics of transnational labor mobility and capitalist labor subordination that produces such spatialized (and racialized) differences, above all, to capitalize upon them (see Gambino, this volume).

For many illegalized asylum-seekers, braving the horrors of the European border regime comes only after fleeing from all manner of atrocities, persecution, and misery in their countries of origin and, commonly, also in numerous other countries of "transit," crossed en route to Europe, which have been materially and practically incorporated to various extents into the externalized policing of the frontiers of Europe (Andersson 2014a, 2014b; see Andersson; Garelli and Tazzioli; Lecadet; Osseiran; Stierl, this volume). For most of these same refugees, as well as many others who migrate in the quest to make a better life for themselves and their loved ones, the vicious severities of this extended and expansive European borderzone present a fierce endurance test, a preliminary apprenticeship in what promises to be a more or less protracted career of migrant "illegality," precarious labor, and deportability (De Genova 2015c; cf. 2002; see Gambino; Garelli and Tazzioli; Lecadet; Picozza; Stierl, this volume). Whether these mobile subjects come to be governed as refugees or migrants, however, their needs, desires, and aspirations always supersede this death-defying obstacle course—albeit, at times, at the cost of their lives. Little surprise, then, that one mode of critical response to the European border regime's ultimate responsibility for the April 2015 shipwreck was to invoke an analogy with the premier slogan of contemporary African American civil rights struggles in the United States—Black Lives Matter—by insisting that Migrant Lives Matter. Here we are reminded that in the European context, the very figure of migration is always already racialized, even as dominant discourses of migration in Europe systematically disavow and dissimulate race as such (Balibar 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992, 1999b; De Genova 2010c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Goldberg 2006, 2009:151–98; see also Dzenovska; Gambino; Scheel; Soto Bermant; Stierl, this volume). Furthermore, given that the horrendous risk of migrant death systematically generated by the European border regime

is disproportionately inflicted upon migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa, the poignant question of whether Black Lives Matter in Europe presents itself ever more urgently. Haunted as Europe's borders are by this appalling proliferation of almost exclusively non-European/nonwhite migrant and refugee deaths and other forms of structural violence and generalized suffering, anyone interested in questions of borders and migration, on the one hand, or questions of race and racism, on the other, today must readily recognize that these questions present themselves in a particularly acute way in the European context.

Conversely, but similarly, anyone concerned with the question of Europe today cannot avoid eventually confronting the urgent and anxious problem of the borders of Europe, and therefore must inevitably come to recognize that the question of Europe itself has become inextricable from the question of migration (Ataç et al. 2015; Balibar 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1993a, 1993b, 1999a, 2004; De Genova 2016a, 2016b; Karakayali and Rigo 2010; Mezzadra 2006, 2010a, 2010b; Rigo 2011; Tazzioli 2015b; Walters 2004, 2009; see also Dzenovska; Soto Bermant, this volume). These questions regarding migration in Europe and the putative borders of Europe, however, cannot be reduced to subsidiary or derivative concerns for a field of inquiry presumed to be more expansive and encompassing, which might be called European studies. It is quite simply no longer credible, or indeed even plausible, to sustain the pretense of any self-satisfied, self-referential scholarship in European studies that complacently disregards or derisively marginalizes the questions of migration and borders. Rather than a discrete and parochial subset for a field that takes Europe to be a greater totality, predictably and presumptuously imagined to be of more universal significance, a genuinely critical examination of borders and migration in Europe unsettles and destabilizes "Europe" as an object of knowledge, and instigates a confrontation with the problem of Europe itself.

The uneven geopolitics of policing the borders of Europe and the heterogeneous tactics of various nation-states for managing the ostensible crisis, as we have seen, have riddled the project of EU-ropean integration and border harmonization with its own irreconcilable contradictions. The referendum in the United Kingdom on June 23, 2016, in which a majority of British voters demanded a formal exit from the European Union, following a prolonged political campaign of anti-immigrant hostility and heightened anxiety over border control, has been merely the most dramatic index of the fractures threatening the viability of the EU in the wake of the migration and border "crisis." Following the so-called Brexit vote, various far-right political movements across Europe chiefly dedicated to reactionary populist hostility toward migrants and

anti-Muslim racism were predictably enthused that they might successfully capitalize on the British example. On the other hand, the spontaneous mobilization of EU citizens' solidarity campaigns under the banner of "Refugees Welcome"—and most poignantly, the collective organization of automotive caravans to openly provide material and practical assistance to refugees and migrants in the completion their cross-border journeys, particularly from Hungary into Austria and Germany, in flagrant defiance of legal prohibitions that would construe such acts of compassion and solidarity as the alleged trafficking or smuggling of "illegal" migrants, and hence as criminal offenses—have only served to amplify and telescope the fracture between these European citizens' transnational solidarity with migrants' and refugees' struggles and the sovereign power of European states (cf. Ataç et al. 2015; Doppler 2015; Kasparek and Speer 2015; Stierl 2015). In other words, political movements on both the right and left, anti-immigrant nativists as well as movements in solidarity with migrants and refugees, help to underscore a fracture between the presumptive sovereignty of state powers and the communities otherwise figured as the polities from which such claims to sovereign power are purported to be democratically derived (De Genova 2015b). Thus, the larger conflictive processes of bordering Europe have generated a still larger political crisis for the institutional politico-juridical formation of the European Union, for EU-ropean citizenship, and for European democracy more generally.

The struggles of migration and borders reanimate race and postcoloniality as central to adequately addressing the most fundamental problems of what "Europe" is supposed to be, and who may be counted as "European"—which together I enfold as the European Question (De Genova 2016a, 2016b). Much as the borders of Europe have been instituted and are constantly being policed for the sake of stabilizing and purportedly protecting the space of Europe—first and foremost, and above all, as a preserve for the presumable birthright entitlements of "Europeans"—the unrelenting struggle over the autonomous mobility of "non-Europeans" across those symbolic and material boundaries continuously instigates a restaging of the borders of Europe as sites of their own subversion, and concomitantly as the scene for the spectral undoing of Europe itself. The borders of Europe therefore present a premier site for the enactment and disputation of the very question of and about Europe. This book therefore situates the borders of Europe not at the margins but rather at the very center of contemporary questions and debates about Europe. And here, behind the debates over the borders of Europe, the still more fundamental point bears emphatic reiteration: The question of Europe itself has become inextricable from the question of migration, which itself is systematically pressed to serve

as a proxy for an ever-deferred confrontation with the European Question as a problem of race and postcoloniality.

Finally, beyond these relatively parochial questions of Europe and European studies, this book is centrally concerned with the autonomous dynamics of human mobility on a global scale and the formations of state power and sovereignty that react to the exercise of an elementary freedom of movement through diverse tactics and techniques of bordering. To the extent that the European Union entails a transnational and partially supranational juridical and political formation, with an extraordinarily variegated and graduated spectrum of differential (and never perfectly harmonized) arrangements that regulate and modulate its internal and external relations, a high degree of instability and mobility is always already implied by the very existence of the borders that may now be characterized as European (see Andersson; Heller and Pezzani; Picozza; Soto Bermant, this volume). And with regard to "unwanted" refugees or "undesirable" illegalized migrants, these European borders have been externalized and virtualized to extraordinary and unprecedented degrees (see Lecadet, this volume). Hence, scholarship in migration and border studies only neglects a rigorous and critical examination of these processes and struggles in the contemporary European context at the risk of failing to apprehend what is indisputably a remarkable site of unprecedented experimentation and improvisation, a transnational and intercontinental laboratory for the regimentation and subordination of human powers and freedoms in relation to the space of the planet. In this respect, this volume contributes to the much wider critical literature on the themes of migration, refugee movements, and border struggles—from the U.S.–Mexico border, and its externalization and extension through the length of Mexico and across the geography of Central America, at least as far as Colombia and Ecuador; to the maritime border enforcement tactics of Australia's "Pacific Solution" and its extension across variegated maritime borderscapes from the Indian subcontinent through Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific; to the complex migration regimes of Saudi Arabia and the Arab/Persian Gulf and their reach into India and the Philippines; to the simultaneous militarized barricading of both the exterior borders and the interior (colonial) frontiers of Israel, to name only the most obvious comparative examples. Thus, *The Borders of "Europe"* (re)situates the seemingly parochial or particularistic matter of Europe and its border and migration crisis within a global frame, profoundly interconnected to the ongoing reconfigurations of an effectively planetary regime dedicated to the neoliberal and postcolonial government of human mobility, and the border struggles that are ever increasingly manifest across the world.

This volume showcases original research on the borders of "Europe" by some of the most promising junior scholars working in this dynamic field of critical inquiry today. Their work exudes the greatest promise of genuine interdisciplinarity, deftly bridging the political and social sciences, integrating critical analyses of law, policy, and politics with fine-grained ethnographic insights into the everyday experiences and perspectives arising from the lived encounters between the autonomy and subjectivity of migration with the tactics and technologies of bordering.

In the opening chapter, Stephan Scheel provides an indispensable contextualization of the ways that the ostensible "crisis" of the borders of Europe supplies a spectacle of border enforcement that systematically diverts critical scrutiny away from the actual production of migrant "illegality" in the laws and policies that govern transnational mobility into the European Union. This chapter reminds us of the well-established fact that the vast majority of illegalized migrants within the European Union do *not* enter by crossing state borders clandestinely or in unseaworthy boats, but rather do so in a perfectly "legal" manner with a Schengen visa to a European destination, only later to become "illegal" once the visa has expired. Thus, Scheel demonstrates how the Schengen visa regime facilitates migratory access to the space of Europe even as it effectively forecloses such forms of "legitimate" mobility for the great majority of humanity. This less visible (less spectacularized) mode of illegalized migration has tended to receive rather scant attention, however. This chapter therefore focuses on the introduction of the EU's Visa Information System (VIS) and the consequent development of a vast biometric database that has foreclosed some of the practices by which migrants could previously successfully appropriate mobility to Europe through access to a Schengen visa. Approaching the Schengen visa regime from the perspective of mobility and the autonomy of migration, Scheel examines how migrants succeed in appropriating the Schengen visa in the context of biometric border controls. From the standpoint of visa applicants, Scheel argues, the Schengen visa regime constitutes an unpredictable regime of institutionalized distrust that renders mobility to Europe a scarce resource by setting unreasonable or unrealistic requirements for a visa that seldom correspond to local circumstances in the places where prospective travelers/migrants submit their visa applications. Hence, in addition to and apart from the dangerous modes of clandestine border crossing that forgo any hope of "legal" arrival in Europe, the Schengen visa regime indeed emerges as a vast machine of migrant illegalization that provokes precisely the

"illegal" practices of appropriation of visas that it is presumably meant to fore-stall. Illustrated through the example of the provision of manipulated support-ing documents, this chapter formulates a conceptual outline of six defining features that migrant practices of mobility appropriation share, irrespective of their diverse forms. Apart from demonstrating that moments of migrant autonomy persist within biometric border regimes, Scheel thus promotes the concept of appropriation as an alternative framework for theorizing migrants' capacities to subvert border controls.

Moving from the comparatively obscure but prosaic practices of biometric bordering enacted through visa controls, Ruben Andersson directs our attention to a seeming paradox that defines the European Union's responses to "irregu-lar" migration and refugee flows across its southern frontiers—that the often draconian practices of border control are conjoined with humanitarian man-dates, such that the apparatuses of migrant capture and "rescue" become deeply entangled. While Italy's navy "rescued" and effectively ferried tens of thousands of migrants intercepted on unseaworthy boats in 2014, Spain added razor wire to the border fences surrounding its North African enclave in Melilla and al-lowed violent "push-backs" into Morocco. Foregrounding these governmental ambivalences, this chapter situates humanitarian and liberal measures firmly within the context of a larger assemblage of migration controls that now reaches far beyond the Euro-African frontier. Whereas the ostensible divide between liberal/humanitarian and securitarian approaches to bordering appears to be substantial, Andersson examines how these are in fact deeply enmeshed within Europe's larger response to unauthorized border crossings. It becomes clear, for instance, that border fences and mass deployments of policing at land borders have pushed migrants and refugees toward more risky maritime crossings— and thus directly into the hands of Europe's humanitarian apparatus. At sea, meanwhile, European security forces have used humanitarian justifications for intercepting boats along African coasts (including boats that were not in dis-tress), yet this co-optation of humanitarianism has in turn been co-opted by migrants themselves, who subsequently came to actively seek rescue. Through such interactions, moreover, Andersson demonstrates how an industry has grown up around migratory routes in which care and control functions both clash and sometimes merge with each other, making any attempt at dismantling the border machinery or implementing alternative approaches increasingly difficult and implausible.

In the third chapter, Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani focus on the specific contradictions and complexities raised for tactics of bordering imple-mented across the Mediterranean Sea. Considering how the liquid expanse of

the sea has traditionally represented a challenge for governance, whereby the impossibility of drawing fixed and stable boundaries in ever-changing waters has inspired notions of the seas as a space of absolute freedom and uninhibited flow, this chapter demonstrates in contrast how the Mediterranean is increasingly subjected to elaborate forms of surveillance and documentation for purposes of governance. A complex sensing apparatus is fundamental to a form of governance that combines the division of maritime spaces and the control of movement, and that instrumentalizes the partial, overlapping, and "elastic" nature of maritime jurisdictions and international law. It is under these conditions that the EU migration regime operates, selectively expanding sovereign rights through patrols on the high seas but also retracting them in tactical retreats from responsibility, as in numerous instances of nonassistance to migrants at sea. Through the policies and the conditions of maritime governance organized by the EU, the authors argue, the sea is turned into a deadly liquid and converted into the direct and immediate cause of death for untold thousands of migrants and refugees. However, Heller and Pezzani also contend that by using the Mediterranean's remote sensing apparatus against the grain and spatializing violations and abuses by border authorities at sea, it is possible to challenge the regimes of governance and visibility imposed on this contested geography.

Crossing the Mediterranean to its North African shore, Laia Soto Bermant considers the constitution of Europe as a political, economic, and cultural project from the point of view of one of its most controversial borderlands: the Spanish enclave of Melilla. A 12-km² enclave located in northeastern Morocco, Melilla has been under Spanish sovereignty since the late fifteenth century. In the early 1990s, when Spain joined the Schengen area, Melilla became one of Europe's southernmost borderlands. Since then, Melilla—as a "European" outpost in Africa—has played a crucial role as a buffer zone between the two continents, operating as a first line of defense against migratory flows into "Europe." This chapter explores Melilla's "border experiments" as a paradigmatic example of the conflicting forces at play in the global move toward border securitization. First, Soto Bermant examines how the enclave has been physically reconfigured over the past two decades in the interests of enhanced "security," and demonstrates how, behind the image of Melilla as a European bastion under siege, there lies a complex system of selective permeability designed to facilitate informal trade flows while nonetheless obstructing migration flows. Further, in the effort to critically problematize the question of "Europe" itself, the chapter explores the discursive activities of place construction that legitimize this system, and considers how "Europe," as an idea and as a political space, has been incorporated into these local narratives.

Moving from the frontiers of Europe into the amorphous and expansive spaces of expulsion where deported migrants must regroup their energies, Clara Lecadet offers a perspective on the European deportation regime from the vantage point of the politicization of expelled migrants in Africa, starting from the middle of the 1990s with the creation of the Malian Expelled Migrants Association in Bamako. Lecadet analyzes the ways in which deportees organized themselves to take collective action, and the spread of a critique of the communitization of European expulsion policies through various forms of political action. The politicization of expellees in fact produced claims directed at the deporting states from beyond their territorial boundaries, with regard to the reception, rights, and citizenship of forcibly "returned" migrants. The chapter likewise examines the inherent contradictions in the claims-making of these political movements as they fluctuated between emancipatory and instrumentalized tactics and strategies within the wider context of a global approach to the implementation of "return" measures promoted by European authorities and international agencies.

From an analogous space in the borderlands of Europe, in their chapter, Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli look at the restructuring of the tactics of bordering along the lines of humanitarian rationalities through the lens of the refugee camp at Choucha, in Tunisia, at the border with Libya. The humanitarian camp had originally been established to provide refugees from Libya's civil war with shelter while their asylum claims were considered. Many who had originally been labor migrants to Libya (mainly from sub-Saharan African countries) found themselves stranded at Choucha, following the camp's official closure by the authorities of the United Nations. Effectively abandoned after having been deemed to be mere "migrants," these refugees enacted various strategies: some remained at Choucha and persisted in their efforts to claim resettlement; some fled to Tunis to seek informal employment, now as irregularized migrants in Tunisia; others left for Europe on "migrant boats." The authors map how these different paths encountered, displaced, and rearticulated humanitarian technologies for migration management, focusing in particular on the refusal by some to take to the sea, on the one hand, and the encounters between others with the Italian Navy's "military and humanitarian" mission Mare Nostrum in the Mediterranean, on the other. Far from being a homogeneous political technology, Garelli and Tazzioli contend, the humanitarian regime emerges as a fragmented mechanism wherein disparate regimes of visibility, temporal borders, tactics of border enforcement, and forms of capture intersect in the production of vulnerability for displaced people.

The next chapter, by Souad Osseiran, examines the predicament of Syrians in Istanbul who inhabit the ambiguous and ambivalent condition that she characterizes as "migrants/refugees," who commonly migrate to Istanbul with the aim of continuing on to "Europe." While in Istanbul, they dedicate much of their time and energies to arranging their ensuing journeys. Part of their preparations entails discussing the various possibilities of migration and the particularities of distinct versions of "Europe," specifically the various EU member states to which or through which they might prospectively travel. This chapter explores the ways in which Syrian migrants/refugees exchange stories in Istanbul about "Europe" and contemplate the peculiarities of the uneven space of the EU. Drawing on ethnographic data gathered in Istanbul from mid-2012 through the end of 2013, Osseiran argues that through the exchange of such narratives about various migratory routes and the divergent encounters with migratory and asylum regimes that these routes imply, Syrian migrants/refugees develop a discrepant understanding of "Europe" and the space of the EU beyond official political boundaries or the constructions of the EU's juridical or legislative bodies. In their stories, notably depicting various European destinations as spaces of greater or lesser temporariness or potential permanence, Syrian migrants/refugees blur borders and boundaries, and elaborate an alternative perspective on "Europe."

Moving from the Turkish zone of migrant "transit" to Greece, on the "European" side of the border, Maurice Stierl recounts his encounters with an extended Syrian family seeking to escape the Greek/EU-ropean borderscape of Athens. Renarrating the struggles of Jaser and his relatives to overcome their migrant predicament in Greece and move onward toward Western European countries highlights not only the effects of diffuse and violent forms of border governance but also the refugees' endurance and resistance in a climate of fear and unwantedness. It is through these encounters in (arrested) transit that this chapter engages with conceptualizations of the autonomy of migration, which tend to depict migration as a social force with "excessive potentialities." Revisiting Michel Foucault's short reflection on the "Lives of Infamous Men," questions of excess, anonymity, im/perceptibility, and autonomy are addressed to (discourses on) contemporary migration movements. The author points out that contemporary EU border governance can be understood as being excessively violent in its own right, often enacting horrific border spectacles that come to be inscribed in both the minds and bodies of border crossers as fear, trauma, and depression, even long after having arrived at their desired destinations. Beginning with such "border entanglements," Stierl argues, enables a closer

exploration of the ways in which human creativity and excess are manifested as well as violated in (attempted) enactments of cross-border movement.

In her chapter, Fiorenza Picozza endeavors to deconstruct the categories through which migrant identities are conventionally read, analyzing the socio-legal production of migrant "illegality" and "refugee"-ness within the context of the Dublin Regulation—the EU's common framework for asylum. The analysis draws upon ethnographic fieldwork in Rome and London, focusing on the trans-European mobility of Afghan "Dubliners" and on how they subjectively experience the Dublin regime at simultaneously legal, social, and existential levels. Dubliners, the chapter demonstrates, seem to be "stuck in transit," constantly moving from one EU country to another, and sometimes spending up to ten years struggling to settle. In spite of the limitations imposed by the Dublin Regulation—for which an asylum claim can be submitted only in the first country in which the asylum seeker has been registered—as well as "national" regulations, by which recognized refugees are only permitted to reside and work in that particular country, Dubliners' restlessness reveals a complex panoply of interstitial spaces of autonomy. In this fraught interplay between "illegality" and various tentative forms of "legality," migration categories are shown to be increasingly bureaucratized and yet, at the same time, increasingly blurred.

Considering an analogous but distinct formation of translocal spatial mobilities, Evelina Gambino provides insight into the Gran Ghettò, a spontaneous migrant settlement located in the heartland of agricultural production in the Capitanata Plain in Puglia, southern Italy. Since the 1990s, thousands of migrant workers have traveled to and resided in this shantytown, transforming it into the largest recruiting center in the region for the provision of "cheap" labor for the tomato harvest. Beginning in 2012, Campagne in Lotta, a large political network of "native" Italian and migrant workers, established an activist project in the Gran Ghettò with the aim of breaking the migrant farmworkers' isolation and articulating collective demands for more fair labor conditions. This chapter is an account of that experience and the political struggle that ensued from it. The account corresponds to two separate but intertwined periods of Gambino's direct activist participation in the Campagne in Lotta project as a "militant researcher." The first section analyzes the conditions of life for illegalized migrant workers in the ghetto, with the workers' exploitation by employers explained against the backdrop of the intersections between capital and numerous governmental tools for the control of migrant mobility. The second section concerns Campagne in Lotta's political intervention in the ghetto, based on the appreciation of and contribution to informal networks of migrant social relations.

Gambino contends that these networks constitute the infrastructure of a virtual migrant metropolis, connecting migrants' movements on a transnational (and effectively global) scale. The chapter describes how, during the three years of its existence, Campagne in Lotta has managed to become a part of these traveling relations, moving across the extended space of this migrant metropolis through its diverse projects and the discovery of new sites of intervention as its participants have changed location. The embeddedness of Campagne in Lotta in this geography of migrant mobility, Gambino contends, constitutes its greatest strength and emerges as the precondition for radically new processes of political experimentation and formations of solidarity and struggle to take place.

In contrast to such solidarity projects, in the concluding chapter, Dace Dzenovska examines how the bordering of Europe comes to be diffused throughout everyday life and relies upon citizen involvement through practices of reporting (or informing on) suspected "foreigners," including tenants, neighbors, and even family members. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the bordering practices of the Latvian State Border Guard and the British Home Office, Dzenovska contends that an analysis of "reporting" as a technology of government and an element of public culture is crucial for understanding the kinds of subjects and socialities that contemporary (late) liberal democratic political regimes assume, deploy, and produce, and thus for understanding the polities that they make possible. Inasmuch as this sort of informing has been associated in recent history with the political repertoires of totalitarian states, Dzenovska uses the historical-analytical lens of state socialism to bring into sharper focus the specificities of reporting in contemporary European liberal democratic contexts. The chapter goes on to suggest that state socialism and postsocialist transformations can serve as "portable analytics" that help to illuminate the power of "freedom" to obscure the work of state power in liberal democratic contexts. Notably, it is precisely in the work of bordering Europe within the contours of the "interior" spaces of European everyday life that this sort of power enlists citizens as informers who can assist in the mundane policing and surveillance of migrant "foreign"-ness.

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Thus, from Mali to Latvia, from London to Istanbul, from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Evros River, from a refugee camp on the Libya–Tunisia border to a migrant farmworker camp in southern Italy, the chapters assembled in this volume explore the heterogeneous formations of the autonomy of migration

and the eclectic assortment of tactics of bordering that have transformed the enlarged and extended space of "Europe" into a variegated borderland (Balibar 2004/2009). The ambitious research and critical analysis compiled here on the borders of "Europe" supply a vital fulcrum for understanding the dynamic tensions and unresolved conflicts that situate the autonomy of migration and the reaction formations of border policing techniques and immigration law enforcement tactics as an indispensable and inescapable centerpiece for European studies today, while simultaneously enriching the wider comparative and theoretical purviews of the overlapping interdisciplinary fields of migration, refugee, and border studies on a global scale.

Acknowledgments

NOTES

1. See also the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) "Missing Migrants Project," http://missingmigrants.iom.int.

2. The intensified enforcement at border crossings of easiest passage relegates illegalized migrant mobilities into zones of more severe hardship and potentially lethal

passage. The escalation of migrant and refugee deaths along the U.S.–Mexico border (De León 2015; Dunn 2009; Nevins 2008, 2010; Regan 2010; Rosas 2006; Stephen 2008; Squire 2014; Sundberg 2011; Urrea 2004) as well as in the maritime border zones of Australia (Weber and Pickering 2011) bears a striking resemblance to the parallel proliferation of migrant deaths instigated by the unprecedented extremities and severities of the European border regime—particularly across the Mediterranean Sea but also externalized across the entire expanse of the Sahara Desert (cf. Andersson 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Bredeloup 2012; Lecadet 2013a, 2013b). For a global overview of the escalation in migrant deaths, see IOM (2014) and the IOM's "Missing Migrants Project," http://missingmigrants.iom.int.

3. The most comprehensive database documenting migrant and refugee deaths during attempts to traverse the borders of Europe is "The Migrants' Files," www.themigrantsfiles.com, a data project coordinated by Journalism++, which estimates the total number of European border deaths at more than 30,000. See also IOM (2014); Shields (2015); Spijkerboer (2007, 2013); Spijkerboer and Last (2014); van Houtum and Boedeltje (2009); cf. Carling (2007a) and the IOM's "Missing Migrants Project," http://missingmigrants.iom.int.

4. It remains a matter of speculation whether there was a deliberate rechanneling of migrant and refugee movements by various border policing tactics toward the so-called Balkan route, such as the increasing militarization of the sea routes from Greece to Italy with the launch in June 2015 of the maritime military mission EUNAVFOR-Med, or alternately whether the increasing prominence of this land option was the result of autonomous migratory dynamics (including, of course, the discretionary judgment of so-called smugglers). It is also noteworthy that recourse to the land routes across the Balkans is frequently preceded by comparatively short maritime passages between Turkey and Greece across the Aegean Sea. Nevertheless, while the central Mediterranean routes have remained a primary passage for migratory movements from much of Africa, it seems that movements from the Middle East and beyond, usually via Turkey, have long alternated between two basic options—one passing directly through Greece or Bulgaria, and potentially leading to land routes through the Balkans, and another that involves transit through Egypt or Libya, followed by trans-Mediterranean maritime routes. Indeed, mass deaths by shipwreck began to escalate again during the spring of 2016, and the total number of recorded migrant/refugee deaths in 2016 finally exceeded those recorded for 2015. More than 700 people are believed to have drowned in three shipwrecks in the Mediterranean during the last week of May 2016 alone, marking the deadliest seven days for Europe's borders since the events of April 2015.

5. In response to the versatile autonomous mobilities of migrants, newly mobile and dispersed forms of governmentality and techniques of border control have arisen, provoking William Walters's important call (2014, 2015a, 2015b; cf. 2006) for a more careful critical scrutiny of the proliferation not only of borders and sites of bordering but also the routes and vessels of migratory movement, culminating in what he designates as the "viapolitics" of migration (see also Stuesse and Coleman 2014; Walters et al. n.d.).

6. In addition, as Matthew Carr points out, whereas only 125 people were killed trying to cross the Berlin Wall, at least 150 migrants committed suicide in Germany alone

from 1988 to 2008 because they were confronted with the prospect of deportation (2012:4; see also Ataç et al. 2015).

7. For contributions to the elaboration of the critical concept of the "autonomy of migration," see Mezzadra (2001, 2004, 2011); Mezzadra in Bojadžijev and Saint-Saëns (2006); Mezzadra and Neilson (2003, 2013); Moulier Boutang (1998, 2001); Moulier Boutang and Garson (1984); Moulier-Boutang and Grelet (2001); cf. Bojadžijev and Karakayali (2010); De Genova (2009, 2010b, 2010d); Karakayali and Rigo (2010); Mitropoulos (2006); Nyers (2003); Papadopoulos et al. (2008); Papastergiadis (2000, 2005, 2010); Rigo (2011); Scheel (2013a, 2013b, 2017); Tsianos and Karakayali (2010); Walters (2008).

8. Joint Statement on Mediterranean Crossings of UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for International Migration and Development Peter Sutherland, and Director-General of the International Organization for Migration William Lacy Swing (April 23, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/5538d9079.html.

9. As in all of my previous work, I consistently deploy quotes wherever the term "illegality" appears, and wherever the term "illegal" modifies migration or migrants, in order to emphatically denaturalize the reification of this distinction. Otherwise, I rely on the more precise term illegalized (see De Genova 2002).

10. For various contributions to the critique of the discourse of "slavery," see www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery.

11. For related work on the implication of humanitarian governmentalities in the sorting and ranking of "deserving" and "undeserving" migrants and the selective deployment of humanitarian "exceptions" regarding migrants susceptible to deportation, see Castañeda (2010); Fassin (2005); Fassin and Rechtman (2009); Fischer (2013); and Ticktin (2006, 2011).

12. The Calais area demarcates a site of border policing between Britain and the Schengen zone (the European area free of border controls or passport checks for citizens from the twenty-six signatory countries). The Schengen area includes twenty-two of the twenty-eight EU member states, plus an additional four countries that are not EU members; Britain, however, is not a Schengen country.

13. The Schengen accord predated the European Union, but was incorporated into the EU's Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, with provisions for some member states to opt out.

14. Slovakian police fired live ammunition at border crossers at the border with Hungary, wounding a Syrian refugee woman, on May 9, 2016 (Cowburn 2016a). A few weeks earlier, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish soldiers were firing live rounds at Syrian civilian border crossers (Cowburn 2016b).

15. On the wider topic of the externalization of the borders of the EU, see Andersson (2012, 2014a, 2014b); Andrijasevic (2010); Bialasiewicz (2012); Bredeloup (2012); Carter and Merrill (2007); Casas-Cortes et al. (2011, 2013); Collyer (2007); Dzenovska (2014); Feldman (2012); Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas (2014); Garelli et al. (2013); Hansen and Jonsson (2011); Karakayali and Rigo (2010); Rigo (2011); Soto Bermant

(2014); Tazzioli (2014); Tsianos and Karakayali (2010); van Houtum and Boedeltje (2009); Walters (2009).

16. Subsequently, it was indeed Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel who reinitiated negotiations between the EU and Turkey that sought to reward Turkey with at least €3 billion in exchange for an expanded role in policing the external borders of the EU and the more effective containment of more than 2 million Syrians and other refugees and migrants. As Merkel put it, such measures would help "keep people in the region," which is to say, keep them out of Europe. In addition, the EU reopened stalled negotiations regarding an extension of visa-free travel privileges to (qualifying) Turkish citizens, as well as the larger question of Turkey's prospective admission to EU membership. See Kanter and Higgins (2015). The "deal" was confirmed on March 18, 2016, allowing Greece to "return" or "relocate" (i.e., deport) to Turkey "all new irregular migrants" arriving after March 20, 2016. For analysis of the legal, political, and ethical vagaries of the agreement, see Collett (2016). As a predictable result of these efforts to more effectively close the Aegean routes, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that maritime crossings from Libya in March 2016 had increased to three times the figure for 2015 (Stephen 2016).

17. For more general discussions of the metaphysics of antiterrorism and the rise of specifically anti-Muslim racism in the context of the production of discourses of a "Muslim menace," see De Genova (2007, 2010a, 2010c, 2011b, 2015d); for a discussion of the sociopolitical context of the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings in Paris in January 2015, see De Genova (2017); De Genova and Tazzioli (2015).

18. Replete with the obligatory critiques of the immanence of refugees to the havoc wrought by global capitalism and perfunctory gestures against neocolonialism, Žižek has even transposed his advocacy of "repressive means" (2015) into a call for "military and economic interventions" (2015), and more specifically, the European "militarization" of migration management in the war-stricken sites from which refugees flee, in order to "organize airlifts and regulate immigration" in places such as Syria and Libya (2016b).

19. Indeed, on November 18, 2015, EU member states Slovenia and Croatia, followed by non-EU countries Serbia and Macedonia, abruptly closed their borders to any would-be "asylum-seekers" who could not provide identity documents specifically confirming that they came from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan—effectively segregating refugees according to national origin (Associated Press 2015).