


THE REPUBLIC  
 OF  
PLATO

SECOND EDITION

TRANSLATED WITH NOTES AND  
AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY BY

ALLAN BLOOM



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509 c "I suppose I will leave out quite a bit," I said. "But all the same, insofar as it's possible at present, I'll not leave anything out willingly."

"Don't," he said.

d "Well, then," I said, "conceive that, as we say, these two things *are*, and that the one is king of the intelligible class and region, while the other is king of the visible. I don't say 'of the heaven' so as not to seem to you to be playing the sophist with the name.<sup>35</sup> Now, do you have these two forms, visible and intelligible?"

"I do."

e "Then, take a line cut in two unequal segments, one for the class that is seen, the other for the class that is intellected—and go on and cut each segment in the same ratio. Now, in terms of relative clarity and obscurity, you'll have one segment in the visible part for images. I mean by images first shadows, then appearances produced in water and in all close-grained, smooth, bright things, and everything of the sort, if you understand."

510 a "I do understand."

"Then in the other segment put that of which this first is the likeness—the animals around us, and everything that grows, and the whole class of artifacts."

"I put them there," he said.

"And would you also be willing," I said, "to say that with respect to truth or lack of it, as the opinable is distinguished from the knowable, so the likeness is distinguished from that of which it is the likeness?"

b "I would indeed," he said.

"Now, in its turn, consider also how the intelligible section should be cut."

"How?"

"Like this: in one part of it a soul, using as images the things that were previously imitated, is compelled to investigate on the basis of hypotheses and makes its way not to a beginning but to an end; while in the other part it makes its way to a beginning<sup>36</sup> that is free from hypotheses;<sup>37</sup> starting out from hypothesis and without the images used in the other part, by means of forms themselves it makes its inquiry through them."

"I don't," he said, "sufficiently understand what you mean here."

c "Let's try again," I said. "You'll understand more easily after this introduction. I suppose you know that the men who work in geometry, calculation, and the like treat as known the odd and the even, the figures, three forms of angles, and other things akin to these in each kind of inquiry. These things they make hypotheses and don't think it worthwhile to give any further account of them to themselves or others,

as though they were clear to all. Beginning from them, they go ahead with their exposition of what remains and end consistently at the object toward which their investigation was directed.”

510 d

“Most certainly, I know that,” he said.

“Don’t you also know that they use visible forms besides and make their arguments about them, not thinking about them but about those others that they are like? They make the arguments for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not for the sake of the diagonal they draw, and likewise with the rest. These things themselves that they mold and draw, of which there are shadows and images in water, they now use as images, seeking to see those things themselves, that one can see in no other way than with thought.”

e

“What you say is true,” he said.

511 a

“Well, then, this is the form I said was intelligible. However, a soul in investigating it is compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning because it is unable to step out above the hypotheses. And it uses as images those very things of which images are made by the things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to be clear and are given honor.”

“I understand,” he said, “that you mean what falls under geometry and its kindred arts.”

b

“Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.<sup>38</sup> When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too.”

c

“I understand,” he said, “although not adequately—for in my opinion it’s an enormous task you speak of—that you wish to distinguish that part of what is and is intelligible contemplated by the knowledge of dialectic as being clearer than that part contemplated by what are called the arts. The beginnings in the arts are hypotheses; and although those who behold their objects are compelled to do so with the thought and not the senses, these men—because they don’t consider them by going up to a beginning, but rather on the basis of hypotheses—these men, in my opinion, don’t possess intelligence with respect to the objects, even though they are, given a beginning, intelligible; and you seem to me to call the habit of geometers and their likes thought and not intelligence, indicating that thought is something between opinion and intelligence.”

d

511 *d* "You have made a most adequate exposition," I said. "And, along  
with me, take these four affections arising in the soul in relation to the  
*e* four segments: intellection in relation to the highest one, and thought in  
relation to the second; to the third assign trust, and to the last imagination.<sup>39</sup> Arrange them in a proportion, and believe that as the segments to which they correspond participate in truth, so they participate in clarity."

"I understand," he said. "And I agree and arrange them as you say."