THE BOLIVIA READER

HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS

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Seemin Qayum, and Mark Goodale, editors

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Cover art: Locals on motorbike riding past mural, Tarata, Cochabamba Department, Bolivia. The mural was commissioned by the Comité Pro-Tarata, a group in Virginia. Photo © 2016 James Brunker, Magical Andes Photography.

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To the memory of Olivia Harris, Ruth Volgger, and Martha Cajías

To Isaiah, Dara, and Romana

A la vida

We need to walk in the present with the past before our eyes and the future behind our back.

[Qhip nayr uñtasis sarnaqapxañani.]

[Hay que caminar por el presente mirando el pasado por delante (con los ojos, nayra) y con el futuro atrás (a la espalda, qhipa).]

—Aymara saying popularized by Andean Oral History Workshop (THOA); translated by Sinclair Thomson

The project of the future is made from pieces of the past.

[El proyecto del porvenir está hecho con los pedazos del pasado.]

—René Zavaleta Mercado, "Reflexiones sobre abril," *El Diario*, 11 April 1971, reproduced in René Zavaleta Mercado, *Obra completa I*, edited by Mauricio Souza Crespo; translated by Sinclair Thomson

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Acknowledgments

This book has been long in the making. Perhaps the slow motion was unavoidable for such a broad survey of Bolivian history, territory, economy, politics, and culture, spanning from the mythic dawn of time into the early twenty-first century. In any case, it would not have come into being without the generosity and responsiveness of many Bolivian and Bolivianist colleagues, and it reflects collective knowledge and debate that has accumulated over decades. Though it would be impossible to enumerate all the direct contributions as well as the subtle influences from our colleagues, the volume definitely represents the harvest of a collective labor. We are grateful to the writers, scholars, journalists, artists, photographers, activists, archivists, and publishers, or their family members who have kindly provided material. We would like to acknowledge those who went out of their way to lend a hand or who had sustaining roles in the project. The following list reflects only a sliver of the larger set of friends and *compañeros de ruta* with whom we shared the delights and travails of the work as it unfolded over so many years.

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Introduction

The land we call "Bolivia" today has long elicited contrasting visions of history, territory, society, and the future. Despite the steady rhythms of everyday life, public affairs frequently reveal oscillating moods and clashing perspectives, notes of fatalism and triumphalism, even apocalyptic and utopian expectations. In the 2010s, the Bolivian government stirred sharp national debate by announcing plans to build a highway in the Amazonian lowlands of Cochabamba and the Beni. The highway would slice through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) and, in the view of many indigenous communities as well as environmental scientists and conservationists, the project would bring grave harm to local livelihoods and damage rich but fragile ecosystems. Local indigenous leaders warned: "To open this highway presents a threat to the peoples inhabiting the TIPNIS, because of the loss of natural resources and all the biodiversity that supports the culture and life of the Moxeños, Yuracarés, and Chimanes, who have lived in our territory since before the creation of the country."[1] Still, the government's promises of development and modernization appealed to peasant coca growers on the agricultural frontier, lumber and ranching elites in the lowlands, hydrocarbon firms with an eye on subsoil resources, as well as South American development planners seeking easier transport from the Amazon to the Pacific Ocean. President Evo Morales Ayma—Bolivia's first head of state to claim indigenous ancestry—objected to protests against the project, arguing that infrastructural development will lift indigenous communities out of poverty. President Morales exclaimed: "I don't understand how the brothers and sisters can oppose the integration of Bolivia."[2]

Polarized views are most strikingly on display during Bolivia's recurrent periods of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary struggle. In October 2003, a dramatic indigenous and popular insurrection in Bolivia toppled the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. A wealthy mineowner and leader of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) who was applauded by the U.S. government and international financial institutions for his neoliberal policies, Sánchez de Lozada warned in a bitter op-ed piece published in the *Washington Post* after his downfall: "Bolivia could become the Afghanistan of the Andes, a failed state that exports drugs and disorder." Two years later, Evo Morales drew international attention when he was elected president by

an overwhelming majority of the population. In December 2005, Morales declared, "Beginning tomorrow, beginning next year, the new Bolivian history gets underway."[3] At his inaugural address in January 2006, he expanded on what he meant, looking back to Spanish conquest and subsequent centuries of colonialism: "From 500 years of resistance, to the take-over of power for 500 years . . . , [with] Indians, workers, all sectors bringing an end to injustice, bringing an end to inequality."[4]

In a prior revolutionary moment, when the reactionary president Mamerto Urriolagoitia turned power over to a military junta in 1951 in order to prevent his opponents from governing after they won the national election, he claimed it was to "save Bolivia from the danger of falling under the yoke of Nazi-fascism now in league with communism to break the democratic tradition."[5] When Urriolagoitia's opponents, the MNR, seized power through a popular insurrection the following year, the trade-union leader Juan Lechín saw the moment as a redemption of past indigenous glory: "Today the people have taken command of their own destiny, and have given America a lesson for all time demonstrating that the unconquerable spirit of the heroic race that six centuries ago extended its civilization to the furthest reaches of the eastern lowlands lives on in the ranges of the altiplano."[6]

A generation earlier, writing on the eve of the disastrous Chaco War with Paraguay (1932–35), the Bolivian writer Franz Tamayo expressed his own ambivalent sense of Bolivia as both an abject society and a heroic one. He captured this duality in his reference to "our paradoxical and stupendous state today: an undeniably great territory and great race, and yet also an unending history of misery, impotence, and despair."[7]

More than rhetorical excess, such expressions suggest an underlying "structure of feeling," in the phrase of the British cultural critic Raymond Williams, that is marked by tension and polarity. The clashing views arise out of deep class, ethnic, and geographical divisions, as well as recurrent periods of crisis and transformation in the country. One of the foremost aims of *The Bolivia Reader* is to help understand these tensions of outlook, experience, and expression, as well as their sources.

In international perspective, Bolivia has usually been overshadowed by its South American neighbors Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. (Its other neighbor, Paraguay, remains no less obscure.) But for those foreigners who have trained an eye on the country, or actually visited it, Bolivia incites strong responses. In the early seventeenth century, Spain's great silver mines at Potosí were the envy of all Europe. Don Quixote put them on a par with the treasures of Venice, though the riches of both, he averred, were insufficient to requite the noble services of Sancho Panza. In the mid-twentieth century, the Peruvian writer José María Arguedas admired the vista of the highland capital of La Paz, a broad basin of earthen tones opening up before the imposing Mt. Illimani (over 21,000 ft., or 6,438 m), as "perhaps the most beautiful

and impressive spectacle that modern American man can offer in the New World."[8] On the other hand, foreigners have dismissed Bolivia as a quintessentially backwards place. According to one account, apocryphal yet widely repeated, when Queen Victoria learned of an insult to her diplomat in La Paz, she pronounced, "Bolivia doesn't exist," using a chalk x to cross out the country on a map.[9] Bolivia is also frequently imagined as a remote badlands or backlands, a place where outlaws and revolutionaries go to meet their deaths. In the popular Hollywood film, the eponymous characters Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid announce, "Wherever the hell Bolivia is, that's where we're off to." Even more iconic is Ernesto "Che" Guevara's martyrdom at the hands of the CIA-assisted Bolivian Army after his visionary yet failed guerrilla campaign of 1967. The photograph of his bullet-riddled body lying on display in Vallegrande, a small colonial-era Bolivian town, became a virtually sacred image of one of Latin America's most influential revolutionaries.

There has long been a perverse fascination with the exotic Bolivia. Guidebooks invite the world's adventure travelers to gaze at Bolivia's poverty, geographical oddities, and cultural otherness. A visit to the cooperative mines at Potosí is described as a descent into Hell. The high plateau in southwestern Bolivia is "unearthly" and "a blinding white expanse of the greatest nothing imaginable." Although "rumor has it that a road more terrifying . . . exists somewhere in Zanskar or Bhutan," the route from La Paz to the Yungas is labeled the most dangerous in the world.[10] The Bolivian Amazon is "the lost world" (an association that began with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's 1912 novel of that name). These superficial depictions may tell us more about the preoccupations of foreign observers than anything else, but they have served both to draw people to Bolivia and to keep them away.

Bolivians themselves have also expressed acute ambivalence about their country. Beginning in the colonial period, authorities and elites cast the Amazonian lowlands as a static and remote periphery, as well as the great hope for future prosperity and development. Where many travelers and writers have found the Andean highlands a melancholy landscape inhabited by sullen natives, others perceived in it a telluric power of nature that infused vitality into the ancestral population. The student of Aymara civilization Antonio Villamil de Rada even surmised that the splendid highland valley of Sorata must have been the actual location of biblical Eden. After the civil war of 1899, the sociologist Alcides Arguedas diagnosed Bolivia as a *pueblo enfermo* (sick society), while liberal intellectuals anticipated an imminent capitalist modernity and Indian leaders conceived of the possibilities of national "regeneration." Where Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada imagined a failed state, Evo Morales announced Bolivia was leading the way toward a "new era" for Latin America's peoples. Other indigenous intellectuals envisioned a momentous *pachakuti*, an upheaval and transformation of Andean time-space, in the first years of the twenty-first century.

The country appears to some Bolivians as a fragmented jumble of ethnic and regional pieces that fail to fit together as a national ensemble. The Bolivian political theorist René Zavaleta Mercado described the society as a set of heterogeneous and ultimately incoherent elements which he termed *lo abigarrado*, meaning a clashing combination of colors or disorderly pile of things. But Andean cultural metaphors can point the way to a more positive reading of Bolivia's internal differences. Ancient Andeans, for example, learned to harness a wide array of resources from the different ecological zones of a challenging geography, so as to sustain large populations and sophisticated civilizations. In indigenous textile aesthetics, differing elements are patterned and woven together into an aesthetically appealing fabric. In the traditional ritual combat known as the *tinku*, both the conflicting and complementary aspects of the indigenous life-world are brought together in a moment of spectacular cultural performance. Just as the point at which two tributaries join to form a river is also called a "tinku," here two halves of a community, or *ayllu*, come together on the field of battle to shed fertilizing blood and express their essential interconnection. Through such ecological, aesthetic, and ritual metaphors, it is possible to reimagine indigenous and nonindigenous forces or highland and lowland spaces as coexisting in complementary and productive tension.

In the context of Latin America, Bolivia stands out for its large indigenous population, its regional fragmentation, its economic underdevelopment, and the weakness of the state. In these respects, Bolivia is either singular or a prime example of phenomena found elsewhere in the region. Each of these issues is subject to misrepresentation or cliché. The foremost stereotypes reduce Bolivia to a land of primitive (or pristine) Indian tradition unchanged since the time of the conquest; a land of inhospitable mountain climes; a land of economic backwardness and malfeasance; a land of political instability. This book seeks to dispel such clouds of stereotype while illuminating these issues more fully.

From before the arrival of Spaniards in the 1530s down to our own time, the southern Andean highlands have been one of the most densely populated indigenous regions anywhere in the Americas. Republican elites saw this as a brake on modernization, and anticipated the decline of the indigenous population with national development and integration. The 1900 census confidently asserted,

> It is necessary to state that for a long time a noteworthy phenomenon has been underway in Bolivia: the slow and gradual disappearance of the indigenous race. . . . In little time, following the progressive laws of statistics, the indigenous race will be if not completely erased from the scene of life, at least reduced to a minimal expression. The reader will appreciate that this may be to the good, considering that if there

> has been a retarding cause in our civilization, it is due to the indigenous race, essentially refractory to any innovation or to any progress, given that it has refused and refused tenaciously to accept any customs that have not been transmitted by tradition from its remote ancestors.[11]

Over the course of the twentieth century, a range of conditions seemed to fulfill the prophecy: the stigma attached to being "Indian," the rise of class-based political movements with their emphasis on a new "peasant" (campesino) identity, state efforts to promote homogeneous citizenship, urbanization, the deepening of market relations. Yet a hundred years after the 1900 census, social scientists were astounded to find that 62 percent of the population identified itself as Aymara, Quechua, Guaraní, or from another indigenous group. This proportion made Bolivia—ahead of Guatemala and Peru—the most indigenous country in the Americas.[12] The racial prophecy had not come to pass.

Despite the myth that Indians are resistant to innovation—"invincible misoneists" in the words of the Bolivian ethnologist and eventual president of the republic Bautista Saavedra (1921–25)—indigenous peoples have been adapting to historical change over centuries. In so doing, they have continually transformed themselves, their communities, and the rest of society. Indigenous peoples in the region have seen empires—Tiwanaku, Inka, Spanish—come and go, and learned to negotiate state pacts that guaranteed substantial autonomy for local communities and ethnic federations. They learned to absorb the new religious impositions of their conquerors—the solar cult of Cuzco as well as Christianity—in order to accommodate multiple and powerful sacred forces. Indigenous peoples have seen market systems arise—first in land and other fixed commodities, then in labor—and learned to engage in them so as to sustain themselves.

After independence from Spain in 1825, an elite minority of creoles, people born in Bolivia but of mainly European ancestry, controlled the levers of political, economic, and cultural power, while the indigenous majority remained in its subordinate position. Elites rationalized this order with new scientistic theories that reconstituted colonial racial assumptions about Indian inferiority. In the first part of the twentieth century, some creole and mestizo (mixed-race) artists, writers, and social scientists generated a movement known as *indigenismo*, which adopted a more sympathetic outlook toward Indians—whom they saw as the downtrodden descendants of once great civilizations—and sought to integrate them within the nation. By midcentury, nationalists also voiced the optimistic view that Bolivia's indigenous and European inheritances had joined together to overcome past antagonisms and create a common mestizo cultural identity. As in neighboring Peru and Mexico, these currents of *indigenismo* and mestizo nationalism were generally paternalistic and homogenizing projects to usher the nation into the modern world.

During the heyday of class-based politics in the mid- to late twentieth century, indigenous and peasant communities usually mobilized as rural auxiliaries within the national trade-union movement. In that period, mineworkers stood at the vanguard of the Bolivian Workers Central (COB), one of the most powerful trade-unions in Latin America. In the late twentieth century, indigenous intellectuals and political leaders developed new *indianista* and *katarista* movements—the latter named after the colonial-era indigenous rebel Tupaj Katari—that criticized what they saw as profound structures of internal colonialism in Bolivian society and called for new forms of political representation. At the start of the twenty-first century, ethnic politics assumed a central role in the national arena. Indigenous forces based in the countryside but also in the city took the initiative in powerful popular and nationalist movements such as that which overthrew Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR and brought Morales of the Movement to Socialism (MAS) to power.

Regional fragmentation is a critical feature of other countries as well; however, Bolivia's exceptional topography and regionalist political antagonism do make it stand out in the Latin American context. Bolivia is not only an Andean country, as it is often portrayed. But as in other Andean countries, the spinal column of Bolivian territory is its spectacular cordillera ranges and a high plateau—or altiplano—that since the earliest phases of human settlement has been the main seat of political power in the area. This is the setting for the contemporary departments of La Paz, Oruro, and much of Potosí. Offsetting this highland Andean space, the vast lowland Amazon basin has been the site of limited colonization in the departments of Beni and Pando. Santa Cruz too was long a frontier area, yet it has seen impressive population and economic growth since the mid-twentieth century. Mediating between highlands and lowlands is a zone of fertile and ecologically diverse intermontane valleys, known by the Aymara and Quechua loanword *yungas*. Cochabamba has been a breadbasket for the highlands since the time of Inka colonization in the fifteenth century, as well as a nexus for interregional circulation. The temperate valleys of Potosí and Chuquisaca have also always been closely bound up with the Andean axis. Tarija spans out from similar valley terrain into the southeastern plains of the Chaco, bordering on Paraguay, and to the Andean district of northern Argentina. Bolivia's coastal swath on the Pacific was annexed by Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879–82), making it and Paraguay the only landlocked countries in Latin America today. The highly uneven mountain and valley terrain along with the large swaths of scantily settled lowland territory have posed great obstacles to national and economic integration until the present.

These conditions have also shaped the increasingly sharp regionalist identities and political tensions in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. If the ethnic or racial split between Indians and *q'aras* (an Aymara term commonly applied to non-Indians) has led some observers to speak of "two Boliv-



Map of Bolivia.

ias," this phrase has also been used to describe the regionalist divide between highlanders and lowlanders. In this quasi-racial folk classification, Collas (taken from the Inka term for people living in Qollasuyu, the southern Andean quadrant of Inka state territory) and Cambas (originally a term for lowland Indians and mestizo peasants that was recast to refer to all people born in the Santa Cruz region) are seen as distinct peoples. As Santa Cruz came to rival La Paz, its residents voiced increasing criticism of state centralization, and regional elites even threatened secession. After the recent discovery of major reserves of natural gas in the area, the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando formed a bloc known as the Media Luna (because of the area's crescent-moon shape on the map), which pushed successfully for greater decentralization of power and regional autonomy. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, fierce regionalist battles over economic resources and development policy raised the prospect of civil war.

In the twentieth century, Bolivia ranked among the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere, its discouraging economic indicators for income, standard of living, health, and education rivaling those of Haiti. Despite the familiar image of poverty, the bitter irony is that Bolivia has always possessed abundant reserves of natural resources highly valued in international markets. The Rich Mountain at Potosí was once the Spanish Crown's greatest treasure, and at the height of the silver fever, the city burgeoned into one of the most populous and thriving in the world. During World War II, Bolivian tin provided 49 percent of world supply, and the mining magnate Simon Patiño was reputed to be one of the world's wealthiest men. With the collapse of the tin market in the 1980s, Potosí no longer exported anything other than its own impoverished mining and agricultural laborers, who migrated to the cities and lowlands of Bolivia or abroad in search of low-wage jobs. Potosí ended up the poorest region in the poorest country on the continent. This riches-to-rags story is a prime example of what dependency theorists saw as the "development of underdevelopment," an effect of the colonial and neocolonial integration of peripheral regions into expanding global markets since the sixteenth century. In *Open Veins of Latin America* (1971), Eduardo Galeano wrote, "Condemned to nostalgia, tortured by poverty and cold, Potosí remains an open wound in the colonial system in America: a still audible 'J'accuse.'"[13]

After 1952, when the first social revolution in postwar Latin America brought the MNR to power, Bolivia experimented with state capitalism to maintain sovereign control over natural resources and foment national economic development. This period brought a reduction in social inequality and, even at the height of corrupt military rule, significant state revenues, yet no structural solution to poverty. In 1985, at a time of rampant inflation and plunging prices for tin, the MNR reversed course dramatically. Bolivia was one of the first countries in which a civilian government applied an orthodox model of shock treatment, and thereafter sought to end state management and open the country to direct foreign investment through economic restructuring. After the initial success with monetary stabilization, this internationally touted neoliberal experiment failed to deliver on promises of economic reactivation and employment. With inequality and disenchantment growing, the "Water War" in Cochabamba in 2000, a revolt against the privatization of the local water supply, and the "Gas War" centered in El Alto in 2003, an uprising against multinational control of the country's natural gas reserves, opened a new phase in Bolivian history. These insurgent movements after 2000 put Bolivia at the forefront of popular efforts around Latin America to move away from the reigning neoliberal economic model.

After 2003, there were more positive economic signs. The growth rate ticked upward, due especially to high international commodity prices, while poverty and inequality rates declined, thanks to redistributive policies under

the MAS government. Nonetheless, some observers questioned the sustainability of this progress, given that the country had gone through numerous boom-and-bust cycles historically and remained dependent on global commodity markets. Analysts and civil society groups also drew attention to the social and environmental costs of the extractive industry driving the boom and to entrenched levels of poverty and income disparities that could only be overcome through structural change, including shifts in the model of economic accumulation, environmental and fiscal policy, and the property regime.

Perhaps no foreign stereotype is harder to shake than the idea of Bolivia's chronic political instability. Converting all changes of government, whether constitutional or not, into "coups," the CIA World Factbook erroneously asserted, "Bolivia, named after independence fighter Simón Bolívar, broke away from Spanish rule in 1825; much of its subsequent history has consisted of a series of nearly 200 coups and countercoups."[14] Yet state institutions have been weak arguably since the colonial period and certainly throughout the republican era. Mariano Melgarejo (1864–71) symbolizes the long line of *caudillos bárbaros* (barbarous strongmen) and de facto authoritarian rulers since the nineteenth century. According to legend, the capricious tyrant Melgarejo even named his horse a general and then obliged the foreign diplomatic corps to pay honors to the newly inducted military authority. Nonetheless, the state has at times enjoyed widespread legitimacy, most notably in the revolutionary period after 1952. The cliché thus affords a measure of truth, although it provides no way to understand the durability of certain pacts between social forces and the state or its stewards, the lasting achievements of the revolution of 1952, or those of the nearly forty years of post-authoritarian civilian government.

A common historical pattern in the Southern Cone countries has been the rise of consolidated "populist" and social-democratic governments in the mid-twentieth century, followed by authoritarian regimes in the latter part of the century, followed by democratization processes and civilian governments enjoying substantial popular legitimacy by the 1990s. In contrast, in the northern Andes, there were more commonly oligarchic liberal or conservative governments that blocked populist and social-democratic reform projects through the mid-twentieth century, and did not subsequently experience dictatorship, yet which devolved into states with scant popular legitimacy facing serious crisis by the late 1990s. Bolivia is anomalous in that it features both patterns. Like the Southern Cone countries, it experienced a process of national-popular reform (culminating in the 1952 revolution), only to be followed by recurrent authoritarian regimes (from the 1960s to early 1980s) and a return to democracy thereafter. Still, midcentury reform processes were only partially successful, and military rule involved a limited scale of violence, while democratization in the 1980s and 1990s remained relatively for-

mal. Like Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela to the north, the state has enjoyed only superficial legitimacy and ultimately remained vulnerable to social unrest. Bolivia's major political transformation from the neoliberal government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to the left-leaning nationalist government of Evo Morales in the twenty-first century again exposed the weakness of the state. Yet it also revealed how new efforts to negotiate a political community with broad-based legitimacy drew on a potent collective memory of earlier national-popular moments. While the MAS government faced opposition from its inception in 2006, it nonetheless had unexpected durability. In September 2015, Morales broke the record for the longest continuous term in office of any Bolivian leader.

The Bolivia Reader introduces the country to those who are unfamiliar with its history and geography, its politics and culture. At the same time, it seeks to demystify, to challenge stereotypes, to afford a deeper insight into the country's singularity and complexity. For those who wish to extend their knowledge, it indicates paths for further exploration. The purpose is to understand the land called "Bolivia" more on its own terms, with the sharp internal differences that entails. The aim is to hear Bolivian voices, expressed in diverse, sometimes clashing idioms.

The *Reader* takes a historical approach, tracing major processes from Andean antiquity through Inka and Spanish conquest, nearly three centuries of colonial rule, nearly two hundred years of the Bolivian republic, up until our own charged historical present. The book is also organized thematically, with its different parts focusing either on issues of territory and economy or on politics and culture. Parts I and II—on early societies and conquests—look at these issues prior to the arrival of the Spanish. Parts III and IV—on the fortunes and misfortunes of Spanish colonialism—examine these issues from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth. Parts V and VI—on the trials of sovereignty—cover the issues approximately from 1825 to 1920. Parts VII, VIII, and IX—on nationalism and revolution—cover the period from 1920 to 1985. Parts X, XI, and XII—on new visions and new divisions—ranges from 1985 up to our own time.

The volume privileges primary sources, which give readers the opportunity to engage directly with materials produced in the historical period in question. The sources selected include classic works essential for any basic familiarity with Bolivia, as well as unfamiliar items that provide fresh perspectives. Almost all are here available in translation for the first time. The sources employed include myth, popular song, poetry, fiction, theater, photography and visual art, maps, chronicles and travelers' accounts, journalism, testimony and memoir, legal, administrative, and diplomatic documents, political discourse, historiography, ethnography, theology, and social theory.

Indigenous intellectuals in the Andean Oral History Workshop cite the Aymara phrase "Qhip nayr uñtasis sarnaqapxañani" [We need to walk in the present with the past before our eyes and the future behind our back], alluding to the past as a key point of reference as we move into an unknown future.[15] Similarly, the Bolivian political theorist René Zavaleta Mercado once remarked, "The project of the future is made from pieces of the past." He stressed the importance of learning lessons from the revolution of 1952 to see what was to be done in his own time, two decades later. We might imagine those pieces of the past in different ways—say, as the missing parts to an unfinished puzzle or the building blocks for an entirely new construction. Yet Zavaleta seems to have had in mind a more jagged image. He referred to the revolution of 1952 as a "mirror of fire," and hence his pieces (*pedazos*) would be closer to the shards of a shattered mirror.[16] There are numerous examples in *The Bolivia Reader* of historical actors drawing on their notions of the past to frame their actions and future aims. The primary sources in this volume are themselves pieces from the past that we may take up for our own purposes, as fragments in whose reflection we can see ourselves and envision the future behind our backs.

Notes

1. Resolución del XXIX Encuentro Extraordinario de Corregidores del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure Autónomo de los Pueblos Indígenas Moxeño, Yuracaré y Chimán, Comunidad de San Miguelito, 18 May 2010.

2. Mattia Cabitza, "Una carretera aleja a Evo Morales de los indígenas del Tipnis," BBC Mundo, Bolivia, 18 August 2011, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/08/110818_bolivia_tipnis_carretera_cch.shtml.

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