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Atiya Husain

NO GOD BUT MAN

On Race, Knowledge, and Terrorism

No God but Man

DUKE

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PRESS

No God but Man

ON RACE, KNOWLEDGE,
AND TERRORISM

Atiya Husain

To Issra

Contents

Acknowledgments

The idea for this book has been in my mind since 2013, when the FBI added Assata Shakur to its Most Wanted Terrorist list. The decade between her addition and the completion of this book has been enough time for me to start down one line of inquiry but see that better answers are to be found elsewhere. I started this project with one set of assumptions about race, and over the course of the next decade, deeper engagement with these archival materials—the FBI Most Wanted program's posters and Assata Shakur's published and unpublished writings— forced the realization that my assumptions were getting in my way. This sort of journey significantly broadens the scope of who must be acknowledged: I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to my thinking over these years. I am indebted to those whose scholarship helped inform my earlier exploration, as well as those who offered critiques and disagreements in good faith as I have sought to do in this book as well.

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INTRODUCTION

What the Federal Bureau of Investigation keeps under lock and key has been of greatest interest to scholars, lawyers, and social movements.[1] What the FBI seeks to actively advertise, however, is just as important as what it tries to keep to itself. The bureau has regularly produced wanted posters as an archive that exists to be seen. This heavily stylized, heavily reproduced public document can tell us much about the very same issues of social movements, repression, and even bureaucracy that draw scholars, journalists, and activists to secret files to begin with. Wanted lists and posters stand out compared to other sorts of FBI paper.[2] If redacted FBI files and never-to-be-released secret files are one end of the spectrum of FBI documents, then wanted posters are on the opposite end. Wanted posters are what the FBI proudly displays and distributes for public consumption. The wanted poster format is standardized and familiar: a heading, a name, photographs, and then a stack of categories. The categories in use are date(s) of birth used, place of birth, height, weight, occupation, hair, build, eyes, sex, nationality, languages, citizenship, complexion, scars and marks, tattoos, and, of course, race. There is often a line at the bottom of the poster offering a cash reward for information leading to capture, or an additional note that the individual is armed and dangerous, with some written narrative on their crimes, affiliations, where they were last seen, and memorable details. These sorts of FBI posters have been in circulation since the early twentieth century.

Their production and distribution were formalized in the 1950 creation of the FBI Most Wanted program.

Wanted posters are fertile grounds for classification and categorization. There are at least two clear sites of category formation in the Most Wanted program: first, the columns of physical attributes and other identifying information under each individual's photograph on a poster (e.g., nationality, citizenship, race, scars and marks, etc.); and second, the several wanted lists that constitute the program. The Most Wanted program began with just one wanted list of ten people, but since the 1990s it has developed several more lists and expanded in size. By the 2010s, there were about three hundred to four hundred posters of individual wanted people in the program at any given time.[3] The lone Ten Most Wanted in 1950 would be joined by lists including Parental Kidnapping, in 1998; Seeking Information—Crimes against Children, in 2004; Cyber's Most Wanted, in 2013; and Human Trafficking, in 2014. By 2021 the largest list was Fugitives, consisting of more than one hundred posters, while smaller lists like Cyber's Most Wanted could include as few as six or seven posters. Individuals are sometimes moved from one list to another, suggesting that the difference between the lists is meaningful for FBI categorization practices. The importance of these categories exceeds the confines of the FBI since posters are made for public distribution and thus with some sense of their intended viewership's understanding of particular categories in mind. Posters are ideological, as they both establish categories and reflect existing categories enough to make sense to their viewers.

Perhaps the most important list, for both the bureau and the purposes of this book, is the Most Wanted Terrorist (MWT) list. The list began with twenty-two men when then president George W. Bush announced it to reporters in October 2001. It was the first terrorism list of the program, later accompanied by Seeking Information—Terrorism in 2002 and Domestic Terrorism in 2006.[4] It is indeed possible to say that this list and its roughly two dozen posters are even more important to the FBI than its Ten Most Wanted: the MWT has rewards for information leading to capture in the millions, far surpassing the rewards offered for the Ten Most Wanted and other lists, which have reward amounts in the thousands or none at all. Though seemingly singular or small, since it comprises just a couple dozen people, the MWT list is inherently significant beyond its relevance for the FBI. Massive structural shifts have taken place in the name of capturing these few people and whatever they are presumably tied to. More specifically, the federal government restructured, creating the Department of Homeland Security. These names were offered as justification for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, all part of launching a global war on terror that ham-

mered Bosnia, Sudan, Yemen, and many more.[5] Hundreds of thousands have perished, and entire geographies have been restructured via drone warfare.[6] The climate impacts of the war on terror are considerable. Generally, wanted posters are designed to identify and criminalize one individual at a time, but this atomizing has repercussions far beyond the represented individual. Bombing campaigns are conducted in the name of killing just one person on a wanted poster. How many thousands of people did the United States and its allies kill in their global war on terror when the single individual named Osama bin Laden was their most wanted enemy? The claim to having targeted or successfully killed one or two *terrorists* allows for the killing of masses, facilitated by certain kinds of thinking sedimented in the form of the wanted poster, as this book and its many sources show. Given the constellation of issues to which the MWT list is connected, this list drives the questions of this book.

Scanning the posters of the Muslim men on the first version of the MWT list in 2001, observers of the early years of the war on terror would initially be unsurprised by the images: dark hair and eyes. Beards. Flashes of the word Al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden is a familiar face. Muslims with birthplaces listed in Comoros, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia, as well as Alabama and Wisconsin, have been added to this high-priority terrorism list in the two decades since its creation. Looking at their photographs, one would notice faces that would easily be classified all over the US color line and its current official categories of white, Black, and Asian, even while most individuals have markers like names, places of birth, and affiliations likely indicating Muslim status. Several others have been added to the MWT list since 2001 that do not match the familiar profile of the Muslim terrorist, like Daniel Andreas San Diego, associated with environmental terrorism, and Assata Shakur (Joanne Deborah Chesimard on her wanted poster), formerly of the Black Panther Party and Black Liberation Army.

The list is home to a puzzle and a history that are perhaps counterintuitive. For this reason, they are useful to explore for pushing prevailing thought on race theory and category formation in the humanities and social sciences toward my argument that race is largely incoherent as an analytical category. The puzzle stems from the categories of use on the MWT list that distinguish it from others throughout the Most Wanted program. The MWT list differs from other posters across the Most Wanted program in at least one striking way: most of its Muslims are lacking an official race category. For those who match that image of the Muslim terrorist, the category of race is missing in the columns of attributes on each poster. Like most posters, there are entries for categories like eyes, height, sex, scars and marks, and so on. Nearly every possible category is

used on their posters except race. Race has sometimes been missing on posters in the past, but as one of many missing categories on a poster. On the MWT list, however, race is rather systematically missing, and that absence is limited to the archetypal Muslim terrorist. Those who do not match this image but who are still on the MWT list, like Shakur and San Diego, still have a race category. However, this difference should not be taken to mean that racelessness can be easily attributed to simple identifiability as Muslims. The hundreds of posters in the rest of the program include fellow Muslims who are easily identified as such because of their names and descriptors like *imam* in the occupation category, for example. They are accused of nonterrorism crimes, and their posters do have race categories. It is absolutely critical to note that race labels are not simply different for Muslims, and those associated with them, on nonterrorist as compared to terrorist lists. Rather, race labels disappear altogether.[7] This basic comparison between Muslims accused of terrorism (raceless) and Muslims accused of other crimes (racially categorized) suggests that simply being visibly or identifiably Muslim is not the factor leading to racelessness. There are many questions to ask about this.

One of the main questions of this book is: What can this singular official racelessness tell us about race?[8] The racelessness signaled on the Most Wanted Terrorist list is the substantial puzzle from which this book's broader agenda expands. This racelessness is not accidental nor a careless omission, as chapter 3 demonstrates in detail, but rather a puzzle illustrative of a broader racial epistemology in which the FBI is but one powerful node.[9] Each chapter moves chronologically, looking at four very different cases: the poster form as based on the concept of the average man in late nineteenth-century statistics and race science, Assata Shakur's brief years as a Muslim, the official racelessness described earlier, and Shakur's post-9/11 trajectory in which the FBI represents her as a non-Muslim alongside Muslims on the MWT list. These cases offer a look at race from different angles and all come down to the MWT list, but with regard to very different moments and peoples, supporting an argument about taking seriously the defects in race as a mode of organization and thus as an analytical category. Although many have argued against race as a mode of organization before, this argument departs from much scholarly work on Muslims and the war on terror, largely sociological, that tends to find race useful as an analytical category, which is an opening for this book's interest in making room for more generative thought in this area of study.

After 9/11, there was an eruption of knowledge that sought to understand what the experiences of violence and discrimination against Muslims in the war on terror meant and how best to theorize them. Was it a problem of religious

discrimination? Racial discrimination? Was it religio-racial? Was it orientalism? Was it Islamophobia? Was it a problem of capitalism? Of imperialism? All these options in various combinations and with different approaches were offered up in the important work of scholars like Hisham D. Aidi, Evelyn Alsultany, Talal Asad, Sahar Aziz, Moustafa Bayoumi, Hatem Bazian, Khaled Beydoun, Louise Cainkar, Edward E. Curtis, Sohail Daulatzai, John Esposito, Neil Gotanda, Zareena Grewal, Yvonne Haddad, Juliane Hammer, Sherman A. Jackson, Deepa Kumar, Arun Kundnani, Erik Love, Sunaina Maira, Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, Nadine Naber, Jasbir Puar, Junaid Rana, Sherene H. Razack, Omid Safi, Salman Sayyid, Saher Selod, Kumarini Silva, Leti Volpp, and more. To the question of how to understand what the war on terror meant, race rose as a winner, moving up from being a marginal arena of explanation to a central concept in the debate. Knowledge producers in the halls of universities, at marches, in nonprofit organizations, and increasingly in policy circles advanced the argument that Muslims' experiences, in the United States and around the world, bore some relationship to race. Some argued that Muslims who previously experienced the comforts of whiteness in the United States fell from that status. Some argued that 9/11 might have had an intensification effect but that the Muslim has long been a racial or racialized category for the West more broadly. In contrast, others argued that Muslims' status as a religious group or an immigrant group in Western countries is far more important than race for understanding their post-9/11 predicament; but for my purposes, this counterargument suggests above all that the appeal to race was gaining enough traction to merit a direct rebuttal.[10]

A theoretical shorthand — "the racialization of Muslims" — permeated debates and analysis that had little to do with criminalization. It also traveled to scholarship not centrally about Muslims. For example, Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Angela Davis use this phrase to refer to post-9/11 violence against Muslims in their work on prisons addressing a popular audience. The dizzying array of definitions of racialization notwithstanding, this concept was adopted as especially useful for theorizing the relationship between race and Muslims, again, both inside and outside academe. A few core questions guided the knowledge produced on race and Muslims: How are Muslims racialized? Where does the figure of the Muslim fit in the racial taxonomy? What is the relationship between race and religion? These questions, and the assumptions folded up inside each of them, continue to define much of the literature on Muslims and race in the twenty-first century.

The crown jewel of the evidence marshaled to support the argument that Muslims are racialized is the stereotypical image of the Muslim terrorist. One

might then reasonably expect the MWT list to serve as evidence of this argument. What might such a reading look like? Analysis of the racelessness of Muslims on the terrorist list based on the Muslim racialization argument briefly described so far may proceed by reading racelessness as itself a racial category. This reading has its merits. It rightly recognizes the lumping together of people who are otherwise connected to very different religions (Sikh, Hindu, and Coptic, for example) and geographies (Italian, Syrian, Bosnian, and so on). Similarly, the word *brown* appears in literature on post-9/11 surveillance in connection with some hazy sense of *Muslim-looking*. Such works seek to capture the commonsense quality of the brown/Muslim image, a common sense that is unimpeded by its imprecision and awkwardness.[11] Such a reading may appear to account for what is obviously a case of group formation. However, interpreting the MWT list as a case of the racialization of Muslims, or locating a definition of race that allows for defining Muslims as one, would leave too much unaccounted for. The great flaw of these sorts of readings is that they defer the question of why race is the factor used to single out Muslims on the MWT list when it could be anything else. What is *race* to the FBI such that Muslims on the Most Wanted Terrorist list do not have it? And what can this tell us about race more broadly in the twenty-first century, coming off the complex contestations around race in the previous few decades? Rather than making a transhistorical argument about Islam, race, or terrorism, assuming that these have a single meaning or uniform expression across time and space, this book instead draws its conclusions from the specific historical, empirical case of the MWT list and connected issues that, owing to their particularities, have much to reveal about policing, race, social science, religion, blackness, and Islam in the United States.

The Average Man

One of this book's arguments is that the MWT list demands an analysis outside of those racial terms of engagement on which the sociology of race and much of the social sciences and humanities have relied. These terms bear a genetic relation to the identification practices in policing that produced the raceless Muslim terrorist pattern to begin with. If these terms are then applied to analyze this pattern, we risk suffering from what Barbara J. Fields so aptly calls a problem of trying to "lift something up while you are standing on it."[12] The book therefore begins with attention to those racial terms of engagement in chapter 1. After all, answers to the question of what race means to the FBI on their wanted posters is not just a question of what fills in a blank on wanted posters; it is a question of

the very presence of that blank, which takes us to the form of the wanted poster and the bureau's categories of choice.[13]

The history of the form of the wanted poster grounds this analysis. The wanted poster form descends from the work of nineteenth-century Belgian astronomer–turned–social scientist Adolphe Quetelet. Sometimes cited as a founder of sociology, he is credited with establishing the quantitative paradigm in the social sciences. Part of that probabilistic revolution, his influence is diffused across the social sciences. His innovation in statistical methods continues to wield influence today. Most importantly for this book, he came up with the concept of the average man.

Quetelet's statistical invention of the average man, *l'homme moyen*, was an ideal figure of what he called "beauty" and "goodness" whose perfection was represented as the very middle of the normal curve, or bell curve, that Quetelet imported from astronomy into the study of human difference. Quetelet modeled physical features of the body and moral propensities on the bell curve. The average man was the fictional, normative figure in the middle of the curve against which all others were measured as *deviant* to a greater or lesser degree; he even referred to measurements on either extreme of the bell curve as monstrous. For Quetelet, the *average* of the average man suggested not mediocrity but a particular kind of perfection. It was an overvaluing of a certain way of being human that he deemed best based on the curve. It was an immediately controversial concept in statistics. It was rejected by many statisticians. Scholars have debated the extent to which the average man concept is important at all for the statistical knowledge that would follow.

Although the average man was indeed rejected by many prominent statisticians of the day, it was put to use by police decades later. French police clerk Alphonse Bertillon adopted Quetelet's average man to organize police records of arrestees as part of his foundational work on introducing scientific rationality into policing. Bertillon created small index cards featuring standardized photographs we call mug shots—also his invention—and a standardized list of body parts with measurements and descriptive details resembling wanted poster categories. Each arrested person would have a card. The collected measurements on each card would be reduced to a single measurement. Based on that one measurement, the tens of thousands of cards would be filed in a particular place in massive cabinets. That particular place was determined by the measurement's distance from the average man. The appeal of this method was that an arrestee could be identified, so it was claimed, by measuring them and seeing if those measurements already belonged to a card, thus suggesting a repeat offender. This method, *bertillonage*, would expand from France, across Europe and its

colonies, and, of course, to the United States and Canada. The FBI would adopt this method as well. As Simon A. Cole has shown, the American uptake of these methods was sloppy, departing from Bertillon's fastidious and exacting vision.[14] J. Edgar Hoover, for example, complained that inconsistencies in measurement made it an unwieldy system for the bureau; he lauded fingerprinting as a much more efficient alternative to *bertillonage*.[15] In fact, Hoover's own genealogy of criminal identification asserts that *bertillonage* was replaced by fingerprinting.[16] However, traces of the form of *bertillonage* remain. The categories used on Bertillon cards match many of those still used on wanted posters, such as hair color, eye color, tattoos, and scars and marks, for example. The FBI's uptake of Bertillon's methods and episteme of scientific rationality for identification led to the creation of the identification order, a precursor to the FBI wanted poster with all the same information as a wanted poster, plus fingerprints. Identification orders are distributed by federal and local police internally between cities and offices. Wanted posters, in contrast, are distributed to the public. These earlier forms would find their full expression in the Most Wanted program years later. The retention of the same form of the FBI wanted poster is one piece of evidence that the epistemology of the average man lives on.

When it comes to wanted posters, the average man as an organizing feature of the poster categories is where race can be found. The point here is not centrally to argue that the average man is a racial concept, which others like Ian Hacking have already done well, as chapter 1 discusses, but to highlight how the average man conforms to a definition of race that considers its universalism and its purpose as a way to organize knowledge long before the obviously racial categories of black and white become definitive. Theoretical work, much of it from Black studies, that analyzes the figure of man as a centerpiece of race is especially useful here. R. A. Judy's definition of white supremacy offers several important features extending to a useful definition of *race*. He defines white supremacy as the "hyper-valuing of the noble man ... the noble man of heroic virtue, *arête*, or the noble man of *virtus*, in the Roman tradition ... or the Kantian *anthropos*"; "It's about that particular anthropocentrism ... that can only think about civilization in terms of the hero," he explains. This understanding of white supremacy, which is "not about white people in Europe or anything as simple as that," he emphasizes, highlights instead a particular understanding of the human that constitutes a definition of race.[17] That view of the human is a major anchor of race for this book.[18] In this understanding of race, I wish to highlight two aspects: (1) its materiality, and (2) its relation to a theocentric turned biocentric understanding of nature.

First, the average man, a statistical version of the noble man Judy critiques, is not merely a colorful metaphor or a cultural figure. Rather, given legs through *bertillonage*, it is made concrete as a statistically derived way of organizing humans with direct consequences for their freedom or captivity. Man is an abstraction but is made materially concrete, as its statistical iteration of the average man demonstrates. As Baidik Bhattacharya observes, nineteenth-century human sciences gave "their object—*man* himself—its empirical solidity" by borrowing "epistemological models and conceptual tools from the sciences of life, labor, and language."[19] And still, "the materiality of man remained elusive." Bhattacharya's approach to this need to locate the materiality of man is that resolution is not found in European history or the study of epistemology alone, but in the "governmental practices of the empire, which combined knowledge and techniques of managing the material body . . . and thus provided legitimacy to such disciplinary inquiries into the human body."[20] The average man, and its path to the MWT list, is a site of all these: scientific knowledge production, the later-baptized-as-neutral basic methodology of the social sciences, and the exercise of imperial power. The average man therefore helps us see how race is material via its epistemological dimension. In other words, the epistemology of race cannot be dismissed as distanced from material conditions and social structure.

Second, this understanding of race rooted in the concept of man also highlights the place of religion, not only as an identity of some on the MWT list but as an epistemology based on some understanding of nature. Most analysis applying the conceptual frameworks common to post-9/11 studies on Muslims in the war on terror would locate questions of religion in the (majority Muslim) religious identity of the list. Attention to the medium and history of the wanted poster, however, requires a reorientation and a different framework. As historian Theodore Porter and sociologist Frank Hankins mention, Quetelet's work came out of religious thought as a counter to it, though not antagonistically, while also retaining similar forms. Statistics were once used in tandem with theological explanations for social phenomena. Quetelet secularized statistical explanations for regularly occurring phenomena, once understood as an outcome of divine planning and then explained by Quetelet, and others, as an outcome of an autonomous system of nature. But in both the theocentric and biocentric, there is an arbiter of knowledge, and that goes from being God to being man. Quetelet's thought and his figure of the average man are examples of what Sylvia Wynter calls *Man2*, a secular version of the earlier religio-secular understanding of man that emerges toward the end of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth.[21] For Wynter, *man* refers to one way of being human

structured on western European ways of being that are then overrepresented. The West represents man as the only, universal way of being fully human, and it distributes this understanding across the globe. This monopoly on humanity begins with a figure she calls *Man1*, or *homo politicus*, which is an earlier variant of man in explicitly religious and political terms. *Man2*, in contrast, is a purely secular variant emerging in bourgeois capitalist terms. The supreme source of legitimacy moves from a religio-secular understanding of man built on a Christian idea of God to instead a purely secular or, as Wynter says, de-godded source of legitimacy that continues to be structured on the theological model. God is replaced with a secular understanding of nature as the knower and arbiter of truth. Along similar lines, nature, Quetelet argues, determines man's fate, but there is a critical caveat—nature can be shaped by the average man.[22] In a move that most indicates Quetelet's secular turn but using the form of religion, he indicates a conditionally omnipotent and omniscient element of the average man. He believes that everything could be known and categorized in relation to the average man, or the ultimate human, pending enough observations.

The cut-and-dried categories on wanted posters come out of this epistemological rupture of the secular, which, I argue, cannot be neatly severed from its religious roots. What, then, is the place of religion for wanted posters? This epistemological rupture suggests that race and religion are not intersecting or intersectional (which implies separation sometimes and combination at other times), nor are they simply entangled or laid on top of one another—metaphors that perhaps obstruct understanding. Instead, I emphasize the shift from the theocentric to the biocentric alongside the maintenance of a similar knowledge structure across both.[23] This emphasis helps us apprehend subsequent happenings in the Most Wanted program and its categories, such as the FBI's inclusion of Assata Shakur, who was added to the MWT list in 2013. Her representation in the program, as well as her legal cases, require an understanding of the epistemological dimension of race, specifically its grounding in the epistemological rupture of the secular. Frameworks like intersectionality that are commonly employed to interpret Assata Shakur's thought and experiences have little room for such an understanding. Such frameworks may not only serve as a placeholder for mapping out relationships between what are understood as the identity categories of race and others like gender; as chapter 4 on Assata Shakur shows, they may enable the very same powers that seek her extradition from Cuba. To instead understand the trials of Assata Shakur with an emphasis on the secularization of knowledge is to illuminate the nature of the challenge that she and others in the Black liberation movement posed to this epistemology of man since, as Enrique Dussel argues, "the quintessence, the backbone" of Euro-

centrism is the theology of Latino-German Christendom.[24] The theological challenge that she and the rest of the Black liberation movement made requires an understanding of the theological nature of what they fought, which, as *No God but Man* emphasizes, hinges on the Negro category.

Islam and "the Negro"

On its wanted poster for Assata Shakur in 1983, the FBI used the word *Muslim*. Convicted in 1977 of killing a police officer, she escaped prison in 1979 and was granted asylum in Cuba. The poster followed her prison escape. It described her as wearing "Muslim or men's clothing." By 2013, when the bureau added her to the MWT list, the word *Muslim* was long gone from her poster even as she was surrounded by Muslims. Further, a race category has always appeared on her posters; she does not bear the mark of the Muslim on the MWT list. Featured on wanted posters on and off since the 1970s, she has also been wanted longer than anyone who has ever been on the MWT list, including Osama bin Laden. The FBI announcement of her addition to the MWT list notes that she is the first woman; however, she is also the first and only representative of the mid-twentieth-century Black liberation movement. She is a lightning rod of a figure for her enemies and her supporters: police unions, the state of New Jersey, and the federal government have sought her extradition from Cuba, and protestors in the recent Black Lives Matter movement could be heard chanting her words at protests and wearing T-shirts that read "Assata Taught Me." Her autobiography has been on university course syllabi since its publication in the late 1980s, which further distinguishes her from most others on the MWT list. In representations of Assata Shakur by both her enemies and her supporters in the twenty-first century, she is not a Muslim.

And yet, there are records from different types of sources that make clear that she called herself a Muslim at some point. According to court records, her correspondence from prison, and her attorneys' biographical accounts of her criminal trials, the use of the word *Muslim* to describe Assata Shakur on her wanted poster is not a complete FBI fabrication put forth to malign her. In fact, she had some connection to Islam from the mid- to late 1970s that materialized in a religious freedom case. She asserted her Muslim status in the courtroom, demanding court proceedings stop on Fridays to respect her religious freedom.

Islam appeared in the opening statement Assata Shakur intended to read at her murder trial in 1977. The court did not permit her or her attorney to read it. In the statement, later published in several sources, including bulletins put out by the Assata Shakur Defense Committee and the *Attica News* in February

1977,[25] she sought to address the jury: "During the jury selection process you were asked whether or not you had heard of the Black Panther Party, the Black Liberation Army and of the Muslim religion. You were asked those questions for a reason. Although my religious and political beliefs are theoretically not on trial here, so much misinformation and plain nonsense was put out in the media about my political affiliations, that I feel compelled to set the record straight."[26] As chapter 2 demonstrates in detail, her Islam was sometimes respected by the court and sometimes not. But of interest is the way in which Islam arose—she brought it up as a move that asserted her power. The ways that Islam appears do not suggest that it is a subordinated religion or identity on the basis of which remedy is required, as per contemporary racialization arguments. Instead, Muslim status appears in moments in which she is pushing against courtroom efforts to punish and control her. This is a show of power (the little power she had in that situation), which is otherwise a major theme of her autobiography, to the point that it has been subject to critique for this. Through this show of power, she sent the message to the courts that she was not going to simply submit to their will.

Her Muslim status comes up in the courts and the media, and is discussed by Assata Shakur herself, as though it differs in some way from what she ordinarily is or would be. It is posed as a counter to her racial status, as part of an "alternative modality of blackness," to use Sherman A. Jackson's words.[27] In the rest of her opening statement, she gestures to this: "Unlike Alex Haley, the author of *Roots*, I am unable to trace my family back to Africa. And so, in an effort to return to my roots and to rediscover my culture and identity, I chose an African name, Assata Shakur, and adopted the Islamic (Muslim) religion."[28] Her point here is part of what Sylvester Johnson argues was "the most consequential epistemic shift effected by Black ethnic religions" such as Islam: they claimed "that Christianization and slavery were essentially processes of cultural destruction," which included the destruction of connections to Islam.[29]

In her opening statement, she situates Islam explicitly as part of a project of recovery of what was denied her as someone positioned inside the racial Negro construct as lacking history, culture, and civilization. For Cedric Robinson, this erasure is central to race. I would add that race is less a construction per the ubiquitous sociological "social construction of race" and more borne of obliterations—the obliteration from historical memory of actual encounters between (those who would go on to be called) Europeans and Black Africans, and, of course, the obliteration of peoples to form something new, like the Negro and other races. "This 'Negro' was a wholly distinct ideological construct from those images of Africans that had preceded it," differing "in function and

ultimately in kind."[30] Robinson notes the centrality of Islam to that process. "Where previously the Blacks were a fearful phenomenon to Europeans because of their historical association with civilizations superior, dominant, and/or antagonistic to Western societies (the most recent being that of Islam)," he argues, "now the ideograph of Blacks came to signify a difference of species, an exploitable source of energy (labor power) both mindless to the organizational requirements of production and insensitive to the subhuman conditions of work." This is part of a planetary shift. "In the more than 3,000 years between the beginnings of the first conception of the 'Ethiopian' and the appearance of the 'Negro,' the relationship between the African and European had been reversed."[31] The reversal involved Europe's rise to world influence and unprecedented levels of control over the fate of much of the planet and its living beings.

In Robinson's account of race, Islam is part of what was erased from Africans to make the Negro. This is important to understanding not only the place of Muslims vis-à-vis race but, as he argues, European racialism more broadly. For this, he explains, four moments must be understood, and "Islamic domination" is one of them:

1   The racial ordering of European society from its formative period, which extends into the medieval and feudal ages as "blood" and racial beliefs and legends.
2   The Islamic (i.e., Arab, Persian, Turkish, and African) domination of Mediterranean civilization and the consequent retarding of European social and cultural life: the Dark Ages.
3   The incorporation of African, Asian, and peoples of the New World into the world system emerging from late feudalism and merchant capitalism.
4   The dialectic of colonialism, plantocratic slavery, and resistance from the sixteenth century forward, and the formations of industrial labor and labor reserves.[32]

Most analyses of racism, Robinson summarizes, begin with the third moment, partially consider the fourth, and ignore the first two.[33] The debate on whether or not race is modern continues, and this book is not engaged in it, but rather notes relevant continuities from before and through modernity.

The analysis of enslaved African Muslims' writings in the work of Sylviane Diouf, Michael Gomez, and R. A. Judy shows how the Negro was configured in part through a specific sort of obliteration that extracted Africans from Islam in the Euro-American worldview related to the construct of the Arab.[34] This is an important aspect of the Negro and, by necessary relation, what it meant to be

Muslim, for that worldview: Muslims—specifically, those Europe recognized as Muslim—represent rivalry and power, in contrast to the Negro, figured as already defeated. By such relations, the Negro could not be Muslim in Euro-American categories. In a reprisal of this earlier formation, the nature of the Muslim threat for the war on terror is as a powerful rival force requiring extreme measures to defeat, and not as a weak sort of enemy, per the concepts of the Negro as well as the Indian who have been figured as already defeated.[35] These categories of Negro, Indian, and so on were never purely descriptive of natural phenomena, as their makers claim; these categories continue to suffer incoherence, as the case of raceless Muslim terrorists initially suggests, and these categories are also subject to being bent toward very different goals, as Assata Shakur shows.

Assata Shakur's brief period as a Muslim is important for this book's argument on race. The knowledge of Shakur's years as a Muslim has receded from public—and indeed the FBI's—memory, too. Further, in popular culture, and in the recent Black Lives Matter movement, she is heavily represented, but not as a Muslim, whether in past or present tense. Islam is absent from popular and scholarly biographical treatments of her story, with few exceptions. Likely, cues are taken from her autobiography, in which she writes that she always had respect for Islam but had "never practiced it." Although disappeared, her brief Muslim status is important for what it enables and for what it can clarify about race and the big themes of this book. Based on analysis of how Islam came up in her battles with the state, in both courtroom and prison, I argue that her Muslim status pushes against race and gestures toward other ways of conceiving of relations beyond the terms of race. The nature of that push lies not in her simple self-identification with Islam for the sake of it, which is to say not as a matter of her simple use of her own will in ways that were disliked by those she leveraged it against. Rather, her identification with Islam has a particular significance in the racial context of the United States as just described. Her Muslim status militates against the particular obliteration resulting in the Negro, which is to say a particular racial arrangement. She considers and also does not use those rules to make her moves. That rejection destabilizes the very basis of race (the average man, noble man, *Man2*, and so on) in posing a challenge outside its logics. This rejection of man, specifically its white divinity, and Black people being drawn to Islam as an alternative to that racial experience, is not unique to her but was rather a basic feature of Islam in Black America in the mid-twentieth century. A major feature of Black Islam is rejecting that white divinity (the theological character of man), and her seemingly uneven engagement with Islam proceeds in that tradition.

It was common enough for Panthers to be Muslim or consider Islam, which held a political meaning entangled with Black Power. Huey P. Newton's perspective on religion is instructive, as it articulates the alternative humanism of the Panthers and their relation to God, which differs in key ways from the average man, *Man2*, the noble man, and so on. In *Revolutionary Suicide*, he explains what was meant by the phrase "All Power to the People." It was based on "the idea of man as God." Further:

> I have no other God but man, and I firmly believe that man is the highest or chief good. If you are obligated to be true and honest to anyone, it is to your God, and if each man is God, then you must be true to him. If you believe that man is the ultimate being, then you will act according to your belief. Your attitude and behavior toward man is a kind of religion in itself, with high standards of responsibility.[36]

Unlike the version of man critiqued by Judy and Wynter, and that proposed by Quetelet, Newton's version is not a peak version of the human, but rather each human stands in for the divine, owed whatever God is owed. Black Power continues to have its critics: for its cultural nationalism, masculinity, misogyny, strategy, alliances, and more. But an aspect of it that I seek to emphasize, these critiques notwithstanding, is the theological challenge it poses: that the problem of race is not just its essentialism, or its erasure of history from people, or that it classifies poorly, but also that it has a false divine figure that persists into the most powerful articulation of the secular and shapes our sense of reality and possibility.[37] Newton is clear that his own notion of man was once religious, then turned secular: "It was especially important to me that I explore the Judaeo-Christian concept of God" because it led Black people to believe, he writes, that they will live better in the next life and experience justice then.[38] "All Power to the People" was intended to ground Black people in the present. At the same time: "The Black Panthers have never intended to turn Black people away from religion. We want to encourage them to change their consciousness of themselves and to be less accepting of the white man's version of God—the God of the downtrodden, the weak, and the undeserving. We want them to see themselves as the called, the chosen, and the salt of the earth."[39]

Along these lines, Assata Shakur's Islam, like that of other Black people in the mid-twentieth century, was a show of power, not weakness. It was as much a restoration project of seeking one's history and practices that were violently erased by chattel slavery as it was a project of creating the cultural intricacies that make Islam a Black religion in the United States.[40] If Islam is a restoration of that which was obliterated in the making of race for those pushed into the

Negro category, then to be Muslim, in this context, is to move against the US racial order and its logics.

On Race Theory

It is widely acknowledged in scholarship on race that the meanings of race are contested. They are stretched and played with toward various ends, and defined and redefined a thousand times, as Stuart Hall emphasized. And my point is not only that there are clear limits to that stretching but also, perhaps, that there is promise in the limits of that stretching. In other words, the liberatory potential of some reclaimed understanding of race has proven itself to be illusory, and another option has always been possible. This option is useful not only as an end goal imagined to be part of some distant future, but it is analytically important right now; it is necessary for simply understanding the MWT list and its version of race.

Theories of race coming from thinkers as different from one another as Sylvia Wynter and R. A. Judy in Black studies discussed earlier, as well as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy in cultural studies, and the social scientific approaches of Adolph Reed, Barbara Fields, and Karen Fields, all tend to emphasize the limits and boundaries of race. This case of the raceless Muslim terrorist provides fresh evidence of these scholars' conclusions. It is one entry in a larger sort of archive that exceeds this book, an archive of phenomena that do not quite fit the terms of race, an archive that these thinkers have also engaged to come to their conclusions in various disciplines and with various, sometimes contrasting, commitments. It should be noted that none of them study those who are considered racially ambiguous, or those in the intermediate category between Black and white on the racial hierarchy, to argue that race is limited. This would be an easy conclusion to reach when empirically studying those who are not readily identifiable as either Black or white in the black-white binary that has defined race in the United States in many ways. Rather, many of these thinkers examine exactly that which (supposedly unambiguously) defines race: race as fabricated by law, plantation economy, eugenicists, statisticians, and so on.

While studying the experiences of Black people and blackness, that great metonym for *race*, they find that, still, race is not a concept worth holding onto as analytically useful for understanding those to whom it has been applied as a presumably obviously useful means for understanding. For one, as Fields and Fields emphasize, race clouds any solid understanding of racism. As they explain, the social practice of racism produces the conception of race, and not the other way around. They emphasize the difference between these

terms and problematize their conflation. "The shorthand" that allows "race" to mean many different things all conflated together makes the nefarious move of transforming "*racism*, as something an aggressor *does*, into *race*, something the target *is*, in a sleight of hand that is easy to miss."[41] There are other ways scholars have distinguished between race and racism. Some will define race as what comes first and racism as activity based on the reality of race rather than the assumption of race along similar lines; there are presumably antiracist attempts to maintain a distinction in order to end racism but preserve race. For me, Fields and Fields's reason for distinguishing between the two is useful, and not these latter reasons (which may be what Anibal Quijano critiques in a footnote poking at Americans for their obsession with differentiating between the two).[42] Following decolonial thought that emphasizes the racialization of knowledge structures, I position race as a problem as well, and not only racism, as Judy's intellectual project would suggest. Judy considers how race is one system of knowledge that stands in contrast to that of Frantz Fanon, whose project Judy seeks to build on to think toward alternatives. At the very least, this suggests that race is not always already part of every system of knowledge. What these otherwise very different thinkers share is a notion that race is not a sprawling social construct common to all that is social but is bounded by time and space as historic fabrication that should be treated analytically as a fabrication that, as David Theo Goldberg puts it, is to be *mentioned* but not *used* as an analytical category.[43]

Philosopher Tommie Shelby makes a useful distinction between an external attribution, what we may call race, a blackness of white creation, or racial blackness, on the one hand; and a blackness of Black creation that, for me, is not a case of race.[44] Both sorts of blackness appear in the idiom of *Negro*, *Black*, *African American*, and so on, so the important differentiating feature here is not the word *blackness* itself but the contextual question of the goals and activities around which it is oriented. There is thus a critical difference between the epistemological and material creations of that plantation economy, for example, and the epistemological and material practice and creations of affinity among those otherwise different peoples pushed together by such an arrangement. The blackness of Black creation runs counter to European *race* and the presumed promise of being recognized as such in European categories, and this, too, may use racial language but does not align with man in its interests, desired outcomes, or methods of knowing and living. Their separation is a valuable heuristic. This heuristic does not require adhering to some notion of ontological differences between Black and white, nor does it establish a clean line between the two that ignores Black actors acting in white interests and the reverse. It also

does not rely on reducing or romanticizing the blackness of Black creation.[45] The value of limiting the definition of race by making a distinction between the goals of that blackness of white creation and Black creation becomes apparent when considering the relation between Muslims and race.

Research on Muslims and race in the United States tends to collapse this distinction. There is indeed some notion of a Muslim of American creation that clashes with Muslims' own ideas of what it means to be Muslim. Junaid Rana rightly points out a related problem in the contemporary task of producing knowledge about Muslims inside of "race": "the danger is a complicity with liberal modes of thinking that would render the figure of the Muslim as simply a racialized subject without addressing issues of sociality, theology, and even alternative modes of political thought and liberation."[46] Junaid Rana and Gilberto Rosas note that there are two understandings of *Muslim* in conflict, a collapse of two very different meanings of *Muslim*. It refers to "a religious community to be policed and disciplined into the American polity," on the one hand, and then a related but different enough definition that is part of racial epistemology "as a general category that situates Muslims as an ambiguous racial community that encompasses the 'Arab–Middle Eastern–Muslim' . . . South Asians (including Christians, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs), and possibly Latinas/os, and African Americans."[47] And yet, theoretical frameworks used in the study of the racialization of Muslims cannot get out of this problem of unintentionally doing the work of subsuming Muslims into race. Race, while fueling this problem, remains an attractive framework for understanding the experiences and positioning of Muslims in the war on terror and for resisting it. It is clear, and I agree, that race has something to do with what Muslims have faced after 9/11, and my overall point in this book is that precision about that something is critical. For me, that something is in the world of epistemology, and less so in what is called racial identity. Those who have argued that Muslims are racialized have fought against the incorrect (often right wing or liberal) idea that race has nothing to do with violence against Muslims in the war on terror because Islam is a religion, which is connected to the charge that Muslims are exaggerating about the violence and discrimination they face. The arguments against this charge fail, however, because they are using the same general categories. This book's interest is in clearing some of the barriers to exploring the promise of rejecting expressions of racial epistemologies in the study of Muslims and race.

A sprawling definition of race is adopted in literature on Muslim racialization. Race is used to "bear the weight, metaphorically, of other kinds of difference" and a wide range of activity.[48] Michael Omi and Howard Winant are

among the most frequently engaged scholars of race in this area of study. Their approach to race is then instructive: "While race is a template for the subordination and oppression of different social groups," they "emphasize that it is also a template for resistance to many forms of marginalization and domination."[49] The first part of Omi and Winant's definition of race describes race in a way that would account for the average man as a template for the human to whom others are subordinate. Scientific race is certainly in the business of producing templates. The second part of their definition of race, however, while true in some cases, is more debatable for movements like civil rights and Black Power that are nevertheless read as squarely racial. Then, either the second part of their definition reflects a misreading of movements that have adopted race language to push for something very different from a racial order, or the second part itself does the work of race, which is to endlessly organize and categorize persons, places, and things as subordinate or subordinated, however sympathetically, to a godlike figure whose position at the top of this hierarchy is natural/ized. Here, critical versions of race theory run into a problem: Omi and Winant begin by arguing that race is a particular sort of violent construct coming out of Europe, then conclude that it becomes a liberatory project as well. All is read back into race. These two parts of a race definition for Omi and Winant are simply one example of a broader consensus in much scholarship on race and Muslims discussed in chapters 3 and 4. When Muslims are put into this very broad theoretical understanding of race, in which race is a template for violence and all that is against that violence, the observation that the war on terror treats Muslims as the enemy (race) comes to serve as the basis for stretching the definition of race to remedy this situation (antiracism), in an anxious appeal to a liberal antiracism that requires self-definition in man's image, as chapter 4 argues.[50]

The bigger question raised is whether scholarship engages the logic of race to understand it or whether some other kind of logic is engaged, a question I ask not from ungrounded theorizing but from the empirical realities of the MWT list.

Overview of Chapters

The chapters are organized chronologically, all approaching issues related to the Most Wanted Terrorist list. I begin with the history and epistemology of the MWT list in chapter 1 and then move on to case studies more directly connected to individuals on the list in the remaining three chapters, with the fourth chapter and conclusion considering contemporary expressions and challenges to the racial epistemology organizing the MWT list.

Chapter 1 has three goals: to offer a genealogy of the wanted poster as organized by the average man; to trace the religious roots of the secular, racial knowledge formation that continues to nourish it; and to provide an overview of the Most Wanted program. I argue that the statistical invention of the average man is defined by race as the overvaluing of one way of being human. After an introduction to the average man, I show how late nineteenth-century French police clerk Alphonse Bertillon adopted Quetelet's average man decades later to organize French police records at home, in the colonies, and in major cities across the world. Lastly, I trace the FBI's uptake of the methods and episteme of scientific rationality for identification, leading to the creation of the identification order, a precursor to the FBI wanted poster, and ultimately an entire FBI program dedicated to the distribution of wanted posters. Rather than accepting the narrative that modern science is secular (defined as free of religion), chapter 1 excavates the theological aspects of the history of the wanted poster.

Chapter 2 considers archival materials related to Islam surrounding Assata Shakur in the 1970s and 1980s, including her wanted posters from those years. This chapter advances the argument that, rather than another case of racial particularism in a critical frame, the blackness of Black Power—again, that blackness of Black people's creation—is an argument against race. In other words, I argue that her invocation of Islam functioned as a move against racial logics. The chapter moves chronologically, beginning with a discussion of how Islam appeared in courtroom matters during her various trials. It then analyzes how the New Jersey state police and FBI have used Islam to describe her on her wanted poster and identification order. She is ungendered, per Hortense Spillers, in posters, the courts, and the media in relation to the Muslim label. She is gendered in whatever contradictory ways serve the purposes of those doing the gendering. Lastly, the chapter covers the period after her escape to Cuba, from where she writes in her autobiography that she "never practiced" Islam. The contradiction between her claim never to have practiced Islam, alongside archival material in which she called herself Muslim, is then interpreted through a discussion of an essay by Safiya Bukhari, another former Panther who was a devoted Muslim. Bukhari's discussion of fearlessness draws attention to the social role of the theological dimension of Black Islam that resonates with the less overtly theological approach of Shakur, in which Bukhari sought to kill her potential to be owned by anything but God.

The goal of chapter 3 is to offer the wealth of examples of wanted posters of raceless Muslims on the MWT list. The chapter highlights the distinctiveness of the MWT posters by making key comparisons between their posters and those of Muslims on nonterrorism lists, as well as non-Muslims on terrorism lists. I

argue that the fact of their racelessness is something to think with rather than to consider as a case of the racialization of Muslims. The racelessness of Muslims on the MWT list marks paradox: they are at once off the charts in their (social scientific) deviance (from the average man), while also marked as rivals, which is to say as formidable rather than weak enemies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the crashing together of frameworks of difference that make this paradox, modeled on Nasser Hussain's argument regarding Guantánamo as a place not where law is absent, but where different legal systems converge to create hyperlegality. The FBI's posters are in a scientific paradigm, and the Muslim enemy is in a theological one. These converge to produce the paradox expressed as racelessness.

Chapter 4 approaches debates on Assata Shakur's 2013 designation as a terrorist as a moment illuminating some of the problems of how race, blackness, and Islam are theorized by those critical of the war on terror. Some of Shakur's supporters' attempts to save her from the terror designation turn her into a Black Madonna, to use Dhoruba Bin Wahad's phrase—an abstract, innocent, heroine figure. The racial logic of innocence that challenges her addition to the MWT list in 2013 but not the list itself, I argue, renders her a kind of average man. This logic of the average man is also reflected in research on the war on terror for those signified by acronyms like SWANA (Southwest Asian and North African) and AMSA (Arab, Muslim, South Asian) based on its use of concepts like racialization and intersectionality. The chapter locates traces of the average man in these concepts through their treatment of racial blackness. It raises the question as to whether these concepts, even when put forth as merely descriptive, are analytically relying on racial blackness and thus doing the epistemological work of race. A review of Shakur's posters from the 1980s onward, and state and political organizations' pursuit of her, then lead to a discussion of how her baptism as innocent by her supporters resonates with the atomizing function of wanted posters and the FBI's view of a "Black messiah"—an atomizing to make guilty, rather than innocent. Critiquing racial blackness as a model, the chapter points to the original conception of Black studies, as it is already connected to Islam, as holding useful ways of thinking and pursuing the change that we, who are concerned with the position of Muslims in the war on terror, seek. The conclusion chapter revisits Eqbal Ahmad's famous speech, "Terrorism: Theirs and Ours," and discusses the promise of his notions of *theirs* and *ours* but put toward this book's analysis of race.

INTRODUCTION

1. Jeffreys-Jones, *The FBI*; Johnson and Weitzman, *The FBI and Religion*; Theoharis, *The FBI*; O'Reilly, *"Racial Matters"*; Gage, *G-Man*; Martin, *The Gospel of J. Edgar Hoover*.

2. See Cole, *Enemy Aliens*, for more on other sorts of lists, such as the FBI's Security Index (p. 102), and the custodial detention list circa World War II (p. 93).

3. The FBI Most Wanted program website, which is the central location for wanted posters dating from the 2000s, has hundreds of other posters that are not included in the analysis here. There are posters of missing persons, as well as posters for events featuring several unnamed individuals who are wanted in connection with the event but not charged with any crimes. To the extent that missing persons, specifically, need to be identified, the format of their posters is the same as the wanted posters.

4. In 2002, it was called Seeking Information—War on Terrorism; in 2012, it was called Seeking Terror Information; and from 2015 until 2020, it was called Seeking Information—Terrorism.

5. On Bosnia as an early and important battleground in the global war on terror, see Li, *The Universal Enemy*.

6. Hussain, "The Sound of Terror."

7. There is a valuable scholarly literature tracking cases in which groups fall out of whiteness or become white, but this is not a directly comparable case. See Brodkin Sacks, "How Did Jews Become White Folks?"; Gualtieri, *Between Arab and White*; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*; Haney-Lopez, *White by Law*. In sociology specifically, see Maghbouleh, *The Limits of Whiteness*.

8. To be sure, finding an explanation is a challenge considering the secrecy of an entity like the FBI. The power of an explanation also depends on what is deemed acceptable as a source and how it is interpreted—the words of the FBI? The thought process of the person making these posters? The press releases of the bureau when announcing new additions to their lists? These sources of explanations have their limits as well, since the FBI is interested in maintaining a positive public image and is also not a neutral provider of information. Because this book's interest is in race theory, the nature of the explanation for

the missing race provided in this book concerns what race means such that there is race-lessness in this case.

9. The FBI is an example of what Ann Morning describes as an institution that will "interpret, act upon, and transmit to the public scientists' concepts of race" (Morning, *The Nature of Race*, 192). My argument, however, is not that the FBI or the state as a whole put forth one coherent definition or conceptualization of race, as Morning and others have also pointed out (see Goldberg, *The Racial State*, 182–83), noting important differences in the definitions of race in the census as compared to the legal system, for example.

10. Further, the establishment in 2024 of a MENA (Middle Eastern and North African) category on the 2030 US Census, after years of Arab American advocacy for it, is a logical conclusion to the debates that pushed race to the forefront as a useful concept for post-9/11 organizing against Islamophobia.

11. Cainkar, "Fluid Terror Threat"; Silva, *Brown Threat*.

12. Denvir, "Revisiting *Racecraft* with Barbara and Karen Fields."

13. On the benefit of analyzing media forms rather than only media representations to understand race, see Towns, *On Black Media Philosophy*.

14. Cole, *Suspect Identities*.

15. Hoover, "Criminal Identification."

16. Hoover, "Criminal Identification."

17. Moten, "Of Human Flesh."

18. I use *man* interchangeably with *average man*, *noble man*, *Man2*, and other such versions unless I am giving a genealogy or more detailed discussion of one in particular, like the average man in chapter 1. See chapter 1 and the conclusion on the similarity between these versions of man.

19. Bhattacharya, "Somapolitics."

20. Bhattacharya, "Somapolitics," 136.

21. Wynter, "On How We Mistook the Map for the Territory."

22. Quetelet, *A Treatise on Man*, 74.

23. For a critique of these metaphors, see Hickman, "Globalization and the Gods."

24. Dussel, *The Theological Metaphors of Marx*, 166.

25. Assata Shakur Defense Committee, February 14 and 21, 1977, box 1, folder 15–16, Majority Report Research Files, Articles, Statement, Bulletins, Newspaper, Tamiment Library and Wagner Labor Archives, NYU; *Attica News*, p. 2, box 8, folder 5, Assata Clippings, Tamiment Library and Wagner Labor Archives, NYU.

26. Box 1, folder 15, Majority Report Research Files, Articles, Statement, Bulletins, Newspaper, Tamiment Library and Wagner Labor Archives, NYU.

27. Jackson, *Islam and the Blackamerican*.

28. Box 1, folder 15, Majority Report Research Files, Articles, Statement, Bulletins, Newspaper, Tamiment Library and Wagner Labor Archives, NYU.

29. Johnson, *African American Religions*, 299–300.

30. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 82.

31. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 82.

32. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 67–68.

33. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 67–68.

34. Judy, *DisForming the American Canon*.

35. There is a need for understanding "the *actual* interaction between Britons and Muslims," and not only representations of Muslims in English plays and literature, for Nabil Matar, whose work on the relations between Muslims and Britons in the Age of Discovery is relevant here (Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen*, 7). He notices a contrast between those multidimensional, actual interactions, and the one-dimensional English representations of Muslims. Piracy was one of several sites of actual encounter between Britons/settlers and Muslims. The other ways, during the English Renaissance and its Age of Discovery, that Britons had real encounters with Muslims, specifically Turks and Moors, were trade in English, Welsh, and Mediterranean ports, and ambassadors' and emissaries' visits to London; Britons helped transport Muslims to Hajj when the latter were threatened by Maltese pirates; and Britons could be found as fighters on Barbary pirate ships, as well as among those enslaved by Barbary pirates. "To numerous Britons, the Turks and Moors were men and women they had known, not in fantasy and fiction, but with whom they had worked and lived, sometimes hating them yet sometimes accepting or admiring them" (5–6). Evidence of actual interaction appears in prison depositions and captives' memoirs, among other sources. Actual interactions with Muslims in Britain, North Africa, and the Levantine region were characterized by "familiarity along with communication and cohabitation," but "in literature and theology, and thus in the emergent ideology of early modern Britain, the Muslim was depicted as occupying a place beneath the civilized European/Christian" (14). Notably, and similar to my argument about FBI representations of the Muslim in the war on terror, this was the "construction of an image that was independent of and contrary to empirical evidence," and understanding that gap between reality and representation is critical for understanding the work of the representation (14–15). An important example is in the representation of "Barbary pirates." The word *Barbary* originates in the Greek and Latin *barbarus*, referring to the foreign and uncivilized (see Ben Rejeb, "Barbary's 'Character' in European Letters"). Although the term had existed prior to the early modern period, it was not until that time that English and other European writers began to use the term for Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and North Africa, "paradoxically when [European writers] had access to extensive and reliable information about the advanced, not 'barbaric,' military and historical civilization of the Muslim Empire" (Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen*, 15). European hopes for conquering the Muslim were central to this characterization. It did not reflect a material reality of domination; it was aspirational, and the idea of barbarism helped this desire along. The idea of barbarism linked the Muslim with Indian "savages," which had become superimposed on one another in late seventeenth-century English thought and ideology (170). Materially, "in the Muslim world . . . the Muslims were religiously and militarily powerful, were widely influencing English culture, and were dictating their own terms of commercial and industrial exchange" (15–16), whereas Indigenous people in the Americas had been conquered. Despite these critical material differences between the Muslim and the Indian, this European reading of them together was transferred into colonial discourse by the eighteenth century (170). Europeans rationalized their domination of Indigenous people through the idea that they were barbaric;

but "Britons categorized the Muslims as barbaric even though they, the Britons, had not dominated them" (14–15). Thus, Britons produced "a representation of a representation" (15) based on a representation of Indigenous peoples of the Americas as Indians (a European construct, a distortion). The goal was to position Muslims in their worldview in a way that was convenient for their goals. The wish for domination of Muslims shaped European representations of the Muslim as though already conquered like the Indian. As Lotfi Ben Rejeb writes, "It is an extraordinary ideological feat in literature," as one site of representations of the Muslim, "for concreteness to be so abstracted and abstraction then presented as concreteness, fancy as reality" (Ben Rejeb, "Barbary's 'Character' in European Letters," 352–53).

36. Newton, *Revolutionary Suicide*, 178.

37. Along similar lines, Vincent Lloyd argues that Huey P. Newton presented a "black political theology as critique of idolatry" (Lloyd, *Religion of the Field Negro*, 196).

38. Newton, *Revolutionary Suicide*, 179.

39. Newton, *Revolutionary Suicide*, 179.

40. Some religious studies scholars emphasize continuity and the legitimacy that comes with a long genealogy of Islam, while others emphasize the creative agency of later generations in forming an Islam of their own. On this debate, see Adhami, "W. D. Muhammad's Hermeneutics"; Dorman, *The Princess and the Prophet*; Curtis, *Islam in Black America*. This debate is often concerned with the place of agency, but for me the case made by those with the long genealogy view is especially interesting for their argument against the religious dimension of race.

41. Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 17.

42. Quijano, "¡Qué tal raza!"

43. All take seriously that the fabrication of race has real effects, as they show how the world as we know it is organized racially; the contradiction between race as fabrication and race as having real effects is a limitation not of their arguments, but of the concept itself. On *mention* versus *use*, see Goldberg, *Racist Culture*, viii.

44. Shelby, *We Who Are Dark*.

45. Adolph Reed argues that "black power activism's sole critical category was race," so "radicals were generally unprepared to respond when the new, mainstream black political elite gained momentum in the late 1960s and began to consolidate a new kind of racially assertive but still accommodationist politics" (Reed, "The Allure of Malcolm X," 204). There is a difference, as Reed also notes, between what race meant for Black power compared what it means for this Black political elite. Black power's race analysis is tied to material politics, which Reed praises. To this I add that *race* may be the same word, but the difference in what it makes reference to for Black power versus the Black political elite is critical for my analysis. The religious dimensions of the materialist race concept that Black power used and their understandings of human difference may have potential to challenge the accommodationism that Reed rightly critiques.

46. Rana, "No Muslims Involved."

47. Rana and Rosas, "Managing Crisis," 225.

48. Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument," 35.

49. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 108.

50. A representative example of one such definition of racial identity: "Racial identity is more than a mere performance of culture, more than the fact of skin color, and more than phenotype. It is also shared history, an ancestry, and community connection, a bricolage of internal and external practices, and subjectivation. It is dynamically co-created by the practices of gender, sexuality, and class." Choudhury, "Racecraft and Identity," 14.

1. *L'HOMME MOYEN* AND AMERICAN ANTHROPOMETRY

1. An 1893 meeting in Chicago resulted in the creation of the National Chiefs of Police Union. In 1902, it changed its name to the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

2. King, "Foreword," v.

3. Hoover, "Criminal Identification."

4. Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," 19; Sarton, "Preface to Volume XXIII," 14. See also Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, on key differences between Comte and Quetelet. Quetelet took much of Comte's work, including the term *social physics*, and used it in ways Comte would strongly dislike. Comte was more interested in the historicist terrain of moral science, Hacking argues, while Quetelet explored the numerical terrain (39). Relatedly, Comte did not think of the normal (which for Quetelet would distill down to *average*) as a statistical idea while Quetelet did, being among those who would go on to make "normal" the "premier statistical idea of the late nineteenth century" (144–45). For more on Quetelet and sociology, see Beirne, "Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology"; Beirne, *Inventing Criminology*; Lazarsfeld, "Notes on the History of Quantification."

5. Lazarsfeld, "Notes on the History of Quantification," 194.

6. Goldthorpe, *Pioneers of Sociological Science*, 1.

7. Quetelet, *A Treatise on Man*, 6.

8. Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking*, 42.

9. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*.

10. Lazarsfeld, "Notes on the History of Quantification," 295.

11. Donnelly, *Adolphe Quetelet*.

12. Donnelly, *Adolphe Quetelet*.

13. Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, 112.

14. Quetelet, *A Treatise on Man*, 96.

15. "While social physics has been acknowledged for its direct influence on Galton, Pearson, Lombroso and Durkheim and its indirect influence on Darwin, Comte and Maxwell, it has just as often been treated as an absurd overextension of a quantifying fetish. At its worst critics derided a philosophy of crude materialism and determinism. At best, more sympathetic readings saw *l'homme moyen* as an unfortunate diversion on the road to the more mature social sciences of the late nineteenth-century." Donnelly, *Adolphe Quetelet*, 135.

16. Moten, "Of Human Flesh," 260.

17. My use of Quetelet in this book is not as a hero or antihero figure himself, or as singularly responsible for the trajectory leading to wanted posters, but as having a specific contribution whose argument I am focusing on. However, the institutional aspects are