
Sexual
Politics
under
Neoliberal
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Queer in
Translation
Evren Savcı

Queer in

Translation

BUY

Perverse Modernities A series edited by
Jack Halberstam and Lisa Lowe

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Sexual

Politics

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Islam

Queer in Translation

Evren Savcı

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Gezi Park in Istanbul, on June 1, 2013, during a demonstration
against the demolition of the park. Photo by BULENT KILIC/
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For Zeliş, Boysan, Ali, and Ayda, who left us too soon.

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Contents

Acronyms ix
Acknowledgments xi

Introduction 1

1 Subjects of Rights and Subjects of Cruelty 29
2 Who Killed Ahmet Yıldız? 53
3 Trans Terror, Deep Citizenship, and the Politics of Hate 80
4 Critique and Commons under Neoliberal Islam 109

Conclusion: Queer Studies and the Question of Cultural Difference 142

Appendix: On Method and Methodology 151
Notes 157
Bibliography 205
Index 225

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Acronyms

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
BDP	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (Right Path Party)
EU	European Union
FETÖ	Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (Pro-Fethullah Terrorist Organization)
FTM	female-to-male
GIT	Group International de Travail: "Liberté de Recherche et D'enseignement en Turquie" (International Work Group: "Academic Liberty and Freedom of Research in Turkey")
HDP	Halkların Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democratic Party)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JİTEM	Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism)
KADEM	Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği (Woman and Democracy Association)

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KİSS	Küresel İncelemeler ve Sınıfsal Stratejiler (Global Analyses and Class-Based Strategies)
LGBTİ	Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Transseksüel, İnterseks
LGBTT	Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Transseksüel, Travesti
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NTV	Turkish TV channel
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
STD	sexually transmitted disease
TEKEL	Tütün, Tütün Mamulleri, Tuz ve Alkol İşletmeleri A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü (Tobacco, Salt, and Alcohol Administration)
THY	Türk Hava Yolları (Turkish Airlines)
TOKİ	Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı (Housing Development Administration)
TÜSİAD	Türk Sanayici ve İş İnsanları Derneği (Turkish Industry and Business Association)
UN	United Nations
YÖK	Yükseköğretim Kurulu (Council for Higher Education)
YTL	Yeni Türk Lirası (New Turkish Lira)

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Introduction

During the 2000s Turkey experienced both the rise of robust and varied LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans)[1] movements across the country as well as the rise to power of the so-called moderate Islamist party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; Justice and Development Party).[2] While many liberal democracies might view these developments as contradictory forms of social change, a sizable portion of Turkey's Left-leaning liberals initially welcomed both as signs of the increasing cultural liberalization of a nation with a patriarchal, heteronormative, militarist, and strictly secular history—a history that had rendered unimaginable both strong LGBT movements *and* robust parliamentary representation for the Muslim voter base.[3] Also strikingly new in the Turkey of the early 2000s: The AKP clearly departed from previous Islamist parties with its pro-West, pro-globalization, and pro–big business stance. Soon after being elected to office in 2002, the party went to work trying to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria for membership in the European Union, in the process being especially attentive to ethnic and religious rights.[4] It was in this climate, and under the AKP regime, that the annual LGBT pride march, the first of which took place in 2001, grew significantly.[5] Queer activists had been forming formal and informal associations since the early 1990s, and that visibility and organizing activity increased in the 2000s as the nation's "sexual others" became loud and clear in their demands for social justice.

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In late June 2015, however, thirteen years after the AKP's rise to power, police attacked people gathering for the LGBT pride march, using tear gas and water cannons to prevent crowds from gathering in Taksim Square or entering the adjacent İstiklal Street. The following year, both the trans and LGBT marches and related press releases were banned for alleged security reasons, and those who tried to gather, chant slogans, or even clap and whistle were again met with police violence and detentions.[6] While such police repression of dissent was no longer considered out of the ordinary after the infamous Gezi Park riots of 2013, where tens of thousands protesting the proposed redevelopment of the public park into a shopping mall were attacked for days with water cannons, tear gas, and plastic bullets, the police had nevertheless not interfered with the pride march of 2013 or 2014.[7] By 2015, however, the exception made for pride seemed to be over, and LGBT marches were now considered to be security concerns alongside other protests and demonstrations.

How does one make sense of these stark shifts, from exciting democratization to the authoritarian crushing of any and all dissent, all within less than a decade? *Queer in Translation* argues that the answers to this question lie in the marriage between neoliberalism and Islam as devised by the AKP regime. The party has not only embraced a neoliberal order, which has resulted in increasing levels of precarity as well as securitization, but also conjured a particular regime of morality that cannot be reduced to the logic of neoliberalism or to that of Islam alone.[8] This regime of morality is precisely what makes sexual politics and discussions about sexual minorities in Turkey a fruitful place from which to draw the contours of what I call, following other scholars of Turkey, neoliberal Islam.[9] LGBT politics in particular emerges as a site where the effects of the existing regime of morality, as well as resistance to it, crystallize. In the following chapters I discuss the various ways in which neoliberal Islam at times foreclosed and, at other times, produced dialogues about justice in Turkey, and how at times it made solidarities unimaginable and, at others, produced a set of conditions that made them unavoidable.[10]

Yet the key intellectual contribution of *Queer in Translation* is not establishing the truth or detailing the mechanisms of neoliberal Islam. Rather, I am interested in the productive paradox that neoliberal Islam posits to queer studies as the field has taken significantly different critical and epistemological positions vis-à-vis the disparate aspects of this political-economic-religious order: On the one hand, queer studies has been deeply critical of neoliberalism and its taming effects on sexual dissent. On the other, Islam in queer studies is often analyzed as the target of Western imperialism, and discussions about Islam are located in contexts of Muslim-minority popu-

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lations, Muslim immigrants, Islamophobia deployed in homonationalist justifications of the US war on terror, or the continued Israeli occupation of Palestine.[11] This tendency results in most discussions of neoliberalism being confined to US and Western European contexts and in situating Islam, whenever it is addressed, as the subjugated other of Western modernity.[12]

These diametrically opposed treatments of neoliberalism and Islam in queer studies are symptomatic of a key epistemic problem in the field—that of reading nonnormatively gendered and sexualized subjects elsewhere through the paradigm of anthropological difference. This results in positioning queers in the non-West either as authentic local subjects or as modernized, globalized, and therefore inauthentic.[13] Sexual liberation movements that organize in the so-called Third World under any variation of the moniker LGBT have been rendered particularly suspect in queer studies, as the sexual identities they embrace and the liberation politics they practice are often imagined to shore up Western imperial claims about non-Western cultures as backward, nondemocratic, and homophobic. This is especially true of the Muslim world, since recent imperial wars waged against the Middle East have been justified among conservative and liberal queer organizations alike with arguments about state homophobia and violence in these societies.[14] The significance of queer critique aimed at the deployment of liberal LGBT rights to justify imperial wars and Islamophobia notwithstanding, the authentic/colonial binary that underlies this scholarship has made it difficult to theorize the *complexities* of both what circulates under the signifier Islam and of sexual political movements in Muslim-majority countries.

I offer a way out of the epistemological bind that neoliberal Islam poses to queer studies through two interrelated arguments. First, I make a historical/geopolitical one: A historically situated ethnographic study of the contemporary Turkish Republic offers a way out of this queer bind by helping contextualize Islam as a lived reality grounded in political economy and government rule.[15] Second, I make a methodological proposition of *translation* as a way to counter and move past the binaries of colonial/authentic, modern/traditional, and global/local, building on my emphasis on grounded fieldwork.

Turkey throws a particular wrench in the ongoing reproduction of the colonized East/colonial West divide as the descendant of an empire as well as thanks to its current imperial aspirations as exemplified in its military invasion of Syria.[16] With its history of repressive secularism and its present of repressive Sunni Islamism, the republic interrupts the representation of Islam as the victim other of the imperial West.[17] Neoliberal Islam in particular inter-

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venes in the divides of traditional/modern, cultural/economic, and public/private but also in authentic/colonial and East/West—binaries that I suggest continue to haunt sexualities and queer studies scholarships in geographies that are considered to lie outside the West. Further, the positioning of Muslims as victims of colonial modernity and of Islam as *the* current alternative to Western liberal cultural and political economies continues to reproduce Islam not only as homogenous but also as radical alterity to Western modernity. This has not only intellectual but also political implications that we need to confront: The framework of Islam as a victim of Western imperialism is not only a reproduction of the timeless image of Islam as culture, but it also corresponds to the rhetoric used, for instance, by the Islamic State in its imperial war against non-Muslims as well as non-Sunni Muslims, most prominently in Iraq and Syria.[18] While the main goal of this book is to illustrate the complexities of sexual politics under neoliberal Islam, it also recounts stories that, perhaps inevitably, will demonstrate the multiplicity of Islam among those who live it and speak on its behalf, despite the Turkish government's increasing efforts to homogenize and monopolize its meaning.

The methodological solution I offer to this epistemological problem is that of translation. I trace the travel and translation of modern political languages around gendered and sexual minorities, such as "gender identity," "sexual orientation," "hate crimes," "homophobia," and "LGBT rights," within the context of contemporary Turkey and analyze how they enter public political discussions in order to understand the contours and the effects of neoliberal Islam as well as its internal contradictions and unexpected outcomes that make room for resistance.[19] Critical translation studies is helpful in moving away from the colonial/authentic binary because the field deeply historicizes and denaturalizes the link between language and culture and opens up a way to rethink what seems to be the perpetual unspoken equation of language = culture = difference = decolonial. My goal here is not to vacate discussions of linguistic travel out of power but to insist that we understand both language and power historically and in ways that do justice to differences that can get subsumed under the sign of postcolonial and decolonial localities, which are increasingly burdened by decolonial expectations of the Global South.[20] In so doing, I hope to further the queer studies project of analyzing regimes of normativity and respectability in light of imperialism and the global political economy on two fronts: First, by grounding religion, and in my case (Sunni) Islam, in its political economic context, I aim to unburden it from its assigned role as an alternative to political modernity and the imperial West

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in discussions of sexual orders.[21] And second, by introducing translation studies to queer studies, I hope to interrupt the unspoken English norm in a field where language and discourse have been central to understanding the workings of normativity and power and also to rethink the implications of queer theory's homolingual address for our theories about universality and particularity.[22]

In tracing the travel and translation of the sexual politics vocabulary to Turkey, I purposefully move away from discussions of sexual subjectivity, such as gay, lesbian, or trans, and focus on other terms that are imagined to define or delineate issues around modern sexualities, such as gender identity, sexual orientation, outness, or hate crimes. I do so because, for one, as I outline in the conclusion, the existing paradigms through which sexualities in the non-West are analyzed end up entangled with the binary of authentic/colonial as long as they center on sexual subjectivity. This is because once sexual subjectivity is epistemically centered as the marker of modernity, other indications of it, such as neoliberal capitalism, factor into analyses *only* insofar as they tell us something about how they shape sexual subjectivity. This inevitably recenters the formation of sexual subjectivity as the only meaningful response to modernity. I will show that this is true even for scholarship that has diligently demonstrated that categories of traditional/modern, imported/indigenous, and global/local are inadequate for understanding the complexities of various contemporary sexual and gendered formations or for making sense of the ways in which the subjects who would fall into the various categories experience the world.[23]

The second reason for my moving away from subjectivity has to do with the ways in which an understanding of sexuality as a set of discourses and Foucauldian "subjectless" critique have circumscribed *how* we approach the very question of subjectivity. As I will discuss in more detail below, the focus on the discursive misses out on the hermeneutic dimension of language and meaning. It also risks flattening out the messiness and complexity of personhood. As an effect of subjectless critique, queer studies has failed to sufficiently theorize the social, which is often conflated with the normative, as exemplified in the anti-social turn in queer studies.[24] The social is precisely that messy space between subjectivity and subjectlessness that my analysis aims to capture: where things do not align, subjects are improperly hailed and misinterpellated, language is opaque, and meanings are multiple and contradictory—where subjects are also persons.[25] In *Ghostly Matters*, Avery Gordon invites us to think about the complexity of personhood; this means, among other

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things, that our categories will always fail to capture the messiness of the social. "It has always baffled me," she writes, "why those most interested in understanding and changing the barbaric domination that characterizes our modernity often—not always—withhold from the very people they are most concerned with the right to complex personhood."[26] I move away from categories of sexual subjectivity in my attempts not to deny complex personhood to people who identify with such categories as gay or lesbian *and* my simultaneous desire not to overemphasize agency in ways that reproduce the structure/agency binary. In fact, I turn to translation as methodology precisely in an attempt to afford more hermeneutic complexity to terms like *outness*. For instance, in chapter 2, where I recount the narratives around a young gay man's murder, I show through the story of Ahmet's outness, which inevitably is entangled with his gayness, that neither *out* nor *gay* captures the complexity of his social existence. Ahmet's relationship to his sexuality and its social life exceed both of these terms and yet are in relationship to them and certainly do not constitute radical and authentic alternatives. As I will discuss, critical translation studies is particularly helpful in dealing with the mess of the social because it understands meaning as always fractured, complex, and, well, messy. And to risk stating the obvious: That meaning and language are social, that they are slippery, complex, and multiple, does not mean that they stand outside regimes of power.

In the conclusion I return to the question of *why* queer studies literature on the non-Western other has centered subjectivity in order to think through the underlying theory of modernity that has informed the field as well as to reflect on where that leaves queer studies vis-à-vis the issue of cultural difference. In what follows, I will first chart out queer studies' disparate analyses of neoliberalism and Islam, which I understand to be a symptom of the field's approach to cultural difference, and which has implications for how sexual politics are theorized elsewhere. I then turn to translation as methodology to discuss how the understanding of language and meaning in translation studies can intervene in the homolingual address of queer studies and its epistemic outcomes, especially regarding authenticity/coloniality and tradition/modernity. I conclude with a discussion of the setting of the stories that follow, that is, the AKP's neoliberal Islamic regime. I situate this formation historically in order to not present the AKP government as a novelty or an exception, and discuss the moral regime of neoliberal Islam as the backdrop against which sexual politics in Turkey unfolded.

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Homonormativity, Homonationalism, and the Sticky Problem of Neoliberal Islam

Neoliberalism and its effects on queer politics have been a central concern for queer studies since the early 2000s.[27] In fact, the political economic and geopolitical turn in queer studies has been a most welcome shift in analyses of neoliberalism *and* of contemporary sexual subjectivities and politics. For one, feminist and queer literature insisted on the inseparability of the economy and the state from the cultural, suturing the various and at times contradictory uses of the term *neoliberalism* to mark economic, political, social, and cultural changes during late capitalism.[28] Lisa Duggan, for instance, has warned against the supposed economic/cultural divide perpetuated by the neoliberal logic that *depoliticizes* neoliberalism's redistribution of resources along class, racial, gendered, and sexual lines while positioning identity politics as a matter of special interest groups, which are then pushed outside of the realm of the economic.[29] Duggan maintains, "The goal of raising corporate profits has never been pursued separately from the rearticulation of hierarchies of race, gender, and sexuality in the United States and around the globe. Neoliberals . . . make use of identity politics to obscure redistributive aims, and they use 'neutral' economic policy terms to hide their investments in identity-based hierarchies."[30]

Second, queer studies scholars have illuminated neoliberalism's cultural effects on gay and lesbian politics of hailing self-responsibilizing and (economically, sexually, and politically) respectable citizens, leading them to conceptualize the changes in what used to be more radical sexual politics as homonormativity.[31] Homonormativity captures how the infiltration of progressive movements with the values, logic, and vocabulary of neoliberalism has resulted in the contemporary mainstreaming of LGBT politics in the United States, where an emphasis on privacy, domesticity, and individual freedom has produced such political goals as legalization of gay marriage, acceptance of gays and lesbians in the military, and increasing demands for antidiscrimination and hate crime laws.[32] While this neoliberal brand of identity/equality politics has usually been discussed as a depoliticization of the queer movement and its marriage with consumerism and domesticity, scholars have also documented instances where neoliberal queer values are employed in the name of being more political. Radical transformative politics are increasingly replaced by an emphasis on multiculturalism and diversity, both of which matter as long as they are predictable, marketable,

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and profitable, marking queers of color and working-class queers as those who cannot be the representatives of diversity politics, as they often lack the diversity skills garnered through corporate diversity workshops taught by diversity experts or, alternatively, during expensive college education.[33]

Liberal notions of freedom dominate mainstream LGBT politics, yet liberal freedom comes with a system of constraints as well as costs associated with it. The principle of calculating the cost of manufacturing freedom is called security.[34] Thus, not unlike neoliberal straight life, neoliberal queer life is one that both demands to be *recognized* for its power of consumption, its respectability, and its family forms, and needs to be *protected* from homophobia, whether engaging in local leisure or travel. This has led to several key developments. For one, it has served an increasing gay(-led) gentrification of inner cities, displacing immigrant communities or bodies of color as sources/locations of homophobic violence.[35] Second, it has swayed the agenda of many LGBT organizations toward demanding federal-level hate crime laws, which critics maintain feeds the prison-industrial complex and the increasing criminalization of poor communities of color.[36] Third, this demand for protection has served the production of certain sites, such as Tel Aviv, as gay meccas, that is, safe spaces for gay tourism where homophobia is allegedly properly policed by the state.[37] This, as scholars have argued, conceals the racism of the Israeli state and its ongoing settlement in and attacks on Palestinian territories.[38] Finally, gay (neo)liberalism seeks the right not only to be protected but also to protect. This latter desire has put the gay military conscription on the US LGBT agenda, resulting in the repeal of the Clinton-era don't-ask-don't-tell policy in 2010 and, more recently, the acceptance of transgender people to serve in the military.

It is in this literature on queer securitization where Islam and Muslim subjects make an appearance, either in critiques of the positioning of homophobic, usually hypermasculinized Muslim men as the threat to gay freedom par excellence or in analyses of discourse on Muslim gays and lesbians in need of rescue from their homophobic cultures. In other words, scholars maintain that the increasing need for protection among homonormative gays has produced an amorphous Muslim culture, and geographies and subjects associated with it, as the location of homophobia and thus as the very thing from which they need protection.[39] In perhaps the most classic work of this archive, Jasbir Puar has argued that this logic, which she terms homonationalism, ranks nations according to their levels of modernity and democracy based on rights and protections for gays and lesbians.[40] She maintains that the mistreatment of gays and lesbians in the so-called Mus-

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lim world is employed as a reason why the war against Muslim terrorism is simultaneously a war for/of gays and lesbians. Israeli pinkwashing works as an exemplary mechanism that relies on and further perpetuates this logic, where Israel's human rights violations against Palestinians are concealed by its self-proclaimed progressive position on gay and lesbian rights. The logic of homonationalism situates Tel Aviv as a gay mecca and the nation as the only democracy in the Middle East, exemplifying how gay rights can cover for racial settler colonial projects. Puar's analytic helps shift the focus from the biopolitical distribution of resources to worthy subjects to holding the biopolitical in tension with the necropolitical. This critical shift, in turn, helps us understand how some queer lives today are folded into proper citizenship and on whose behalf death and death-like conditions are unleashed onto disposable bodies and populations. Rejecting the suggestion that all queers always fall outside of reproductive nationalisms and therefore outside of the investments of biopolitics, Puar asks, "How do queers reproduce life, and which queers are folded into life? . . . Does this securitization of queers entail deferred death and dying for others, and if so, for whom?"[41]

Puar's timely and critical intervention has given rise to a body of scholarship that has analyzed the emergence of saving Muslim gays and lesbians as a homonationalist and homoimperialist agenda, especially in the United States, Western Europe, and Israel.[42] There is no doubt about the significance of this work, given the rising fascism and anti-Muslim xenophobia in the United States and Europe that repeats such old tropes as a "clash of civilizations" and the radical unincorporability of an ominous Islam.[43] However, while extremely helpful, generative, and politically urgent, this focus on Islamophobia, homonationalism, and pinkwashing as experienced and performed in Euro-American contexts inevitably frames Islam based on its discursive and symbolic production through an Orientalist, Islamophobic world order.[44] How can we think about the effect of political Islam in Muslim-majority contexts in general and in the case of Turkey under neoliberal Islam in particular, where the dynamics of which lives are folded into national belonging and which lives are cast out as moral or national others are complicated by the coming together of these two systems? This framework, which critiques Islamophobia as an outcome of neoliberal securitization and rescue regimes, turns into a paradox in a context where Muslims are not embodied in the minority, the immigrant, or the victim of Islamophobia and are not signs, figures, or discursive others.[45] How does one step outside this seeming paradox and think about sexual politics under neoliberal Islam from within queer studies, given that neoliberalism has been its ultimate object of critique

DUKE
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and Islam its object of rescue? What happens when two structures that have been discussed separately in terms of their influence on sexual politics—neoliberalism and Islam—coincide and create new and complex moral regimes that neither theories of neoliberalism nor discussions of Islam and sexuality are equipped to properly address?

Perhaps this is one reason why the burgeoning field of queer studies in Turkey has not engaged with much of the literature on homonationalism or homonormativity. In recent years, a significant number of articles and volumes have appeared that analyze the role of sexualities and genders that fall outside respectable normativities in Turkey.[46] Most of this rich research and writing has focused on various forms of queer and trans subjectivities and identifications, queer (readings of) art and cultural production, and subcultural formations.[47] Thus far the effects of neoliberalism on gender and sexual formations[48] and the intersection of Islam and queer sexualities[49] have not received much attention.[50] This is partially because Turkish sexual liberation movements have not (yet) faced the same challenges of neoliberal incorporation as the ones located in the United States or Western Europe.[51] It is also because as subjects living and theorizing in a Muslim-majority country with an Islamist authoritarian government, these scholars *experience* Islam as a multifaceted, complex, and contradictory formation, as well as very differently from immigrant minorities in US and European contexts.[52] In other words, homonationalism and pinkwashing do not provide the most immediately relevant frameworks for thinking about neoliberalism as experienced in a Muslim-majority country, under an authoritarian rule that heavily relies on Islam as its moralizing discourse.[53]

A newly emerging queer studies literature in the United States analyzes sexual regimes in the Middle East with an eye to biopolitical forms of control.[54] This scholarship decenters US imperialism as the central or only concern, eschews easy formulations of sovereign/nonsovereign, and does not exceptionalize the precarity of queer life, and yet it interrogates the deployment of sexuality in various bio- and necropolitical configurations.[55] Paul Amar, for instance, has shown that sexuality and morality have become parts of the discursive mechanism for the Egyptian human security state.[56] In this refreshing work that thinks about sexual politics without reducing it to identity politics, Amar argues that human security governance aims "to protect, rescue, and secure certain idealized forms of humanity identified with a particular family of sexuality, morality, and class subjects, and grounded in certain militarized territories and strategic infrastructures."[57] Similarly, Sima Shakhsari's work that critiques the emergent neoliberal entrepreneurial

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Iranian queer subjects in the post-9/11 North American knowledge market, where narratives of Islamic repression coming from reportedly native informants are highly valuable, disrupts frameworks that would understand Iranian subjects simply as victims of neoliberal modernity.[58]

My work seeks to contribute to this emerging scholarship and to the queer critique of neoliberalism at large by focusing on the Turkish case. I also seek to contribute to the queer and trans studies literatures in Turkey—while thus far questions of neoliberalism and Islam have not occupied the central agenda of this scholarship, how to understand the existing neoliberal authoritarian Islamist AKP regime, how to strategize for resistance, and how to work in solidarity toward inhabitable futures for all are questions with which many, including queer studies scholars and queer activists in Turkey, are grappling. While I position my central intellectual intervention in North American– and Western European–based queer studies, I am hopeful that the stories I unfold here will contribute to queer studies in Turkey by providing relevant and helpful examples of both the dead ends and the possibilities—"ways to imagine different aspirations for our political projects"—that emerge in the cruxes and fissures of the contradictions of neoliberal Islam.[59] I will speak to the particular ways in which the AKP's neoliberal Islam challenges these disparate treatments of neoliberalism and Islam in queer studies below. For now, however, I turn to critical translation studies to lay out the role that language and translation play in this book.

Translation as Queer Methodology

Despite queer studies' commitment to critiquing identity and universalism and the field's recognition of the constitutive powers of language, it is only very recently that queer studies scholars have recognized the English-centeredness of much of the literature.[60] With the exception of categories of sexual identity, such as gay and lesbian, which act as signs of modernity = cultural imperialism par excellence, many of the concepts employed by queer studies, such as affect, temporality, toxicity, failure, or hope (this last one usually as a bad queer theory object), assume an unspoken universality.[61] This is made possible in particular by failing to situate the terms in the English language and, therefore, assuming their translatability both linguistically and metaphorically.[62] Such grounding of linguistic concepts in the materiality of language becomes especially important if we are to follow the queer theoretical proposal that language is not simply an expression or a representation but is constitutive of "the real."[63]

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

My aim is not only to point out the specificity of English as a language that dominates queer studies' epistemological unconscious over and against other languages but also to underline the homolingual address that queer theory and queer studies inevitably engage in as a result and to invite a rethinking of the particular theories of language that animate the field. Naoki Sakai maintains that the homolingual address imagines the world made up of communities of languages (a United Nations model of languages, if you will), where languages are supposed to be easily identifiable as autonomous and distinct from each other.[64] As opposed to this unspoken homolingual address that dominates most fields of inquiry and forms the "modern regime of translation," critical translation studies scholars remind us that language, as an object with particular attributes and constituting comparable entities, is itself a historical construct.[65] Linguistic practices without proper names were deemed deviations as a result of Romanticism and disqualified as proper language.[66] Moreover, the nationalization of languages and the formation of what was considered a mother tongue occurred as a result of the formation of nation-states—further establishing monolingualism and reifying the nation and its citizens' relationship to it.[67] A distinct national language worked to establish the nation as authentic,[68] accompanied by the erasure and, at times, ban of indigenous languages or their reduction to dialect.[69] Therefore, it is useful to keep in mind that what we recognize today as languages are themselves products of a political history of modernity. As a result, arguments that equate the appearance of new names for sexual subjectivity in a particular language (say Turkish) as a colonial effect inevitably naturalize the said national languages as indigenous, thereby erasing the polyglot histories of these spaces as well as ongoing struggles to maintain them, which in the case of Turkey include speakers of Kurdish, Armenian, Circassian, Zazaki, Laz, Greek, Arabic or Serbo-Croatian, and Ladino.[70]

My understanding of language and the use of *translation* to understand the emergence of new sexual and gender idioms in contemporary Turkey owes a great debt to translation studies. Sakai has argued for the past two decades that we need to think about translation as a social practice, thereby undoing the false binary between language and practice.[71] Departing from Sakai's question, "What sort of social relation is translation in the first place?," a number of critical translation studies scholars urge us to question the modern regime of translation and its role in contemporary global capitalist modernity.[72] They suggest that understanding translation as "a transfer of message from one clearly circumscribed language community into another" presumes languages as homogenous and distinguishable entities, between

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which translation is supposed to act as a filter.[73] Likening this presumed linguistic equivalence to the capitalist equivalence of commodities, Jon Solomon calls this modern system "translational accumulation."[74] Translational accumulation assumes equivalence and commensurability between languages and systems of signs, where linguistic difference, assumed to be a gap, is traversed by translation.[75] The contemporary international system constituted by nation-states is shored up by national languages as markers of national, and presumed cultural, difference. In other words, the modern regime of translation shores up anthropological difference by equating nation, culture, and language—the very structure that makes the universalism/cultural imperialism versus particularism/cultural authenticity double bind possible.

Instead of abandoning translation as a concept and episteme altogether, translation studies scholars suggest that we think of translation as outside the homolingual address, which ahistoricizes and naturalizes languages.[76] What does it mean then to employ translation critically as a lens without repeating the regime of anthropological difference? Following translation theorists, I employ translation as a methodology to think about the question of difference without reproducing the universalism/particularism binary. I suggest that we not use the term to indicate a seamless move from one language to another in order to bridge the linguistic gap and find common ground but, instead, to indicate *social disjunctures*.[77] "Translation can inscribe, erase, and distort borders. . . . [T]ranslation deterritorializes languages and . . . shows most persuasively the unstable, transformative, and political nature of border, of the differentiation of the inside from the outside, and of the multiplicity of belonging and nonbelonging."[78]

This definition of translation led me to look for social disjunctures in the understandings and uses of the concepts I was following—for instance, if not all subjects who employed the term *LGBT rights* meant the same thing when they expressed support for, or objection to, LGBT rights, what kinds of social and political outcomes would such disjunctures have?[79] Using translation as a methodology led me to pay ethnographic attention to various, and at times conflicting, meanings and political positions that the same terms could evoke—such as *sexual orientation*, *gender identity*, *LGBT rights*, *hate crimes*, *homophobia*, and *outness*. This methodology also inevitably complicates the local, which is often homogenized in its opposition to the global. Not only is this a problematic binary because it has mapped onto others, such as colonial versus authentic, but also because it perpetuates the false assumption that careful attention to the particular is an intellectual and a political solution

DUKE
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PRESS

to the homogenizing forces of globalization—which is often understood in critical scholarship as universalism working as cultural imperialism.[80] I join Sakai in cautioning us not to forget that particularism is complicit with universalism.[81] In other words, our critiques of universalism will not go very far if they are invested in producing and sustaining cultural and linguistic particularity. Understanding not only culture but also language as nonstatic, grounded, and historically changing and as a practical human activity that is deeply intertwined with the material production of the world allows us to see that it is precisely in those moments that trouble both the meanings of vocabularies of gender and sexuality and the political regimes that employ them that we can discover productive spaces for thinking and being otherwise. Understanding how new forms of oppressive systems coalesce and erode our capacities to *think* of a different world is crucial not only to grasp the power of language and knowledge but also to start imagining life differently.

Therefore, emphasizing the English-centeredness of queer studies in a study of the travel and translation of concepts of nonnormative genders and sexualities is *not* to ask for a heightened linguistic sensitivity, an invitation to remember that English is not the only language through which subjects are constituted and make sense of their experiences (and with which scholars make sense of the world).[82] Such an emphasis would mean that we should consider how vocabulary in different languages might inform different ways of knowing and being, which always risks repeating the homolingual address, thus leading to a problematic nativism and cultural relativism against which transnational feminists have long warned us.[83] This is because the (national) language as a unified entity of the homolingual address works as a key mechanism of the production of cultural particularity and because (cultural) particularity is co-constitutive with universalism. Thus, my emphasis on the English-centeredness of queer theory is instead an invitation for queer studies to consider *how homolingualism has shaped its epistemological unconscious* and to start thinking about language heterolingually as well as historically.

On the one hand, the homolingual address informs queer studies' unquestioning equation of (national) language with (national) culture (if there is no indigenous vocabulary of X somewhere, X must not be indigenous to their culture) and erases the political histories of linguistic erasures and suturing. On the other, the Foucauldian theory of modernity posits subjectivity as the key marker of modernity and thus the existence of modern (linguistic) categories of identity as the marker of colonial erasure of authentic culture.[84] I return to this focus on sexual subjectivity over other markers of modernity in the conclusion, but for now I ask: What if we think of lan-

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guage not simply as textual and constitutive but as historically changing and practical human activity?[85] If we follow the translation studies insight that we accept every address as requiring an act of translation (and not assume that communication automatically happens between two subjects who share the same linguistic community), then translation as an episteme indeed interrupts Foucauldian discourse, which dispenses with the hermeneutic dimension of understanding.[86] In other words, understanding language as a historical, practical human activity helps us think about whether certain addresses arrive at all but also about *how* exactly those addresses arrive at their destination.[87] Understanding language as practical human activity helps us both consider discourses in action/practice and not project language beyond history.[88] Further, language as a practical human activity enables us not to neglect the issue of access to language, which is often a deeply classed (and in many occasions a racialized) matter. The move away from an emphasis on sexual subjectivity as *the* determinant of modernity also provides a way to think about collectivities, solidarities, and social change.

Well over a decade ago, David Eng, Jack Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz stated:

> Such a politics must recognize that much of contemporary queer scholarship emerges from U.S. institutions and is largely written in English. This fact indicates a problematic dynamic between U.S. scholars whose work in queer studies is read in numerous sites around the world. Scholars writing in other languages and from other political and cultural perspectives read, but are not, in turn, read. These uneven exchanges replicate in uncomfortable ways the rise and consolidation of U.S. empire, as well as the insistent positing of a U.S. nationalist identity and political agenda globally. We propose epistemological humility as one form of knowledge production that recognizes these dangers.[89]

While the invitation to epistemological humility is most welcome, queer studies can go further than to merely reproduce the same center, though this time with humility. One way to do this is by bringing translation studies to bear on queer studies, which can have the effect of finally rendering queer studies more heterolingual. This would complicate the various coarticulations of sexual epistemologies with colonialism, imperialism, or neoliberal capitalism as they are currently imagined to happen both within and through English-language terminology as well as homolingually. What ethnography can contribute to the effect translation studies can have on queer studies is to complicate the local and thereby prevent reductions of the local to the cultural

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and to the linguistic. Such reductionist accounts themselves always already rest on assumptions about the unity of national languages and the historical erasures that have followed from them—dynamics that queer studies has always been committed to dismantling.

Below I outline key features of the AKP's neoliberal Islam in order to show the impossibility of understanding Islam in today's Turkey as pure, authentic, victimized, or alternative to Western modernity. It is also not possible to understand it as singular or as disentangled from neoliberalism. I trace the historical links between neoliberalism and Turkish moderate Islam, which is increasingly being used by the AKP regime to justify growing inequalities and precarities by producing immoral others. This will help us see why frameworks of homonationalism or homonormativity fall short in capturing the relationship between sexual liberation movements in Turkey and neoliberal Islam.

The Rise of the AKP and the Moral Politics of Neoliberal Islam

Lest readers think that the marriage of neoliberalism with Islam is an AKP invention, it is important to note that the introduction of neoliberalism *and* a particular public moderate Islam to Turkey both date to the military coup of September 12, 1980.[90] While the economic liberalization program of Turkey had been devised several months prior to the coup, the military junta was central to ensuring the continuity of the economic reform package known as the January 24th Decisions. Up until then, the Turkish economy had been a state-led, closed-market system with an emphasis on national production and consumption combined with strict import regulations. The military coup not only enforced the beginnings of the neoliberalization of the economy through IMF- and World Bank–supported structural adjustment policies, but it also preempted any organized resistance to this process by banning many forms of political organizing, including by labor unions, and jailing union leaders.[91] Turkey as a result became one of the key testing grounds for the joint IMF–World Bank approach.[92]

If economic neoliberalization was one significant outcome of the 1980 coup, its other key effect was the introduction of Islam and, more specifically, what was referred to as *Türk-İslam sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic synthesis) as a social glue, a remedy to political rifts in the country.[93] This remedy was intended to end the political divisions between communists and the fascist ultra-Right that had escalated to a violent conflict at the time, especially in

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order to replace “the left-wing ideas and discourse of Turkey’s youth with a more cohesive religious culture.”[94] This move was also done in conjunction with the US war against the perceived communist threat and ultimately led to the crushing of the Left and the strengthening of the center Right in Turkey. Yet the project of Turkish-Islamic synthesis that aimed at the Islamicization of public and social life had to be carefully managed. This was due to both the military-backed *laiklik* (Turkish secularism; from the French *laïcité*) principle of the constitution and the necessity of preventing Islam’s radicalization, as in the Iranian case.[95] In fact, during this period the success of the Iranian Revolution resulted in the United States’ encouragement of liberal Islamist projects all over the Middle East.[96] In this context, “in sharp contrast to the leftist overtone of Islam in Iran (led by Shariati), Islamism in Turkey developed along with an expanding free market.”[97] With support from the 1980s government, the military encouraged the building of mosques and the expansion of religious education. Mandatory religious education was added to public school curricula in 1980. In the decade following the elections in 1983, the Turkish government opened 124 new preacher schools. Between 1973 and 1999 the number of mosques in Turkey increased by 66 percent with the construction of 29,848 new mosques.[98] Religious orders and brotherhoods also boosted their activities in this period, setting up Quran courses; reading groups; charity foundations; women’s, youth, and mutual-support associations; and student dormitories.[99] Thus it is impossible to understand Islam in contemporary Turkey apart from these histories of de-leftification and de-radicalization.[100]

Also referred to as the Turkish model, Islamic liberalism in Turkey—the “marriage of formal democracy, free-market capitalism, and a (toned down) conservative Islam”—took off especially in the 1990s as a result of the failure of center-Right parties to address problems of the urban poor as well as the intensifying war between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdish guerrilla PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) starting in 1994.[101] In a country where the Left was severely dismantled after the 1980 coup, both of these developments contributed to the weakening of the center-Right, paving the way for Islamist parties on the right to rise to power. The first major success of Islamist parties during this period, the triumph of the RP (Welfare Party) in the 1994 municipal elections followed by their success in the 1995 general elections, was due to their political discourse that emphasized social justice, critiqued pro-West big business and the capitalist banking system, and effectively delivered much-needed services, in addition to their Islamist discourse.[102] The party’s municipal governments were lauded not only for

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their efficiency but also for their commitment to aiding the urban poor living in proliferating *gecekondu* (squatter) neighborhoods without proper infrastructure, lacking access to jobs with decent pay and benefits.[103] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's performance as the successful and charismatic mayor of Istanbul during the early RP government, delivering roads, bridges, green spaces, and, in some cases, jobs set him up as a promising political candidate to run the country—especially in the context of a neoliberal understanding of politics as "a technocratic endeavor: rational, sterile, and free from the messiness of ideology and ideological struggles."[104] When the military forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign in 1997 and banned him from formal politics for five years, citing growing Islamist insurgency, Erdoğan emerged as the undisputed new leader of Islamist politics.[105]

In 2001 Erdoğan formed the AKP, which came to power in the 2002 elections as the first single-party government following a series of failed coalitions, and at the tail of the major 2001 economic crisis.[106] The young leadership of AKP positioned the new party as democratic, secular, pro-Western, pro-state, and pro-capitalist, and the neoliberalization of the country sped up under AKP leadership.[107] Unlike the previous Welfare Party–led coalition, AKP wholeheartedly embraced and followed the IMF- and World Bank–induced austerity measures, and within the first several years of the new government Turkey experienced significant economic growth.[108] The party also discursively solidified its (neo)liberal position by distancing itself from military rule and by rhetorically aligning the Kemalist raison d'état with military authoritarianism and a closed-market economy. This position implied that (military) violence, authoritarianism, and lack of freedom rested with the statist economy of the Kemalist era and that the AKP-led neoliberal economy equaled freedom and was made possible by its non-militaristic/non-fascist/nonauthoritarian regime. As I detail in chapter 4, in his speeches Erdoğan frequently aligned himself with the two prime ministers who have been key liberalizers of the economy, Turgut Özal in the 1980s and Adnan Menderes in the 1950s, creating a genealogy of economic liberalism as progress. He also narrated the progress of the Turkish economy as historically under attack by forces he claimed were plotting against the nation.

AKP distinguished itself from previous Islamist governments not only in its alliance with Western big business but also in its acceleration of the EU accession process by passing packages of laws to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.[109] A significant early legislative overhaul resulted in changes to the penal code, including the removal of references to such concepts as morality, chastity, honor, or virginity; the criminalization of marital rape; and the

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recategorization of sexual assault under crimes against the individual instead of crimes against public morality.[110] Capital punishment, which has strong historical ties to military coups in Turkey, was banned.[111] The AKP's discourse of democracy also delved into ethnic rights. Despite the government's failure to prevent the assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink and even though the nationalist faction within the party had blocked the first attempt to hold a conference on the Armenian genocide, at the time my fieldwork began in summer 2008, the Kurdish opening, the Armenian opening, and the Alevi opening were all important discussion items on the national agenda.[112] There was also talk of a headscarf opening that would allow women to wear the Islamic headscarf in public universities and offices, which was outlawed at the time.

It was in this climate, and under the AKP, that the LGBT pride march, which had been held annually starting in 2001, grew significantly in size. In summer 2008 the AKP was in the midst of their democratic openings and showed no signs of the authoritarianism, rampant privatization, and precaritization of life and labor that would follow. As previously noted, their policies were initially welcomed by many Turkish Left-leaning liberals. And while such moves as the Kurdish opening were indeed reminiscent of political strategies that have been critiqued as the multicultural incorporation of difference in Euro-American contexts, in a country where uttering the Kurdish language in the parliament had led to deputy Leyla Zana's ten-year imprisonment, the AKP's diversity politics were hard to dismiss.

Thus, the picture at the start of my research was of a moderate Islamist party that was pro-West, pro-business, and fully in compliance with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as EU demands, and of an LGBT movement that was flourishing. This was not an uncomplicated terrain, however; in fact, in chapter 1 I detail the complex entanglements of the headscarf opening with LGBT rights in ways that foreclosed the establishment of alliances among activists. Nevertheless, it was a hopeful atmosphere and, according to several LGBT activists, a welcome change from the center-Left Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP; Republican People's Party). These activists found CHP to be staunchly secularist (*laïcist*), which, among other things, meant that the party had relied on the Turkish military purportedly to protect democracy, including in the form of military coups. The strong anti-militarism of LGBT activists contributed to their alignment with AKP, as the party not only ended capital punishment (which, as noted, is strongly associated in Turkey with military coups), but it also expressed the desire to transform the nation's culture of military custody.

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If AKP's cooperation with the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank is one reason for the impossibility of understanding Islam in contemporary Turkey through a romanticized notion of the local and as disentangled from a transnational political economy, another one can be found in the AKP's neoliberal packaging of Islamic difference in the 2007, UN-backed neoliberal branding project Alliance of Civilizations. Islamic civilization has been proposed as a true alternative to Western civilization by Ahmet Davutoğlu, one of the masterminds behind the AKP, who has served in various high-ranking positions, including chief adviser to PM Erdoğan, minister of foreign affairs, and prime minister.[113] The Alliance of Civilizations project sought to promote "tolerance, respect, dialogue and cooperation" in the global fight against terrorism, turning the clash of civilizations logic on its head while nonetheless relying on the same neat distinctions between East and West and reifying an ahistorical culture of each.[114]

A number of scholars have analyzed the various economic and social effects of neoliberalism in Turkey: from the privatization of various public goods, such as telecommunications, petrochemicals, and other industries, to the weakening of labor unions, the rise of informal and precarious labor, the shrinking of social security and pension systems, the transformation and incorporation of radical Islamists into a neoliberal mold, and the Islamic charity fixation on social welfare.[115] I return to these issues in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4, when I analyze the intense privatization and urban redevelopment under AKP-led neoliberalism as well as the moralization and securitization of the revolts against them. Here I will briefly provide a couple of examples of how the economy, security, and Islamic morality are woven together in order to lay out the terrain on which the sexual politics detailed in the following chapters unfolded. These examples illustrate what I consider to be the two key distinctions of the morality politics of the AKP's neoliberal Islam. For one, the binaries evoked and utilized by neoliberalism (deserving/undeserving; legitimate/illegitimate; morally upright/questionable; responsible/irresponsible) are animated by an alleged Islamic morality. For another, using this vocabulary of Islamic morality, the AKP has extended the meaning of marginality onto a wide range of bodies and subjectivities instead of limiting it to the lower ranks of society, a development that has had an important impact on how the politics of normality is understood and countered in Turkey.

As discussed at the beginning of this introduction, between 2008 and 2015 Turkey went from supporting a growing LGBT movement to attacking participants at the 2015 pride march. Then, in 2016, both the trans and the

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LGBT marches were banned, and anyone who tried to participate was again met with police violence and detentions. Security measures were not only applied to the pride march and LGBT events—security emerged as an overarching framework through which increasing precarities resulting from rapid privatization and financialization were to be contained. Those suspected to be security threats to the nation and the national economy, which are often conflated in the AKP's rhetoric, were also rendered as *morally* suspect. For instance, during the Gezi Park uprisings, in his attempts to delegitimize the protesters, Erdoğan wrongfully claimed that they had entered the Dolmabahçe Mosque with shoes on and had drunk beer inside.[116]

I write about the employment of Islamic morality in order to securitize and contain the Gezi Park uprisings in more detail in chapter 4. For now, I note that Gezi provides a perfect example of how the logic of the market, the logic of security, and the discourse of Islamic morality (often proposed as national values) are openly tied together in AKP officials' and especially Erdoğan's rhetoric. This connection serves to reinforce economic obligations as well as economic betrayals as deeply moral ones.[117] This was evident in pro-AKP media as well as in the rhetoric of AKP politicians claiming that Gezi constituted a movement started by innocent environmentalists who wanted to protect the park but was taken over by anti-government political factions that provoked everyone in the squares and the streets to demand the government's resignation. By positioning those critical of the government as simultaneously *morally* and *politically* suspect, the government's rhetoric collapsed the two categories, delegitimized the political demands of the demonstrators, and justified the securitization of the protests. At the same time, it was precisely this *morality* politics that expanded the meaning of marginality to cover ever-expanding crowds that helped many previously disparate groups see the links between their marginalization and oppression and to reject the government's call to respectability.

Inderpal Grewal has argued that contrary to arguments that neoliberalism has waned, we are experiencing a more "advanced" stage of it, which "enables its contradictions to be resolved by neoliberal and militarized means, that is, through the work of securitized, exceptional citizens."[118] Following Grewal, I suggest that if neoliberal capitalism is a system that produces increasing precarity for larger groups of people (through the disappearance of the middle class, the rise of surplus existence, the disappearing of welfare and related social safety nets, the rising dispossession and indebtedness, and the crushing of labor unions), and if it justifies such inequality via moralizing mechanisms (the categorization of deserving versus undeserving, the rise

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of respectability politics, the increasing individualization of responsibility, and an emphasis on self-sufficiency and self-entrepreneurialism), then in the case of Turkey, Islamic morality factors as the key mechanism through which neoliberalism is "domesticated"[119] and through which the government distinguishes between the deserving and the undeserving, the good moral citizens and the bad immoral elements conspiring with foreign powers for the government's downfall, and between those who need to be securitized and those who will assist in that securitization. Similar to Grewal's "exceptional citizens" in the United States, in chapter 3 I discuss the employment of "deep citizens" in Turkey, those who help impose state ideologies of morality and execute violence on behalf of the state.[120]

At the same time, I am not arguing that securitization constitutes a brand-new state logic or practice in Turkey. In fact, the language of terrorism and the Turkish state's war against Kurds have been ongoing for over three decades. Under neoliberalism, however, old forms of securitization are in fact garnering new neoliberal logics. Security is marketed to populations not only through the old discourses of national unity but also as a necessity when the national economy is under attack—this line of reasoning is especially applicable to economies that rely on foreign investment and tourism and, thus, political stability. In a system of market veridiction, where the robust economy already tells us that AKP is the right government for Turkey, this weaving together of economy and security implies that protecting the economy might also require protecting the Turkish government and vice versa. In other words, the fight against Kurds or any other so-called terrorists or lobbies is now a national duty not simply for security for security's sake but so that the Turkish economy will continue to prosper.

As AKP continues to discursively nationalize and moralize the economy, it continues to privatize public goods. When citizens object to such privatization they are deemed enemies of the state, which is no different from being enemies of the national economy and of religion. They are not only traitors seeking the downfall of the nation, and therefore questionable national subjects; they also are declared morally suspect, where the contours of morality are weaved with a formal and generic understanding of Islam (indicated by such actions as taking one's shoes off upon entering a mosque and not drinking alcohol inside). This weaving together of the economy and Islamic morality are also illustrated in instances of Erdoğan attributing the deaths of hundreds of miners at the Soma mine explosion not to unsafe labor conditions, but to the *fıtrat* (Allah-given nature) of mining. *Fıtrat* also served to remind feminists, who protested Erdoğan's claim that women who are not

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mothers are incomplete, that it was in the *fitrat* of womanhood to bear children.[121] His continued demand that all families bear at least three children was simultaneously explained by the God-given nature of womanhood *and* Turkey's need for a young population for a strong economy. At the same time the Turkish state continues to kill Kurdish children, who are imagined as future impediments to the Turkish economy and therefore a threat to the state, Turkish mothers are invited to bear children for the future of the same Turkish economy as good national subjects, but also as good Muslims, who are told by Erdoğan not to worry about finances, as Allah will provide the *rızık* (livelihood) of every child.[122]

Despite Turkey's attempts to brand its Ottoman past as well as its current moment as a tolerant civilization throughout which different ethnic and religious groups peacefully live side by side, Kurds are joined today by many others in the securitized category of the terrorist.[123] During the AKP's seventeen-year reign, various political groups have been charged with terrorism, which has only intensified since the July 2016 coup attempt. Among those deemed terrorists, in addition to political Kurds, are those who speak up against the state violence targeting Kurds, such as Academics for Peace, and also the radical Left, Gülenist religious Right, as well as various members of the military, the judiciary, and the education sector. As of April 2020, the government had arrested over 90,000 people and purged 150,348 civil servants.[124] Among those cast out as unrespectable, immoral subjects are women who seek abortions or refuse motherhood, women who laugh out loud in public, students living in coed housing, bachelors, citizens who consume alcohol or tobacco, journalists who critique the government, and anyone deemed to be in opposition to Erdoğan's rule. This deployment of marginality through discourses of terrorism *and* immorality is continually justified by the rhetoric of Turkey's strong economy, which is under national and international attack and demands the securitization of those elements seeking its downfall.

I am not arguing that this expansion of marginality is unique to Turkey. The world is experiencing a rise in authoritarian and fascist regimes in which premises of liberalism and respectability as usual no longer apply.[125] What I offer instead is an invitation to hear the stories that follow as illustrative of complex contradictions of neoliberalism in general and of neoliberal Islam in particular. These contradictions at times perpetuate the regimes that produce them and at others interrupt them. The stories that follow illustrate the complex and occasionally unexpected outcomes of such expanding characterizations, as they focus on the shifting meanings of morality and marginalization in relationship to the state and the economy. They also dem-

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

onstrate that neither LGBT activists' initial excitement about the AKP and their democratic openings nor their subsequent alienation from and critique of its conservative, authoritarian, and racist rule can be understood through colonial mimicry or the frameworks of Islamophobia or homonationalism. Finally, it is worth noting that the Turkish model is not representative of all of the operating logics of various forms of neoliberal Islam. I suggest, however, that there are lessons to be learned from this case about why it might matter to contextualize both neoliberalism and Islam, even as theory (queer or otherwise) might entice us toward abstraction.

Queer in Translation

When I embarked on this project in 2008, many of the current political realities of Erdoğan's regime were either nonexistent or nascent and barely recognizable. LGBT political organizing was vibrant; new solidarity associations were forming all over the country and not just in urban centers. Political, or personal, disagreements between different organizations never seemed to get in the way of solidarity. The pride march, with an entire week of events leading up to it, seemed to attract larger crowds every year. It is only fair to say that, under those circumstances, I did not set out to study neoliberal Islam, inasmuch as it was not yet a term widely used by scholars to talk about the political regime in contemporary Turkey. Interested in queer political organizing, I had set out to analyze how LGBT activists understood their political goals and commitments. As I quickly realized, understanding queer politics required coming to terms with the effects that newly emerging vocabularies were having on the articulation of political imaginaries and desires. Thus, I followed not one organization but events and cases that emerged while I was in the field that told stories of how vocabularies such as LGBT rights, gender identity, sexual orientation, homophobia, and hate crimes were used in public and political discussions. As a result, each of the chapters features a case study tracing the translation of these idioms and showing that translation as a transnational queer methodology can help us analyze the social disjunctures that at times are produced and at other times heightened by the emergence of new vocabularies. The particular debates that unfold in each chapter are also inevitably affected by and thus shed light on how Islam and neoliberalism are conjoined in contemporary Turkey.[126]

My first summer of fieldwork also was the beginning of Turkish government officials making references to demands by LGBT organizations. In chapter 1, "Subjects of Rights and Subjects of Cruelty," I trace the terms

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LGBT rights and *homophobia* as they began to be voiced in public political debates; also at that time, the headscarf issue was being debated as a woman's human right rather than a religious right, an aspect of the various liberal openings the AKP was introducing as part of the EU accession process. These liberal human rights discourses ultimately worked to position Muslim headscarf activists against LGBT activists by confronting the former over whether they supported LGBT rights, thereby testing their sincerity in claiming their own human rights. By rendering their complex positions—which did not follow an easy for-or-against (LGBT rights) political formula—as homophobic, these debates foreclosed solidarities between headscarf activists and LGBT activists in protesting increased neoliberal state violence. Thus, I show that even dominant and universalizing discourses such as human rights are not something to which every subject who decides to engage with them is granted equal access (the right to claim human rights is not equally distributed, if you will). At the same time, Muslim women's positions on the issue of LGBT rights ultimately illuminate that it is not only human rights discourses but also their Western critiques that travel transnationally in these debates. Finally, I discuss the potential of what I call a *politics of cruelty*, whereby subjects *oppose* cruelty as an alternative framework for social justice to liberal rights–based politics. I do not romanticize this view as a perfect solution, especially because, as I show, the question of the current relationship between the state, public space, and religion are shot through with modern and liberal understandings of these terms not only for secular but, also, Muslim subjects.

Another story that erupted during that first summer and that unfolded in complex and unpredictable ways was the murder of a twenty-six-year-old gay man, Ahmet Yıldız. Following the story of his murder introduced me to the bear subculture of İstanbul, of which Ahmet had been a participant. Chapter 2, "Who Killed Ahmet Yıldız?," examines the travel of the concepts of *outness* and *chosen families* through the story of Ahmet's murder. I show that the positioning of Ahmet's life as an unfulfilled desire for an out-and-proud existence and his murder as an honor killing worked to nationally reify the Eastern Kurdish regions of the country as feudal and traditional and traveled internationally to tell the story of what happens to gay people in backward Muslim countries. These narratives in turn relegate family violence to geographies imagined as Muslim and uphold both Western family romance and the myth of the West as a location of stranger danger. Turning to the only witness of the murder case, a Muslim single mother, reveals other sexual others of the Turkish state who are not easily folded into the neoliberal logic of minority groups needing protection. It also reveals alternative Muslim ap-

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

proaches to homosexuality and sin that are not encountered in transnational gay accounts of the story. Finally, I use Ahmet's story to problematize the newsworthiness of the eventful death of a young gay Kurdish man and the valorization of gay (Kurdish) lives in the context of slow deaths that have been and continue to be administered to many Kurdish citizens all over the country by the neoliberal Sunni state.

There may have been no better witnesses than trans sex workers to two important transformations introduced by neoliberal Islam in Turkey: urban redevelopment projects and transformation of the police force. Chapter 3, "Trans Terror, Deep Citizenship, and the Politics of Hate," traces the travel of the term *hate crime* by focusing on the spatial exclusion of transvestite and transsexual sex workers from public space; it also demonstrates how changes in the police treatment of sex workers speak to larger changes in national politics. In addition, it shows how violence against trans sex workers illuminates a new relationship that is mediated by the state, citizens, and violence. Both this new relationship, which I call *deep citizenship*, and the demands of trans women sex workers for a hate crime law challenge current theories that fail to see how a neoliberal state does not always concentrate the means of violence. Understanding *hate* as a structuring element of neoliberal Islam that renders lives precarious, trans women seek not to punish individual haters but to use the term as a means of understanding vulnerabilities as shared, collective realities. They also understand hate as a mirror of the logic of terror, a mechanism of rendering subjects as criminal and monstrous, which I show has extended from so-called Kurdish terror, leftist terror, and transvestite terror in the 1990s to much larger publics today. Holding an investment in life and a divestment from hope together in tension, trans women's analyses demonstrate that asking for legal change can have meanings beyond the purchase of respectability politics on citizen-subjects.

In chapter 4, "Critique and Commons under Neoliberal Islam," I return to the question of possibilities for political solidarities and resistance. One of the first things that struck me as I started my research was how politically knowledgeable and savvy LGBT activists were regarding the global political economy and neoliberal funding structures yet still reproduced class divisions that were not necessarily accounted for by neoliberal notions of respectability. Focusing on the tensions between LGBT activists and the clients of a women-only (and mostly queer) bar, I show how the thing that was experienced as a political/apolitical divide between activist and non-activist LGBT groups in Istanbul was in fact a *class divide* based on cultural capital

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS

and informed by the travel of Western theories on *gender identity* and *sexual orientation*. I juxtapose this moment of failed coalition building with the solidarity LGBT activists and non-activists established during Gezi Park uprisings in 2013, when many citizen-subjects were officially cast as unrespectable others. Rejecting the neoliberal Islamic state in its call for conservative consumer respectability, and turning the park into a commons for several weeks, helped queer and non-queer subjects move past class, ethnic, and religious divides to imagine new ways of living together. It also resulted in new ways of understanding past divisions as produced by structures that worked not for, but against, the people. I contrast these two cases of the relationship of apolitical subjects to politics to point out both the limits of critique as a Left political mode of engagement and to emphasize the promises and potential of the commons. While I underscore the limits of the Gezi commons in accounting for the larger effects of class, I end by recognizing the political potential of this imperfect collectivity in resistance for redefining life to make it worth living.

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Notes

Introduction

Portions of this chapter previously appeared in "Ethnography and Queer Translation," in *Queering Translation/Translating the Queer: Theory, Practice, Activism*, ed. Brian James Baer and Klaus Kindle (New York: Routledge, 2017), 72–83; and "Translation as Queer Methodology," in *Other, Please Specify:__________: Queer Methods in Sociology*, ed. Kristen Schilt, Tey Meadow, and D'Lane Compton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 249–61.

1. I have chosen to use LGBT in referencing various queer organizations in Turkey despite the fact that the abbreviations of the names of most of the organizations I have either worked with, or known of, have changed several times over the past decade. During the summer of 2008, when I first started this fieldwork, most organizations used LGBTT, which stood for Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Transseksüel, Travesti. Over the next couple of years, one of the *T*s was dropped from the abbreviation, with the remaining *T* now standing for *trans*, in order to avoid hierarchies that might be suggested by differentiating between *transseksüel* (transsexual) and *travesti* (transvestite) based on different trans subjects' status vis-à-vis hormone use, surgery, or both. There was yet another change in 2015, when *İ* was added for *interseks* (intersex), making the abbreviation LGBTİ. Currently most organizations prefer LGBTİ+ in order to signal inclusivity of various gendered and sexual others. (I thank Beren Azizi for verifying this information.) I settled on LGBT for this project after much thinking for three reasons: First, during the bulk of my research, intersex activism was not on the agendas of activists groups; therefore, LGBTİ/LGBTİ+ would wrongly suggest that the book covers intersex politics when it does not. Second, inasmuch as the acronym has changed several times over the course of this project, there is reason to think that

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

further changes might occur before publication of this book, rendering futile any attempt to ensure currency. Third, and connected to the second point, while I fully respect queer organizations' name changes, which often are guided by concerns about inclusivity, I also harbor an uneasiness regarding some of the politics that accompany these changes. In addition to questions scholars have raised already about the politics of inclusion (see Butler, *Gender Trouble*), I am also wary that the corrective nature of the name changes—after all, the change is made to ensure a more "correct" abbreviation—suggests that we are always improving the practices of naming. This position plays into a particular modern narrative of progress, suggesting that we are always moving toward better futures. This position is also used at times to correct and discipline those subjects who do not employ what is viewed as the accurate terminology. For the violence enacted by such erasures, see Valentine, *Imagining Transgender*. While I refer to LGBT politics, activism, and organizing throughout the book, when I refer to particular activist groups, I use their own current abbreviation.

2. The term "moderate Islam" (*ılımlı İslam*) has been used in conjunction with President George W. Bush's Greater Middle East Project to refer to US think tanks' and the US government's interest in encouraging nonradical, US-friendly Islamic governments, especially after the September 11 attacks, even though US interest in a nonradical Islam dates back at least to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Several thinkers have voiced criticism of the AKP government's affiliations with moderate Islam as a US project (Macit, *Küresel Güç Politikaları: Türkiye ve İslam* [Global politics of power: Turkey and Islam]; Emre Kongar, "Ilımlı İslam, demokrasi ve antiemperyalizm" [Moderate Islam, democracy and anti-imperialism], *Cumhuriyet*, September 14, 2018, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/emre-kongar/ilimli-islam-demokrasi-ve-antiemperyalizm-1082298). In 2008, Attorney General Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya opened a case requesting the closure of AKP and the ban of a number of its key politicians from politics for five years, citing the party's and its leaders' relations to moderate Islam as well as their connections to Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen who resided (and continues to do so) in the United States ("İşte AKP iddianamesi tam metin" [Here is the AKP indictment full text], *Hürriyet*, March 19, 2008, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/iste-akp-iddianamesi-tam-metin-8467042). The term has been criticized by both Islamists and secularists. I, too, find the radical-versus-moderate binary problematic and in this book use *Islamists* to refer to AKP politics. See note 8 for an explanation of my use of *Islam* in the book. For more on moderate Islam and Turkey see Büyükkara, "Ilımlı İslam Tartışmaları Zemininde Günümüz Türkiyesi'nde Laikliğin Anlam ve Sınırları" [The meanings and limits of secularism in the context of moderate Islam debates in contemporary Turkey].

3. This defense of Turkish democracy had historically manifested itself not only in quite undemocratic and violent ways—military coups, shutting down Islamist parties, barring Islamist politicians from engaging in official politics, crackdowns on intellectuals and journalists, and the headscarf ban for public employees and students at public schools, including universities—but also in an elitist positioning of the pious subjects of the country as backward, ignorant, and undeserving of the democratic rights, freedoms, and privileges bestowed on them by Kemal Atatürk, founder of the

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republic. Turam, *Between Islam and the State*; Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism*. For more on Atatürk as a military leader and founder of the secular republic, and for an overall introduction of militarism as a defining feature of Turkish national culture, see Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation*.

4. Turam, *Between Islam and the State*; Cizre, *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey*.

5. Özbay, *Queering Sexualities in Turkey*.

6. Trans activists started organizing a separate trans pride march in 2010 as they felt that the larger LGBTİ+ pride march did not provide the space or the level of visibility they desired. The Trans Pride March (Trans Onur Yürüyüşü) regularly takes place the Sunday before the LGBTİ+ pride march in June, and many trans activists also still participate in the larger LGBTİ+ march.

7. Özkırımlı, *The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey*. The fact that the pride march was the first and for a time the only sizable gathering permitted at Taksim Square following the resistance rendered this delayed reaction rather surprising. In fact, even as successive AKP governments started showing signs of authoritarianism and corruption, the pro-AKP LGBT group AK LGBTİ emphasized the AKP's (alleged) liberal position on gay and other civil rights issues by noting that their administration was the only one under which a stand-alone annual pride march had been allowed to take place.

8. While there is no such thing as a single logic of Islamic morality, I use *Islam* critically throughout the book in order to both outline and challenge Turkish government claims to it. The AKP's neoliberal Islam project has been a strictly Sunni one, but calling it neoliberal Sunnism would not be accurate, since the AKP often claims to speak on behalf of Islam in general and not Sunnism in particular.

9. Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism*; Yücesan-Özdemir, "The Social Policy Regime in the AKP Years"; Balkan, Balkan, and Öncü, eds., *The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist Capital in Turkey*; Yeşilyurt-Gündüz, "The EU and the AKP."

10. I do not mean to suggest that when not conjoined with Islam neoliberalism is otherwise without contradiction. This would equate to imagining that there is a pure form of neoliberalism, which, following Stuart Hall, I refute. According to Hall, "Neo-liberalism is . . . not one thing. It combines with other models, modifying them. It borrows, evolves and diversifies. It is constantly 'in process.' We are talking here, then, about a long-term tendency and not about a teleological destination." Hall, "The Neo-liberal Revolution," 708. Also see Ferguson and Hong, "Sexual and Racial Contradictions of Neoliberalism."

11. There are certainly scholars who study gender and sexuality in Muslim-majority contexts who are not blind to the nation-state context or the political economy and whose work can easily be folded into "queer studies"; these include Afsaneh Najmabadi (*Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards*) and Minoo Moallem (*Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister*). Yet this scholarship is often historical in nature, leaving contemporary queer formations and sexual politics to be represented as signs under the framework of homonationalism. For an exception to this, see Najmabadi, *Professing Selves*.

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

12. There are notable exceptions to this, such as Rofel, *Desiring China*; and Amar, *The Security Archipelago*.

13. Petrus Liu makes a similar point in his *Queer Marxism in Two Chinas*. I engage his work in more detail in the conclusion of the book, where I discuss the question of cultural difference in queer studies.

14. Long, "Unbearable Witness."

15. Moallem, *Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister*.

16. See Firat Bozcali, "Turkey's Three-Front War?," *Jadaliyya*, August 31, 2015, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32412/Turkey's-Three-Front-War; Patrick Kingsley, "Who Are the Kurds, and Why Is Turkey Attacking Them in Syria?," *New York Times*, October 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/the-kurds-facts-history.html.

17. Iran also features a similar noncolonized past, yet the Islamic Republic of Iran's current relationship with the United States positions it neatly within the "victim of US imperialism" category—a different political situation from that enjoyed by Turkey until recently, that is, as the second most important ally of the United States in the Middle East following Israel.

18. There have been a number of critics of such tendencies, but let me refer to two of them in order to raise two particular issues. In her critique of understanding Turkish history as "Westernization," Yael Navaro-Yashin states, "It is interesting that there should be such an implicit overlap between [the] modernization/Orientalist construct of 'Westernization' and postmodernist/post-Orientalist references to 'modernity.' The concept of Westernization . . . is based on the assumption, by default, that an essentially separate 'culture' existed prior to the development or the shift." Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State*, 10. Such studies, as a result, "have risked reproducing essentialism in leaving a precipitation of cultural authenticity or tradition underneath the layers of European costume, thereby overlapping, by default, with cultural revivalisms or nationalisms in the contexts studied" (8). In his critique of the "alternative modernities" paradigm as a crude "culturalist" approach, Arif Dirlik notes that people have always conceived alternatives to capitalist modernity, but only starting in the 1980s did those "alternatives" come to be conceived in cultural, rather than systemic, terms. Dirlik, "Thinking Modernity Historically," 17. Dirlik continues, "In fact, 'cultural difference' in conversations about modernity has relied on a systemic overlooking of worldwide capitalism" (19). In the conclusion of this book, I return to the question of cultural difference in scholarly searches for alternatives to (colonial) modernity in order to unpack the implications they have had for queer studies in particular.

19. The methodology I used in choosing the particular debates to focus on is presented in the appendix.

20. I am aware of the significant differences between postcolonial and decolonial critique, as well as the different histories each draws from. I am using postcolonial and decolonial in the same context here to refer to the folding of the various geographies they cover into the Global South, which is then overburdened with revolutionary expectations. While I am lured by feminist and queer imaginaries for less destructive and more just futures, I am weary of the romanticization of the past in much of deco-

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lonial and indigenous studies. Kēhaulani Kauanui voices a similar concern regarding indigenous studies' conceptualization of a pre-settler colonial time as devoid of patriarchy. Kauanui, "Native Hawaiian Decolonization and the Politics of Gender."

21. Scholars have noted that these arguments have often been used by conservative governments located outside of "the West." To use perhaps the most relevant example here, former AKP prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was trained as a political scientist, notes in his 1993 book *Alternative Paradigms* that "the Islamic paradigm" is "absolutely alternative to the Western" (cited in Dirlik, "Thinking Modernity Historically," 14n11).

22. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*.

23. Joseph, *Against the Romance of Community*; Blackwood, "Transnational Sexualities in One Place"; Boellstorff, *A Coincidence of Desires*; Carrillo, *The Night Is Young*; Cruz and Manalansan, *Queer Globalizations*; Jackson, "Capitalism and Global Queering"; Jackson, *Queer Bangkok*; Blackwood, "Transnational Discourses and Circuits of Queer Knowledge in Indonesia"; Gopinath, *Impossible Desires*; Manalansan, *Global Divas*; Moallem, *Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister*; Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*; Reddy, *With Respect to Sex*; Rofel, *Desiring China*; Wilson, *The Intimate Economies of Bangkok*.

24. Edelman, *No Future*; Halberstam, "The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies."

25. For a discussion of the radical political potential of misinterpellation, see Martel, *The Misinterpellated Subject*.

26. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, 4.

27. As the editors of the 2005 special issue of *Social Text* titled "What's Queer about Queer Studies Now?" put it: "A renewed queer studies . . . insists on a broadened consideration of the late-twentieth-century global crises that have configured historical relations among political economies, the geopolitics of war and terror, and national manifestations of sexual, racial, and gendered hierarchies." Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz, "Introduction," 1.

28. Scholars of neoliberalism have, and continue to point out the various and at times contradictory uses of the term "neoliberalism" to mark economic, political, social and cultural changes during late capitalism. While there is no consensus about what is exactly meant when the term is evoked, the common denominator of the existing literature points to at least three key "schools" of neoliberalism: one that understands neoliberalism as mainly an economic shift resulting in massive upward redistribution (Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*); a second one that sees neoliberalism most significantly as a transformation of statecraft and the shift from a welfare state to a carceral state (Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*); and finally the school that sees neoliberalism as a normative reason and a governing rationality that extends itself into all dimensions of everyday life, including realms that have no relationship to the economy (Brown, *Undoing the Demos*). This is of course not to say that scholars in one camp refute the changes pointed out in the others. What is at stake here is rather an emphasis on which transformation exactly (economy, state, culture) lies at the heart of neoliberalism, what makes neoliberalism *neo*. Bernstein and Jakobsen, "Introduction"; Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and

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De-Democratization"; Springer, "Neoliberalism as Discourse: Between Foucauldian Political Economy and Marxian Poststructuralism"; Wacquant, "Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism."

29. Duggan, *Twilight of Equality?*

30. Duggan, *Twilight of Equality?*, 16–17.

31. Duggan, *Twilight of Equality?*

32. Duggan, *Twilight of Equality?*; Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz, "What's Queer about Queer Studies Now?"; Eng, *Feeling of Kinship*; Ferguson and Hong, "Sexual and Racial Contradictions of Neoliberalism"; Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*; Reddy, *Freedom with Violence*; Spade, *Normal Life*; Ward, *Respectably Queer.*

33. Ward, *Respectably Queer.*

34. Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended."*

35. Boyd, "San Francisco's Castro District"; Hanhardt, *Safe Space*; Haritaworn, *Queer Lovers and Hateful Others*; Manalansan, "Race, Violence, and Neoliberal Spatial Politics in the Global City"; Schulman, *Gentrification of the Mind*.

36. Spade, *Normal Life*. Spade argues that the very demand for state and police protection places middle- and upper-middle-class respectable queers at the heart of LGBT politics, as they would be the only ones who can imagine being protected by these structures. I take issue with this proposition in chapter 4, where I discuss the campaign demanding a hate crime law initiated by trans sex workers in Turkey.

37. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.

38. Hochberg, "Introduction"; Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.

39. This is certainly not exclusive to Muslims. Other communities of color or immigrant groups have been designated as locations of homophobia as well. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.

40. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.

41. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 36.

42. Bracke, "From 'Saving Women' to 'Saving Gays'"; El-Tayeb, *European Others*; Haritaworn and Petzen, "Invented Traditions and New Intimate Publics"; Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*; Ritchie, "How Do You Say 'Come Out of the Closet' in Arabic?"

43. Examples abound, but to just name a couple, in the summer of 2016, Turkey's pending membership in the EU was used as a key reason for the Brexit vote; also, one of the early actions taken by the US Trump administration was an executive order preventing the citizens of seven Muslim countries from traveling to the United States, even if they held documents authorizing their entry.

44. See Ritchie, "Pinkwashing, Homonationalism, and Israel-Palestine," for a critique of the conceptual limits of homonationalism.

45. There are other critiques of this focus as well, including the erasure of anti-Black racism in France due to the emphasis of Islamophobic racism.

46. Bereket and Adam, "The Emergence of Gay Identities in Turkey"; İflazoğlu and Demir, eds., *Öteki Olarak Ölmek* [Dying as the other]; Bereket and Adam, "Navigating Islam and Same-Sex Liaisons among Men in Turkey"; Berghan, "Patronsuz ve Pezevenksiz Bir Dünya!" [Boss- and pimp-free world!]; Çakırlar and Delice, eds., *Cinsellik Muamması* [Sexual enigma]; Erdem and Ergül, eds., *Fetiş İkâme*

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[Fetish substitute]; Gorkemli, "'Coming Out of the Internet'"; Gorkemli, *Grassroots Literacies*; Güneş, *Göğe Kuşak Lazım* [The sky needs a rainbow belt]; Güngör, *Öteki Erkekler* [Other men]; Hocaoğlu, *Eşcinsel Erkekler* [Homosexual men]; Alkan, *Cins Cins Mekan* [Queer space/place]; Mutluer, ed., *Cinsiyet Halleri* [States of gender]; Özbay, "Nocturnal Queers"; Özbay, *Queering Sexualities in Turkey*; Özbay and Soydan, *Eşcinsel Kadınlar* [Homosexual women]; Ozyegin, "Reading the Closet through Connectivity"; Ozyegin, *New Desires, New Selves*; Şeker, ed., *Başkaldıran Bedenler* [Revolting bodies]; Yardımcı and Güçlü, eds., *Queer Tahayyül* [Queer imaginary]; Zengin, "Sex for Law, Sex for Psychiatry"; Zengin, "Violent Intimacies." It is worth noting that a number of presses in Turkey are committed to publishing feminist and queer work. While a number of the books noted here have come out of Metis Publishing House's general research series Siyah-Beyaz (Black and white), Sel Publications has two series committed to sexuality and queer studies: Queer Düş'ün (Queer dream/thought) and LGBT Kitaplığı (LGBT library). These series include both original publications by scholars from Turkey as well as fully translated works, such as Sara Ahmed's *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* and *The Promise of Happiness*, Jack Halberstam's *The Queer Art of Failure*, Monique Wittig's *The Straight Mind*, Virginie Despentes's *King Kong Theory*, and Sherry Wolf's *Sexuality and Socialism*. While not translated as entire books, the work of other queer studies scholars have appeared in the various edited collections published in Queer Düş'ün that mix original work and translations, such as Lauren Berlant, Michael Warner, Guy Hocquenghem, David H. Halperin, Robert McRuer, Mario Miele, Paul B. Preciado, Lisa Duggan and Kathleen McHugh, Del LaGrace Volcano and Ulrika Dahl, and Leo Bersani, among others. Metis Publishing House does not have a particular queer series but does put out translations of queer studies' texts, such as Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble*, *Precarious Life*, and, with Athena Athanasiou, *Dispossession*. Butler's *Bodies That Matter* and *Psychic Life of Power* also have been translated by other presses. Much of Foucault's work appears in Turkish, including *The History of Sexuality*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, *Discipline and Punish*, and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Bilgi University Press is publishing his Lectures at Collège de France, with six volumes having been published at the time of this writing (April 2020). Finally, since November 2014, Ankara-based KaosGL has been putting out the biannual peer-reviewed magazine *KaosQ+*, which features translated works as well as original publications. This volume of translated works will come as no surprise to anyone born and raised in countries with a non-English primary language, but I found it useful to include this incomplete list to give all readers a sense of what forms of queer thought are translated into Turkish, what kinds of works audiences come into contact with, and with what works Turkish scholars imagine themselves in conversation. This might be particularly useful since *Queer in Translation* might inadvertently promise the study of translations of queer studies work itself, which is not the goal of this book. That being said, the sexuality and queer studies research being translated into Turkish is an important backdrop to this study, the aim of which is to trace how contemporary categories of thought regarding nonnormative genders and sexualities are publicly debated in Turkish. Most of those who translate these works are themselves queer academics, artists, or activists.

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47. It is also worth noting that this amount of scholarship has been produced despite the challenges of doing academic work in the area of sexualities in Turkey. Özbay, *Queering Sexualities in Turkey*.

48. This is with the exception of Gul Ozyegin and Cenk Özbay's work: Ozyegin, *New Desires, New Selves*; and Özbay, *Queering Sexualities in Turkey*.

49. The work of both Tarik Bereket and Barry Adam and Şebnem Keniş constitutes exceptions. See Bereket and Adam, "Navigating Islam and Same-Sex Liaisons among Men in Turkey"; and Keniş, "Islam and Homosexuality Debates in Turkey."

50. These works also focus mostly on the effects of neoliberalism on sexual subjectivities. In the conclusion, I discuss in detail queer studies' focus on sexual subjectivity as the key marker of modernity and what the implications of this focus have been for queer analyses that lie outside of the so-called West.

51. I am not suggesting that neoliberal subjectivity and homonormativity are nonexistent among Turkey's gays and lesbians. As Özbay's careful study demonstrates, Istanbulite middle-class gay male clients of reportedly heterosexual rent boys distinguish between good and bad rent boys. See Özbay, *Queering Sexualities in Turkey*. So-called good rent boys are marked by a desire for upward mobility, a tendency to treat clients as potential contacts for networking and future jobs, and an expressed desire for a more respectable life than sex work. Bad rent boys, on the other hand, are understood as more criminal, less trustworthy, and in many ways less legible to middle-class gay men because they do not act as proper entrepreneurial subjects and refuse to see sex work as an investment in a future defined by neoliberal parameters. In other words, homonormative gay subjects (very much in the sense that Duggan means it) exist in Turkey. However, those values have not yet infiltrated queer activism, which remains fairly grassroots and critical of neoliberal capitalism and respectability politics. Further, the strong presence of sex workers in the queer movements in Turkey shapes all activists' orientation toward sex work as a matter of labor and not as a matter of respectability. See chapter 3 for more details about the politics of trans sex work.

52. I want to acknowledge that some of these scholars, including myself, currently live and work in the diaspora. Yet, to my knowledge, we all have been born and raised in Turkey, and our commitment to writing about home is testimony to attachments that go far beyond intellectual interest.

53. For more on the limits of homonationalism as a framework see Ritchie, "Pinkwashing, Homonationalism, and Israel-Palestine"; Haike Schotten and Haneen Maikey, "Queers Resisting Zionism: On Authority and Accountability Beyond Homonationalism," *Jadaliyya*, October 10, 2012, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27175/Queers-Resisting-Zionism-On-Authority-and-Accountability-Beyond-Homonationalism.

54. Mikdashi and Puar, "Queer Theory and Permanent War." Mikdashi and Puar's question of whether "queer theory (still) require[s] a sexual or gendered body or a sexual or gendered injury—particularly if part of the project of homonationalism is to produce and stabilize transnational, imperial, and settler colonial forms of sexual and gendered injury?" is an apt one. However, I do see the strength of queer inquiry

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asking questions about the production of an asymmetrical value of human life and the historical centrality of sexuality in racializing mechanisms, which have been key to colonialism, dispossession, extraction, and other forms of exploitation.

55. Amar, *Security Archipelago*; Arondekar and Patel, "Area Impossible"; Mikdashi and Puar, "Queer Theory and Permanent War"; Shakhsari, "Weblogistan Goes to War." While I otherwise agree with Mikdashi and Puar's analysis about this emerging field, I diverge from their assessment that this work ultimately "provincializes" the United States. I maintain that it is crucial to entertain multiple sovereign centers simultaneously, which constitutes part of the strength of this work. US imperialism does not, and need not, disappear from analyses that discuss the history and contemporary world of the Middle East. I hold this position very much in alliance with Grewal and Kaplan's suggestion that we think of hegemonies as scattered. Grewal and Kaplan, eds., *Scattered Hegemonies*.

56. Amar, *Security Archipelago*.

57. Amar, *Security Archipelago*, 6–7. While Amar declares that human security states, with discourses that veer away from markets and the rational-liberal consumer, signal the end of neoliberalism, I understand securitization as an extension of neoliberal regimes that produce different discourses of rescue based on the political economic context. For instance, unlike in Egypt, current Turkish government's humanitarian discourses target not a particular segment of its own citizens, but Syrians who had to take refuge in Turkey as a result of the civil war fueled by the Turkish government itself alongside the United States and Russia. Turkey's admission of millions of refugees is often evoked in President Erdoğan's rhetorical addresses to "the West," where Europe in particular and the West in general are called out for their failed humanitarianism. See chapter 4 for more on Erdoğan's rhetorical uses of the Syrian refugee crisis.

58. Shakhsari, "Weblogistan Goes to War."

59. Ferguson and Hong, "Sexual and Racial Contradictions of Neoliberalism," 1063.

60. Arondekar and Patel, "Area Impossible." Important exceptions to this are of course translation studies scholars who have analyzed sexualities. See, for instance, Baer, "Russian Gays/Western Gaze"; Baer and Kaindl, *Queering Translation/Translating the Queer*; Bassi, "Displacing LGBT"; and Gramling and Dutta, "Translating Transgender."

61. A big thank you to my colleague Julie Hua for pointing out affect as a universal proposition. Elsewhere, I have discussed the specific problems with the universalism of Sara Ahmed's "happy objects." See Savcı, "On Putting Down and Destroying."

62. Just to share a small example, Kathryn Bond Stockton's wonderful work that theorized a queer child's growth as "growing sideways" (versus the normative "growing up") is utterly untranslatable to Turkish, as the only term applicable to it is "to grow"—neither up, nor in any other particular direction. This is one of many examples one could give, of course, but it is useful because it exposes queer (and all other) theory's dependence on vocabulary both to critique and to imagine otherwise. Stockton, *The Queer Child*.

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63. Butler, *Gender Trouble*; Butler, *Excitable Speech*.

64. See Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*. Puar and Mikdashi refer to the United States– and Western Europe–centeredness of queer theory as queer theory's own homonationalism. This is certainly a suggestion worthy of consideration, but a queer theory that shifts geographic focus while remaining English centered might get us out of homonationalism without getting us out of queer theory's homolingual address. Neither does it interrupt the naturalization of the nation form through the homolingual regime of languages. Mikdashi and Puar, "Queer Theory and Permanent War."

65. Mezzadra and Sakai, introduction, 10. Also see Gal, "Migration, Minorities, and Multilingualism"; Gramling, *Invention of Monolingualism*; Makoni and Pennycook, *Disinventing and Reconstituting Languages*.

66. Gal, "Migration, Minorities, and Multilingualism."

67. Rafael, *Motherless Tongues*; Yildiz, *Beyond the Mother Tongue*.

68. Mezzadra and Sakai, introduction; Yildiz, *Beyond the Mother Tongue*.

69. Rafael, *Motherless Tongues*.

70. Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State*.

71. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*.

72. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*, 3; Mezzadra and Sakai, introduction; Solomon, "Postimperial Etiquette," 185.

73. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*, 6.

74. Solomon, "Postimperial Etiquette," 185.

75. This of course conveniently overlooks the fact that when other languages are translated into American English, translation is often employed as a mechanism of domesticating and incorporating what is alien and unfamiliar. Rafael, *Motherless Tongues*.

76. Some of these points will be familiar to those who work with transnational feminist scholarship. Transnational feminists have long critiqued such tendencies that produce third world difference (Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes"), that assume and reproduce clear distinctions between the global and the local (Nagar and Swarr, *Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis*), that locate hegemony squarely in the West (Grewal and Kaplan, *Scattered Hegemonies*; Hoang, *Dealing in Desire*), as well as the nostalgic yearning for a precolonial, authentic past of the Global South (Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?"). What translation studies contributes to these debates is the complication of *the linguistic*, which seems to remain the marker of culture par excellence.

77. Mezzadra and Sakai, introduction.

78. Mezzadra and Sakai, introduction, 11.

79. Afsaneh Najmabadi notes, "Perhaps one of the problems with the current heated debates between proponents of 'global gay' or 'gay international' resides in the presumption, common to both groups, that 'I am gay,' or 'I am transsexual' means the same thing anywhere it is pronounced." Najmabadi, "Transing and Transpassing," 37.

80. Dirlik, "Thinking Modernity Historically."

81. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*.

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82. See Joan W. Scott's seminal essay "The Evidence of Experience" for a very useful discussion on how experience is linguistically bound.

83. Abu-Lughod, ed., *Remaking Women*; Alexander and Mohanty, eds., *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*; Grewal and Kaplan, eds., *Scattered Hegemonies*; Nagar and Swarr, *Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis*.

84. Also see Mourad for a critique of equating translated sexual terminology with cultural inauthenticity in the context of Lebanon. Mourad, "Queering the Mother Tongue."

85. Williams, *Marxism and Literature*.

86. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*.

87. Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity*.

88. Williams, *Marxism and Literature*.

89. Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz, "Introduction," 15.

90. In this sense Turkish economic neoliberalization bears eerie similarities to that in Chile, often noted as the first neoliberal experiment. Harvey, "Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction."

91. Yirmibeşoğlu, "Women and Trade Unionism in Turkey."

92. Senses, "Turkey's Experience with Neoliberal Policies."

93. Altınordu, "The Politicization of Religion"; Akın and Karasapan, "The 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis'"; Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism*; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, "New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey?"; Özbay et al., *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey*; Tuğal, *Fall of the Turkish Model*; Turam, *Between Islam and the State*; White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*.

94. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 221.

95. *Laiklik*, the Turkish-style secularism, which many scholars compare to the French *laïcité*, has always required full regulation of religion by the state, including, for instance, the regulation of religious education and textbooks and the training and appointment of imams. It was established as one of the six Kemalist principles during the early years of the republic and became constitutionally protected in 1937. Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism*. As discussed in chapter 2, undermining the *laik* principles of the republic have historically been grounds for criminal investigation and charges for individuals as well as political parties and associations.

96. Altınordu, "Politicization of Religion." Cihan Tuğal refers to Turkey in this context as the "global system's best bet for rendering Islam governable." Tuğal, *Fall of the Turkish Model*, 8.

97. Turam, *Between Islam and the State*, 49.

98. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*; Altınordu, "Politicization of Religion"; White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*. According to the Presidency of Religious Affairs website, around 8,600 more mosques were added between 2008 and 2018, putting the number of mosques in the country at 88,681 (https://stratejigelistirme.diyanet.gov.tr/sayfa/57/istatistikler [accessed April 17, 2020]). The reported population of Turkey in December 2018 was 82,003,882 ("Son Dakika: Türkiye'nin Nüfusu Açıklandı [2018 TÜİK verileri]" [Last minute: Turkey's population an-

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nounced (2018 TÜİK data)], *NTV.com.tr*, February 1, 2019, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/son-dakikaturkiyenin-nufusu-82-milyonu-asti,QzFOktjusUex4xpyjjDRaw). This corresponds to one mosque for every 924 people.

99. Altınordu, "Politicization of Religion."

100. This constitutional and military *regulation* of Islam is nevertheless accompanied by the popular impression of its *repression*. This is due to Atatürk's legacy as a military hero and the founder and leader of the secular republic, symbolically positioning the armed forces as the protector of secularism. It is also due to various military-staged formal and semiformal interventions in what was perceived as Islamic insurgency in the 1990s. Two things are worth noting here regarding this forgetting of the earlier marriage of the military, religion, and neoliberalism in Turkey. First, as Berna Turam notes, "Atatürk believed that 'the modern state would be shored up by *civic religion*' and used it as another force to glue the nation together. In sharp contrast to the Shah's estrangement of the clergy by his anti-religious arbitrary rule, Atatürk often used religious idioms in his discourse and refrained from anti-religious attitudes and discourses. . . . Hence, any argument that pits the Republic against the Muslim faith misses the contingent relationship between them." Turam, *Between Islam and the State*, 41. Second, the current shape of the political collective memory is also perhaps partially due to the fact that Turgut Özal, who is known as *the* historical figure responsible for the liberalization of the economy and starting down the path of Turkish neoliberalism, had run and won the 1983 general election—the first one after the coup—against the opposing junta party. This opposition is misleading, however, given that Özal had been appointed as deputy prime minister during the postcoup military regime and had resigned from the post in 1982 due to disagreements over economic policy. Later, this early delinking of the military's ties to neoliberalism and the liberalization of Islam would aid the successive AKP governments in aligning the military with authoritarianism, the old Kemalist regime with a state-led economy, and their own rule with anti-militarism and democratic (neo)liberalism.

101. Tuğal, *Fall of the Turkish Model*, 4. These two issues are connected, as some of the poverty in urban areas resulted from the forced migration of citizens inhabiting the predominantly Kurdish regions in southeast Turkey that have become targets of the Turkish state's counterterrorism measures, including burning down entire villages suspected of providing aid and accommodations (*yataklık yapmak*) to terrorists.

102. Altınordu, "Politicization of Religion"; Arat, *Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy*; White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*. White and Altınordu are in disagreement here. Jenny White argues that the Islamist rhetoric played no role in the Welfare Party's success at the ballot box, emphasizing instead their focus on the urban poor and especially the growing immigrant populations residing in squatter settlements. Ateş Altınordu, on the other hand, critiques the arguments that attribute the Welfare Party's success solely to the failure of the center-Right parties, the party's successful grassroots organizing, or their appeal to the urban poor, arguing that the successful politicization of Islam in the 1990s was due to the reactionary measures taken by secularist governments against the Islamic revival of the 1970s and especially 1980s.

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103. White notes that voters in squatter neighborhoods were very informed about different party platforms but mostly saw "voting and petitioning local officials . . . as the primary means to bargain for community needs with political parties and with city and national authorities." White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*, 106.

104. Özbay et al., *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey*, 4.

105. Altınordu, "Politicization of Religion"; Arat, *Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy*; Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*; Turam, *Between Islam and the State*; White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*.

106. Erdoğan came to power as the leader of the AKP following a six-month prison sentence in 1998 for "inciting religious hatred"—an instance many see as part of a series of early signs of his long game (along with public statements that he did not think of democracy as an end, but as a means). Erdoğan was charged for reading passages from a poem and was also banned from politics after finishing his prison sentence. He later claimed that he believed the passage belonged to a poem by Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who also wrote the lyrics to the Turkish national anthem. The particular lines that resulted in the charges against him read: "minarets [as our] bayonets, domes [as our] helmets."

107. Coşar, "AKP's Hold on Power"; Duran, "Justice and Development Party's 'New Politics'?"; Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*; White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*.

108. Zabcı, "Internalisation of Dependency." Turkey's economic growth was measured at around 8.8 percent in 2010 and 2011, but it dropped to (nevertheless high levels of) 2.2 percent in 2012 and 3.8 percent in 2013. See "Turkey Economy Profile 2019," Index Mundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/turkey/economy_profile.html.

109. Cindoglu and Unal, "Gender and Sexuality in the Authoritarian Discursive Strategies of 'New Turkey.'" Zuhal Yeşilyurt-Gündüz notes that while AKP efforts to meet the criteria for admittance to the EU are often analyzed in terms of civil rights–related policy changes, a number of neoliberal measures also were taken to encourage the accession process, especially an emphasis on privatization in order to enhance the candidate's "capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union." Yeşilyurt-Gündüz, "The EU and the AKP," 277. Cihan Tuğal argues that the key distinction of AKP from previous Islamist regimes was its successful incorporation/absorption of radical Islamists into their neoliberal politics. Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*.

110. Acar and Altunok, "The 'Politics of Intimate'"; Dedeoğlu and Elveren, eds., *Gender and Society in Turkey*.

111. Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism*; Turam, *Between Islam and the State*.

112. These included talks about education in the mother tongue for all, including Kurdish, as well as the launching of the first Kurdish-language public TV station and talks about the mutual opening borders and reviving of diplomatic relationships. There also were talks about relaxing the ban on wearing the headscarf by students at public universities and employees at public offices. As the Turkish state had been the largest employer until the liberalization of the economy in the 1980s, most women who wore headscarves could not find employment or simply had to not wear them at

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work. This ban was not equally enforced on each campus, yet it became more regularly and strictly imposed after 1997. I tell the story of this ban and its repercussions in more detail in chapter 1.

113. Dirlik, "Thinking Modernity Historically." Davutoğlu left the AKP to form a new political party in the summer of 2019.

114. Iğsız, "Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests." Such a reification of difference makes it easy to package and sell nations worldwide via neoliberal branding projects. For a similar neoliberal branding project in India, see Puri, "Sculpting the Saffron Body."

115. Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism*; Dedeoğlu and Elveren, eds., *Gender and Society in Turkey*; Özbay et al., *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey*; Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*; Yücesan-Özdemir, "Social Policy Regime in the AKP Years."

116. The imam of the mosque immediately renounced Erdoğan's claim, stating that the protesters had escaped from police violence and had turned the mosque into an infirmary for those wounded by tear gas canisters and plastic bullets. The imam was reassigned a few months after refusing to testify that the protesters had consumed alcohol in Dolmabahçe Mosque. See "Dolmabahçe Camisi'nin imam ve müezzini gitti" [Dolmabahçe Mosque's imam and muezzin reassigned], *Hürriyet*, September 21, 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dolmabahce-camisinin-imam-ve-muezzini-gitti-24756039.

117. Another instance where economic obligations and betrayals were presented as moral ones was at the end of 2016, when the value of the US dollar was rising steadily vis-à-vis the Turkish lira, indicating a pending economic crisis. Erdoğan openly asked citizens to exchange their US dollars for Turkish lira in order to help the government fight what he called the "interest lobby" and foreign powers conspiring against Turkey. See "Erdoğan'dan 'Dolarınızı bozdurun' çağrısı" [Erdoğan's call to "exchange your dollar"], *Hürriyet*, December 2, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-38179921.

118. Grewal, *Saving the Security State*, 4. David Harvey also briefly notes, in his infamous essay "Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction," that "the neoliberal emphasis on individual rights and the increasingly authoritarian use of state power to sustain the system become a flashpoint of contentiousness. The more neoliberalism is recognized as a failed if not disingenuous utopian project masking a successful attempt at the restoration of class power, the more it lays the basis for a resurgence of mass movements voicing egalitarian political demands, seeking economic justice, fair trade and greater economic security and democratization." Harvey, "Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction," 157.

119. Yücesan-Özdemir and Coşar, eds., *Silent Violence*.

120. Berna Yazıcı notes another particularity of the Turkish case, which is the government's insistence on the significance of an extended, three-generational family structure in AKP's Return to the Family project. Yazıcı, "Return to the Family."

121. Dedeoğlu and Elveren, eds., *Gender and Society in Turkey*; Korkman, "Blessing Neoliberalism;" "Erdoğan, 'kadınlığın tanımı'nı da yaptı: Anneliği reddeden kadın eksiktir, yarımdır" [Erdoğan also defined "womanhood": A woman who refuses motherhood is incomplete; she is half a woman], *Diken*, May 6, 2016, http://www

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.diken.com.tr/erdogan-kadinligin-tanimini-da-yapti-anneligi-reddeden-kadin-eksiktir-yarimdir.

122. "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Çocuk yapmanın parayla pulla alakası yok, rızık Allah'tan" [President Erdoğan: Having children has nothing to do with financial means; Allah provides for them], *T24*, March 4, 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-sigarayla-mucadelede-mahalle-baskisi-yapmak-lazim,289349.

123. Iğsız, "Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests."

124. Sinem Adar, "Paradoxes of 'New Turkey,'" *Jadaliyya*, May 26, 2017, http://jadaliyya.com/Details/34310. Updated data are available at the website www.turkeypurge.com.

125. Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended"*; Grewal, *Saving the Security State*.

126. Details on the methodology used are presented in the appendix.

Chapter One. Subjects of Rights

Portions of this chapter previously appeared in "Subjects of Rights, and Subjects of Cruelty: The Production of an Islamic Backlash against Homosexuality in Turkey," *Political Power and Social Theory*, no. 30 (2016): 159–86.

1. Faruk Bildirici, "Eşcinsellik Hastalık, Tedavi Edilmeli" [Homosexuality is an illness; it should be cured], *Hürriyet*, March 7, 2010, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kelebek/escinsellik-hastalik-tedavi-edilmeli-14031207.

2. Bildirici, "Eşcinsellik Hastalık, Tedavi Edilmeli." It is unclear from the short excerpt whether the minister felt the need to acknowledge the existence of homosexuals to distinguish herself and the government she was a part of from Iran's previous president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who infamously had claimed that there are no homosexuals in Iran. This lack of clarity is partly due to the fact that the questions posed by the journalist were not published in the profile piece.

3. "Homosexuality Is a Disease" (translated from Turkish), letter to Selma Aliye Kavaf, head of the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs, Escinsellikhastaliktir.blogspot.com, March 21, 2010, http://escinsellikhastaliktir.blogspot.com. The letter, posted in its entirety (the URL itself translates as homosexualityisanillness.blogspot.com), is dated March 20, but the public reading of the letter took place on March 21, and most news outlets reported on it on March 22. See, for instance, "STK'lardan Bakan Kavaf'a destek mektubu!" [Letter of support from NGOs to minister Kavaf], *CNNTurk*, March 22, 2010, https://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/03/22/stklardan.bakan.kavafa.destek.mektubu/568892.0/index.html.

4. Asad, *Formations of the Secular*.

5. Atatürk's address to the nation at the republic's tenth anniversary, October 29, 1933. "10. Yıl Nutku" [(Atatürk's) 10th Year Address], *T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı*, https://www.ktb.gov.tr/TR-96294/10-yil-nutku.html.

6. I acknowledge the initial employment of Islam in Atatürk's (national) narratives as well as the continuity of these reforms with those of the mid-nineteenth-century Tanzimat era. However, ultimately the republican reforms worked toward an almost

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