

POSTCOLONIAL CONFIGURATIONS

Dictatorship, the Racial Cold War, and Filipino America

JOSEN MASANGKAY DIAZ

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For my parents

CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Unmaking Configurations

FILIPINO AMERICA AS NATIONAL HISTORY

In 2011, the names of activists Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes were etched onto the Bantayog ng mga Bayani (the Wall of Martyrs Memorial) in Quezon City, Manila. The wall is part of a larger memorial that remembers those who "lived and died in defiance" of Ferdinand Marcos's dictatorship in the Philippines.[1] In 1982, gunmen murdered the men outside the meeting hall of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (Local 37) at Pioneer Square in Seattle, Washington. The investigation and trial that followed the assassination linked the killings to union leaders in the United States, cronies of Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, and the Marcos regime itself. As of 2011, Domingo and Viernes were the only Filipino Americans whose names were listed on the wall.[2]

On the Bantayog, Domingo and Viernes join hundreds of other heroes of the anti–martial law movement, individuals vetted by a Research and Documentation Committee to ensure "that the name of obscure, unknown martyrs in remote places may be brought to light."[3] Every year, the committee charged with the maintenance of the memorial adds more names to the wall.[4] The quest to identify, name, and honor those who might otherwise be "unknown martyrs" has become a key feature of the struggle to "never again, never forget" martial law and the Marcos dictatorship, which lasted

FIGURE I.1 Bantayog ng mga Bayani memorial sculpture. Photo: Rhea Claire Madarang/Rappler.

from 1965 to 1986.[5] This vetting seeks to uncover the individual stories of the heroes to reveal the extent of the regime's violence.

In addition to the wall, the memorial includes a sculpture that represents the "self-sacrifice of a fallen figure of man, held in one hand by the rising figure of a woman who symbolizes the Motherland, while her other hand reaches for the glorious son of freedom" (figure I.1).[6] Following the arc of homogeneous, empty time, the memorial underwrites the dictatorship as an aberrant yet significant moment within an otherwise progressive national history that gestures toward liberation.[7] Not reflective of the country's colonial inheritances or its cacique politics, the memorial positions the dictatorship as an unprecedented abuse of governmental power. The "glorious son of freedom" is the abstract and universal telos of a national sovereignty guided by the liberal promise of republicanism. Characterized by a "political anxiety" about the state of the Philippine republic, the memorial confirms the nation as the primordial location of freedom, where freedom exists in contradistinction to an exceptional dictatorship and in accordance with post-1986 state discourses about the return to democracy.[8]

Memorializing marks no beginning or end; rather, it operates as an ongoing task of historical revision, wherein grappling with and making sense

of martial law and the Marcos regime offer an avenue for contending with and legitimizing present political conditions. Within this framework, the memorial overdetermines the lives of the martyrs, who are called into recognition by the memorial itself, and transforms them into a singular entity made to personify the romance of the "Motherland." This memory work constructs "monuments of a historical consciousness" that arrest Domingo and Viernes as figures of a national history about the fall of dictatorship and the rise of democracy.[9] As heroes of an anti–martial law movement and defenders of the republic, they come into visibility within the boundaries of this national story.

In several US-based studies of the Marcos dictatorship, however, the assassination of Domingo and Viernes is a catalyst for memorializing a distinct Filipino American social movement.[10] Domingo and Viernes's political work with the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP, or the Union of Democratic Filipinos) reveals the ways that Filipinos in the United States cultivated a transnational anti–martial law movement that threaded the violence of the dictatorship both to US imperialism in the Philippines and to the racialized and classed discrimination of Filipinos in the United States.[11] Their struggle against the labor exploitation of Filipino cannery workers and the displacement of low-wage and poor communities by urban development in Seattle reflects a political consciousness that formed alongside Black, Indigenous, Third World, and other resistance movements in the United States in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. Within these narratives, Domingo and Viernes personify the efficacy of transnational political organizing in the United States, where the Filipino American activist embodies an emergent racial consciousness grounded in knowledge about the interconnectedness of US colonialism and racism. Such studies generate reflections about martial law that position Filipino America as a nucleus for expansive transnational connections.

While the Bantayog incorporates the Filipino diaspora in the United States within its invocation of Philippine national history, the United States itself remains an aporia, a peripheral presence that lingers on the edges of the memorial but does not fully materialize within its conception of dictatorial power. The memorial frames the dictatorship as a national dilemma rather than a quandary about state and imperialist power, even though Marcos enjoyed US support during much of his reign. The US-based histories, on the other hand, overdetermine Domingo and Viernes as Filipino American. The proclamation of an already coherent and uncomplicated Filipino American subjectivity attends neither to the terms of its formations during

the Marcos era nor to the risks of its invocation as such. Even as both memorializations situate the assassination as part of a wider story about martial law, the declaration of its importance often embeds Domingo and Viernes within the discourses that have come to define the study of the dictatorship. The two men become recognizable only within the parameters of these limited frames. More importantly, their recognition elides other forms of sociality that materialize within and between the pathways of transpacific relations.

How do these narratives memorialize Filipino America? How do they remember martial law and dictatorship in ways that idealize the nation and the transnational? In what ways do these ideals inhere through specific conceptualizations of race, gender, and subjectivity? How might one begin to rethink these formations in order to reimagine authoritarianism not as aberrational to but as a critical function of liberalism? How can we reimagine Filipino America to highlight other forms of exclusion and belonging that impart insight into the continuity of colonial modernity in shaping our discourses of subjectivity?

This book turns to Filipino America as a kind of postcolonial memorialization, a project that suspends an event or the experience of an event as a cohesive recollection while it moves other moments of Philippine-US collaboration inside and outside visibility. To apprehend it in this way rather than treating it as a static category of racial or ethnic difference is to point to it as a nexus for laying bare the collaborations of Cold War politics—the intertwining programs of dictatorship, colonial and imperialist war, and liberal reform—that make race and gender legible as distinct forms during specific periods. Rather than privilege a set of answers about the Filipino relationship to America, this memorialization helps resituate Filipino America as a persistent question about the terms that surround its invocation. I begin here to destabilize the familiarity of Filipino America, to disrupt its cohesion, to engender a different critique and politics of Filipino and America that is attuned to the discourses of raciality that encircle Philippine-US dictatorship.[12] More significant than revealing the truth (or what Lisa Yoneyama calls the "how much" of history) of dictatorial violence, I treat dictatorship as a consequence of empire, one whose legacies manifest themselves in the very discourses by which we come to remember it.

The year after the assassination, Dorothy and Fred Cordova founded the Filipino American National Historical Society (FANHS) in Seattle, providing a home for the collection of archival documents and the showcase of Filipino American culture and history.[13] The organization was the culmination

of the Cordovas' decades-long work to establish programs dedicated to the two-pronged project of Filipino American cultural preservation and identity formation among Filipino American youth. Fred Cordova's 1983 pictorial history, *Filipinos: Forgotten Asian Americans*, showcased the collection by including two centuries' worth of photographs and oral histories. It serves as one of the first composite histories of Filipinos in the United States. In its opening pages, Cordova dedicates the book to "Filipinos, who are forgotten Asian Americans, forgotten Filipino Americans, forgotten Pinoys, forgotten Americans."[14] For Cordova, Filipinos' elision not only from US national history but also from the minoritized discourses of Asian American history conveys the specificity of Filipino American abjection. The underlying task here, to remember forgotten Filipinos, is not simply an attempt to recover something that was lost. To remember is to conceptualize Filipino America as the emergence of a once-marginalized form of Filipino subjectivity whose expression heralds the arrival of a distinct racial formation.[15] Within the broad reaches of US history, the Filipino and the US colonial history of the Philippines are often rendered insignificant if not entirely erased. Yet Filipino America in Cordova's collection marks the transformation of the Filipino, no longer a "little brown brother" or an immigrant "alien," from the object of US exclusion to the subject of US multiculturalism.[16] The invocation of a Filipino American "national history," more specifically, attempts to resolve the incommensurability that has characterized a Filipino ontology within US colonial epistemologies and US citizenship.[17]

While the ongoing work of FANHS illustrates the immensity and generosity of the Cordovas' historical and cultural projects as well as the "integrity and strength of local experience and knowledge" that such projects encapsulate, the declaration of a Filipino American national history reappears elsewhere and is worth untangling.[18] The invocation of a national history privileges a unidirectional diasporic trajectory that positions the United States as both origin and final destination, arranging Filipino America within the temporal and spatial parameters of the US nation form. Cordova's history begins with descriptions of the "Louisiana Manilamen" and ends with the Filipino American soldiers of World War II, bookended by historic firsts. Contextualizing contemporary migration as a product of US conquest, empirical studies of the Filipino diaspora in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s have often followed such an approach.[19] These explorations, however, consider the Filipino experience in the United States through an additive model that situates Filipino America as the accumulation of historical experience in which history overdetermines the effects

of coloniality. By concealing the overlaps and intersections that have constituted such migrations, these studies fail to address the limitations of this empiricism. In the epilogue of his book, Cordova writes, "We waste precious time in perennially asking these questions about ourselves among ourselves but never listening to ourselves for the answers which should come from within ourselves in our search for ourselves."[20] National history "answers" this slew of historical inquiries. The equation of Filipino America with national history irons out the tensions that invisibility provokes, conflating racial subjectivity with racial arrival.

The promise of a national (as well as a transnational) history establishes Filipino America as an already cohesive and coherent formation, constantly sewing its seams even as they threaten to come undone. FANHS's origin story absents the assassination of Domingo and Viernes, killed by Marcos associates in the same city where the Cordovas founded the organization.[21] This is not to argue that FANHS is responsible for attending to anything and everything having to do with Filipinos in the United States. It only suggests that the theorization of invisibility as the defining characteristic of Filipino American raciality renders the assassination illegible within the epistemological frame of Filipino American national history. Such a framework would assume a distinct experience and subjectivity that positions a cohesive national history as the prescription for the injury of invisibility. The absence that invisibility imparts obscures a dialectical struggle between the visibility afforded by historical and political recognition based on racial difference and the materiality that recognition elides. Where Filipino American national history might foreclose other subjectivities that exceed its articulation of belonging, the assassination unsettles Filipino America by unraveling it from the subject of national history and revealing it as the condition of living under both Philippine authoritarianism and US liberalism. The labor struggles between Filipino and other Asian workers and US agribusiness in the US West during the period, for instance, reveal a critical contradiction of US multiculturalism. Continuous assaults on immigrant labor in the 1970s and 1980s, misaligned with the civil rights legislation of the late 1960s, highlight the ways that the imperatives of racial capitalism always underscore the celebratory declarations of liberal progressivism.[22] Labor policies under the Marcos regime transformed Filipino labor into a capacious vehicle for facilitating the movement of multinational capital within the country while rendering Filipinos themselves subject to the restrictions of martial law. Filipino workers' struggles pinpoint the disjuncture

between the promise of freedom, on the one hand, and the actualization of that freedom, on the other.

Claims for subjectivity often absorb acceptable difference within US national discourses in ways that sustain liberal race projects.[23] While political representation attempts to address the invisibility that Cordova described, it fails to attend to the myriad forms of power and violence that have constituted Filipino colonial and diasporic formations.[24] I argue for an incessant interrogation of the subject that highlights its racialized, classed, gendered, and sexualized constitution. However, I also insist that the study of subjectivity is imperative for understanding the interconnectedness of seemingly oppositional modes of state governance that cohere as colonial modernity. The "achievement of subjectivity" as an epistemological endpoint occludes the radical possibilities inherent in the study of Filipino America.[25] By unhinging the Bantayog, the narratives of Domingo and Viernes, and FANHS from the contours of heroism and self-determination that shape them, these projects reveal Philippine-US dictatorship as a crisis where the representation of that crisis is the ground on which one can contend with the multiplicity and extensiveness of state and imperialist power.

Even as these narratives reframe the lives of Domingo and Viernes according to the parameters of national history projects, Domingo's and Viernes's intellectual and political work confounds the bounds of these arrangements. That the two men are visible, recognizable, and knowable is precisely the point: this visibility, recognizability, and knowability reveal the ways that we come to know the past and the means by which the past comes to be made known to us.[26] The heroization of Domingo and Viernes as martyrs of the transnational anti–martial law movement functions through a conceptualization of power as coercion and suppression, and freedom as the absence of power. When such heroization operates through national memory projects, it reinforces the supremacy of the masculinized citizen-subject as a mode of self-determination and the historical agent of national progress, one who acts bravely in order to access rights afforded by the state, rights that are limited only in their distribution, not in their constitution.[27] This subject is the vehicle through which the republic functions as a benefactor of the people; at the same time, he is the modality by which challenges to the state also gain political legibility. Heroization is a memorial in itself, a way to personify politico-juridical law; and in transmogrifying the labor and energies of a people, it contains difference in the production of the subject of modernity.

Challenging the overdetermination of political unity that the memorials underline, I read this heroization as an attempt to remember the production of death but not the widescale management of life that leads to such death, let alone the language by which we conceive of and name that life.[28] Beyond a conceptualization of power as suppression, I point to the inextricability of state and imperialist power that is multimodal, multivalent, and expansive and that operates as much through repression as through acts of false liberation. Interrogating forms of subjectivity that materialize as state recognition emphasizes the criticality of other social forms, often rendered feminized and queer, that are not simply invisibilized or marginalized by dominant forms of citizenship and belonging but rendered incommensurable and expendable by these parameters. These tempting versions of political subjectivity that cohere within strictures of global capitalism foreclose the creative possibilities necessary for social disruption and upheaval. I search for ways to name the dead and the living that do not overdetermine their being and becoming in the world.[29]

* * *

Postcolonial Configurations is about dictatorship, coloniality, and subjectivity. Interrogating Filipino away from America to explore the processes by which the two were defined, redefined, and sutured during the Marcos dictatorship, this book proposes "postcolonial configuration" as a modality for reconsidering the continuous and perplexing relationship between Filipino and America throughout the Cold War. A configuration is a racial and gender formation that becomes recognizable, namable, and legible at the intersections of overlapping state and national forces. These forces are transpacific collaborations that invest in development and modernization and take shape as authoritarianism, liberalism, and imperialism. This means that "binational" partnerships orchestrated by the Philippine and US governments are rarely, if ever, equitable alliances or strictly confined to "foreign policy." Rather, the distinct political orders of dictatorship and representative republicanism—what Hannah Arendt has described as the long-standing "affinity between democracy and dictatorship"—are often framed as oppositional state systems but are shaped by a more intricate geopolitics that make each integral to the other's function.[30] A configuration identifies subjectivity as the critical avenue for identifying and comprehending this affinity. Subjectivity consolidates postwar, postcolonial anxieties in the Philippines and the United States into cohesive, portable forms. Distinct from calls for and investments in new archives, new histories, or new ways

to consider the transnationality of Filipino America, configuration offers a different way to contend with the ongoing significance of the Filipino to, within, and alongside America. It is less interested in defining what Filipino America is, is not, or should be. Rather, configuration allows the incongruencies and incoherences that shape the Filipino relationship to America to guide other inquiries into state and imperialist power.

This book decenters the usual figures of Filipino American national history not to recuperate new ones but as a way to point to other socialities that often fall by the wayside of Filipino and Filipino American studies as well as studies of dictatorship in the Philippines and to offer other ways to consider the legacies of US-backed authoritarian regimes. It mines old figures for different lessons to explore the ways that colonial epistemologies continue to bear on knowledge production.[31] To unmake a configuration is to interrogate the logic of wholeness—of subjectivity, nation, and culture—and the violence that often underlines it.[32] Unmaking traces the fissures that always constitute the projection of cohesion to reveal what Frantz Fanon has called the "empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been."[33] Unraveling the seams of wholeness exposes other expressions of lifemaking that have always been, knowledges of the world that are suppressed yet continue to make themselves known in some way even if they fail to bind together into recognizable forms.[34] Unmaking seeks neither recovery nor revision; instead, it attempts to inch closer to articulating a Philippine historical experience.[35] I propose that we risk losing Filipino America as an object of recognition or recuperation, or as the center of intellectual work, in order to catalyze other points of political possibility. This is not an attempt to dismiss the concrete ways that diasporic experiences engender important forms of recognition.[36] It only wrestles with the tenacity and dynamism of coloniality to shape our language for ourselves.[37] It is, above all, an effort to envision other ways of thinking alongside and inhabiting the world.

THE FILIPINO QUESTION

The Filipino question has long organized colonial historiography. After its defeat in the war of 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States for $20 million. The war between the US military and Philippine forces that followed this cession resulted in the loss of over 500,000 Filipino lives (nearly a million by some accounts) and the formal declaration of US colonial tutelage over the archipelago. The period of US colonization, officially from

1898 to 1946, saw the development of a US governmental system in the Philippines as well as the rise of public institutions that would outlast the colonial era. In the first decades after the war, Filipino workers migrated to the United States as US colonials, serving as a new laboring body in the United States, particularly in Hawai'i and along the West Coast, that helped to manage agricultural development and industrial expansion and mitigate the ongoing effects of emancipation, immigration, exclusion, and burgeoning labor movements. Filipino workers moved to and from the United States until the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 granted commonwealth status to the Philippines and designated US colonials as new foreign aliens.[38] By the time Domingo and Viernes organized Filipino cannery workers in Seattle in the late 1970s, these laborers had long been navigating what Rick Baldoz has called "transpacific traffic," the movement of people and goods that followed the rise of US overseas empire as well as the expansion of US capitalism alongside empire.[39]

Filipino raciality in the United States has been constituted precisely by the conditions attached to the early decades of Philippine sovereignty. The years that defined the Philippine commonwealth also structured the exclusion of Filipino colonials from the United States. Yet exclusion, in terms of immigration mandates as well as the violent attacks on Filipino migrant workers in the 1920s and 1930s along the US West Coast, operated not as antithetical to the US "benevolence" represented by the granting of commonwealth status and later independence but as an important extension of it.[40] The violent struggles illustrated by the race riots in Exeter and Watsonville, for example, evidenced the dangers of the project of inclusion, however tentative, of colonial subjects into the national body.[41] The categorization of the colonial subject as foreign alien mandated by Tydings-McDuffie made possible the removal of the Filipino from the US ideal of racial homogeneity while maintaining the project of US benevolent empire, what the Insular Cases evidenced as "foreign in a domestic sense."[42]

During World War II, the Philippines operated as the stage for the Pacific Theater, an interimperial war between Japan and the United States for control over Asia and the Pacific. After the Japanese imperial occupation of the Philippines during the war, the Allies' victory returned control of the archipelago to the United States. With the US declaration of Philippine independence in 1946, colonialism took different shape. Washington orchestrated a series of economic and political mandates that severely restricted the reach of Philippine sovereignty. The postwar, postcolonial period saw the repeated failure of US promises to the Philippines: the revocation of benefits

for Filipino veterans who fought for the US military during World War II; the US management of the Philippine economy through the Bell Trade Act (and the subsequent Laurel-Langley Agreement); and the fortification of the US military in the country through the Joint US Military Assistance Group. The Bell Trade Act tied the Philippine economy to US investments, and the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 ensured US military control over the Clark Air Base in Angeles City and the Subic Bay Naval Base in Olongapo. Throughout the 1950s, when the Philippine government, together with the US Central Intelligence Agency, waged a vociferous battle against the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or People's Anti-Japanese Army) resistance, such collaboration further entrenched the nation within the geopolitical program of US imperialist war, while the Filipino people languished under the control of a deepening oligarchy.

To argue that US politics has compromised Philippine independence is to restate a well-known fact. What is important to emphasize is that Philippine leaders' struggle to define national sovereignty against such realities produced an array of political projects that attempted to resolve these contradictions. While President Ramon Magsaysay distinguished himself as "America's boy," Carlos Garcia advanced a Filipino First stance. He implemented an isolationist policy that mediated continuous US efforts to saturate the Philippines with US imperial programs, what he described as "a new Asia policy for the Philippines."[43] US neocolonialism also compelled Filipino intellectuals to expound on the effects of postcoloniality on the Filipino condition. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, statesman Carlos Romulo ruminated on the Philippines' global position to express the possibility of renewed affiliations between the Philippines and the Third World. While, as Augusto Espiritu has written, Romulo was a staunch anticommunist and clear Washington ally, his articulation of Afro-Asian affiliation at the meeting defied any easy subservience to the Philippines' former colonizer. He supported the conference delegates and their decolonial aspirations.[44] The conference challenged Romulo to distinguish a Philippine sovereignty that, while in tension with its alliance with the United States, was accountable to the decolonization struggles of nonaligned nations.[45]

Certainly, by 1955, the United Nations and its financial arms became extensions of Western hegemony, especially their deployment of an integrationist paradigm that espoused widescale international cooperation.[46] It was in the spirit of this liberal internationalism that the US military sanctioned the continued occupation of nations in the Pacific, Asia, Latin America, and Africa as part of a broader effort to protect the "free world" against

the threat of communism. US military offensives continued throughout the Mariana Islands, Samoa, and the Marshall Islands. The Korean War and the Vietnam War violently bifurcated Norths from Souths in an effort to maintain the US stronghold over Asia. In the decades that followed these wars, the rehabilitation of Asia through the continued reconstruction of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and other countries channeled multinational investment into these nations in ways that kept them tethered to the ebbs and flows of global capitalism. Neoliberalism as a practice of deregulation and privatization throughout the 1970s and onward functioned precisely through these ongoing alliances between the US and other Western governments and the national administrations of decolonizing nations. The inherent contradiction of a free world organized by these systems of structural adjustment is what Aihwa Ong has termed "neoliberalism as exception."[47] Such political arrangements heralded the emergence of a new world order, yet they also rearranged past forms of coloniality into new frameworks of modernity.

While Filipino migration to the United States continued to be restricted in the first decades following independence, the 1950s and 1960s saw the institutionalization of the Exchange Visitor Program, which facilitated the mass migration of Filipino nurses and other professionals to the United States. Catherine Ceniza Choy has written extensively about the "multidirectional and interdependent" nature of such migration, noting that the program shared similarities with earlier US colonial education programs that dominated the early half of the twentieth century in the Philippines.[48] I note it here to pivot away from the notion that Filipino migration to the United States unabatedly continued since the early years of US colonization and, rather, to emphasize the extent to which shifting US-Philippine relations in the postwar period shaped distinct racial formations. Both the unfair treatment (lower wages and difficult work hours compared to their white counterparts) that Filipina nurses experienced in the United States and the remittances they sent back to the Philippines showcase the ways that Filipinas' position in the United States during the period articulated both the tentative racial pluralism of the early US Cold War and the burgeoning dependency of the Philippines on Filipino labor migrants generally and gendered labor specifically.[49] These formations reflected the myriad anxieties about the scope of US overseas empire as well as the shape of Philippine sovereignty. While this racial position drew from the longer legacy of Filipino migration during the colonial period, it also pinpoints a subjectivity that emerged from a nascent postwar, postindependence politics.

Writing in 1959, Renato Constantino admonished ineffectual "Filipino-American" leadership (by which he referred to Filipino leaders beholden to the United States), asking, "Is it any wonder that having regained our independence we have forgotten how to defend it?" Demanding a distinctly nationalist education, Constantino insisted that "the new demands for economic emancipation and the assertion of our political sovereignty leave our educators no other choice but to re-examine their philosophy, their values, and their general approach to the making of the Filipino."[50] I am drawn to Constantino's invocation of the Filipino in 1959, over a decade after independence, as a *question* about the shape of subjectivity in relation to the ongoing nature of coloniality.[51] Within Constantino's essay, it is "the making of the Filipino" that provides an entryway for exploring both this continuity as it seeped through the crevices of national culture and the "philosophy," "values," and "general approach" that constitute this culture. Relatedly, Nick Joaquin, in 1988, proclaimed that "the identity of a Filipino today is of a person asking what is his identity."[52] Joaquin treats "Filipino identity," like Constantino, as a quandary unto itself. The problem of Filipino identity has long organized concerns about authenticity and progress: What belongs to the Filipino, and what belongs to the foreigner? What must the Filipino keep, and what must the Filipino throw aside? For Joaquin, subjectivity—framed here as identity—offers a medium for charting a genealogy of nationalism rather than upholding the certainty of the nation itself.[53] Denise Cruz has noted, however, that the politics of Philippine nationalism in the postwar era took shape precisely through the mediation of women's bodies and lives. This "male cultural nationalism" cohered through shifting ideas about a woman's role within the nation.[54] The Filipino question is an epistemological one whose positing and answer have often occluded the ways that masculinized conceptualizations of the nation as well as the gendered labor of "women's work" undergird every invocation of Filipino identity. Insofar as the Filipino evokes a persistent query, attempts to answer it also reflect the expanding contours of state and colonial power as they are embodied through changing forms of racialized and gendered subjectivity.

Several studies have explored the "Filipino" as a social category that emerged during the era of Spanish colonization to differentiate Spanish officials and *indios* from mixed-race mestizos. Early US census records in the Philippines illustrate the means by which colonial tutelage homogenized native difference to produce "a people."[55] The overdetermination of Filipinos as a distinct creolized *race* drove the colonial discourses of modernity. In his theorization of "race as praxis," John D. Blanco contends

that "race attempts to lay claim to a knowledge or science of *history*. It not only attempts an account of human difference, but it does so in and through a narrative whose function it was to inform the prudence of colonial practices—decrees, policies, and their enforcement or disregard."[56] The utility of Blanco's discussion here is its theorization of race not as the fact of difference but, rather, as a struggle between colonial knowledge production of which race is a part and the myriad challenges to that order. The question of the Filipino is, above all, an inquiry into race as the representation of coloniality. If, indeed, the problem of race in the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century reflected the transformation of colonial policy into an articulation of human difference, the period of independence traces the transformation of that question into a language of postcolonial sovereignty.

This is to argue that the postcolonial does not mark colonialism's end but signifies the distinct expression of modernity enabled by the *declaration* of colonialism's end. Ferdinand Marcos and his administration recuperated the Filipino question as a vehicle for organizing an authoritarian politics that attended to the crises of the period—governmental corruption, civil insurgency, communist infiltration, and the Vietnam War, for instance. For Marcos, elected to the Philippine presidency in 1965, the proclamation of the postcolonial advanced new discourses of state governance emboldened by the language of modernity.[57] Through his political rhetoric of national progress, Marcos emplaced the Filipino within the prescriptions for global capitalist integration mediated by the integrationist paradigms of postwar international financial institutions. The regime's modernization program, for instance, materialized as urban renewal projects, the advancement of public health programs, and the celebration of national culture, often guided by UN mandates and US aid. Marcos consolidated the tensions that had long defined decolonial theorizations of Filipino subjectivity into a pronouncement of national identity that declared the realization of a true sovereignty shaped by the international politics of the Cold War. I define authoritarianism in this way as a system of governance—or "art of government"—that consolidates decolonial and anticolonial discourses and resistances into an evocation of national sovereignty that presents the state as the guarantor of postcolonial self-fulfillment and sanctions extrajudicial power as the means of defining and protecting the project of self-determination.[58] It was not simply that Marcos was a US-backed dictator; the shifting logics of US hegemony, rooted in a politics of counterinsurgency and neoliberalism, shaped his articulation of a new nationalism whose consequences would reverberate well after his deposal.

In his 1969 State of the Nation address delivered four years after his election to the presidency, Marcos introduced New Filipinism—later, the New Society—as a program for national modernization. New Filipinism produced a postcolonial discourse that concerned itself with rectifying national injury by supplanting colonial institutions and ideologies with new edifices (figurative and literal) that promoted economic and political self-sufficiency.[59] While the New Society materialized as a set of policies and reforms, Marcos's proclamation of a new nationalism often relied on a historicism that claimed the maturation of the colonial object into a political agent that might finally claim the telos of sovereignty. The New Society announced the arrival of the Philippines to modernity, where the Philippines inhabited a world stage of independent nations and participated in its program of global exchange and goodwill. This was a declaration riddled with paradoxes. Adopting the language of decolonial struggle and Third World affiliation, Marcos identified Filipino subjectivity as a profound site of crisis. In his speech, he described "Juan Tamad" as the archetypal figure of Filipino degeneracy that signified the languid state of the Filipino in the world. Attuned to the sweeping force of decolonial movements around the globe, which condemned racial subjection as an operation of colonial domination, Marcos positioned the rectification of the racial subject as a critical focus of political reform, deploying raciality as an avenue for symbolizing the national predicament that Marcos declared himself as uniquely fit to address. Raciality here is not only an "account of human difference" but a vehicle for managing difference through the distinct expressions of and programs for global exchange. Imploring the Filipino people to wage battle against this image by practicing Filipino ingenuity, he promoted modernization projects that would remedy Filipino abjection. For Marcos, the solution to the crisis of Filipino subjectivity was social welfare, infrastructural reform, and rural development; but these projects failed to improve the lives—indeed, they worsened the life conditions—of a vast majority of Filipino people.

By 1972, Marcos declared martial law. He consolidated the branches of governance into his executive power, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, censored the press, and tortured and disappeared his political critics. More than a point of political and historical exception, martial law is a palimpsest, a symptom of and response to the colonial century. In his justification of martial law, Marcos warned the Filipino people that radical insurgents threatened to destroy the nation. He framed martial law as an instrument for containing a growing movement organized by the communist left. In his justification of martial law, Marcos proclaimed that he was waging a

"revolution from the center," a people's rebellion that would save the nation from external threats—even as that "revolution" kept that very people under political arrest. In this way, Marcos's declaration of martial law was also an attempt to delineate "the people" from enemies of the state. The former was no given: martial law effectively defined Filipino subjectivity against the nation's others, a general category that required state force to materialize this abstraction into detail, a materialization that simultaneously elevated and disciplined the country's most marginalized populations.[60] To illustrate, Melisa S. L. Casumbal-Salazar notes that "Philippine indigenous subjectivity is aporetic to the extent that it is predicated on simultaneous, contradictory claims—to territoriality and non-territoriality, singularity and commonality, and both resistance to and inclusion within the time-space of the nation."[61] The state's identification of indigeneity veers between an articulation of its heterogeneity and its singularity, at once proclaiming the cohesion of the nation and using national law to dispossess Indigenous people. For Marcos, Filipino subjectivity garnered specificity through the shifting signification of the racial other, often Indigenous, often Muslim. Set against Indigenous, Muslim, and other peoples excised from the nation, Marcos's enactment of race reconstituted the Filipino as the postcolonial subject of modernity.

THE RACIAL COLD WAR

In response to the defeat of fascism and totalitarianism at the end of World War II, the United States renewed its commitment to civil liberties, pluralism, and free-market capitalism. The adherence to these commitments also defined inclusion into an international body. The 1942 Declaration of the United Nations proclaimed that the "complete victory over [UN] enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world."[62] Emerging as a response to these "savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world," this international philosophy provided the ideological backing to support the formation of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, and other institutions of international governance led by the United States and its allies. As these organizations structured the terms

of nationhood and economic stability for decolonizing governments, the discourse of life and liberty that had previously underpinned the mandates of colonial administrations now outlined the terms of global integration. Liberalism transformed colonial power into international governance.[63] In his theorization of "Asia as method," Kuan-Hsing Chen argues that "the cold war mediated old colonialism and new imperialism."[64] Indeed, the Cold War not only facilitated the transformation of coloniality into twentieth-century globalization but also saw the construction of programs whose operation rendered these processes invisible.

International institutions, through which the United States and western Europe monopolize the terms of global integration, disperse the terms of coloniality through the law. This law often underpins state violence as the justifiable means to an end. The law is not an end divorced from violence but a process that unfolds through it insofar as, Walter Benjamin writes, "lawmaking is power making and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence."[65] Where these liberal declarations denounced tyranny, these institutions rewarded nationalist governments that aligned themselves with international mandates even as they defied the doctrine of life and liberty that liberalism denounced. US pronouncements against totalitarianism as the originary violence of the post–World War II era made room for the formation of authoritarianism in the decolonizing world.[66] The rise of authoritarian regimes at the end of the war did not necessarily contradict the aims of Western liberalism; they often emerged in tandem with its principles. By the time Marcos declared martial law in 1972, authoritarianism had already become a key feature of US-backed regimes in Asia. US support of the Marcos regime, like its defense of the Park Chung Hee administration in South Korea and the military occupation of Taiwan, illustrates the degree to which authoritarianism and extrajudicial violence served as modalities for liberalism's function. The rise of the United States as the leader of the postwar free world required the legitimization of necessary violence throughout Asia in an effort to contain leftist insurrection and communist encroachment.

Authoritarianism operates as a postcolonial state of exception that betrays the central paradox of liberalism's operation, the contradiction to its promise of life and liberty. As a state of exception, authoritarianism is, as Giorgio Agamben writes, "not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law's threshold or limit concept."[67] While US state reports often reprimanded Philippine authoritarianism in the later years of Marcos's presidency as the obverse of

freedom, it also sanctioned it as both a necessary force in the curtailment of communism and a reminder of the exceptionality of American democracy. The actuality of authoritarianism also demonstrated the US urgency to extend this freedom elsewhere.

Alongside the advent of the New Society in the Philippines, Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society platform in the 1960s promised an unprecedented era of US progressivism. Resistance movements in the United States, particularly Black and Third World social movements, articulated important connections between Indigenous, Black, and brown struggles for liberation and decolonization movements throughout the world. This political work to materialize a human rights apart from state articulations of citizenship was, at times, incommensurable with US civil rights law that aimed to preserve the sanctity of US institutions. Yet the declaration of the "great" extracted the language of unprecedented struggle into a paradigm of liberal progress. In his study of Black social movements that followed World War II, Cedric Robinson noted that the class war that followed the political struggles of the 1960s "reconfigured anticommunism into a race discourse on the rule of law."[68] The intimidation, surveillance, and policing of leftist activists rearranged anti-Black policies into US Cold War counterinsurgency programs in ways that further dispossessed the Black working class yet also generated the conditions for new social movements. Civil rights reforms emerged from the international politics that constituted the US Cold War.[69] Jodi Melamed attends to the ways that the US government used the racial crises of the 1960s and 1970s to construct a transnational politics that maintained its geopolitical dominance.[70] Progressive racial policies were couched in the discourses of Cold War anticommunism and mitigated political tension within the United States while intensifying militarized imperialism outside it.

Johnson's invocation of greatness signified the US defeat of fascism, the challenge to global injustice, and the emergence of the United States as the rightful leader of the free world. At the same time, this pronouncement of greatness relegated US colonialism to empire's past even as the United States as empire of the present continued its imperial and neocolonial occupations. The discourse of equality for colonial subjects has often organized the terms of political struggle in ways that tether social movements to the investments of empire.[71] Throughout the book, I analyze US liberalism as the political philosophy and practice of extending individual recognitions and rights and expanding the scope of free movement and trade to curtail collective calls for self-determination. Liberalism brushes up alongside authoritarianism in its attempts to govern the terms of political

agency. It also guides an American exceptionalism that espouses an aggressive anticommunism that legitimizes militarization and occupation. Within these articulations of authoritarianism and liberalism, configurations become ways to disperse the urgencies of racial crises within the parameters of state recognition.

In 1965, Johnson signed into law the Hart-Celler Act (or the Immigration and Nationality Act), eliminating nationality as a prerequisite for immigration to the United States by ending the US national quota system. As others have already noted, the act did not intend to radically alter the demographic makeup of the United States, only to stand in as a model of liberal, anticommunist reform during a Cold War in which superpowers jockeyed for Third World favor. It did, however unintentionally, offer a pathway for people, especially those from Asia and Latin America, to enter the United States. The act importantly increased the size of the Filipino diaspora in the United States, shaping the contours of Filipino America into a recognizable political body.[72] No longer restricted by the provisional and exclusionary mandates of earlier US immigration law, the post-1965 Filipino migrant to the United States gained access to an unprecedented legal pathway to US citizenship. Much scholarship that addresses post-1965 Filipino diasporic formations in the United States does well to acknowledge that both a legacy of Filipino movement between the colony and the metropole and the social conditions under martial law in the Philippines spurred migration from the Philippines to the United States in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. But apprehending the Filipino diaspora in the United States in this way establishes the language of US legal reform as the primary discourse with which to articulate its emergence. This conceptualization of the post-1965 Filipino immigrant allows US legislation to imagine this figure into being notwithstanding other politics and subjectivities established and foreclosed in its formation.

In 1974 (on May Day, no less), the Marcos administration instituted the Labor Code of the Philippines. The code formally legalized policies to govern labor within the country but also effectively defined labor export, for the first time, as a critical component of the Philippine political economy. One of its objectives was "to insure careful selection of Filipino workers for overseas employment in order to protect the good name of the Philippines abroad."[73] While the code aimed to protect Filipino contract workers from "exploitation" and "discrimination" in their countries of employment, it also required the remittance of "foreign exchange earnings" back to the Philippines. Whereas the Hart-Celler Act pronounced the momentous subsumption of

national difference into the exceptional American nation, the labor code identified this difference as a key to Philippine aspirations. The code's address of exploitation and discrimination aimed to protect migrants from what it perceived to be the effects of national difference while it rendered their labor distinctly consumable and expandable. Taken together as Cold War policies, both the labor code and the immigration act organized the distinct recognition of the Filipino as a facet of a Cold War globality that empowered the former colonial subject only to the extent that such policies also ensured the continuity of migration and labor extraction.[74] That the Hart-Celler Act determined the bounds of Filipino America at the same time that the site of Filipino labor was made boundless reveals the ways that national reform capitalized on racial difference in the service of transnational cooperation.[75] The emancipatory project of citizenship is the site on which state power reorganizes the terms of belonging alongside the movement of labor and the circulation of capital. Lisa Lowe notes that "immigration law reproduces a racially segmented and stratified labor force for capital's needs, inasmuch as such legal disenfranchisements or restricted enfranchisements seek to resolve such inequalities by deferring them in the promise of equality on the political terrain of representation through citizenship."[76] This transnational management of racial difference, especially through the inclusion and protection of that difference, negated the unresolved tension of Filipino raciality by saturating it within the juridical framework of international integration.

Earlier attempts to contextualize the epistemological formations of Filipino America point to the ongoing legacies of colonialism in shaping the bounds of Filipino America. Yet an interrogation of the terms of Filipino America, I insist, requires a study of the precise ways that the Cold War fashioned *new* discourses of race to shape the Philippine-US relation. In his discussion of the contentiousness of Filipino American subjectivity, Oscar Campomanes explains that "this unique burden on US Filipino politics of emergence and recognition is at its heaviest, and the Filipino American difficulty in pursuing this politics at its most vexed, at the precise moments when US Filipino nominative or identity formations are structured by such irreconcilable Philippine-US nationalist antagonisms and nativistic narrations."[77] Campomanes directs attention to the timeliness of a "U.S. Filipino politics of emergence and recognition" that actually constitutes the shifting politics of US-Philippine neocolonialism. This notion of Filipino America interrogates identity as it embodies an ongoing struggle between the aims of the Philippine state and those of US geopolitical programs.

Moreover, in his study of the genocidal logics of the Filipino American condition, Dylan Rodriguez writes that "post-1965 Filipino Americanism is, from its moment of articulation, a material discourse and self-consciously popular cultural formation that intends a communion of desires, historical identifications, and political allegiances."[78] Rodriguez succinctly draws attention to Filipino American civil recognition as having emerged from an ongoing US colonial and genocidal war. Such a theorization points to the limitations of a Filipino American politics of recognition.

While Campomanes and Rodriguez offer lucid interrogations of Filipino America as an effect of coloniality, I contend that Filipino America is a distinct predicament of *post*coloniality. The configuration as the subject of modernity (and no longer the object of coloniality) gained motility and currency across geographies, nations, and governments in ways that served the aims of collaborative regimes and economic markets. In addition to its function as a mode of "self-comprehension" produced from "an extended monologue of radicalizations," Filipino America emerged within a politics of international integration and global capitalism that managed the modernization of the Third World.[79] Postwar, postcolonial state collaborations between the Philippines and the United States often used the law to invest in and make legible new social formations that set the terms by which Filipino America cohered as a form of civil recognition. Where Filipino America has often come to name a consequence of colonial intrusion, the articulation of the Philippine-US relation as a postcolonial state of exception makes visible the necessity of the Filipino to America. Where the coherence of Filipino America as a category of racial difference or of cultural belonging obscures the space between Filipino and America in exchange for its recognition, authoritarianism points to that space as liberalism's threshold, the gap that must be closed in order to guarantee empire's extension and maturation.

Few studies position Filipino America or the Philippines as critical sites of engagement for an exploration of Cold War politics.[80] While the Philippines was instrumental for US military operations during the war in Vietnam, it bypassed the proxy wars that characterized the devastating US assaults in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.[81] If critical scholarship seeks to uncover the events and sites that are obfuscated by the persistence of US Cold War historical narratives, how too might such studies reinforce the need to recover the truth of the conflicts in ways that delimit other possibilities for its interrogation? The elision of the Philippines from this body of scholarship reflects some of the problems associated with the apprehension of the conflict and period. In addition to the state and international pol-

icies that constituted the US Cold War, the intellectualism that emerged from the period also established epistemologies for comprehending its politics. The rise and institutionalization of area studies, for instance, drew from an orientalist objectification of the colonial other to legitimize academic expertise that transformed the discourses of colonialism into a rhetoric of containment and integration.[82] These studies of Asia and the Pacific theorized these regions as distinct, contained, and unlinked to histories of colonialism, imperialism, and empire. This regionalism marginalizes the Philippines to the local rather than underlining it as a central site of engagement. It refuses the political connections between the Philippines and the rest of Asia during the Cold War, delinking its importance to the formation of Cold War ideologies. Similarly, while the study of Filipino America often assumes the United States as the privileged site of analysis, such an assumption relegates both Filipino and America as static objects and sites rather than as provocations to interrogate the other formations that emerge in their invocation and the rigidity of their political and intellectual borders. Instead, reconsidering Filipino America as an inquiry into the "layering, erasures, and reinscriptions of histories, spaces, and cultures," as Martin Manalansan and Augusto Espiritu encourage, challenges the determinisms of Cold War knowledge production.[83]

Dominant conceptualizations of the Cold War as a battle between "the two imperial hegemons" obscure the magnitude of "struggles to obtain or vanquish racial domination."[84] Upending a Manichean conceptualization of the Cold War as a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, I name the racial cold war, following Yoneyama's lowercase designation, not as a historical period but as a multistate governmentality in which authoritarianism and its paradigms of order, sovereignty, development, and modernization align with republicanism and its operations for progressivism, reform, and militarism to resolve and organize the colonial problem of raciality, where raciality also operates through gender and sexuality.[85] The racial cold war shifts the focus of study from the exceptionality of the historical period to interrogate the complex production of Cold War subjects as configurations that outlast the period.[86] In doing so, it presents an alternative analytic for contending with coloniality in the Philippines that notes the ways that the progression of international politics after World War II comes to bear on the earlier Filipino quandary.

The racial cold war highlights a set of transpacific politics to study the ways that proclamations of newness reorganized historical coalitions into different political arrangements that could operate within the shifting

landscapes of the postcolonial epoch. The racial cold war necessitates transpacific critique to challenge the disciplinary boundaries that emerged as the product of Cold War knowledge production or, as Jodi Kim has written, to point to the Cold War as "a structure of feeling, a knowledge project, and a hermeneutics for interpreting developments in the 'post–Cold War conjuncture.'"[87] Rather than revise US Cold War history to include a consideration of the Philippines (that is, to have the US Cold War bear on the Philippines), this study conceives of national and postcolonial politics as integral to each other's unfolding.

THE CULTURE OF COLD WAR MARTIAL LAW

Through the racial cold war, state programs assembled configurations that advanced modernization and globalization and quelled resistive claims against the state. As the state and its laws construct these forms of representation, it is less interested in people's self-determination than it is in the consolidation of political power, the suppression of dissent, the accumulation of land and capital, and the monopolization of the terms of justice. A configuration captures the historical nuance of colonial subjectivity by pinpointing who, what, and why governments invested in the transformation of subjectivity during distinct periods. A configuration allows one to trace the means by which racial difference surfaces as a subjectivity that claims ownership over that difference to access promises of recognition, representation, and capital. Most importantly, it makes visible the dialectical relationship that constitutes any formation of subjectivity to challenge the overdeterminations that suffocate the expression of historical experience.

Culture is a site of struggle not only between dominant and subordinated articulations of experience but also against the idea of culture as the mere symbolic expression of racialized difference.[88] Throughout this book, culture is both a mode of expression for state power (as in "national culture") and the emergent forms of lifemaking that are obfuscated by or exceed that power.[89] This is what Raymond Williams has described as a "whole actual life, that we cannot know in advance, that we can know only in part even while it is being lived."[90] Each chapter situates official state records with and against cultural texts to explore a culture of cold war martial law. These texts tackle martial law and dictatorship yet often fall outside a conventional archive of martial law insofar as they treat dictatorship not as a singular event but as a set of historical, political, social, and cultural

studies, as facets of broader concerns about memory, labor, and subjectivity. Expanding the time and place of dictatorship and the Cold War beyond the frame of 1947 to 1989 and outside only the Philippines and the United States, the texts consider other sites for locating and contending with Filipino America. They reveal the ways that Filipino American subjectivity finds fruition and coherence not only within the borders of the United States but also, and especially, in the spaces of migration and movement in ways that often refuse the impulse of diasporic conclusion or homeland return. Their conceptualization of time and space, power and resistance, and remembering and forgetting illuminate other subjectivities, affiliations, and relations. This body of literature reflects a continuous tension between the construction of wholeness and the ongoing work to refuse it.

These texts illustrate the complexity of postcolonial configurations. Each chapter explores the formation of a particular configuration and then charts a path for unmaking it. The first chapter interrogates "national culture" as it named state fictions that consolidated postwar memories of US colonial and imperial wars into discourses of Cold War national identity. Lowe has noted of US national culture that "where the state is unable to accommodate differences, it has fallen to the terrain of national culture to do so."[91] Both Marcos's and Johnson's separate but linked conceptualizations of national culture declared the end of colonial time in order to narrate progressive national histories that justified civil rights programs as well as new nationalisms. In this way, national culture offers a mode for tracing the transpacific geopolitics that organized the Philippine-US alliance as well as the diasporic Filipino subjectivities promised by these renditions of culture. In the second half of the chapter, I read Eric Gamalinda's 1990 novel *Empire of Memory* to highlight the importance of Gamalinda's notion of "memory as anti-history." Memory as anti-history theorizes national culture as a site of reckoning and disrupts the linear temporality of national historiographies that are instrumental for solidifying hegemonic notions of subjectivity.[92]

In the second chapter, US immigration reform and Philippine state investments in migrant remittances produce the *balikbayan* or Filipino return migrant to the Philippines as an emblem of national and historical progress as well as transpacific state collaboration. Much scholarship on the balikbayan focuses on the sociological development of the balikbayan and the early formations of the Philippine remittance economy. This chapter reconsiders the balikbayan as a distinct Cold War formation that inheres not only through the regime's development policies but also through the liberalization of US immigration reform. Analyzing Philippine-US transportation policies,

the nationalization of Philippine Airlines, and the Marcos regime's urban development programs, my analysis focuses on the ways that the racialized and gendered constitution of the balikbayan set the terms for the displacement and dispossession of Manila's poorest communities. I also consider features from the Marcos-era publication *Balikbayan Magazine* to envisage the balikbayan as a distinct historical agent that materializes the logics of Cold War modernity.

Tracing the rise of the New Filipina as a discourse that emerged from the Marcos regime's investment in women's empowerment as well as international mandates for women's rights, the third chapter considers the avenues through which the state recognition of Filipina women as new political agents facilitated the extraction of women's labor and the feminization of the national economy. It argues that the Marcos regime's distinction of the New Filipina as connected to yet distinct from earlier ideas of women's roles in the Philippines aligned with international declarations for women's rights that characterized the postwar neoliberal mandate imposed on decolonizing nations. The chapter studies Lino Brocka's 1976 film *Insiang* to analyze the filmmaker's social realism as a technique for visualizing and apprehending the gendered violence of the authoritarian state. Brocka's strategies for showcasing the universal delineated the distinct and repressive forms of gendered violence under the Marcos regime.

The fourth chapter argues that the Marcos regime's articulation of Filipino raciality functioned, in part, by translating the tenets of international humanitarianism into a model of Filipino subjectivity that could be transformed into global reproductive labor. The gendered work of the Filipino humanitarian at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center functioned to rehabilitate the refugee. The chapter discusses the ways that Filipino humanitarianism drew from Marcos's own conceptions of the human and humanism as well as from US colonial understandings of the efficacy of Filipino service work. Focusing on English teacher Ruby Ibañez's letter published in a journal of refugee instruction, I analyze the ways that the refugee processing center extracted the labor of the Filipino teacher in the service of refugee rehabilitation. But I also trace the ways that Ibañez unmakes the configuration of her subjectivity by charting affiliations between the Filipino teacher and the refugee student that confound the paradigms of global humanitarianism.

Returning, in the conclusion, to memorialization and the work of memory, I point to a politics of reckoning to reconsider the legacies of dictatorship in the present. Filipino American cultural production continues to turn to the martial law era as a site for contending with ideas of becoming and being.[93]

Vince Gotera's poem "Three Sonnetinas" and R. Zamora Linmark's poem "What Some Are Saying about the Body" direct attention to subjectification as a mechanism for consolidating energies, stories, and lives into forms of political recognition that adhere to colonial conceptions of humanity and state mandates of citizenship. Importantly, they also invigorate the crevices of subjectivity as sites of potential.[94]

A configuration must be unmade to reveal its making. It must be undone from, as Benjamin writes, "the utopia that has left its trace in a thousand configurations of life."[95] Unmaking helps identify the processes, procedures, and systems that transform difference and experience into juridical frameworks that iron the tensions and complexities of that difference by consolidating them into cohesive forms under the law. Unmaking offers a modality for historicizing and interrogating social formations and for imagining other subjectivities that are not tied to the prescriptions of empowerment, emancipation, and liberation defined by modernity. Unmaking assumes not cohesion but disorder in ways that uncover the labor and energies that constitute solidity, directing attention to the inherent instability of each arrangement. In revealing the ways that configurations uphold and confound the operations of authoritarianism and liberalism, unmaking turns to other forms of life and living that refuse the promise of historical agency. Unmaking searches for a language to describe the ways that people create other lifeworlds—the sites, spaces, and places that are not always recognizable within the framework of the dominant or the historical but that are essential to living.[96] While they are often born of power and violence, these lifeworlds also make legible resistances that might otherwise remain undetectable if all we ever search for is the "transparent I."[97] This insistence on interrogating the politics of Filipino America is not an attempt to denounce the kind of solidarities and kinships it enables but, rather, a struggle to forge other critiques and imaginations.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION. UNMAKING CONFIGURATIONS

1 See the "Bantayog ng mga Bayani" informational website at https://bantayog.org/about/. Lisandro E. Claudio has written about the tensions that constitute the memorial ("Memories of the Anti-Marcos Movement").

2 Chew, *Remembering Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes*, 53.

3 Bantayog, "About"

4 Bantayog, "About."

5 "Never again" has become a rallying cry against the historical revisionism that has sought to redefine the legacy of the dictatorship as the Marcos family regains political power in the Philippines. In her study of millennial activism against martial law in the Philippines, Joy Sales notes that "'Never again, never again, never again to martial law!' and 'Stop, stop, stop the killings. End martial law!'—encapsulated how Filipinos around the world refuse the repeating of history, while acknowledging how Duterte's administration is not merely a copycat of Marcos" ("#NeverAgainToMartialLaw").

6 Bantayog, "About."

7 I draw from Walter Benjamin, who noted that "the past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to [as] redemption" ("Theses on the Philosophy of History," 254).

8 Wendy Brown writes, "Institutionalized, freedom arrayed against a particular image of unfreedom sustains that image, which dominates political life with its specter long after it has been vanquished and preempts appreciation of new dangers to freedom posed by institutions designed to hold the past in check. Yet the very institutions that are erected to vanquish the historical threat also recuperate it as a form of political anxiety; so, for example, functions the 'state

of nature' or the 'arbitrary sovereign' in the liberal political imagination" (*States of Injury*, 8).

9 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 262.

10 See Churchill, *Triumph over Marcos*; and Chew, *Remembering Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes.*

11 Domingo, "Building a Movement."

12 Antonio Tiongson has described the term "Filipino American" as a "troubled and uneven coupling" that must be positioned "within a much broader historical context, in imperial and global terms that take into account the imbrication of U.S. national formation and its imperial history" (Tiongson, Gutierrez, and Gutierrez, *Positively No Filipinos Allowed*, 4–5). Perhaps similarly, Jessica Hagedorn's novel *Dogeaters* is, beyond a rumination on martial law, an interrogation of the uneasiness of Filipino American subjectivity. Her characterization of Freddie, Dolores, and Rio Gonzaga, in particular, is telling. Freddie "believes in dual citizenships, dual passports, as many allegiances to as many countries as possible at any given time . . . a 'guest' in his own country" (7). Dolores "carries American papers because of her father, feels more viscerally connected to the Philippines than he ever could. She used to argue with him. . . . 'You are definitely a Filipino! A mestizo, yes—but definitely a Filipino'" (8).

13 To date, FANHS holds a Pinoy Archive in Seattle, boasts more than thirty chapters around the United States, and holds yearly national conferences dedicated to the cultural and historical representation of Filipino America.

14 Cordova, *Filipinos*, xiii.

15 In *Racial Formation in the United States,* Michael Omi and Howard Winant note, "We should think of race as an element of social structure rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion. Such a perspective informs what we mean by racial formation" (112).

16 US multiculturalism refers to a specific post-1965 discourse of racial pluralism that heralded the end of racial strife in exchange for the rhetoric of individualism that gained traction throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Also see Iyko Day's *Alien Capital.*

17 In the introduction to the formative anthology *Positively No Filipinos Allowed*, Tiongson writes that the anthology aims "to signify the ways Filipinos endure the burdens and legacies of empire past and present, which cannot be understood simply in terms of exclusion but more in terms of the coerced incorporation of Filipinos into the nation, underwritten by the violence of conquest, empire building, white supremacy, and global capital" (Tiongson, Gutierrez, and Gutierrez, *Positively No Filipinos Allowed*, 1).

18 The October celebration of Filipino American History Month is another example. Robyn Rodriguez explains that "October was designated 'Filipino American History Month' by its originator, the Filipino American National Historical Society (FANHS), not only because it is the birth month of Filipino American labor leader,

Larry Itliong (Itliong was born on October 25th), but because October 18, 1587[,] marks the first known landing of Filipinos on the shores of (what is now) the continental United States at Morro Bay, California. . . . This narrative along with the fact that groups like FANHS worked to ensure the marking of the site with a commemorative plaque and struggled for the recognition of Filipino American History Month more broadly are but a few examples of the kinds of investments Filipino Americans have in staking a claim to Americanness and belonging in America" (*Filipino American Transnational Activism*, 1).

19 N. V. M. Gonzalez and Oscar Campomanes ("Filipino American Literature") and Robyn Rodriguez ("Toward a Critical Filipino Studies Approach to Philippine Migration") have each addressed the ways that the "three waves" approach to the historicization of Filipino immigration to the United States presents problems for conceptualizing the dynamism of Filipino American history.

20 Cordova, *Filipinos*, 228.

21 Some have noted that the organizational tensions between FANHS and KDP during the 1970s and 1980s illuminates disagreements about the shape and scope of Filipino American political work. For more about the intersecting histories between FANHS and the KDP, see Augusto Espiritu, "Journeys of Discovery and Difference"; Dorothy Fujita-Rony, "Illuminating Militarized Rupture"; Schulze-Oechtering and Jopanda, "Transpacific Freedom Dreams"; and L. Joyce Zapanta Mariano, *Giving Back*. See also Ligaya Domingo's critique of FANHS as unable to contend with the transnational politics of anti–martial law activism ("Building a Movement," 66–69). Recent studies of martial law have shed new light on the details of the Marcos dictatorship and have complicated the history of anti–martial law activism.

22 When using the term "racial capitalism," I draw specifically from Cedric Robinson's work. Robinson wrote: "The development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term 'racial capitalism' to refer to this development and to the subsequent structure as a historical agency" (*Black Marxism*, 2).

23 In her formative work on subjectless critique, Kandice Chuh has written that questions about identity are always questions about memory and forgetting, an amnesiac struggle in which forgetting strives toward a racial sameness. Chuh explains that subjectless critique addresses the cohesion or "achievement" of Asian American subjectivity as a project of US nationalism. In its attention to the "irremedial complexity of 'Filipino America,'" Chuh's analysis contends with subjectivity as it wrestles with the necessity of political representation and the limitations of representation to address the myriad forms of power and violence that constitute such formations (*Imagine Otherwise*). Laura Kang has written about the enfiguration of "Asian American women" as both a "historiographical dilemma" and shorthand "for the ways that 'Asian,' 'American,' and 'Asian

American' come to bear on the gendered ontology of 'women'" (*Compositional Subjects*).

24 Chuh, *Imagine Otherwise*, 44, 33–35.

25 Chuh, *Imagine Otherwise*, 32.

26 Lisa Yoneyama theorizes that "what matters is not how much we know about the past but rather through what structural access, and under what personal, social, and historical conditions, we come to an awareness of it" ("For Transformative Knowledge and the Postnationalist Public Spheres," 331).

27 For more on the citizen-subject as national agent, see Lowe, *Immigrant Acts*.

28 Neferti Tadiar offers a useful discussion of the ways that the categorization of the "people" excises "the exploitative classes from the term [and] arrives at the category of 'the masses,' which in its positive form is articulated as the political unity forged against imperialism and feudalism." Moreover, in her theorization of "life-times" as living labor, Tadiar warns of the dangers of subscribing to forms of political emancipation that replicate the logics of capital and disregard or foreclose other forms of lifemaking ("Life-Times of Becoming Human," 7).

29 Chuh, *Imagine Otherwise*, 56.

30 Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 316.

31 Stuart Hall wrote of Raymond Williams: "He sees both the dangers of reconstructing a spuriously unified cultural identity and a falsely continuous national history when the real history is one of ruptures and discontinuities—'industrial conflict within rapid economic development and agrarian conflict within impoverishment, depopulation, and marginalization'—and even the resistance to cultural colonization was itself a deeply differentiated response, governed as much by what it was responding to as what it was in itself" ("Culture, Community, Nation," 359).

32 Here I take up Wendy Brown's provocations in *States of Injury* about the left's abandonment of freedom as a statist political project. One of the things that Brown accomplishes is a deep consideration of the ways that discourses of empowerment are intricately intertwined with state power (23–24).

33 Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 148.

34 Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 121–27.

35 Neferti Tadiar describes the Philippine historical experience as "both the imaginary, affective, sociosubjective activity that impels and shapes prevailing notions of production in a sociohistorical formation and the hermeneutic perspective that recognizes alternative agencies in the making of history, which such activity affords" (*Things Fall Away*, 15).

36 This is Angela Davis's directive to organize identity around politics and not politics around identity ("Interview with Lisa Lowe," 318).

37 See Antonio Gramsci's notion of "social formation" (via Ferreira da Silva's *Toward a Global Idea of Race*, xxv). While Paul Gilroy's theorization of a "politics of transfiguration" is imperative for conceptualizing the "hidden internal fissures in the concept of modernity" (*Black Atlantic*, 38), I point to configurations, too, as a formation invested with the aspirations of state governmentalities.

38 Poblete, *Islanders in the Empire*.

39 Baldoz, *Third Asiatic Invasion*.

40 In her discussion of the Commonwealth period and the complexity of the postcolonial marker to describe the period, Amanda Solomon argues that the "moment is ironic in that . . . this time of seemingly official separation is actually when the Philippines and U.S. are tied even closer to each other through economic, martial and cultural policies." Further, Solomon notes that "there is no progress from colonial to post-colonial; rather, the islands seem to permanently inhabit a space and time of deferred decolonization, never arriving at any 'post-colonial' telos" ("Managing the [Post]colonial," 10).

41 In his analysis of Juan C. Laya's *His Native Soil*, Paul Nadal writes that Laya's realism presents a "depiction of a colony in transition tasked to incorporate its racially disenfranchised populations in the United States, and this in view of its future-oriented imagining of Philippine modernity" ("Literary Remittance"). See also Estella Habal's discussion of anti-Filipino riots, in which she contends that "racial violence in Watsonville embodied a clear social statement by the local white community—the unassimilability of the Filipino" ("Radical Violence in the Fields").

42 See, *Decolonized Eye*.

43 Garcia, "One Hundred Years of the Ateneo de Manila."

44 Augusto Espiritu, "'To Carry Water on Both Shoulders,'" 179.

45 Augusto Espiritu's study of Carlos Romulo and the Bandung Conference is an illuminating historical look into Romulo's ambivalent expressions of anticolonialism and sovereignty. Espiritu writes that Romulo "created a space for a discourse of both friendship (however unequal) *and* criticism, and of a shared anti-communist, free-market ideology *and* a principled disagreement on the questions of nationalism, racism, and colonialism. This is a synthesis critical to understanding the post–Bandung Conference history of various modes of transcending the East-West conflict, such as the idea of a Third World, as well as that of NAM [Non-aligned Movement], for indeed Romulo and others had helped to formulate a kind of third way that transcended the binaries of American imperial capitalism and Soviet communist support for revolution" ("'To Carry Water on Both Shoulders,'" 186–87).

46 Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*.

47 See Tadiar, *Fantasy Production*; and Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*.

48 Choy, "From Exchange Visitor to Permanent Resident," 160–61.

49 Choy, "From Exchange Visitor to Permanent Resident," 165–67.

50 Renato Constantino and Letizia Constantino, "The Miseducation of the Filipino."

51 Tadiar has rightfully noted that Constantino's conceptualization of the crisis of Philippine culture treats "true culture" as a static form that could be otherwise realized if it were not for its oppression by US colonialism. She writes, "To the anti-imperialist nationalists, Philippine culture was suffocating under the weight of Western powers, duped by colonial mentality, weakened through brain drain,

alienated and divided from itself, all to the economic and political detriment of the people. In Renato Constantino's version of this narrative, a version widely held in the wake of national political independence 'granted' by the United States in 1946, true Philippine culture was itself oppressed, prevented from coming into authentic, unalienated, and empowered being" (*Things Fall Away*, 27).

52 Joaquin, *Culture and History*.

53 Diaz, "'We Were War Surplus, Too.'"

54 Cruz, *Transpacific Femininities*, 18.

55 Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History*, 32.

56 Blanco, "Race as Praxis in the Philippines at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," 361.

57 There is, according to Tadiar, an "effective historical role that the very trope of modernity has played in creating the conditions it designates," and Ferdinand Marcos's knowingness of such trope "stir[red] the desires for modern development and . . . undergird[ed] the transnational model of modernization, which the technocratic architects of the regime attempted to follow" (*Things Fall Away*, 153).

58 Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality as an "art of government" is instructive here: "The art of government must therefore fix its rules and rationalize its way of doing things by taking as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be. What government has to do must be identified with what the state should be. Governmental *ratio* is what will enable a given state to arrive at its maximum being in a considered, reasoned, and calculated way. What is it to govern? To govern according to the principle of *raison d'état* is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, and so that it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it" (*Birth of Biopolitics*, 4).

59 See Ferdinand Marcos's *New Filipinism* as well as Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joon Yoo's discussion of injured masculinity (*Trans-Pacific Imagination*).

60 Ferdinand Marcos, *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines*.

61 Casumbal-Salazar, "Indeterminacy of the Philippine Indigenous Subject," 79.

62 "Declaration of the United Nations."

63 Reddy, "Globality and the Ends of the Nation-Form."

64 Chen, *Asia as Method*, 8.

65 Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 295.

66 Arendt explains, "Political consequences such as postwar pacifism, for example, derived from the general fear of war, not from the experiences in war. Instead of producing a pacifism devoid of reality, the insight into the structure of modern wars, guided and mobilized by fear, might have led to the realization that the only standard for a necessary war is the fight against conditions under which people no longer wish to live—and our experiences with the tormenting hell of the totalitarian camps have enlightened us only too well about the possibility of such conditions. Thus the fear of concentration camps and the resulting insight into the nature of total domination might serve to invalidate all obsolete political differentiations from right to left and to introduce beside and above them the

politically most important yardstick for judging events in our time, namely: whether they serve totalitarian domination or not" (*Origins of Totalitarianism*, 442).

67 Agamben, *State of Exception*, 4.

68 Robinson, *Black Movements in America*, 124.

69 Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*.

70 Melamed, "Spirit of Neoliberalism."

71 Ching, *Becoming "Japanese,"* 53.

72 The three-waves approach to the study of Filipino immigration to the United States has shaped the epistemological and discursive boundaries of Filipino America as a social formation.

73 Labor Code of the Philippines, Art. 12, g.

74 In 1977, Marcos bestowed on Cesar Chavez the Presidential Appreciation Award for his work to "improve the lot of Filipino migrant workers in California" (*Washington Post*, "Cesar Chavez Hails Philippines' Rule"). See Fujita-Rony, "Coalitions, Race, and Labor"; and San Juan, "Philip Vera Cruz."

75 Denise Ferreira da Silva contends that "the racial subaltern is always already inscribed as a historical subject who finally comes into representation as a *transparent 'I'* when articulating an emancipatory project" (*Toward a Global Idea of Race*, xxiv).

76 Lowe, "International within the National," 32.

77 Campomanes, "Figures of the Unassimilable," 46.

78 Dylan Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse*, 33.

79 Dylan Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse*, 26.

80 In her discussion of the absence of "Asia's necrohistories" from US and Canadian studies of the Cold War, Lisa Yoneyama contends that "the areas that appeared as postcolonies in the aftermath of Japan's defeat have been perceived for the most part as unproductive sites for anthropologically theorizing 'violence in war and peace'" (*Cold War Ruins*, 23).

81 Yến Lê Espiritu, *Body Counts*.

82 David Price has investigated the alignment of postwar anthropology with the expansion of US empire. He argues that "many who took part in transforming the postwar world did so while continuing to use the previous war as an ideological reference point. Most anthropologists working on occupations or aid programs conceived of their role as that of a stabilizer or liberator, not an active agent of a new American empire" and that "anthropology has long been ambivalent about how to cope with the political processes in which it is enveloped" (*Cold War Anthropology*, 51).

83 Manalansan and Espiritu, *Filipino Studies*, 9.

84 Robinson, *Black Movements in America*, 134.

85 Lisa Yoneyama theorizes that the lowercase "cold war" designation points to "an alternative to the Cold War geography, which emerged out of transwar, interimperial, and transnational entanglements" and enlivens "a conjunctive cultural critique of the transpacific in order to elucidate the still-present Cold War frame of knowledge" (*Cold War Ruins*, x).

86 See also Denise Cruz, *Transpacific Femininities*; Chen, *Asia as Method*; and Lin, "Resignifying 'Asia' in the Transnational Turn of Asian/American Studies."

87 Kim, *Ends of Empire*, 3.

88 See Stuart Hall's theory of popular culture ("Notes on Deconstructing the Popular") as well as Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd's discussion of culture in *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital*.

89 Challenging limited readings of Filipino writing, Oscar Campomanes insists on a reconceptualization of "Filipino (American)" cultural production that gravitates toward the Filipino imagination: "Are we actually confronted with unrecognizably different or alternative kinds of imagination and nationality in Filipino literatures and predicaments? . . . It is precisely their perceivable intermixtures of alternations *between* Filipino (American) texts and conditions that demand more critical attention than they have received. If Filipinos seemed to have failed in the 'epic' effort to forge a nation, and their intellectuals have only 'lyrically' bewailed this miserable 'failure,' is it possible that this prevalent judgment can only be the result of the critic's own failure of 'discriminating' imagination, and a function of residually (neo)colonial reading regimes?" (Gonzalez and Campomanes, "Filipino American Literature," 84).

90 Raymond Williams, "Culture Is Ordinary," 96.

91 Lowe, "International within the National," 38–39.

92 Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 88–89.

93 Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," 225.

94 Here I am drawn to Sylvia Wynter's conceptualization of the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, especially "the logical inference that one cannot 'unsettle' the 'coloniality of power' without a redescription of the human outside the terms of our present descriptive statement of the human, Man, and its overrepresentation" ("Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom," 268). Denise Ferreira da Silva's theorization of being not as interiority but as constituted by modern fields of representation is also instructive. Ferreira da Silva writes that the transparency thesis is "the ontoepistemological account that institutes 'being and meaning' as effects of interiority and temporality. What this reading provides is the delineation of an other ontoepistemological context, globality, in which being and meaning emerge as an effect of exteriority and spatiality, a mode of representing human difference as an effect of scientific signification. By showing how the *transparent 'I,'* which the representation of the subject historicity presupposes and (re)produces, emerges always already in a contention with others that both institute and threaten its ontological prerogative, my reading displaces the transparency thesis to refashion the modern subject as *Homo modernus*, the global-historical being produced with tools yielded by both fields of modern representation, namely, history and science" (emphasis in original, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*, 4). I am also informed by Dipesh Chakrabarty's distinction between "being" and "becoming" as ways to conceptualize History 2 not as the "dialectical Other of the necessary logic of History 1" and its historical drive to

articulate the ends of capital; rather, "History 2 is better thought of as a category charged with the function of constantly interrupting the totalizing thrusts of History 1" (*Provincializing Europe*, 66).

95 Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, 5.

96 "Lifeworlds" refers to the phenomenological concept of experience of the world, as outlined by Edmund Husserl and theorized by Jürgen Habermas. My usage of it here, however, draws from postcolonial and feminist scholars. Neferti Tadiar's concept of life-times, moreover, is "a concept for reckoning with the diverse array of acts, capacities, associations, aspirations in practice, and sensibilities that people engage in and draw upon in the effort to make and remake social life in situations of life-threatening hardship, deprivation, and precariousness" ("Life-Times of Becoming Human," 1).

97 Denise Ferreira da Silva has written, "From an analytical position that engages modern representation as a political-symbolic context composed by strategies of engulfment, I show how the spelling of the proper name of man, the writing of the transparent I, is also an effect of raciality. For I choose engulfment" (*Toward a Global Idea of Race*, 33).

CHAPTER ONE. THE FICTIONS OF NATIONAL CULTURE

1 Curtis, "First Lady Adds to Glitter; Musicians' Strike Is Settled."

2 In addition to the grand plan of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, the brainchild of Robert Moses and John D. Rockefeller, the opera house was a part of the broader project of cultural rejuvenation, as some explain, a showcase of American cultural excellence during a period of Soviet propaganda and threat. As a case in point, the overdetermined celebration of American arts and culture depended precisely on the dislocation of mostly poor, working-class, immigrant, and minority communities in the Upper West Side, as Moses described, the elimination of the city's slums. It is important to recall that that Johnson's war on poverty served, in many ways, as a function of liberal governance that could not often account for this kind of "slum clearance." See Foulkes, "Other West Side Story."

3 Naima Prevots (*Dance for Export*) has detailed the ways that the US State Department sponsored the travel of African American dancers abroad to evidence to international audiences the weight that the country assigned to African American cultural production even as Black life was characterized by aggressive assaults of exclusion by that very state. Christina Klein (*Cold War Orientalism*) has theorized the ways that the sentimentality of US cultural production about Asia instilled within US audiences ideas about global economic cooperation and military containment. Likewise, scholars of the Philippines have interrogated the role of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to Marcos's justification of authoritarianism. Gerard Lico's (*Edifice Complex*) analysis of Marcosian architecture, for instance,