



**Office of Inspector General  
County of Los Angeles**

**Reform and Oversight Efforts:  
Los Angeles County Sheriff's  
Department**

January to March  
2019

INTRODUCTION ..... 1

MONITORING ..... 2

    Department Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems ..... 2

    Deputy-Involved Shootings ..... 2

        Shootings: January 1 through March 31, 2019 ..... 2

        Comparison to Prior Years ..... 4

        District Attorney Review of Deputy-Involved Shootings ..... 5

    Homicide Bureau’s Investigation of Deputy-Involved Shootings..... 6

    Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau ..... 6

    Internal Affairs Bureau..... 7

        Internal Affairs Bureau Investigations ..... 7

        Cases Closed Due to Inactivation..... 7

    Executive Force Review Committee ..... 8

    Civil Service Commission Dispositions ..... 8

    Service Comment Reports ..... 9

    Taser Use in Custody ..... 11

    Use-of-Force Incidents in Custody Division ..... 13

    In-Custody Deaths ..... 14

    Office of Inspector General Site Assessments..... 15

CITIZEN’S COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE UPDATES ..... 16

    CCJV Recommendation 3.12: The Department should purchase additional body  
    scanners ..... 16

    CCJV Recommendation 7.14: The grievance process should be improved to  
    include added checks and oversight..... 16

    CCJV Recommendation 7.15: The use of lapel cameras as an investigative tool  
    should be broadened ..... 17

COMMENTS REGARDING DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS AND JAILS..... 17

## INTRODUCTION

This report encompasses the monitoring, auditing, and review of activities related to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) or Department that occurred from January 1, 2019 until March 31, 2019.<sup>1</sup> The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has four primary functions:

- Monitoring the LASD's operations and conditions in its jail facilities, including the Department's response to prisoner and public complaints.
- Periodically reviewing data on the Department's use of force, the Department's investigations of force incidents and allegations of misconduct, and the Department's disciplinary decisions.
- Conducting periodic audits and inspections of Department operations and reviewing the quality of the Department's audits and inspections.
- Regularly communicating with the public, the Board of Supervisors, the Civilian Oversight Commission (COC), and the Sheriff's Department regarding the Department's operations.

In the last *Quarterly Report* published and available to the public in February 2019, we sought to expand the amount of data we provide to the public. In this *Quarterly Report*, we continue to work towards that goal. To that end, we have added a new section relating to the use of Tasers in custody. By adding this new section and by continuing to provide updates to other previously published information, our goal is to keep the public, the Board of Supervisors, and the COC aware of any recent trends, recent changes in practices, and any other changes that are occurring within the Department.

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<sup>1</sup> The Report will note if the data reflects something other than what was gathered between January 1, 2019, and March 31, 2019.

## MONITORING

### Department Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

The Department reports that it did not deploy the Unmanned Aircraft System this quarter.

### Deputy-Involved Shootings

#### Shootings: January 1 through March 31, 2019

The Department's definitions of shootings can be found in the *Manual of Policies and Procedures* (MPP), section 3-10/300.00.

We categorize Deputy-Involved Shootings by the outcome (i.e. was a person injured by the gunfire). The Department categorizes shootings by the tactical reason that the shooting took place. Consequently, the number of shootings reported by the Office of Inspector General may on occasion be greater than the number of hit shootings which appear on the Department's data-sharing web-site.

We report as a Deputy-Involved Shooting any shooting in which: 1) a person was intentionally shot at by a Department member, whether injured by the gunfire or not; 2) a person was injured, including fatally, by the Department member's gunfire, whether intentionally or not; or 3) the Department member shot at a vehicle occupied by a person, unless it is clear from the circumstances that the purpose of the shooting was to disable the vehicle (i.e., shoot tires).

The Department categorizes accidental shootings of persons by the nature of the shooting itself. For example, if a deputy unintentionally discharges a firearm and a person is accidentally struck by the gunfire, the Department categorizes this shooting as an unintentional shooting.

The Department's Homicide Bureau investigates all Deputy-Involved Shootings in which a person is injured, regardless of the shooting's category.<sup>2</sup>

From January 1 to March 31, 2019, we responded to four investigations of Deputy-Involved Shootings. In all four, persons were struck by either gunfire or by glass that shattered as a result of gunfire. One of the persons who was struck by gunfire succumbed to his injuries and died. The Department provides some details of these shootings on its public data website at: <https://data.lacounty.gov/Criminal/All-Shooting-Incidents-for-Deputy-Involved-Shootin/xutq-azb6/data>. The OIG

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<sup>2</sup> See MPP, 3-10/440.00.

recommends that in the future the Department attach narrative descriptions, as provided below, on the Department's website for all Deputy-Involved Shootings. The following descriptions are offered to provide an understanding of situations that commonly lead to Deputy-Involved Shootings.

**Lancaster:** The Department reported that on February 17, 2019, at about 6:04 p.m., deputies responded to a 911 call stating that a suspect was walking near businesses waving a knife. When deputies arrived, they saw a male Hispanic suspect seated in a chair in a parking lot. The suspect stood up quickly and walked towards one of the deputies with the knife in his hand. Deputies gave orders for the suspect to drop the knife. The suspect continued to advance, at which time a Deputy-Involved Shooting occurred.

The suspect sustained two gunshot wounds to his upper body and face. He was transferred to the hospital and is expected to recover. The suspect's knife was recovered from the scene.

**Huntington Park:** The Department reported that on March 14, 2019, at about 10:40 p.m., deputies saw a female Hispanic suspect driving a car in a suspicious manner. The deputies activated their lights and sirens to conduct a traffic stop. The suspect initially complied and pulled over, but then sped off when the deputies pulled up behind the car. The deputies did not pursue the car as it raced away. A few minutes later, they found the suspect's car in another parking lot. Again, when the deputies tried to initiate a stop, the suspect's car sped off when the deputies next saw the car parked in a driveway, they got out of their vehicle to contact the female suspect. The suspect put the car in reverse and swerved out. As she was reversing towards the deputies, one of them shot at the front driver side window seven times. The female suspect was able to continue reversing the car and in the process struck a civilian's parked car before she sped away. A containment was set up and the suspect was arrested a short distance away from where the shooting had occurred.


The suspect was not struck by any of the bullets; however, when the bullets shattered the suspect's vehicle, some of the glass shards appear to have caused minor injuries to the suspect's face and neck.


**Palmdale:** The Department reported that an anonymous caller called on March 16, 2019, at about 10:14 p.m., to report that a male white suspect wanted for a warrant was staying in a trailer at a particular location. Deputies confirmed that the suspect in fact had a warrant out for his arrest. Deputies responded to the location and attempted to contact the suspect, but got no answer. Later that evening, the same anonymous caller contacted deputies again stating that the suspect had

returned to the trailer. Two deputies responded to the location. They knocked on the trailer door and identified themselves as deputies. The suspect told the deputies he had a gun and was not going to exit. A short time later, the trailer door opened and the suspect pointed a gun at the deputies. A Deputy-Involved Shooting occurred. The suspect retreated back into the trailer and refused to exit. After deputies deployed tear gas into the trailer, the suspect exited the trailer with a gun and pointed it at deputies. One of the deputies shot at the suspect, who retreated back into the trailer. After additional tactical measures were taken, deputies entered the trailer and found the suspect dead. No weapon was recovered.

**Compton:** The Department reported that deputies responded to an assault-with-a-gun call. As they approached the scene, the deputies spotted two male Hispanic suspects walking along the sidewalk. When the deputies approached the suspects, one of them took out a gun and pointed it at the deputies. Both deputies fired at the suspect. The suspect who drew the gun sustained wounds to his torso, lower back, left arm, and left buttocks. He was transported to the hospital and was listed in fair condition. The other suspect sustained a gunshot wound to his leg. He was transported to the hospital and treated for his injury. The weapon the suspect drew was recovered at the scene.

### Comparison to Prior Years





### District Attorney Review of Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Department’s Homicide Bureau submits the completed investigation of each Deputy-Involved Shooting in which a person has been injured and that occurred in the County of Los Angeles to the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (LADA) for review and possible filing of criminal charges.

Between January 1 and March 31, 2019, the LADA issued findings in three Deputy-Involved Shooting cases.

- In the February 5, 2018, non-fatal shooting of Michael Lombardi, the District Attorney opined in a memorandum dated February 13, 2019, that “there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Deputy Buonarigo did not act in lawful self-defense.”
- In the March 18, 2018, fatal shooting of Manuel Borrego, the District Attorney opined in a memorandum dated January 22, 2019, that the deputy acted lawfully in self-defense and the defense of others.
- In the May 8, 2018, non-fatal shooting of Michael Contreras, the District Attorney opined in a memorandum dated January 9, 2019, that the deputy acted lawfully in self-defense.

The District Attorney's findings may be found at the LADA's web site at:  
<http://da.lacounty.gov/reports/ois>.

## **Homicide Bureau's Investigation of Deputy-Involved Shootings**

Homicide Bureau is responsible for conducting the investigation into a hit shooting. Regardless of whether the deputy shot intentionally to hit the person injured or it was a result of an accidental discharge, if a person is hit, the Homicide Bureau is responsible for conducting that investigation. After completing its investigation, the Homicide Bureau submits its investigation to the LADA for consideration of filing of criminal charges. If the LADA declines to file the case, the Department's Internal Affairs Bureau will then begin its investigation into whether the involved personnel violated any departmental policies in using force.

For the present quarter, the Homicide Bureau reports having 11 shooting cases that involve Department personnel that it is still investigating. The oldest case is the August 12, 2018, fatal shooting of Anthony Vargas in East Los Angeles.

The Department reports that this quarter it has sent four cases that involve Deputy-Involved Shootings to the LADA for filing consideration of criminal charges. The oldest case LADA awaiting a filing determination is a February 11, 2016, shooting in Lancaster that has been at the LADA since August of 2017.

## **Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau**

The Department's Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) reports directly to the Sheriff and Undersheriff. It is responsible for investigating allegations of criminal misconduct by members of the Department.

For the present quarter, the Department reports that ICIB has 83 active LASD cases.<sup>3</sup> Of those 83, 43 are under investigation, 29 are awaiting filing decisions from the prosecutorial agency, and 11 are in some stage of the criminal trial process. The Department sent over nine cases to the LADA for filing consideration. The Department also reports that for the outside-agency cases, four cases are awaiting prosecutorial filing decisions, two cases have been filed and are at some stage of the criminal trial process, and the remainder are still being investigated. The Department reports that the LADA declined to file charges in 10 cases. The oldest open case that ICIB has on its books is from January 15, 2015; it is pending review of a filing decision by the prosecutorial agency.

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<sup>3</sup> There are eight active cases and/or investigations by outside agencies against LASD employees.

## Internal Affairs Bureau

The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) is responsible for conducting administrative investigations of policy violations and/or policy of equity violations by department members. It is also responsible for responding to and investigating policy violations in Deputy-Involved Shootings and significant use-of-force cases.


### Internal Affairs Bureau Investigations

For the present quarter, the Department reports that IAB opened 62 new cases. In the same period, IAB reports it has closed 176 cases and that there are 322 pending cases on IAB's caseload.


### Cases Closed Due to Inactivation

In the present quarter, the Department has inactivated 54 administrative cases. When an investigation is inactivated, the investigation is terminated and no findings are made.<sup>4</sup> Administrative investigations can be inactivated at the request of the employees' Division Chief or Division Director to the Captain of IAB detailing the reasons for the inactivation. The case is considered "inactivated" when the IAB closes the case and logs the closure in the Department's Personnel Resource Management System (PRMS).

The following graphs depict (1) the five-year history of cases closed due to inactivation, and (2) a comparison of the number of cases closed due to inactivation the first calendar quarter of 2019 to the first calendar quarters of the preceding five years.



<sup>4</sup> See the OIG's April 11, 2019 report-back to the Board of Supervisors, *Report-Back on LASD Internal Administrative Investigations and Dispositions of Disciplinary Actions* for more details.



### Executive Force Review Committee

The Department outlines in its MPP the tasks and duties of the Executive Force Review Committee (EFRC).<sup>5</sup> The EFRC evaluates every shooting and force incident to which the IAB Force/Shooting Response Team has responded.<sup>6</sup>

This quarter, the Department held six EFRC meetings during which sixteen cases involving force were heard. In particular, there were five hit-shooting cases, two non-hit shooting cases, and nine cases involving other types of force. The cases stemmed from incidents that occurred as far back as 2016 to as recently as 2018. The EFRC found that in two of the 16 cases, the employees' conduct was not tactically sound. The Department did not impose discipline on those deputies. In the other remaining cases, the EFRC found the employees' conduct was within policy and made no further recommendations.

### Civil Service Commission Dispositions

This quarter, the Civil Service Commission issued a final decision in four cases. Of those four cases, the Commission sustained the Department's discipline in three cases and reduced the Department's discipline in one case.

<sup>5</sup> See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, *Manual of Policies and Procedures*, 3-04/10.00.

<sup>6</sup> For a detailed description of how EFRC is conducted, please refer to the OIG's June 2018 report, *Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department*.

## Service Comment Reports

In accordance with Department policies, LASD accepts and reviews all comments from members of the public that are germane to departmental service or individual performances.<sup>7</sup> The Department categorizes these comments into three categories:

- External Commendation: an external communication of appreciation for and/or approval of service provided by Department members;
- Service Complaint: an external communication of dissatisfaction with Department service, procedure or practice, not involving employee misconduct; and
- Personnel Complaint: an external allegation of misconduct, either a violation of law or Department policy, against any member of the Department.<sup>8</sup>

The following chart lists the number and types of comments received by each station and/or unit this quarter<sup>9</sup>:

Station/Unit	Commendation	Personal Complaint	Service Complaint
AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU	0	1	0
ACCESS TO CARE BUREAU	1	0	0
DETECTIVE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS	1	0	0
SOUTH PATROL ADMINISTRATION HEADQUARTERS	1	1	0
AERO BUREAU	1	0	1
ALTADENA	1	2	0
OFFICE OF THE ASST SHERIFF I	1	0	0
AVALON	4	0	0
COMM & FLEET MGMT BUREAU	1	1	0
COMMUNITY COLLEGE BUREAU	5	1	0
CENTURY	11	17	2
CERRITOS	9	2	3

<sup>7</sup> See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, *Manual of Policies and Procedures*, 3-04/10.00, "Department Service Reviews."

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*

<sup>9</sup> If a station or unit does not appear on this chart, the station or unit did not receive any comments from January 1 until March 31, 2019. This data was pulled from the Department's PRMS system on April 2, 2019, and reflects the data provided as of that date at 3:39 p.m. It is possible for the same employee to get a service complaint and personnel complaint based on the same incident in question.

Station/Unit	Commendation	Personal Complaint	Service Complaint
CIVIL MANAGEMENT BUREAU	12	5	4
COURT SERVICES CENTRAL	1	3	1
COMPTON	0	9	2
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP BUREAU	7	1	0
CENTURY REG DETENTION FACILITY	3	1	1
CRESCENTA VALLEY	14	2	0
COUNTY SERVICES BUREAU	5	5	1
CARSON	10	2	3
COURT SERVICES TRANSPORTATION	0	2	0
EAST LA	8	5	4
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BUREAU	1	0	0
COURT SERVICES EAST	3	3	1
FRAUD & CYBER CRIMES BUREAU	1	0	0
FISCAL ADMINISTRATION	0	1	0
HUMAN TRAFFICKING BUREAU	3	0	0
INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU	3	4	0
INDUSTRY	14	9	1
INMATE RECEPTION CENTER	4	1	1
LANCASTER	16	26	5
LAKESWOOD	4	8	2
LOMITA	8	4	1
MARINA DEL REY	3	6	2
MAJOR CRIMES BUREAU	0	1	0
MEN'S CENTRAL JAIL	3	0	2
MALIBU/LOST HILLS	3	6	3
NARCOTICS BUREAU	2	2	0
NORTH CO. CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	0	1	0
NORWALK REGIONAL	8	9	1
OPERATION SAFE STREETS BUREAU	1	1	0
PARKS BUREAU	2	3	0
PALMDALE	20	16	5
PICO RIVERA	3	6	0
RECORDS & IDENTIFICATION	2	1	0
TRAINING BUREAU	2	0	0
SANTA CLARITA VALLEY	27	12	2
SAN DIMAS	14	3	2
SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT BUREAU	0	3	0
SHERIFF INFORMATION BUREAU	0	2	0
SOUTH LOS ANGELES	10	6	2

Station/Unit	Commendation	Personal Complaint	Service Complaint
SCIENTIFIC SERVICES BUREAU	0	3	0
SPECIAL VICTIMS BUREAU	1	0	0
TRAINING BUREAU	0	1	0
TEMPLE CITY	12	6	3
TRANSIT SERVICES BUREAU	3	2	1
TWIN TOWERS	0	2	0
WALNUT/SAN DIMAS	9	7	4
WEST HOLLYWOOD	17	16	2
COURT SERVICES WEST	8	5	2

## Taser Use in Custody

A Taser is an electro-muscular disruption device that the Department classifies as a “Less-Lethal Weapon.” It disrupts a person’s electro-muscular system by transmitting up to 50,000 volts of electricity into a person through darts shot into the body or by applying the Taser directly to the body (i.e., “drive stunning”). Tasers are used by law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. In 2011, the National Institute of Justice reported that Taser use had increased in recent years and that more than 15,000 law enforcement and military agencies now use Tasers.<sup>10</sup> The Department has used, and continues to use, Tasers in both custodial and field settings.

The policy governing Taser use in custody facilities is found in the *Custody Division Manual* (CDM), section 7-08/030.00, “Electronic Immobilization Device (Taser) Procedures.” The CDM Taser policy states that a Taser may be used when fully justified and in conformance with MPP and CDM policies.<sup>11</sup> The policy also states:

The TASER is a less lethal hand held electronic immobilization device used for controlling assaultive/high risk persons. The purpose of the TASER is to facilitate a safe and effective response to situations which jeopardize the life and safety of personnel, inmates, and/or the security and operations of custody facilities.<sup>12</sup>

This language mirrors the language of MPP, section 5-06/040.95, which states that a Taser may be used for controlling “Assaultive/High Risk” persons. The Department defines the term “Assaultive/High Risk” in the *Situational Use of Force*

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. *Research in Brief, Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less-Lethal Weapons*, May 2011, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Department, *Custody Division Manual*, 7-08/030.00.

*Options Chart* section of the *Arrest and Control Defensive Tactics Manual* (DTM).<sup>13</sup> Under the *Situational Use of Force Options Chart*, a Taser may be used on a suspect who is "Assaultive/High Risk,"<sup>14</sup> which is defined as follows:

Behaviors/Situations that belong in the assaultive/high risk category include:

An unlawful threat or unsuccessful attempt to do physical harm to another, causing a present fear of immediate harm; a violent physical attack; a situation in which the totality of articulated facts causes a reasonable officer to form the opinion that a significant credible threat of violence exists.

The assaultive individual has crossed the line of resistance and is threatening an assault, attempting an assault, or physically assaulting the Department personnel or citizen. This category also deals with high-risk situations. In this category, the likelihood of injury is obvious due to deliberate assaultive actions or other significant threatened actions. These actions (or threatened actions) are so obvious as to make a reasonable person realize that they must do something to defend themselves [*sic*], or others.<sup>15</sup>

The OIG has compiled the number of times the Department has deployed a Taser in custodial settings from January 2018 through March 2019. The numbers below were gathered from the Department's *Monthly Force Synopsis*, which the Department produces each month and provides to the OIG each month.<sup>16</sup>

Month	Number of Times Taser Deployed
January 2018	5
February 2018	2
March 2018	7
April 2018	7
May 2018	0
June 2018	4
July 2018	6
August 2018	7
September 2018	3
October 2018	5
November 2018	3
December 2018	1

<sup>13</sup> Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, *Arrest and Control Defensive Tactics Manual* 2011, pp. 20-24. See Exhibit A.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at p. 24.

<sup>15</sup> Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, *Arrest and Control Defensive Tactics Manual* 2011, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> The OIG is not making any representation on whether the use of a Taser in each of these incidents was permissible under the Department's policies and/or if the Taser was deployed lawfully.

Month	Number of Times Taser Deployed
January 2019	9
February 2019	9
March 2019	5

## Use-of-Force Incidents in Custody Division

The OIG monitors the Department’s Custody Services Division data on use-of-force incidents, prisoner-on-prisoner violence, and assaults on Department personnel.

In July 2017, we published a report analyzing the methods the Department used to collect data for jail violence statistics.<sup>17</sup> After analyzing the Department’s databases and reviewing the Department’s internal records on jail violence, we concluded that the Department lacked a centralized system that collects, verifies, and validates the accuracy of its jail violence statistics. The lack of such a centralized system, as well as the numerous different databases the Department uses to document jail violence information, caused the Department to disseminate inconsistent data on jail violence. The Department has acknowledged that its data at times may have been inconsistent and is working to implement a centralized system to collect, verify, and validate the data on its jail-violence statistics.

With the caveat that the data may be inconsistent or may change in the future given these shortcomings, we are publishing the Department’s data on jail violence statistics for the public to have a better understanding of the number and types of force incidents that occur in the custodial setting. The Department has periodically released this data through its public data-sharing website at: [http://lasd.org/public\\_data\\_sharing.html](http://lasd.org/public_data_sharing.html). In our December 2018 *Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department: Reform and Oversight Efforts* report we published data on the number of “Prisoner-on-Staff Assaults,” “Prisoner-on-Prisoner Assaults,” and “Staff-on-Prisoner Assaults from 2014 to the first quarter of 2018. The Department has now published data for the second quarter of 2018, as reflected below:

- Prisoner-on-Staff Assaults = 173
- Prisoner-on-Prisoner Assaults = 905
- Use of Force on Prisoners = 592

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<sup>17</sup> Los Angeles County Office of Inspector General, *A Review of the Jail Violence Tracking and Reporting Procedures of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department*.

## In-Custody Deaths

Between January 1 and March 31, 2019, seven people died while in the Department's custody. OIG staff responded to the scene of those deaths that occurred in the Department's detention facilities. The following are brief summaries of each of those deaths:

On January 2, 2019, an individual at Men's Central Jail was discovered unresponsive in a cell during distribution of medication. Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, and they pronounced the individual dead at the scene.

On January 5, 2019, an individual was discovered unresponsive in a cell at the Correctional Treatment Center of the Twin Towers Correctional Facility. Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, and the individual was pronounced dead at the scene.

On January 24, 2019, an individual died at the Los Angeles County/USC Medical Center (LCMC) after being transferred from Twin Towers Correctional Facility (TTCF) on January 22, 2019, for a medical emergency.

On February 17, 2019, an individual died at the LCMC after being transferred from TTCF on February 8, 2019, for a medical emergency.

On March 5, 2019, an individual was reportedly discovered by deputies in a cell at Men's Central Jail during what was described as a suicide attempt. Deputies and medical personnel rendered emergency aid until paramedics arrived and transported the individual to White Memorial Medical Center. The individual thereafter died on March 7, 2019.

On March 17, 2019, an individual was discovered unresponsive in a cell at TTCF during a mandated safety check. Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, and the individual was pronounced dead at the scene.

On March 20, 2019, a deputy discovered an individual unresponsive in a cell at Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF). Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, and the individual was pronounced dead at the scene.

There were Custody Services Division administrative death reviews into each of these seven deaths. None of the deaths of individuals in the Department's custody during this quarter occurred outside of a jail or hospital setting and there is no evidence that a use of force by personnel immediately preceded any of the deaths

or otherwise contributed to them. The OIG is nonetheless still concerned about the quality of the medical and mental health care provided to patients, the poor coordination and communication between Correctional Health Services and Custody Services personnel, the sufficiency of the safety checks, and the timeliness and quality of life-saving efforts. OIG personnel continue to attend administrative death reviews to monitor the quality and thoroughness of the reviews as well as the ongoing efforts of the Department and Correctional Health Services to improve patient care.

### Office of Inspector General Site Assessments

OIG staff regularly conduct site visits and inspections at the Department’s custodial facilities to identify matters requiring attention. All site visits result in extensive follow up. In the first quarter of 2019, we completed 38 site assessments and logged 55 monitoring hours inside five of the Department’s jail and lockup facilities. During those visits, OIG staff typically met with Department personnel of all ranks, security and custody assistants, civilian staff, clergy, and volunteers. As part of the OIG’s jail monitoring, OIG staff attended 51 Custody Services Division executive and administrative meetings and met with division executives for 55 monitoring hours.

OIG staff also continued to meet with prisoners housed in general population modules, administrative segregation units, disciplinary units, and medical and mental health units. We also continued to meet with civil detainees. OIG monitors met with and received input from individuals at cell front, during recreation and treatment group time, and in private interview rooms when necessary to ensure confidentiality. The following chart represents LASD facilities visited from January 1 through March 31, 2019:

Facility	Site Visits
Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF)	6
Inmate Reception Center (IRC)	4
Men’s Central Jail (MCJ)	16
North County Correctional Facility (NCCF)	1
Pitchess Detention Center North (PDC North)	0
Pitchess Detention Center South (PDC South)	0
Twin Towers Correctional Facility (TTCF)	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>

## **CITIZEN'S COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE UPDATES**

### **CCJV Recommendation 3.12: The Department should purchase additional body scanners**

The Department continues to operate body scanners at CRDF, PDC North, PDC South, PDC East, NCCF, and the IRC.

We previously reported that the Department had installed four body scanners at NCCF, three in the Inmate Processing Area (IPA) and one near the vocational shops. The body scanner near the vocational shops needed repair of a damaged control cable and two parts required replacement, all repairs have been completed. The body scanner must now be programmed and connected to the Department's network in order to be fully operational. The technician is scheduled to complete the programming by May 10, 2019.

In late February 2019, the final body scanner that will be assigned to MCJ was purchased and is scheduled to arrive in early June 2019. The construction necessary to install this body-scanner has begun in anticipation of the machine's arrival.

The Department has developed an electronic tracking system for the contraband found by the body scanners and is in the process of finalizing the policy and procedures for gathering and tracking contraband found throughout all custody facilities into one report.

### **CCJV Recommendation 7.14: The grievance process should be improved to include added checks and oversight**

The Department is still in the process of installing iPads in all jail facilities to capture information related to prisoner requests and, eventually, prisoner grievances. There are now 170 installed and operational iPads, an increase of 15 iPads since the last quarter. There are now a total of 60 iPads at CRDF, 47 iPads at MCJ, and 63 iPads at TTCF. The Department also reports that it has completed the Wi-Fi upgrades needed at TTCF and CRDF for the iPads to fully function. The Wi-Fi upgrades are now underway at MCJ and a plan is being developed to start implementation of iPads at PDC North.

The Department has reported that iPads have automatically responded to 29,117 requests for information from January 1 through March 31, 2019. As previously reported, the Department has expanded the types of information that can be accessed from the iPads and will continue to add information as feasible.

As reported in the OIG’s January 2018 *Quarterly Report*, the Department implemented a policy restricting the filing of duplicate or excessive inmate grievances. The Department reports that between January 1 and March 31, 2019, 14 inmates were restricted from filing 34 grievances under this policy. We reviewed the restricted grievances to ensure that the restrictions complied with the policy. We will continue to monitor the restrictions on access to the grievance system and the implementation of the policy.

**CCJV Recommendation 7.15: The use of lapel cameras as an investigative tool should be broadened**

As previously reported, the Department opted for an alternative implementation of this recommendation and embarked on a five-year program to install fixed cameras in the jail facilities. The Department continues to install Closed Circuit Television cameras at PDC South. As previously reported, the Department completed installation of 190 cameras throughout the PDC South compound, including classroom buildings and the visiting area. PDC South reports that it is still experiencing issues with installing the cameras in the vocational shops and laundry areas. The Department was initially expecting to have all cameras installed and fully operational by December 2018, but the anticipated completion date is still unknown at this time.

**COMMENTS REGARDING DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS AND JAILS**

The OIG received 89 new complaints in the first quarter of 2019 from members of the public, prisoners, prisoners’ family members and friends, community organizations, and County agencies.<sup>18</sup> Sixty-four of the complaints related to conditions of confinement within the Department’s jail facilities, as shown below:

<b>Complaint/ Incident Classification</b>	<b>Totals</b>
Personnel Issue	
Discrimination	4
Failed to Take Action	2
Rude/Abusive Behavior	1
No Discernible subject	1
Medical/Dental Issue	11
Mental Health Services	1
Housing	5
Dietary	2
Other Service Issue	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>

<sup>18</sup> When complaints raise multiple issues, the OIG tracks and monitors the Department’s response to each issue. As such, a single complaint may receive more than one classification as reflected in the referenced tables.

Thirty-five complaints were related to contacts between Department personnel and persons who were not in custody, as shown below:

<b>Complaint/ Incident Classification</b>	<b>Totals</b>
Personnel Issue	
Use of Force	2
Rude/Abusive Behavior	5
Discrimination	5
Unlawful Arrest	1
Unlawful Search	5
Unlawful Detention	4
Failed to Take Action	5
Off Duty Conduct	2
No Discernible Subject	1
Other Service Issue	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>

Five complaints were not about the Department or Department personnel and were referred to the appropriate agency or the complainant was directed to seek legal advice.