



Office of Inspector General County of Los Angeles

Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

January through March 2026

Issued May 21, 2026

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ABOUT QUARTERLY REPORTS

Quarterly reports provide an overview of the Office of Inspector General's regular monitoring, auditing, and review of activities related to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department) over a given three-month period.¹ This quarterly report covers Department activities and incidents that occurred between January 1 and March 31, 2026, unless otherwise noted. Quarterly reports may also examine issues of interest. This report includes special sections on the following topics:

- High Risk Traffic Stops
- *Johnson v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department* Monitoring Report

MONITORING SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT'S OPERATIONS

Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Office of Inspector General reports on all deputy-involved shootings in which a deputy intentionally fired a firearm at a human, or intentionally or unintentionally fired a firearm and a human was injured or killed as a result. During this quarter, there were four incidents in which people were shot or shot at by Sheriff's Department personnel. Three people were fatally struck by deputies' gunfire. In one off-duty shooting a deputy shot at three people but it is unknown if anyone was hit.

The Office of Inspector General staff was notified of the deputy-involved shootings but did not respond per the suspension of rollouts as stated in a [memorandum to the Board of Supervisors dated June 11, 2025](#). A modified roll out protocol began on May 4, 2026. Office of Inspector General staff members assigned to our rollout team now respond to the scene of deputy-involved shootings during the workday.²

¹ This report refers to the Sheriff's Department, the Department, or LASD when referencing the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The Office of Inspector General is also referred to as OIG in some places throughout the report.

² Beginning on May 4, 2026, Office of Inspector General staff will also respond to the scene of in-custody deaths during the workday. Deputy inspectors general and inspectors are assigned to the deputy-involved-shooting and in-custody-death rollout teams.

The Sheriff's Department [maintains a page on its website](#) listing deputy-involved shootings that result in injury or death, with links to incident summaries and video.³

The information in the following shooting summaries is based on the information provided by the Sheriff's Department at the Critical Incident Reviews (CIR) and the information on the Department's website, including the written summaries and Critical Incident Briefings.⁴ The information presented at CIR, in the written summaries, and in the Critical Incident Briefing is preliminary in nature. Statements of deputies and witnesses are not provided until the Sheriff's Department completes its investigation.

Narcotics Bureau: Hit Shooting – Fatal⁵

On January 13, 2026, at approximately 12:20 p.m.,⁶ Narcotics Bureau personnel were in the city of Palmdale to serve a search warrant. Prior to serving the warrant, they were advised by other deputies on scene that a person was sitting in a vehicle adjacent to the location in question. This person, who was later determined to be a twenty-five-year-old Hispanic man, was seated in the driver's seat of the subject car. He was the sole occupant.

For “a potential risk to officer safety,”⁷ and to determine if the vehicle or the driver were connected to the warrant location, the deputies drove up near to the vehicle, exited their cars, and surrounded it. From video of the incident, it appears that the deputies were

³ Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(i) requires that in response to a Public Records Act request, records relating to the report, investigation, or finding of an “incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer” be made available. Delaying the availability of some information is permissible if certain criteria are met. On April 10, 2026, OIG inquired as to whether non-hit shootings meeting the criteria in this subsection are posted on the website or whether LASD has any plans to include non-hit shootings on its deputy-involved shootings transparency page. The Department replied that it is in the process of determining the answer.

⁴ [Manual of Policy and Procedure \(MPP\) section 3-09/330.00 Critical Incident Review Panel](#) identifies what is a critical incident and describes the process for reviewing such incidents.

⁵ The [summary of the incident](#) linked on the Sheriff's Department's transparency page notes that OIG staff responded to the scene of this shooting. While OIG was notified, staff did not respond to the scene. OIG staff attended a Department Critical Incident Review.

⁶ The written summary of the incident on the LASD transparency page for deputy-involved shootings indicates this incident occurred at 12:20 pm. However, the [Critical Incident Briefing](#) accessible from that same page indicates that the incident occurred at 11:55 a.m.

⁷ This phrase is in quotes as this is the reason provided by the Department in the Critical Incident Briefing. By including this as the reason for contacting the driver, OIG is not opining as to whether or not the deputies were in any danger at the time they approached the decedent's vehicle.

wearing tactical vests and that at least some of the vests had the word *Sheriff* on it.⁸ From the video it is not clear if the wording on the vests would have been noticeable to the driver of the car. One deputy was positioned at the driver's side rear door and others were near the front and rear of the vehicle.⁹ The driver drove forward and, in doing so, the rear tire of the car went over the foot of a deputy positioned at the driver's side rear door. As the vehicle continued forward in what appeared to be an attempt to maneuver around the deputies and leave, a deputy fired one round at the suspect.

The deputies rendered aid to the driver prior to the arrival of the Los Angeles County Fire Department personnel, but the driver died at the scene.

To date, there is no information tying the deceased driver to the crimes that were the subject of the search warrant.

The Sheriff's Department posted a [written summary](#) and a [Critical Incident Briefing](#) of this incident on the [Transparency page for Deputy-Involved Shootings](#).

Areas of Further Inquiry

Did the decision to approach the vehicle by Narcotics personnel compromise public safety and the safety of the deputies?

Did the deputies have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the car was involved in criminal activity that justified commanding the driver to stop the car?¹⁰

Were any of the deputies directly in the path of the vehicle as it began moving forward?

Did the shooting violate the [Department's policy](#) against discharging a firearm at a stationary or moving vehicle?

Was the approach to the suspect's vehicle and the deputies subsequent positioning tactically sound and consistent with best practices and Department policies?

Did the tactics used escalate the situation, possibly contributing to the use of force?

⁸ The Critical Incident Briefing indicates that the faces of the deputies are blocked out because they are undercover. The fact that deputies were in tactical gear suggests that the deputies were not undercover, although they may not have been readily identifiable to the decedent as deputies.

⁹ The [Critical Incident Briefing](#) describes a detective as being "near the front driver's side of the vehicle."

¹⁰ The language by the deputies and threats to shoot the driver of the car in commanding him to stop may also violate [MPP section 3-01/030.85: Derogatory Language](#).

Why were no body-worn camera videos activated until after the shooting?¹¹

Was there a crossfire issue, meaning were other deputies potentially in the line of fire?

Off-Duty Shooting – Twin Towers Correctional Facility Deputy: Unknown Hit/Non-Hit Shooting

The Sheriff's Department reported that on January 13, 2026, at approximately 9:10 p.m., a Twin Towers Correctional Facility deputy returned home from work and, as he parked in his driveway and exited his car, a white 4-door sedan pulled up behind him. Two men exited the vehicle and approached the trunk of the deputy's vehicle and rummaged through its contents. The deputy retrieved his back-up weapon, fully exited his vehicle, and took cover behind a second vehicle parked in the driveway. The deputy pointed his firearm at the men and ordered them to get away from his vehicle. One man produced a firearm and fired two to three rounds at the deputy. Those rounds struck the deputy's house, directly behind him.

¹¹ The Critical Incident Briefing notes "Body-worn cameras preserve a period of pre-event video, without audio once the record function is activated. The discharge occurred during this buffered footage, which therefore contains no audio." It is not clear from the briefing whether there is any other body-worn camera video of the incident. If more than one deputy was outfitted with a body-worn camera, no explanation was provided in the Critical Incident Review or Briefing as to why all deputies with the cameras did activate their cameras as required by [Department policy when making a vehicle stop](#). OIG has raised activation concerns in the past and continues to recommend that body-worn cameras be activated for all interactions with civilians.

OIG has recommended that **all** special units deploy body-worn cameras. This recommendation was made in the context of two deputy-involved shootings by a surveillance teams. (See [Sixth Report Back on Implementing Body-Worn Cameras in Los Angeles County](#) (April 11, 2022) and [Seventh Report Back on Implementing Body-Worn Cameras in Los Angeles County](#) (September 22, 2022).) [OIG's eighth report](#) sent on March 21, 2023, notes that the Department informed OIG that then-newly elected Sheriff Luna's goal was to equip specialized units such as the Narcotics Bureau and the Major Crimes Bureau with body-worn cameras.

As noted in the OIG's September 2025 [Thirteenth Report Back on Implementing Body-Worn Cameras in Los Angeles County](#), the Department reported that it is negotiating with its employee unions regarding changes to its policies to cover specialized units in order to deploy body-worn cameras to these units. It is not clear to OIG why such negotiations are necessary given the Department's current policies on cameras.

Also of note is a recent summary corrective action plan for a million-dollar settlement of a deputy-involved shooting that found one of the root causes was the unavailability of body-worn camera video. (See *County Claims Board Recommendation for* [Estate of Nicholas Burgos, et al. v. County of Los Angeles](#).)

The deputy fired approximately three to four rounds at the man. The two men ran off in different directions and a third man who was in the suspects' vehicle drove away. It is unknown if the deputy's rounds struck any of the men or their vehicle.

This incident occurred in the jurisdiction of Whittier Police Department, which is handling the criminal investigation. Whittier Police Department declined to share any investigative reports with the Sheriff's Department until the conclusion of its criminal investigation. Because the Sheriff's Department is not the handling agency, there was no Critical Incident Review or Briefing for this shooting.

Major Crimes Bureau: Hit Shooting – Fatal

On January 22, 2026, at approximately 8:32 p.m., Major Crimes Bureau sworn personnel were conducting surveillance of robbery suspects.¹² The deputies followed the suspects to several shopping centers. While at a shopping center in West Hills, the deputies observed the two suspects sitting in a car while appearing to observe people in the parking lot at the shopping center. The suspect driver of the car was a Black woman, and the passenger was a Hispanic man. When a woman exited a nearby store, the suspects drove towards the woman, the male suspect exited the passenger's side of the car, pointed a handgun at the woman, ran towards her, and pushed her to the ground. While holding the gun to her head and dragging her, the suspect forcefully took her purse. The deputies reported that the suspect was heard threatening to shoot the woman as he dragged her.

Having just witnessed this crime the deputies went to detain the suspect, who attempted to flee. Deputies in multiple vehicles drove towards that suspect and his victim. The two deputies in the vehicle closest to the suspect exited their car. As the suspect attempted to flee, he pointed his firearm in the direction of the deputies and deputies fired at the suspect. One deputy reported seeing a flash from the suspect's gun pointed in his direction. Video from a business security camera shows the weapon being pointed in the direction of deputies who had exited their car and what appears to be a muzzle flash from the suspect's weapon.¹³ At least one deputy continued firing at the suspect. A total

¹² The deputies were wearing U.S. Marshals vests during the time they were conducting surveillance and at the time of the incident. While the deputies are dual certified as U.S. Marshals, they were not working as U.S. Marshals while following the suspects. LASD reported that the deputies were working in the capacity as U.S. Marshals earlier in the day and did not have time to change their vests.

¹³ The business security video may be viewed as part of the [Critical Incident Briefing](#).

of 11 rounds were fired by one deputy, and one round was fired by the other deputy. Three bullets hit the window of a nearby business.

The second suspect fled in the car and was later apprehended.

The male suspect was pronounced deceased at the scene by a paramedic. A loaded 9 mm ghost gun with an extended magazine was recovered at the scene.

No deputies were injured and the victim was treated at the scene for minor injuries.

The deputies conducting the surveillance did not have body-worn cameras and therefore there is no body-worn camera video of this shooting. The Department reported that members of its Major Crimes Bureau are not assigned cameras and are not obligated to wear them.¹⁴

The Sheriff's Department posted a written [summary](#) of the incident and [Critical Incident Briefing](#) on its website, which includes security camera video of the shooting.

Areas of further Inquiry

Are there concerns about why one deputy fired 11 rounds, and the other fired 1 round?

Did the deputies have a tactical plan in place that considered they might witness a robbery and that the suspects might be armed?

Did the deputies consider the backdrop of the shooting and that there were people in the area of the shooting, including the victim?

Lancaster Station: Hit Shooting – Fatal

On March 15, 2026, Lancaster Station received a call for service at 1:30 p.m., stating that a Hispanic man was shooting an assault rifle at neighbors. When deputies responded to the location, three victims flagged them down and reported being shot at, with two of them suffering non-life-threatening injuries that appeared consistent with shotgun pellet wounds. The victims stated the suspect left the location on foot.

¹⁴ As noted in a footnote regarding the January 13, 2026 deputy-involved shooting by Narcotics Bureau deputies, OIG has recommended that **all** special units deploy body-worn cameras. This recommendation was made in the context of two deputy-involved shootings by a surveillance teams. (See [Sixth Report Back on Implementing Body-Worn Cameras in Los Angeles County](#) (April 11, 2022) and [Seventh Report Back on Implementing Body-Worn Cameras in Los Angeles County](#) (September 22, 2022).).

Using binoculars, deputies located a person who appeared to be the suspect and relayed the information to an assisting airship. Deputies responded to the location, where they observed in a fenced-in area standing behind a travel trailer. The suspect failed to obey commands to put up his hands and surrender. The commands were made in both English and Spanish as the call for service included that the suspect was Spanish speaking. The suspect produced a handgun and shot multiple rounds at deputies, at which point four deputies shot at the suspect; the three deputies fired their service weapons, and a sergeant fired a duty rifle.

While still armed with the handgun, the suspect ran to a makeshift building. Shortly after, the suspect emerged and the sergeant fired at him. The suspect appeared to have been struck by gunfire. Once it was deemed safe, deputies approached the suspect and saw that he sustained one gunshot wound to the head. The suspect was subsequently pronounced dead at the scene.

Some of the deputies' bullets struck nearby trailers, at least one of which was occupied.

One .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun, one 12-gauge pump action shot gun, and shell casings were recovered at the scene. The handgun was in arm's reach of the suspect.

The body-worn camera video included in the Critical Incident Briefing shows that the deputies and the sergeant all activated their cameras prior to the shooting. At least one deputy activated the camera prior to exiting his car, which is aligned with the Department's policy, training, and best practices.¹⁵ Due to the distance and obstructions, none of the body-worn cameras captured an image of the suspect as he was firing.

The [shooting summary](#) and [Critical Incident Briefing](#) are posted on [the Sheriff's Department webpage for deputy-involved shootings](#).

Areas of Further Inquiry:

When the second shooting occurred, did the suspect point a firearm at the deputies before they fired?

Was there time to evacuate the nearby trailers knowing that the suspect was armed and that the deputies might have to engage by firing their weapons?

¹⁵ Based on the timing of the incident relative to when the deputies and sergeant exited their vehicles, it is likely that all four activated the camera prior to exiting. This aligns not only with Department training but with best practices and OIG's recommendations regarding camera activation.

District Attorney Review of Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Sheriff's Department's Homicide Bureau investigates deputy-involved shootings in which a person is hit by a bullet, except for deputy-involved shootings that result in the death of an unarmed civilian, which California law requires the Attorney General to investigate.¹⁶ For those shootings it investigates, the Homicide Bureau submits the completed criminal investigation of each deputy-involved shooting in Los Angeles County that results in a person being struck by a bullet to the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (District Attorney's Office or District Attorney) for review and possible filing of criminal charges.

Between January and March 31, 2026, the District Attorney's Office posted memoranda on its website for two findings on deputy-involved shooting cases involving the Sheriff's Department's employees.¹⁷ The District Attorney's Office declined to file charges in each case, as they determined that the use of force was not unlawful. The memoranda may be found on the [District Attorney's website page for Officer-Involved Shootings](#). The following are the deputy-involved shootings posted:

- [The January 30, 2025, fatal shooting of Juan Manuel Alvarez.](#)
- [The March 24, 2024 fatal shooting of a juvenile by Deputy Antonio Del Rio.](#)
- [The July 4, 2023 fatal shooting of Greg Covey, Jr. by Deputy Randy Austin.](#)
- [The January 30, 2025 fatal shooting of Juan Manuel Alvarez by Deputy Zachary Van Der Zanden.](#)

California Department of Justice Investigations of Deputy-Involved Shootings Resulting in the Death of Unarmed Civilians

Under California law, the state Department of Justice (CA-DOJ) investigates any peace officer-involved shooting resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian and may issue

¹⁶ In 2020, the California Legislature passed AB 1506, which requires that a state prosecutor investigate all shootings involving a peace officer that result in the death of an unarmed civilian. See [A.B. 1506 \(McCarty 2020\)](#) (codified at [Govt. Code § 12525.3](#)). The Attorney General's findings in these investigations are reported in the section of this report below entitled *California Department of Justice Investigations of Deputy-Involved Shootings Resulting in the Death of Unarmed Civilians*.

¹⁷ The District Attorney's Office posts its decisions on deputy and officer-involved shootings on its website under [Officer-Involved Shootings](#). The Office of Inspector General retrieves the information on District Attorney decisions from this webpage.

written reports or file criminal charges against a peace officer, if appropriate.¹⁸ [No CA-DOJ investigations were opened during the first quarter of this year](#) regarding shootings by deputies from the Sheriff's Department and all previous investigations regarding Sheriff's Department shootings are closed.¹⁹ During the first quarter of 2026, DOJ [issued no written reports](#) regarding shootings involving Sheriff's Department deputies.

Homicide Bureau's Investigation of Deputy-Involved Shootings

For the present quarter, the Homicide Bureau reports that it has six shooting cases involving Sheriff's Department personnel open and under investigation. The oldest case in which the Homicide Bureau maintained an active investigation at the end of the quarter relates to a June 9, 2025, shooting in the jurisdiction of Century Station. For further information as to that shooting, please refer to the Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department - April through June 2025](#). The oldest case that the Homicide Bureau has open is a 2019 shooting in the city of Lynwood, which was submitted to the District Attorney's Office and for which the Sheriff's Department still awaits a filing decision.

This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported it sent four deputy-involved-shooting cases to the District Attorney's Office for filing consideration.

Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau

The Sheriff's Department's Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) reports directly to the Division Chief and the Commander of the Professional Standards Division. ICIB investigates allegations of criminal misconduct committed by Sheriff's Department personnel in Los Angeles County.²⁰

The Sheriff's Department reports that ICIB has 76 active cases. This quarter, ICIB reports sending 17 cases to the District Attorney's Office for filing consideration. The District Attorney's Office is still reviewing 36 cases previously sent from ICIB for filing. The oldest open case that ICIB submitted to the District Attorney's Office and still awaits

¹⁸ Government Code § 12525.3(b).

¹⁹ On April 1, 2026, Sheriff's Deputies allegedly shot an unarmed man resulting in his death and CA-DOJ opened an investigation.

²⁰ Misconduct alleged to have occurred in other counties is investigated by the law enforcement agencies in the jurisdictions where the crimes are alleged to have occurred.

a filing decision relates to conduct that occurred in 2018, which ICIB presented to the District Attorney in 2019.

Internal Affairs Bureau

The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) conducts administrative investigations of policy violations by Sheriff's Department employees. It also responds to and investigates deputy-involved shootings and significant use-of-force cases. If the District Attorney declines to file criminal charges, IAB conducts an independent investigation to determine whether Sheriff's Department personnel violated any policies during the incident regardless of the District Attorney's decision not to prosecute. If the District Attorney files charges, IAB proceeds with a review for policy violations following the prosecution. If IAB finds policy violations, the Department may impose discipline up to and including termination.²¹

The Sheriff's Department also conducts administrative investigations at the unit level. The subject's unit and IAB determine whether an incident should be investigated by IAB or remain a unit-level investigation based on the severity of the alleged policy violations.

During this quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported opening 129 new administrative investigations. Of these 129 cases, 48 were assigned to IAB, 61 were designated as unit-level investigations, and 20 were entered as criminal monitors (in which IAB monitors an ongoing criminal investigation conducted by the Sheriff's Department or another agency). In the same period, IAB reports that 136 cases were closed by IAB or at the unit level. There are 474 administrative investigations pending, of which 333 are assigned to IAB and the remaining 141 are unit-level investigations.

Civil Service Commission Dispositions

The Civil Service Commission hears employees' appeals of major discipline, including discharges, reductions in rank, or suspensions of more than five days. Between January 1 and March 31, 2026, the Civil Service Commission issued final decisions in five cases involving Sheriff's Department employees. In these five cases, the Civil Service Commission sustained the Department's discipline in four cases and adopted the findings and recommendation of the Hearing Officer in one case. The Civil Service Commission reports its actions, including final decisions, in [minutes of its meetings](#) posted on the County's website for commission publications.

²¹ If a deputy were convicted of criminal charges and decertified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, the deputy would be unable to be employed as a peace officer.

The Sheriff's Department's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

According to [data posted by the Sheriff's Department](#), it deployed its Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 34 times between January 1 and March 31, 2026.

The Office of Inspector General continues to recommend that the Sheriff's Department provide more specific information regarding the use of UAS for a "high risk tactical operation." Circumstances justifying use of a UAS for a search might include exigent circumstances, a reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring, probable cause to conduct a search, or the execution of a search warrant. The law recognizes these reasons for conducting a search as legal under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which does not have an exception for a warrantless search based on a "high risk tactical operation."

Historically, members of the public have supported drone usage in law enforcement but have requested usage be limited to activity that provides the greatest benefit to life and safety, and that safeguards be in place to avoid usage encroaching into areas which are likely to result in excessive invasion of privacy. Imprecise categories and limited information can result in law enforcement action that undermines public trust.

Status of the Sheriff's Department's Adoption of an Updated Taser Policy and Implementation of a System of Tracking and Documenting Taser Use

Status of Taser Policy Implementation and Training

On October 3, 2023, the Board of Supervisors (Board) passed a [motion](#) instructing the Sheriff's Department to revise its Taser policies and incorporate best practices from other law enforcement agencies to ensure its policies complied with State and Federal law. The motion directs the Office of Inspector General to include in its quarterly reports to the Board the status of the Sheriff's Department updated Taser policy, deputy compliance with updated policies and training, and documentation on the Department's Taser use.

The Sheriff's Department reported that from the Phase 1 purchase of 3,197 Taser 10s, approximately 3,000 are currently deployed.²² The Sheriff's Department reports that full Taser 10 deployment is expected within the next few months. Additional Taser 10s have not been purchased due to reported funding constraints. After full deployment of the 3,197 units, the Sheriff's Department intends to provide annual

²² This section on Tasers includes the information reported by the Sheriff's Department for the quarter covered in this report and does not include information reported previously.

recertification training and training for newly assigned personnel as part of routine Department operations.

Tasers approved for use by the Department are Taser 10, Taser X26, and Taser 7. The intention is to phase out Taser X26 and Taser 7.

The Sheriff's Department Body-Worn Camera Unit tracks only Taser 10 usage, the Department's dashboard tracks all Taser usage.

Tracking Taser Use

In May 2024, the Sheriff's Department launched [a web dashboard reporting Taser usage](#) by date range with options to narrow the result parameters by patrol or custody, patrol station or facility, incident type, or city. The available data includes the result of the use of force (i.e., whether the use resulted in serious injury or death). The Sheriff's Department provided the following information for Taser usage:

- Since the deployment in 2024, web dashboard shows there were approximately 548 total Taser deployments. Out of the 548 deployments, 466 were in patrol operations, 54 were in custody and 28 deployments were in various other units.
- During the first quarter of 2026, the Department reports there were 69 Taser uses: four in Custody and 65 in Patrol Operations.
- The Department reports that in incidents involving a weapon, there were eight (12%). One of these eight incidents involved a firearm, three involved a knife and four involved another weapon.
- At end of the first quarter of this year, 50 Phase 1 Taser 10s have been deployed in Custody Division in Men's Central Jail and Inmate Reception Center.
- Each Taser 10 is equipped with technology that signals the BWC to activate when a deputy turns off the Taser 10's *Safe Mode* as the deputy readies the Taser to fire. The Department reported four such activations, referred to as signal activations, during this quarter.²³ The four signal activations were for Tasers used

²³ Per Sheriff's Department policy, a deputy should activate their BWC in advance of enforcement or investigative contact. In those incidents where the TASER 10 was deployed but no signal activation occurred, it was because the deputy's BWC was already recording. Per a response from the Department, the signal activation feature on the TASER 10 serves as a fail-safe to account for situations that unfold rapidly, where a deputy may need to react immediately for officer safety before manually activating the BWC. It also functions as a secondary safeguard in cases where the BWC was not activated as required.

in a custody setting. Due to the recent implementation of body-worn cameras in custody facilities, staff may still be getting used to activating the cameras.²⁴

High-Risk Traffic Stops

On September 25, 2022, Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputies conducted a high-risk, felony traffic stop²⁵ of Gabriela Koutantos, who was driving a U-Haul cargo van, the license plate for which was entered as stolen in the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications system (CLETS).²⁶ According to the lawsuit filed on October 12, 2023, by Ms. Koutantos and her mother, who witnessed the stop, Ms. Koutantos rented a U-Haul cargo van to transport donations to the East Los Angeles Women's Center when she was stopped at gunpoint by deputies, forced to kneel, put into the back of a patrol car, and detained for nearly an hour. Prior to being placed in the patrol car, a female deputy searched Ms. Koutantos and handcuffed her. The lawsuit alleged excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure.²⁷ While Ms. Koutantos was detained, an investigation by one of the deputies determined that the information in the CLETS system regarding the vehicle was incorrect and that Ms. Koutantos was not driving a stolen vehicle.²⁸ On March 3, 2026, the Board of Supervisors authorized a settlement of the case in the amount of \$900,000.²⁹

²⁴ In patrol operations deputies are trained to activate the camera when interacting with civilians. Because custody staff interact with incarcerated persons throughout the day, the training for activating the cameras is not quite as straightforward.

²⁵ Law enforcement agencies use the term felony-traffic stops or high-risk stops or some combination of these terms to refer to traffic stops where guns are drawn and either placed in a low-ready position or pointed at the subject of the stop. See Field Operations Support Services [Newsletter 25-07 - High-Risk Stop Tactics Chinarian v. City of Los Angeles](#).

²⁶ See *Gabriela Koutantos, et. al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al.*, United States District Court Case No. 2:23-cv-08592; [County of Los Angeles Claims Board Agenda for January 5, 2026](#) at page 13; Cameron Kiszla, [Women sue LASD alleging 'traumatizing' traffic stop was unnecessary, illegal](#), KTLA5, (October 13, 2023); [Mark Nero, LA County Sheriff's Dept. Sued Over 'Violent' Traffic Stop](#), Patch, (October 12, 2023).

²⁷ *Gabriela Koutantos, et. al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al.*, United States District Court Case No. 2:23-cv-08592; [County of Los Angeles Claims Board Agenda for January 5, 2026](#) at page 13.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ [Statement of Proceedings for the Regular Meeting of the Board of Supervisors, March 3, 2026](#).

The proposed settlement was presented to the County of Los Angeles Claims Board (Claims Board) on January 5, 2026. The case summary presented to the Claims Board includes a summary corrective action plan. The summary corrective action plan noted that a case against the Los Angeles Police Department had similar facts, but that counsel for the Sheriff's Department argued that the deputies pulling over Ms. Koutantos had more than reasonable suspicion when they stopped Ms. Koutantos at gunpoint. The claims board summary corrective action plan noted that "on July 19, 2024, the policy regarding pointing firearms at suspects during high-risk traffic stops has changed."

The Sheriff's Department revised its use of force policy, which became effective March 14, 2025.³⁰ While the revised policy discusses displaying firearms, the language speaks to when an officer *may* display a weapon, rather than limiting displaying a weapon to when it is legally justified. (See [MPP section 3-10/045.00 Use of Deadly Force and Firearms](#).) With respect to conducting traffic stops at gunpoint there is no specific policy that aligns with case law on excessive force, and the use-of force-policy does not sufficiently align with the cases on stolen vehicle stops.

Reasonable Use of Force for a Traffic Stop

Peace officers may stop a vehicle if there is a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. (See *United States v. Cortez* (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417-418.) In conducting a traffic stop, peace officers may only use the force necessary to make an arrest, prevent escape, or overcome resistance. The case of *Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3d 1181 and *Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3d 1039 established that peace officers may be held liable for using excessive force based on conducting a traffic stop at gunpoint where the basis of the traffic stop is nothing more than a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle was stolen. As noted in *Washington v. Lambert*:

³⁰ Perhaps the policy draft was finalized by July 19, 2024.

In this nation all people have the right to be free from the terrifying and humiliating experience of being pulled from their cars at gunpoint, handcuffed or made to lie face down on the pavement when insufficient reason for such intrusive police conduct exists. The police may not employ such tactics *every time* they have an “articulable basis” for thinking that someone may be a suspect in a crime. The infringement on personal liberty resulting from so intrusive a type of investigatory stop is simply too great. Under ordinary circumstances, when the police have only a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, drawing weapons and using handcuffs and other restraints will violate the Fourth Amendment. (*Washington v. Lambert, supra*, at page 1181.)

In *Green v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3d 1039, 1047, the court addressed the significance of officers pointing firearms at an individual as part of its analysis of whether a detention rises to the level of a de facto arrest.³¹ The court explained that drawing and aiming a firearm constitutes a substantial show of force that weighs heavily in favor of finding an arrest, particularly when combined with other coercive measures such as physical restraint or prolonged detention. The court, however, did not adopt a categorical rule that pointing a gun automatically converts a stop into an arrest. Instead, it applies a totality of the circumstances approach, emphasizing that such force may be permissible during an investigatory detention if it is reasonably necessary for officer safety in light of the perceived threat. Where the use of firearms is disproportionate to the circumstances or unsupported by specific safety concerns, it can transform what would otherwise be a temporary detention into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.³²

In *Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir 2024) 113 F.4th 888, Los Angeles Police Department officers stopped Ms. Chinaryan after a reported stolen vehicle alert, conducted a high-risk stop, and detained her at gunpoint before they were able to confirm the vehicle was stolen. Ms. Chinaryan sued, arguing the stop, detention, and use of force were unconstitutional because the underlying alert or suspicion was mistaken and the force used was excessive under the circumstances. Addressing precedent cases, the Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement can be liable for

³¹ *Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3d 1039, 1047.

³² California Penal Code section 836(a)(3) codifies constitutional law on arrests and permits an arrest when there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a felony, regardless of whether a felony was ultimately committed in fact. Given the case law, stopping the driver of a vehicle at gunpoint would seem to be excessive force if the only evidence known to the officer is a database entry that a vehicle is stolen. From the summary corrective action plan there appears to be no evidence supporting the de facto arrest of Ms. Koutantos.

conducting a high-risk traffic stop based on nothing more than reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen.³³ In the *Chinaryan* case, the court noted that while “vehicle theft is an ‘arguably severe’ crime, the officers had no articulable basis to suspect that [Ms. Chinaryan or her passengers] posed a threat to anyone beyond the generic threat that a suspected vehicle thief poses.” Ms. Chinaryan was not “uncooperative or taking action” that suggested the possibility of flight or that she was a danger to anyone. (*Chinaryan*, *supra*, at page 898.)

While these cases would seem to establish that excessive force was used in the traffic stop of Ms. Koutantos and that her detention at gunpoint, forcing her to kneel, her handcuffing, and being seated in a patrol car for a substantial period of time constituted a de facto arrest, the summary corrective action plan asserts that the deputies who stopped Ms. Koutantos had *more than reasonable suspicion* without articulating any facts supporting that claim or supporting probable cause for the de facto arrest. Based on the facts presented in the claims board case summary and summary corrective action plan, it is hard to imagine what facts constituted *more than reasonable suspicion* justifying the deputies’ use of force and de facto arrest of Ms. Koutantos.

Sheriff’s Department Policies on Traffic Stops

The current concern raised by this settlement, is that the summary corrective action plan asserts that at the time of the incident deputies were in compliance with high-risk traffic stop tactics and procedures but fails to acknowledge that case law from as early as 1996 essentially held that the deputies’ conduct in the stop of Ms. Koutantos and her de facto arrest constituted excessive force and an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, current Sheriff’s Department policy does not sufficiently prohibit displaying firearms when stopping the driver of a suspected stolen vehicle absent specific information that the driver or passengers pose a danger. The policy on displaying firearms states the following:

- *Unnecessarily or prematurely displaying a firearm (pistol, rifle, or shotgun) could limit a Department member’s alternatives in controlling a situation, may create unnecessary anxiety on the part of members of the public, and could result in an unwarranted or unintentional discharge of the firearm. Department members are expected to*

³³ *Chinaryan*, *supra*, citing to *Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996), 98 F.3d 1181 and *Green v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F. 3d 1039.

exercise sound judgment and critical decision-making when choosing to display a firearm or point it at a person.

- *Department members may display a firearm to a threatening person to help establish or maintain control in a potentially dangerous situation if the totality of the circumstances creates an objectively reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm.*
- *When a Department member displays their firearm to a threatening person, in the absence of an imminent threat but where they reasonably believe that a potential threat exists, based on the totality of the circumstances, Department members should generally point their firearm in a safe direction without pointing it at a person.*
- *In situations where a Department member reasonably believes an imminent threat exists based on the totality of the circumstances, that Department member may point their firearm at the threatening person or animal until they no longer reasonably perceive the threat.*

While this policy states that displaying the firearm should be necessary, most of the language is permissive as to when a deputy *may* display a firearm; there is nothing requiring “more than reasonable suspicion” to display or point a firearm at the driver or passenger of a suspected stolen vehicle. The policy does not sufficiently state the stopping the driver of a stolen vehicle at gunpoint without additional facts is excessive force and that subsequent restraints on liberty are a de facto arrest that requires probable cause.

The Department did send out a newsletter intended for training on stolen vehicle stops. But that newsletter by the Department’s Field Operations Support Services (FOSS) was not sent out until *November 6, 2025*, three years after the traffic stop of Ms. Koutantos, and two years after the filing of the lawsuit, despite an acknowledgement in the newsletter citing to the *Washington* and *Green* cases and noting that the “Ninth Circuit found that the law governing high-risk tactics was ‘clearly established’ long before the LAPD’s 2019 stop that is the subject of the *Chinaryan* case.”³⁴ Given the acknowledgement that the law regarding excessive force for stopping stolen vehicles was established long before the LAPD’s 2019 stop, the laws were clearly established long before the stop of Ms. Koutantos.

³⁴ See [FOSS 25-07 High Risk Stop Tactics Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles](#).

While the Office of Inspector General acknowledges that not all situations can be implemented into policy, limitations on conducting traffic stops at gunpoint should be implemented into policy because these stops are not infrequent. Additionally, there is a policy covering tactical incidents that includes traffic stops. By failing to address *Chinaryan* and the earlier cases, the policy does not sufficiently notify deputies that traffic stops at gunpoint require articulable reasons that the driver or passengers pose a threat to the safety of the deputies or others. [MPP section 3-10/150.00 Tactical Incidents](#) outlines departmental expectations for managing and responding to tactical incidents that involve elevated risk and may require specialized coordination and resources. The policy defines tactical incidents broadly as situations involving potential armed confrontation and high-risk suspects, including traffic stops. The policy emphasizes officer safety, scene control, and coordinated response rather than establishing specific rules governing the drawing of firearms. Within this framework, the policy requires deputies to continuously assess evolving threats during tactical incidents and to respond in a manner consistent with the level of perceived risk. When circumstances indicate an elevated or potentially dangerous situation, deputies may adopt heightened tactical postures, which can include positioning themselves defensively and, when appropriate based on reasonable perception of threat, drawing or readying their firearms. By failing to include limitations on drawing guns when conducting traffic stops of stolen vehicles in MPP section 3-10/150.00 there is a gap that could easily be filled by aligning the policy with case law on drawing guns when the only information is that the vehicle is stolen.

[FOSS Newsletter 15-24 Detaining Felony Suspects](#), provides additional tactical guidance for deputies detaining felony or high-risk suspects, again emphasizing officer safety, coordination, and control of the scene. It instructs deputies to maintain visual awareness of threats, use clear verbal commands, request backup, and position themselves advantageously during encounters. The policy stresses that suspects should not be allowed to remain standing and should be handcuffed and secured as soon and as safely as possible, because no detention is considered fully controlled until the suspect is restrained. The automatic handcuffing of a detained suspect is inconsistent with the law and the later FOSS newsletter ([High Risk Stop Tactics](#) *Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles*).

While the Department correctly noted that the preamble to the use-of-force policy states that Department members “may only use that amount of force that is objectively reasonable, proportional, and which reasonably appears necessary at the time to defend others or themselves, effect an arrest or detention, prevent escape, or overcome resistance,” the broad language of the policy preamble does not sufficiently convey the law expressed in the line of cases leading up to and including *Chinaryan*.

A statement in the summary corrective action plan that the case of *Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles* is under review by the Sheriff's Department suggests the Sheriff's Department is open to revising its policies to reflect the line of cases on traffic stops at gunpoint. The Office of Inspector General is encouraged that there is the possibility of a policy change.

Additionally, the Department reports that it conducts a number of training classes related to High-Risk traffic stops, including the *Chinaryan* case, these include: Tactics and Survival Courses (TAS1, TAS2), High Risk Stops, Patrol School, and High-Risk classes address cases relevant to high-risk traffic stops. In addition, the Department utilizes the Briefing Room, an online training tool that provides video training on California law and federal cases. The Department is also updating its in-house video on Felony Traffic Stops. The Department extended an open invitation for OIG staff to attend these classes to conduct ongoing oversight of this issue. That invitation is appreciated and represents the type of engagement that fosters collaboration.

Recommendations

1. The Department should implement a policy consistent with the case law prohibiting traffic stops at gunpoint based solely on information that a vehicle is stolen.
2. The Department should conduct training for all deputies assigned to patrol consistent with the information in [FOSS Newsletter 25-07](#).
3. The Department should rescind or modify [FOSS Newsletter 15-24](#) for consistency with FOSS Newsletter 25-07 and the cases cited on traffic stops and de facto arrests that violate constitutional rights.

Outstanding Requests to the Sheriff's Department

The Sheriff's Department provided responses to each of the requests made by the Office of Inspector General during the first quarter. The only outstanding request may be found in the [Office of Inspector General's report covering the fourth quarter of 2025](#).

CUSTODY DIVISION

Jail Overcrowding

As previously reported by the Office of Inspector General, overcrowding in the Los Angeles County jails continues to jeopardize the ability of the Sheriff's Department

to provide habitable, humane, and safe conditions of confinement as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.³⁵

The Los Angeles County jails have a Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) total rated capacity of 12,404.³⁶ According to the Sheriff's Department Population Management Bureau Daily Inmate Statistics, as of March 31, 2026, the total population of people in custody in the Los Angeles County jails was 12,462. As of December 31, 2025, the total population of people in custody in the Los Angeles County jails was 12,236.

The table below shows the daily count of people in custody, according to the Population Management Bureau Daily Inmate Statistics, at Men's Central Jail (MCJ), Twin Towers Correctional Facility (TTCF), Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF), Pitchess Detention Center – East (PDC-East), Pitchess Detention Center – North (PDC-North), Pitchess Detention Center – South (PDC-South), and North County Correctional Facility (NCCF) on the last day of the previous four quarters. On these dates, three facilities (MCJ, PDC-North, and NCCF) that together account for more than half the Department's jail capacity operated over the BSCC rated capacity.

Facility	BSCC	Facility Count			
	Capacity	6/30/2025	9/30/2025	12/31/2025	3/31/2026
MCJ	3512	3441	3751	3609	3812
TTCF	2432	2433	2403	2309	2270
CRDF	1708	1416	1496	1414	1430
PDC-East	926	7	17	11	15
PDC-North	830	1373	1348	1321	1253
PDC-South	782	546	640	611	640
NCCF	2214	3148	3142	2961	3042

³⁵ See *Fischer v. Winter* (1983) 564 F. Supp. 281, 299 (noting that while overcrowding may not be unconstitutional in itself, overcrowding is a root cause of deficiencies in basic living conditions, such as providing sufficient shelter, clothing, food, medical care, sanitation, and personal safety).

³⁶ The total rated capacity is arrived at by adding the rated capacity for each of the County jail facilities: MCJ 3512, TTCF 2432, CRDF 1708, PDC-East 926, PDC-North 830, PDC-South 782, and NCCF 2214. Some portions of the jail facilities are not included in the BSCC capacity ratings. When referring to the jail facilities, this report includes only the BSCC rated facilities. The rated capacity has not been recently updated and does not take into account the understaffing or the deteriorating physical plant of MCJ, meaning that the current safe capacity of the Los Angeles County jails is certainly substantially lower than the rated maximum.

Availability of Menstrual Products in the Los Angeles County Jails

On June 25, 2024, the Board of Supervisors (Board) passed a [motion](#) requesting the Sheriff's Department and directing the Office of Inspector General, Sybil Brand Commission, and the Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission to review and report back on policies related to the availability and accessibility of menstrual products in the Los Angeles County jails, in light of recent legislation, and directing the Office of Inspector General to include status on the availability and accessibility of menstrual products in its quarterly reports to the Board, until further notice.³⁷

In its initial [report](#) to the Board, staff from the Office of Inspector General detailed the availability of pads, tampons, and panty liners for menstruating individuals. In September 2025, the Sheriff's Department, in partnership with the Los Angeles-based nonprofit, The Flow, began piloting menstrual cups for incarcerated workers and incarcerated persons enrolled in rehabilitation/education programs at CRDF.³⁸ In March 2026, staff from The Flow and the Sheriff Department's Gender Responsive Services (GRS) conducted additional learning sessions for incarcerated people in the pilot modules.³⁹ A total of two sessions were held, with 54 individuals participating, of

³⁷ See [Penal Code, § 4023.5\(a\)](#). ("A person confined in a local detention facility shall be allowed to continue to use materials necessary for personal hygiene with regard to their menstrual cycle and reproductive system, including, but not limited to, sanitary pads and tampons, at no cost to the incarcerated person."); [Cal. Code Regs., tit 15, § 1265](#). (Each menstruating person shall be provided with sanitary napkins, panty liners, and tampons as requested with no maximum allowance."); Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Manual, [§ 6-15/010.00 Inmate Clothing, Bedding, and Personal Hygiene](#). ("All menstruating inmates shall have ready access to sanitary napkins, panty liners, and tampons."); Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 5-16-040 Distribution of Personal Care Items](#). ("Each menstruating inmate housed at CRDF shall be provided with sanitary napkins, panty liners, and tampons. All feminine hygiene products shall be readily available in a common space within each module or pod setting."); [Penal Code, § 3409\(a\)](#). ("A person incarcerated...who menstruates or experiences uterine or vaginal bleeding shall, without needing to request, have ready access to, and be allowed to use, materials necessary for personal hygiene with regard to their menstrual cycle and reproductive system, including, but not limited to, sanitary pads and tampons, at no cost to the person.").

³⁸ The Flow "distributes free menstrual cups and provides bilingual education to help people manage their periods with dignity, autonomy, and sustainability." The organization has received menstrual cup donations from saalt, Pixie, and Diva, and funding from a number of entities including the Los Angeles Giving Circle, Sidney E. Frank Foundation, and Bloomberg Philanthropies. The Flow has also partnered with community organizations like A New Way of Life, CASA of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Regional Food Bank, and Women's Foundation California. Incarcerated persons participating in the Conservation Work Program are housed in module 1700, while those enrolled in education services offered by Gender Responsive Services are housed in modules 3500 and 3600.

³⁹ See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, § 5-21-20, Education Based Incarceration: "The Gender Responsive Services Unit is responsible for providing inmate educational programs in accordance with the Minimum Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, Title 15, section 1061, 'Inmate Education Plan' [at Century Regional Detention Facility.]" At CRDF, Gender Responsive Services offers services in numerous housing modules, including 1700, 3500 and 3600.

whom 53 were new to the pilot program. All 53 chose to take a menstrual cup and received instructions.⁴⁰ The next round of learning sessions was scheduled for April 2026. Plans to expand access to menstrual cups in other housing modules is contingent on feedback and grant funding.

Between January and March 2026, Office of Inspector General staff periodically verified the availability and accessibility of menstrual products at Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF) during site visits.⁴¹

Communication with CRDF leadership. In January 2026, OIG staff raised concerns about reported search practices and menstrual product accessibility to CRDF leadership via email. In February 2026, the Office of Inspector General met with CRDF leadership to discuss the concerns and recommendations outlined in OIG's last [quarterly report](#). Two incarcerated workers reported that some reception deputies continued to request that they remove their menstrual cup in the search area after completing their work shift and denied them access to a toilet as required by the revised unit order on searches.⁴² Other incarcerated workers reported to the Office of Inspector General that some deputies do not ask whether they are wearing a menstrual cup and acknowledged not self-disclosing to avoid possibly being asked to remove it in the search area. In the meeting, CRDF leadership confirmed the in-person briefings were conducted in December 2025 about the revised unit order on searches. To address concerns, CRDF leadership committed to directing supervisors to re-brief reception personnel.

Concerns about accessibility and distribution practices outlined in previous OIG [reporting](#) were also discussed during the meeting. OIG reiterated that the Sheriff's Department should consider resuming cell-to-cell distribution of menstrual products in addition to placing products in common areas. CRDF leadership agreed to consider the recommendation, and acknowledged the risks associated with leaving access largely to the discretion of custody staff and incarcerated workers.

Grievances. For this reporting period, the Office of Inspector General independently retrieved grievance data from the Custody Inmate Grievance Application ("CIGA") for March 1 through March 31, 2026, and queried predetermined search terms to review

⁴⁰ Menstrual cups were disinfected in a boiling water dispenser prior to distribution.

⁴¹ Staff from the Office of Inspector General visited general population, moderate observation housing, high observation housing, Gender Responsive Services, and incarcerated worker housing modules.

⁴² See CRDF Unit Order, # 6-01-00 Protocol for Inmate Searches (version obtained via email).

grievances about the availability and accessibility of menstrual products, searches while menstruating, and related matters.⁴³

A total of 1,218 records were retrieved from CIGA for the one-month period, of which 1,175 were requests, 36 were standard grievances, and 7 were grievances against staff. Office of Inspector General staff identified a total of two grievances containing one or more of the search terms.⁴⁴ One grievance contained the terms “period” and “blood,” and one contained the term “blood.” Both grievances were submitted by individuals temporarily housed in the detox/intake module at CRDF. Of the two grievances, one was deemed to be related to the availability and accessibility of menstrual products. That grievance covered multiple issues, among them an allegation that the grievant was not provided “panties while on [her] period.”⁴⁵ The complainant submitted the complaint to the Executive Office of the Board of Supervisors after her release from custody, and the Executive Office forwarded the complaint to the Office of Inspector General. The Office of Inspector General forwarded this third-party complaint to the Sheriff’s Department for processing on March 26, 2026. The Sheriff’s Department issued a finding of “sustained in part” but did not address the complainant’s allegation of not being provided “panties” while she menstruated.⁴⁶

Because of the low number of grievances related to the availability and accessibility of menstrual products, the Office of Inspector General is optimistic that the steps taken regarding past concerns will result in sufficient availability of menstrual products and commends the Sheriff’s Department in their sustained efforts to comply with state law, the Board directive, and Sheriff’s Department policy. Notwithstanding this, the Office of Inspector General also recognizes that some people in custody may hesitate and opt not to submit grievances about menstrual products for a variety of reasons, for example, shame, humiliation, normalization of inadequate access, fear of retaliation or little faith in the grievance system. It is imperative that the Sheriff’s Department maintain product availability and accessibility while addressing and resolving

⁴³ The Office of Inspector General selected ten terms, including menstrual product(s), menstrual cup(s), pad(s), tampon(s), panty liner(s), sanitary napkin(s), menstruation, period, bleeding, and blood, to identify potentially relevant grievances.

⁴⁴ The ID number for the two identified grievances are 26-13-00902 and 26-13-01343.

⁴⁵ Other issues included cleanliness, clothing, general living conditions, hygiene, medical care, and water quality.

⁴⁶ See Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Custody Division Manual, [§ 8-03/005.00 Inmate Grievances](#).

complaints in a manner that upholds the dignity and health of menstruating individuals in custody.

Johnson v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Monitoring Report

The Office of Inspector General serves as the court-appointed monitor for the *Johnson v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department* class-action lawsuit. The lawsuit alleged that the Sheriff's Department denied proper accommodations for a class of people (Class Members) with mobility impairments housed in Los Angeles County Jails or provided them with inadequate accommodations. The lawsuit also alleged that the Department inappropriately segregated them, excluded them from jail programs and services, and subjected them to multiple and pervasive physical access barriers throughout the facilities.⁴⁷ In 2015, the Sheriff's Department entered into a settlement agreement ("Agreement") to implement systemwide reform of the conditions of confinement for people with mobility impairments. The Office of Inspector General filed its [Tenth Implementation Status Report](#) on March 31, 2026, and reported that of the seven provisions of the Agreement that remain in effect, the Sheriff's Department has achieved sustained compliance with one, and partial compliance with six.⁴⁸

While progress has been slow at times, the Department took significant steps to address several issues. For example, it exceeded the requirements set forth for providing thermal clothing by implementing a process for distributing such clothing to all Class Members, without a prescription, and upon their arrival at the IRC and CRDF Reception Center. Another example of the Department's efforts towards achieving compliance is the Department's use of harnessing technology to address the Agreement terms which requires all "ADA" grievances be identified and marked as "ADA."⁴⁹ In October 2025, the Department used its digital databases to assist in identifying and marking grievances as required under the provision. While the technological update came after this past year's self-assessment period, the

⁴⁷ *Johnson v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department*, Case No. CV 08-03515 DDP (C.D. Cal. Filed May 29, 2008).

⁴⁸ The Agreement contains a total of 49 provisions. Pursuant to stipulation of the Parties, the Court has severed 38 of the 49 provisions from the Agreement, these are provisions that have either achieved sustained compliance or were documented as "completed" during settlement negotiations and are no longer subject to monitoring by the Office of Inspector General. As noted in the Office of Inspector General's *Tenth Implementation Status Report*, the Sheriff's Department achieved sustained compliance with one additional provision. There are now five sustained provisions which have not been severed from the Agreement.

⁴⁹ ADA stands for the Americans with Disabilities Act. This act requires that reasonable accommodations be made for people with disabilities.

Department's efforts to find innovative ways to address issues are commendable and the Office of Inspector General is optimistic this will bring the Department closer to compliance in the coming years.

Although notable progress has been made in improving the conditions that gave rise to the Agreement, the Office of Inspector General's report again identified systemic issues which stymie the Sheriff's Department's reform efforts and make it unlikely that the Sheriff's Department will achieve compliance on the remaining provisions without additional extensions of its settlement term.⁵⁰

First, the Sheriff's Department continues to expand the areas within the jails where it houses Class Members by placing them in non-ADA housing areas within the MCJ and TTCF. Class members in these areas continue to face architectural barriers, which pose safety risks and have not been provided with adequate accommodations to assist them. The Department acknowledged that there is a need for accessible showers on the 2000, 3000, 5000, 9000 floors of MCJ; however, since the *Ninth Implementation Status Report*, there have been no architectural improvements made to any jail facility where Class Members are housed. As a result, Class Members continue to struggle with steadying themselves while showering and those who cannot stand for long periods of time reported having to use alternatives to shower benches, like utilizing plastic chairs that are not intended for use in a shower. Although the Department has distributed some shower chairs with non-slip feet to certain housing areas, Office of Inspector General staff continue to see the use of plastic chairs in showers throughout the facilities.

Second, as reported in the *Eighth Implementation Status Report* and the *Ninth Implementation Status Report*, Office of Inspector General staff again observed that prescriptions for mobility assistive devices are not actively monitored, resulting in delays in the removal of devices once prescriptions expire and secondary review options are exhausted. Medical and custody staff explained there is no established process for removing devices from Class Members and neither provided any clarity as to who is responsible for doing so, indicating a lack of collaboration or cooperation between the Sheriff's Department and Correctional Health Services. The Office of Inspector General staff spoke with several Class Members at MCJ, TTCF, and CRDF who were in a wheelchair that did not belong to them based on the classification on their wristband. When questioned regarding the wheelchair, they confirmed that the wheelchair did not

⁵⁰ The Agreement, which took effect on April 22, 2015, was originally set to expire on April 22, 2018. The parties have stipulated to, and the court approved, several extensions of settlement term, most recently extending the settlement term by one year to May 30, 2027.

belong to them, but they used it to sit. In fact, Office of Inspector General staff observed several wheelchairs in one Class Member's housing location at TTCF that were not assigned to anyone. The unaccounted-for mobility assistive devices throughout facilities could contribute to the delay in Class Members receiving their prescribed mobility assistive devices. In addition, mobility assistive devices that are not properly inventoried or monitored once they are no longer medically necessary present jail safety and security concerns.

Lastly, as the Office of Inspector General has previously reported, a lack of standardized documentation practices and procedures continues to hinder the Department's ability to demonstrate compliance with the terms of the Agreement. Specifically, documentation indicating Class Members are offered and provided programming information at townhall meetings, are properly designated as requiring mobility assisted devices, and whether Class Member grievances are addressed by the proper entities should be standardized. The Office of Inspector General urges the Department to establish standardized documentation practices and procedures among its jail facilities to identify where gaps exist in providing accommodations as required by the Agreement. Without proper accommodations, Class Members face the same conditions and barriers as they did when the Agreement was signed 10 years ago.

Commissary Prices

Background

On July 9, 2024, the Board of Supervisors passed a [motion](#) directing the Sheriff's Department to report back on measures taken to ensure commissary prices in the Los Angeles County Jails are not excessive and remain comparable with prices for groceries and other retail outlets. The motion directed the Office of Inspector General to review the Sheriff's Department's report back and provide an assessment, which was issued on February 6, 2025, entitled [Report Back on People Over Profit: Fairness and Equity in Commissary Prices for the Los Angeles County Jails](#). The motion also directed the Office of Inspector General to provide quarterly updates on the Sheriff's Department's progress on the removal of the profit mark-ups and reduction of prices on commissary items.

Title 15 Meetings with Keefe Commissary Network

As noted in previous reports, the vendor for commissary items and vending machines is [Keefe Commissary Network](#) (Keefe).

The contract requires Keefe to attend monthly Title 15 meetings the County convenes to present reports on commissary and vending sales trends and spikes, billing issues,

complaints submitted by incarcerated people, machine maintenance and reliability, security concerns, and any other operational problems identified by the parties. Office of Inspector General staff attended the Title 15 meetings held this quarter, which included representatives from each custodial facility, representatives from telephone services, and Keefe staff.

The Sheriff's Department received grievances requesting vending card refunds. The Department provided assurances that cards with a positive balance will result in a refund to the holder; this includes the initial deposit unless the card is damaged. Personnel are processing the requests in batches as they are received. If a person is released from custody before they receive their refund, they can retrieve the refund from the cashier of the correlated custody facility. The Department was unable to provide a timeline for completion of the process.

Multiple telephones at MCJ were removed by people in custody. At the meeting, Department staff provided assurances that they conduct regular monitoring of the telephones to observe the need for repairs, including replacing parts and remounting the telephones.

Because of a consistent demand for hotpots, the department placed a bulk order in early March to meet demand.

Vending Machine Installation

The process of installing new vending machines remains ongoing. New vending machines are now installed and operational at CRDF, Twin Towers, and NCCF. The transition remains in progress at PDC and MCJ. The old machines were scheduled to be removed from PDC North and South by mid-April 2026. Keefe is setting up the new machines off site to ensure functionality upon installation. MCJ is next on the schedule. The goal is to have all the new vending machines installed and operational by the end of June 2026.

A vending machine at MCJ was vandalized. Because of the planned installation of the new machines, the damaged machine will be removed but not replaced. If an old-style machine malfunctions and is fixable, repairs will be made.

Kosher/Halal Menu Availability

Regarding the availability of updated Kosher/Halal menus originally discussed in the Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department – July through September 2025](#), the new menu has not yet been

released. Keefe, ISB, and the Contracts Unit continue to meet to work on the menus and food options.

Department staff directed Keefe to distribute information regarding Kosher and Halal products until the menus with the proper designations are finalized. Keefe's handouts include proper designation for the Kosher and Halal products. The Department also disseminates information directly to all the facilities and Food Services to ensure there is full clarity on the identification of the items.

Inmate Welfare Commission

The Inmate Welfare Commission (IWC) met in January and March of 2026. There is an anticipated end-of-fiscal year closing fund balance of \$14.3 million, which exceeds the anticipated closing balance by approximately \$5 million. This is attributable in part to cost savings from vacancies among Inmate Services Bureau (ISB) positions that are financed by the Inmate Welfare Fund (IWF) and lower expenditures on Approved Inmate Programs than budgeted.

MCJ Captains are working on a proposal for the IWC for new workout equipment for the two MCJ roof recreational areas. NCCF is working on an estimate for their garden nursery program, including rebuilding the classroom/shed used for that program that was damaged in a recent storm. NCCF seeks to have its vocational welding school resume operations by June of this year.

Classes for the LGBTQ+ population at Men's Central Jail taught by Community Based Organizations and Public Health are planned in order to provide learning opportunities and for earning milestone and work credits.

The IWC seeks to sell the Department's tattoo removal machine in order to purchase a newer model and reinstitute a tattoo removal program. The IWC is seeking to consult with experts to improve tattoo removal services.⁵¹

In-Custody Deaths

Between January 1 and March 31, 2026, eleven people died in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department. The Department of Medical Examiner's (DME) website currently reflects the manner of death for ten of these deaths, which were determined to

⁵¹ On May 13, 2026, Inmate Services Bureau requested funding for the Mobile Tattoo Removal Program. The program would better facilitate the removal of tattoos compared to the outdated machine currently in the Department's possession.

be natural.⁵² For the remaining death, the DME finding has been deferred.⁵³ One person died at MCJ, one person died at TTCF, one person died at NCCF, and eight people died at hospitals after being transported from the jails. The Sheriff's Department posts the information regarding in-custody deaths on a [dedicated page on Inmate In-Custody Deaths on its website](#).⁵⁴

Office of Inspector General staff attended the Custody Services Division Administrative Death Reviews and the Correctional Health Services Mortality Reviews for each of the eleven in-custody deaths. The following summaries, arranged in chronological order, provide brief descriptions of each in-custody death:

Date of Death: January 1, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On December 28, 2025, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from NCCF to LAGMC for a higher level of care. On January 1, 2026, the person was pronounced dead. Areas for further inquiry include whether the person received the proper medical referral from IRC providers and a Peer Review into the person's medical care. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as peritonitis, mesh-associated necrotizing soft tissue infection of the groin and abdominal wall, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus cellulitis secondary to excoriation, and scabies infection.

⁵³ In the past, the Office of Inspector General has reported on the preliminary cause of death as determined by the Medical Examiner, Correctional Health Services (CHS) personnel, hospital personnel providing care at the time of death, and/or Sheriff's Department Homicide investigators. Because the information provided is preliminary, the Office of Inspector General has determined that the better practice is to report on the manner of death. There are five classifications for manner of death: natural, accident, suicide, homicide, and undetermined. Natural causes can include illnesses and disease and thus deaths due to COVID-19 are classified as natural. Overdoses may be accidental, or the result of a purposeful ingestion. The Sheriff's Department and Correctional Health Services use evidence gathered during the investigation to make a preliminary determination as to whether an overdose is accidental or purposeful. Where the suspected cause of death is reported by the Sheriff's Department and CHS, the Office of Inspector General will include this in parenthesis.

⁵⁴ Penal Code § 10008 requires that within 10 days of any death of a person in custody at a local correctional facility, the facility must post on its website information about the death, including the manner and means of death, and must update the posting within 30 days of a change in the information.

Date of Death: January 12, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On January 12, 2026, custody staff conducting Title-15 safety checks at MCJ found an unresponsive person in a single-person cell. Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered emergency aid, and administered five doses of Narcan. According to the paramedic on scene, the person presented with early onset rigor mortis and was pronounced dead at the scene. Areas for further inquiry include the quality of the earlier Title-15 safety checks. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as acute bacterial bronchopneumonia.

Date of Death: January 13, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On January 12, 2026, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from NCCF to Henry Mayo Newhall Hospital for a higher level of care. On January 13, 2026, the person was pronounced dead. Areas for further inquiry include the quality and timeliness of Title-15 safety checks and the use of a simple face mask for severe hypoxia. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death acute respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress syndrome, severe pneumonia (viral and bacterial), and chronic alcohol use and early liver cirrhosis.

Date of Death: January 22, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On January 22, 2026, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from TTCF's Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) to LAGMC for a higher level of care. The person was pronounced dead the same day. Areas for further inquiry include the emergency response and a Peer Review into the utilization of resources when there is a lack of CTC beds available. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and pulmonary thromboembolism.

Date of Death: January 27, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On January 12, 2026, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from TTCF to LAGMC for a higher level of care. On January 27, 2026, the person was pronounced dead. Areas for further inquiry include Health Service Request processing. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as acute respiratory distress syndrome and influenza A pneumonia.

Date of Death: January 29, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On January 19, 2026, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from TTCF to LAGMC for a higher level of care. On January 29, 2026, the person was pronounced dead. Areas for further inquiry include whether the Sheriff's Department had the authority to release the person from custody based on the charges and their medical condition. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as chronic ethanol use disorder.

Date of Death: January 29, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On January 29, 2026, custody staff conducting Title-15 safety checks at TTCF found an unresponsive person in a single-person cell. Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered emergency aid, and administered three doses of Narcan. The person died at the scene. Areas for further inquiry include the timeliness and quality of the emergency response, the quality and timeliness of Title-15 safety checks, and the person refusing medical care. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

Date of Death: February 2, 2026

Custodial Status: Sentenced

On February 2, 2026, custody staff and CHS distributing medication at NCCF found an unresponsive person in a single-person cell. Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered emergency aid, and administered five doses of Narcan. The person died at the scene. Areas for further inquiry include whether CHS staff were in command of the emergency response and re-briefing IRC medical providers on the expectations for addressing Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) in the IRC Clinic. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as hypertensive cardiovascular disease and severe obesity.

Date of Death: February 4, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On February 3, 2026, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from MCJ to LAGMC for a higher level of care. On February 4, 2026, the person was pronounced dead. Areas for further inquiry include whether there were observable signs indicating the person required immediate medical attention during the earlier Title-15 safety checks, whether the person's medical information was properly reported to CHS staff, and the quality of medical care that the person received at

LAGMC.⁵⁵ Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and metastatic hepatocellular carcinoma and diabetes mellitus.

Date of Death: February 13, 2026

Custodial Status: Sentenced

On February 11, 2026, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from TTCF's CTC to LAGMC for a higher level of care. On February 13, 2026, the person was pronounced dead. Areas for further inquiry include TTCF custody staff failing to activate their Body-Worn Cameras. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as metastatic rectal cancer.

Date of Death: March 24, 2026

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On March 24, 2026, people housed in a dorm at MCJ alerted custody staff at a deputy booth of a man down within the dorm. The person, who was conscious and breathing, was transported to the MCJ clinic and paramedics transferred the person to LAGMC for a higher level of care. The person was pronounced dead the same day. Areas for further inquiry include MCJ custody staff failing to activate their body-worn cameras and the quality of Title-15 safety checks.⁵⁶ Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website does not currently reflect the manner of death, and the cause of death is deferred.

Efforts to Reduce In-Custody Deaths

On March 3, 2026, the Board of supervisors passed a motion, [Strengthening Accountability to Significantly Decrease Jail Deaths in the Los Angeles County Jails](#). The motion directs the Office of Inspector General to include in quarterly reporting information on the Medication Assisted Treatment program, summaries and status of corrective action plans instituted after an in-custody death, improvements to the Corrective Action Plan tracker, compassionate release efforts, and an analysis of the Mortality Review process. The Office of Inspector General began monitoring and

⁵⁵ This concern is not to suggest that the patient received inadequate care while at MCJ or LAGMC. Rather, a review of the person's medical care while at LAGMC might assist CHS in the mortality review of this death.

⁵⁶ While the activation of the body-worn cameras is noted here, the deputies were within the 120-grace period, during which the deputies transition to wearing the cameras. There is an expected period of adjustment for deputies for whom the cameras are newly deployed.

tracking the requested items and will include this information in future reporting as directed.

In-Custody Overdose Deaths in Los Angeles County Jails

On December 19, 2023, the Board of Supervisors [passed a motion](#) directing the Sheriff's Department to "[c]ollect and track data outlining narcotics recovery in county jail facilities to evaluate the efficacy of drug detection interventions and provide information to the OIG," and [s]trengthen existing policy on increasing and conducting more comprehensive searches of the belongings of staff and civilians who enter the facility, beyond visual inspections." The Board also directed the Office of Inspector General to report quarterly on the Sheriff's Department's progress on these mandates, including progress or any recommendations included in Office of Inspector General reports, as well as on the number of in-custody deaths confirmed or assumed to be due to an overdose, and on any additional recommendations related to in-custody overdose deaths.

Of the eleven people who died in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department between January 1 and March 31, 2026, the medical examiner's final reports, including toxicology assessments, do not confirm that any person died due to an accidental overdose. Toxicology results remain pending for one of the eleven deaths and may indicate an overdose death once completed. As of this report, the DME has confirmed that nine individuals died due to accidental overdose during the 2025 calendar year and no individuals died due to accidental overdose during the first quarter of 2026.

Tracking and Improving Narcotics Intervention Efforts

The Sheriff's Department does not presently track narcotics detection in a format that allows data to be analyzed and reports that it does not have the capacity to build a mechanism to track narcotics seizures by drug detection mechanism, nor is it able to compile extractable data collected in the Los Angeles Regional Crime Information System (LARCIS) to evaluate the efficacy of drug detection intervention. Instead, the Sheriff's Department takes the position that constructing an all-encompassing jail management data system would best support the Sheriff's Department's efforts to track narcotics recovery and evaluate the efficacy of drug detection interventions. The Office of Inspector General continues to recommend that the Sheriff's Department examine ways to comply with the Board's directive by standardizing search procedures division-wide, improving reporting requirements for staff, and compiling data on detection interventions and seizures using existing technologies.

The Board's second directive requires that the Sheriff's Department "[s]trengthen existing policy on increasing and conducting more comprehensive searches of the

belongings of staff and civilians who enter the [jails].” The Sheriff’s Department previously reported that its current policy grants the Sheriff’s Department broad authority to search staff and civilians entering the jails, so that no changes to existing policy are required to implement more comprehensive searches. The Sheriff’s Department previously reported that it implemented more frequent unannounced and randomized staff searches that began in May 2024.

Narcotics detection training

Office of Inspector General staff attended Department trainings related to narcotics and contraband detection within custodial settings.

Person searches. Jail Operations conducts in-person training on searching inmates for recent Academy graduates and also conducts refresher courses every one to two years. Custody Assistants (CA) received this training as well.

The training includes the best practice of activating body-worn cameras prior to the search and articulating the search after camera activation and in reports. The training also emphasized using tactics to avoid using force in completing the search.

Screening and Distribution of Supplies and Mail. The Jail Operations training on the screening and distribution of supplies and mail provided an overview of the processes. While Deputies open and inspect all mail for contraband, they are instructed not to read legal mail, including confidential legal mail from lawyers and entities such as the State Bar or the ACLU. There is training on recognizing counterfeit seals or mail falsely designated as legal correspondence.

Because contraband smuggled through the mail does enter custodial facilities, the Department is considering digitizing the mail system to reduce the risk of contraband smuggling through the mail. If such a system is introduced, the Department will need to ensure that privacy concerns are addressed in policies for monitoring digitized mail.

Fraternization. The training included prohibitions on fraternization and the dangers associated with developing close personal relationships with people in custody, noting that these relationships might result in manipulation to assist the incarcerated person in ways that are against policy or illegal. At least one real-life example was included in the training.

Department Search Statistics

As previously reported, the comprehensiveness of the searches varies across facilities as does the minimum requirement per week. The table below details the staff search practices at all jail facilities from January 1 to March 31, 2026. The data regarding the number of staff searches and searches with K-9 illustrated in the table was supplied by CSSB. CSSB extracted data on searches from the CWCL on April 7, 2026. K-9 data was obtained from the Custody Investigative Services (CIS) Searches of Custody Personnel Report on April 8, 2026. The Office of Inspector General was unable to verify the data provided by CSSB without additional information.

	Number of Staff Searches	Number of Staff Searches with K-9	Monthly Minimum Search Requirement ⁵⁷	Search Inside Security	Search Evasion Concerns	Where Searches Logged
Facility	Q1	Q1				
MCJ	127	29	Unable to Determine ⁵⁸	No	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
TTCF	190	10	Yes ⁵⁹	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
IRC	44	8	Unable to Determine ⁶⁰	No	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report

⁵⁷ Each jail facility's unit order regarding staff searches was used to determine whether it met its minimum search requirement by month. Where the unit order is silent regarding the minimum search requirement, the Office of Inspector General was unable to determine if the requirement was met. Also, the jail facility must meet the minimum search requirement during each of the three months in the quarter in order to be found in compliance.

⁵⁸ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Orders, [§ 3-08-021 Security of Personal Property](#) does not describe a minimum number of searches per week, which makes it difficult to determine whether they met this requirement.

⁵⁹ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 3-08-010 Security of Personal Property](#). ("Watch commander shall ensure a minimum of two random searches are conducted each week of persons entering the secured area during their assigned shift").

⁶⁰ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 5-23/006.00 Security and Searches of Person Property](#) does not describe a minimum number of searches per week, which makes it difficult to determine whether they met this requirement.

CRDF	101	6	Yes ⁶¹	No	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
NCCF	153	6	No ⁶²	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
PDC-North	63	2	Unable to Determine ⁶³	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
PDC-South	46	6	No ⁶⁴	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report

Office of Inspector General Site Visits

The Office of Inspector General regularly conducts site visits and inspections at Sheriff's Department custodial facilities. In the first quarter of 2026, Office of Inspector General personnel completed 97 site visits, totaling 240 monitoring hours, at IRC, TTCF, CRDF, MCJ, Pitchess Detention Center North, South and East, and NCCF.

As part of the Office of Inspector General's jail monitoring, Office of Inspector General staff attended 105 Custody Services Division (CSD) executive and administrative meetings and met with division executives for 130 monitoring hours related to uses of force, in-custody deaths, Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) compliance, restrictive housing, and general conditions of confinement.

⁶¹ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, § 3-01-090 Searches of Sworn Personnel, Custody Assistants, Professional Staff and their personal property-Approved by CSS 3/11/2024 ("The searches shall be conducted a minimum of once per week, per shift." [unit order obtained via email message]).

⁶² NCCF did not meet its minimum search requirement in January 2026. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 07-145/10 Personal Property Searches](#). ("A minimum of four (4) random searches per shift per week of any personnel and/or official visitors shall be conducted at the discretion of the watch sergeant.").

⁶³ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 3-06-010 Security of Personal Property](#) does not describe a minimum number of searches per week, which makes it difficult to determine whether they met this requirement.

⁶⁴ PDC-South did not meet its minimum search requirement in February 2026. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, § 3-02-080 *Searches of Sworn Personnel, Custody Assistants, Professional Staff and Their Property on the Facility*. ("The searches shall be conducted at a minimum of once per week, per shift.").

Use-of-Force Incidents in Custody

The Office of Inspector General monitors the Sheriff's Department's use-of-force incidents, institutional violence, and assaults on Sheriff's Department or CHS personnel by people in custody.⁶⁵ The Sheriff's Department most recent force report is for use-of force-incidents in custody through the third quarter of 2025. [This report](#) and reports for prior quarters may be found on the Sheriff's Department website's transparency section under the page for use of force.

Sheriff's Department's Service Comment Reports

Under its policies, the Sheriff's Department accepts and reviews comments from members of the public about departmental service or employee performance.⁶⁶ The Sheriff's Department categorizes these comments into three categories:

- External Commendation: an external communication of appreciation for and/or approval of service provided by the Sheriff's Department members;
- Service Complaint: an external communication of dissatisfaction with the Sheriff's Department service, procedure, or practice, not involving employee misconduct; and
- Personnel Complaint: an external allegation of misconduct, either a violation of law or Sheriff's Department policy, against any member of the Sheriff's Department.⁶⁷

The Sheriff's Department has a [complaints dashboard](#) that can be sorted by date range, with options to narrow the results by practice area (such as Patrol or Custody), rank, or station or unit.

Sheriff's Department's Response

The Sheriff's Department was provided with a draft of this report and sent a letter in response, which is incorporated on the following pages.

⁶⁵ Institutional violence is defined as assaultive conduct by a person in custody upon another person in custody.

⁶⁶ See [Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Manual of Policy and Procedures, § 3-04/010.00, Department Service Reviews](#).

⁶⁷ It is possible for an employee to get a Service Complaint and Personnel Complaint based on the same incident.



OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

HALL OF JUSTICE

ROBERT G. LUNA, SHERIFF



May 26, 2026

Eric D. Bates, Interim Inspector General
Office of Inspector General
County of Los Angeles
312 South Hill Street, Third Floor
Los Angeles, California 90013

Dear Mr. Bates:

**RESPONSE TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT EFFORTS:
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 2026**

On May 11, 2026, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) provided the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department with an initial validation draft of its report titled *Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, January through March 2026*, and requested a response by May 20, 2026 (Draft Report).

The Draft Report was distributed to the Department units responsible for the subject areas addressed in the report. During the review period, the Department engaged with the OIG in an effort to address areas requiring additional information, correction, or clarification, as well as those where the Department's perspective differed from the OIG's position.

On May 21, 2026, the OIG provided the Department with a revised Draft Report that reflected some, but not all, of the Department's earlier feedback. In these instances, the Department has prepared this letter to offer comment and additional context to ensure clarity in the final presentation.

The following sections address those specific areas in the Draft Report:

211 WEST TEMPLE STREET, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

A Tradition of Service
— Since 1850 —

Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Department agrees that all field personnel, including specialized units, should be equipped with body worn cameras. As previously reported by the Department, this matter remains under meet-and-confer with the respective labor unions. The Department is statutorily obligated to engage in the meet-and-confer process when proposed changes affect the working conditions of represented employees.

High-Risk Traffic Stops

The Department appreciates the OIG's continued engagement on the important issue of high-risk traffic stop policies and welcomes the opportunity to respond fully. While the Department agrees with the OIG on several points, and has already acted on two of the three recommendations, the Department has significant concerns about the analytical framework the OIG employs, particularly its use of the Koutantos case as the centerpiece of a critique that, on closer examination, does not fairly account for the legal landscape at the time or the substantial policy work the Department had already undertaken.

The Use of the Koutantos Case

The OIG's analysis focuses on the Koutantos settlement, treating it as evidence of a systemic policy failure (Report at 13-16). The Department respectfully submits that this framing is both analytically flawed and fundamentally unfair.

The traffic stop of Ms. Koutantos occurred on September 25, 2022. At that time, the Department was already engaged in a multi-year, comprehensive revision of its Use of Force Policy – a process undertaken in direct collaboration with the United States (US) Department of Justice (DOJ), federal monitors, and nationally recognized use-of-force experts. That process involved years of substantive work, extensive legal review, and a lengthy meet-and-confer process with labor. The revised policy was published in July 2024 and, following training to the policy, became effective in early 2025.

Developing a responsible, durable policy of this complexity takes time – particularly when there are federal monitors involved and particularly when a new administration came into office that made revision of the Use of Force Policy a priority. The OIG criticizes the Department for not having a more specific policy in place at the time of the Koutantos stop, while declining to acknowledge that the Department was, at that very moment, engaged in

exactly the kind of careful, expert-guided, federally-overseen policy development that responsible governance requires. That omission is significant and undermines the fairness of the critique.

More importantly, it would have been neither practical nor appropriate for the Department to pause that multi-year collaborative process, one involving the DOJ and labor negotiations, in order to insert an interim policy response to a single incident whose litigation had not yet concluded. The OIG's implicit suggestion that the Department should have done so conflates reactive policymaking with sound institutional practice. Good policy is not written case-by-case in response to pending litigation; it is developed deliberately, with broad legal and operational expertise, and with the input of all affected stakeholders. That is precisely what the Department did.

Furthermore, the Koutantos stop predates the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2024) 113 F.4th 888 by nearly two years. The OIG uses Koutantos to establish a baseline of policy failure, yet the legal standard the OIG applies in its critique is one that was not authoritatively articulated by the Ninth Circuit until August 2024. It is simply not appropriate to evaluate the Department's 2022 conduct and 2022 policies through a legal lens that did not fully crystallize until 2024. Courts themselves do not apply newly clarified legal standards retroactively to find that prior conduct was obviously unlawful; the OIG should exercise similar restraint.

The Department also notes that the Koutantos Summary Corrective Action Plan (SCAP) was not a unilateral Department document. It was prepared collaboratively, with the involvement of County Counsel, outside counsel, and the CEO's OIG. The OIG takes issue with the SCAP's assertion that the deputies had "more than reasonable suspicion" without articulating specific supporting facts. The Department notes that characterizations of the evidentiary record in a SCAP (suitable for public posting) reflect litigation counsel's assessment of the facts and applicable law in the context of ongoing legal proceedings, not a formal policy position. Reading the SCAP's litigation framing as a definitive statement of the Department's constitutional understanding elevates a litigation document beyond its proper purpose and scope.

The Law Prior to *Chinaryan*

The OIG argues that *Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996) and *Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) already established the relevant legal standards clearly enough that no additional development was needed, and that the Department's failure to specifically incorporate those standards into policy long before 2022 reflects institutional neglect (Report at 14-15). The Department respectfully but firmly disagrees.

While *Washington* and *Green* addressed excessive force in the context of traffic stops, the practical application of those holdings to the specific and varied circumstances of a high-risk stolen vehicle stop remained genuinely contested in the courts and among law enforcement agencies throughout California and the broader Ninth Circuit for years. The fact that the Ninth Circuit itself did not publish a decision squarely addressing this precise question until *Chinaryan* in 2024, nearly thirty years after *Washington*, is itself telling. If the law were as settled and clearly applicable as the OIG suggests, there would have been no need for the Ninth Circuit to take up the question again. The *Chinaryan* decision added critical precision: it held explicitly that the absence of suspect-specific, articulable safety concerns cannot justify high-risk stop tactics based solely on a stolen vehicle report, and it did so with a clarity and directness that earlier decisions did not provide in the context of vehicle theft stops specifically.

The OIG cites the Field Operations Support Services (FOSS) Newsletter's own acknowledgment that the law was established before the 2022 Koutantos stop as evidence against the Department (Report at 17). The Department notes that statements in training materials about the state of the law are designed to instill caution and compliance. They are not judicial admissions about what a reasonable law enforcement agency should have understood years earlier. Law enforcement agencies throughout California, including the Los Angeles Police Department, the San Francisco Police Department, and the Pasadena Police Department, responded to *Chinaryan* by issuing training bulletins and updated guidance and not by amending their formal policy manuals, reflecting the widespread understanding that *Chinaryan* represented a meaningful legal development, not a mere repetition of settled doctrine. The Department acted consistently with that understanding, and the OIG's criticism of that approach does not fairly account for how the law enforcement community as a whole interpreted the pre-*Chinaryan* legal landscape.

The Sufficiency of Current Policy

The OIG contends that existing Department policy does not adequately restrict firearm use during traffic stops of suspected stolen vehicles, and that Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP), Section 3-10/150.00 (Tactical Incidents) contains a gap that the Department has failed to address (Report at 18). The Department disagrees and believes the OIG significantly understates the scope and quality of the policy framework now in place.

As noted above, that framework was not developed hastily or in response to a single case. It was the product of years of collaboration with the US DOJ, federal monitors, and nationally recognized Use of Force experts who conducted a comprehensive review of applicable federal law and national best practices. The result was a policy architecture that is deliberately principles-based rather than scenario-specific, and intentionally so. Broad, principles-based policies are preferable to policies that attempt to enumerate every specific situation the deputies may encounter, because the latter approach risks creating internal inconsistencies, leaving gaps for unanticipated circumstances, and producing a policy manual that is too cumbersome to be operationally useful.

The MPP Section 3-10/045.00 (Use of Deadly Force and Firearms), published July 2024, established for the first time a Department-wide standard requiring that a deputy may only point a firearm at a person when they reasonably believe an imminent threat exists based on the totality of the circumstances. This standard applies comprehensively to all firearm pointing, including during tactical incidents and high-risk traffic stops, and is not inconsistent with the *Chinarian* framework. The OIG argues that, because this provision does not specifically reference high-risk stolen vehicle stops, it is insufficient. But by that logic, every permissible application of a Use of Force standard would need to be individually enumerated in policy, rendering comprehensive, expert-developed policy frameworks meaningless in favor of an ever-expanding list of scenario-specific rules. That is not how sound policy development works.

The Department also notes that MPP Section 3-10/100.00 (Use of Force Reporting - Department Member Responsibilities) requires deputies to verbally notify a supervisor following any incident in which a firearm is pointed at a person, and MPP 3-10/110.00 (Use of Force Review – Sergeant Responsibilities) requires supervisory review of all available video footage as

part of the review of the electronic Pointed Firearm at Person Report. These accountability and oversight mechanisms are precisely the tools that allow the Department to identify and address problematic patterns in deputy conduct, including in the context of high-risk traffic stops, before they become systemic issues.

The OIG's criticism of MPP Section 3-10/150.00 (Tactical Incidents) for focusing on officer safety coordination rather than force limitations misreads the purpose of that policy and the broader policy architecture (Report at 18). The Tactical Incidents policy works in conjunction with, not in isolation from, the Use of Force provisions throughout the manual. The MPP Section 3-10/000.00 (Preamble to the Use of Force Policy) mandates that deputies may only use force that is objectively reasonable, proportional, and necessary under the circumstances. That mandate does not disappear because a separate policy addresses tactical coordination. The OIG's assertion that the absence of duplicative force-limitation language in MPP 3-10/150.00 (Tactical Incidents) constitutes a policy gap ignores the integrated structure of the Department's policy manual.

The Recommendations

Recommendation 1 — The Department does not agree that a stand-alone policy specifically addressing firearm use during stolen vehicle traffic stops is required. The comprehensive coverage provided by MPP 3-10/045.00 (Use of Deadly Force and Firearms) and the broader Use of Force policy framework addresses the relevant constitutional standards applicable to all firearm pointing, including during high-risk traffic stops. The Department's view is that this integrated approach, developed with federal oversight and national expertise, is more durable and operationally sound than a proliferation of scenario-specific policy provisions. That said, the Department commits to continued monitoring of developments in this area of law and will reassess whether additional specificity is warranted if the legal landscape evolves further or operational experience indicates a need.

Recommendation 2 — The Department agrees and has acted. A training directive has been assigned for completion by all patrol units addressing high-risk traffic stops in light of *Chinarian*. This training is delivered through the Briefing Room platform, which is updated weekly and provides deputies with current guidance on applicable case law. The assigned training directly addresses the question of whether high-risk stop tactics may be used based

solely on a stolen vehicle report. The Department's implementation of this training is fully consistent with the OIG's recommendation.

Recommendation 3 — The Department has rescinded Newsletter 15-24. The Department acknowledges that its rescission, together with the guidance provided in FOSS Newsletter 25-07, better reflects the Department's expectations for deputies conducting high-risk stops and aligns Department training with current Ninth Circuit law.

Summary to High-Risk Traffic Stops

The Department takes seriously its obligation to ensure that deputies conduct traffic stops in full compliance with constitutional requirements and the evolving body of applicable case law. The Department's policy framework, developed through years of collaboration with the DOJ, federal monitors, labor, and national experts, provides a principled, comprehensive, and legally grounded foundation for that conduct. The Department has already acted on two of the three OIG recommendations and will continue to monitor the law in this area. The Department also reiterates its open invitation to OIG staff to attend relevant training sessions and looks forward to continued collaboration on these important issues.

Johnson v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Monitoring Report:

Shower Accessibility and Use of Non-ADA Compliant Chairs

The OIG report references shower accessibility issues (Report at 25).

The Department conducted an analysis of the Johnson class member population, which was completed on April 20, 2026, and is enabling the Department to strategically evaluate areas to improve shower accessibility with the installation of The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)-compliant grab bars and shower benches. Potential installation sites have since been identified for both row and dormitory showers at Men's Central Jail (MCJ) and Century Regional Correctional Facility (CRDF).

Furthermore, recognizing the need to improve ADA-compliant shower access, the Department procured and distributed 28 portable shower chairs during June and July 2025 among multiple class member housing areas at CRDF, MCJ, and Twin Towers Correctional Facility (TTCF). Since that time, the

Department obtained and distributed 29 additional chairs to MCJ housing areas which housed the most class members. In April 2026, the Department ordered 20 additional shower chairs, which are currently being distributed to MCJ class member housing locations.

The Custody Compliance and Sustainability Bureau's (CCSB) Johnson Team and the ADA coordinators assigned to CRDF, MCJ, and TTCF continue to brief line personnel regarding the availability of portable shower chairs and the requirement that such chairs be provided to all Johnson class members. Personnel are also being reminded to discontinue the use of standard plastic chairs that are not designed or approved for shower use and remove them from shower areas.

Monitoring and Accountability for Mobility Assistive Devices

The OIG report references issues with mobility assistive devices being given to individuals without need, possibly making it more challenging for those needing the devices to have access to them (Report at 25-26).

Correctional Health Services (CHS) is responsible for the prescription and issuance of mobility assistive devices and for monitoring their continued medical necessity upon expiration of the prescription orders. A class member list, containing information about prescribed devices, including their expiration dates, is made available to custody personnel daily. To streamline efforts and improve efficiency, the Department provided CHS personnel with a culled list of class members with expired prescription orders to allow CHS to identify any potential informational discrepancies and initiate the secondary review process required by the Johnson Settlement Agreement.

The MCJ ADA coordinator submitted eight secondary review requests on behalf of class members. To date, one has been completed, resulting in the discontinuation and removal of the mobility assistive device. The Department is currently evaluating new operational protocol by which ADA coordinators will be required to review expired orders on a periodic basis and assist class members with requesting secondary reviews of expired device orders via the health service request system.

With respect to unassigned wheelchairs being observed at CRDF, MCJ, and TTCF, the ADA Compliance Team assigned to Access to Care Bureau conducts alternating weekly collection efforts at each facility. As a result of these

efforts, nine unassigned wheelchairs were removed from housing areas in January 2026, 23 in February 2026, and 16 in March 2026. Because the wheelchairs cannot be safely reconditioned, they are discarded. Consequently, wheelchairs are not reassigned to other class members and unassigned wheelchairs do not potentially delay the issuance of a new wheelchair for another class member.

Currently, the facilities have a limited supply of transport chairs, which are used for class members upon request for intra-facility transport. To address this issue, the Access to Care Bureau ordered ten additional transport chairs on April 29, 2026. Upon receipt, the chairs will be strategically distributed among CRDF, MCJ, and TTCF.

In certain housing areas with a high number of class members, Custody personnel reported using wheelchairs, as an interim measure and in lieu of transport chairs, to ensure intra-facility transportation to court and medical appointments within the facility.

Standardized Documentation for Town Hall Meetings and Program Information

The OIG report references a lack of standardized documentation practices for townhall meetings (Report at 26).

The CCSB Johnson Team conducts weekly monitoring of Town Hall Meeting (THM) submissions from CRDF, MCJ, and TTCF to assess compliance with the Settlement Agreement. Since implementation of this oversight process, measurable improvements have been observed in both the accuracy and timeliness of submissions. Additionally, a revised THM form was distributed in February 2026, to improve standardization and full documentation.

As a result, there have been noted improvements in documentation and reporting consistency at TTCF and significant improvements in both areas at MCJ. To remedy identified deficiencies, the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) process has been implemented for impacted facilities.

To standardize practices, improve documentation quality, and increase compliance, the CCSB Johnson Team distributes a daily email, Monday through Friday, to personnel responsible for conducting THMs. The communication includes an updated "Custody Programs" half-sheet flyer

(updated August 2024), and the revised THM form. The daily email also provides instructions for conducting and documenting THMs in accordance with the Johnson Settlement Agreement.

Standardized Documentation for Mobility Assistive Device Classifications

The OIG references a lack of standardized documentation for those designated as requiring mobility assisted devices (Report at 26).

To ensure class members are properly designated with the proper classification code on their wristbands, the ADA coordinators at CRDF, MCJ, and TTCF are required to conduct wristband verification checks for all class members during quarterly egg-crate mattress audits. The most recent audit was completed on March 23, 2026.

At the conclusion of the audit, and when necessary, class members were issued wristbands which accurately reflected their current classification. The next quarterly audit is scheduled for the last week of June 2026.

Standardized Documentation Demonstrating Proper Handling of Class Member Grievances

The OIG references a lack of standardized documentation practices indicating whether Class Member grievances are addressed by the proper entities (Report at 26).

Grievance investigations are evaluated using objective criteria and are subject to supervisory review. Additionally, the use of the Custody Inmate Grievance Application system has improved both ADA designation accuracy and timeliness tracking.

During the first quarter of 2026, the Department implemented a structured monitoring and quality control process to achieve compliance with the grievance provisions of the Johnson Settlement Agreement. Assessments are conducted on a systematic and frequent basis to ensure timeliness and the quality of the response, with an associated increase in communication between the ADA Compliance Team and certain facilities to relay concerns and provide recommendations to ensure provision alignment.

Conclusion

The Department values the opportunity to engage with the OIG on matters that are critically important to our mission. We take these reports seriously, as they serve as a public representation of the Department's ongoing efforts across several key areas. For that reason, we welcome the chance to provide the Department's comments, with the aim of offering additional clarity and ensuring full transparency for your office and the public.

Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact Commander Ernest Bille, Office of Constitutional Policing, at (323) 307-8358.

Sincerely,

ROBERT G. LUNA, SHERIFF


APRIL L. TARDY
UNDERSHERIFF