

THE INNER LIFE OF RACE



SOULS, BODIES, &
THE HISTORY OF
RACIAL POWER

*Leerom
Medovoi*

THE
INNER
LIFE OF
RACE

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For Marcia, Samara, Jacob, Ro,
and for a better world

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INTRODUCTION

Ensoulment: A Strategy of Racial Power

On her way to work one morning
Down the path alongside the lake
A tender hearted woman saw a poor half frozen snake
His pretty colored skin had been all frosted with the dew
“Poor thing,” she cried, “I’ll take you in and I’ll take care of you”
“Take me in tender woman
Take me in, for heaven’s sake
Take me in, tender woman,” sighed the snake.
—OSCAR BROWN JR., “The Snake”

If the language of race can be grounded in color, physiognomy, ancestry, religion, ideology, identification, or even sexual desire, what exactly holds it together? I will hypothesize in the following pages that race is above all a technology of power. From this vantage point, the best way to theorize race is to begin not with an explanation of how it fractionalizes populations (which it can do in many ways) but with the question of why it does so and with what ultimate results. My answers in this book will revolve around the key concepts of enmity and security, an approach that derives in part from the fact that my project originally began as an attempt to explore Islamophobia as a species of racism. What, I wanted to ask, distinguishes Islamophobia from other racisms that have been central to critical ethnic studies

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in the United States? To what extent does the word “Islamophobia,” which implies the pathological fear of a religion, clarify (or not) this distinctive form of racism? If religious affiliation is spiritually rather than corporeally defined, what conception of “race” is even at stake in Islamophobia? And in the long aftermath of the war on terror, these questions raised another: What role do projects of security and the production of populational enemies play in the history of racial power?

In the process of trying to answer these questions, I began to rethink certain working assumptions about the basic features of race and racism, widening in the process both the theoretical and historical scope of this book. I found that the critical study of Islamophobia opens onto a set of major questions about the shared genealogies of race and security that would require writing a different study than the one I had first conceived. I also found that what W. E. B. Du Bois called racisms of the “color line” cannot easily be cordoned off from the study of Islamophobia and antisemitism, nor indeed from the wider politics of populational security that underlay racisms.¹ All of this became especially clear to me in the face of Donald Trump’s powerful recombination of race-making practices, which, as this book intends to show, characterize a late-fascist flexible racism with a paradoxically long genealogy.

As a central feature of his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump lambasted a “corrupt political establishment” for admitting two distinct populations entry into the United States: Syrian refugees fleeing a destructive civil war, as well as other refugees from Muslim majority countries; and Latin American immigrants, likewise seeking an escape from violence in their home countries. However much they looked like humanitarian victims, insisted Trump, these groups were twin Trojan horses smuggling across our borders a murderous intent that would eventually be unleashed on Americans. Trump’s proposed solutions to both “threats” were virtually identical: erect a barrier against their entry. For Middle Easterners, Trump proposed a blanket travel ban. For Latin Americans, Trump proposed a border wall.

Trump’s ongoing hostility toward Mexican and Central American immigrants can be closely identified with his white nationalist sentiments, a key element in his right-wing populist politics that aim to “make America great again” by stemming a rising tide of color and restoring a political culture of white supremacy associated with some glorious yet unspecified past. This account of Trumpian racism seems right as far as it goes. Taking it as our starting point, however, how do we interpret Trump’s symmetrical attitudes toward Latin American immigrants and Muslims? Have Arabs and Muslims, as some argue, become reclassified as people of color in the post-9/11 era, such that the immigrant from Syria embodies today the same dreaded dilution of American

whiteness as the immigrant from Mexico or Honduras? Or do we need a different order of explanation? Does right-wing populist racism, perhaps, activate a politics of population that renders Muslims as enemies of national greatness on the basis of something not quite explicable through the hierarchy of the white/nonwhite binary? If so, what could that alternate basis be? And might it also turn out to apply to Latin Americans?

To add yet another level of complication, there is also the question of the racialization of Trump's "corrupt political establishment." To that end, how should we introduce into our overarching analysis the striking resurgence of antisemitism? Jews are certainly not people of color, even in Trump's America. Yet the chants of "Jews will not replace us" heard at the 2017 white supremacist Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville clearly drew inspiration from the appeal of Trump's plan to fight the "very bad people" who "want to do great destruction to our country."² The antisemitic variation on Trump's extensive cast of "bad people" was on especially vivid display in the final video ad of his 2016 presidential campaign, titled "Donald Trump's Argument for America," which featured Janet Yellen, George Soros, and Lloyd Blankfein as sinister Jewish bankers busily extracting ever more wealth from the American working class (Trump 2016).

It should be clear that Muslims, Mexicans, and Jews represent far from identical dangers in the Trumpian racist model. The respective perils to America around which each threat is articulated—terrorism, criminality, and finance—adopt very different inflections. But what then do they actually share? In certain respects, this is an old and vexing question in the scholarship on race and racism. Color-line racism, Islamophobia, and antisemitism: are they fundamentally different from one another, or does some common political strategy of racism underlie them all?³ At the end of the day, this book supports the second position. But to extract the common racial kernel at the heart of their disparate but related politics, I will need to revisit certain features of what is conventionally understood to define both race and racism, rereading them in ways that still centrally feature the hierarchizing action of a color line between white and nonwhite, while recognizing that this line serves as just one important rule in a wider and more encompassing game of racial power.

The principal argument of this book is that racial power employs not so much a differential logic consistently grounded in hierarchies of embodiment, as a dialectic of bodies and souls, a dialectic through which those hierarchies are adduced and within which they are enfolded. Because bodies represent the visible moment in a racial dialectic of the seen and unseen, especially in the context of the "color line," this fuller operation is not always on open display. Once

the soul enters into the analysis, however, race proves a far more capacious and flexible strategy of power—bearing a far more complex genealogy—than attention to the body alone would suggest.

The soul may seem a strangely old-fashioned concept to invoke. It is a word that whiffs of religious superstition, so unlike its counterpart, the body, which has become a highly fashionable topic of academic study, whether in the name of a new materialist methodology, a biopolitical analysis, or the underlying concerns of antiracist and antisexist scholarship. I should therefore state at the outset that I generally share the materialist outlook (in my case a historical materialist one) of much contemporary antiracist criticism. This book is meant as a critical intervention into the practical political history of how human bodies have been administered by successive regimes of power. Yet I proceed from the assumption that thinking exclusively from the viewpoint of “body politics” will not suffice for the critical analysis of race and racism, precisely because the exercise of racial power has always involved producing the soul (or its various analogs: the mind, the spirit, the conscience, the subject, the inner self) so that it might serve as what Michel Foucault once called, in a brilliant reversal, “the prison of the body” (Foucault 2012, 30). To be sure, racialized populations are administered in part by regimes of classification that employ what materialist critics might call the politics of “embodiment,” but this book will argue that racial embodiment finds its greatest effectiveness within strategies of power that pair it with the tactics of what I will call “ensoulment.” By “ensoulment” I mean a political effort to know (and, through knowing, an effort to conduct) an inner life that is assumed to be not directly perceivable on the body’s surface even if it can only be deciphered and governed through the mediation of bodily symptoms. In this book, therefore, to “ensoul” a person or a population is to perform a biopolitical calculation that associates them with a certain quantity and quality of threat, and which thereby specifies to which technologies of power their bodies should be subjected.

This tactical concept of “ensoulment” as the work of the dialectic under investigation also suggests something about why this introduction adds the phrase “game of racial power” to the more common terminology of the “racial formation” or the regime of “structural racism.” The concept of “racial formation” offers a powerful way of thinking about the socially constructed arrangements through which populations are divided, classified, and hierarchized, but also the way in which these divisions are reconstructed over time. “Structural racism” likewise offers a materialist formulation with which to challenge the reduction of racism to a social mentality, a set of collective prejudices, or a discriminatory attitude, redirecting us instead toward the set of material rela-

tions (political, social, economic) that produce and reproduce the disparities of racism. What the language of “game” adds is a way of viewing racism as a regulated conflict over the “truth” of a population that conducts itself at both a macrostrategic and microtactical level. While “regimes” simply govern, “games” must be played, necessitating imaginative judgments, speculative predictions, and tactical “moves” that will have outcomes for all those caught up in the game.

From Biopolitics to the Government of Souls

To consider how ensoulment is advanced through the game of racial power, I would like to return briefly to Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign. At his 2016 rallies, Trump at some point discovered and began reading aloud to his supporters the lyrics to an old rhythm and blues song titled “The Snake,” which he converted into a fable for the overarching racial threat he associated with Latin American immigrants and Muslim refugees. The song tells the story of a “tender-hearted” woman who, finding a half-frozen snake outside, falls in love with its “pretty skin,” which she kisses and holds tight. “Take me in, tender woman,” sighs the snake, so she takes him home to share a warm comforter, dishes of honey and milk, and a chance to recuperate. On returning from work at the end of the next day, she finds the snake fully recovered. But even though he “might have died” without her intervention, the snake expresses not gratitude but treachery, biting the woman and injecting her with his lethal venom. When she cries in distress, “you know your bite is poisonous and now I’m going to die,” the reptile answers with a malicious grin, “Oh shut up you silly woman . . . You knew damn well I was a snake before you took me in.”

Trump’s choice of this song was more than a little ironic. “The Snake” was written in 1963 by Oscar Brown Jr., a postwar African American musician, civil rights activist, and former communist. Like another of his songs, “Signifying Monkey,” “The Snake” grew out of Brown’s interest in the folkloric trickster figure that features prominently in both African American and West African culture.⁴ The particular version of the song that Trump originally encountered was likely the better-known cover of Brown’s song by R&B performer Al Wilson, whose use of an upbeat tempo also reflects a playful trickster narrative.

At Trump’s rallies, however, the song took on ominous new meaning as a racial threat of murderous violence. The snake became the “dangerous immigrant,” while the woman stood in for an America too soft-hearted and prone to seduction to avoid what should have been a self-evident danger. Trump’s public readings of “The Snake” staged a certain drama of body and soul through which he could operationalize his campaign around racial menace. What exactly is a

snake? In Trump's story, a snake metaphorically stands in for populations that are naturally predisposed to injure American life. But the snake's aptness as such a figure concerns a meeting ground between its outer and inner racial nature. Outwardly, the snake is readily identified by its colorful skin, but the reptilian nature that really matters here is an inward propensity to poison and kill even those who have treated it well. Insofar as the snake symbolizes danger to the life of the national population, it appears as the archetypal figure of what Foucault once called biopolitical threat. In that well-known formulation, biopolitics is a form of governance designed to ensure the "security of the whole [population] from internal danger" by introducing mechanisms such as "forecasts, statistical estimates and overall measures" that permit interventions at the level of a population's general or aggregate life (Foucault 2003, 245–46). Foucault also famously argued that racism is critical to biopolitics because the category of race is precisely what allows biopolitical power to establish a militarized frontier in the population that divides those whose life must be defended from those who must be targeted in acts of "defense."

What is striking about Trump's politics of racial threat is that he articulates them biopolitically even in this more precise sense of treating the population as a stochastic domain of probabilities. Although the fable of the snake condenses the entire population into a two-character allegory, it nonetheless mobilizes a distinctly macrological and statistical form of state racism. In his speeches, tweets, and diatribes, Trump has consistently advanced a probabilistic language to describe the biopolitical threat of America's racial enemies. About Muslims, for example, he has said, "we have people out there that want to do great destruction to our country . . . whether it's 25 percent or 10 percent or 5 percent, it's too much" (Johnson and Hauslohner 2017). To relate these numbers back to his fable, Trump implies that perhaps 95 percent of Muslims might prove to be nothing like the snake of his song. Still, according to the political thought process behind the so-called Muslim travel ban, the odds are that every nineteen good Muslims who are admitted entry into the United States will smuggle at least one terrorist in with them. Trump has applied this same sort of probabilism to the people of Mexico: "They're not sending their best. They're not sending you. . . . They're sending people that have lots of problems. . . . They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people" (Trump 2015). This declaration, which Trump pioneered for the populist turn in the Republican Party, establishes a classic biopolitical caesura dividing a "you" (the American population) from a "they" (Mexicans making their way into the American population). While "you" names a law-abiding and life-fostering population, "they" differ from "you"

by bearing the lethal threats of drugs, crime, and rape. But once again, Trump's final sentence anticipates the statistical exceptions. A few Mexicans will be good people, just as a few Americans will no doubt turn out to be bad people. The law of averages always ensures outliers. Yet the racial differences between us and them are fixed by precisely these statistical certainties about aggregated danger.⁵ And for this reason, the lesson of Trump's macrological fable is permitted to stand: in a country of mostly good people, a healthy population, security is compromised by augmenting it with another population that contains a much higher percentage of bad people. How do we know they are likely to have bad people? Presumably because of their colorful skin. The moral? Enemies of life and health should never be invited into the population just because they may be accompanied by some good ones. Or to put this another way, we should know a caravan containing likely snakes when we see it.

There is one final aspect to the "snake" fable deserving of consideration, namely the woman's motive for sheltering a snake in the first place. Her tender heart refers to more than just misplaced generosity: it is literally a spiritual organ that contains her self-destructive desires. The woman is described as dotting on the snake, stroking its "pretty colored skin," calling it "beautiful," kissing it, and even clutching it to her bosom. Her seduction dramatizes precisely the wrong way to respond to the snake's physicality. Instead of finding the snake's colorful skin attractive, she should have recognized in it the "threat of race," a visual warning about the reptile's cold-blooded intentions.⁶ Race here is not just a technology for difference-making; it is also a machine for sounding alarms about perilous proximities, menacing attractions, and looming contamination. It possesses and concerns itself with what Sharon Holland has called its "erotic life" (Holland 2012). For this reason, the woman's tender heart proves not entirely unlike the snake; it signals the danger that the woman invites due to the seducible nature of her *own* inner life, a life that is also gendered and sexual. The threat of race lies inside as well as outside, lodged within a certain segment of the population to be sure, but secreted as well within every heart and soul. The inward threat of race sometimes proves to be nothing less than racial desire itself, a desire that indicates the self's perilous internal resonance with racial difference. By secretly wanting the snake, one actually becomes a snake. It is the danger posed by this desire, therefore, that demands the waging of an outward war not only against one's external enemies but also a civil war of the self against one's inner demons.

The religious significance of the soul is far from irrelevant. One wonders, for example, whether Trump's choice of the song had something to do with the snake's inevitable Biblical significance for his evangelical supporters, who

would surely hear in the lyrics a strong echo of Genesis 2–3. In a very old Christian tradition, the snake who appears in the Garden of Eden is an avatar of Satan, wickedly bent on destroying humanity's claim on eternal life by seducing Eve into sinful disobedience against God.⁷ Because Eve capitulates to the snake's temptation, she in turn entices Adam, bringing the snake's curse upon him as well. Both she and her man are punished with mortality. The life of body and soul will no longer be eternally yoked together. Instead, the body will experience death and the soul will face a perpetual risk of damnation. The snake of Genesis can therefore stand as a religiously inflected metaphor for the biopolitical threat to life. It is a bookend figure in the Christian Bible, connecting Genesis to the final volume, the Revelation of John, where Satan returns as the serpentine Dragon waging a final battle against the Lamb of Christ, while Eve reappears as the "whore of Babylon." In Trump's politicization of this theology, therefore, the wicked soul of the malicious immigrant figures the satanic "axis of evil" against which the security state must always stand guard, an evil against which America apparently requires special governmental vigilance because the tender hearts of its people leave it so vulnerable to seduction.

Karen and Barbara Fields have argued that "racecraft," by which they mean the regime of racism that creates the classificatory schema of "race," finds a sociological precedent in the kind of "witchcraft" that Martin Luther once produced through his hostile pronouncements: Luther built a Protestant world in part by inventing witches as a theological enemy whose threat to the Christian soul became an early modern social fact (Fields and Fields 2012). In this sense, it was Luther, not the witches, who actually engaged in a kind of occult practice, conjuring something into existence through its discursive incantation. Racecraft is a similar kind of conjuring trick, creating the fiction of "race" as an existing fact about each of us and a social fact about our world. The Fields' useful connection between contemporary racecraft and early modern witchcraft is no historical accident. As this book will show, biopolitics when flexibly construed can be shown to predate the statistical demographics and scientific racism of the early nineteenth century. Before there were statistics, there was already the problem of managing the Christian flock of believers. Before there was an evolutionary racial hierarchy that viewed the "higher European races" as further removed from biological animality than the "lower races," one finds a theological gap between those closer to God and those approaching the Devil's wickedness. And finally, before there was regulation of the life of a biological species, there was a government of souls. Biopolitics concerns itself not only with protecting a society's corporeal life in this world, but also with defending its eternal life against its theopolitical enemies. All this is simply to say,

at this early point in the book, that the logic of race we find Trump employing reaches back through a surprisingly long history. As I will show in chapter 3, race was also constitutive of the early security state, which from the very start employed what we normally consider antiquated technologies of power concerning the governance of spiritual conduct. Security is rooted in an ancient promise of redemption from evil, and race is rooted in an equally ancient characterization of the evil from which “we” must be redeemed.

Race, Knowledge, and Risk

If racial fables like that of the snake have a moral, it would be the importance of *knowing* how racial knowledge should serve to protect against danger. To borrow David Theo Goldberg’s basic insight, race is not only a marker of difference but also a “suggestion of threat,” by which he means that the racialization of a group serves to “conjure or condition, raise or rationalize anxieties about insecurity, possible loss, viral infection, even extinction” (Goldberg 2009, 28). But in order for race to signify threat, it must first be formulated as a problem of power/knowledge. Securing oneself against a racial threat means learning when to know “damn well” (i.e., to grasp the exceedingly high probability) something about another’s inner life given the color of their skin, the shape of their body, the fact of their ancestry, the loyalties they declare, the beliefs they profess, or even the company they keep. It is also about ascertaining which vulnerabilities in our *own inner life* present a risk of self-annihilation. But none of these things are actually certainties, or if they are, we should think of them as certainties about an uncertainty. If race is a judgment about threat that can only be specified in the actuarial form of aggregate probabilities, then any individual case can only ever take on an aleatory quality ratified by the opacity of inward life. Since it cannot be directly seen, the soul is technically inscrutable. One can never be sure what kind of person someone is on the “inside” until they reveal themselves through their actions. Similarly, unless and until someone has been seduced, the character of their weakness (or perhaps the weakness of their character) may not be observable.

If probabilities hold, however, one can at least venture estimates about such uncertainties. Risk, as the economist Frank Knight once argued, is that which converts uncertainty (what we cannot anticipate at all) into something calculable (Knight 1921). Risk tells us what we can anticipate about what we do not know. If race serves as an epistemological ground for the management of bodies and populations in the name of neutralizing biopolitical threats, then it does so by converting uncertainty about a population’s threat into a calculation of

risk. Race is the answer yielded, the effect produced, when a biopolitical regime solves for the risk level of a population's threat. It thereby becomes an apparatus of security. In knowing what part of a population disproportionately threatens the rest, or what aspect of inner life disproportionately leaves the entire soul vulnerable, one can at least attempt to "secure" that threat, to manage it as a risk. Race is an apparatus of security for this reason: although the soul cannot be directly perceived, through technologies of race-making it is converted into something that can be made calculable.

How does this work? Properly speaking, the threat of a biopolitical enemy is taken to emanate from their inner life, their intention to harm the population as a structured whole. But it is important to recall that the calculability of that threat relies upon the inspection of the suspect's outer life. Such discernment is always mediated by the body. This is a rather complex operation. If regimes of race are established through the operation of probability machines for the calculation of populational security measures, then, counterintuitively enough, these regimes of race appear to reject the claim of any absolutely consistent one-to-one relationship between body and soul. Racialization derives from the management of security-relevant correlations between body and soul, but it also presupposes a certain instability in the body/soul relationship that becomes aleatory at the level of the individual. Sometimes the body is presumed to provide an indispensable clue regarding the truth of the soul it contains, but just as easily the body can be expected to elide or deflect that inner truth. If race is a shorthand for reading the body so as to forecast the threat of (or to) the soul, then race also presupposes that the inescapably necessary interpretive act may backfire. Hence Trump's probabilistic language. Sometimes an apparent danger proves to be a false alarm. Conversely, a body suggesting low probability of threat may perfectly camouflage a malicious soul. Put another way, race may be seen as a game of power/knowledge that is played by multiple agents with different strategies and for different effects.

Racial Truth and the Politics of Exposure

What game of truth emerges out of these kinds of conditions? I have found useful here Zahid Chaudhary's conjoining of the Lacanian concept of the "subject presumed to know" with the Foucauldian concept of knowledge/power to develop an account of what he calls the "politics of exposure" (Chaudhary 2020, 12). "Exposure," in Chaudhary's analysis, has multiple meanings, including the unmasking or revealing of something that was hidden, but also the abandonment of someone or something to a state of vulnerability or precarity. Race can

be construed as just this kind of game, one that consolidates power through the attempted exposure of a subject's inner truth. As Kirstie Ball has pointed out, surveillance presupposes its targets to possess both visible outer surfaces (such as skin) and hidden or secret inner ones (the layerings of its soul). It is these secret inner layers, the ever deeper psychic contours of the subject, that surveillance aims to expose by unsheltering or stripping them bare (Ball 2009). In such games of concealment and exposure there are therefore two subjects who know: a racial enemy presumed to be hiding their malice, but also the subject of racial security whose policing practices work to expose the hidden biopolitical enmity. For the last four centuries, such policing has often been institutionally located in the governmentality of the state.⁸ As we shall see in chapter 2, policing was also once conducted by the church. And as chapter 4 will explain, what we mean by "police" today is this project's secular liberal variant. But the key point here is that the subject of security or police must know what it does not know. It recognizes its own uncertainty regarding the precise individuals who bear enemy intentions, or the specific nature of the enemy intent they harbor. Still, to know that one does not know is to stand ready to calculate risks. This self-knowledge facilitates investigations to expose suspected persons and places, forcing into the open the revelations that security requires.

We can also formulate the exercise of racial power through the somewhat different terms of what Paul Ricoeur famously called the "hermeneutics of suspicion," which addresses that special situation when truth takes the form of lying (Ricoeur 1977, 32–36). Because racial power hypothesizes that the body houses an inner secret, the most important feature of its status as corporeal glyph or text becomes what it elides. One therefore must not accept at face value what one sees, but interpret the immediate manifestation instead as a negative symptom of something else. Ricoeur characterizes the maxim of the hermeneutics of suspicion in this way: "guile will be met with double guile" (Ricoeur 1977, 34). Security exercises a hermeneutics of suspicion because it must always ask under what conditions it is safer not to believe but to doubt. Racial knowledge is therefore of a sort that reveals the truth of a threat potentially denied by the body on its surface. Like Freudian analysis of the unconscious, racial power obtains its knowledge of persons and populations through a negative cryptography or symptomology: it decodes signs that manifestly obfuscate their latent meaning. To racialize a population in this sense is to see through them to a security risk that they do not openly acknowledge. This is the logic that in common parlance we often call "racial profiling." It occurs whenever a security regime singles out a population of individuals whose bodily appearance is read suspiciously as "race"—in other words, as a clue to some concealed threat.

Suspicion can be approached as either an affective or an epistemological state of affairs. In its affective register, racial suspicion bears a special relationship to fear. It is fear, of course, that is the emotion most strongly associated with a figure who threatens harms. Sara Ahmed has characterized the affective politics of fear as fundamentally concerned with the “conservation of power” precisely through its effort to ensure security against a perceived threat to life. But where fear is “produced by an object’s approach,” specific to an object that we recognize at once as dangerous, anxiety is in Ahmed’s view a generalized “approach to objects,” an expectation—even in the immediate absence of objects—that any future (approaching) object will constitute a threat worthy of fear (Ahmed 2004, 66). Suspicion, I suggest, lies at the threshold between Ahmed’s conception of fear and anxiety because it names an affect that has been subjected to a stochastic logic. Suspicion evaluates its objects in terms of greater or lesser risks of harm. Objects of suspicion can be said to be the ones that *we are presumed wise to fear given what we know*. In relation to those specific objects, we must maintain an affective state of high alert and heightened attention. This could be characterized as a circumscribed and controlled form of *anxious reason*, one that produces for racial power the “anti-ness” that is so critical to anti-Blackness, antisemitism, and anti-immigrant xenophobia. This moment when “anti-ness” is produced is also tantamount to the act I am calling “racial ensoulment.”

When we describe the objects of suspicion as those whom we know it is wise to fear, we are already observing how suspicion transforms from an affective state into an epistemological regime. Technologies of security that presuppose an epistemology of suspicion operate by means of hermeneutical preemption. They begin by presupposing the possible existence of a threat that cannot yet be seen. They then convert the uncertainty about that threat into a risk by finding ways to calculate its probability of occurring and the intensity of its likely effects. Finally, they hedge against that risk by conducting inquiries, examinations, and surveillance, and generally employing technologies of knowledge/power to gather evidence that can expose a threat wherever it is most likely to be located. The moment of final revelation, the release of the deepest secret, may or may not lead to an exercise of sovereign violence in which the final “exposure” is of a different order: punishment, incarceration, police brutality, assassination, death. This moment could be described as a necropolitical act of sovereign vengeance against the unmasked racial enemy. But until that moment, the game of racial power operates at a governmental register, exercising suspicion in order to administer the social discipline and biopower through which the entire population is conducted to produce security.

Because security is reactive, always responding to a preexisting secret of inner life, it often cultivates its own countersecrecy; by not letting the pre-

sumed enemy “know” what it knows, security seeks to trick its enemy into inadvertent self-exposure. This is why regimes of security are often formulated as variants on what Timothy Melley (2012) has called a “covert sphere,” a domain of governance-through-secrecy that is typically mustered as a countering force: a *counterterrorism*, an *anticommunism*, an *anti-Blackness*, a colonial *counterinsurgency*.⁹

Inner Life of the Color Line

This lengthy excursus into race and security may at first glance seem difficult to reconcile with our conventional critical reading of so much American racism as a regime that both presupposes and establishes the hierarchy of power and privileges of a population deemed white over those populations deemed not. But it can in fact explain much about it. No regime of power can survive long without continuous efforts to maintain itself through some principle of self-adjusting reflexivity. This principle of reflexivity can also be characterized as power’s re-direction of itself in response to knowledge of changing movements and alignments within the field of its operation. If for all its abstraction this begins to sound like a language of battle, there is a reason for it. Foucault once asked (in a reversal of the Clausewitzian formulation) whether politics might actually be war conducted by other means, and if therefore war might not provide the proper analytics of power (Foucault 2003, 15–16).¹⁰ However one might view this general thesis, there is no question that American white supremacy can be characterized, in Nikhil Singh’s words, as a “long war” that produces the color line as a military front, mobilizing those located on the “white” side of the line as a population prepared to fight for those forms of privilege, status, wealth, or right that are presumed to be under perpetual siege by those on the other side (Singh 2017, 23–29). This military logic rests on the idea that the best defense is a good offense. Whether through the force of law, money, language, or physical violence, the “long war” continually repositions, resubjectivizes, dispossesses, incarcerates, or sometimes simply massacres populations deemed not-white whenever a perceived shift in the circulation of power is seen to threaten the future supremacy of a whiteness that the enforcement of the color line is presumed to guarantee. What is striking about this long war of race in America for the purposes of this book, then, is its familiar hermeneutic of suspicion: battles are launched against anyone who is even suspected of waging—sometimes suspected even of *wishing* they could wage—a secret attack on the hierarchies of the color line. Slaves planning revolt, native peoples scheming to reclaim their lands, Japanese Americans plotting treason, Latinos and Asians conspir-

ing against the exploitation of their labor: these are the kinds of hidden threats against which the long war of race preemptively declares itself ready to wage battle. These hidden threats, moreover, might also be ensouled by whites who mingle with people of color, who love, live, or transact with them, or who perhaps simply resemble them in some aspects of their life chances. Since such people may be suspected of wanting to blur or erase the color line, they can become, like Trump's "tender-hearted woman," potential racial enemies who must be struggled against. These battles, self-described as defensive actions, are actually preemptive, continuously reconsolidating the very color line that is presumed to be at risk of erasure. White violence in this way envisions itself as a practice of defensive security, even when most obviously on the attack. And if war, like a game, involves both a level of overall strategy and another of multifarious tactics that include feinting, bluffing, spying, camouflaging, and other forms of covert operation, then in addition to open battle, this long war has involved its own games of concealment and exposure. Baring the secrets of inner life, ensouling one's enemies, constitutes a central theater of operation for the racial power of white supremacy.

"Look, a Negro!" is the repeated refrain in Franz Fanon's famous analysis of Blackness as a produced fact of colonial power that relies upon the epidermalization of human difference (Fanon 2008, 89–91).¹¹ Fanon's formulation is actually more important than it might seem at first glance because it flags Blackness as something whose political force presupposes its observability within a phenomenological regime of the sensorium. As Simone Browne has argued, surveillance has long been critical to the "dark matter" of anti-Blackness (Browne 2015). The color line presupposes that Blackness is something registered within the field of the perceptible, usually (but not always) meaning that it can be seen, and therefore that it specifies where the eye of white power should direct its practices of surveillance.¹² Surveillance is a strategy of populational control, but it can also be viewed as a military tactic, as a form of reconnaissance that aims to discover the maneuvers of an enemy, whether actual, potential, or probable. This is why, as Browne shows, the history of surveillance has been so closely tied to the history of the American color line's militarization, from the surveillance of every aspect of slave life to the contemporary practices of racial profiling and the dangers of "driving while Black" (Browne 2015, 12–13). But it is also important to see that these practices of surveillance also presuppose a permanent endangerment of the color line and its regime of power that is rooted in the presumptive covertness of the Black soul's effort to resist the regime of the color line that subjects it.

Of course, this presumption that a threat to the color line exists on all sides is itself one of the chief products of the game of power, and precisely because of power's redirectable quality as a movement of capacities, it is in fact self-fulfilling. Once a game of power is in play, it will be played from many directions. When white supremacy bifurcates the population into white and nonwhite through its operations of racial ensoulment, counteroffensives in the "long war of race" become inevitable. W. E. B. Du Bois's famous reading of the striving of the "souls of black folk" constitutes precisely such an effort to counterensoul Blacks, to wage war against what he called the "nameless prejudice" that instills an "all-pervading desire to inculcate disdain for everything black, from Tossaint to the devil" (Du Bois 2007, 12). Movements such as Negritude, Black Power, or Black Lives Matter have repeatedly emerged to provide tactics of self-defense (including covert ones) to those threatened by white supremacy. In the process, such movements initiate their own game of racial power, marshalling the biopolitical capacities of a racialized population in its self-defense, and developing on its behalf their own countervailing mechanisms of security.¹³ Race becomes the basis for cultivating a political counterlanguage of struggle, power, solidarity, and liberation. It fights against "microaggressions" and the "weaponizing" of power.

Passing and the Dialectics of Body and Soul

Why are the secrets of inner life critical to this biopolitical logic of race war? Perhaps the easiest way to discern this connection, and to grasp in the process how the color line as a caesura exceeds the politics of sheer embodiment, is to consider the threshold case of "passing." Conventionally speaking, passing is understood as a situation in which someone presents themselves as racially other than what they are, self-presenting as white when they are Black, for instance, or the other way around. In the African American literary tradition especially, as Gayle Wald has shown, passing is sometimes narrated as a means for an individual to "transgress the social boundary of race, to 'cross' or thwart the 'line' of racial distinction that has been a basis of racial oppression and exploitation" (Wald 2000, 6).¹⁴ Passing is therefore, in the story of such individuals, a special tactic on the battlefield of racial power that serves the purpose of what in the field of surveillance studies is referred to as "antisurveillance."¹⁵ Understood as antisurveillance, passing can serve as a means of concealing oneself from the eye of white power as it tries to perform its oversight of Blackness.

Passing can only appear to be a transgression of the color line, however, because it is already a technology of power imminent to the regime of color

line racism. Because “passing” confirms that the color line is a frontier that *can be crossed*, it shores up its status as a line whose integrity must be surveilled and policed. In the process, passing comes to organize white people’s relationships, not just to Black and other nonwhite people, but to other (presumably) white people.¹⁶ It is not white people who create the color line, but rather the color line that creates “white people,” investing them with the responsibility to constantly surveil each other, which in turn has historically placed white people (especially but not exclusively lower-class whites) in a constant danger of being “exposed,” lest they deviate from accepted behavior and norms that might tarnish or blacken them with the stigma of the race traitor. Like other games of racial power, then, the color line’s long war has been directed inwardly as well as outwardly.¹⁷

Any effort to explicate the subject of passing without addressing these dialectics of body and soul, and that theorizes race purely from the perspective of embodiment, will fail to grasp how passing exploits the interference or dissonance between the dueling interpretive registers of race conveyed respectively by putatively visible bodies and putatively invisible souls. Where, we might ask, is the “Blackness” located in the “Black person” light enough to pass? Not apparently in the body. Any feasible answer provided by the game of racial power would seem to point toward the inner life: in Du Bois’s famous “double consciousness,” that person’s potentially veiled self-awareness, complex psychic attachments, subjective identifications or evaluations as Black, something they paradoxically may seek to advance by surreptitiously passing as white.¹⁸

Of course, this reading could be subjected to ideological critique in which the inner life is shown to be the illusory product of what Marx once called the “camera obscura” of our experience of material processes (Marx and Engels 2018, 154). One could offer to locate even the “Blackness” of the passing subject materially in the structures and discourses of racial law and their relationship to structures of kinship or descent, whose framing of racial power the subject has “internalized.” But even in such a materialist analysis, the moment in which an act of “internalization” occurs remains indispensable for making the narrative of passing intelligible. We could say that it is indeed this moment of “internalization” that a racial regime seeks to control when it intervenes in relation to a person or population’s conduct to reach something “deeper.” Such efforts represent what I am calling the passing subject’s “ensoulment” by a regime of race, which does not merely try to master the subject’s act of internalization, but then sweeps up its own footprints, recoding that internalization as the cause rather than the effect of the passing subject’s Blackness.

Like the exception to a grammatical rule, the person who passes should not be viewed as violating the ordinary protocols of race but as demonstrating in-

stead, through their exceptionality, how the rule actually works. Passing is a template for the policing of the color line, but that policing process takes the form of playing a game of concealment/exposure that can sometimes be operationalized by a “person of color,” who adapts their body and its performances (clothing, vocalization, choices in fraternization) to anticipate and redirect the expectations of white supremacy. This is the game, for example, that Boots Riley stages for the setting of the telemarketing workplace in his brilliant satirical film *Sorry to Bother You*, when his ill-fated protagonist plays to his advantage (at least for a while) the uses of his “white voice” (see Riley 2018). Ironically, the passing self illuminates the regime of truth through which racialization writ large actually gets enforced. This is obscured only by the color line’s presumption that racial subjects normally bear visibly marked bodies that serve as determinant signs of their interior life. The color line, in other words, presents the passing subject as a paradoxical exception, a case in which, for example, a Black soul has been concealed within a body failing to so signify. But those exceptional cases are part of its operations of power. Color line racism is prepared for exceptional cases, which it presents as a form of subterfuge in need of revelation: the moment of public exposure in most passing narratives is precisely the moment when the subject finally fails to outmaneuver the power of race.

These observations lead toward a different account of the color line, one that interprets it within a larger racial frame that involves security’s probabilistic calculations about the relationship between body and soul. When it comes to the conventions of color-line racism, it is important not to be naïve about the racialization of the body. Color-line racism is a highly complex strategy of power that—its tacit appeal to phenotypical distinctions notwithstanding—actually operates by mobilizing an ever-changing array of social narratives, habits of perception, and performative practices through which populations are distinguished and administered.¹⁹ Nevertheless, a naturalistic reference to differentiated human embodiment remains its ideological kernel. Color-based categories of race proceed on an ideological basis *as if* the divides in the population that they produce either are or should be visibly marked as distinctions between, for example, the white and the Black, brown, or Asian body. The formulation of color-line racism, to paraphrase Slavoj Žižek, might be: I know very well that I cannot always tell when someone is Mexican or African American, but still I behave as if their Blackness or brownness is something I can see.²⁰ The very *idea* of color registers this presumption of visual perceptibility, while the idea that one “cannot always tell” necessitates a game of concealment/exposure as the color line’s backstop.

Racism without Race?

We can now return to a question I raised near the beginning of this introduction: what does the tactic of ensoulment tell us about the relationship of color-line racism to other modes of racialization, such as those associated with Islamophobia since the war on terror, or with contemporary antisemitism? Steven Salaita has insisted that the color line of white supremacy remains the most productive paradigm for understanding “anti-Arab racism,” which he has characterized as “a redirection of classic American racism at a non-White ethnic group whose origins lie in an area of the world marked for colonization by the United States and whose residents are therefore dehumanized for the sake of political expediency” (Salaita 2006, 13). There are two difficulties with Salaita’s argument that are worth distinguishing. The first stems from a certain ontologization of race that presupposes the “nonwhiteness” of Arabs as the explanation for anti-Arab racism and colonization, rather than recognizing that the reverse must be true: Western colonialism is a race-making practice that produces anti-Arab racism. And insofar as this anti-Arab racism is adapted to the regime of the color line, it must train the eye of power to see Arabs as “nonwhite.” But when Salaita admits to the temptation of subsuming Islamophobia under the sign of anti-Arab racism, a deeper conceptual problem emerges, not only because Islamophobia also targets non-Arabs, but also because it proceeds from assumptions about the meaning of adherence to a “religion” rather than about the signification of “color” (Salaita 2006, 11–12). As Moustafa Bayoumi has suggested, the racialization of Arabs in America has never been understood as a matter of the “color of one’s skin,” but instead as a fluctuating, geopolitically motivated judgment about Islam (Bayoumi 2006). This raises a question that cannot be treated as merely peripheral to the history of racism. As Junaid Rana observes, the problem associated with the “comingling” of race and religion is nothing new, but rather a dynamic that dates back all the way to the “genealogical foundation of the race concept” (Rana 2007, 149).²¹

As modalities of racism, both Islamophobia and antisemitism can be said to invert the approach to the game of racial power found in the presumptively marked bodies of the color line. They follow the dialectic of body and soul along a different pathway that rings alarms about the threat of the *unmarked* body: the person who can slide right past airport security with their shoe bomb, or perhaps the Jew who could “replace you” without anyone even noticing. These practices delineate a mode of racialization whose ideological kernel begins with the potential *invisibility* of the threat posed by the psycho-politically inner life of the population that it represents. It is not that such racisms are different

in kind from the racism of the color line (Medovoi 2012a).²² It is rather that populations can be subjected to an inverted strategy with which to play the same game of racial power, one that runs the hermeneutic of suspicion in the opposite direction. Not because I *can* see something in their body I know to be suspicious, but on the contrary, I am suspicious because I *cannot* see something in their body.

For a revealing example of this hermeneutic at work, one could turn to the quintessential Nazi propaganda film *Der ewige Jude*, or *The Eternal Jew* (Hippler 1940), in which what makes the Jew so dangerous is that, while he or she is *sometimes* identifiable by clothing, noses, beards, and so forth, the Jew is characterized by a distinctive ability to pass or blend in, becoming the perfectly camouflaged enemy within. By contrast to color-line racism, passing is no longer the threshold case or the exception here, but itself the rule. Consider a particularly telling scene in which *Der ewige Jude* depicts the bearded face of a traditional Jew, dressed in yarmulke and orthodox garb, only to dissolve into another image of the same face, now clean-shaven and wearing a modern suit (see figures I.1 and I.2).

Corporeally indistinguishable from genuine German citizens, Jews constituted, in the conspiratorial logic of this Nazi film, what an antiterrorist regime of state security today might call a “sleeping cell” in the national body politic. This antisemitic game of racial truth involves exposing the hidden Jews whose feigned assimilation within the population represents the gravest possible danger to German society. But we could say that this danger is therefore now associated with a novel problem of uncertainty regarding where to locate the



FIGURE I.1. Marked Jew. From *Der ewige Jude* (1940), dir. Fritz Hippler.

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FIGURE 1.2. Unmarked Jew. From *Der ewige Jude* (1940), dir. Fritz Hippler.



racial subject. The racial truth about Muslims or Jews is known, but it cannot be acted upon if one cannot know with certainty who is a Muslim or Jew. Yet this does not lead to a delimiting of disciplinary power, nor to a reduction in the application of surveillance. On the contrary, they are expanded because the potential scope of who might carry the racial threat becomes limitless. Uncertainty now becomes doubly productive of racial power because it concerns not only who among the racial subpopulation bears a malignant intent, but how one can even identify that subpopulation at all, given its presumed imperceptibility. Surveillance is multiplied by the task of divulging the racial population before it can proceed to assessing the risk that this racial presence represents.

Ensoulment, Antisemitism, Islamophobia

Several efforts have been made to theorize this variety of racial power. Étienne Balibar offers one influential model in the context of his analysis of “neo-racisms,” which include for him contemporary Islamophobia in Europe. Balibar calls this always potentially unmarked raciality of the Muslim a case of “racism without race,” associated with a long history of antisemitism in which, “admittedly, bodily stigmata play a great role in its phantasms, but they do so more as signs of a deep psychology, as signs of a spiritual inheritance rather than a biological heredity. These signs are, so to speak, the more revealing for being the less visible and the Jew is more ‘truly’ a Jew the more indiscernible he is” (Balibar 1991a, 23–24). This notion of indiscernibility also plays a role in how Salman Sayyid and David Tyrer have analyzed Islamophobia’s appar-

ent uncertainty about the existence in Muslims of any phenotypical specificity, something they call the problem of “how to spot a Muslim” (Tyrer and Sayyid 2012, 357), and that Tyrer has characterized as the “scandal of the apparently incomplete raciality of Muslims” (Tyrer 2013, 40). Using a Lacanian lens, Tyrer argues that the marking of raciality facilitates the fantasy of national wholeness from which racial “others” can be safely excluded. If the racially marked “other” serves as a special “object of desire” for white supremacist nationalism, then the phenotypically ambiguous Muslim would apparently threaten the “possible loss of the [racial] object of desire” (Tyrer 2013, 40). It is in this operation that Tyrer locates the “phobia” inherent in Islamophobia.

Another important account can be found in Moishe Postone’s provocative reading of Nazi antisemitism as a kind of right-wing anticapitalist ideology that converts the Jew into a concrete figure for money as the fetishized image of abstract capital (Postone 1980). For Postone, the antisemitic discourse of the National Socialists conceived Jews as agents possessing an invisible power capable of manipulating the wealth of a society toward purposes alien and hostile to it. Antisemitism therefore presents itself as a liberatory struggle against the foreign aims of finance to manipulate our lives. I will return to Postone’s thesis in my analysis of racial capitalism in chapter 4, but at this stage I want simply to focus on what his argument suggests about the antisemitic embodiment of the Jew. On the one hand, Postone’s analysis could suggest that for antisemitism the Jews (as a population) function as the racial body of money. But we could just as easily run this reading in reverse to suggest that money serves as the invisible racial soul of the Jew. Postone does not write at all about Islamophobia. If we were to ask whether Islamophobia posits an analogously invisible racial soul of the Muslim, we might conclude that it invests that soul with some kind of terroristic power, one that perhaps functions as a foreign counterpart to the state’s abstract claim on the right to violence. But the key point would be that, for Islamophobia and antisemitism respectively, the soul of the Muslim and Jew “embody” something which is abstracted from their particular physical form and therefore remains invisible to the eye of power.

Bringing the Muslim and the Jew together as twin racial figures reminds us that neither is the unique target of this game of power that is premised on racial invisibility. It is not only that the very idea of antisemitism originally served to conjoin Jew and Muslim together into a unitary threat, as both Gil Anidjar (2008) and Ivan Davidson Kalmar (2009) remind us, but also that at certain historical moments other populations have also been singled out for the invisible danger posed by their inward commitments to religious theologies or political ideologies—Catholics, communists, or anarchists—or even to

their perverse inner desires—miscegenators, gays, queers, trans people. We can therefore subsume the history of various practices (antipopery, anticomunism, anti-anarchism), along with antisemitism and Islamophobia, and even homophobia and transphobia, into a certain way of managing the body/soul relationship that foregrounds the problem of the soul's corporeal invisibility. Although I have elsewhere called this "dogma-line racism" because my focus at that stage of reflection was on the "religionization" of race that often characterizes antisemitism and Islamophobia, this mode of racialization can be more generically characterized as one that directs its suspicion toward that which *cannot* be discerned in the body, whether it be a heretical dogma, a treasonous loyalty, or even a perverse desire or identification.

It is important to be careful here in specifying what does and does not distinguish this modality of racism from the color line. The issue is not that the color line always produces a racism of marked bodies while Islamophobia and antisemitism traffic instead in unmarked bodies. As I observed above in relation to the exception of "passing," unmarked bodies are in fact a necessary preoccupation for color-line racism. Conversely, it is possible to be misled by Balibar's characterization of antisemitism or Islamophobia as examples of "racism without races" (Balibar 1991a, 21). If "race" may be lodged in the soul rather than located in the body, then corporeal undecidability is hardly evidence for the absence of race, only the apparent absence of its marker at a particular moment. Markings remain important even to the exercise of antisemitic and Islamophobic racism, as the first, Jewishly garbed, image from *Der ewige Jude* demonstrates, or as Jasbir Puar has observed in regard to the exposure of Sikhs to post-9/11 Islamophobic violence through the catalyst of the turban (Puar 2011): clothing, garments, and badges will appear prominently in this book's history of auxiliary racial markers. Antisemitism and Islamophobia therefore join with color-line racisms in trafficking assumptions about the marked body, or at a bare minimum the markable body.²³ What distinguishes this modality of racism, therefore, is only its inverted axiomatic: antisemitism and Islamophobia proceed as if their racial target either was or could be corporeally undetectable. To wit, I know very well that I can sometimes recognize a Jew on sight. Still, they may always be concealing themselves.²⁴

The principal problem introduced by *this* hermeneutic of suspicion is whether the threat to a population might turn out to be lodged not in a particular and identifiable sector within it, such as in the presumptively marked bodies of people of color for example, but rather in *any and all* members of the population, among invisible and unknown cells of terrorists or communists for instance, or worse yet, in previously unthreatening members of the population

who have been seduced by terrorists or communists (or indeed people of color) to serve as their agents. This latter suspicion conjures up the need for a security regime that treats threat as the endemic and universal self-endangerment of population itself. It is a game of power that formulates a dark counterpart to John Rawls's "veil of ignorance," grounded in the abstraction of security rather than justice (Rawls 2009). Because we cannot know in advance who are actual (or even potential) members of a threatening race within a population, we must approach security as if anybody might belong (including at the limit even ourselves). Ensoulment and embodiment are axiomatically divergent. Like liberal justice, therefore, security in this form seeks to universalize its sphere of application: everyone must take their shoes off at airport security in an age that presupposes the terrorist's potential inscrutability.

The Pincer Action of Racial Power

The two hermeneutics of racial suspicion I have described—one particularizing and the other universalizing—are neither antithetical nor mutually exclusive formations. Rather, they advance simultaneous and coexisting racial hypotheses through which power works upon the population with a pincer-like action.²⁵ Even the fable of "The Snake" exhibits this dual movement. The snake represents the extreme instance of the particular. We presume to know a snake when we see one; its serpentine body unambiguously signals its venomous evil; there is a fixed population of snakes and we "know damn well" what they are when we see them. But as we have already noted, the tender heart of the woman living inside the home is also a threat, for through it she becomes a person who maliciously leaves the door to the homeland ajar, allowing the snake to enter. The threat she represents cannot be read off her body, except arguably by pointing to the gendered association of women with either tender hearts or the romantic desire that those tender hearts embody. But this means that the actual threat resides in a place that any of us might be hiding within ourselves. If I am a "man" with a tender heart, I may prove to be gay, transgendered, or simply perverse. This is a threat that will always exist for me because it is impossible to say when I might inadvertently discover myself to be attracted to a dangerous person, ideology, or movement, due to aspects of my inner life previously unknown to others, or veiled even from myself. The snake may therefore live within the self as easily as it does in some part of the population designated as "other." We see this racial danger depicted in the Showtime series *Homeland* through the character of Nicholas Brody, a white, Protestant, decorated Marine war hero and rescued POW who is suspected and finally revealed (after

much inconclusive surveillance) to be a secret convert to Islam and a terrorist operative.²⁶ The fact that Brody nearly becomes a vice-presidential candidate, and thus the ultimate terrorist Trojan horse, captures the kind of anxious suspicion with which this variety of racial power invests its figures: they represent the universalizing dimension of racial threat, since one can never know who has been inwardly converted, seduced, infected, or otherwise turned toward a threatening intent. Any figure of biopolitical danger may end up vacillating between the particularizing and the universalizing delineation of the enemy, at times allegorizing a specified group within which the threat can be fixed, particularized, and isolated (communists, Muslims, Blacks), while at other moments signifying a floating risk, tied to the soul's fundamental inscrutability that circulates through the totality of the population. The history of race involves the history of this productive vacillation.

Methodology of This Book

So far in this introduction I have been conceptualizing the operation of racial power at a considerable level of abstraction. Let me therefore take some care to explain this book's aims. This preliminary excursus has sought to elucidate what will appear in the following chapters as family resemblances shared by successive episodes in the history of race and racism. Yet this book ultimately offers less a theory of racism than a genealogy of the dialectic of body and soul that grounds the changing racial politics of security over the *longue durée*. So, for example, chapter 1 focuses on medieval strategies of security that preceded the historic invention of race, but that nonetheless created its conditions of possibility. Chapter 2 specifies the moment in early Iberia when race first emerged as a problem within the field of security, as well as how it was expanded into a principal technology for the early coloniality of power in the Americas. Chapter 3 explores how racialized religiosity was enfolded into the birth of the Westphalian state as the apotheosis of security, while chapter 4 considers how the racial capitalist project of liberal security gradually reconstituted race as the biopolitical threat to bourgeois civil society. Each of these moments changed the game of racial power in striking ways, yet each still recognizably engages with its own politically distinctive dialectic of body and soul. The analytics of race found in this introduction therefore should not be construed as a transhistorical template that allows each moment to be grasped as another instantiation of racial power's sameness. On the contrary, I hope to show that race first had to be created, then at every turn drastically reformulated to serve the changing historical problems of security. In the era of capitalist production

that we inhabit, racial power can and must be understood as a key element in capital's social reproduction. But this relationship, I will argue, is mediated through a political logic of security and should not be quickly reduced to an alibi for class. This requires another set of methodological insights, drawn from elements in the Marxist tradition, that seeks a complex reading of the overdetermined relationship of the "economic" to the political and the cultural.

The book is indebted, in other words, to the Marxist insight that any mode of production always involves not only the production of what Marx and Engels called a "definite mode of life," but also a way for that life activity to reproduce itself, politically and socially, as well as economically (Marx and Engels 2018, 150). What Foucault called "governmentality" is, in my view, best read against the grain as a framework for the Marxist problem of capitalist reproduction, albeit one that engages the domain of the political without relying on a reified conception of the state as its unique and necessary agent. Foucault's account of "governmentality" can be interpreted as a specific mode of political reflexivity that came into existence alongside capitalism and has furnished it with the regulatory apparatus through which regimes of accumulation can be reproduced, particularly in societies where populations are growing rapidly and where forms of social organization are constantly "melting into air" under the revolutionary pressures that capitalism itself exerts.²⁷ "Race," I will argue, was a key mechanism for the rise of governmentality as that kind of political reflexivity.

As theorists of racial capitalism have shown, the production of race has been especially critical to the relationship between governance and the accumulation of capital.²⁸ Historically speaking, discourses of race and racism preceded the birth of capitalism, but they were not simply accommodated in accidental form by capitalism as it encountered them. Technologies of race collectively represent a part of what Dipesh Chakrabarty (borrowing from Marx's own terminology) has called "History 1" (the past that capitalism posits for itself), as opposed to "History 2" (the antecedents with which capitalism has come to coexist but does not require) (Chakrabarty 2008, 62–71). What Chakrabarty is trying to distinguish here are elements of the past that simply persist in the capitalist era and those that become critical to the social reproduction of capitalism as a mode of production. As I will show in chapter 4, the technologies of racial power form part of the past that capitalism posits for itself in part because they have furnished capitalism with the means of reproducing the social and legal meaning of private property and free labor, two critical preconditions for the establishment of a regime of capital accumulation. But they are also crucial to the reproduction of capital because they have furnished it

with the biopolitical means of responding to radical challenges and revolutionary possibilities. From its earliest moments, capitalism has relied on the highly adaptable strategy of government offered by racialization for rapidly and flexibly reclassifying and redirecting populations in response to emergent threats to governance's forms of impersonal domination. Race is therefore not always reducible to a mediation of class. The more general view, instead, is that race mediates a logic of security politics that runs throughout capitalism's regimes of power. It works to constitute a mode of governance that allows the accumulation of bodies and subjection to keep pace with the accumulation of capital.

In addition to the techniques of genealogy and historical materialism, this book relies at times on an etymological method. I consider the origins and changing uses of certain words as they became attached to racial power to see what light they shed on its changing stratagems. I am following the spirit of what Sarah Kofman terms "genealogical etymology," the study of conceptually freighted words, not to uncover the Platonic essence of each of their ideas but rather to foreground the historical "becoming" that inheres in the metaphors embedded in a word, metaphors whose significance is obscured if we posit the word's conceptual unity (Kofman 1994, 85). The historical materialist basis for this method can be easily found in Raymond Williams's classic study *Keywords*, in which he tracked the social struggles embedded in the contradictory meanings of words that have formed the lexical corpus of British society (Williams 2014). Among the keywords figuring prominently in this book's vocabulary of racial power are *race* itself, but also *security*, *state*, *population*, *sedition*, *statistics*, *plantation*, *fanatic*, *party*, *faction*, *cabal*, and *fundamentalist*. Each of these words brings into focus a certain inflection point in the "becoming" of racial power over the *longue durée*.

To the extent that this book is directly in dialogue with a single thinker, it would have to be Michel Foucault. It is Foucault's reflections on power as a kind of political capacity or ability that emerges when knowledge is invested in social relations (a knowledge of the body's location by discipline, a knowledge of the population's regularities by biopower) that most inspire this project. This book thinks primarily alongside two of Foucault's best-known lecture series: the lectures from 1977–78 published as *Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault 2007), from which it derives the centrality of security to the problem of government, and the 1975–76 series published as *Society Must Be Defended* (Foucault 2003), from which it borrows its thematics of war and race. This book's more obvious intimacy is perhaps with the first of these series, in cleaving so closely to the animating question Foucault posed there: How might the state and its history look different if we did not invest them from the start

with a primarily juridical conception of sovereign power connected to the exercise of political will, whether the will of the ruler or that of the people? Foucault answered this question by recommending that we rethink the history of the state as simply one episode in a longer history of government—a history concerned with the political problem of how populations should be secured against endemic risks and uncertainties. To this end, he began his inventory of government with the medieval pastorate, an early form of power he considered to be governmentality’s predecessor, and whose spiritual aims regarding the population he then traced forward through the history of the state, and eventually to the development of liberal political economy. This book retraces those exact historical footsteps (pastoral power, reason of state, liberalism), yet ends up on a quite different journey that tracks the genealogy of security and race, as well as the itinerary of the body/soul relationship.

In one important respect, however, I break sharply with *Security, Territory, Population*: I depart from the anemic way in which Foucault had come to think about security by the time he wrote those lectures. By contrast to his immediately preceding works (Foucault 1990, 2003, 2012), in his 1977–78 lectures, Foucault (2007) treats security as a glorified macroeconomic problem, a matter of how best to recalibrate the population’s conduct away from practices or behaviors that increase the risk of unfavorable aggregate outcomes (high grain prices, destructive epidemics, economic downturns). “Security” thus loses the military dimension that Foucault had so presciently acknowledged in his preceding explorations. Something critically important in those earlier studies had been jettisoned by the time Foucault turned to the problem of government. For reasons that I continue to find enigmatic, he opted to bracket the important question of when, how, and why war sometimes provides the model for political power, and crucially, how that warlike dimension of politics has depended on governmental practices that establish the caesurae of race.

This book is therefore animated in part by the following question: How would we need to reformulate the genealogy of government traced by Foucault in *Security, Territory, Population* if we insistently retained a view of security as a military and not just an economic project? What might the periodization schema and the account of governmentality found there have looked like had they retained Foucault’s earlier attentiveness in *Society Must Be Defended* to race (the permanent military division of the population) and to war (the ongoing state of affairs obtained by that division) as integral mechanisms of security? It is not just that the later lectures would have been completely altered; the political genealogy they trace would necessarily have placed the exercise of war

against ongoing racial threats at the very heart of the history of government. Trump would not seem like an anomaly in the annals of government but would instead appear as a familiar and recurring figure. This is the book I have here attempted to write.

Itinerary of the Chapters

In the following chapters, I will move chronologically through a long but nevertheless distinctive genealogy of racism as a key stratagem of power. My focus is on a series of Euro-American projects of security that came to produce the truth of “race” as one of their principal effects, though toward its conclusion this book will admittedly take a global turn. Chapter 1 takes up a moment in the European Middle Ages when “race” as an explicit discourse of political security did not yet exist, but when a conception of threat to the population was nonetheless already central to governmental practice. Although feudalism’s agrarian relations of fealty and vassalage are often taken as the paradigmatically medieval regime of power, I proceed on the assumption that it was the Roman Church’s pastoral “government of souls,” its management of the flock of Christendom through a regime of instruction, inspection, confession, and interrogation, that actually provided the governmental tool kit out of which “race” would eventually be assembled.

I argue that medieval pastoral power was not pacific, as Foucault (2007) misleadingly suggests, but grounded in bellicosity. The so-called war on heresy that gained momentum in the High Middle Ages was central to the Roman Church’s practices of “pastoral power.” Shepherds were necessary because the flock in Christ’s sheep pen was menaced by wolves and foxes. In the Middle Ages, the flock was a governing metaphor for church governance constituted around the politico-theological threat of evil to seduce Christians and steal them away from Christ’s promise of eternal life. I have already asserted that there was no language of race as such during the Middle Ages, a position that I recognize is subject to lively scholarly debate, and that I will therefore argue in greater detail through the first two chapters. Nevertheless, even though it operated at a historical moment before race, medieval pastoral power evinced a dialectic of body and soul, conducted through a game of concealment and exposure, that looks ahead to the biopolitics of racial power. This theme of concealment and exposure organized itself not only around heretics, but also around the quasi-heretical dangers posed by the infidelity of Jews and Saracens. The war on heresy, even at this early stage, already constituted a politics of ensoulment out of which the threat of race would eventually be assembled.

Chapter 2 seeks to answer the question of where and when a language of race first appeared. Rather than beginning with early representations of populations who are racialized today, I proceed instead by tracing how the word “race” emerged etymologically in relation to the metaphor of a frayed or strained fabric through which the threat of a hidden defect in the population could be imagined. This etymology, which I locate at the Iberian threshold between the medieval and the early modern, would first be associated with the threat of formerly Jewish conversos and ex-Muslim Moriscos, members of the Spanish population whose imputed heretical threat to church, society, and the state could all be tied directly to the defective predisposition of their souls, a form of inherited probability correlating with their non-Christian ancestry. The momentous future importance of “race” derived from how this political concept came to be exported into new settings in the Iberian colonies of the Americas, where it would become a technology for organizing and securing colonial populations against probable threats ensouled within communities or individuals defined by Jewish, Muslim, African, or Native ancestry.

Although “race” began as a political instrument associated first and foremost with the spiritual mission of the church, in chapter 3 I consider how it became integrated into the aims of government at the precise moment when the political project of the “state” emerged as a defining theme of power. The logic of “reason of state,” which concerned above all the problem of political stability (maintaining a “state” of affairs), hegemonized political power by promising to negotiate the schism between Catholic and Protestant Christianity on the European continent. In the process, “reason of state” turned the problem of religious threat to government into a form of racial security. Using the case of Elizabethan English statecraft, I show how the birth of the security state relied upon a tacit reconception of race that, while still orbiting around religious threats, was now displaced from the domain of theology per se onto the two bodies of political theology. Although this reconception of race seems only distantly relevant to the color-line racisms that dominated New World contexts, religionized race in the metropole would prove capable of reinvigorating the ensoulment of dangerous populations as the fundamental problem for state security, advancing in the process the “second pincer” of race as universal threat that I earlier connected to the invisibilizing game of racial power that often characterizes practices of antisemitism and Islamophobia.

In chapter 4, I trace the liberal reconstitution of race that would accompany the expansion of capitalism alongside the triangular Atlantic trade. The chapter offers a novel account of racial capitalism consistent with my book’s focus on security and the politics of ensoulment. Liberalism refashioned the state in the

image of a political association designed for securing the “society” of possessive individuals. Race, at this point, becomes a language for ensouling the free and propertied individual’s living antithesis: the one who fundamentally subverts freedom through their criminal or revolutionary threat to the possessive individual. In the settler colonial setting, liberal freedom and whiteness become tautological as the game of race becomes infiltrated by the capitalist logic of private property. It is at this moment, the long dawn of capitalist modernity, that race became generalized as a biopolitical technology for guaranteeing bourgeois white freedom by waging war against those whose inner lives pose a clear and present danger to that liberal freedom: rebellious slaves, revolutionary communists, and revolting colonials.

The book concludes with a sketch of the last century of the inner life of race, from the quilting point of anticommunism during the Cold War to that of antiterrorism under neoliberal globalization, and returning at last to the current moment when the problem of the dangerous inner life no longer attaches centrally to either communism or terrorism but reflects instead a potentially terminal crisis of the neoliberal phase of capitalism. In the reactive and neofascist politics of today’s right-wing populism, racial threat has proliferated into a many-headed hydra, inclusive of dangerous people of color, malevolent Islamic terrorists, amoral Jewish financiers, fake news media, and hostile parties, but more generally representing the danger of any secretly contaminated self, any snake who can be suspected of a plot to poison the population and damage the health of the body politic. Perhaps this book’s investigation into the long history of ensoulment will offer some tools for teasing out the unstable rules governing the games of racial power we are forced to play today. Insofar as the soul is still central to them, and insofar as I believe we cannot see past racism without conceiving how to dismantle the technologies of ensoulment, I hope this book can make a contribution in the realm of thought to the forms of antiracism we are looking for in these ominous times.

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INTRODUCTION. ENSOULMENT: A STRATEGY OF RACIAL POWER

Epigraph: “The Snake,” a song written by Oscar Brown Jr., first appeared on his album *Tell It Like It Is!* (1963). A cover version recorded in 1968 became a hit for the soul singer Al Wilson.

1. Although W. E. B. Du Bois coined the term “color line” in *The Philadelphia Negro* (1995, 116), he popularized it in *The Souls of Black Folk* through his famous pronouncement, “The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line” (2007, 32).

2. For an account of the Charlottesville white supremacist rally, see Rosenberg 2017.

3. It would be impossible to provide a bibliography that does justice to the history of this investigation in a single footnote, especially since this entire book will be engaging with this corpus of questions. I should mention, however, a handful of very different kinds of studies to suggest the range of scholarly interventions that have been attempted. In a classic study, *Racism: A Brief History* (2015), George Fredrickson explores the long-term historical linkages and comparative relations between modern antisemitism and color line racism; J. Kameron Carter’s *Race: A Theological Account* (2008) locates the basis of all forms of racism in the specification of the Jews as obstacles to the universalizing aims of Christian theology; Junaid Rana’s *Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora* (2011) considers the historical intertwining of race and religion as an informing context to anti-immigrant racisms in the present moment; and Sohail Daulatzai’s *Black Star, Crescent Moon* (2012) considers twentieth-century Black Islam as an anti-imperial political formation that relied on the imaginative interplay of the Muslim Third World and Black freedom struggles. These and many other studies have sought to show how Islamophobia, antisemitism, and anti-Blackness share common histories that must be thought together if the political work of race-making is to be grasped comprehensively.

4. For more on Oscar Brown Jr., see the “Biographical/Historical Note” in the guide to his papers, collected at Howard University (DCAAP 2016, 4).

5. Evelyn Alsultany’s thoughtful analysis of post-9/11 media representations of Arabs and Muslims supports the view that Trump’s probabilistic mode of racialization is nothing

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new. As she notes, media images of Arab or Muslims as terrorists were always balanced with positive counterimages meant to immunize programs from accusations that they “stereotyped” Arabs or Muslims as haters (Alsultany 2012). A statistical racism could thereby present itself as postracial. Asultany echoes Mahmood Mamdani’s analysis of the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” binary (Mamdani 2005), which allegorically reduces a biopolitical statistical racism to the two Cold War figures that forecast the dueling possibilities for Muslim inner life.

6. I am alluding here to David Theo Goldberg’s pithy book title, *The Threat of Race* (2009).

7. For a masterful history of the religious tradition that turned sex into sin and the snake into a figure of evil, see Pagels 1989.

8. By “police” I here mean not only what we mean more narrowly by police today, but more broadly the management of a population through the use of “intelligence” (information about the population) and “policy” (techniques of acting on that information). “Policy” and “police” share the same etymology, and in fact, the first meaning of “police” was as a synonym for policy. I will discuss this genealogy in chapter 4.

9. On counterinsurgency, see Guha 1994. See also Manu Karuka’s account of US imperial expansion as always taking the form of a reactive and fragile countersovereignty (2019).

10. The original formulation appears in Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* (1989, 87).

11. This said, note that the original French phrase this translates is “Tiens, un nègre” (Fanon 1952, 90), which is perhaps better translated as “Here, a n—gger.” The original captures a sense of observation, coupled with racial fear and loathing, without locking it into the visual register.

12. Jennifer Lynn Stover (2016), however, astutely shows how the color line also concerns a regime of *audibility*.

13. Special thanks to Zahid Chaudhary for drawing my attention to the importance of stressing this reversibility of racial power.

14. Two key novels in the tradition that interest Gayle Wald are James Weldon Johnson’s *Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man* ([1912] 1990) and Nella Larsen’s *Passing* ([1929] 1986), both of which concern surreptitiously crossing the line in order to thwart it.

15. “Antisurveillance” could be defined as the neutralization of a regime’s tactics of surveillance. See Monahan 2015.

16. The threat of passing was intensified during the early twentieth century with the legal institution of the “one-drop rule” as the legal definition of Blackness.

17. I thank Anoop Mirpuri for his crucial feedback and intervention in my account of passing. The language I use in this paragraph is indebted to his comments. For his own account of how passing operates as a technology of racism in the context of professional sports, see Mirpuri 2010.

18. It is in exactly this context that Du Bois famously activates a militarized terminology of the twoness of the Black soul: “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body” (2007, 8).

19. I thank a helpful anonymous reader’s report for suggesting this incisive formulation.

20. This reflects the classic formulation for fetishistic disavowal in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (Žižek 2019, 28–30).

21. Junaid Rana's rich exploration of the "race-ing of religion" over the *longue durée* (2007) has been immensely illuminating and useful to my work.

22. At the time I wrote "Dogma-Line Racism" (2012a), I conceived color and dogma as two different axes through which race gets mapped. Though I would still argue that this is a useful approach, I now prefer to think of race as a game of power that alternates between a particularizing and a universalizing mode of population management. I will elaborate on this conception in the coming pages.

23. Thanks to Judith Butler for calling my attention to this distinction: the racism of "interiority" that Jasbir Puar (2011) explores should not be mistaken for a "racism without race."

24. In the essay "Algeria Unveiled," Frantz Fanon demonstrates this logic perfectly. The veil becomes an indicator of a potential resister, but the absence of the veil, denoting the apparently "modern" or "secular" Algerian woman, may represent an even deeper form of deception perpetrated by the revolutionary woman (2004, 53–55).

25. Étienne Balibar's discussion of racism as relying on both a universalizing and a particularizing logic bears an oblique relationship to the dual heremeneutics of suspicion I describe here. For Balibar, the focus is on racism's scale—that is, how it operates both above and below the level of the nation. While that distinction matters for my analysis, my focus is on whether the threat of race should be secured in relation to part or all of the population. The question, in other words, is whether the boundary conditions for racial threat tend to bifurcate the population, run coterminous with the boundary of the population, or striate both its inside and its outside. See Balibar 1991b.

26. The TV series *Homeland* ran for eight seasons from 2011 to 2020.

27. I have explored this argument in my essay "Swords and Regulation" (Medovoi 2012b). A briefer but similar discussion appears in chapter 4 of this book.

28. Albeit in tremendously different and frequently incompatible ways, I would include here the work of Cedric Robinson, Barbara Jeane Fields, Robin Kelley, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Walter Johnson, Iyko Day, Moishe Postone, Hylton White, and Jodi Melamed.

1. RACE BEFORE RACE: THE FLOCK AND THE WOLF

Epigraphs: The Gospel of John is quoted from the New Revised Standard Version found in the *HarperCollins Study Bible* (Attridge 1989, 1834–1835). The full text of Philip the Chancellor's poem, written some time before 1250, is reproduced in Traill 2006 (245). For the *Protocols of the Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion*, see Nilus 1965. This forged work was first published in Russia in about 1903.

1. Elsewhere, Anibal Quijano writes, "Con la formación de América se establece una categoría mental nueva, la idea de 'raza.' Desde el inicio de la conquista, los vencedores inician una discusión históricamente fundamental para las posteriores relaciones entre las gentes de este mundo" (With the formation of the Americas, a new mental category was established, the idea of "race." From the start of the conquest, the victors initiated a discussion historically fundamental for subsequent relations between the peoples of the world) (Quijano 1995, 5), translation mine. The Smedleys similarly write, "*Race* as a mode of describing and categorizing human beings appeared in the languages of the Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, French, Germans, Dutch, and English as these groups established