Silicon Valley Imperialism

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&

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Acknowledgments

This book has emerged through over a decade's worth of connections and political commitments in both Romania and the United States, and ultimately it is dedicated to those organizing against Siliconization and racial dispossession in and across both. I can't understate how indebted I am to everyone who I have learned from and with on this journey.

I could have never asked for a more supportive adviser and mentor throughout this book's emergence into its finalized iteration than Neda Atanasoski, whose generosity, brilliance, and ongoing support is woven into each page. Not only has her scholarship on postsocialism, technology, liberalism, and race been an unending source of inspiration, but even now, as I prepare this text's final touches, she has continued to offer steadfast mentorship. From our first meeting as I began graduate school in the Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, to the present, I owe her mountains of gratitude for never having stopped believing in this work. At UCSC, I was also lucky to have worked with Karen Barad, Megan Moodie, and Lisa Rofel, each of whom helped shape this book and my thinking on postsocialism, the Cold War, feminist technoscience, and connectivity, and each of whom has offered important mentorship along the way. I am thankful too for helpful conversations there with Neel Ahuja, Miriam Greenberg, Christine Hong, Jennifer Kelly, Marisol LeBrón, Steven McKay, Nick Mitchell, Jenny Reardon, and Felicity Amaya Schaeffer. I additionally want to thank Alaina Lemon, who was pivotal early on in my theorizing of race and Eastern Europe, and Liviu Chelcea, who enthusiastically joined my committee and helped me think through complex dynamics of housing, privatization, and anticommunism. Ananya Roy's work on property, race, and banishment has been hugely influential for me too, and I am honored to have received mentorship from her for many years now as well.

who are still plugging away at collective work including Ariana Faye Allensworth, Azad Amir-Ghassemi, Bianca Ceralvo, Ciera Dudley, Terra Graziani, Gracie Harris, Nathan Kim, Alexandra Lacey, Sam Rabiyah, Dan Sakaguchi, and Manon Vergerio. I also want to thank those who taught me about the power and histories of tenant organizing there, in anti-eviction meetings, on the streets blocking tech buses, and in books, zines, murals, oral histories, and more.

I am lucky to have been able to workshop this book's chapters with many generous scholars. Chapter 1 in particular benefited from feedback from Kim TallBear and Angela Willey on an earlier but connected paper in *Imaginations: Journal of Cross Cultural Image Studies,* and from guidance from Matthew Hayes and Hila Zaban related to writing in *Urban Studies*. I am also grateful for feedback from participants at the International Workshop on Racial Capitalism conference at the University of Texas at Austin organized by Zachary Levenson. While Neda Atanasoski's expertise informs this entire book, our collaborative writing together on postsocialism has very much informed chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 3 also benefited from collaboration with Mary Taylor in workshopping possibilities of antifascist anthropology. My studies on underground computing cultures, meanwhile, are indebted to ongoing exciting collaborations with Luis Felipe R. Murillo, which alongside conversations with Sareeta Amrute and Héctor Beltrán inspired an earlier version of chapter 5 that appeared in *Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, and Technoscience*. Similarly, chapter 6 benefited from a workshop with Environmental Humanities @ UT thanks to Heather Houser and with the Center for Women's and Gender Studies at UT thanks to Christen Smith. The book's coda, meanwhile, has been grounded in conversations with everyone involved in the Landlord Tech Watch project and Anti-Eviction Lab. Special thanks too to Desiree Fields for inspiring conversations on property and technology over the course of many years now.

At UT, I was lucky to find helpful colleagues in the Department of American Studies including Alex Beasley, Iván Chaar López, Lina Chhun, Cary Cordova, Janet Davis, Lauren Gutterman, Rich Heyman, Steven Hoelscher, Stephanie Kaufman, Randolph Lewis, Stephen Marshall, Julia Michenberg, Karla Peña, and Shirley Thompson, all of whom have supported this work. It was also wonderful to work with so many creative and astute students at UT and to workshop ideas woven throughout this book in classes. Collaboration with Iván Chaar López in creating the Critical Digital Studies Group was especially rich, where Edgar Gómez-Cruz, Amelia Acker, and other remarkable faculty and graduate students have inspired my thinking on digitality. I am also grateful to everyone in the Feminist Geography Collective, especially Caroline Faria, Kaily Heitz, Laurel Mei-Singh, and Pavithra Vasudevan.

Introduction

"Is this what it's really like in Silicon Valley?" my friend asks me, imagining that the recent rebranding of the Romanian city of Cluj as "the Silicon Valley of Eastern Europe" implies a sort of mimicry. Somehow, we've managed to find our way inside what has become an emblem of Cluj's transformation—the tall, jutting tower of NTT Data, which flashes a colossal sign, godlike onto the city's tech horizon. Now that we're inside, feelings of curiosity and clandestineness have overcome us as we study the interior of the building's fake wall plants, human-shaped robots, and large, soft mushroom statues, all appealing to the astrofuturist science fiction aesthetic of outer space travel and speculative futures—though perhaps more that of an Elon Musk imaginary than that of the cosmonautical communist futurism popular during state socialism in Romania, which lasted from 1947 to 1989. NTT Data, a Japanese-based information technology (IT) firm, set up shop in the aftermath of Romania's transition in what are now considered ongoing postsocialist times. While numerous global (and primarily Western) tech corporations rushed in to capitalize on the labor and infrastructural spoils of the 1989 transition, it was later, in 2013, that NTT acquired the Cluj-based EBS software company. Soon after, NTT remodeled the building and employed new aesthetic grammars of *Siliconization*, or the technopolitics and processes caught up in fantasies of becoming Silicon Valley. In the case of NTT, this meant distributing software services replete with "real-time solutions" and "global delivery capabilities" to forty countries, and having a Romanian staff fluent in English. Soon enough, wEBSite Bistro was opened on the building's fourth floor, accessible to guests who have since been able to order food and drinks from electronic tablets on the balcony while surrounded by cranes and the echoing sounds of so-called smart city development. And this

is where my friend and I are sitting, hovering above the threshold of Eastern Europe's supposed new Silicon Valley.

Over the last decade, Romania's tech industry has gained international attention, with the country boasting some of the continent's fastest internet and a growth of start-ups and firms, particularly in Cluj and Bucharest (but also in cities such as Timișoara, Iași, and Brașov). Real estate speculators chase technocapitalist development, particularly proximate to newly constructed and revitalized office buildings. Often, a prerequisite for this entrepreneurial techno-urban remaking is the cleansing of poor and working-class residents, particularly Roma families and people squatting in buildings that otherwise have been neglected by the city for decades. Skyrocketing rents, alongside brutal evictions, manifest racial expulsion to interstitial wastelands squeezed between the urban and rural made a catchment for those rendered disposable by planners, developers, speculators, and the state. Ananya Roy refers to such expulsion processes as forms of "racial banishment" through which subaltern communities are pushed to the far edges of urban life.[1] Earlier today, for instance, my friend and I ran into a couple she knew from down the street who will be displaced later this month. Living on a crumbling lot without running water or utilities, squeezed between the shiny City Casa residential complex and the glistening German iQuest campus, they knew that their time was limited as soon as the cranes came in. "All of the space around here is becoming too valuable," they shrugged on their break from recycling cardboard around the neighborhood.

Racial banishment amid the onslaught of technocapitalism is motored through methods of Siliconization alongside anticommunist processes of property restitution (*restituire*), or the reprivatization of homes that had been nationalized and made public during state socialism's early years. Today, these homes are being returned to the heirs of the presocialist bourgeois under the anticommunist auspices of transitional justice and Westernization. Due to centuries of anti-Roma racism—which included practices such as slavery, forced labor, eugenic technoscience, and mandated assimilation—few Roma owned property prior to socialism. Socialist property nationalization altered this landscape, providing public housing opportunities that many people have since lived in for generations now. Such provisions are being eviscerated today through the anticommunist mandates of reprivatization, which render state socialism a dark and deadened stain to be cleansed by embracing the logics of private property. This means rendering socialist projects such as housing nationalization retrograde. It also means championing evictions as a means of cleansing the socialist past and restituting capitalism, now recoded as smart

city urbanization. In Veda Popovici's words, the neoliberal consensus of anti-communism following the Cold War "has been signified as a 'return to Europe,' a correction towards the so-called *natural* way of being part of the Western world."[2] Smart city ideals are thus espoused by local administrations eager to distance themselves from the backward past and catch up to the Western future. Against this backdrop, leftist projects such as housing and racial justice, never mind public or social housing, get interpreted as primitive and are thus ejected from urban futurity. As Enikő Vincze has found, roughly 30 percent of housing became nationalized (and thus social, or public) during socialism, but only 2 percent is now.[3]

In Cluj, smart city making has led to a rise in rents and evictions alongside new racial geographies of dispossession and segregation. Many evictees are Roma, and frequently people end up banished to the local waste site, Pata Rât, situated eighteen kilometers outside the city center. There, four different communities reside, the most recent having arrived in 2010 during a moment of newfound tech development led by the company Nokia. A militarized eviction followed suit, with over three hundred people forcibly expelled from their homes in the middle of a freezing December night. Over a decade later, displaced tenants continue to reside around the dump, crammed into tiny homes circumscribed by toxic waste. This injustice is put into stark relief as a new tech development project, Transilvania Smart City, is being erected next door. George Zamfir argues that while banishing Roma from Cluj's urban center in 2010 was a "prerequisite for Westernization," this new "smart" development will result in "10 thousand new luxury apartments whose residents will benefit from drone delivery and gondolas . . . located less than 500 meters from the homes of evicted Roma."[4] It is this disjuncture marked by technocapitalist fantasy and racial disavowal alike that the dispossessed are forced to rehearse.

The collapsing of racial and communist renunciation here strategically ignores that despite its many failures, state socialism had provided housing, employment, and education for many previously abandoned. This dismissal supports what Liviu Chelcea and Oana Druță critique as "zombie socialism," a neoliberal rhetorical technique that erases the nuances, temporalities, victories, and catastrophes that state socialism produced.[5] Zombie socialism holistically conflates socialism with totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and even fascism, negating its more emancipatory and antifascist histories. This is not to erase the racial and chauvinist violence that the Communist Party deployed, such as forced assimilation into the deracinated communist worker and instances of forced eviction. Nor is it to overlook the fact that throughout its tenure, the party became increasingly repressive, nationalistic, and surveillance driven, as

Katherine Verdery has well documented.[6] But it is significant to note that in the postsocialist present, emancipatory socialist inheritances such as public housing get cast as retrograde through a zombie socialist lens.

Zombie socialist epistemologies on one hand understand Siliconization as a path toward Westernization. On the other, they fetishize a presocialist urban past often described as Romania's "golden era." It was then that cities such as Bucharest were recognized as "the Little Paris of the East" and Timișoara "the Little Vienna of the East." Yet this was also a fascistic time led by groups such as the Iron Guard and the Legionnaires who were determined to exterminate Jews, Roma, communists, queers, and deviants. Thus, while proponents of anticommunist futurity find comfort in the golden era, so does a growing neofascist movement—one today embodied by the Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (Alliance for the Union of Romanians/AUR). Although "the Little Silicon Valley of the East" is conjured not by AUR members but rather by liberals, that their vision restitutes the same golden era speaks to the strange bedfellows that anticommunism produces. I am particularly interested in the contours of this alignment and what they say about tech fantasies throughout this book.

While *Silicon Valley Imperialism* is concerned with the racial and spatial violence that anticommunist Siliconization conjures, it also refrains from only reading socialism as a matter of the state. As writing by Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora, as well as by Mary Taylor and Noah Brehmer, importantly illustrate, there are many socialisms that have long existed beyond the enclosure of the state within Eastern Europe and beyond.[7] In this regard, postsocialism emerges not as a simple spatiotemporal marker of state socialism's end, but rather as a theoretical concept useful for marking the cessation of state socialism as a dominant discourse overdetermined by Cold War knowledge production. Conceptually, postsocialism thus facilitates an exploration of socialist legacies on multiple scales beyond the state, offering insight regarding past and present radical imaginaries of collective action.

Committed to mapping anticapitalist threads and fabrics through postsocialist analytics, this book also attends to the racial and spatial violence that processes of Siliconization and anticommunism conjointly inhere in state socialism's remains. While their interlocked power manifests racial dispossession, it also encloses revolutionary potentiality. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, Romania experienced a surge of anticommunist and anti-corruption protests largely designed by members of the country's burgeoning tech sector, as well as by architects fixated on presocialist urbanism. Known as the Light Revolution, demonstrations gained international acclaim for their use of digitality to dis-

avow the undead ghosts of Romania's "corrupt" socialist past. Many expressed allegiance to the European Union (EU), the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Rather than acknowledging the violence of global capital, protests instead upheld an anticommunist imaginary in which socialist deviation and its corrupt ghosts could be pacified, corrected, and eradicated through Siliconization.

As I question throughout this book, What does it mean that liberal and fascist glorifications of presocialism align amid today's anticommunist conjunctures? Lilith Mahmud's understanding of liberalism as a cosmological reaffirmation of "the moral superiority of the Occident" is helpful here.[8] Liberalism, she finds, peaked during the Enlightenment but continues to inform feelings of belonging and political subjectivity for many Western (and in this case Western aspirational) subjects. Drawing on this, I am particularly interested in how post–Cold War liberal cosmologies chart new conduits between the Enlightenment and Silicon Valley. I am also concerned with how liberal negations of illiberalism messily collapse fascism, authoritarianism, communism, and un-Americanism—basically anything that stands in the way of Western-becoming. In this sense, throughout this book I assess a post–Cold War paradigm that positions liberalism and illiberalism as an epistemological impasse within the political-ideological spectrum, one that obfuscates how the material violence of capital and empire spectrally haunts both the so-called East and West today.

This spatiotemporal conjuncture highlights the multiple imperial legacies haunting postsocialist times. The space now known as Romania has long been occupied by multiple imperial projects, from the Roman to the Ottoman, from the Russian to the Austro-Hungarian. And while Romanian and Hungarian nationalists' respective struggles over Moldova and Transylvania today can spark questions regarding whether Romania itself bears empire-like qualities, the United States also has found its way into the fold. Although the simultaneity of empires and their phantoms is nothing new, the Cold War worked wonders in reducing the capacity to understand imperial multiplicity. Yet "imperial formations," as Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan put it, are not monolithic steady states, but rather "states of becoming, macropolities in states of solution and constant formation."[9] Processes of becoming and unbecoming, of blurring and realigning, show that despite claims of one empire dying, ending, or being abdicated by another, imperial formations continue their work of haunting. Imperial formations, in this sense, serve as a critical analytic for theorizing "not the inevitable rise and fall of empires, but the active and contingent process of their making and unmaking."[10] By foregrounding the role of Western and US technoculture, technocapital, and their imaginaries

throughout this book, I remain attentive to the reality that many other empires and relationships to the state are at play.

With this in mind, in this book I forge the analytic of *Silicon Valley imperialism*, or a global condition in which Silicon Valley's existence is necessitated by its unending growth and in which it penetrates and devours people's intimate lives, local epistemologies, and personal data while also consuming global and even outer space imaginaries in novel ways. While Silicon Valley is emboldened by and often co-constitutive of US empire, it is not synonymous with it. Nor has it replaced US empire or co-opted the entrenched space of Western Europe in presocialist golden era fantasies. Rather, Silicon Valley imperialism coexists on a mutating playbook of schisms and captures, of post-Enlightenment liberal and illiberal imaginaries, and of desires and horrors—all informing various states of becoming and unbecoming.

Writing of neoliberalization amid post-Mao China, Lisa Rofel locates the formation of "desiring subjects" in postsocialist cultural publics.[11] For her, desire encapsulates an aspirational politic that informs public understandings of postsocialist materialities, one that seeks coherence despite the instability and unpredictability of transition. Similar desires can be located in postsocialist Romania, ones that mobilize zombie socialist grammars to justify and make sense of the predation of socialist-era infrastructure, all the while capturing space for the global capital investment geographies of creative capital, tech start-ups, and outsourcing. Cranes and cacophonous sounds of construction fill the air throughout Cluj's Mărăști neighborhood, where NTT Data and dozens of new outsourcing firms are based. Once home to socialist-era textile factories and other working-class manufacturing plants, many of its tech workers earn up to five times more than their neighbors today.[12] That said, there are plenty of others who are paid far less to engage in more menial tasks "behind the curtain" of automation. Nevertheless, the dream of entrepreneurialism is strong. As Oana Mateescu writes, "With the professionalization of the hipster into the upster (which, in Cluj, signals involvement in the start-up ecosystem), labor becomes a form of social and urban belonging framed in the terms of a tech-nomoral governance that can refashion the entire city into a laboratory."[13] Yet these fantasies are only accessible to some. Very few upsters are Roma, and many aspire to move to higher corporate echelons to eventually land gigs at Google or Oracle. Yet for the most part, technocapitalist logics reduce these workers to surrogate cogs in a machine that accumulates wealth in California's San Francisco Bay Area region—a space that first "became" Silicon Valley during the Cold War.

While Silicon Valley imperialism has unevenly transformed both Bay Area and Cluj postindustrial presents, neither actually *is* Silicon Valley. That said, Silicon Valley imperialism is hard at work in both, sowing the seeds for what I describe as its twin concept of *racial technocapitalism*. By this, I refer to the technocapitalist imperatives undergirding racialized processes of data, land, infrastructure, and housing theft. Racial capitalism, in Lisa Lowe's words, "suggests that capitalism expands not through rendering all labor, resources, and markets across the world identical, but by precisely seizing upon colonial divisions, identifying particular regions for production and others for neglect, certain populations for exploitation, and others, disposal."[14] Racial technocapitalism conceptually homes in on how Silicon Valley imperialism disparately materializes racial and spatial dispossession while fabricating anticommunist techno fantasies. Sometimes, racial technocapitalism mobilizes *technofascist* formations, or the techniques through which anticommunist, white nationalist, populist, neoliberal, and even liberal ideologies mechanize fascist conditions of possibility. Racial technocapitalism and technofascism alike offer Silicon Valley imperialism new imaginative and material transits. Yet at the same time, both predate and are not reliant on Silicon Valley's existence. For instance, prior to the formation of Silicon Valley, interwar counting machines made by IBM were used by the Romanian state to map racialized populations as disposable (as I explore in chapter 4).

There are also socialist-era computing histories that predate processes of Silicon Valley imperialism that need to be taken into account in understanding Romania's technological past and present. Indeed, despite today's Siliconizing sea change, this is not the first era in which Romania has experienced a tech boom. To conflate technological development in Romania with Western incursion epistemologically gentrifies the socialist period, which also was a time of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and cyber development. It was then that the country produced the most third-generation computers (1960s and 1970s machines with integrated circuits and miniaturized transistors) in the Eastern bloc, while also fostering deviant practices of cloning Western fourth-generation microprocessor home personal computers (PCs) underground. Other clandestine practices such as internet cabling, software piracy, and media bootlegging have thrived in socialism's aftermath, much of which embrace an ethos of *șmecherie*—a Romanian word with Roma roots inferring cunningness, or a sort of street-smart cleverness.[15]

Siliconization has meant the co-optation of both state computing and hardware production, along with the predation of technodeviant practices

and infrastructures, not to mention the cheap surrogate labor that outsourcing provides. After 1989, the land that state socialist factories (computer and otherwise) sat on was largely bought by real estate speculators, divided into joint stock trades, and sold. Firms such as Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Oracle, and IBM (again) swept in, absorbing socialist-era tech workers and embracing the grammar of zombie socialism in order to justify intervention. This co-optation has only augmented in recent years, getting at what Silvia Lindtner describes as "displacements of technological promise," or nonlinear, recursive moves that recuperate spatial and technological pasts into the frameworks of neoliberal futurity, casting those who don't fit into its vision into the waiting room of history.[16]

Technological promises infiltrate postsocialist urbanity throughout Cluj, yet sometimes they get corrupted by other technological futures past that refuse Silicon predation. As Tung-Hui Hu, Brian Larkin, and Shannon Mattern have each illustrated, while present-day infrastructures often co-opt those of prior eras, remnants of the past also refuse complete assimilation.[17] Sometimes in Cluj then the past seeps out despite the shiny veneer of Siliconization. For instance, although NTT absorbed EBS, much of the area's "chic modernist" development sits on former industrial and residential exoskeletons. The German iQuest campus, along with iQuest Real Estate and Taco Development, all balance upon the ruins of the Flacăra textile factory. The factory's former canteen now houses tech firms with abstruse names such as Doc.Essensis and CCSCC. One block down the road, the old Napochim plastics factory, known as "The Red Flag" when it first opened in 1947, is being transformed into an apartment block to house tech workers. The former Arbator Butchery, meanwhile, is becoming the "Oxygen Mall." Still lounging on NTT's balcony, my friend and I laugh, "See, it's not the greenwashing of postsocialism—it's the oxygen-washing!" Oxygen-washing, as a form of Siliconization, paves the way for what Neferti Tadiar describes as "uber-urbanization," a process that signposts "the imaginative and techno-infrastructural value-propelled project behind the global fantasy of city everywhere, whose defining tropes also act as programmatic codes for the enterprise."[18]

My friend and I are in the midst of a collaborative mapping project led by the housing justice collective, Căși Sociale ACUM! (Social Housing NOW!), which she cofounded in 2016 in Cluj. We are currently working on a Căși project made in collaboration with the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project (AEMP), which I cofounded in 2013 in Siliconizing San Francisco. While Căși organizes tenants and evictees in Cluj to create social housing alternatives and stop evictions, the AEMP emerged to map landscapes of dispossession and create

tools for housing justice. I had been studying housing injustice in Romania for some years prior to cofounding the AEMP, which in part inspired me to ground the project in visions of international solidarity, anti-imperialism, and spatial justice. Now, back in Romania, I find myself circling through the merits and pitfalls of applying AEMP digital cartographic methods since honed in the Bay Area to map Siliconizing Cluj. Committed to not transposing universalizing mediations of space, race, and tech gentrification onto Romanian topographies, I am nevertheless invested in tracing the Silicon connections between the two locales in order to help sow the seeds for anti-imperial future-making. These commitments to housing justice and anti-imperial solidarities across Bay Area and Romanian urban space animate this book, as do questions about what other worlds become possible when refusing to read Silicon Valley as the zero point of spatiotemporal and technological analysis. *Silicon Valley Imperialism* thus traverses an array of socialist and postsocialist tech projects and anticapitalist visions that corrupt Silicon promises.

Geographically, this book's chapters transit the Romanian cities of Bucharest, Cluj, and Râmnicu Vâlcea, and the Moldovan city of Chișinău, while also engaging spaces now comprising California's so-called Silicon Valley region. Employing ethnographic and interdisciplinary reading practices, I analyze three phenomena unique to Romania's relationship with Silicon Valley imperial circuits: (1) geographic entanglements of Silicon Valley and Romanian technological, racial, and urban lifeworlds; (2) presocialist, socialist, and Cold War technohistories as they inform, haunt, and inspire those of the postsocialist/post–Cold War spectral present; and (3) the spatiotemporal entwining of divergent techno-imaginaries and materialities in postsocialist times. As I show, imaginaries and materialities, when studied together, underpin how meanings, dreams, and desires inform and are informed by lived realities. Here I invoke Karen Barad's feminist concept of "agential realism," in which politics, ethics, and observations are inherently composed of material and discursive intra-actions.[19] Producers of knowledge and their imaginative worlds thus directly inform the construction of what becomes material.

While situating my inquiry into the spacetime of Silicon Valley imperialism, I also chart visions and practices of unbecoming. In Angela Willey's words, "Knowledge and power are not only always enmeshed with one another but also always implicated in possibilities for new becomings" and practices of "becoming otherwise."[20] There is analytic agency, then, sewn into aspirations of both *becoming* and *unbecoming* Silicon Valley. This work of unbecoming reveals that while Siliconization is real and ongoing, so are other techno-urban practices unrecognizable through Google Glass or its search engine results.

Their endurance imparts frictions that slow down and at times undo Silicon materialities and imaginaries. Anna Tsing's work on frictions of global connection is helpful here in revealing how globalization processes produce not simply culture clashes or one-way influences, but rather messy, awkward zones of encounter.[21] She also shows that because speculative enterprises often require imaginative work prior to materialization—not only by companies, but also by places (for instance, Cluj's elite dreams up becoming "the Silicon Valley of Eastern Europe")—anticapitalist conjuring work can be just as powerful in processes of unbecoming. Throughout this book, I unearth practices of unbecoming by engaging in the work of activists, organizers, artists, performers, technologists, and theorists who look to past, present, and future refusals of Siliconization. It is through their work that Silicon Valley imperialism becomes unhinged and unraveled—sometimes overtly, sometimes in back-end code. In tracing these practices as well as the violent structures that their work refutes, this book's chapters dip in and out of technopolitical moments and intimate spaces alike in order to theorize interconnected spatiotemporalities always in flux.

Racial Technocapitalism

One might assume that racial technocapitalism is an import into Romania given the power of Silicon Valley imperialism and US empire; history, however, is far more complex. Yes, Silicon Valley transports US understandings of race and racialization, with the whole of Eastern Europe often being racialized as backward and requiring Western technological salvation. However, if following Cedric Robinson's observation that capitalism has always been co-constituted by racism, beginning within Europe's borderlands, things become more muddled.[22] As feudal landlording practices transitioned into capitalism (by enclosing the commons, creating new markets, and suppressing anticapitalist uprisings),[23] so did racializing practices, which exploited the labor and dispossessed the land of Roma people, Jews, Slavs, Tartars, the Irish, and others. With this in mind, Robinson's intervention positions capitalism as inherently racist from the start. In the Romanian provinces of Moldova and Wallachia, Roma slaves were forced to work the lands of boyars (landlords) and churches for five centuries and were never offered reparations after mid-nineteenth-century abolition. In Transylvania, landownership too depended on racialized serfdom. As Anca Parvulescu and Manuela Boatcă observe, "Although historians have foregrounded the labor of the enslaved in the transatlantic trade and different forms of indentured labor that were enmeshed with it globally,

FIGURE I.1. Sign advertising NTT Data's new café, wEBSite Bistro, in the streets headed to their offices in downtown Cluj. Photo taken by author, 2018.

enslaved rural populations rarely appear in labor histories of modern East Europe."[24] Or, as Ioanida Costache articulates, "Any discussion of racism and colonialism in Europe remains incomplete without a critical integration of the situation of the Roma," who have been subjected to racialized exploitation "from the extraction of their labor as an enslaved people to their genocide."[25] This is why, per Piro Rexhepi, today's Roma displacement cannot simply be chalked up to neoliberalism, but rather needs to take into account "histories of racial capitalism underwritten by colonial mappings of population, place, and time."[26]

State socialism, as a project, was established in part to obliterate the capitalist regime that preceded it, one that had been informed by imperiality, racialization, fascism, and aspirations to become European. This, however,

FIGURE I.2. Robot at
NTT Data. Photo taken
by author, 2018.

is not to suggest that the socialist project obliterated racism.[27] Per Rexhepi,
"The protracted racialization of Roma populations across different (post)Ot-
toman spaces betrays the supposed racelessness of socialism."[28] While many
socialists referred to racism as *şovinism*, or chauvinism, many Roma recall ex-
periences of *ură de rasă*, or race hate, during the era. As Manuel Mireanu has
traced, anti-Roma racism was augmented in the 1980s in Romania, with Roma
people often rendered social problems, school dropouts, nomads, and squat-
ters.[29] Despite this, many Roma who experienced race hate during socialism's
latter years are quick to acknowledge how much worse it became in the 1990s,
a period marked by austerity, unemployment, and also racist pogroms. Enikő
Vincze and George Zamfir write that today, as has been the case historically,
"Racialized nationalism does not consider Roma as people with an ethnic back-
ground similar to other ethnics, but as lesser humans belonging to an inferior
race."[30] Given this, we can see that while racism is not a recent import into

Romania, there are new racial transits that do need to be studied, be they of so-called presocialist "returns" or of those that accompany Silicon Valley imperial grammars.

While Robinson, along with other scholars of Black Marxism, positions capitalism as an inherently racial project, other Marxists have additionally foregrounded its historic reliance on innovation and technology. Yet those interested in capitalism's technological reliance have not always attended to the significance of race and coloniality. Some of this came to a head during the 1974–1982 Brenner debate, which saw Robert Brenner argue against Immanuel Wallerstein regarding primitive accumulation—Karl Marx's concept of how precapitalist modes of production, including those of feudalism and slavery, preconditioned capitalist economics. While Wallerstein's world-systems theory found primitive accumulation reliant on the West's ability to exploit peripheral and semiperipheral lands including Eastern Europe,[31] Brenner, whose theorizations were largely based on examples from the English countryside, believed that capitalism emerged through the alienation of the means of production.[32] This, he claimed, inspired new techniques of market competition and technological revolution within Europe, or "innovation via accumulation."[33] Yet in *Capital*, while Marx does back some of Brenner's ideas, he also supports Wallerstein's. As the famous passage goes: "The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production."[34] While his remark connects slavery, imperialism, and capitalism to new technologies of exploitation beyond Eastern Europe, in *Capital* he also looked to Romanian provinces to exemplify the appropriation of peasant labor by wealthy boyars such as Vlad Țepeș, known today as Count Dracula.[35] Marx was however hazier regarding the role of racialization within Eastern Europe, not to mention the role that slavery and colonization continued to play within capitalist contexts elsewhere.

David Harvey's concept of "accumulation by dispossession" has served as a partial antidote here, particularly in assessing the dispossessive violence that capitalist innovation inheres.[36] He looks to how processes of primitive accumulation are requisite on new territories of acquisition and therefore dispossession, often made accessible through financial crises. Yet as Paula Chakravartty and Denise Ferreira da Silva argue, missing from his analysis are how such new territories protract historic racial and imperial practices, epistemologies, and geographies.[37] They also suggest returning to Cedric Robinson, C. L. R. James, and Frantz Fanon to better understand "how historical materialism alone

cannot account for the ways in which capitalism has lived off—always backed by the colonial and national state's means of death—of colonial/racial expropriation."[38] Or, as Brenna Bhandar puts it, colonial encounters have long relied on the logics of private property in order to create capitalist markets, in turn producing racial regimes of ownership that haunt the present. Such confrontations have manifested "a conceptual apparatus in which justifications for private property ownership remain bound to a concept of the human that is thoroughly racial in its makeup."[39] As she notes, while racial capitalism was indeed a core tenet of feudal Europe prior to the colonization of the Americas, it became globalized in the era of modern colonialism, which relied on new technologies of economic, racial, and spatial measurement, codification, and abstraction. Such techniques were used to render colonized peoples "outside of history, lacking the requisite cultural practices, habits of thought, and economic organization to be considered as sovereign, rational economic subjects."[40] Prior imperial violence is thus not simply stuck in the past but is rather an ongoing condition of possibility that very much informs capitalist logics and their racial technologies.

Returning to Romania then, historic formations of empire, racial capitalism, and technocapitalism require a similar approach—one that takes into account the simultaneity of multiply existing imperial formations over time. This is in part what informs Parvulescu and Boatcă's formulation of an "interimperial approach" to the region, one that provides a corrective to linear narratives of industrialization as requisite for capitalism. Rather, they argue that imperial histories in East Europe "left indelible marks on both the socioeconomic organization and the self-conceptualization of its subjects, which placed them in a different relationship to the West European core than the American colonies."[41] Drawing on world-systems analysis, they note how while racial capitalist difference in the colonies marked "*colonial difference* from the core*," ethnic and class-based hierarchies within East Europe illustrated the "*imperial difference* between European empires and their former subjects."[42] This, in Boatcă's words, has long positioned East European spaces to serve as "laboratories of modernity at the level of global capitalism."[43] The semiperipheral East, portrayed as white Christian Europe's incomplete and darker self,[44] gets mapped then as "culturally alien by definition."[45] While state socialism concretized this alien otherness to the West, it also wrought the region free (or freer) from Western imperial control through industrialization. In this sense, histories of technological development, empire, and ethnic/racial difference in Eastern Europe do not easily map onto Western capitalist trajectories and need to be explored through unique historic contexts.

US empire helped engineer and then capitalize on the collapse of communism (though of course this had to do with a range of factors notwithstanding increased authoritarian rule, nationalism, and a shift away from the antifascist ideals that originally contoured the socialist project). Silicon Valley imperialism in particular orchestrated the co-optation of socialist-era infrastructure, knowledge, and technofuturity. This then adds a new layer of empire into the mix, one that embraced technoliberal grammars. Here, by *technoliberalism*, I invoke what Atanasoski and Vora describe as a "political alibi of present-day racial capitalism that posits humanity as an aspirational figuration in relation to technological transformation, obscuring the uneven racial and gendered relations of labor, power, and social relations that underlie the contemporary conditions of capitalist production."[46] Technoliberalism then unevenly powers the appropriation of space, race, labor, and futurity to embolden racial technocapitalism. Not only does it transit Western understandings of race and technology into the East, but it also galvanizes the coloniality undergirding California's so-called Silicon Valley. In this way, racial technocapitalism in Romania is a stratified constellation marked by variegated imperial histories, each of which transits different relational understandings of race, ethnicity, and class.

Silicon Valley Imperialism

Most of the tech companies scattered about Cluj, but also Bucharest and other Romanian cities, are not from Silicon Valley per se (although plenty are); many are in fact based in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and beyond. That said, they cumulatively serve as an alibi for Silicon Valley imperial visions, while also being hooked into Silicon Valley venture capital circuits, software, servers, data centers, and code. Today, not only does California's Silicon Valley contain more billionaires, venture capitalists, and patents per square foot than anywhere else on earth, but also, the region hosts fifty of the top one hundred most expensive zip codes in the United States and most of the firms that power much of networked life globally. As scholars such as Margaret O'Mara and Linda Weiss have each observed, Silicon Valley economics have everything to do with the United States' Cold War pursuit of technological supremacy and defense.[47] This has continued in Cold War aftermaths, with Google's former CEO, Eric Schmitt, leading a Pentagon advisory board while Meta's Mark Zuckerberg embraces Cold War 2.0 logics which suggest that breaking up Facebook's monopolies would empower Chinese tech. Though these companies remain reliant on military contracts, they work to avoid government

regulation, oversight, and taxes. They would rather, per Facebook's original motto, "Move fast and break things." Yet as Ruha Benjamin saliently questions, "What about the people and places broken in the process?"[48]

Not only does Silicon Valley maintain material and military infrastructural dominance, but it also manufactures and disseminates aspirational and entrepreneurial desires. As Richard Walker writes, "The mythology of the plucky tech entrepreneur has diffused around the world, becoming a key element in the capitalist dream world of today."[49] Many of these entrepreneurs find themselves in places like Cluj, looking to capitalize on cheap outsourcing, technological prowess, English language capacity, and more. Upon the ruins of socialist technofuturism, Silicon Valley–based start-ups and "digital nomad" remote workers offer workshops, TED talks, and more on how to become better at capitalism, how to successfully amass big data, and how to mobilize artificial intelligence, machine learning, and algorithmic automation.

However, as Lilly Irani cautions in her work on "entrepreneurial citizenship" in India, by looking for Silicon Valley everywhere, older forms of power relations that have perhaps more explanatory and political strength (for instance, British colonialism) remain hidden in plain sight.[50] By only seeing Siliconization as responsible for technological development in Cluj, an array of histories remain buried. As Andrew Schrock summarizes, "Silicon Valley was always a promise, never a place."[51] This promise is not dissimilar to that which Sara Ahmed critiques as "the promise of happiness," which imparts a moral and affective fantasy.[52] Conversant with Lauren Berlant's "cruel optimism" and its unfulfillable promises of upward mobility,[53] Silicon Valley conjures fantasies of liberal assimilation despite the material and imaginative violence it yields. While this may look different in the array of "Silicon Valleys" popping up around the globe—from Silicon Plateau in Bangalore to Silicon Wadi in Israel—promises, disavowals, and spatial erasure do ensue.

Just as Cluj is not and never will *be* Silicon Valley, neither will the many lands of the San Francisco Bay Area. As Kim Tran writes, "I have never heard a poor person of color from the South Bay ever call where I'm from 'Silicon Valley.'"[54] Yet even the South Bay, San Jose, and San Francisco—cities collectively recognized as Silicon Valley—bear imperial toponymies, referencing lands violently stolen from Ohlone and Miwok peoples by Spanish missionaries, Anglo gold rushers, and then US empire. This process, in Jodi Byrd's words, "cohered and transformed external lands into internal domestic spaces that now seamlessly exist."[55] Massacre by massacre, the US government sought to expand the country to the western edge of continental space by killing California Indians rather than honoring treaties.[56] It was the hydraulic mining frenzy that fol-

lowed the gold rush, that, in Malcolm Harris's words, manifested a new creature: "the California engineer, master of water, stone, and labor."[57] As he traces, it was nineteenth-century frontier scientists who set the stage for technologies of racial capitalist production vis-à-vis the "California model," an exportable formula that legitimized white supremacy and resource grabbing.[58] Per Harris, "California engineers became the heralds of proletarianization around the world, the shock troops of global enclosure, drawing the lines that so many were forced to follow."[59] This set the stage for geographies of racial technocapitalism in the Valley today.

Thus, despite popular understandings that position US imperialism fomenting through its external island conquests beginning in the late nineteenth century, as well through its Cold War nuclear-armed global superpower status gained by protecting the "free world" from communism, in fact US empire is rooted in the ongoing and incomplete project of settler colonialism (incomplete in that Native peoples and lands are still here). Not that this model did not seep into Cold War science; on the contrary, it laid the groundwork for the very formation of Stanford University and the tech companies that the institution later helped grow. US empire continues to expand today by transferring "Indianness" onto an array of extractable materialities—including data accumulated "at home" in the Silicon Valley region and abroad (for instance, in Eastern Europe).

Building on the foundations of US empire, then, Silicon Valley imperialism reiterates Native erasure through ongoing practices of gentrification. In Nick Estes's words, "Gentrification doesn't only happen in cities, and it doesn't only mimic colonial processes—it is colonialism. Settler colonialism, whether in border towns, rural areas, or urban geographies, is fundamental to the history of US expansion that has required the removal, dispossession, and elimination of Indigenous peoples."[60] Although "gentrification" discursively traffics in popular understandings of housing financialization, the whitening of neighborhoods, and practices of forced expulsion globally, its vernacular utilization can, and often does, deracinate the present from centuries of racial dispossession and violence. This is in part why Roy prefers the analytic of racial banishment, which signals "the public means of evictions as well as forms of racialized violence, such as slavery, Jim Crow, incarceration, colonialism, and apartheid, that cannot be encapsulated within sanitized notions of gentrification and displacement."[61] In Romania, racial banishment is useful for apprehending how presocialist fascist spatiality maps onto the Siliconized present.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, racial banishment marks centuries of colonial violence, not to mention segregation, exploitation, and dispossession

imposed upon Natives, immigrants, and people of color during the development of a number of capitalist projects that followed the gold rush. Railroad development, canaries and fruit production, microelectronics manufacturing, and more preyed upon hazardous immigrant labor, all of which laid the foundation for Silicon Valley economics.[62] Though the term "Silicon Valley" did not appear until 1971 in reference to semiconductor success by known eugenicist William Shockley,[63] such events had everything to do with Stanford University, which had established a research park in 1951 that became home to many of the Valley's earliest companies. Yet Stanford University would not have come into being in the first place if it weren't for capital from founder Leland Stanford's prior frontier ventures in gold and railroads. In this sense, the bedrock of Cold War Silicon Valley has always been stained by the ravages of empire.

In addition to trafficking racial technocapitalist tactics of innovation, exploitation, and accumulation, Silicon Valley imperialism rehearses anticommunist ideologies. It was in 1950 that Norbert Wiener, the "father of cybernetics," argued that the solution to authoritarianism and fascism required remodeling the world through distributed communications systems managed by computers.[64] This framework was used to position the region's technologies, as well as neoliberal economics, as salvific in the battle against illiberalism (often equated with communism)—be it at home or abroad.[65] It was communist visions led by groups such as the Black Panther Party that soon became feared as the illiberal sparks capable of dismantling US empire locally—in turn incentivizing state-backed repression.[66] Silicon Valley technologies and ideologies were in turn developed to maintain US imperial power both at home and abroad in the liberal war against racialized communism/illiberalism. Per Atanasoski and Vora, the United States "morally underwrote its imperial projects as a struggle for achieving states of freedom abroad over illiberal states of unfreedom, racializing illiberal systems of belief as a supplement to the racialization of bodies under Western European imperialism."[67] The Cold War paradigm and its development of weapons, computers, and semiconductors thus racialized the illiberal communist other—not to supplant existing racial difference, but rather to add a new genre of raciality into the mix that Silicon Valley technologies could help discipline.

As the Cold War was coming to a close, Ronald Reagan synthesized this logic by proclaiming that "the Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip," or the "oxygen of the modern age."[68] Thus not only did Reagan offer a discursive prototype to today's "oxygen washing" in Cluj, but he also allegorized Silicon Valley imperialism through biblical tropes. Of course, these myths have long been used to justify colonial technologies of

control upon "savages" imagined as technologically unsophisticated and thus without legitimate claims to land. Sylvia Wynter writes that with the Spanish colonization of the Americas, jurists and theologians transitioned from solely categorizing those requiring domination as "Enemies of Christ/Christ Refusers" to those of a different race.[69] In other words, through imperialism, race became an "extrahuman" trait that required remapping the "space of Otherness . . . defined in terms of degrees of rational perfection/imperfection."[70] A master code was thus established of racialized rationality/irrationality, and it has been used since to justify imperial rights to sovereignty upon stolen land, not to mention the institutionalization of the plantation system. While this master code haunts the present, it has also, Wynter notes, grown to rationalize the superiority of the First World over "underdeveloped" places and to render the "Invisible Hand" of the free market as inevitable. This master code reifies the authority of what she describes as the contemporary "biocentric ethnoclass genre of the human, of which our present techno-industrial, capitalist mode of production is an indispensable and irreplaceable, but only a proximate function."[71] And so, per Reagan, the microchip became an object through which to reproduce the master code of Western capitalist authority.

It was the microchip, then, that Silicon Valley ideologues imagined manifesting Francis Fukuyama's overdetermined and unfulfilled proclamation of the post-1989/1991 "end of history," in which the entire world would be blanketed by liberal democracy.[72] This end-of-history imaginary, coupled with shifts toward consumer markets and ongoing US imperial formations, has razed new and uneven space for Siliconization. Perhaps it should be of no surprise that in 2008, tech evangelist Chris Anderson penned an op-ed suggesting that with the rise of big data, we have also reached the "end of theory," where it no longer matters why things happen as long as they can be modeled, predicted, and scaled.[73] Elided from this temporal apogee are the racial asymmetries undergirding geographies of datafication and digitality, so that digital universalism remains, in Anita Say Chan's words, a myth at best.[74] Or, perhaps, this end of theory/history is a new instantiation of the same master code critiqued by Wynter, which seeks to dampen class conflict and revolutionary uprisings by trafficking imaginaries of assimilation into the tech bourgeoisie and its fictive projections of liberal universality.

In 2014, a lengthy article in *Time* featured a story detailing Zuckerberg's project Internet.org, designed to supply even the most "remote" spaces of the planet with internet. The cover image of the article depicted a tall, white Zuckerberg surrounded by shorter, brown children from the rural town of Chandauli, India. As Kentaro Toyama chastised, "Internet.org is a form of colonialism that whitewashes Facebook's techno-imperialism under a cloak

of doing good."[75] Such a salvific mission, one to effectively "save the world" with one's own product, gets echoed in Silicon Valley spaces far and wide. Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI and past president of YCombinator, has built an economy within Silicon Valley to be "a guild of hyper-capitalist entrepreneurs who will help one another fix the broken world."[76] Meanwhile, Elon Musk, the world's wealthiest person (as of 2023), who maintains power through leadership positions in SpaceX, Tesla, Twitter/X, the Boring Company, and more, claims his ventures such as colonizing Mars and preserving "free speech" will save the world, or at least some wealthy humans on it.[77]

In such contexts of Silicon Valley imperialism, data, materials, imaginaries, outer space, and even sociality are for the taking, often under the pretense of saving humanity within the endless end of history. At the same time, Silicon Valley imperialism functions to accumulate capital on stolen lands where Native worlds and histories have suffered numerous assassination attempts. In this sense, the grabbing of land and the grabbing of data go hand in hand in order to destroy worlds for some and protract them of others. As Katherine McKittrick contextualizes, "Land grabbing is a self-replicating system that provides the avaricious conditions for the data grab. . . . The task of the data grab is to remake our sense of place, heartlessly."[78] Ohlone lands have been actively made and remade through Spanish and US empire before being remade again through Silicon Valley imperialism. And in Cluj, where Western tech firms launch outsourcing exploitations upon the ruins of socialist modernity, place is also actively being reshaped. Yet despite Siliconized subsumption, other futures past and present remain, many of which crystallize through anti-imperial politics and postsocialist analytics.

Postsocialism

By tracking Silicon Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism together, in this book I theorize a particular postsocialist moment. By postsocialism, I refer to a post-1989 condition that has endured in both Eastern Europe and the West and that unevenly recodes configurations of race and empire today. At the same time, I find it a useful analytic for theorizing anticapitalist practices that exceed the spatiotemporal borders of state socialism and the Cold War. In other words, I find postsocialism germane to everyday life, infrastructure, and politics in the former Eastern bloc and beyond.[79] My take here is particularly inspired by the feminist collaboration between Atanasoski and Vora, who suggest that postsocialism resists "the revolutionary teleology of what was before," materializing space to explore socialisms' ongoing legacies today.[80] To this end,

they offer the framework of pluralizing postsocialisms, highlighting "current practices, imaginaries and actions that insist on political change at a variety of scales, including local, state, and transnational ones." By unmooring post-socialism from its oft-assumed spatiotemporality, anticapitalist practices that exceed the boundaries of state socialism surface.

While mid-twentieth-century decolonial movements have been under-stood as globally significant, just as noteworthy have been twentieth-century moves to disavow socialist practices within and beyond Eastern Europe. As Redi Koobak, Madina Tlostanova, and Suruchi Thapar-Björkert write, "Never fully realised in any of the spaces that claimed to be socialist, the state socialist utopia is still crucial as a dream, as an alternative to the capitalist liberal or neoliberal model."[81] While socialism—as utopic and anticipatory project—has been discredited as a dream from the past, in fact, it has never fully arrived. Postsocialism thus highlights the ongoing practice of imagining and actual-izing anticapitalist alternatives, lifeworlds, and futures to come. This aligns with Lisa Lowe's suggestion that the past conditional temporality, or "what could have been," offers a way past Western universalist epistemological enclo-sures of revolutionary change.[82] By revisiting "times of historical contingency and possibility to consider alternatives that may have been unthought in those times,"[83] anticolonial and non-Western Marxist futures past resurface.

At the same time, postsocialism also marks the temporal uncanniness im-bued in the process of living on amid the aftermaths of state socialism. David Scott writes of melancholy and hopelessness associated with "the temporal disjunctures involved in living on in the wake of past political time, amid the ruins, specifically, of postsocialist and postcolonial futures past."[84] As he illustrates, the emancipatory dreams guiding revolution can crumble in its af-tershocks, particularly when nationalist and neoliberal futures take over. Thus, while postsocialism is a useful analytic for mapping the material, imaginative, and epistemological legacies of the socialist project, it is also conceptually helpful in apprehending the brutality of global capital. It meanwhile remains theoreti-cally germane in examining Soviet socialism in itself as an imperial project, one that broke from some of the Marxist and anti-imperialist ideals that originally inspired it. In its plurality then, postsocialism shows that the legacies of Marx and Lenin have multiple lives beyond and in excess of European spatiality.[85] But also, as liberation theorists such as Enrique Dussel have observed, there are Indigenous socialisms and communalisms in the Americas that predate and coagulate with Marxism.[86] David Graeber and David Wengrow have more re-cently suggested that perhaps it was these Native communalisms that inspired French Enlightenment critiques of private property before Marx, ultimately

igniting revolution.[87] All of this underscores the need for postsocialist theory to take into account socialisms' multiplicities.

Despite postsocialism's plurality, Cold War area studies formations have long quarantined it as a conceptual apparatus only related to the aftermaths of state socialist spatiotemporality. This has animated a breadth of scholarship on the merits of postsocialist theory and its connections to postcolonial theory, as well as whether or not to abandon the term entirely given that it has now been over three decades since the collapse of the Iron Curtain. While the "post" in postcolonialism has been accepted as signaling not colonialism's end but rather historic and entangled endurances of empire, race, and struggle globally, scholars such as Martin Müller have suggested that postsocialism is not worthy of such affordances and that it be retired in favor of new formations such as the "Global East."[88] While this move elides theoretical interventions about postcolonialism's relevancy in the North and West,[89] it also obviates the imperiality of the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.[90] Further, just as capital remains global, so are practices of capitalist refusal in ways that postsocialist analytics are productive in apprehending. Postsocialist theory is also still useful in assessing the hauntings of disaster capitalism in the so-called post–Cold War "East" (which has not abated despite wishful thinking).

Müller's rejoinder is hardly the first regarding the theoretical merits (or lack thereof) of postsocialism. Postsocialism emerged as a term in academic writing in the 1990s and which, unlike postcolonialism (which entered academic discourses years after decolonization movements began and which was at its inception a theoretical concept), initially stood as a spatiotemporal descriptor applied mostly to post-1989/1991 Central and Eastern European nations and at times, when modified, to China, Vietnam, and Cuba.[91] Yet postsocialism was also important in portraying, as Verdery argues, "reorganization on a cosmic scale," and the redefining and reordering of "people's entire meaningful worlds" via processes of privatization, lustration, democratization, transition, neoliberalism, and other modes of liberal-democratic governance[92]—in other words, the remaking of persons from socialist to capitalist subjects. To this end, postsocialist theory was used to study the pandemonium brought about by injections of post-1989 neoliberalism, which sought to transform what Koobak, Tlostanova, and Thapar-Björkert describe as "the eternal present of the consumer paradise" associated with history's end and the expansion of NATO and global trade.[93] It also documented leftist organizing against such paradises.[94] While the left has continued to organize for anticapitalist futures, postsocialist theory has begun to accept the inevitability of the capitalist global order. It has seen, in Tlostanova's words, socialist state modernity accepted as a nonviable project, uncrit-

ical of the ongoing work of training its practitioners "on how to become fully modern (in the only remaining neoliberal way) and therefore, fully human."[95]

This not-yet-human stance, one of ex-socialist subjects lagging behind the humanity of their Western counterparts, was recently reified by a CBS reporter referring to Ukrainians as "semi-civilized" upon Russia's 2022 invasion.[96] While complicated by very stark stratifications of ethnic and racial difference within the former Eastern bloc—this semicivilized positionality does nevertheless bring into light the ongoing saliency of postsocialist theory, particularly regarding temporality, globality, and race. Whereas postcolonial theory has importantly studied the backwardness with which subaltern subjects are interpellated, postsocialist theory is particularly well situated to analyze the temporal disjuncture that the collapse of state socialism imposed. After all, the socialist project was both one in which time was supposed to speed up to materialize a communist utopic future, but also one, especially in the 1980s, that many associated with temporal stagnation.[97] Theorizing state socialism's demise, Boris Groys writes that the postsocialist subject travels "not from the past to the future, but from the future to the past; from the end of history . . . back to historical time. Post-Communist life is life lived backward, a movement against the flow of time."[98] This forges what Anita Starosta describes as postsocialist "common time," or "a process of never-finished synchronization among multiple temporalities—and by the same token, the process of forging the only possible authentic 'we.'"[99] The never-finished nature of this time, or what David Scott calls "leftovers from a former future stranded in the present,"[100] reflects that despite the best attempts of Westernization and Silicon Valley imperialism alike, spatiotemporal otherness persists.

When it comes to analyzing the ruins, dreams, and disasters contouring formerly socialist cities, this spatiotemporal otherness often remains a shallow marker of topography and periodization rather than a time-space theoretic. The Cold War again is to blame here, as it was then that the field of urban studies was revitalized to better theorize the newly accessible "world of cities"[101]—many of which were transforming through rampant injections of post–Cold War neoliberalism. Through this, a dominant analytic emerged, one that understood postsocialist urbanities as "correcting" themselves, catching up to their Western counterparts. As Martin Ouředníček argues, pervasive anticommunism and Western admiration has "created ideal conditions for an uncritical implantation of Western theoretical concepts, for the westernization of the spoken language in general, and in academic vocabulary in particular."[102] Three decades after the collapse of the Cold War, postsocialist urbanists today are more apt to acknowledge the limitations of Western conceptual frames by

engaging postcolonial theory. But here postcoloniality does the heavy theoretical lifting, while postsocialist cities are remaindered as what Örjan Sjöberg calls "case studies onto themselves,"[103] confined into what Michael Gentile depicts as "the peripheries of urban knowledge."[104] Ana Vilenica, in a brilliant critique of Western theory dominating conversations on urban commoning, also blames "neocolonial 'transitional' narratives" for creating an Eastern distrust of collective projects, which get interpellated as Western humanitarian interventions rather than homegrown anticapitalist struggles.[105] In this sense, producing urban studies of commoning and anti-eviction work in Eastern Europe requires contending not only with Western Cold War epistemic dominance, but also the internalized anticommunism that the Cold War has wrought.

In an attempt to address some of the politics undergirding paradoxes such as this, Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery have contemplated the possibilities of welding postcolonial and postsocialist studies together. "Just as postcoloniality had become a critical perspective on the colonial present," they write, "postsocialism could become a similarly critical standpoint on the continuing social and spatial effects of Cold War power and knowledge."[106] To this end, and in recognition of the Cold War as an epistemological limit to how the world could be known in the second half of the twentieth century, they argue for a new post–Cold War framing: "It is time to liberate the Cold War from the ghetto of Soviet area studies and post-colonial thought from the ghetto of Third World and colonial studies. The liberatory path proposed here the jettisoning of these two posts in favor of a single overarching one: the post–Cold War."[107] Their intervention points to the ongoing necessity of thinking empire, socialist modernity, and global capitalism together. Yet perhaps part of the problem remains in that much of the Western left today still only imagines the alternative to capitalism being state socialism. By pluralizing postsocialisms, new paths for investing in anticapitalist frameworks beyond the state percolate. In this way, by connecting postsocialisms and postcolonialisms in their pluralities—not simply for postsocialism to theorize the West nor just for postcolonialism to chart the East—we can better apprehend the spatiotemporalities of neoliberalism, liberalism, and illiberalism alongside ongoing anticapitalist collectivity and anti-imperial revolution.[108]

Il/liberalism

Given the revival of the Cold War as a geopolitical framework amid Putin's invasion of Ukraine and before that the blaming of Russian and Eastern European hackers for Trump's electoral victory, postsocialism also offers an

important corrective to the dehistoricized and decontextualized framing of democracy and authoritarianism as the only (and opposing) political forms. Today's so-called Cold War 2.0 transpires in a moment when although state socialism has receded into the past, the US/Russian antipodal battling for imperial control of "satellite" states appears alive and well. This gets inscribed as a contest between liberalism and illiberalism, between democracy and authoritarianism, between lightness and darkness, and weirdly enough, between communism and capitalism (even though Russia and Eastern Europe are capitalist today). At the same time, mythology and media networks reify Cold War paranoia, informing what Sorin Cucu describes as a double allegorical formation: "Historical events such as the end of the Cold War are not what they appear to be, yet even this new Cold War is not what it purports to be. Double deception!"[109] As a "postmodern pastiche" of the Cold War, its 2.0 form resuscitates prior fears of information leakage and espionage through what Alaina Lemon describes as "technologies for intuition."[110] This highlights the need to better engage with fiction, speculation, and technology in charting Cold War 2.0 verisimilitudes, where the Cold War's mythological powers materialize undead fantasies of bipolarity.

While powerful in its framing of democracy and authoritarianism as opposites, this bipolarity fails to accommodate a critique of capitalism. In the words of Alexei Yurchak, "The opposition of 'democracy' and 'authoritarianism,' . . . instead of providing analytical clarity, in fact, contributes to decoupling 'democracy' from 'capitalism' and thus concealing and depoliticizing the real conditions."[111] Yet capitalism and liberal democracy have been historically entangled, as has been evidenced through zombie socialist property restitution schemas as well as through the predation of socialist infrastructure by Silicon Valley firms. Thus, given the resurgence of the "Cold War," postsocialism remains salient in assessing contested political terrains and their undead fictions. At the same time, as Wendy Brown warns, many of today's "fascist returns," such as Make America Great Again (MAGA) Trumpism in the United States, hinge not just on updating interwar fascist pasts, but also on the fruits of neoliberalism coming to bear—many of which are also intimately tethered to liberal anticommunist frameworks.[112] This aligns with interventions made by scholars such as Robinson and James who decades ago now pointed out the need to theorize fascism, capitalism, and Western imperialism as connected.[113] Similarly, Evgeny Morozov dissuades against a growing belief on both the left and right that we are somehow in the midst of a feudal return, one marking the end of capitalism and a return to rule by tech elite lords.[114] This is because technofeudal analytics negates the ongoing might of technocapitalism, which,

while perhaps not as sensational as technofeudalism, remains the name of the game. Thus, studying liberal, capitalist, and imperial epistemologies remains just as important as ever in assessing today's "illiberal returns."

In December 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Romanians voted to grant parliamentary power to the fascist-leaning AUR party. AUR, which means "gold" in Romanian, has openly sympathized with the Iron Guard Legionnaire movement, which, while tethered to Orthodox Christian mysticism, powered fascist populism in presocialist times to rid the country of its Jews, Roma, deviants, and communists. One of AUR's leaders, Sorin Lavric, had been fanning racist flames during this time, blaming Roma people for being the main harbingers of the COVID-19 virus.[115] Such a sentiment had already been spreading widely in mainstream culture, with articles and social media posts fashioning Roma as nomadic vectors for transmission.[116] One op-ed written by a disgruntled Romanian flight attendant bemoaned having to bring diasporic Roma back to Romania from their homes abroad. "I was so happy when I took you to other countries," she addressed to her Roma passengers. "I was thinking, 'My God, one less,' and now you come back with skirts full of stolen money, with the same raffia nets, a bit arrogant and disgusting! You come to kill our elders, our parents, and the worst thing is that we also bring you and welcome you home!"[117] Such biological racist ideology has since been spreading like wildfire, updating older histories of anti-Roma racism beyond fringe far right groups. As Costache summarizes, "Put simply, if civilization is synonymous with science, medicine, modernity, and technology, then it is foiled by those living in poverty, and squalor like many Roma, who lack access to all things that index 'civilization,' like running water."[118] To return to the pure, presocialist past and to restore possibilities of Westernization through Siliconization, figures like the fascist Antonescu are invoked to complete the eugenicist project.

Today's ethno-nationalist move to restitute fascism's "golden era" is nationalistically anchored in what Anders Hellström, Ov Cristian Norocel, and Martin Bak Jørgensen describe as "the nostalgic longing for an ethnically homogenous past that never quite existed."[119] In theorizing nationalism in postsocialist contexts, Anikó Imre suggests its legitimacy "is grounded in mythical origin stories that can be resourced to posit collective beginnings, which then put the nation on a path towards a future destiny, a narrative journey shaped by power holders in the present."[120] For instance, during the summer of 2022, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán delivered an eerie speech in the small Romanian town of Băile Tușnad (which maintains an ethnic Hungarian majority) against the mixing of races, or what he called "species."[121] In his words, "We [Hungarians] are not a mixed species . . . and we do not want to become a mixed spe-

cies." Following his oration, Orbán traveled to the United States to speak on a Trumpian panel in Dallas, Texas, leading critics to theorize that his Romanian speech was just as much intended for US white supremacists as Hungarian fascists. Yet in Eastern Europe, his rhetoric also speaks to post-1989 promises of joining, or perhaps returning to, the European body. There, nationalists seek to purge racial "others within," while preventing Romania from being "colonized" with refugees.[122] Not coincidentally, this language invokes the presocialist period when Jews were described as having colonized Romania. To this end, AUR references "Jewish colonization" while also aspiring for a "revolution" to remove the "rotten system" allegedly controlled by George Soros.[123]

The spatiotemporal connections between the East and West, presocialist and postsocialist temporality, and liberalism and illiberalism invoke the conditions that communism first emerged to combat. It was as state socialism was solidifying across the Eastern bloc that Hannah Arendt and Karl Polanyi each charted connections between liberal democracy and fascism, suggesting that fascism (particularly Nazism) emerged from crises in liberal empires.[124] Arendt offered Nazism as a genealogy rooted in the late nineteenth-century German colonial expansion and genocide in Namibia. Meanwhile, Polanyi (who defended his dissertation in Cluj in 1909) saw the 1930s rise of fascism as an effect of state-enforced laissez-faire and self-regulating market economies. These markets, left unhindered, could not help but produce imperial domination, he observed. Nikhil Pal Singh argues that although these two thinkers offer much to study that connects liberalism, imperialism, racism, and fascism, they both fail to fully understand the raciality of US liberalism as well as its implications in Cold War socialist space.[125] Further, Arendt's critiques of Stalinist totalitarianism and German Nazism have too easily merged in popular interpretations, inspiring some of the conflations of fascism and socialism saturating liberal mythologies today. Cold War understandings of Soviet illiberal technologies have been mapped onto post-9/11 imaginaries of technoterrorism, for instance. As Atanasoski and Vora suggest, "As fascism was excised from the realm of the West to that of the East, then, certain modes of automation, especially those that reduced the human to the machine, came to be associated with ongoing states of unfreedom justifying US 'humanizing' imperial violence in the decolonizing world where the Cold War was fought."[126]

Robinson's theorization of fascism serves as antidote here, particularly his observation that for many non-Western peoples, "fascism—that is militarism, imperialism, racial authoritarianism, choreographed mob violence, millenarian crypto-Christian mysticism, and a nostalgic nationalism" has been "no more an historical aberration than colonialism, slave trade, and slavery."[127]

Even in Italy, fascism emerged as part of Mussolini's strategy to gain control of colonized peoples in Palestine, Libya, and East Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, and to suppress communist possibility.[128] In other words, capitalism and imperialism predate and inform fascist possibility. Similarly, in reflecting on the interwar imbrication of capitalism and fascism, James offers, "More and more groups of German capitalists began to see their way out in Hitler."[129] Anticolonial and Black radical thinkers continued to make these correlations throughout the Cold War. Yet in its aftermaths, liberals have mobilized what Lilith Mahmud describes as "fascism's spectral powers by invoking it as an imminent threat to political life."[130]

While liberalism has generally opposed what fascism stands for, Mahmud warns that "its own values of moderation, rationality, and freedom have at times displaced to the margins of legitimate political discourse not only fascist positions but also antifascist ones."[131] As has been made evident amid Light Revolution protests that discredit anticapitalist, antifascist organizing, but also within the broader project of Siliconization—which while framed as a liberal project, materials racial banishment and chastises antifascist work—fascism maintains power by stupefying "a normative liberal subjectivity into disarming antifascist resistance, thus abetting fascism's rise."[132] It is because of this that Mahmud calls for an anthropology of spectral fascism as well as an antifascist anthropology in order to locate how and why white supremacy sits at the core of both fascism and liberalism. Adrienne Pine builds on this in suggesting that an antifascist anthropology, as opposed to an anthropology of fascism, means explicitly taking a political stand in one's work. This requires disavowing liberalism while interrogating its conceptions of illiberalism. It also means reimagining ethnography beyond "individualistic neoliberal logics of funding and employment" and instead reframing it as "part of a collective, emancipatory project of anti-imperialist, anticapitalist struggle."[133] As Mahmud puts it, "An antifascist, illiberal anthropology, must be willing to name fascism even when it haunts democratic sites, when it latches onto liberal thought, when it sounds civilized and reasonable, when it incarnates in police uniforms rather than black shirts" (or green shirts in the case of Romania's Legionnaires who the AUR party venerates).[134] Embracing an antifascist anthropology then means not only studying AUR formations and supporting antifascist organizing, but also interrogating liberal constellations that, in reifying the Cold War inimical, fodder racial capitalist, neoliberal, and fascist specters.

Throughout this book, I participate in an antifascist ethnographic and reading practice invested in how antifascist postsocialist frameworks can apprehend the post–Cold War bifurcation of liberalism and illiberalism. Postso-

cialist analytics, alongside antifascist reading and ethnographic practices, are well positioned to assess this impasse, but also the time and space of political action. Indeed, amid the cosmic ruptures of today's Cold War 2.0, marked by white supremacist leaders and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as liberal constellations opposing the two, postsocialism is far from a place of retirement. With this in mind, *Silicon Valley Imperialism* aims to reshape the spatial extent of postsocialism, positioning it as an emerging theoretical concept useful in assessing contestations of race, space, empire, technology, liberalism, and illiberalism, as well as anticapitalist, antifascist, and anti-imperial collectives that have inherited socialist legacies.

Unbecoming

Part of the work of crafting a postsocialist ethnography means charting the ongoing work of refusing, refuting, and unbecoming subsumed by capital, and in this case, Siliconized. After all, despite its real powers, Silicon Valley imperialism is also a project that continually fails to absorb, explain, and transform all that it desires. While it champions figments of ingenuity and novelty, Siliconization depends on the predation of prior technofuturisms—some of which, when conjured anew, can lead to its own corruption. Perched on NTT's balcony, staring out at the new construction surrounding us, my friend, a couple of decades older than me, begins to remember the thrill she had as a child in the 1970s when the nearby Central Commercial Center—then a marker of socialist modernity—opened its doors to the public for the first time. As Stephen Collier offers, perhaps what was most remarkable during this era was not the state's ability "to create 'ideal cities of the future' but its utterly pathological inability to do anything else."[135] Indeed, techno-urban modernity was part and parcel of the social project.

Today, amid the ruins of this future past, the Central Commercial Center's top floor has been transformed into ClujHub—a coworking space with daily talks in which successful Westerners attempt local entrepreneurial inculcation, and in which Romanian technologists teach successful business practices. It also houses Uber, much to the chagrin of local taxi drivers, many of whom are working class and/or Roma and many of whom have protested against its transportation monopolization. Recounting her first visit to the Central Commercial Center with her mother in the 1970s, my friend pauses, and then begins to question if that not-so-distant memory mirrors that of NTT opening its cosmological fourth floor up to us today. Rather than trumpeting socialist prosperity though, the imagery surrounding us at NTT is one of global capital.

And yet, its success depends on the exoskeletons of socialist infrastructure, not to mention the computing prowess of many who grew up during socialism and its aftermaths. Might Silicon Valley imperialism's own proclamations of ingenuity then be a fiction of sorts—one corrupted by the ghosts of a techno-futurity that came before?

With this in mind, *Silicon Valley Imperialism* focuses on the entanglements, ruptures, frictions, and fictions caught up in Siliconization. By fictions, I signal the speculative fantasies and desires entrenched in both socialist and postsocialist technocultures. Becoming Silicon Valley, after all, is only one of many imagined anticipatory trajectories that, while partly true, also elides other visions and futures. It was only during the Cold War that Bay Area geographies "became" Silicon Valley, recoding settler technologies of enclosure onto stolen lands. Despite this, Ohlone land rematriation projects led by groups such as the feminist Sogorea Te' Land Trust are hard at work reclaiming stolen land within ever-expanding Siliconized borders.[136] At the same time, housing and racial justice organizing work continue its undoing in Romania. Groups such as Căși Sociale ACUM! in Cluj and its sister organization, the Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire (FCDL/The Common Front for Housing Rights) in Bucharest, organize daily against technologies of dispossession—thereby also undoing Siliconization. Underground cyber projects also endure, many driven by șmecherie practices of deviancy. There are also art and theater collectives engaging in technological worldmaking projects illegible to Silicon imperial reading practices. By worldmaking, here I build on Adom Getachew's description of a venture that while critical of imperial inheritances, nevertheless aims to create new movements, worlds, and connections against empire.[137]

Engagement with these worlds allows me to illustrate how post–Cold War end-of-history narratives are only some of many postsocialist speculations. In other words, anti-imperial worldmaking projects effectively corrupt Siliconization by speculating on other futures past. Speculation, as Aimee Bahng illustrates, is not solely the domain of finance capital.[138] Speculation can also invoke Samir Amin's proposition to move beyond negative critique by anticipating "the world we wish to see."[139] This allows us to reactivate, as Gary Wilder suggests, "repeating traces of unrealized past possibilities, of alternative forms of life."[140] Sometimes then, acts of speculation involve extrapolating technological futures past to undo Silicon Valley imperial circuits of reproduction. Aligned with what Karen Barad describes as the work of "re-membering," speculation then regenerates "what never was but might yet have been."[141] This does not mean wallowing in the genre of socialist nostalgia, but rather engaging in

pluralistic postsocialist possibilities past and present beyond the state and beyond empire.

Connections

The worldmaking projects against Silicon Valley imperialism mapped throughout this book take place in Eastern Europe and the United States. Rather than compare Siliconization across these spaces, I trace connections and entanglements. In observing that comparative approaches to traditional area studies might force false reductions, Sanjay Subrahmanyam once suggested that perhaps a connected approach might be more useful in understanding spatial tethering and transactions.[142] Lisa Lowe has similarly argued that comparative methods have become too institutionalized, used to produce modern knowledge by mapping deviations from Western rationality and ideals.[143] With this in mind, Gillian Hart writes, "Political stakes are especially important since much of what travels under the banner of 'comparison' tends to be deeply retrograde."[144] To this end, Ananya Roy has noted that for some time now, poor people's movements and the work of nonalignment has maintained "an imagination of trans-national thinking and global inter-connectivity." Their vision, she writes, "is not one of comparison . . . but can the critical theory catch up?"[145] Indeed, what would it mean to produce interconnected studies driven by poor people's movements in alignment with anti-imperial and antifascist organizing rather than simply comparative studies of urban spaces or Silicon Valley from up above?

Building on this, rather than employing a comparative framework in which two distinct spaces are compared side by side—in this case, Romania and Silicon Valley—here I employ *connected methods* to foreground relationalities that center housing, racial, and technological justice as entwined fields of inquiry. Aligned with what Donna Haraway describes as feminist practices of situated knowledge production[146] as well as what Kim TallBear offers as practices of "standing with" by conducting research in good relations,[147] this book interrogates imperial modes of knowledge production. It draws on ethnographic engagement and collaborative mapping projects, as well as interdisciplinary reading practices. In combining and connecting methods, I embrace what Mel Y. Chen describes as an "exceedingly, rudely feral transdisciplinarity,"[148] one rooted in connections across an array of sources and spacetimes. Inspired by Lowe's tactic of "reading across archives" to understand the "intimacies and contemporaneities that traverse distinct and separately studied 'areas,'"

I aim to unsettle "the discretely bounded objects, methods, and temporal frameworks canonized by a national history invested in isolated origins and in dependent progressive development."[149] Or, as McKittrick writes: "Connections. Reading across a range of texts and ideas and narratives—academic and nonacademic—encourages multifarious ways of thinking through the possibilities of liberation and provides clues about living through the unmet promises of modernity."[150] Lingering in spaces of connection then means refusing to objectify people as data or sites from which to apprehend difference. It also means refusing the boundaries and comparativities of Western modern knowledge production.

Connection also requires rootedness to the ground itself. Here I draw on Jodi Byrd, Alyosha Goldstein, Jodi Melamed, and Chandan Reddy's provocation that by maintaining a relationship to the land itself, by seeing it as "an ontological condition for a different concept of the political that refuses conquest," futures beyond "economies of dispossession" are possible.[151] I have strived to maintain such grounded relationalities in conducting research for this book, which does not feign a semblance of objective distance and which refrains from reducing the dispossessed to sites of authenticity, but rather takes place through my relationships, commitments, and collaborations on the ground—all of which revolve around an explicit vision of spatial/racial justice and anti-imperialism. In the Bay Area, much of this grounded thinking generates from my work with the AEMP. I cofounded the AEMP in 2013 to support direct action and mutual aid housing justice work. Since then, I have been plugged into the collective daily, working with a brilliant group of volunteer researchers, mappers, storytellers, and software developers, all committed to producing work that supports tenant organizing despite Silicon Valley. I have also mobilized countermapping techniques to support housing justice knowledge in Bucharest and Cluj, where I have lived and visited off and on for over a decade. Much of this book draws on time spent in community there between 2011 and 2019, with a heavier concentration between 2016 and 2019, during which I participated in housing justice research while attending art events, protests, and political theater performances. Much of this time was spent with the FCDL in Bucharest, as well as with Căși in Cluj. These two collectives prioritize work that directly empowers on-the-ground anti-eviction organizing.

Groups such as the FCDL are deeply embedded in local anarchist, feminist, and anti-racist social centers where countless hours are spent meeting, learning, cooking, collaborating, and dancing. Much of my time in Bucharest was spent within the space of the Macaz Bar Teatru Coop (Macaz Bar Theater Cooperative). There, I attended countless talks, organizing meetings, parties, and

political theater performances, constantly learning from the organizing, artistic, and community-building work of colleagues, collaboratives, and comrades. Artist, organizer, and political theorist Veda Popovici served as an important teacher, friend, and comrade in many of these spaces, and this book is in large part indebted to ongoing conversations with her. I also spent time in Macaz's sister space, A-casă in Cluj, a feminist anarchist social center then situated on Someșului Street. There, if you sit in the garden where the collective grows fruits and vegetables, NTT's tower peeks out above the bustling technoscape of new tech construction.

While this book is based on these collective commitments, I have also ventured into tech conferences, meetings, and hubs in the spirit of what Laura Nader calls "studying up."[152] Ethnographic work in these spaces has helped me chart not only the material impacts of Siliconization, but also how different understandings of futurity, technology, and postsocialism collide. This has also allowed me to weave together complex perspectives, from tech workers staffing US call centers to former hackers from Râmnicu Vâlcea—the Romanian mountain town infamously nominated as "Hackerville" by the West. While studying technocultural conjunctures, frictions, and fantasies in these spaces, my analysis of Silicon Valley imperialism remains deeply grounded in and through my commitment to anti-imperial worldmaking.

Chapter Map

Silicon Valley Imperialism is divided into two parts: "Silicon Valley Spatiotemporality" and "Techno Frictions and Fantasies." The first focuses on geographies of Siliconization and racial dispossession both in Romania and in the San Francisco Bay Area. The latter more broadly explores the multiple temporalities of socialism, the Cold War, and their aftermaths, providing a view of the present Siliconizing trajectory and its dominant (fascist) futures before exploring alternatives. While any chapter can be read on its own and in any order, I nevertheless recommend reading them sequentially to follow the threads that this book sews.

Chapter 1, "Digital Nomads and Deracinated Dispossession," positions the figure of the digital nomad as an avatar for Silicon Valley imperialism. It investigates how the landing of digital nomads and Western tech in Cluj cannibalizes Roma housing and personhood, updating presocialist racial property logics. It also shows how the digital nomad, while complicit in postsocialist processes of gentrification, discursively recodes Orientalist fantasies of the "free and wandering Gypsy," a literary trope that emerged within the heart of

nineteenth-century Western Europe to allegorize imperiality. The deracinated nomad's fetishization today indexes Silicon Valley's imperial status, while transiting presocialist private property relations into postsocialist times. To better illustrate imperial violence but also resistance to it, this chapter engages in a close reading of a storymapping project coproduced with Căși, as well as ethnographic work assessing the racial geographies of digital nomadism and smart city production.

Chapter 2, "Postsocialist Silicon Valley," transits to the San Francisco Bay Area, where I assess how the Cold War and its aftermaths recode colonial spatiality through a series of dispossessive booms and busts that encroach upon common spaces and anticapitalist politics. I look at the Valley's imperial formation, assessing how gold rush legacies and Cold War technocultures have morphed into consumerist playgrounds for the rich today. By mapping the co-optation of socialist ideals such as sharing, I track technoliberal moments in postsocialist contexts. At the same time, the chapter mobilizes postsocialist analytics to apprehend anticapitalist pasts, presents, and futures that refuse Silicon Valley imperial plans. Throughout, I engage with housing justice work in which I have been a part while also weaving in historical uprisings and illustrations from political artist Fernando Martí.

Chapter 3, "The Technofascist Specters of Liberalism," investigates how liberal property and protest formations on both sides of the former Iron Curtain enable technofascism to spread. Refusing the post–Cold War trope that positions "the dangerous East" as the harbinger of authoritarianism that liberalism will save the world from, I instead suggest that the East offers important lessons regarding how liberalism prefigures fascist possibility. In compiling a genealogy of Romanian populist protest movements that have slowly seen anticapitalist politics get co-opted by the anticommunist right, I chart the increasingly cramped space from which to foster dissent. Engaging a counterfactual exercise, this chapter also describes a protest that never came to be against the furniture company IKEA. While Romanian liberals have mobilized against the incursions of a Canadian gold mining company that has sought to plunder the country's minerals, they have failed to organize against the largest owner of Romanian forestlands in part due to the liberal fantasies of Western intimacy that IKEA affords.

Chapter 4, "The Most Dangerous Town on the Internet," looks at how Silicon Valley imperialism builds on Cold War imaginaries while disavowing its own technofascist past. It explores the role of IBM in powering Romania's presocialist genocidal project while also looking at the company's postsocial-

ist incursion aimed at capitalizing on socialism's remains. At the same time, the chapter investigates how Western technological imaginaries collapse communism and fascism together, promising salvation through Siliconization. By drawing on ethnographic research and archival investigations, it explores Romanian computing histories. It also follows a theater play made by the Bucharest-based playwright David Schwartz that brings to the fore lived experiences of postsocialist technological transition.

Chapter 5, "Corruption, Șmecherie, and Clones," further explores socialist and postsocialist technoculture in Romania, focusing on retrospective and speculative accounts of what did, and what could have, transpired beyond the purview of the state, capitalist transition, and the Siliconized present. Against a backdrop of anticommunist politics, the chapter looks to deviant technological practices that existed, and that perhaps could have corrupted, Silicon Valley imperialism from materializing. While describing a collaborative art piece by Veda Popovici and Mircea Nicolae, *Istoria (Nu) Se Repetă* (History [Does Not] Repeat Itself), I pepper in ethnographies of scammers, computer cloners, and political artists who illustrate practices of *șmecherie*. These *șmecherie* narrations, technocultures, imaginations, and speculations, I suggest, corrupt Siliconization.

Chapter 6, "Spells for Outer Space," builds on ongoing speculative themes, weaving together socialist astrofuturism portrayed in Romanian and Moldovan film, art, and speculative fiction with ethnographic observations of capitalist ruination. I begin with a close reading of the film *Gagarin's Tree* by Mona Vătămanu and Florin Tudor, which features the Romanian scholar of decolonization Ovidiu Țichindeleanu considering socialist visions of developing an anticapitalist utopia in outer space. While illustrating materialities that emerged from these dreams, I also question why they crumbled after 1989. While communist utopianism was based on friendships with other Second and Third World peoples, and while it in large part developed in resistance to presocialist fascism, state socialism never managed to fully resolve anti-Roma racism. What might have happened if socialist astrofuturism could have better integrated what Roma feminist playwright Mihaela Drăgan describes as Roma futurism?[153] Might this, coupled with anticapitalist and antifascist organizing, helped avert the Siliconized genre of astrofuturity dominating cosmological imaginaries today?

The book's coda, "Unbecoming Silicon Valley," looks at frictions engendered in both the United States and Romania through practices of outsourcing landlordism. Today, US corporate landlords use digital "proptech" platforms

to facilitate scalable property management and sell fantasies of frictionless automation. Yet in fact many deploy outsourced labor in locales such as Cluj. On one hand, by deploying Romanian workers behind the magical curtain of automation, novel circulations of race, labor, tenancy, and capital are animated. On the other, propertied frictions also bear potentiality for new transnational geographies of resistance, ones connected by housing and labor movements. Such resistance is part and parcel of the project of unbecoming Silicon Valley as it weakens the Silicon grip on technology, property, and futurity. As the stories woven together throughout this book evoke, anti-imperial worldmaking projects necessitate new transnational solidarities and connections, ones also grounded in the ongoing work of racial, spatial, and technological justice.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 Roy, "Dis/Possessive Collectivism."
2 Popovici, "Becoming Western."
3 Vincze, "Ideology of Economic Liberalism," 32–33.
4 Zamfir, "Countering Housing Dispossession."
5 Chelcea and Druță, "Zombie Socialism."
6 Verdery, *My Life as a Spy*.
7 Atanasoski and Vora, "Postsocialist Politics"; Taylor and Brehmer, *Commonist Horizon*.
8 Mahmud, "We Have Never Been Liberal."
9 Stoler and McGranahan, *Imperial Formations*, 8–9.
10 Stoler and McGranahan, *Imperial Formations*, 8.
11 Rofel, *Desiring China*, 22.
12 Fiscutean, "'Life Is Pretty Good Here'"; Petrovici, "Working Status."
13 Mateescu, "In the Romanian Bubble," 243.
14 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*, 150.
15 Linguistically, *șmecherie* is used by Roma and non-Roma Romanians alike due to the prevalence of Roma culture in poor and working-class space and exists without an exact English equivalency.
16 Lindtner, *Prototype Nation*, 5.
17 Hu, *Prehistory of the Cloud*; Larkin, *Signal and Noise*; Mattern, *Code, Clay, and Dirt*.
18 Tadiar, "City Everywhere," 57.
19 Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*.
20 Willey, *Undoing Monogamy*, 3.
21 Tsing, *Friction*, xi.
22 Robinson, *Black Marxism*.
23 Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*.
24 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 67.
25 Costache, "Subjects of Racialized Modernity."

26 Rexhepi, *White Enclosures*, 10.

27 Todorova, *Unequal under Socialism*.

28 Rexhepi, *White Enclosures*, 19.

29 Mireanu, "Incriminarea Romilor Din Baia Mare."

30 Vincze and Zamfir, "Racialized Housing Unevenness," 452.

31 Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*.

32 Aston and Philpin, *Brenner Debate*; Morozov, "Critique of Techno-Feudal Reason," 102.

33 Brenner, "Origins of Capitalist Development."

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35 Marx, *Capital*, 1:348.

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37 Chakravartty and Silva, "Introduction," 368.

38 Chakravartty and Silva, "Introduction," 368.

39 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*, 4.

40 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*, 2.

41 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 7.

42 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 7.

43 Boatcă, "Counter-Mapping as Method," 253.

44 Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms"; Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*.

45 Boatcă, "Counter-Mapping as Method," 254.

46 Atanasoski and Vora, *Surrogate Humanity*, 4.

47 O'Mara, *The Code*; Weiss, *America Inc.*?

48 Benjamin, *Race after Technology*, 13.

49 Walker, *Pictures of a Gone City*, 7.

50 Irani, *Chasing Innovation*.

51 Schrock, "Silicon Valley."

52 Ahmed, *Promise of Happiness*.

53 Berlant, *Cruel Optimism*.

54 Tran, Twitter post.

55 Byrd, *Transit of Empire*, 28.

56 Madley, *American Genocide*.

57 Harris, *Palo Alto*, 21–22.

58 Harris, *Palo Alto*, 22.

59 Harris, *Palo Alto*, 22.

60 Estes, *Our History Is the Future*, 363.

61 Roy, "Dis/Possessive Collectivism," 3.

62 Pellow and Park, *Silicon Valley of Dreams*.

63 Hoefler, "Silicon Valley, USA."

64 Wiener, *Human Use of Human Beings*.

65 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*; Turner, "Machine Politics."

66 Roy, Schrader, and Crane, "Gray Areas."

67 Atanasoski and Vora, *Surrogate Humanity*, 11–12.

68 Rule, "Reagan Gets a Red Carpet."

69 Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality," 296.

70 Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality," 296.

71 Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality," 317.

72 Fukuyama, *End of History*.

73 Anderson, "End of Theory."

74 Chan, *Networking Peripheries*.

75 Toyama, "Problem with the Plan."

76 Friend, "Sam Altman's Manifest Destiny."

77 Solon, "Elon Musk."

78 McKittrick, *Dear Science and Other Stories*, 109.

79 Many scholars have argued that postsocialism is a global condition. See Fraser, *Justice Interruptus*; Lykke, "Rethinking Socialist and Marxist Legacies"; Verdery, *What Was Socialism?*; Shih, "Is the *Post-* in Postsocialism?"; Suchland, "Is Postsocialism Transnational?"

80 Atanasoski and Vora, "Postsocialist Politics," 139.

81 Koobak, Tlostanova, and Thapar-Björkert, "Uneasy Affinities," 1–2.

82 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*, 150.

83 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*, 175.

84 Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 2.

85 Derrida, *Specters of Marx*; Robinson, *Anthropology of Marxism*.

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87 Graeber and Wengrow, *Dawn of Everything*.

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89 Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*; Roy and Bhan, "Lessons from Somewhere."

90 Tlostanova, *Postcolonialism and Postsocialism*.

91 Shih, "Is the *Post-* in Postsocialism?"; Rofel, *Desiring China*.

92 Verdery, "Faith, Hope, and Caritas," 35.

93 Koobak, Tlostanova, and Thapar-Björkert, "Uneasy Affinities," 2.

94 Dunn, *Privatizing Poland*; Humphrey and Verdery, *Property in Question*; Razsa, *Bastards of Utopia*; Verdery, "Faith, Hope, and Caritas."

95 Tlostanova, *Postcolonialism and Postsocialism*, 4.

96 Nolan, "Trevor Noah."

97 Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*; Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*.

98 Groys, *Art Power*, 154–55.

99 Starosta, "Perverse Tongues, Postsocialist Translations," 205.

100 Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 5.

101 Robinson, "Cities in a World"; Spivak, *Death of a Discipline*.

102 Ouředníček, "Relevance of 'Western' Theoretical Concepts," 547.

103 Sjöberg, "'Cases unto Themselves?'"

104 Gentile, "Three Metals," 1140.

105 Vilenica, "Who Has 'the Right to Common'?," 12.

106 Chari and Verdery, "Thinking between the Posts," 11.

107 Chari and Verdery, "Thinking between the Posts," 29.

108 Even when it comes to less emancipatory revolutions, for instance the industrial and AI revolutions, postsocialist frameworks are helpful in unpacking associated

understandings of the human, freedom, and futurity. See Atanasoski and Vora, *Surrogate Humanity*.

109 Cucu, "Acts of Collusion," 276.
110 Lemon, *Technologies for Intuition*.
111 Yurchak, "Trump, Monstration and the Limits," 1.
112 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*.
113 Robinson, "Fascism and the Intersections"; James, "After Hitler, Our Turn."
114 Morozov, "Critique of Techno-Feudal Reason."
115 Nahoi, "De Vorbă cu Ideologul AUR."
116 Chiruta, "Representation of Roma."
117 Codruț, "O Stewardesă Ryanair a EXPLODAT."
118 Costache, "'Until We Are Able.'"
119 Hellström, Norocel, and Jørgensen, "Nostalgia and Hope," 2.
120 Imre, "Illiberal White Fantasies."
121 Böröcz, "Horror of Miscegenation."
122 Cinpoeş and Norocel, "Nostalgic Nationalism"; Tudor, "Partidul România Unită."
123 Cârstocea, "First as Tragedy."
124 Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*; Polanyi, *Great Transformation*.
125 Singh, *Race and America's Long War*, 111–13.
126 Atanasoski and Vora, *Surrogate Humanity*, 40.
127 Robinson, "Fascism and the Intersections," 152.
128 Robinson, "Fascism and the Response."
129 James, "After Hitler, Our Turn," 325.
130 Mahmud, "Fascism, a Haunting," 143.
131 Mahmud, "Fascism, a Haunting," 143.
132 Mahmud, "Fascism, a Haunting," 144.
133 Pine, "Field Is upon Us."
134 Mahmud, "Fascism, a Haunting," 160.
135 Collier, *Post-Soviet Social*, 112.
136 Gould, "Ohlone Geographies."
137 Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*.
138 Bahng, *Migrant Futures*.
139 Amin, *World We Wish to See*.
140 Wilder, "Hasty Reflections."
141 Barad, "Transmaterialities," 406–7.
142 Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories," 745.
143 Lowe, "Insufficient Difference."
144 Hart, "Relational Comparison Revisited," 372.
145 Roy and Bhan, "Lessons from Somewhere."
146 Haraway, "Situated Knowledges."
147 TallBear, "Standing with and Speaking as Faith."
148 Chen, *Animacies*, 234.
149 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*, 6.
150 McKittrick, *Dear Science and Other Stories*, 48.
151 Byrd et al., "Predatory Value," 10.

152 Nader, "Up the Anthropologist."

153 Drăgan, "Roma Futurism Manifesto."

1. DIGITAL NOMADS AND DERACINATED DISPOSSESSION

1   Coastei Street is now Episcop Nicolae Ivan Street.

2   In addition to Nokia's office, the "Octavian Goga" Cluj County Library was slated to be built, along with a series of mansions and new headquarters for the Faculty of Orthodox Theology based out of the city's Babeș-Bolyai University.

3   Zincă, "Grounding Global Capitalism."

4   Căși Sociale ACUM!, "Humanitarian, Ecological and Housing Crisis."

5   Voyles, *Wastelanding*, 15.

6   Pellow and Park, *Silicon Valley of Dreams*.

7   Popovici, "Becoming Western."

8   Miszczyński, *Dialectical Meaning*, 58; Zincă, "Grounding Global Capitalism."

9   Mireanu, "Security at the Nexus," 126–29; Raț, "Și țiganul este aproapele meu?"

10 Tsing, *Friction*, 74.

11 Vincze and Zamfir, "Racialized Housing Unevenness," 443.

12 Romania Journal, "Romanian Parliament."

13 By deracinated dispossession, I build on a concept that I first developed with Alex Werth in which we mapped out how Siliconized analysis in San Francisco gentrification has bled into Oakland, deracinating contexts of East Bay dispossession that predate and exceed Silicon Valley–induced gentrification such as the foreclosure crisis or Cold War–era policing of Black-owned music venues. See: McElroy and Werth, "Deracinated Dispossessions."

14 Lancione, "Politics of Embodied Urban Precarity"; Popovici, "Residences, Restitutions and Resistance."

15 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "One Day."

16 AT&T Tech Channel, "Interview with Arthur C. Clarke."

17 Saxenian, *New Argonauts*.

18 Taylor, "Life as a Digital Gypsy."

19 Said, *Orientalism*.

20 Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms"; Lowe, "Rereadings in Orientalism"; Saul, *Gypsies and Orientalism*; Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*; Zăloagă, "Professing Domestic Orientalism."

21 Said, *Orientalism*, 247.

22 Lemon, *Between Two Fires*, 37.

23 Brooks, "Possibilities of Romani Feminism."

24 Gheorghe, "Cu Fustele-n Cap," 140.

25 Bițu and Vincze, "Personal Encounters"; Costache, "Roma Futurism and Roma Healing"; Gheorghe, Mark, and Vincze, "Towards an Anti-racist Feminism"; Kóczé et al., *Romani Women's Movement*; Oprea, "Romani Feminism in Reactionary Times"; Roman, "'Neither Here, Nor There'"; Rucker-Chang, "Challenging Americanism and Europeanism"; Vișan and Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire, *Jurnal Din Vulturilor*.

26 Costache, "Subjects of Racialized Modernity."

27 Duncan, "Wild England," 382.

28 Clare, *Poems of the Middle Period,* 52.

29 Sonneman, "Dark Mysterious Wanderers," 130.

30 Saul, *Gypsies and Orientalism*, 117.

31 Lemon, *Between Two Fires*, 47–48.

32 Mróz, *Roma-Gypsy Presence*.

33 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 69.

34 Kay, "Digital Nomad Deception."

35 Hayes, "'We Gained a Lot,'" 1954.

36 Mullaney et al., *Your Computer Is on Fire*.

37 Kay, "Digital Nomad Deception."

38 Mateescu, "In the Romanian Bubble," 247.

39 Henderson, "Best Cities to Live."

40 Bunici, "Best Work-Friendly Coffee Shops."

41 Atlas & Boots, "Best Countries for Remote Workers."

42 Romania Journal, "Romanian Parliament."

43 Turp-Balazs, "Romania Becomes Latest CEE Country."

44 Cocola-Gant, "Tourism Gentrification."

45 Zara, "Best Places for Digital Nomads in Cluj."

46 Lonely Planet, "Top Region to Visit."

47 Cristian, "Uber Reaches 17 Cities."

48 Morin, "Romania Is Not the Land."

49 Light, "Facing the Future," 1058.

50 Kahancová, Meszmann, and Sedláková, "Precarization via Digitalization?"

51 Pavlínek, "Regional Development Implications."

52 Miszczyński, *Dialectical Meaning of Offshored Work*, 27–29.

53 Miszczyński, *Dialectical Meaning of Offshored Work*, 21–23.

54 Colliers International, "Romania Research and Forecast Report," 18; Digital Nomads Romania, "Coworking Spaces in Bucharest."

55 Marica, "Cluj-Napoca and Bucharest."

56 Ban, *Ruling Ideas*.

57 Eurostat, "Foreign Control of Enterprises."

58 Filip, Kmen, and Tisler, "Digital Challengers."

59 Filip, Kmen, and Tisler, "Digital Challengers."

60 TopCoder, "Community Statistics."

61 International Trade Administration, "Romania."

62 Senycia, "Developers in Romania."

63 Senycia, "Developers in Romania."

64 N-iX, "Top IT Outsourcing Destinations."

65 Brainspotting, "Europe Technology Talent Map," 6–7.

66 Brainspotting, "Europe Technology Talent Map," 35; Brainspotting, "IT Talent Map," 4.

67 Softech, "Software Outsourcing."

68 Fiscutean, "In Romania."

69 Colliers International, "Romania Research"; Filip, Kmen, and Tisler, "Digital Challengers."

70 Eurostat, "People at Risk."
71 Brainspotting, "IT&C Talent Map"; Brainspotting, "IT Talent Map"; Brainspotting, "Europe Technology Talent Map," 35; Eurostat, "Annual Detailed Enterprise Statistics."
72 Petrovici and Mare, *Economia Clujului*.
73 Brainspotting, "IT Talent Map," 9.
74 Mateescu, "In the Romanian Bubble," 245.
75 Brainspotting, "IT&C Talent Map," 6.
76 Mateescu, "In the Romanian Bubble," 245.
77 Kahancová, Meszmann, and Sedláková, "Precarization via Digitalization?"
78 Florea and Popovici, "Complicities, Solidarities," 141; Vincze and Zamfir, "Racialized Housing Unevenness," 446–47.
79 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 70.
80 Achim, *Roma in Romanian History*.
81 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 72.
82 Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies," 264.
83 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 67.
84 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 70.
85 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 77.
86 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 79.
87 Grellmann, *Dissertation on the Gipsies*, ix.
88 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 57.
89 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*.
90 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 62.
91 Achim, *Roma in Romanian History*.
92 Necula, "Cost of Roma Slavery," 37.
93 Achim, *Roma in Romanian History*, 113; Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies," 266.
94 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*, 75.
95 Achim, *Roma in Romanian History*, 122–24; Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies," 267.
96 Petrovici et al., "Racialized Labour," 7.
97 Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies," 269; Turda, *Modernism and Eugenics*, 72–79.
98 Chelcea, *Ţiganii din România: monografie etnografică*, 99.
99 Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies," 267.
100 Hajská, "'We Had to Run Away.'"
101 Ancel, *History of the Holocaust*, 2.
102 Achim, *Roma in Romanian History*, 89.
103 Kelso, "'And Roma Were Victims, Too,'"; Achim, *Roma in Romanian History*, 89; Anastasoaie, "Roma/Gypsies," 270; Ancel, *History of the Holocaust*, 2.
104 Friling, Ioanid, and Ionescu, *Final Report*.
105 Ioanid, *Ransom of the Jews*, 93; Levy, *Ana Pauker*.
106 Lancione, "Politics of Embodied Urban Precarity," 4.
107 Florea and Dumitriu, "Living on the Edge," 193.
108 Vincze, "Ideology of Economic Liberalism"; Zamfirescu and Chelcea, "Evictions as Infrastructural Events," 6.
109 Petrovici et al., "Racialized Labour," 7.

110   Dean, Goschler, and Ther, *Robbery and Restitution*.

111   Shafir, "Varieties of Antisemitism"; Shafir, "Polls and Antisemitism," 415.

112   Chelcea, Popescu, and Cristea, "Who Are the Gentrifiers?"

113   McElroy, "Public Thinker."

114   Zavisca, *Housing the New Russia*.

115   Zamfir, "Countering Illegibility," 38.

116   Eurostat, "People at Risk"; O'Neill, *The Space of Boredom*.

117   Gheorghe, Mark, and Vincze, "Towards an Anti-racist Feminism"; Matache, "Bi-ased Elites, Unfit Policies"; Vișan and Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire, *Jurnal Din Vulturilor.*

118   Verdery, "Fuzzy Property."

119   Verdery, *What Was Socialism?*

120   Grama, *Socialist Heritage*, 177.

121   Grama, *Socialist Heritage*, 178.

122   Zamfir, "Countering Illegibility," 41.

123   Kusiak, "Legal Technologies."

124   Stan, "Roof over Our Heads."

125   Atanasoski, *Humanitarian Violence*, 17.

126   Verdery, "Fuzzy Property," 54.

127   Zamfirescu and Chelcea, "Evictions as Infrastructural Events," 7.

128   Rorke, "Eyes Wide Shut."

129   Florea and Dumitriu, "Living on the Edge," 196.

130   Vincze, "Ideology of Economic Liberalism," 32–33.

131   Zamfirescu and Chelcea, "Evictions as Infrastructural Events," 7.

132   Vișan and Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire, *Jurnal Din Vulturilor*; Zamfir et al., "Housing Struggles in Romania."

133   McElroy, "Digital Cartographies of Displacement"; Maharawal and McElroy, "Anti-Eviction Mapping Project."

134   Roy, "Dis/Possessive Collectivism."

135   Vincze and Zamfir, "Racialized Housing Unevenness," 452.

136   Colliers International, "Romania Research and Forecast Report," 18.

137   Mattern, "Post-It Note City."

138   Vincze, "Ideology of Economic Liberalism," 41.

139   Vincze, "Ideology of Economic Liberalism," 42.

140   Vincze and Zamfir, "Racialized Housing Unevenness," 453.

141   Petrovici, "Working Status," 41.

142   Romania Insider, "Over 43% of Romania's GDP."

143   Van Baar, "Emergence of a Reasonable Anti-Gypsyism."

144   Petrovici, "Working Status," 51.

145   Liberty Technology Park, "Liberty Technology Park Cluj."

146   Tadiar, "Metropolitan Life and Uncivil Death," 320.

147   Vincze and Zamfir, "Racialized Housing Unevenness," 457.

148   Kóczé, "Race, Migration and Neoliberalism," 461.

149   Tudor and Rexhepi, "Connecting the 'Posts,'" 1.

150   Kóczé, "Race, Migration and Neoliberalism," 461.

151 Căși Sociale ACUM!, "To Whom?"

152 Căși Sociale ACUM!, "To Whom?"

153 Mirabal, "Geographies of Displacement," 30.

154 Mirabal, "Geographies of Displacement," 30.

155 Căși Sociale ACUM!, "To Whom?"

156 Barad, "Troubling Time/s and Ecologies," 76.

2. POSTSOCIALIST SILICON VALLEY

1 Martí, *Futuros Fugaces*.

2 Hippler, *Hunter's Point*.

3 Shaping San Francisco, "John Ross."

4 Carlsson, "Hunters Point Uprising."

5 Gray-Garcia, "Ending Eviction Moratoriums."

6 Daniel, "Top Tech Analyst."

7 Maharawal, "Tech-Colonialism."

8 Dubal, "Drive to Precarity"; Opillard, "From San Francisco's 'Tech Boom 2.0.'"

9 Atanasoski and Vora, *Surrogate Humanity*.

10 Brahinsky and Tarr, *People's Guide*, 8.

11 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*, 6.

12 Pellow and Park, *Silicon Valley of Dreams*; Roy, Schrader, Crane, "Gray Areas"; Self, *American Babylon*.

13 Estes, *Our History Is the Future*, 169–200; Harris, *Palo Alto*, 301–59.

14 Atanasoski and Vora, "Postsocialist Politics," 143.

15 Gibson-Graham, *Postcapitalist Politics*, 2.

16 Atanasoski and Vora, "Postsocialist Politics," 144.

17 Fukuyama, *End of History*.

18 Spencer, "Long before Tech Bros."

19 Madley, *American Genocide*, 36.

20 NoiseCat, "'Taking Back What's Ours.'"

21 Pellow and Park, *Silicon Valley of Dreams*, 50.

22 Baumgardner, *Yanks in the Redwoods*.

23 Harris, *Palo Alto*, 15.

24 Shinn, *Mining Camps*.

25 Harris, "Whiteness as Property."

26 Madley, *American Genocide*.

27 Burnett, "State of the State Address."

28 Blomley, "Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence."

29 Hayes and Acton, *Travellers, Gypsies, Roma*.

30 Harvey, *New Imperialism*, 149.

31 Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 10.

32 Parvulescu and Boatcă, *Creolizing the Modern*; Robinson, *Black Marxism*.

33 Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*.

34 Schaeffer, *Unsettled Borders*, 9.

35 Blanchfield, "Top Guns."