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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRISTEN HALL, individually  
and on behalf of all others  
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SMOSH DOT COM, INC., d/b/a  
SMOSH, and MYTHICAL  
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-01997-JAM-AC

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'  
MOTION TO DISMISS**

I. BACKGROUND

Kristen Hall ("Plaintiff") brings this putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. Section 227, *et seq.* First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), ECF No. 10. Defendants are Smosh Dot Com, Inc. ("Smosh"), an online entertainment and merchandise company, and Mythical Entertainment, LLC. (collectively "Defendants"), Smosh's parent company. *Id.* ¶¶ 12-15. Plaintiff alleges Defendants sent at least five text messages soliciting Smosh merchandise to the phone number used by her minor son. *Id.* ¶¶ 26, 31-35. In

1 response, she filed this lawsuit. Compl., ECF No. 1. She  
2 asserts claims against Defendants for violations of the TCPA and  
3 Section 302.101 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. FAC at  
4 2.

5 Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss.<sup>1</sup> Mot. to  
6 Dismiss ("Mot."), ECF No. 34. Plaintiff opposed the motion.  
7 Opp'n, ECF No. 37. Defendants replied. Reply, ECF No. 38. With  
8 the Court's permission, see ECF No. 40, Plaintiff filed a sur-  
9 reply. Sur-Reply, ECF No. 41. After careful consideration of  
10 the parties' briefing and relevant legal authority, the Court  
11 grants Defendants' motion.

## 12 II. OPINION

### 13 A. Legal Standard

14 A defendant may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter  
15 jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
16 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If the plaintiff lacks  
17 standing under Article III of the United States Constitution,  
18 then the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and the case  
19 must be dismissed. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060,  
20 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). To establish standing, a plaintiff must  
21 "have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly  
22 traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and  
23 (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial  
24 decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).  
25 Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter  
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27 <sup>1</sup> This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without  
28 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was  
scheduled for June 28, 2022.

1 jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the  
2 burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. See Kokkonen  
3 v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

4 B. Analysis

5 "The TCPA establishes the substantive right to be free from  
6 certain types of phone calls and texts absent consumer consent."  
7 Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043  
8 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Because  
9 "unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by  
10 their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of  
11 their recipients," receipt of such messages constitutes a  
12 "concrete injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III  
13 standing." Id.

14 Defendants move to dismiss for lack of standing. Mot. at  
15 4-5. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiff does not have  
16 standing because she did not plead she was the actual user of  
17 the phone number to which Defendants sent the text messages nor  
18 the actual recipient of those messages. Id.; Reply at 2-3. Her  
19 son was. Id.

20 Plaintiff insists she does have standing because "(1) she  
21 received text messages to her cell phone number which was  
22 registered on the Do-Not-Call list; and (2) the messages invaded  
23 her right to be left alone." Opp'n at 14 (citing to FAC ¶¶ 28,  
24 34, 37). She downplays her son's use of the number by citing to  
25 the allegations that her minor son only used the phone "at times"  
26 and that she registered the number on the Do-Not-Call list to  
27 protect her son from advertisers. Id. at 15 (citing to FAC  
28 ¶¶ 26, 29). But as Defendants argue, Plaintiff's attempts to

1 rewrite the FAC in her opposition brief are improper. Reply at  
2 2-3. The FAC clearly indicates Plaintiff's son was the phone  
3 user and the recipient of the messages. See FAC ¶¶ 26, 31-34.  
4 Plaintiff's new contention - that actually she received the text  
5 messages - fails because a complaint cannot be amended through an  
6 opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep't  
7 of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff did  
8 not plead she received any of Defendants' text messages. She  
9 pled only that she was "the subscriber and owner of the phone."  
10 FAC ¶ 37.

11 Plaintiff also does not bring forward any binding authority  
12 supporting the proposition that she has standing merely as the  
13 subscriber/owner of the phone. See Opp'n at 14-15. First,  
14 Plaintiff cites to a FCC Decision, In the Matter of Rules and  
15 Regulations Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 30 F.C.C.R. 7961  
16 (2015). Id. at 15. Then she cites to Miholich v. Senior Life  
17 Ins. Co., Case No. 21-cv-1123-WQH-AGS, 2022 WL 410945 (S.D. Cal.  
18 Feb. 10, 2022), which is readily distinguishable. Id. at 14.  
19 The first standing issue in Miholich was whether Plaintiff's  
20 telephone was used for business and thus fell outside the  
21 protection of the do-not-call provisions of the TCPA, which only  
22 protect residential telephone subscribers not businesses. 2022  
23 WL 410945, at \*3. Here, that issue is not present because it is  
24 undisputed the phone number was residential. See FAC ¶ 27. The  
25 other standing issue in Miholich was whether plaintiff  
26 sufficiently pled that defendant sent the TCPA-violative messages  
27 or that defendant had a relationship with a third-party sender of  
28 the messages, such that plaintiff's injury was fairly traceable

1 to defendant's conduct or redressable by defendant. 2022 WL  
2 410945, at \*4. Again, that issue is not present here. In sum,  
3 Miholich does not support Plaintiff's argument that she has  
4 standing merely by owning the phone.

5 Further, Plaintiff does not address Agne v. Papa John's  
6 Int'l, Inc., 286 F.R.D. 559, 565 (W.D. Wash. 2012), the case  
7 Defendants cite in their motion in support of their argument "it  
8 is the actual user of the number that the TCPA is intended to  
9 protect." See Mot. at 5; see also Opp'n. Nor does Plaintiff  
10 address Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 857 F.Supp.2d 1316,  
11 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012), relied on by Defendants to support their  
12 position that the "'called party' language of the TCPA means the  
13 actual recipient of the calls or texts and not the owner." See  
14 Mot. at 4; see also Opp'n. "Failure to oppose an argument raised  
15 in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of that argument."  
16 Resnick v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., Case No. CV 16-00593-BRO  
17 (PJWx), 2017 WL 1531192, at \*22, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017).

18 For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has  
19 not carried her burden to show she has standing. See Kokkonen,  
20 511 U.S. at 377. Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore  
21 granted. Because the Court dismisses for lack of standing, the  
22 Court does not reach the parties' additional 12(b)(6) arguments.  
23 See Mot. at 7-11; see also Opp'n at 6-13.

24 C. Sanctions

25 A violation of the Court's standing order requires the  
26 offending counsel, not the client, to pay \$50.00 per page over  
27 the page limit to the Clerk of Court. Order re Filing  
28 Requirements at 1, ECF No. 5-2. Moreover, the Court did not

1 consider arguments made past the page limit. Id.

2 Plaintiff's opposition exceeds the Court's page limit by 8  
3 pages. See Opp'n. Plaintiff's counsel must therefore send a  
4 check payable to the Clerk for the Eastern District of California  
5 for \$400.00 no later than seven days from the date of this Order.

6 Defendants' reply exceeds the Court's page limit by 3.5  
7 pages. See Reply. Defendants' counsel must therefore send a  
8 check payable to the Clerk for the Eastern District of  
9 California for \$175.00 no later than seven days from the date of  
10 this Order.

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12 III. ORDER

13 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS  
14 Defendants' motion to dismiss.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 Dated: July 11, 2022

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19 JOHN A. MENDEZ,  
20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
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